Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Date: 24/07/2017
Before :
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2. Mr Ravenscroft contends that CRT had no power to remove The Three Wise
Monkeys from the River Trent because it was moored in a part of the river
which did not constitute the main navigable channel. He says therefore, that
the powers in section 8 British Waterways Act 1983 (the 1983 Act) did not
apply. Mr Ravenscroft seeks various declarations in that regard to the effect
that the seizure of the vessel was unlawful, the term main navigable channel
having the same meaning as it does in the British Waterways Act 1971 (the
1971 Act) and the Transport Act 1968 (the 1968 Act). He also seeks a
refund of the sum of 8,176 and compensation.
4. Further, and in any event, Mr Ravenscroft contends that the CRT took the
Three Wise Monkeys and used it unlawfully to distrain for licence fees. He
seeks a declaration to that effect, a refund of the removal and storage charges
of 6,490.80 and subsequent costs together with such compensation as the
Court considers just and appropriate
paintwork and forcing of studs on the canopy which was easily remedied.
There is no evidence before the Court as to any loss in that regard.
Background
7. CRT is the statutory successor to the British Waterways Board (the BWB)
and pursuant to the British Waterways Board (Transfer of Functions) Order
2012 (SI 2012/1659) all references to the BWB in the legislation with which
this matter is concerned are to be construed as references to the CRT. The
CRT is a charitable body and the navigation authority for certain inland
waterways in England and Wales. It is not in dispute that that stretch of the
River Trent upon which the Three Wise Monkeys was moored is such an
inland waterway by virtue of section 4 and Schedule 1 to the 1971 Act as
amended. The reference in the schedule to the 1971 Act is to The Trent
Navigation from the tail of Meadow Lane Lock, Nottingham to Gainsborough
Bridge. The extent of the River Trent to which section 4 of the 1971 Act
applies was extended by virtue of section 36(2) British Waterways Act 1974 to
include:
8. When known as the Grandma Molly, the Three Wise Monkeys had a
pleasure boat certificate issued by the BWB. That certificate expired on 30 th
June 2011. It is not in dispute that the vessel has not had a pleasure boat
certificate or other form of relevant consent since. CRTs evidence (which is
disputed) is that prior to its removal from the River Trent, various notices were
served both on the vessel itself and on Mr Ravenscroft at his last known
address but that no response was received.
Representation
The Evidence
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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11. The evidence was contained in witness statements of: Mr Ravenscroft dated 12
January 2017; Mr Stuart Garner, an enforcement officer on behalf of the CRT,
dated 10 January 2017; Mr Michael Grimes, Head of Boating at the CRT but
who has since left that employment and whose evidence was adopted by Mr
Thomas Deards, the CRT Head of Legal in his first witness statement of 22
March 2017 and Mr Deards second witness statement of 8 May 2017.
13. Mr Moore also provided me with a number of Google Earth images. They
were: an aerial view of the Trent Navigation at Farndon Ferry and its environs;
a close up aerial view of the Farndon Ferry area itself; a stretch of the River
Trent showing a pontoon stretching out some distance almost to a dotted line
imposed down the centre of the river; an aerial view showing boats moored in
a river close to the bank; and an aerial view of a stretch of the River Thames
showing boats moored in the centre of the river in the lee of an island, also in
the centre of the river.
14. Mr Garners evidence relates for the most part to the notices served in relation
to the Three Wise Monkeys and the events at the Marina on 27 January
2015. Mr Grimes evidence which was adopted by Mr Deards, contains
general information about the management of waterways by the CRT.
15. Mr Garner says that on 1 June 2012, the BWB sent a letter to the owner of the
land at Farndon Ferry, requesting details of the owner of the vessel. No
response was received. He goes on to say that on 17 July 2012, a patrol notice
was served on the boat stating the owner should apply within 14 days for a
licence and requested that the owner contact the relevant Enforcement Officer.
Further, on 9 August 2012 notice was served pursuant to section 8(2) British
Waterways Act 1983 requiring the boat to be removed. Mr Garner states that
the notice was served both on the boat itself and at Mr Ravenscrofts last
known address. Thereafter, a further patrol notice was served on the boat and
by post at Mr Ravenscrofts address on 17 October 2012.
The notice itself is headed Notice Pursuant to section 8(2) British Waterways
Act 1983 Sunk, Stranded, Abandoned or Unauthorised Craft. It makes no
mention of arrears of licence fees.
17. Thereafter, on 1 July 2014, Mr Garner says that he served a further patrol
notice on the boat in which it was stated that the boat was on a waterway
without permission and was not displaying a licence. It also stated that a
licence should be applied for within 14 days. On 15 July 2014, a further
section 8 notice was served on the boat and by recorded delivery at Mr
Ravenscrofts last known address. The notice included the reference to the
boats new name, the Three Wise Monkeys. The notice served by post was
returned marked not called for. A final patrol notice in the same form as
before, was served on the boat on 3 September 2014.
18. Copies of all the relevant notices and correspondence are exhibited to Mr
Garners evidence together with photographs of the vessel with notices
attached to it dated 9 August 2012, 14 February 2014 and 15 July 2014 and a
photograph of the interior of the vessel dated 27 January 2015 which shows a
bundle of unidentified papers on a surface in the cabin.
. . .
In early March 2015 and at your request, CRT provided
you with details of the removal and storage charges
incurred by them, which are payable by Mr Ravenscroft
under section 8(3) of the Act. We again attach details of
the same for your records. Removal and storage charges
total 6,630.00 as of Todays [sic] date. Storage charges
will continue to accrue at a rate of 45 + VAT per week
until such a date that said expenses have been paid in
full, upon which CRT will release to Boat [sic] to Mr
Ravenscroft in accordance with section 8(4) of the Act.
In addition, Mr Ravenscroft owes CRT 1,685.20 in
respect of Licence Fees payable from 1 July 2011 to 30
June 2015, as outlined previously to you and in the
attached. Therefore, the total amount outstanding is
8,315.20. . .
23. In the circumstances of this case, and the nature of the relevant issues to which
I refer below, to further the overriding objective, only limited cross
examination took place. Nevertheless, I asked for a list of matters contained in
evidence which are challenged albeit not addressed in cross examination.
Those lists are appended to this judgment.
25. Mr Ravenscroft also accepted that he was on the vessel most days in 2014
whilst he was painting and refurbishing it. He stated that he saw patrol boats
but that they never pulled over to the Three Wise Monkeys. He was shown
the photograph of the notice attached to the window of the vessel which is
dated 14 February 2014 but denied receiving it. He did, however, admit that he
had received one of the patrol notices when other people also involved in the
refurbishment of the vessel had given it to him and explained that he did not
have to do anything until the refurbishment was complete and the vessel was
ready for sale. He asserted that he did not need a licence because he was not
using the vessel to go up and down the river at that stage. He described it as
being a like a car in the garage rather than on the road. In this regard, in my
judgment on the balance of probabilities, given that Mr Ravenscroft accepted
that he had been on the boat most days in 2014, he must have seen and
received the patrol notices served during that year, which were affixed to the
boat, a number of which appear in the relevant photographs. I am unable to
accept his evidence, therefore, that he only received one such notice and that
despite the content of those notices he considered that he did not need to
contact CRT to obtain a licence.
26. In relation to the purported sale of the vessel in 2011, Mr Ravenscroft said that
he had an invoice and an email about it but accepted that they were not before
the court. He also accepted that he had not informed CRT of a change of
ownership in 2011 or in relation to his alleged re-purchase of the vessel in or
around 2014. He later suggested that he had sold the vessel very quickly in
December 2014 on Ebay. Once again there was no documentary evidence of
this before the court. In the absence of such evidence and in the light of Mr
Ravenscrofts shifting oral evidence on the subject, the fact that he did not
inform CRT of a change of ownership in 2011 and his re-purchase thereafter
and the fact that he did not mention the transfer of ownership when four years
arrears of licence fees were demanded, I am unable to accept his evidence in
that regard. In the absence of any documentary evidence, I am also unable to
accept his evidence in relation to the alleged contract for sale of the vessel in
December 2014. In any event, no particulars of loss have been provided, nor
were submissions made in relation to any loss.
28. Mr Garner was cross examined by Mr Moore. Mr Garner maintained that there
was no intention on the part of the CRT to hold the vessel as a lien for arrears
of licence fees and that his reference to them in the Marina on 27 January
2015 when confronted by Mr Ravenscroft, his father and associates had been
in response to a specific enquiry as to arrears. He accepted the total figure that
he had quoted orally on that occasion to enable Mr Ravenscroft to recover his
vessel had included such arrears.
aware of the CRT having sought to have any prosecutions brought under the
1971 and/or 1983 Acts and that it is correct that licences can be withheld under
section 17 of the British Waterways Act 1995 (the 1995 Act) unless the
criteria set out at sub-sub-sections (a) (c) of that section are met. In his
second witness statement he also clarified that CRT does not contend that the
public right of navigation in relation to the River Trent was repealed by the
Transport Act 1968.
The Issues
30. The main issue which is at the heart of this matter is the true construction of
the phrase main navigable channel in section 4 of the 1971 Act as amended.
If, as Mr Ravenscroft contends it does not extend from bank to bank but is
equivalent to the fairway or thoroughfare of the River Trent, the Three
Wise Monkeys was not moored within it and there was no power to remove
his boat in the first place, to levy either the removal and storage charges or the
sum in respect of arrears of licence fee. If the main navigable channel
extends to the full width of the main river and only excludes tributaries,
streams and backwaters, as CRT contends, although Mr Ravenscroft accepts
that the Three Wise Monkeys should have had a pleasure boat certificate, he
says that the steps which were taken were disproportionate, unnecessary and
contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of Human Rights Act 1998. Further, and in
any event, Mr Ravenscroft contends that the CRT took the Three Wise
Monkeys and used it unlawfully to distrain for licence fees.
31. The first issue is the proper construction of the phrase main navigable
channel in section 4 of the 1971 Act. Neither Mr Moore nor Mr Stoner took
me to the principles of statutory construction in their oral submissions,
although Mr Stoner did refer to the principle in Pepper v Hart. Since the
hearing, they have both indicated that they have no objection to me adopting
the approach outlined by Arden LJ in 9 Cornwall Crescent London Ltd v
Mayor & Burgesses of the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea [2006] 1
WLR 1186 at [50] and [52], where she stated:
32. The principle in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 is well known. It is that
reference to Parliamentary materials as an aid to construction is permissible
only where three conditions are met, as set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson at
p.640B-C:
33. By way of background, I was taken to Transport Act 1962 which created four
public authorities including CRTs predecessor, the BWB. Section 10 provides
that it is the duty of the BWB in the exercise of its powers under the Act, to
provide to such extent as they may think expedient (a) services and facilities
on the inland waterways owned or managed by them . . . and to have due
regard to efficiency, economy and safety of operation as respects the services
and facilities provided by them. Further, by section 43(3), the CRT and the
BWB before it, was empowered to demand, take and recover . . . such
charges for their services and facilities, and to make the use of those services
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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and facilities subject to such terms and conditions, as they think fit. Section
43(8) provides that:
and section 105(2) prescribed the dimensions and kind of vessel to which the
duty to in section 105(1) (a) and (b) related. Furthermore, the obligations in
section 10 of the 1962 Act were restricted to commercial waterways and
cruising waterways by section 107 of the 1968 Act. There was no longer an
obligation to maintain the remainder. It is also important to note that section
115 provides that for the purposes of section 105, references to any right of
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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36. The preamble to the 1971 Act itself, describes it as An Act to make provision
for regulating the use of pleasure boats and houseboats on certain of the inland
waterways of the British Waterways Board and for making charges therefor; to
confer further powers on the Board and for other purposes. Section 3 contains
definitions for the purposes of the Act including:
...
37. Part II of the 1971 Act is headed Pleasure Boats and contains the following
relevant provisions:
That section is subject to section 4 of the British Waterways Act 1983 (the
1983 Act). There is no dispute that the Three Wise Monkeys is a pleasure
boat for the purposes of Part II of the 1971 Act which includes sections 4 -7.
38. In fact, conditions as to certificates and licences are contained in the 1995 Act
at section 17. It is relevant for these purposes to note that by section 17 a
relevant consent which is defined to include a pleasure boat licence may be
refused in respect of vessels unless three conditions are met. They are: (a) that
the vessel complies with the applicable standards; (b) the vessel is insured and
evidence of the policy is produced; and (c) that there is a mooring where the
vessel can be lawfully kept or the vessel will be used bona fide for navigation
and will not remain continuously in one place for more than 14 days or such
longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances.
39. The power to remove a boat from an inland waterway is contained in section 8
of the 1983 Act which is as follows:
40. Mr Moore also took me to the Trent Navigation Act 1906 and to section 46(5)
which contained an obligation on the Company to dredge the River Trent
between specific points so as to provide and maintain a channel of a
minimum depth of five feet and of a minimum width of sixty feet at the
bottom and to keep such channel clear and free from obstruction . . . which
might interfere with or obstruct the navigation. In fact, by section 34 of the
Trent Navigation Act 1858, the Company defined as the Company of
Proprietors of the River Trent Navigation, the Navigation being defined as
the River Trent from Wilden Ferry in the Counties of Derby and
Leicester, . . . to Gainsborough and includes the Canal and Side Cuts
constructed , was required to:
41. In his skeleton argument, Mr Moore also referred to extracts from a debate in
relation to the Bill which became the 1971 Act, recorded in Hansard and to
extracts from Select Committee Minutes. He did not take me to them during
his oral submissions. He stated that it was clear that the intent of the 1971 Act
was to impose the requirement of registration only on boats utilising the main
navigable channel which as a result, benefited from the work done to maintain
navigability. In his skeleton, he set out a passage in which a Mr Jupp QC for
British Waterways explained to the Chairman of the Select Committee:
The licence which a boat owner takes out and pays for
makes him free of the artificial canal system, including
the locks, and gives him the free use of the locks on the
river navigations of the Board. On the rivers the situation
is different. The Board are able to, and do, charge for the
use of locks and people who have not got a canal licence
because they do not keep their boats on the canals pay
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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42. He also set out an extract from Hansard in which Mr John Wells MP in
presenting the Bill to Parliament stated:
Until tonight the rivers the Bill will create charges upon
have, in the jargon of the Inland Waterways community,
been called free rivers ...
Submissions
45. Mr Moore also says that it is important to look to the use of the term main
navigable channel before the enactment of the 1971 Act and, in particular, in
the 1968 Act and the 1965 Byelaws, as a guide to its meaning. He relies upon
the use of the term in Byelaw 19 of the 1965 Byelaws which is accepted by
CRT to mean the thoroughfare in the context in which it appears. He also
says that it is obvious that the term refers to the same channel which the CRT
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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and the BWB before it, had an obligation to maintain under section 105 of the
1968 Act to enable navigation. He notes that the vocabulary used in relation
to the maintenance obligation is the same as that in relation to the registration
obligations in sections 6 and 7 of the 1971 Act.
46. Further, he points out that it is not suggested that the maintenance obligation
extended from bank to bank of either a river or a canal. In this regard, he
referred me to extracts from the Fraenkel Report entitled A Study of
Operation and Maintenance Cost which was commissioned by the
Department of the Environment and was produced in 1973. At paragraph
10.5.4, the Report contained an expression of opinion in relation to the
meaning of main navigable channel. It stated:
The Report also contained numerous tables of dimensions both of locks and
other facilities and of the vessels using the waterways. As I understand it, it
also set out alternatives in relation to the extent of the maintenance obligation
under the legislation at the time. Mr Moore also took me to a table of depths
and widths which is published. On the relevant stretch of the River Trent the
published dimensions are 11.44 metres in width and 2.38 metres in depth, the
entire width of the River at that point being approximately 54 metres.
47. In this regard, Mr Moore also drew attention to an observation made by the
Waterways Ombudsman and reported in her Annual Report for 2010-11. She
noted at paragraph 12 of her Report, that the CRT can sometimes interpret
legislation in different ways depending on what suits them in particular cases
and pointed to her summary of case 516. In that summary, it was noted that the
CRT interpret the phrase main navigable channel as referring to the whole
width of the waterway. She went on:
48. Mr Moore also referred to the ability to further describe the main navigable
channel by reference to a map, set out in section 4(2) of the 1971 Act. It is
not in dispute that there are no such maps in relation to the River Trent.
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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50. Lastly, Mr Moore says that main must be given a proper meaning. He also
says that it can be equated with or is closely aligned with what has become
known as the Minimum Operational Channel. He highlighted a passage in a
paper by Graham Holland, Head of Asset Management to a WUSIG Meeting
on 13 April 2011. It had a schedule of dimensions attached. It was stated that:
The suggested MOC dimensions is often but not always based on the
minimum width that would allow 2 standard beam boats for that navigation to
just pass .... The MOC dimensions for each canal, river and navigation appear
in a schedule. This includes dimensions for the River Trent. Mr Moore says
that the MOC is the absolute minimum for a main navigable channel.
51. Mr Stoner QC submits first that neither the 1965 Byelaws nor the earlier
statutes are of assistance in construing the 1971 Act because they precede it.
He submits that they would only be of relevance if what is referred to as the
Barass principle applied. That is referred to in Bennion on Statutory
Interpretation - A Code 6th edition at section 210(3). The sub-section is as
follows:
The comment on that sub-section states that under the Barras Principle where
an enactment uses a processed term, that is one upon whose meaning the
courts have previously pronounced, it may be presumed that it was intended to
have that meaning in the enactment. It is accepted that the principle also
applies if there is an event which bears on the meaning of a term used in
subsequent legislation. Mr Stoner says neither is the case here.
52. Concentrating on the 1971 Act itself, he says that the preamble makes its aim
and purpose clear: it was to regulate the proper use of the relevant waterways,
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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to provide services and to create a registration regime for which charges were
to be imposed. He submits that the provisions make no sense if main
navigable channel is to be construed narrowly to mean the deepest part of the
waterway which is used as a thoroughfare or fairway and that such a
construction is contrary to the aim and purpose of the Act itself. He asks
rhetorically, if that were the case, how would the strict liability offences
contained, for example, in sections 5(2) and 9(4) have any certainty about
them and how would the CRT and the BWB before it have proper control over
the waterway and be able to raise revenue in order to fulfil their maintenance
obligations and the provision of services?
53. In this regard, Mr Moore says that offences should be construed strictly and
narrowly in favour of the public and that the uncertainty in relation to
boundaries would arise in any event. He says that it can be resolved by
applying for a map under section 4(2) or one could mark the main navigable
channel with buoys to which Mr Stoner responds that marking with buoys
would be wholly impractical and that as the deepest part of a river changes
from time to time, if Mr Moore is right, one would have to apply for a map
and carry out surveys of all inland waterways at regular intervals and re-
position buoys with regularity.
54. Mr Stoner submits that it is of particular note that the definition of pleasure
boats for the purposes of the 1971 Act is so wide and includes even punts
which one would associate with shallow water. He says that the definition
itself is consistent with the main navigable channel encompassing the river
or navigation, bank to bank but for its unnavigable parts. In addition, he draws
attention to section 5(1) of the 1971 Act which amongst other things provides
that it is not lawful to keep . . . a pleasure boat on a river waterway unless a
certificate . . . is then in force. He submits that the inclusion of keep along
with let for hire and use in that sub-section is not consistent with a
definition of main navigable channel which is restricted to the thoroughfare
or fairway. He says that one does not naturally keep a pleasure boat in the
thoroughfare. He also points out that if Mr Moore were correct, it would be
possible to let a pleasure boat for hire without a pleasure boat certificate, as
long as it did not use the thoroughfare. He says that that would be inconsistent
with the aim of the 1971 Act expressed in the Preamble and cannot be the
ordinary and proper meaning of the words particularly, in the light of the strict
liability offence of contravening section 5(1) contained in sub-section (2).
55. He also points out that in the absence of any marking for the main navigable
channel, which Mr Moore accepts to be the case, it would be necessary to
argue the point on each occasion in relation to a prosecution under section 5(2)
and that this cannot have been the intention of Parliament. He makes the same
point in relation to sub-sections 9(1) and (4) which respectively contain the
requirement for registered boats to have their name and number conspicuously
displayed and create an offence of using such a pleasure boat on river
waterway without such registration marks. Mr Stoner says that in the light of
such matters, the phrase must have been intended to cover bank to bank and to
exclude tributaries, streams, cuts and unnavigable stretches and would be a
nonsense if it were restricted to the thoroughfare.
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56. He submits that this is reinforced by the fact that the Schedule 1 of the 1971
Act contains reference to both tidal and non-tidal waters. He took me to
paragraphs 6.04 6.06 of Wisdoms Law of Watercourses 6th Edition, at
which it is explained that the public have a right to use a tidal watercourse for
navigation in its entirety but that whether particular water is navigable is a
question of fact and depends on the character and nature of the channel. It is
also explained that there is no right at common law to navigate non-tidal
inland waters although a right may be acquired by immemorial usage and
other means. Mr Stoner submits therefore, that in such circumstances, his
construction of main navigable channel is consistent with both tidal and
non-tidal waters and avoids confusion. It includes the main waterway and
excludes tributaries, streams, cuts and creaks. I should add that in this regard,
Mr Moore says that Mr Stoners construction does not work because the
waterways listed in the schedule are not just river systems. They include
navigations.
57. If he is wrong and the provisions of the 1968 Act are relevant as an aid to
construction of the 1971 Act, Mr Stoner points out that the statutory obligation
to maintain contained in section 105 is not limited to dredging and applies to
commercial and cruising waterways which pursuant to section 104 and
Schedule 12 are the main navigable channels of the listed waterways. Mr
Stoner submits that the natural meaning of the phrase in the context of the
maintenance obligation applies bank to bank and not solely to a narrow
channel which might be created after the event and also had the capacity to
move. He points out that the maintenance obligation includes for example, the
maintenance of water levels on artificial watercourses, maintenance of
infrastructure and the control of vegetation.
58. He submits that a real window on the meaning of main navigable channel
can be found when one views sections 104 and 105 in the light of section
107(1) 1968 Act. It restricts the duty of the BWB under section 10 of the 1962
Act to provide services and facilities on the inland waterways owned and
managed by them to the commercial waterways and cruising waterways only.
The duty as redefined is applicable to the main navigable channel because of
the definition of commercial waterways and cruising waterways in
Schedule 12 of the 1968 Act. Mr Stoner says that it is plainly appropriate if
those waterways are the whole of the main channel from bank to bank and
wholly inappropriate if the main navigable channel is in fact limited, as Mr
Ravenscroft contends, simply to the main navigation fairway or thoroughfare.
He also submits that although section 105, which imposes the maintenance
obligation, does not use the term navigation it does refer to the obligation of
securing the waterways for public use for suitable craft, which implicitly is a
reference to navigation.
59. Mr Stoner also points out that the Fraenkel Report post dated the 1971 Act and
therefore, can be of no assistance in construing it. He says that the Minutes of
the Select Committee to which Mr Moore referred in his written submissions
and to the extracts from Hansard are both inadmissible and of no assistance.
He says that the criteria in Pepper v Hart are not met and that in any event the
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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Conclusion:
60. I approach the task of construction of main navigable channel with Arden
LJs approach in 9 Cornwall Crescent London Ltd v Mayor & Burgesses of the
Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (supra) firmly in mind. I must
construe the phrase in its legislative context and policy context, as shown by
any admissible material, such as Law Commission reports, explanatory notes
accompanying legislation, travaux prparatoires and (in certain cases)
Hansard.
61. Before going any further, I should state that I do not consider that the extracts
from Select Committee Minutes or from Hansard to be admissible. In my
judgment, the criteria in Pepper v Hart are not met. It does not seem to me that
the relevant provisions of the 1971 Act are ambiguous, obscure or lead to
absurdity. Even if they did, I do not consider that the extracts from Hansard
and Select Committee Minutes contained in Mr Moores skeleton argument
contain clear statements by the Minister or promoter of the Bill which are
relevant to the task of construction in hand.
62. What then is the proper construction of the phrase main navigable channel in
Part II of the 1971 Act? It seems to me that taking into account both the
legislative and the policy context and the purpose of the 1971 Act itself, it
cannot be correct that the phrase main navigable channel is confined to the
deepest part of any river, canal or navigation which is used from time to time
as a thoroughfare or fairway. It seems clear from the Preamble to the 1971 Act
that its purpose or aim was the imposition of a licensing system in order
properly to regulate the use of waterways and to raise revenue for the
provision of related services. With that context in mind, Mr Moores
construction would make a nonsense of the control and registration provisions
contained in the 1971 Act and would render their operation all but impossible.
It would be surprising if main navigable channel were construed in a way
which only required licences to be obtained in respect of a narrow band of
unmarked and undefined water in the centre, or perhaps not in the centre of the
river or canal. It would render the entire regime of the 1971 Act unworkable.
On that basis, it seems to me that the statutory context is such that Mr
Ravenscrofts interpretation cannot be correct.
63. This is all the more so in the light of the fact that it is accepted that the
thoroughfare or fairway on the River Trent is not delineated and may change
from time to time. No doubt the position is the same on most of the inland
waterways for which the CRT is responsible. I do not consider that the
difficulty is resolved by the ability to apply for a map. It seems to me that the
power in section 4(2) of the 1971 Act is not apt to enable the production of a
map by order of the Secretary of State each time the route of the thoroughfare
of a waterway changes. If Mr Moore were right, it would be necessary to
conduct frequent surveys of all inland waterways for which CRT is responsible
in order to obtain up to date details of the position of the deepest channel and
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to record the same on a map made by order of the Secretary of State. It seems
to me that the map produced to Mr Moore as a result of his Freedom of
Information request in 2011 takes the matter no further forward. It is not
suggested that the map was produced pursuant to section 4(2) of the 1971 Act
or that anything can be gleaned from the comments made by the Customer
Service Co-Ordinator.
64. I also agree with Mr Stoner that his wider construction is consistent with the
existence of the strict liability offences in sections 5(2) and 9(4) of the 1971
Act. If main navigable channel were construed in the way which Mr Moore
suggests there would be no certainty as to whether those offences had been
committed. In my judgment, it cannot have been Parliaments intention to
create strict liability offences the parameters of which are uncertain. Further,
although I place much less weight upon it, I also agree with Mr Stoner that his
wider construction is also consistent with the very wide definition of pleasure
boat in the 1971 Act.
65. The wider construction is also consistent with section 5(1) of the 1971 Act
which includes the term keep and let for hire. If Mr Moores construction
were correct, a pleasure boat certificate would only be required if a vessel
were kept or let for hire in the thoroughfare of the river in question. It
seems to me that it is not consistent with the purpose of the 1971 Act set out in
the Preamble. Furthermore, it seems to me that it is not normal to assume that
a pleasure boat will be kept in such a thoroughfare at all.
66. In fact, although it post-dates the 1971 Act and therefore, is not relevant as an
aid to construction (and I do not take it into consideration in that regard) I
consider that the natural and ordinary meaning of main navigable channel
was described in general terms in the Fraenkel Committee Report. The term is
used to distinguish between the entirety, bank to bank of the main through
routes of the respective Commercial and Cruising Waterways from un-
navigable river loops, canal branches, unused sections, cuts and creeks not
essential to through navigation. If such a construction is adopted all the
remainder of the legislative provisions are workable and make sense. In my
judgment, therefore, it is the correct construction and equates with that put
forward by Mr Stoner on behalf of the CRT.
67. I come to that conclusion despite the use of the phrase main navigable
channel in Byelaw 19 of the 1965 Byelaws. It seems to me that the use is
context specific. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that Parliament
intended the phrase to bear the same meaning in the 1971 Act as it did in the
1965 Byelaws. On the contrary, as I have already decided, it seems to me that
such an intention would be contrary to the scheme of the 1971 Act. In any
event, I was not referred to an authority on the meaning of the phrase which
pre-dated the 1971 Act or to an event prior to 1971 which would bear on the
meaning of the phrase in the 1971 Act. For completeness, I should also add
that I did not find reference to the 1975 and 1976 Byelaws to be of any direct
assistance.
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
68. I also agree with Mr Stoner that the provisions of the 1968 Act are of no
assistance in construing the provisions of the 1971 Act for the same reasons
which apply to the 1965 Byelaws. In any event, in my judgment, they do not
assist Mr Moore in the way in which he suggests. The obligation in section
105(1)(a) is to maintain the commercial waterways in a suitable condition for
use by commercial freight-carrying vessels. By virtue of Part I of Schedule
12, commercial waterways are defined as the main navigable channels of
the rivers, navigations and canals which are listed. Suitable condition is
expanded upon in sub-section 105(2) by reference to the dimensions (length,
width, height of superstructure and draught) of the vessels customarily using
the waterway in the nine months preceding 8 December 1967. As Mr Stoner
pointed out, there is nothing to suggest that the maintenance obligations in
section 105 are confined to dredging a central channel or thoroughfare. They
are general, albeit limited by reference to the dimensions of the vessels
described in sub-section 105(2), including notably, the height of the
superstructure of such vessels. Accordingly, it seems to me that the obligation
might well include necessary steps to be taken on or near the banks of a
waterway and may include for example, maintenance of locks, bridges and/or
tow paths and the removal of overhanging vegetation. Although I am not
required to determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase main
navigable channel in Schedule 12 of the 1968 Act, given the breadth of
section 105, it seems to me that it is not naturally confined to a deep channel
or thoroughfare as Mr Moore would have it.
69. Further, I do not consider the fact that CRT may have sought to argue that its
maintenance obligation is limited to the thoroughfare, when before the
Waterways Ombudsman takes the matter any further forward.
70. For the sake of completeness, I should add that I did not find the references to
the Minimum Operational Channel of assistance. I was not informed as to
whether the term has any statutory basis and the information to which I was
referred did not itself refer to the main navigable channel. In the
circumstances, I derive nothing from the use of the term or the existence of
dimensions for specific waterways. Although I do not take it into account, it
seems to me that the existence of such dimensions referable to a term other
than main navigable channel in fact, militates against main navigable
channel being confined to the thoroughfare on a waterway.
72. Mr Ravenscroft also contends that the removal of the Three Wise Monkeys
from the River Trent was a breach of his rights under the Human Rights Act
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
73. In this regard, Mr Moore says on behalf of Mr Ravenscroft that even if the
Three Wise Monkeys required a licence in the position in which it was
moored and therefore was unlicensed and even if it was unlawfully on the
river despite a common law right of navigation, CRT was wrong to use its
section 8 powers to remove the vessel from the water. He says it ought to have
used the more proportionate means at its disposal. He points out that CRT
could have: recovered the arrears by prosecuting Mr Ravenscroft under section
5(3) of the 1983 Act; it could have recovered the arrears of licence fees as a
debt under section 7(2) of the 1971 Act and section 5(2) of the 1983 Act; or it
could have marked and buoyed the vessel under section 8(3)(c) of the 1983
Act. He says it should only have used section 8 after all else had failed. He
says that that is the approach adopted by the Environment Agency on the
waters for which it is responsible.
74. In this regard, Mr Stoner took me to The Human Rights Act 1998, Wadham
7th ed at paragraph 8.07 which appears under the heading: Protocol 1, Article
1, Protection of Property. It is stated that three distinct rules arise from the
case of Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35. They are that to
establish that there has been prima facie interference with the right to property
it must be shown that: the peaceful enjoyment of the applicants possessions
has been interfered with by the state; the applicant has been deprived of his
possessions by the state; and the applicants possessions have been subjected
to control by the state. It makes clear that interference, deprivation or control
will not violate Protocol 1 Article 1 if done in the public interest or to
enforce such laws [as the state] deems necessary to control the use of property
in the public interest.
75. It also states at paragraph 8.30 that ECtHR has held that the second paragraph
of Article 1 should be construed in the light of the general principal enunciated
in the opening sentence of Article 1. It goes on to state: Controls on use of
property are therefore subject to the fair balance test in the same way as
deprivations of possessions. This principle was set out in R (Countryside
Alliance and Ors) v Attorney General and Anr [2007] UKHL 52, [2008] 1 AC
719. That was a case which was concerned with the validity of the provisions
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
of the Hunting Act 2004. Mr Stoner referred me to [155] of the speech of Lord
Brown in which he addressed Article 1 rights in the following way:
76. Mr Stoner also referred me to R (Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd) v The
Housing Corporation [2005] 1 WLR 2229. In that case, the claimant sought
judicial review of the decision by the Housing Corporation to direct the
claimant to transfer its land, against its will, to another registered social
landlord instead of permitting the voluntary transfer to another housing co-
operative. The appeal was concerned solely with whether it was
disproportionate for the Housing Corporation to adopt a course which was not
the least intrusive of the claimants rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol.
Maurice Kay LJ stated:
...
77. Mr Stoner also took me to a passage from the first edition of Judicial Review
Principles and Procedure by Auburn, Moffett and Sharland concerned with
proportionality under the Human Rights Act 1998. At paragraph 18.19 it is
stated that a proportionality test is applied when assessing whether an
interference with a qualified right can be justified as necessary in a democratic
society. In a footnote it is stated that the proportionality review for the
purposes of Article 1 of the First Protocol is less intensive than in relation to
other articles. It is also noted at paragraph 18.30 that the minimum
impairment requirement must be deployed with caution: . . what is
important is whether the objective can be achieved by a less intrusive measure
without significantly compromising that objective.
78. Lastly, in this regard, I was referred to Bank Mellat v Her Majestys Treasury
(No 2) [2014] AC 700, a case concerning financial restrictions imposed under
section 62 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Lord Sumption considered the test to
be applied at [19] and [20] in the following way:
79. Mr Stoner submits therefore, that the question is not merely whether there was
an alternative to the measure adopted. He says that neither a prosecution nor a
claim for a debt are necessarily less intrusive measures and that marking and
attaching buoys under section 8(3)(c) of the 1983 Act is only relevant if the
vessel were sunk or stranded. In any event, he points out that section 8 is not
about the recovery of money. He says that its purpose is to facilitate the proper
management of the waterway in order to ensure safety and that vessels on the
river are insured. He submits therefore, that the legitimate aim of section 8 is
to remove vessels which are not lawfully on the waterway from the point of
view of good management and safety. In this regard, he relies on the evidence
of Mr Grimes which was adopted by Mr Deards, as to the substantial increase
in the boats on CRTs managed waterways and the pressure caused in a finite
space, the need to control that use and to raise revenue. Mr Stoner points out
that it is necessary to maintain a fair balance between those objectives and the
interests of the public in using the river for navigation. He adds that it is
important to view this case in context and on its own facts and points out that
there were seven notices served either on the Three Wise Monkeys itself or
at Mr Ravenscroft last known address without any response.
80. He also says that although the approach of the Environment Agency may be
different, there having been 324 prosecutions and only 17 removals during a
period the length of which is unclear, its powers are also different. Under
paragraph 16 of the Environment Agency (Inland Waterways) Order 2010 the
Agency has power to remove or relocate a vessel which is not registered but
also has power under paragraph 17 to require the owner or master of a vessel
to give information including the name, address and identity of the owner and
under paragraph 18, it is an offence not to do so. He says that CRT do not have
those powers and in this case, could not be certain of the identity of the current
owner of the Three Wise Monkeys and accordingly, would not have been in
a position to prosecute.
81. In response, Mr Moore referred to sections 5(2) and 7(2) of the 1971 Act and
pointed out that the former refers to any person contravening section 5(1)
being liable to a fine and that the latter refers to a liability in respect of the
master of the vessel which is defined to include, any person whether the
owner, the master or other person lawfully or wrongfully having taken control
of the vessel. He says therefore, that the comparative legislation is not
different.
82. Mr Stoner also points out that the vessel was returned to Mr Ravenscroft
before these proceedings were commenced, that there is no evidence of any
loss caused and accordingly, there can be no question of damages being
awarded under section 8 Human Rights Act 1998.
Conclusion:
84. First, in my judgment, it is quite clear that the power contained in section 8 is
not one which can only be exercised once other powers have been exercised as
Mr Moore suggests. On its express wording, it is free standing. In any event,
as the cases make clear, the relevant question is: (i) whether the objective of
section 8 is sufficiently important to justify the limitation upon Mr
Ravenscrofts property rights; (ii) whether section 8 is rationally connected to
the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used
without unacceptably compromising the objective of section 8; and (iv)
whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the
consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the
individual and the interests of the community.
85. In my judgment, the purpose and objective of section 8 relates to the proper
and safe management of the waterways and is not directly connected to licence
fees. Its objective is to keep the waterways safe and accessible for all craft
which use it and properly to regulate that use for all. Section 8 relates to
circumstances in which boats are abandoned and stranded as well as when
they are unlawfully on the waterway. It seems to me that the objective I have
described is sufficiently important in the circumstances to justify the inroad
into the right to property which it entails. If the CRT were not able to exercise
such a power in appropriate circumstances, the waterways which they manage
would be less safe and accessible to all.
86. I also consider that there is no question that given its wording, section 8 is
directly connected to its objective. It is concerned with the removal from the
inland waterway of vessels or parts of vessels which are sunk, stranded,
abandoned or left or moored without lawful authority. In my judgment
removal in such circumstances is directly connected with the safe and proper
management of the waterways for all users.
87. It also seems to me that although there are other measures which can be
adopted to recover arrears of licence fees, the power in section 8 is not
directed to that end and therefore, those powers, being the power to prosecute
and to recover arrears as a debt are not directly comparable or relevant. As I
have already stated, I consider the objective of section 8 to be the safe and
proper management of the waterway rather than the recovery of arrears.
Therefore, the question of whether there is a less intrusive measure which
could have been used without unacceptably compromising the objective does
not arise.
88. However, if the ability to recover arrears of licence fees by way of a debt or
prosecution were directly comparable with section 8, I would have decided
that whilst prosecution was not less intrusive, recovery of a debt would have
been.
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
89. In any event, has a fair balance been maintained between the rights of the
individual and the interest of the community? I am satisfied that it has. It
seems to me that it is necessary to keep the waterways properly regulated for
the benefit of the whole community and that accordingly, it is appropriate to
take such steps as are necessary to remove boats in the circumstances set out
in section 8. In this regard, it should also be borne in mind that as long as the
owner is known, the vessel is not confiscated and can be recovered on
payment of the storage and removal charges. This it seems to me, is a proper
and fair balance between the competing interests of the community and rights
of the individual.
91. Mr Moore on Mr Ravenscrofts behalf says that it was quite clear that a
condition for return of the Three Wise Monkeys was the payment of arrears
of licence fees: it was demanded orally by Mr Garner at the Marina and was
set out as a condition in some of the correspondence from Shoosmiths on
behalf of CRT.
92. He submits that although the letter from Shoosmiths on behalf of CRT to Mr
Ravenscrofts previous assistant, Ms Tracey Thomas of 10 March 2015
separated out storage charges from arrears of licence fee and stated that the
Three Wise Monkeys would be returned if the former were paid although a
total made up of storage charges and licence fees was due, in the emails of 19
March and 2 April 2015, from Lucy Gray on behalf of CRT to Ms Thomas and
to Mr Ravenscroft respectively it was stated that the vessel would be released
upon payment of a total sum of 12,676 which included licence fee arrears. In
a previous email sent by Helen Underhill on behalf of CRT to Ms Thomas
dated 16 February 2015, a breakdown of seizure and storage charges was
provided together with a breakdown of arrears of licence fees and a total
amount owing was shown.
93. Furthermore, Mr Moore says that there was no mistake about it. It was clearly
CRTs policy to recover arrears of licence fees in this way and it was set out
on their website until recently.
94. He submits that this is a breach of the Statute of Marlborough 1267. Sections 1
and 4 of that Act are as follows:
...
95. Mr Moore says that CRT should be punished for having levied unlawful
distress because it took possession of the Three Wise Monkeys and then
demanded arrears of licence fees as part of the condition for return of the
vessel despite the fact that section 8(4) of the 1983 Act makes clear that on
payment of storage and removal charges amongst other things, it shall return
the vessel. He says that even if the possession was lawful, it was being used
for unlawful means.
96. CRT accepts and admits that it was not entitled to seek payment for the licence
arrears as a pre-condition for the return of the Three Wise Monkeys.
However, it contends that it did not levy distress which is described in the 4 th
Edition of Words and Phrases Legally Defined as:
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
97. It is submitted that CRT was in lawful possession of the Three Wise
Monkeys pursuant to section 8, the vessel having been removed from the
River Trent because it was on the water without a pleasure boat certificate
which was unlawful under section 5 of the 1971 Act. Mr Stoner says that:
there is no evidence that it was removed from the River in order to recover the
licence fees; and it was not seized because of licence arrears or for the purpose
of obtaining payment of those arrears. Mr Stoner points out that none of the
notices served on the vessel made mention of fees at all.
98. However, it is admitted that after the vessel was removed from the water,
whilst still in the Marina, Mr Garner referred to the payment of 8,000 or
9,000 in order to have the vessel put back in the water, and that that figure
must have included an element of arrears of licence fees. In this regard, Mr
Stoner pointed out that Mr Garners reference to licence fees should be
understood in the context that he was expressly asked about them. It is also
accepted that in subsequent correspondence the sum demanded as a condition
for return of the vessel included arrears of licence fees. However, it is
submitted that the vessel was not detained longer as a result and that there was
no offer purely to pay the storage and removal charges despite the fact that the
correspondence reveals that Mr Ravenscroft was aware of the distinction.
99. Mr Stoner submits that if he is wrong and distress was levied, the Statute of
Marlborough does not apply in any event. He says that section 1 is concerned
with illegal distress and section 4 with excessive measures in relation to what
would otherwise be legal distress. He submits that the taking of the vessel was
not illegal and there is no evidence that there were cheaper means which
should have been deployed.
100. As the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (the 2007 Act) and the
Tort (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) were also
mentioned in Mr Moores skeleton although not pursued before the court, Mr
Stoner also addressed those statutes. In short, he submits that the 2007 Act and
sections 62 65 which are concerned with enforcement by taking control of
goods is of no relevance because none of the relevant Waterways legislation is
referred to in Schedule 13. In relation to the 1977 Act, he submits that the
vessel was returned before the proceedings were commenced and therefore the
provisions of the Act have no application.
Conclusion:
101. As I have already made clear, I do not consider that the exercise of section 8
powers is inherently concerned with the recovery of arrears of licence fees. It
is concerned with the proper and orderly management of the waterways and
the maintenance of safety, including the provision of insurance for vessels
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
upon those waterways. Having said that, it is clear that the figure quoted when
the vessel was lifted from the water on 27 January 2015, included arrears of
fees and that it was not until 10 March 2015 that the matter was presented in
an appropriate matter, excluding those arrears from the figure required to
recover the vessel. Thereafter, a composite figure was quoted in
correspondence once again.
102. However, it seems to me that distress was not levied and therefore, neither
section 1 nor section 4 of the Statute of Marlborough is relevant. The vessel
was removed from the water pursuant to and for the purposes of section 8 of
the 1983 Act. It was not taken into the possession of CRT in satisfaction of the
arrears of licence fees. As Mr Stoner points out, none of the notices whether
served on the vessel or at Mr Ravenscrofts postal address made any reference
to arrears of fees.
103. It was extremely unfortunate that arrears of fees were rolled up in the figure
quoted at the Marina, that it took so long to present the matter properly and
that mistakes were made in correspondence subsequently. I also note the
policy which appeared on the CRT website until recently. However, in my
judgment, the removal of the vessel from the waterway was pursuant to
section 8 and did not relate to the arrears. Accordingly, it seems to me that it
was not removed from the water as a remedy without legal process for the
recovery of a debt.
104. Even if I am wrong about that and distress was levied when the Three Wise
Monkeys was removed from the River Trent, in addition to the exercise of the
section 8 powers, in my judgment, no loss was suffered whether for the
purposes of an action on the case under section 1 or section 4 of the Statute of
Marlborough. CRT was entitled to incur and to recover the storage and
removal charges incurred in the exercise of its powers under section 8 of the
1983 Act: section 8(3). Further, CRT was entitled to recover arrears of licence
fees under section 5 of that Act. There is no evidence of any further loss. At
the very best, if distraint were levied whether unlawfully or by excessive
means, Mr Ravenscroft might have been entitled to nominal damages.
105. Were it in issue, I would also agree with Mr Stoner that the 2007 Act is not
relevant. The relevant waterways legislation is not included in Schedule 13 of
the 2007 Act and therefore, its terms do not apply. Further, the vessel was
returned before the proceedings were commenced and therefore the only
possible claim which might have been advanced under the 1977 Act would
have related to trespass to goods. This has not been articulated in any way and
in any event, there is no evidence of any loss in relation to the removal of the
Three Wise Monkeys from the River Trent on 27 January 2015 and its return
to Mr Ravenscroft on 6 May that year.
106. For the reasons set out above, Mr Ravenscrofts claims are dismissed.
- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
APPENDIX
3. Not accepted (as with all such references) that the Trust were stealing the boat.
7. Not accepted that Stuart Garner lashed out, pushing a phone into face.
11. Not accepted (if it is intended to suggest as much) that the police officer was saying
that payment of licence arrears would sort out the situation.
12. Not accepted the Trust employees simply refused to answer other than saying will
speak to you later.
16. Not accepted the letter showed previous address: it showed the same address as given
to the Court.
26. Not accepted the Trust said they did not want the owner.
27. Not accepted the Trust employees found the situation funny.
40. Not accepted any criminal damage was done to the canopies (or at all).
45. Not accepted that the Trust said if the matter was not sorted within 6 weeks the Trust
would claim ownership and sell or dispose of the vessel.
47. Not accepted there was essential paperwork on the vessel (unless reference is to the
notices posted on the vessel)
51. Not accepted that Mr Garner said the vessel would be held for 6 weeks whether sums
paid or not.
62. The way this is put is not accepted: it is accepted the Trust agreed not to include the
costs in the sums that had been sought. Did not distinctly insist that licence fees must
be paid (as distinct from it being part of the overall sum sought).
71. Not accepted that the Judge on appeal in the County Court suggested the appeal on
costs could be joined with High Court proceedings.
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
MR GARNER
Para. 4 Not accepted that there are any canal beds, channels etc at the Farndon
Ferry site with any implied CaRT ownership, if so intended; the
riparian owner is alongside natural river, owning the bed to the centre.
Para. 20 Not accepted that Claimant was physically aggressive in the manner
described; he was retreating as Mr Garner walked towards him, not the
other way around.
Para. 21 Not accepted that good warning given to cameraman before lashing out
at the camera.
Para. 24 Not accepted that anyone was aggressive in any way towards the CBS
personnel, though accepted that there was verbal aggression towards
police and Mr Garner.
Para. 34 Is simply outdated. The application for permission to appeal has been
adjourned to a full Appeal Court hearing in December this year.
Para. 43 the implication that any supporters of the Claimant loosened the wheel-
nuts is denied.
Para. 46 Not accepted that response to the exhibited letter was simply a refusal;
a 2 page email was sent with a counter proposal that seemed to the
Claimant to be an even better saving of court and litigant time and
expense.
MR GRIMES/DEARDS
Para. 13 Not accepted that the river Trent was created if that is intended to
imply a legal position equal to the canals vis--vis the public right of
navigation as later claimed [but correctly disavowed by Mr Deards].
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
Approved Judgment
Page l of 2
Para. 14&15 It is not accepted that finite space available has much relevance to
the area concerned in this claim; it is certainly true of localised areas
such as London.
Para. 17 & 18 Denied just for the record Mr Deards having correctly acknowledged
Para. 20 It is denied that the Transport Act 1962 forms the basis for mandatory
boat licences, which requirement was only imposed in 1976 following
relevant empowerment to do so under the British Waterways Act 1975.
Imposition of further conditions MAY be imposed by byelaw under
that Act, but the primary legislation of 1995 was chosen as the
preferred avenue instead.