Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails and seeks to
nullify the Decision[1] dated October 17, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64246 and its Resolution[2] of June 20, 2002 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. The assailed CA decision annulled and set aside the
Orders dated October 9, 2000, December 18, 2000, and March 15, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17 in Batac, Ilocos Norte which admitted
petitioners amended complaint in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17.
The Facts
Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene presented her PhP
5 community tax certificate[6] (CTC) issued on 11/07/99 in Curimao, Ilocos
Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and was substituted
by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca.
On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these
partly constituted real action, and that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos
Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid. In its dismissal order,[7] the
court also declared all the other issues raised in the different Motions to
Dismiss x x x moot and academic.
From the above order, Irene interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration[8] which Julita and Francisca duly opposed.
Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene filed on July
17, 2000 a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint),[9] attaching therewith a
copy of the Amended Complaint[10] dated July 14, 2000 in which the names of
Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin appeared as additional
plaintiffs. As stated in the amended complaint, the added plaintiffs, all from
Ilocos Norte, were Irenes new trustees. Parenthetically, the amended complaint
stated practically the same cause of action but, as couched, sought the
reconveyance of the FEMII shares only.
During the August 25, 2000 hearing, the RTC dictated in open court an
order denying Irenes motion for reconsideration aforementioned, but deferred
action on her motion to admit amended complaint and the opposition
thereto.[11]
(1) Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,[13] Irene may opt
to file, as a matter of right, an amended complaint.
(2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was a Batac, an
Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended complaint setting out the same cause of
action cured the defect of improper venue.
(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the filing of
the amended complaint in question in the place of residence of any of Irenes co-
plaintiffs.
In time, Julita and Francisca moved to dismiss the amended complaint, but the
RTC, by Order[14] dated December 18, 2000, denied the motion and reiterated
its directive for the two to answer the amended complaint.
In said order, the RTC stood pat on its holding on the rule on amendments of
pleadings. And scoffing at the argument about there being no complaint to
amend in the first place as of October 9, 2000 (when the RTC granted the
motion to amend) as the original complaints were dismissed with finality
earlier, i.e., on August 25, 2000 when the court denied Irenes motion for
reconsideration of the June 29, 2000 order dismissing the original complaints,
the court stated thusly: there was actually no need to act on Irenes motion to
admit, it being her right as plaintiff to amend her complaints absent any
responsive pleading thereto. Pushing its point, the RTC added the observation
that the filing of the amended complaint on July 17, 2000 ipso facto superseded
the original complaints, the dismissal of which, per the June 29, 2000 Order,
had not yet become final at the time of the filing of the amended complaint.
Following the denial on March 15, 2001 of their motion for the RTC to
reconsider its December 18, 2000 order aforestated, Julita and Francisca, in a
bid to evade being declared in default, filed on April 10, 2001 their Answer to
the amended complaint.[15] But on the same day, they went to the CA via a
petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64246, seeking to nullify the
following RTC orders: the first, admitting the amended complaint; the second,
denying their motion to dismiss the amended complaint; and the third, denying
their motion for reconsideration of the second issuance.
Irene and her new trustees motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision was denied through the equally assailed June 20, 2002 CA
Resolution. Hence, this petition for review is before us.
The Issues
We affirm, but not for all the reasons set out in, the CAs decision.
Verification is, under the Rules, not a jurisdictional but merely a formal
requirement which the court may motu proprio direct a party to comply with
or correct, as the case may be. As the Court articulated in Kimberly Independent
Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism (KILUSAN)-Organized
Labor Associations in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) v. Court
of Appeals:
[W]hat petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion
to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule
that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Section
2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend
her complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this
Courts ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co. considering that respondent
has the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court
to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against
it. In other words, the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was
purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to admit
her amended complaint.[34]
It may be argued that the original complaints had been dismissed through
the June 29, 2000 RTC order. It should be pointed out, however, that the finality
of such dismissal order had not set in when Irene filed the amended complaint
on July 17, 2000, she having meanwhile seasonably sought reconsideration
thereof. Irenes motion for reconsideration was only resolved on August 25,
2000. Thus, when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, the order
of dismissal was not yet final, implying that there was strictly no legal
impediment to her amending her original complaints.[35]
It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that the venue was in this case
improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a real action involving real
properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac.
In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and his
Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust Irenes purported
65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive of the fruits of the trust, and
to execute in Irenes favor the necessary conveying deed over the said 65%
shareholdings. In other words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust
arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The fact that FEMIIs assets
include real properties does not materially change the nature of the action, for
the ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only inchoate
as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon
the liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders, depending on the type
and nature of their stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the
corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their stockownership.
Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one
plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties
should be the basis for determining proper venue. According to the late Justice
Jose Y. Feria, the word principal has been added [in the uniform procedure rule]
in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff
or defendant as the venue.[42] Eliminate the qualifying term principal and the
purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice Regalado, be defeated where
a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the latter would not
have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and
entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case.[43]
Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, Irene
stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-
interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be
commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.
As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene as not a
resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Withal, that court was an improper venue for
her conveyance action.
The Court can concede that Irenes three co-plaintiffs are all residents of
Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of the
three can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17
and 3342-17, included as they were in the amended complaint as trustees of
the principal plaintiff. As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of
Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the beneficiary who
must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-
in-interest. In the final analysis, the residences of Irenes co-plaintiffs cannot be
made the basis in determining the venue of the subject suit. This conclusion
becomes all the more forceful considering that Irene herself initiated and was
actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, assigns, or
associates, virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees unnecessary.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene was a resident during the
period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy.
Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence[44] has it that one can have
several residences, if such were the established fact. The Court will not
speculate on the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and
expenses she and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial,
preferred that her case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the heels
of the dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue,
three new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but
in vain as it turned out, that the case stays with the RTC in Batac.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 306-317. Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by Associate
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
xxx
[23] SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, [or] tribunal x x x and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact x x x to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
[24] G.R. Nos. 149158-59, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 45, 60.
[25] Enopia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147396, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 211, 219.
[26] Heirs of Venancio Bajenting v. Ibanez, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 531, 547-548;
citing Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, G.R. No. 148635, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 255.
[27] Calo v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 153756, January 30, 2006, 480 SCRA 561, 567.
[28] Condo Suite Travel, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125671, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 679, 687.
[29] Supra note 26, at 262.
[30] Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon, G.R. No. 148777, October 18, 2007, 536 SCRA
565, 587; citing Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 56, 70.
[31] Art. 1443 of the Civil Code provides that no express trust concerning an immovable property may be proved
by parol evidence, while Art. 1446 of the Code requires that the beneficiary of an express trust must accept the
trust if it imposes onerous conditions.
[32] Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999, 316 SCRA 326, 335;
citing Diaz v. Adiong, G.R. No. 106847, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 631, 637.
[33] Alpine Lending Investors v. Corpuz, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 45, 48; citations omitted.
[34] Id. at 48-49.
[35] See Bautista v. Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc., G.R. No. 148361, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 416, 419;
citing Salazar v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 43364, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 247, 250.
[36] Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 396, 400.
[37] RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 1.
[38] Regner v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 277, 293; citing Hernandez v. Rural
Bank of Lucena, Inc., No. L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75, 84.
[39] RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 2.
[40] Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 539, 552.
[41] Rollo, p. 157.
[42] 1 CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 261 (2001).
[43] 1 REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 108 (8th ed., 2002).
[44] Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 324.