Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The Facts:
FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for
naturalization with the RTC where he alleged the following:
His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a
certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has
resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years
immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11
July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other
places of residence, prior to his present residence, were as follows
(i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii)
Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga
del Norte;
ISSUE:
WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees?
HELD: NO
Although it is True that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens
or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of
Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his
supplemental pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals
that he has successfully established his refugee status upon
arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under
its various international commitments come into operation.
Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be
considered in this case, to wit:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same
circumstances" implies that any requirements (including
requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence)
which the particular individual would have to fulfill for the
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must
be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by
their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an
alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La
Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the
Philippines
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath
taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a
reasonable time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect
Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable
time means that the election should be made within 3 years from
upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead,
he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age
of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable
time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file
the same with the nearest civil registry.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held.
Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident
of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence
from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community
of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He
was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is
the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never
emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime,
Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization
on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First
Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April
28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was
issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was
9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957.
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of
Congress. **
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces
of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political
economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where
he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it
appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The
Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor
of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.
RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of
the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. When a person
applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation
and application. The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other
hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will
be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country
of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The petition
for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
176 SCRA 1 _Law on Public Officers _Election Laws
_Citizenship of a Public Officer _Dual Citizenship _Labo
Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His
rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo
as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence
disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed
became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such
citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was
later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that
even if h_e_s_ _c_o_n_s_i_d_e_r_e_d_ _a_s_ _a_n_
_A_u_s_t_r_a_l_i_a_n_,_ _h_i_s_ _l_a_c_k_ _o_f_
_c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _i_s_ _j_u_s_t_ _a_ _m_e_r_e_
_t_e_c_h_n_i_c_a_l_i_t_y_ _w_h_i_c_h_ _s_h_o_u_l_d_ _not frustrate
the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast
majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest
vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is
disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in
1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an
oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not
dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here.
It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared
as a Filipino through an act of Congress _none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that
his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the
electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a
foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they
known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or
at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city.
Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo
warranto proceeding, that he s_h_o_u_l_d_ _b_e_
_d_e_c_l_a_r_e_d_ _t_h_e_ _m_a_y_o_r_ _b_y_ _r_e_a_s_o_n_ _o_f_
_L_a_b_o_s_ _d_i_s_q_u_a_l_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_ _b_e_c_a_u_s_e_
_L_a_r_d_i_z_a_b_a_l_ _o_b_t_a_i_n_e_d_ _the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed
as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971.
On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate
Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn,
filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7
November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court
en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization
as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial
court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether
or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul
R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to
take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had
already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor
and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the
second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of
Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _F_r_i_v_a_l_d_o_s_
_r_e_p_a_t_r_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _w_a_s_ _v_a_l_i_d_._ _
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because
of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his
repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application
to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship
by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing
the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the
oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon
taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso
jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May
2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied
by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly
provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all
pre-election activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to
conduct a special registration of new v_o_t_e_r_s_ _d_u_r_i_n_g_
_t_h_e_ _p_e_r_i_o_d_ _b_e_t_w_e_e_n_ _t_h_e_
_C_O_M_E_L_E_C_s_ _i_m_p_o_s_e_d_ _D_e_c_e_m_b_e_r_ _2_7_,_
_2_0_0_0_ _deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a
special registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not
absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus
missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the
fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a
Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for
new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend
Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text
MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in
the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates
the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on
Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are
disqualified voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from
approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement
in Section 1 Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a
resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at
present, and that the Court may have to discard that particular
ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to
have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to
have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country.
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires
the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary
visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must
return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met
according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after
he has exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to
rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law
is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the
Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for
deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast
shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the
date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly
its whole meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean
what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent
of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and
intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise
the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in
the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to
proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list
Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA
No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court
is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Read full text
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples
economic life.
_a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade
_aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954
are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action
to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of
the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not
deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real
and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted.
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign
rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a
petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542
which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is
to be authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on
behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after
enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other
government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA
3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its
provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma,
that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter
should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established.
Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and
void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88
SCRA 195
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than
15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on
any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with
regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police
power to such acts.
On Police Power
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this
case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither
does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the
task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of
the Constitution.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22:
Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify
allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello
Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief
of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen.
Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two
appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has
been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their
assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the
time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga
ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior
officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order
to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before
a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress
which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against
the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a
blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.
In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on
executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions
and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily
armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the
premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala
Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and
planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared
their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and
demanded that she resign as President of the Republic.
After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms.
Subsequently, an Information for coup detat was filed against
them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court
martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the
jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered
that their act was not service-connected and that their violation of
Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the
crime of coup detat.
ISSUE:
RULING:
RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the
societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a "national cultural community" and not as a
religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that
OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate
the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers
of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government
fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a
democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its
interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them
to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right
to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health
of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to
OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health
are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products
released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given
detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and
safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health
of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The
halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations
come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit
for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive
Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
TABASA VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines
and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the
agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the
BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for
several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only
person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her
Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his
minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at
the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.
ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 9:25 PM
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is
not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was
not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's
running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was
already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry
and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners
repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore,
qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections.
AAJS, CALILUNG VS. DATUMANONG
Posted by kaye lee on 1:32 PM
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 -
Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth
Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual
allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-
executing provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.