PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
G.R. No. 148748 January 14, 2015
IMELDA, LEONARDO, FIDELINO, AZUCENA, JOSEFINA,
ANITA and SISA, all surnamed SYJUCO, Petitioners,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
FELISA D. BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY & (Consta la descripcion decinica en el Certificado de
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 dated February 23, 2001 and Resolution2 dated
June 26, 2001 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
57777, which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated January 9,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126 of
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-366.
The present controversy involves a parcel of land, measuring
around 2,835 square meters, which originally formed part of a
wider tract of land, dubbed as the Maysilo Estate (subject
land). The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, are
as follows:
Petitioners Imelda, Leonardo, Fidelino, Azucena, Anita, and
Sisa, all surnamed Syjuco (collectively referred to as
petitioners) are the registered co-owners of the subject land,
located in the then Barrio of Balintawak, Municipality of
Caloocan, Province of Rizal, under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-1085304 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City on March 26, 1984. The subject land is
particularly described under petitioners certificate of title as
follows:
It is hereby certified that certain land situated in the Caloocan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, bound and described as follows:
Un terreno (Lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision Psd-706,
parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano original Psu-2345 de la
Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak,
Municipio de Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal. Linda por el NE.
con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por el SE., con el
Lote No. 3-C del plano de subdivision; por el SO. con el Lote
No. 7; y por el No. con el Lote No. 3-A del plano de
subdivision. x x x midiendo una extension superficial de DOS
MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CINCO METROS
CUADRADOS CON TREINTA DECIMETROS CUADRADOS
(2, 835), mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original 8
al 27 de Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre
de 1911 y la de la subdivision, 29 de Diciembre de 1924.
Transferencia de Titulo No. 10301)
xxxx
is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act in the name of IMELDA G. SYJUCO;
LEONARDO G. SYJUCO; FIDELINO G. SYJUCO; AZUCENA
G. SYJUCO; JOSEFINA G. SYJUCO; ANITA G. SYJUCO;
SISA G. SYJUCO, all of legal age, single, Filipinos, - -
as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the
encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as may be
subsisting, and to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance left by the
deceased Monica Galauran and Mariano Mesina. (From T.C.T.
No. 12370)
Petitioners have been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject land, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 1926. Petitioners traced back
their title over the subject land to TCT No. 10301 issued on
February 26, 1926 to Monica Jacinto Galauran. Thereafter,
TCT No. 10301 was replaced by TCT No. 8685 under the
names of Avelina Baello, Felisa Baello, Dolores Baello,
Eduardo Mesina, and Fausto Galauran (Avelina Baello, et al.).
TCT No. 8685 was then replaced by TCT No. 12370 under the
names of the brothers Martin V. Syjuco (Martin) and Manuel V.
Syjuco (Manuel) pursuant to a Deed of Sale of Real
Estate5dated February 7, 1949 executed by Avelina Baello, et
al. in favor of the siblings Martin and Manuel. TCT No. 12370
was, in turn, replaced by TCT No. 48566 issued on July 1,
1964 in Martins name alone in accordance with a Partition
Agreement7 executed by the brothers on June 16, 1964. Upon
Martins death, petitioners inherited the subject land, and
following the extrajudicial partition they executed on June 27,
1976, they registered said land in their names, as co-owners,
under TCT No. T-108530 issued on March 26, 1984.
Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been
1
paying the real property taxes over the subject land since
1949.8
Among the annotations on TCT No. T-108530 are two
encumbrances constituted by petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest on the subject land, particularly: (1) a
lease agreement dated September 24, 1963, in favor of
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company (Manufacturers
Bank), over a portion of the subject land, with the condition
that the buildings which the lessee had constructed thereon
shall become the property of the lessor/s after the expiration of
the lease agreement; and (2) another lease agreement dated
December 20, 1971, in favor of a certain Chan Heng, over the
remaining portion of the subject land.9
Sometime in 1994, however, petitioners learned that a broker
named Exequiel Fajardo, through a Letter10 dated March 9,
1994,offered for sale the subject land along with the
improvements thereon to a certain Luis Ong, giving the
following description of the property and terms of the offer:
AREA: 2,835.30 square meters
Lot No. 23-A-4-B-2A-3B, PSD 706, TCT
265778,
Register of Deeds, Kalookan City
Location: Kalookan City (beside LRT Station)
Owner: Felisa D. Bonifacio
The terms of this offer are as follows:
Price: P35,000.00 per square meter
Payment 50% downpayment;
Terms: Balance subject to negotiation
Petitioners found out that the purported owner of the subject
land, respondent Felisa D. Bonifacio (Bonifacio), was the sub-
lessee of Kalayaan Development Corporation, which, in turn,
was the sub-lessee of Manufacturers Bank, which was the
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
direct lessee of petitioners. Petitioners also learned that
respondent Bonifacio was able to register the subject land in
her name under TCT No. 265778, which was issued on March
29, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Respondent Bonifacios certificate of title described the subject
land as follows:
It is hereby certified that certain land situated in the Caloocan
City, Philippines, bounded and described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of the subd. plan, Psd-
706, L.R.C. Rec.No. ), situated in Balintawak, Caloocan Rizal,
Bounded of the E., along line 1-2 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D,on
the SE., along line 2-3 by lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-C; both of the
subd. plan on the SW., along line 3-4 by lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6;
and on the NW., along line 4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the
subd. plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N.
71 deg. 17E., 1,285.85 m. from BLLN No. 1, Caloocan thence;
S. 01 deg. 46W., 27.70 m. to point 2; S 64 deg. 30W., 105.15
m. to point 3; N 23 deg. 12 W., 26.39 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg.
22E., 116.78 m. to pt. of beginning, containing an area of
TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE SQ.
METERS AND THIRTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,835.30). All pts.
referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by old pts. Bearings true; date of original survey, Date
of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922, is registered in accordance
with the provisions of the Property Registration Decree in the
name of FELISA D. BONIFACIO, of legal age, Filipino, widow,
- prepare a sketch plan of the two lots subject of this petition. As
as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the
encumbrances mentioned in Section 44 of said Decree as may
be subsisting[.] x x x.11
Respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued pursuant
to an Order12 dated October 8, 1992 of the RTC of Caloocan
City, Branch 125, in L.R.C. Case No. C-3288, entitled In the
Matter of Petition for Authority to Segregate an Area of 5,680.1
Square Meters from Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD-706 (PSU-
2345) of Maysilo Estate and Issuance of Separate Certificate
of Title in the Name of Felisa D. Bonifacio. RTC-Branch 125
granted respondent Bonifacios petition for segregation
because:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that in Case
No. 4557 for Petition for Substitution of Names, in the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1, the then
Presiding Judge Cecilia Muoz Palma, issued an Order
dated May 25, 1962 (EXHIBIT "N") substituting Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal as one of the registered owners of
several parcels of landforming the Maysilo Estate and
covered by, among others, Original Certificate of Title No.
994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal with among others
Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio to the extent of 1/6 of 1-
189/1000 per cent of the entire Maysilo Estate. On January
29, 1991, Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio executed in favor of
Felisa D. Bonifacio, herein petitioner, a Deed of
Assignment (EXHIBIT "M") assigning all her rights and
interests over Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A, Psd-706 and Lot 23-A-
4-B-2-A-3-B, Psd-706, both lots being covered by O.C.T.
994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. That even prior to the
execution of the Deed of Assignment but while negotiations
with Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio were going on, petitioner
already requestedthe Lands Management Sector, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital
Region, to prepare and issue the Technical Descriptions of the
two lots subject of this petition. As requested by petitioner,
Elpidio T. de Lara, Chief, Technical Services Section, Lands
Management Sector, DENR-NCR, issued on June 20, 1990,
two technical descriptions (EXHIBITS "J" and "K") covering the
two lots. After the issuance of the technical descriptions, the
petitioner requested Geodetic Engineer Jose R. Rodriguez to
requested, Engr. Rodriguez prepared a sketch plan (EXHIBIT
"L") based from Exhibits "J" and "K" which was submitted to
the Lands Management Services, formerly Bureau of Lands,
for verification and checking. That Mr. Benjamin V. Roque,
Chief, Topographic and Special Map Section, Land
Management Services, formerly Bureau of Lands, certified on
July 31, 1992 that the sketch plan (EXHIBIT "L") is a true and
correct plan of Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B,
both on Psd-[706]. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, RTC-Branch 125 decreed in the same Order:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
GRANTS the petition and orders the segregation of Lots 23-A-
4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B both on Psd-[706] from
Original Certificate of Title No. 994 of the Register of Deeds of
2
Rizal in favor of the herein petitioner. Upon the finality of this
order and the payment of the prescribed fees if any and
presentation of the clearances of said lots, the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City is ordered to issue a new transfer
certificate of title in the name of herein petitioner Felisa D.
Bonifacio over Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-
Bboth on Psd-[706] of O.C.T. 994 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal.13
For unexplained reasons, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City issued TCT No. 265778 to respondent Bonifacio on March
29, 1993 even before RTC-Branch 125 declared its Order
dated October 8, 1992, granting respondent Bonifacios
petition for segregation, final and executory on April 6, 1993.14
Civil Case No. C-366 before
RTC-Branch 126
To protect their rights and interest over the subject land,
petitioners lodged a Petition15 on July 28, 1994, docketed as
Civil Case No. C-366 before RTC-Branch 126, Kalookan City,
praying for the declaration of nullity and cancellation of
respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 over the subject land
in view of petitioners subsisting TCT No. T-108530 over the
very same property. In an Order16 dated July 28, 1994, RTC-
Branch 126 deemed Civil Case No. C-366 as a special civil
action for quieting of title and not an ordinary civil action for
recovery of ownership of land.
Subsequently, petitioners discovered that respondent
Bonifacio sold the subject land in favor of respondent VSD
Realty & Development Corporation (VSD Realty), and that
TCT No. 265778 in the name of respondent Bonifacio had
already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 28531317 in
the name of respondent VSD Realty on September 12, 1994.
As a result, petitioners filed on April 25, 1995 an Amended
Petition,18 impleading respondent VSD Realty in Civil Case No.
C-366.
Petitioners contended before RTC-Branch 126 that although
TCT No. T-108530 of petitioners, on one hand, and TCT No.
265778 of respondent Bonifacio and TCT No. 285313 of
respondent VSD Realty, on the other hand, contained different
technical descriptions, said certificates of title actually
pertained to one and the same property. According to
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
petitioners, respondents certificates of title over the subject
land could have only been obtained fraudulently given that:
a) No subsequent survey of the Lot could have been obtained,
approved by the Director of Lands, and presented by the
respondent as there exists an original isolated survey thereto
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10301 covering the
said land was issued as early as 26 February 1926 in the
name of Monica Jacinto Galauran, married to Mariano Mesina.
b) TCT No. 265778 was issued in the name of the respondent
Felisa Bonifacio on [29] March 1993 before the issuance on 6
April 1993 by the Branch Clerk of Court (RTC Branch 125 in
L.R.C. No. C-3288) of a Certificate of Finality of the aforesaid
Order dated 8 October 1992.
c) TCT No. 265778 was issued to Felisa Bonifacio on 29
March 1993 without the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City
requiring the presentation of the owners duplicate copy of
O.C.T. No. 994.19
Respondent Bonifacio filed her Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim20 on October 11, 1994. She denied knowledge of
petitioners TCT No. T-108530 and maintained that the
technical description of the land covered by petitioners TCT
No. T-108530 is different from that in her TCT No. 265778.
Respondent Bonifacio also averred that the technical
description of the land covered by her TCT No. 265778 had
been verified and approved by the Land Management Services
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR); that she acquired a valid title, TCT No. 265778, over
the subject land pursuant to a court order in a land registration
case; and that Civil Case No. C-366 was a collateral attack on
the validity of her TCT No. 265778. Respondent VSD Realty,
in its Manifestation21 filed on June 31, 1995, adopted
respondent Bonifacios aforementioned Answer.
In the Pre-Trial Order22 dated February 23, 1995 of RTC-
Branch 126, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of
facts and issues:
STIPULATION OF FACTS:
1. That the petitioners are in possession of the lot in question;
and
2. That the respondent is never in possession of the lot in
question.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Technical Description is one and the
same as appearing on both titles; and
2. Whether or not the TCT No. 265778 of the respondent is a
valid title.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioners presented several documentary exhibits23 and the
testimonies of Leonardo de Guzman Syjuco, one of the
petitioners;24 Renato T. Malindog, Land Registration Examiner
of the Caloocan City Registry of Deeds;25 and Engineer (Engr.)
Elpidio T.de Lara (De Lara), Chief of Technical Services
Section, Land Management Sector(LMS), DENR. 26 In its
Order27 dated November 29, 1995, RTC-Branch 126 admitted
all the evidence presented by petitioners.
RTC-Branch 126 summarized petitioners evidence as follows:
Leonardo Syjuco testified that he, together with the other
petitioners in this case, inherited the subject property from their
late father, Martin Syjuco, as shown in Entry No. 15033/T-No.
108530 annotated in TCT No. T-108530 (Exhibit "A"). His
father and his uncle, Manuel Syjuco, in turn acquired the same
from the Baello Family through a Deed of Real Estate (Exhibit
"H"). Thereafter, Martin and Manuel executed a deed of
partition (Exhibit "I") and their father was issued TCT No. 4856
(Exhibit "G") over the subject property. He has been paying the
tax declaration on said property as evidenced by tax receipts
(Exhibits "J" to "J-14"). They then leased the property to
Manufacturers Bank who was the one who built the
improvements on the same with stipulation that they will
become the owners of these improvements after the expiration
of the lease. They also subleased the property to Kalayaan
Development Corporation (KDC, for short) and respondent
Bonifacio is a lessee of KDC. One of their tenants informed
him that their property was being offered for sale and so he
instituted measures to protect their interest. He also
discovered the existence of TCT No. T-265778 (Exhibit "C") in
the name of respondent Bonifacio which he claims to be void
3
as there can be no segregation of a property that was
previously segregated. Witness admits having executed a
lease in favor of a certain John Hay. He likewise admitted that
the technical description appearing on the property lease to
John Hay is not the same as the technical description
appearing on Exh. "A." He claims that when they inherited the
property, the technical description was already recorded
thereon and it was the Registry of Deeds who placed the same
on the property.
Renato T. Malindog, an examiner of the Register of Deeds of
Kalookan City, testified that prior to the issuance of TCT No.
265778, derivative documents were filed before their office
such as the Court Order dated October 8, 1992 in L.R.C. Case
No. C-3288; the Certificate of Finality to said Order dated April
6,1993; the subdivision plan to Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and Lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B also PSD-706 with Plan No. SK-007501-
00024-D and annexed to said documents were the technical
description for Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A, PSD-706 and the
technical description for Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B also of PSD-
706. Based on their record, documents were [received]
regarding the order of finality but there was no showing that
the tax clearance [was] registered in their office. Likewise,
based on the document presented to them, the office who
issued the technical description was from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management
Sector, and one Teodoro E. Mundo, Jr. is the Chief Survey
Division of said office.
Elpidio T. de Lara, Chief of the Technical Services Section of
the Department of Agrarian and Natural Resources, affirms to
having certified to the technical description [o]n July 9, 1990,
referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of subdivision plan PSD
706, based on a request by Felisa Bonifacio. He made the
"Note: Subject for field survey" on Exhibit "M" so that the
corresponding technical description be identified in the plan.
Before issuing the technical description for the subject lot, he
complied with the processes of having the technical
description researched from their records. From their record,
he had not issued a technical description for the subject lot
and they have no record in their office of such. The
corresponding B-37 technical description attached to the letter
request came from the Land Management Bureau, which is
the survey of the technical description. At the time the request
was made until the time the certification was issued, he did not
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
meet Felisa Bonifacio and said request was filed in their office
and sent to the technical services department.28
Respondents, in turn, presented documentary exhibits 29 and
called to the witness stand Geodetic Engr. Evelyn G. Celzo
(Celzo) of the Land Management Services, DENR;30 Fernando
D. Macaro (Macaro), Land Registration Examiner of the
Caloocan City Register of Deeds;31 and Attorney (Atty.)
Kaulayao V. Faylona, Director and Corporate Secretary of
respondent VSD Realty.32
RTC-Branch 126 summed-up respondents evidence as
follows:
Evelyn G. Celzo, a geodetic engineer from the Land
Management Services, testified that she was ordered to
conduct a verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of PSD
706 by their Regional Technical Director, Roquesa de Castro.
The survey was conducted on August 23, 1994 and its result
[was] contained in a report dated April 17, 1995 (Exhibit "4")
which she prepared and submitted. She and her team
personally went to the place and found out that two (2) stores,
namely, Fairy Mart and Zenco Footstep were the present
occupants of the lot. They likewise informed the adjoining lots
that they were going to execute a verification survey. BPM 119
in Kalookan Cadastre was the reference point to determine
whether the lot was really in that place. BPM 153, Kalookan
Cadastre were used as common points to identify the technical
description in Felisas lot. However, insofar as Exhibit "A" is
concerned, the technical description of said property did not
contain these common points. The DENR, NCR, has record of
all technical descriptions approved and verified in said office.
She points out that only one (1) technical description is
allowed for a particular lot. In conducting the survey
verification, the certified TCT was furnished to them by Felisa
Bonifacio, together with the relocation survey filed at the
Technical Reference Section. As to the adjoining lots, they
secured the map of the Maysilo Estate Plan, under the
relocation survey, they found out that the lot belonged to Felisa
Bonifacio and the technical description is the same as the
technical description submitted to her. Her verification survey
was approved as reflected in the original plan from the Bureau
of Land Verification Survey (Exhibit "7"). She also stated that
before the survey, she conducted a research as to the origin of
the technical description from her office and from the Bureau
of Lands in Binondo but there were no available record.
Neither was there any record about the original owner. When
the certified copy of TCT No. 265778 was given to her, there
were no annotations of adverse claims and so she did not
anymore inquire from the Registry of Deeds whether there
were new annotations made thereon.
Atty. Kaulayao V. Faylona, a director and Corporate Secretary
of VSD Realty Corporation, testified that a real estate broker
offered for sale to VSD two (2) lots along Avenida and
occupied by Fairmart and Uniwide Sales, Inc. Among the
documents shown to him by the seller were the Order of Judge
Geronimo S. Mangay, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, Branch 125 (Exhibit "2"), as well as the Transcript of
Case No. C-3288 (Exh. "3"). While he found the issuance of
said Order by the Court regular, he also requested for a
verification survey from the sellers group in order to make
sure that the lot appearing in the technical description is also
the lot actually being occupied by the buildings already
mentioned thereon. The actual verification survey was
conducted by the DENR through Engr. E. Celzo as evidenced
by a report (Exh. "4") submitted for the purpose. Moreover, a
verification plan (Exh. "7") approved by the DENR was likewise
prepared in connection with the verification survey. He even
personally went to the sala of Judge Mangay and verified from
the then Deputy Branch Clerk of Court, the authenticity of the
transcript that was given to him which the said Branch Clerk of
Court confirmed as having been issued by said court. He did
not however go over the petition filed by Felisa Bonifacio since
what was important was that the title was issued in the land
registration proceedings. He knew that Felisa was not in
possession of the said property as it was being occupied by
business establishments who were all not owners of the lot. As
to payments of realty taxes due on the property, he claims that
the title would not have been issued in the first place [and] the
taxes [would] not [have] been previously paid. Insofar as VSD
is concerned, the corporation was up-to-date in its payment of
realty taxes over their property. He stresses that there is no
other owner of the lot in question except Felisa Bonifacio
because there was only one(1) lot with that technical
description. The said approved technical description appearing
on Felisas lot was issued by the DENR which is actually the
custodian of the technical descriptions of lands under the Land
Registration System, which was confirmed by Mr. Elpidio T. de
Lara, complainants witness.33
4
Macaros testimony was not included in the foregoing prcis of
respondents evidence by RTC-Branch 126.Macaro affirmed
before RTC Branch 126 the existence of respondent
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778. Macaro further testified that the
standard operating procedure at the Caloocan City Registry of
Deeds was to require the presentation of the certification
stating that the court order directing issuance of the certificate
of title had already become final and executory, before actually
issuing said certificate of title; but he was unable to explain
how in this case respondent
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued on March 29, 1993,
before the Certificate of Finality of the Order dated October 8,
1992 in Civil Case No. C-3288 was issued by RTC-Branch 125
on April 6, 1993.
On January 9, 1998, RTC-Branch 126 rendered its Decision in
Civil Case No. C-366, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the petition of the petitioners;
2) Declaring that the technical description described in TCT
No. 108530 by the petitioners is not the same as the technical
description on [respondent] Bonifacios title (TCT No. 265778,
now TCT No. 285313);
3) Declaring that TCT No. 265778 is a valid title and
considering that respondent VSDs title, T-285313, replaced
the former title, VSD is hereby declared the owner of the land
in question, that is, Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of PSD 706;
4) For petitioners to pay attorneys fees and the costs of this
suit.34
Comparing the technical descriptions in petitioners TCT No. T-
108530 and respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313,
RTC-Branch 126 noted the bare differences in the land areas
and lot numbers contained therein, and concluded that said
technical descriptions were not one and the same and that
petitioners TCT No. T-108530 did not pertain to the same
parcel of land described in respondent Bonifacios TCT No.
265778. RTC Branch 126 also pointed out that petitioners own
witness, Engr. De Lara, testified that his office, Technical
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Services Section of the DENR, had not previously issued the
technical description appearing on respondent Bonifacios TCT
No. 265778. Engr. De Laras certification of the technical
description of respondent Bonifacios property was issued for
the first time on July 9, 1990 only "after complying with all the
legal processes necessary for the purpose, such as, among
other things, conducting a research from their office records
which showed that no such technical description on the subject
property was previously issued and further stating that the B-
37 technical description came from the Land Management
Bureau which was the survey of the technical
description."35 RTC-Branch 126 further cited the testimony of
Engr. Celzo of Land Management Services who conducted the
verification survey during which it was revealed that "while
common points were used in identifying the technical
description in TCT No. 265778, no such common points
existed in the technical description appearing on petitioners[]
title." RTC-Branch 126 saw no reason to doubt the testimonies
of Engrs. De Lara and Celzo consistent with the rule that
government officials are presumed to perform their functions
with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption.
RTC-Branch 126 also categorically upheld the validity of
respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 as it was issued
pursuant to the Order dated October 8, 1992 of the Caloocan
City RTC-Branch 125. RTC-Branch 126 said that it could not
question the order of a co-equal court and brushed aside
petitioners claim of continuous possession of the subject
property because such fact alone could not defeat
respondents title over said property registered under the
Torrens system. Absent any showing by clear and convincing
proof that TCT No. 265778 of respondent Bonifacio, now TCT
No. 285313 of respondent VSD Realty, was irregularly issued,
RTC-Branch 126 accorded said titles the conclusive
presumption of validity.
CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 before the
Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal36 before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777, with the following sole
assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ANNUL[L]ING
[RESPONDENTS] TITLES WHICH OVERLAP THE
EXISTING TITLE IN THE NAMES OFTHE PETITIONERS.37
Petitioners asserted that the technical description of the land in
their TCT No. T-108530 and that in respondents TCT Nos.
265778 and 285313 pertain to one and the same land.
Petitioners argue that RTC-Branch 126 failed to appreciate the
probative value of Engr. De Laras testimony on this particular
issue. According to petitioners, Engr. De Laras certification
dated July 9, 1990 on the correctness of the technical
description of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD 706, was based
merely on the "B-37 survey" attached to respondent
Bonifacios letter-request, hence, Engr. De Laras certification
included a notation "[s]ubject for field survey" since he did not
know the location of the land referred to by the technical
description. The "B-37 survey" or the subdivision plan of PSD
706 was neither presented before RTC-Branch 126 in this
case nor before RTC-Branch 125 in Civil Case No. C-3288
(respondent Bonifacios Petition for Segregation38 ); thus,
petitioners contended that there was no evidence as to "when
the survey was made, under whose name the survey was
made, and as to whether or not the said survey had the
requisite government approval."39 Petitioners added that it was
incorrect for RTC-Branch 126 to conclude that Engr. De Laras
office had never issued any technical description pertaining to
the subject land prior to July 9, 1990, and what Engr. De Lara
actually said was that there was no record in his office of the
technical description of the subject land as appearing in
petitioners TCT No. T-108530.Petitioners also maintained that
the Survey Order dated August 22, 1994 and the Verification
Plan of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD 706, dated April 28, 1995
had no probative value as (1) said Survey Order was not
authenticated; (2) said Survey Order was incomplete and
uncertain as it did not specify the lot to be surveyed, its
location, and its technical description; and (3) the verification
survey was conducted only on August 23, 1994, after
respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued on March
29, 1993, consequently, said survey could not validate the
irregular issuance of TCT No. 265778.
Additionally, petitioners alleged the following irregularities in
the issuance of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778:
5
(1) Civil Case No. C-3288, respondent Bonifacios Petition for
Segregation, is rooted in a Deed of Assignment of the subject
land purportedly executed on January 29, 1991 by Eleuteria
Rivera Bonifacio in favor of respondent Bonifacio, but said
Deed merely copied the technical description of the land
issued and certified on June 19, 1990 upon the request of
respondent Bonifacio herself.
(2) Respondent Bonifacio merely attached to her Petition for
Segregation in Civil Case No. C-3288 a sketch plan of the
subject land, not an approved survey or subdivision plan.
(3) Respondent Bonifacio stated in her Petition for Segregation
in Civil Case No. C-3288 that her and her transferors
possession of the subject land was "open, public, and
notorious without any known claimants[,]"40 but she later
admitted that she had never been in possession of the said
property.
(4) Respondent Bonifacio attached to her Petition for
Segregation a real property tax computation sheet for the
subject property which was in the name of Martin V. Syjuco,
who was petitioners predecessor-in-interest.41
(5) Respondent Bonifacio obtained TCT No. 265778 over the
subject property on March 29, 1993 whereas the order
authorizing the issuance of said certificate of title became final
and executory only on April 6, 1993.
(6) The Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 265778 to
respondent Bonifacio without requiring the presentation of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994,which covered the
vast land from whence respondent Bonifacios property was
purportedly segregated, and the requisite tax clearance in
respondent Bonifacios name.
Respondents asseverated that the technical descriptions
contained in their TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313, on one hand,
and in petitioners TCT No. T-108530, on the other, do not
pertain to the same land; that respondent Bonifacios TCT No.
265778 was issued pursuant to a valid court order by RTC-
Branch 125 in Civil Case No. C-3288; and that petitioners Civil
Case No. C-366 before RTC-Branch 126 was a collateral
attack on the validity of respondents titles.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
In its Decision dated February 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the Decision
dated January 9, 1998 of RTC-Branch 126 in Civil Case No. C-
366. Aside from essentially adopting the ratiocination in the
appealed judgment of RTC-Branch 126, the Court of Appeals
also espoused respondents argument that Civil Case No. C-
366, instituted by petitioners before RTC-Branch 126, was a
collateral attack on the validity of respondent Bonifacios TCT
No. 265778, in violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. The appellate court, comparing the parties respective
certificates of title, further ruled that:
[A] careful scrutiny of TCT Nos.108530 and 265778 revealed
relevant similarities. Both TCTs originate from OCT No. 994
pursuant to Decree No. 36455, Record No. 4429. TCT No.
108530 was first originally registered on May 03, 1917, in
contrast to Bonifacios title (TCT No. 265778) which was
[registered] in 1912.
In view of this, we quote the ruling enunciated by the court in
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals and reiterated in the cases of Heirs of Luis J.
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals and Mascarias v. Court of
Appeals.
"Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails. x x x. In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof."
Hence, in point of priority in issuance, the title of Bonifacio
prevails over that of the [petitioners]. Since, the land in
question has already been registered under OCT 994, in the
year 1912, the subsequent registration of the same land on
May 03, 1917 is null and void.42 (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals lastly pointed out that petitioners
possession of the subject land cannot defeat respondent
Bonifacios title thereto:
While we recognize the fact that the [petitioners] have been in
44 years of continuous possession, still, we should not lose
sight of the fact that [respondent] Bonifacio is an owner of an
earlier issued title. The imprescriptibility of Bonifacios title
cannot be defeated by the [petitioners] continuous possession
of the questioned lot. To hold otherwise, the efficacy of the
conclusiveness of the certificate of title, which the Torrens
System seeks to insure, would be futile and
nugatory.43 (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals concluded that since respondent
Bonifacio is the owner of the subject land, validly registered in
her name, she is within her rights in selling said property to
respondent VSD Realty, making the latters TCT No. 285313
also valid.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Petitioners reiterate their position that their TCT No. T-108530
and respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 pertain to one
and the same land, and that the latter titles have been
fraudulently obtained. Petitioners also aver that their
undisturbed possession of the subject property gives them a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court to ascertain and
determine the nature and effect of respondents adverse claim
on the subject land.
In addition, petitioners pray for this Court to take judicial notice
of supervening events relative to the indiscriminate issuance or
proliferation of fake titles derived from OCT No. 994 covering
the Maysilo Estate. They point out that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Senate Committees on Justice and
Human Rights, Urban Planning, and Housing and
Resettlement, already conducted separate investigations of
this serious land title anomaly and had submitted their
respective reports on the matter. The DOJ Committee Report
dated August 28, 1997 and Senate Committee Report No.
1031 dated May 25, 1998 validated OCT No. 994 registered
on May 3, 1917; declared OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,
1917 as nonexistent; and recommended the cancellation of all
titles derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.
Petitioners, thus, argue that respondent Bonifacios title, which
originated from OCT No. 994 registered in 1912, is null and
void as the only authentic OCT No. 994 is the one issued
6
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 originally registered on May 3,
1917.
In their Comment, respondents stand by the propriety of the
Decision dated February 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 and the Decision dated January 9,
1998 of RTC-Branch 126 in Civil Case No. C-366.
Respondents also exhort this Court not to take judicial notice
of the DOJ and Senate committee reports because those are
irrelevant to the present case as the true date of registration of
OCT No. 994 has never been an issue herein. At any rate,
respondents insinuate that there was a mistake in the
indication in the title of respondent Bonifacio that it originated
from OCT No. 994 registered in 1912, claiming that the same
"must have been [caused by either] a clerical error or a
mental lapse."
RULING
The petition is meritorious.
On the propriety of petitioners
action to quiet title over the subject
land.
The Court, at the outset, finds untenable the contention that
the action instituted by petitioners is a prohibited collateral
attack on the certificate of title of respondents over the subject
land. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 152944 states:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
To determine whether an attack on a certificate of title is direct
or indirect, the relevance of the object of the action instituted
and the relief sought therein must be examined. The rule was
explained in Catores v. Afidchao45 as follows:
When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of
the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or
proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct attack on a
certificate of title to real property. In their complaint for quieting
of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration of nullity
and/or cancellation of respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and
285313 over the subject land. The relief sought by petitioners
is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to quiet
title, as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove, invalidate, annul,
and/or nullify" a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title."
The Court also finds bereft of merit the contentions that
petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed and/or
that the titles of respondents over the subject land have
already become incontrovertible and indefeasible based on
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.- The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other
disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject,
however, to the right of any person, including the government
and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of
the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
"innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs
in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud. (Emphases added.)
The above-quoted rule has well-settled exceptions.
It is an established doctrine in land ownership disputes that the
filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed
real property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who is in
actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only
by one who is in possession.46
In this case, petitioners have duly established during the trial
that they and/or their predecessors-in-interest have been in
uninterrupted possession of the subject land since 1926 and
that it was only in 1994 when they found out that respondent
Bonifacio was able to register the said property in her name in
another title. It was also only in 1995 when petitioners learned
that respondent Bonifacio was able to sell and transfer her title
over the subject land in favor of respondent VSD Realty.
Moreover, the rule on the incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of
title has no application in this case given the fact that the
contending parties claim ownership over the subject land
based on their respective certificates of title thereon which
originated from different sources. Certainly, there cannot be
two or even several certificates of title on the same parcel of
real property because "a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case" and "a
second decree for the same land would be null and void, since
the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel
of land only once."47 The indefeasibility of a title under the
Torrens system could be claimed only if a previous valid title to
the same parcel of land does not exist. Where the issuance of
the title was attended by fraud, the same cannot vest in the
7
titled owner any valid legal title to the land covered by it; and
the person in whose name the title was issued cannot transmit
the same, for he has no true title thereto. This ruling is a mere
affirmation of the recognized principle that a certificate is not
conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land
had already been registered and that an earlier certificate for
the same land is in existence.48
Accordingly, petitioners filing of an action to quiet title over the
subject land is in order.
On the propriety of remanding this
case for further proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.
In VSD Realty & Development Corporation v. Uniwide Sales,
Inc.,49 this Court remanded the case before the Court of
Appeals, citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation,50 and held:
In the main, respondent Baello contends that the Court erred
in not declaring petitioner VSDs TCT No. T-285312 as null
and void, considering that it is derived from Felisa Bonifacios
TCT No.
265777/T-1325, which, in turn, is derived from the false and
fictitious OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917. The records of this
case, however, show that Felisa Bonifacios TCT No.
265777/T-1325 and VSDs TCT No. T-285312 are derived
from the legitimate OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917,
which date has been held as the correct date of registration of
the said OCT in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation. In her Motion for Leave and Time to
File Judicial Affidavit of Mr. Felino Cortez and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted,
respondent Baello contends that she has additional evidence
showing that the copy of Felisa Bonifacios TCT No. 265777/T-
1325 that was presented to the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan, for the purpose of the issuance of petitioner VSDs
TCT No. T-285312, was tampered with to fraudulently reflect
that it was derived from the legitimate and authentic OCT No.
994 dated May 3, 1917. It is alleged that the original microfilm
copy retained by the LRA shows that Felisa Bonifacios TCT
No. 265777/T-1325 did not originate from the legitimate and
authentic OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917, but was instead
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
derived from OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1912. Baello cited
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation,
which allowed the presentation of evidence before a Special
Division of the Court of Appeals to ascertain which of the
conflicting claims of title should prevail, even though the case
had already been decided; and the additional evidence was
presented in connection with a motion for reconsideration of
this Courts decision.
The Court notes that in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation, the Court pronounced that there is
only one OCT No. 994, which is correctly registered on May 3,
1917, and that any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994
dated April 17, 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent.
The Court recognizes the importance of protecting the
countrys Torrens system from fake land titles and deeds.
Considering that there is an issue on the validity of the title of
petitioner VSD, which title is alleged to be traceable to OCT
No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, which mother title was
held to be inexistent in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation, in the interest of justice, and to
safeguard the correct titling of properties, a remand is proper
to determine which of the parties derived valid title from the
legitimate OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Since this
Court is not a trier of facts and not capacitated to appreciate
evidence of the first instance, the Court may remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, as it has been
similarly tasked in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation on these bases:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original
cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to
resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence
on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate
court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the body that
rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review
findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are
generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that
is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in
appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual
matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former
Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive
evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine
"the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex
which are open spaces and/or areas reserved for certain
purposes, determining in the process the validity of such
postulates and the respective measurements of the areas
referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the
evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioners
Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals
is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as
governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule
32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a
reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other
than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in
any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into
effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to
receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may
likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The
commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in
writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the
order of reference. In Republic, the commissioners report
formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the
matter. The same result can obtain herein."51 (Emphases
added.)
The Court notes, however, that several matters have already
transpired during the pendency of this case that bear
considerable relation in the resolution of the main question of
which of the respective titles of the parties over the subject
land is valid.
Firstly, the Court observes that the certification as indicated in
petitioners title, which the latter submitted during the trial,
shows that it originated from OCT No. 994 registered on May
3, 1917, thus:
It is further certified that said land was originally registered on
the 3rd day of May, in the year nineteen hundred and
8
seventeen, in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A-9, page 226, as Original
Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree
No. 36455, issued in L.R.C. ___ Record No. 4429.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 4856/T-25, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as
the above-described land is concerned.52 (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the title of respondent Bonifacio, the one
presented during the trial, shows that it likewise originated
from OCT No. 994, but such mother title states only the day
and the year of its original registration as follows:
It is further certified that said land was originally registered on
the 19th day of ___, in the year nineteen hundred and twelve,
in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Manila, Volume ___, Page ___, as Original Certificate of
Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C.
___, Record No. 4423, in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No.
994, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-
described land is concerned.53 (Emphasis added.)
Curiously, the title of respondent VSD Realty is supposed to
be a direct transfer from the title of respondent Bonifacio, yet,
the certification as to the original registration of its mother title
OCT No. 994 provides the registration date of May 3,
1917, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally
registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year nineteen hundred
and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A-9-A, Page 226, as
Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No.
36455 issued in L.R.C. ___ Record No. 4429 in the name of
___.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 265778/T-1325 which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so
far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at the City of Kalookan,
Philippines, on the 12th day of September in
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
the year nineteen hundred and ninety-four at
1:23 p.m.54 (Emphases added.)
Furthermore, a certified true copy of respondent Bonifacios
title, which petitioners have obtained just prior to the filing of
the Petition at bar and attached to their Reply dated December
12, 2001, now shows that the date of the original registration of
respondent Bonifacios mother title - OCT No. 994 - has
changed from the 19th day of an unspecified month55 in 1912
to May 3, 1917, and the place of registration from Manila to
Rizal. Aside from these changes, the portions that were left
blank in the earlier copy of respondent Bonifacios title have
already been filled-up in the latest copy of the same, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally
registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year nineteen hundred
and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A-9-A, Page 226, as
Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No.
36455 issued in L.R.C. ___ Record No. 4429 in the name of
___.
This certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No.
994 which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-
described land is concerned.
Entered at Caloocan City,
Philippines, on the 29th day of March in the
year nineteen hundred and ninety-three at
3:20 a.m.56 (Emphases added.)
Secondly, the Court notes that the Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed herein a Motion
for Intervention with attached Petition-in-Intervention, pursuant
to the recommendation in the Report dated May 25, 1998 of
the Senate Committees on Justice, Human Rights, Housing,
and Urban Planning and Resettlement, that the OSG be
mandated "to intervene in land disputes before the court, on
cases whether pertaining to government or private lands as
the OSG may determine, involving fake titles, duplication of
titles or similar anomalies, to guide the court on the position of
the government and to involve the concerned government
entities particularly the Land Registration Authority in a
concerted effort to protect the integrity of the Torrens system
of land title registration."57 The motion was granted and the
Petition of the Republic was admitted in the Courts
Resolution58 dated December 8, 2004.
The OSG manifests, among others, that petitioners TCT No.
T-108530, in reliance to the conclusions of the DOJ and
Senate committees, is the valid certificate of title covering the
subject land as it could be traced back to the authentic OCT
No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917; conversely, respondents
TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 are null and void as these
originated from the spurious OCT No. 994 registered in 1912.
Respondents filed their Comment [to the Republics
intervention]59 on June 1, 2005. Interestingly, respondents now
contend that their TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 are
derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917,
hence, they capitalize on the rulings of this Court in
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v.
Court of Appeals60 and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals61 that those titles derived from OCT No. 994
registered on April 19, 1917 prevail over those titles derived
from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 considering the
priority of the date of registration.
Thirdly, the Court reiterates that the validity of OCT No. 994
registered on May 3, 1917, and the non-existence of a
purported OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, have
already been exhaustively passed upon and settled with
finality in the Resolution[s] dated December 14, 2007 and
March 31, 2009 in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation.62
In Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice,63 this Court reiterated
its pronouncements in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation64 that the true and valid OCT No.
994 was registered on May 3, 1917, not on April 19, 1917, and
that any title that traces its source to the latter date is deemed
void and inexistent. The Court was also explicit that the cases
of MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals had already been rendered functus officio, thus, these
cases can no longer be cited as precedents. The Court
expounded as follows: It is important to emphasize at this point
that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Bancin 2007,
entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation(the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the
succeeding resolution in the same case dated March 31, 2009
9
(the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the
Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another
OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases
involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at
bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said
resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous
cases decided by this Court which have held that there are two
existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from
which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424)
derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior
title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand
on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of
this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the
titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are
sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917,
then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized
by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning
OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs
from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions,
said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the
basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be
relied upon as precedents. Specifically, petitioner cannot
anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19,
1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the
record, that mother title was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date
which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the
title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that
OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be
considered as the date of the title or the date when the title
took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated
[19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent.1wphi1 The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles
made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer
to an inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at
bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as
inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSSor Gonzaga
with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or
similar to that at bar.
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and
Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok
case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to
adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even
consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though
such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals
upon the initiative of the parties. x x x. The reports cannot
conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if
admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the
same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the
parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the
Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept
them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in
the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis,
and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or
reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties
that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of
Appeals. x x x.
xxxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence,
conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on
its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3)
months from finality of this Resolution.
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the
evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the
latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and its
subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier
finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration
date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May
1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded that
"OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its
registration date is null and void."65 (Emphases added.)
In Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v.
Bonifacio,66 this Court upheld the validity of the titles to a
portion of land which originally formed part of the Maysilo
Estate which were sourced from OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917, and declared as null and void a title purportedly
overlapping the said land which traced its roots from OCT No.
994 registered on April 19, 1917. The Court found that it was
physically impossible for Eleuteria Rivera, the person whom
respondent Bonifacio claims to be her predecessor-in-interest,
to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal because it would
turn out that Eleuteria Rivera was older than her alleged
grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, to wit:
Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a
Resolution reversing its Decision of November 29, 2005 and
declaring certain titles in the names of Araneta and Manotok
valid. In the course of discussing the flaws of Jose Dimsons
title based on his alleged 25% share in the hereditary rights of
Bartolome Rivera, Eleuteria Riveras co-petitioner in LRC No.
4557, the Court noted:
. . . However, the records of these cases would somehow
negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification
Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August
1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963
(as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and
4496). It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65
years old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898.
On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912;
hence, she could have been born only on [1903]. This alone
creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation
wherein Vidal, Rivera's alleged Grandmother, was seven (7)
years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts
existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for
him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo
Estate.
10
The same is true in this case. The Death Certificate of
Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was 96 years old when she
died on February 22, 1997. That means that she must have
been born in 1901. That makes Rivera two years older than
her alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal who
was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for
Eleuteria Rivera to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted.) Considering all of the
above matters, especially the fact that respondents claim that
their respective titles, TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313, are
derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, which
this Court had already repeatedly declared to be a non-
existent and invalid title, the Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As held in Manotok, "[a]ny title that traces its source to OC'f
No. 994 dated [19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent."67 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 23,
2001, as well as the Resolution dated June 26, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 which affirmed in
toto the Decision dated January 9, 1998 of Branch 126 of the
RTC of the City of Caloocan in Civil Case No. C-366, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TCT No. 265778 in the name of
Felisa D. Bonifacio and TCT No. 285313 in the name of VSD
Realty & Development Corporation are declared NULL and
VOID. The Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City is DIRECTED
to CANCEL the said certificates of title.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015
MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, REPRESENTED BY JOVIER
TAGUFA, Petitioner, v. GREGORIA TAGUFA, ROBERTO
TAGUFA AND ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the September 13, 2012
Decision1 and the January 25, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. SP No. 122648 which reversed and
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
set aside the July 1, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela (RTC), in an action for
reconveyance and recovery of possession.
The Facts:
The undisputed facts were succinctly summarized in the
August 31, 2010 Decision4 of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Tumauini-Delfin Albano, Tumauini, Isabela (MCTC)
before which a complaint5 for Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession with Damages was filed by petitioner Mariflor
Tagufa Hortizuela (Hortizuela) represented by Jovier Tagufa
against respondents Gregoria Tagufa, Roberto Tagufa and
Rogelio Lumaban (respondents). As quoted by the CA, said
undisputed facts are:
Gleaned from the joint testimonies of R[u]nsted Tagufa xxx
and Jovier Tagufa xxx are the following facts:
The property involved in this case is a parcel of land located at
District IV, Tumauini, Isabela containing an area of 539 square
meters, more or less, and covered by OCT No. P-84609 of the
Registry of Deeds of Isabela. By virtue of the special power of
attorney xxx executed by Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela, Jovier
Tagufa instituted this case against herein defendants praying
for the peaceful surrender of the above-described property
unto them and further ordering defendant Gregoria Tagufa to
reconvey in plaintiffs favor the same property which was titled
under her name via fraud.
Before it was titled in the name of Defendant Tagufa, said
property was originally owned by plaintiffs parents, Spouses
Epifanio Tagufa and Godofreda Jimenez. Although untitled,
the spouses mortgaged the property with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for brevity). For failure to
redeem the property, DBP foreclosed the same and sold it to
Atty. Romulo Marquez xxx who, in turn, sold it back to Runsted
Tagufa, husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, on April 4,
2002 xxx using the fund sent by plaintiff Hortizuela who was in
America and with the agreement that Runsted will reconvey
the said property to her sister when demanded.
However, plaintiff discovered that the same unregistered
property was titled in the name of Gregoria Tagufa under OCT
No. P-84609 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela xxx.
Investigating further, plaintiff discovered that Gregoria Tagufa
was able to title the said property by virtue of a free patent
application before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the execution of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Spouses
Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig dated May 9, 2003
xxx. Plaintiff now seeks to recover possession of the said
property which is presently occupied by Gregoria Tagufa and
her co-defendants and have the same be reconveyed unto
them.6
In its Order, dated May 5, 2010, the MCTC granted the motion
to declare defendants in default and allowed Hortizuela to
present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, on August 31,
2010, the MCTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
ruling that in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have
resorted to a wrong cause of action.7cralawlawlibrary
Not in conformity, Hortizuela appealed to the RTC. In its July
1, 2011 Decision, the RTC reversed the MCTC ruling. The
decretal portion of the RTC decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
granted and the Decision dated August 31, 2010, is
hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Gregorio Tagufa to reconvey
to the plaintiff Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela the land
described in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the same land and
to surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the
following amounts, jointly and severally:
cralawred
a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as Moral Damages;
b) Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorneys Fees.
SO DECIDED.8
11
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the RTC.
The reversal being unacceptable to them, respondents filed a
petition for review before the CA questioning the RTC
decision. This time, the case was disposed in their favor.
According to the CA, although Hortizuela filed with the MCTC
a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession of
the subject lot, she was also questioning the validity of the
Torrens title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
846609. 9 The CA pointed out that this was in contravention of
Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which
provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.- A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law
It cited the well-settled rule that a Torrens title could not be
collaterally attacked; that the issue of whether or not the title
was fraudulently issued, could only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose; and that an action for
reconveyance and recovery of possession was not the direct
action contemplated by law.10 Hence, the dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July
1, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan,
Isabela, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The present
Complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession with
damages is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
Hortizuela filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied
in a Resolution,12 dated January 25, 2013.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION CONSTITUTES AN
INDIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY
OF THE SUBJECT CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHICH IS
PROSCRIBED BY LAW.
Hortizuela claims that respondent Gregoria Tagufa (Gregoria),
being the wife of Runsted, was certainly aware that the subject
land was actually sold by Atty. Romulo Marquez (Atty.
Marquez) to her (Hortizuela). Runsted, only acted as attorney-
in-fact in the sale transaction. Thus, the action for
reconveyance was not a collateral attack on the said title
because Hortizuela was not seeking the nullification of the title,
but rather the reconveyance of the property, covered by the
said title, which Gregoria was holding in trust for her benefit as
the real owner. Gregoria should, therefore, reconvey the
property and its title to her, being the rightful owner.
Position of Respondents
Respondents counter that although Hortizuelas complaint was
denominated as one for reconveyance and recovery of
possession, its main objective was to nullify the title held by
Gregoria over the subject property. For said reason, the
complaint would amount to a collateral attack on the title which
was proscribed under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title. To rule that the action for reconveyance was not
a collateral one would result in the nullity of the decree of
registration.
Another argument that respondents want this Court to consider
in resolving the subject petition is the fact that the overriding
reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for
reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed
to avail of the remedy provided under Section 3813 of Act 496
within the prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the
issuance of the free patent by the government.
Finally, granting that the title over the property would be
nullified and the property be reconveyed to Hortizuela, still the
latter would be ineligible to own the same pursuant to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 223 which requires, among others, that
an applicant for a free patent must be a Filipino citizen.
Hortizuela, by her own admission, is an American citizen who
has been residing in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title and Section 48 of P.D. No. 1528 where it is
provided that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack.14 A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the
object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect
or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as
an incident thereof.15 In its decision, the MCTC wrote:
Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the deed of
sale by and between Romulo Marquez and Runsted Tagufa,
the estranged husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, and
OCT No. P-84609 registered in the name of Gregoria Tagufa
who, according to the plaintiff, fraudulently caused the titling of
the same.
In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the
following indicia of fraud committed by Gregoria Tagufa that
would allegedly justify reconveyance:
First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of spouses Leandro Tagufa and
Remedios Talosig that she is an heir when, in truth, she is only
a grand daughter-in-law,
Second, she already knew when she applied for free patent
that plaintiff was already the owner of the land she was
applying for;
Third, she already knew that when she applied for free patent
that plaintiffs parents were not anymore the owners of the land
as the same was mortgaged with the DBP; and
Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession of the
12
property when she applied for it.
All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never acquired any
valid right or legal title over the property.
Studying the merits of this case and removing all its
superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the title generated in the
name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa having been obtained by
fraud and misrepresentation. However, in the judicious
analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause
of action.16
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC was
convinced that fraud was attendant in the registration of the
land but was not convinced that reconveyance was an
accepted remedy.
Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC and the CA,
however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral
attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an
action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in
personam, available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers
name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought
to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but,
respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered
owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available
as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third
person for value.17cralawlawlibrary
There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at
bench, can only be questioned through a direct proceeding.
The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account
that in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration
is respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned.
What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another's name to its rightful
owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the
land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is
entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the
property.18cralawlawlibrary
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name
does not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject
land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System
does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence
of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it
may be held in trust for another person by the registered
owner.19cralawlawlibrary
Furthermore, respondents argument that the overriding
reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for
reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed
to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496
within the prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the
issuance of the patent by the government, is weak. As was
similarly held in Cervantes v. CA,20 with the land obtained by
respondent Gregoria through fraudulent machinations by
means of which a free patent and a title were issued in her
name, she was deemed to have held it in trust for the benefit
of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her actions. Article 1456
provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.
The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No.
1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10) years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently
acquired free patent may only be assailed by the government
in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public
Land Act.21 In Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto.
Nio Residents Association, Inc.,22 this Court pointed out that:
x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore,
have an even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized
officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru
the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be
authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the
reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject
thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance
with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land
previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director
of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose
of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had
been committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
Government.23
An action for reconveyance is proper
The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A
recognized exception is that situation where plaintiff-claimant
seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of public land
unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle
of enforcement of a constructive trust. This was the ruling
in Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr.,24 where it was written:
A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a
parcel of land even if the title thereof was issued through a free
patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner
thereof.
In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had
already been issued through fraud or mistake and has been
registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the
fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance, thus:
cralawred
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the decree
issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to
13
annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent
statements were made in the application for the patent and no
notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the
petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the
property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law,
it can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the
fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3,
paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the
patent here has already been issued, the land has the
character of registered property in accordance with the
provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act
No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been injured
by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance.
(Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49
Off. Gaz. 3 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)
In the same vein, in Quiiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., we stressed that:
The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language
by Justice Tuason in a 1953 decision, Director of Lands v.
Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: The sole remedy of the land
owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the
instant case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and
no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
for damages." Such a doctrine goes back to the 1919
landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna.
If it were otherwise the institution of registration would, to
quote from Justice Torres, serve "as a protecting mantle to
cover and shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon: "A different view would
encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich
himself at the expense of another." It would indeed be a signal
failing of any legal system if under the circumstances
disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as having lost his
right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one thing to
protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter,
and one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would be rewarded by
allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is
precisely sought to be guarded against. So it has been before;
so it should continue to be. (Citations omitted)
In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not seeking a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree
issued in the registration proceedings. What she was seeking
was the reconveyance of the subject property on account of
the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria. An action for
reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the
rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel the registered
owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.25 Thus, the RTC
did not err in upholding the right of Hortizuela to ask for the
reconveyance of the subject property. To hold otherwise would
be to make the Torrens system a shield for the commission of
fraud. To reiterate,
The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name
did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does
not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it
may be held in trust for another person by the registered
owner.26
Finally, respondents supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible
to own the subject property pursuant to B.P. Blg. 223 because
she was no longer a Filipino citizen cannot be considered for
having been raised only for the first time on appeal. It must be
noted that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.27 The reason therefor is due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 13, VELASCO, JR., J.:
2012 Decision and the January 25, 2013 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 122648 are The Case
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 1, 2011
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
Isabela, is hereby REINSTATED. under Rule 45 challenging the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8,
SO ORDERED. 2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively. The challenged
rulings affirmed the May 7, 2012 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac that
petitioners and respondents are co-owners of the subject
property, which should be partitioned as per the subdivision
plan submitted by respondent spouses Recto and Rosemarie
Candelario.
The Facts
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino
Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago
Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late
Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a
281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave.,
Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate
Title (TCT) No. 318717.
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014 By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed
away, leaving to their ten (10) children ownership over the
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent
FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to
and CATALINO L. IBARRA, Petitioners, the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an
vs. Order4 dated March 22, 2004, the trial court dismissed the
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. case disposing as follows:
IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA,
GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear
namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and despite due notice, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO
SO ORDERED.
CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE
CANDELARIO,Respondents. As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court
became final, as evidenced by a Certificate of Finality5 it
DECISION
eventually issued on August 22, 2008.
14
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition,
respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of
Adjudication6 on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property
in favor of the ten (10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717
was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued
in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of
the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided
share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the
spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale7 dated April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the
spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision8 purportedly executed by them and petitioners,
TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304
was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the
7/10portion.
On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of
Title and Damages against respondents wherein they alleged
that during their parents lifetime, the couple distributed their
real and personal properties in favor of their ten (10) children.
Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the
subject property and the house constructed thereon as their
share. They likewise averred that they have been in adverse,
open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the
property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to
equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the
execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated
September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
Respondents countered that petitioners cause of action was
already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of
petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the
respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission on
the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In
addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints,
respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in
their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and
Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from their co-
respondents their share in the subject property as payment.
Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the
partition of the property.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of Camiling,
Tarlac, the quieting of title case was eventually raffled to
Branch 68 of the court, the same trial court that dismissed Civil
Case No. 02-52. During pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a
quo, admitted having filed an action for partition, that
petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that
served as the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and
that the Agreement of Subdivision that led to the issuance of
TCT No. 434304 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario
was falsified.9 Despite the admissions of respondents,
however, the RTC, through its May 27, 2012 Decision,
dismissed petitioners complaint. The court did not find merit in
petitioners asseverations that they have acquired title over the
property through acquisitive prescription and noted that there
was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed to
them the subject property. Finding that respondent siblings
were entitled to their respective shares in the property as
descendants of Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra and as co-
heirs of petitioners, the subsequent transfer of their interest in
favor of respondent spouses Candelario was then upheld by
the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case
is hereby Dismissed.
Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and Recto
Candelario are hereby declared as the absolute owners of the
7/10 portion of the subject lot.
Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the subject
lots between the herein plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses
Candelarios.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the
CA, pleading the same allegations they averred in their
underlying complaint for quieting of title. However, they added
that the partition should no longer be allowed since it is already
barred by res judicata, respondent siblings having already filed
a case for partition that was dismissed with finality, as admitted
by respondents themselves during pre-trial.
On July 8, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying
the appeal. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE, premises
15
considered, the Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Civil Case No.
09-15, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no evidence on
record to support petitioners claim that the subject property
was specifically bequeathed by Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra in their favor as their share in their parents estate. It
also did not consider petitioners possession of the property as
one that is in the concept of an owner. Ultimately, the appellate
court upheld the finding that petitioners and respondent
spouses Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in favor of the
respondent spouses.
As regards the issue of partition, the CA added:
x x x Since it was conceded that the subject lot is now co-
owned by the plaintiffs-appellants, (with 3/10 undivided
interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (with
7/10 undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-
appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the
back portion of the property, then partition, in accordance with
the subdivision plan (records, p. 378) undertaken by
defendants-appellants [sic] spouses, is in order.10
On November 22, 2013, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
In the present petition, the following errors were raised:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED
RELEVANT AND UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY
PETITIONERS CLAIM OF EQUITABLE TITLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE ORDER OF PARTITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION, BASED ON THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN 2007, IS
BARRED BY LACHES.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A cause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the
SUBSTANTIALLY FLAWED JUDGMENT WHEN IT
NEGLECTED TO RULE ON PETITIONERS CONTENTION
THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION IS ALSO
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT, DESPITE ITS HAVING
BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED AS ERROR AND
PROPERLY ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF, AND WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED
PARTITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUBDIVISION
PLAN MENTIONED IN ITS DECISION, IN CONTRAVENTION
OF THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN RULE 69 OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.11
To simplify, the pertinent issues in this case are as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership
over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for partition is
already barred by laches or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the
subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of the
property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious in part.
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership
over the property
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property.12 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy. 13 In
the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners
absence of the first requisite.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of
whether or not petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of
ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that
is generally improper for Us to delve into. Section 1, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review
on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth." In appeals by certiorari, therefore, only
questions of law may be raised, because this Court is not a
trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial.14 Although there are exceptions 15 to this
general rule as eloquently enunciated in jurisprudence, none of
the circumstances calling for their application obtains in the
case at bar. Thus, We are constrained to respect and uphold
the findings of fact arrived at by both the RTC and the CA.
In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that
petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed,
failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open,
continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the
subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings,
in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico
Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection
from the petitioners.16 Petitioners inability to offer evidence
tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim. On the
contrary, on May 28, 1998, Escolastica Ibarra executed a
Deed of Sale covering half of the subject property in favor of all
her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners alone.17
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her
case by preponderance of evidence.18 Regrettably, petitioners,
as such plaintiff, in this case failed to discharge the said
burden imposed upon them in proving legal or equitable title
over the parcel of land in issue. As such, there is no reason to
disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the
subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and
after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the
spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses
became co-owners of the same.
16
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment
This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by
respondents in their counterclaim. In their answer to the
counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for partition
has already been barred by res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a
first case is final as to the claim or demand in controversy,
between the parties and those privy with them, not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which must have been offered for that purpose and all
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.19 It
precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and
determined by a prior and final judgment.20 As held in
Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:21
It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the state that there
should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit finis litium;
the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari et
eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and
prefer the gratitude identification of a litigious disposition on
the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility
and happiness.22
The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be
vexed twice concerning the same cause. Indeed, res judicata
is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural
society, for not only does it ward off endless litigation, it
ensures the stability of judgment and guards against
inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts.23
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present:
(1) the formal judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the
parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.24
In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an
action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52, which the
RTC dismissed through an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the
failure of the parties to attend the scheduled hearings.
Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer
appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it
cannot be disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No.
02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the same,
and that in both cases, respondents raise the same action for
partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses Candelario
were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is
identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the
same, but also between those in privity with them, such as
between their successors-in-interest.25
With all the other elements present, what is left to be
determined now is whether or not the dismissal of Civil case
No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would
complete the requirements of res judicata.
In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in
a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the
court.
The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a
complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he
fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence
in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply
with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a
case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on
the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice
to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the
order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as
an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of
another action, and the only exception is when the order of
dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal
is without prejudice.26 In the case at bar, petitioners claim that
the Order does not in any language say that the dismissal is
without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal
be on the merits is present.
Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with
prejudice under the above-cited rule amply satisfies one of the
elements of res judicata.27 It is, thus, understandable why
petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for
partition at any time, provided that there is no actual
adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is
Article 494 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which
shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any
partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run
in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. (emphasis supplied)
From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the
law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a
property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the
co-owners specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of
portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides
that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common.
17
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and
the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code,
the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish
the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of
procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the
principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural
rule.28 This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil
Code, viz:
Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings.1wphi1 Partition shall be
governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent
with this Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions,
We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order
of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not
it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will
never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata
in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same
subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners
have been determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper
for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo,29 We ruled in the following
wise:
Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-
ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the one hand, a
co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the
whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion,
but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not
yet technically described.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and his proper remedy
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court,
which he may bring at anytime in so far as his share is
concerned. Article 1079 of the Civil Code defines partition as
the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. It has been held
that the fact that the agreement of partition lacks the technical
description of the parties respective portions or that the
subject property was then still embraced by the same
certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where
the different portions allotted to each were determined and
became separately identifiable.
The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 36-C, which was
immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said
Compromise Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or
duress, the court cannot set aside a judgment based on
compromise. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement
once approved by the court settles the rights of the parties and
has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on
the ground of vice of consent or forgery.
Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment
in Civil Case No. 36-C settled as well the question of which
specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued to the parties
separately as their proportionate shares therein. Through their
subdivision survey plan, marked as Annex "A" of the
Compromise Agreement and made an integral part thereof, the
parties segregated and separately assigned to themselves
distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was immediately
executory, having been accomplished and completed on
December 1, 1971 when judgment was rendered approving
the same. The CA was correct when it stated that no co-
ownership exist when the different portions owned by different
people are already concretely determined and separately
identifiable, even if not yet technically described. (emphasis
supplied)
In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata applied
because after the parties executed a compromise agreement
that was duly approved by the court, the different portions of
the owners have already been ascertained. Thus, there was
no longer a co-ownership and there was nothing left to
partition. This is in contrast with the case at bar wherein the
co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still
subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario.
Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein
respondents from praying for the partition of the property
through counterclaim.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches
We now proceed to petitioners second line of attack.
According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already
barred by laches since by 1999, both Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent
siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case
No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set
in against respondent siblings, so too should respondent
spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they
could not have acquired a better right than their predecessors-
in-interest.
The argument fails to persuade.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise
of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier. It is
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert
it.30 The principle is a creation of equity which, as such, is
applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones
right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable
defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of
the petitioners title, but only with whether or not by reason of
the respondents long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they
should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to
allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to
petitioners.31
As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents
cannot be said to have neglected to assert their right over the
subject property. They cannot be considered to have
abandoned their right given that they filed an action for
partition sometime in 2002, even though it was later dismissed.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent siblings entered into a
Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the
18
subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of
ownership over the same.
The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision
There is merit, however, in petitioners contention that the CA
erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted by
respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that
partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent
spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for
partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein
respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and
that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The
"agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever
or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with
petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of
consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in spite of this fact
would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide
unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their
own whims and caprices. Such a result could not be
countenanced.
To rectify this with dispatch, the case must be remanded to the
court of origin, which shall proceed to partition the property in
accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8,
2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for
purposes of partitioning the subject property in accordance
with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
G.R. No. 123509 March 14, 2000
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES
and EMILIO ROBLES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and
BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA, Inc.,
HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD JR. in his capacity
as Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity
as District Land Officer of the Bureau Of
Lands, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners
must show that they have title to the real property at issue, and
that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Buyers of unregistered real property, especially banks, must
exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and
sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to
observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may
result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the
subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless the co-
ownership is clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by
prescription, acquire title to the share of the other co-owners.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the
June 15, 1995 Decision and the January 15, 1996 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 34213.2 In its
Decision, the CA ruled: 3
WHEREFORE, the trial court's June 17, 1991 decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof a new one is
hereby entered ordering the dismissal of the plaintiffs-
appellees['] second amended complaint.
Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued by the
Bureau of Lands as null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth
Santos to deliver the property subject of this case to the
plaintiff; and
3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absolute owner
of the land in controversy.
The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The present Petition is rooted in a case for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, filed on
March 14, 1988, 4 by Petitioners Lucio Robles, Emeteria
Robles, Aludia. Robles and Emilio Robles. The facts were
narrated by the trial court in this wise:
There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively
owned the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal
with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied the same
openly and adversely. He also declared the same in his name
for taxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax
Declaration No. 17865 (Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding
taxes thereon (Exh. "B"). When Leon Robles died, his son
Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the
land, declared it in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes thereon.1wphi1.nt
Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de
la Cruz and his children inherited the property. They took
adverse possession of said property and paid taxes thereon.
The task of cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio
Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa
19
hut on the land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the
land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel
of land in the, name of Silvino Robles was canceled and
transferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh. "19"), father of
Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles.
Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo
Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow,
the tax declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo
Rural Bank (Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to] the
name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife (Exh. "16").
In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural
Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. Andrea
Robles testified without contradiction that somebody else, not
her husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because
Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a
carpenter.
For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings
were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest
bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and
so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of
defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant
Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and
Ruth Santos.
In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and
attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. On
May 10, 1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of
the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent
No. IV-1-010021 in their names. 5
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts
of the case as follows:
The instant action for quieting of title concerns the parcel of
land bounded and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal.
Bounded [i]n the north by the property of Venancio Ablay y
Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the property of Veronica Tulak y
Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the south by the property of Simeon Ablay
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
y Dionisio Ablay; and [i]n the west by the property of Dionisio
Ablay y Simeon Ablay, with an area of 9,985 square meters,
more or less, assessed in the year 1935 at P60.00 under Tax
Declaration No. 23219.
As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the
above-described parcel from Leon Robles, the siblings Lucio,
Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed Robles,
commenced the instant suit with the filing of their March 14,
1988 complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as
well as the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. Contending that they
had been in possession of the land since 1942, the plaintiff
alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of
1987 that they came to know of the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-brother, Hilario
Robles, in favor of defendant Rural Bank; and that they
likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had
already sold the self-same parcel in favor of the Santos
spouses (pp. 1-3, orig, rec.). Twice amended to implead Hilario
Robles (pp. 76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequent discovery
of the issuance of Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the
defendant spouses, the Director of Land as parties-defendants
(pp. 117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs' complaint sought the
following reliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of their
half-brother, constituted on the land, as well as all proceedings
taken subsequent thereto, were null and void, to wit:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (a) a preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued forthwith restoring plaintiffs to
their possession of said parcel of land; (b) an order be issued
annulling said Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in the name of
defendants spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos, the
deed of sale aforementioned and any tax declaration which
have been issued in the name of defendants; and (c) ordering
defendants jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs pray for other relief as [may be] just and equitable
under the premises. (pp. 120-121, orig. rec.)
xxx xxx xxx
With the termination of the pre-trial stage upon the parties-
litigants' agreement (p. 203, orig. rec.) the trial court proceeded
to try the case on the merits. It thereafter rendered the
challenged June 17, 1991 decision upon the following findings
and conclusions:
The real estate, mortgage allegedly executed by Hilario Robles
is not valid because his signature in the mortgage deed was
forged. This fact, which remains unrebutted, was admitted by
Andrea Robles.
Inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed allegedly by
Hilario Robles in favor of the defendant Cardona Rural Bank,
Inc. was not valid, it stands to reason that the foreclosure
proceedings therein were likewise not valid. Therefore, the
defendant bank did not acquire any right arising out of the
foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, defendant bank could
not have transferred any right to the spouses Santos.
The fact that the land was covered by a free patent will not
help the defendant Santos any.
There can be no question that the subject [property was held]
in the concept of owner by Leon Robles since 1916. Likewise,
his successor-in-interest, Silvino Robles, his wife Maria de la
Cruz and the plaintiffs occupied the property openly,
continuously and exclusively until they were ousted from their
possession in 1988 by the spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that
"open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public lands for the period prescribed by law (30 years),
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other action, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. Possession of public land . . . which is [of] the
character and duration prescribed by the statute is the
equivalent of an express grant from the State, considering the
dictum of the statute itself[:]; "The . . . shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . .
." No proof is admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption[,] and confirmation proceedings would be a little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required character
and length of time. Registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. (Cruz v. IAC,
20
G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988) The land in question has
become private land.
Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the
Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos is not valid
because at the time the property subject of this case was
already private land, the Bureau of Lands having no
jurisdiction to dispose of the same. (pp. 257-259, orig. rec.)
Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos spouses
and the defendant Rural Bank jointly filed their July 6, 1991
Notice of Appeal (p. 260, orig. rec.) . . . . 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioners no longer had any title to the subject property at the
time they instituted the Complaint for quieting of title. The CA
ratiocinated as follows:
As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-appellees no
longer had any title to the property at the time of the institution
of the instant complaint. (pp. 25-27, rec.) The latter's claim of
continuous possession notwithstanding (pp. 3-5, TSN, July 5,
1990; p. 12, TSN, July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss of title is
amply evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subject
realty for taxation purposes not only in the name of Exequiel
Ballena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-24, orig, rec.) but also in
the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo (Exhibit 17, vol. II orig.
rec). On the theory that tax declarations can be evincive of the
transfer of a parcel of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Court
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 214), the court a quo clearly erred in
simply brushing aside the apparent transfers [which] the land
in litigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable, it
cannot, under the circumstances, be gainsaid that the plaintiff-
appellees no longer had any title to speak of when Exequiel
Ballena executed the November 7, 1966 Deed of Absolute
Sale transferring the land in favor of the spouses Hilario and
Andrea Robles (Exhibit "3", p. 25, orig. rec.)
Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their half-
brother, Hilario Robles, are co-owners of the land left behind
by their common father, Silvino Robles, such title would still be
effectively discounted by what could well serve as the latter's
acts of repudiation of the co-ownership, i.e., his possession (p.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
22, TSN, November 15, 1990) and declaration thereof for
taxation purposes in his own name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig.
rec.). In view of the plaintiffs-appellees' inaction for more than
twenty (20) years from the time the subject realty was
transferred in favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants correctly
maintain that prescription had already set in. While it may be
readily conceded that an action to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible (Almanza vs.
Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718; Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 155 SCRA 270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 718; Charon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124
SCRA 784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441; Burton
vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears emphasis that a
co-owner or, for that matter, the said co-owner[']s successors-
in-interest who occupy the community property other than as
co-owner[s] can claim prescription as against the other co-
owners (De Guzman vs. Austria, 148 SCRA 75; Ramos vs.
Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo
vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
If only in this latter sense, the appellants correctly argue that
the plaintiffs-appellees have lost their cause of action by
prescription.
Over and above the foregoing considerations, the court a
quo gravely erred in invalidating the real estate mortgage
constituted on the land solely on the basis of Andrea Robles'
testimony that her husband's signature thereon was forged (p.
257, orig. rec.),
xxx xxx xxx
In according to the foregoing testimony . . . credibility which,
while admittedly unrebutted, was altogether uncorroborated,
the trial court lost sight of the fact that the assailed deed of real
estate mortgage (Exhibit "5", Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a public
document, the acknowledgment of which is a prima
facie evidence of its due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals,
206 SCRA 339). As such, it retains the presumption of validity
in the absence of a full, clear and convincing evidence to
overcome such presumption (Agdeppa vs. Ibe, 220 SCRA
584).
The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic] when it
is, moreover, borne in mind that Hilario Robles made the
following admissions in his March 8, 1989 answer, viz:
3. The complaint filed against herein answering defendant has
no legal basis considering that as the lawful owner of the
subject real property, defendant Hilario Robles has the right to
mortgage the said real property and could dispose the same in
whatever manner he wishe[s] to do. (p. 96, orig. rec.)
Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the foregoing
admission is binding against Hilario [Robles]. Judicial
admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the
pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in
the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to
prove the same. They cannot be contradicted unless shown to
have been made through [a] palpable mistake or [unless] no
such admission was actually made (Philippine American
General Insurance, Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194).
It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees cause any that, aside
from complying with the requirements for the foreclosure of the
subject real estate mortgage (Exhibits "6", "7", "8" and "10",
Volume II [)], the appellant Rural Bank had not only relented to
the mortgagor's request to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol. II,
orig. rec.) but had likewise granted the latter's request for an
extension of the redemption period therefor (Exhibits "11" and
"12", pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into minute detail in
discussing the Santos spouses' rights as purchasers for value
and in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.), the mortgagor
and the plaintiffs'-appellees cannot now be heard to challenge
the validity of the sale of the land after admittedly failing to
redeem the same within the extension the appellant, Rural
Bank granted (pp. 10-11, TSN, November 15, 1990).
Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the constitution
and foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage, the
plaintiffs-appellees' attack upon . . . Free Patent No. IV-I must
necessarily fail. The trial court, therefore, misread, and ignored
the evidence o[n] record, to come up with erroneous
conclusion.
Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and
jurisprudence, Petitioners Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio
all surnamed Robles filed this Petition for Review. 7
The Assigned Error
Petitioners ascribe the following error to the respondent court:
21
Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that
with the transfers of the tax declaration over the parcel of land
in question from Silvino Robles to Exequiel Ballena, then to the
Rural Bank of Antipolo, then to Respondent Hilario Robles,
then to Respondent Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then
finally to Respondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by
themselves and their predecessors in interest have been in
open, actual and adverse possession of said parcel of land
since 1916 up to their forced removal therefrom in 1988, have
lost their title to said property by prescription to their half-
brother, Respondent Hilario Robles, and then finally, to
Respondent Spouses Santos. 8
For a better understanding of the case, the above issue will be
broken down into three points: first, the nature of the remedy of
quieting of title; second, the validity of the real estate
mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the free patent granted to
the Santos spouses.
First Issue:
Quieting of Title
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a
common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
uncertainty on the title to real property. 9 It is essential for the
plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. 10 Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 11
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is
a valid and efficacious is clear in the present case. Petitioners
allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed
property is clouded by the tax declaration and, subsequently,
the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Vergel and Ruth
Santos. The more important question to be resolved, however,
is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will
entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of
title.
Petitioners anchor their claim to the disputed property on their
continued and open occupation and possession as owners
thereof. They allege that they inherited it from their father,
Silvino, who in turn had inherited it from his father, Leon. They
maintain that after their father's death, they agreed among
themselves that Petitioner Lucio Robles would be tending and
cultivating it for everyone, and that their half-brother Hilario
would be paying the land taxes.
Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from 1962 until
1987, the subject property had been declared in the names of
Exequiel Ballena, the Rural Bank of Antipolo, Hilario Robles,
the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., and finally, Spouses Vergel
and Ruth Santos. Maintaining that as co-owners of the subject
property, they did agree to the real estate mortgage
constituted on it, petitioners insist that their shares therein
should not have been prejudiced by Hilario's actions.
On the other hand, Private Respondents Vergel and Ruth
Santos trace their claim to the subject property to Exequiel
Ballena, who had purportedly sold it to Hilario and Andrea
Robles. According to private respondents, the Robles spouses
then mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. not as
co-owners but as absolute owners in order to secure an
agricultural loan worth P2,000. Upon their failure to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property
sold to the bank as the highest bidder. Thereafter, private
respondents purchased the property from the bank.
Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been
occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax
declarations issued in their names. Also undisputed is the fact
that the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the
land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly
ousted therefrom in 1988. In 1962, the subject property was
declared in the name of Exequiel for taxation purposes. On
September 30, 1965, it was again declared in the same name;
on October 28, 1965, in the name of the Rural Bank of
Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in the name of Hilario and
Andrea; and thereafter, in the name of the Rural Bank of
Cardona and, finally, in the name of the Santos spouses.
Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider
irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed
property. First, while it was declared in the name of Exequiel in
1962, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance
evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact
is important, considering that the petitioners are alleging
continued possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was
the father-in-law of Hilario, to whom petitioners had entrusted
the payment of the land taxes. Third, considering that the
subject property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural
Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed and in fact
declared in the bank's name in 1965, why was he able to sell it
to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly, inasmuch as it
was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of
Cardona, Inc., did not observe due diligence in determining
Hilario's title thereto.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the
property in question is vital to the resolution of the present
Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his
title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him
to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation
and the possession thereof by the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed, and
Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by prescription was
not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly
evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the
heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the
best proof of that transfer. No such document was presented,
however.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners
that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank
of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof.
Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the
property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for
quieting of title.
22
Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario
effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership.
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing. 12
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the
subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from
the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably
shared in its fruits. 13 Likewise, his act of entering into a
mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a
repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his
undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his
share, as he in fact did. 14Neither should his payment of land
taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion
that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to
repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and
possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as
owners.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be
mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. 15 In the present
case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not the absolute
owner of the entire subject property; and that the Rural Bank of
Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title thereto, failed to
observe due diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad
faith.
First, the bank was utterly remiss in its duty to establish who
the true owners and possessors of the subject property
were.1wphi1 It acted with precipitate haste in approving the
Robles spouses' loan application, as well as the real estate
mortgage covering the disputed parcel of land. 16 Had it been
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
more circumspect and assiduous, it would have discovered
that the said property was in fact being occupied by the
petitioners, who were tending and cultivating it.
Second, the bank should not have relied solely on the Deed of
Sale purportedly showing that the ownership of the disputed
property had been transferred from Exequiel Ballena to the
Robles spouses, or that it had subsequently been declared in
the name of Hilario. Because it was dealing with unregistered
land, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction
between Hilario and his father-in-law Exequiel were
suspicious, the bank should have exerted more effort to fully
determine the title of the Robleses. Rural Bank of Compostela
vs. Court Appeals 17invalidated a real estate mortgage after a
finding that the bank had not been in good faith. The Court
explained: "The rule that persons dealing with registered lands
can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to
banks." In Tomas v. Tomas, the Court held:
. . . Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in
dealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, for
their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in
trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should
guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence
which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be
denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act
496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith,
as well as to mortgagees of the same character and
description. . . . 18
Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that, notwithstanding
the bank's insistence that it had become the owner of the
subject property and had paid the land taxes thereon, the
petitioners continued occupying it and harvesting the fruits
therefrom. 19
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the
disputed property not as absolute owner but only as a co-
owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his undivided share therein. The
said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos
spouses, was a mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and
equity mandate the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who
merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what legally
pertains to the latter Hilario's share in the disputed property.
Third Issue:
Efficacy of Free Patent Grant
Petitioners repeatedly insist that the disputed property belongs
to them by private ownership and, as such, it could not have
been awarded to the Santos spouses by free patent. They
allege that they possessed it in the concept of owners
openly, peacefully, publicly and continuously as early as 1916
until they were forcibly ousted therefrom in 1988. They likewise
contend that they cultivated it and harvested its fruits. Lucio
Robles testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, why do you know this parcel of land?
A Because before my father died, he showed me all the
documents.
Q Before the death of your father, who was the owner of this
parcel of land?
A My father, sir.
Q How did your father acquire this parcel of land?
A My father knew that it [was] by inheritance, sir.
Q From whom?
A From his father, Leon Robles, sir.
Q And do you know also [from] whom Leon Robles acquired
this land?
A It was inherited from his father, sir.
Q What is the nature of this parcel of land?
A It's an agricultural land, sir.
Q Now, at the time of the death of your father, this land was
planted with what crops?
A Mango trees, santol trees, and I was the one who planted
those trees, sir.
23
Q When did you plant those trees?
A Before the death of my father, sir.
Q Now, after the death of your father, who cultivated this
parcel of land?
A I took charge of the land after the death of my father, sir.
Q Up to when?
20
A Up to the present, sir, after this case was already filed.
The preceding claim is an assertion that the subject property is
private land. The petitioners do not concede, and the records
do not show, that it was ever an alienable land of the public
domain. They allege private ownership thereof, as evidenced
by their testimonies and the tax declarations issued in the
names of their predecessors-in-interest. It must be noted that
while their claim was not corroborated by other witnesses, it
was not controverted by the other parties, either.
Carlos Dolores insisted that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc.,
of which he was the manager, had acquired and possessed
the subject property. He did not, however, give any reason
why the petitioners had continued occupying it, even as he
admitted on the stand that he had visited it twice. 21
In the light of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land, petitioners are
"deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate
of title being issued." 22 The land was "segregated from the
public domain." Accordingly, the director of lands had no
authority to issue a free patent thereto in favor of another
person. Verily, jurisprudence holds that a free patent covering
private land is null and void. 23
Worth quoting is the disquisition of the Court in Agne v.
Director of Lands, 24 in which it held that a riparian owner
presently in possession had a better right over an abandoned
river bed than had a registered owner by virtue of a free
patent.
Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of
private respondents' predecessor-in-interest was issued, the
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
President of the Philippines, or his alter ego, the Director of
Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has
ceased to be a public land and has passed to private
ownership and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity
arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land
is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public
lands and does not cover lands publicly owned. The purpose
of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act
No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the
public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not
included therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of
private ownership, constitutes no part of the public domain,
and cannot possibly come within the purview of said act 2874,
inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is
not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the
same is excluded from the provisions of the text thereof.
We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by
the issuance of the free patent over the same land because
the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain.
Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands.
Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under
the private ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part
of the lands of the public domain, the same could not have
been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee and his
successors-in-interest acquired no right or title to said land.
Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo
Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued
pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible. Hence
we ruled in Director of Lands v. Sicsican, et al. that if at the
time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered
therein were already private property of another and, therefore,
not part of the disposable land of the public domain, then
applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.
Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and
void ab initio if the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the
land is part of the public domain, although it is not. As earlier
stated, the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from
the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands. Being null and void, the free patent granted and the
subsequent titles produce no legal effect whatsoever. Quod
nullum est, nullum producit effectum.
A free patent which purports to convey land to which the
government did not have any title at the time of its issuance
does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true
owner. The Court has previously held that the Land
Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody
who resorts to the provisions thereof a better title than what he
really and lawfully has.
xxx xxx xxx
We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion
that the title of herein petitioners over the land in dispute is
superior to the title of the registered owner which is a total
nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners under
a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a
registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.
The Santos spouses argue that petitioners do not have the
requisite personality to question the free patent granted them,
inasmuch as "it is a well-settled rule that actions to nullify free
patents should be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General at
the behest of the Director of Lands." 25
Private respondents' reliance on this doctrine is misplaced.
Indeed, the Court held in Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 26 that only the solicitor general could file an action for
the cancellation of a free patent. Ruling that the private
respondents, who were applicants for a free patent, were not
the proper parties in an action to cancel the transfer
certificates covering the parcel of land that was the subject of
their application, the Court ratiocinated thus:
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the
proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint,
praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates
of title of petitioners on the ground that they were derived from
a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of
said title. While private respondents did not pray for the
reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the
petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same
result of reverting the land to the government under the
Regalian Doctrine. Gabila v. Barinaga 27 ruled that only the
government is entitled to this relief. . . . .
24
Because the cancellation of the free patent as prayed for by
the private respondents in Peltan would revert the property in
question to the public domain, the ultimate beneficiary would
be the government, which can be represented by the solicitor
general only. Therefore, the real party-in-interest is the
government, not the private respondents.
This ruling does not, however, apply to the present case. While
the private respondents in Peltan recognized that the disputed
property was part of the public domain when they applied for
free patent, 28 herein petitioners asserted and proved private
ownership over the disputed parcel of land by virtue of their
open, continued and exclusive possession thereof since 1916.
Neither does the present case call for the reversion of the
disputed property to the State. By asking for the nullification of
the free patent granted to the Santos spouses, the petitioners
are claiming the property which, they contend, rightfully
belongs to them.
Indeed, the same issue was resolved by this Court in Heirs of
Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals. 29 In that case, the trial
court dismissed a Complaint seeking the declaration of nullity
of an Original Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a free
patent, reasoning that the action should have been instituted
by the solicitor general. In reversing the trial court, the
Supreme Court held:
It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null
and void, and produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod
nullum est, nullum producit affectum. Moreover, private
respondents' claim of open, peaceful, continuous and adverse
possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and
its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their
original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of
action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General was afforded
an opportunity to express its position in these proceedings. But
it manifested that it would not file a memorandum, because
"this case involves purely private interests." 30
The foregoing considered, we sustain the contention of
petitioners that the free patent granted to the Santos spouses
is void. It is apparent that they are claiming ownership of the
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
disputed property on the basis of their possession thereof in Robles' share therein. Consequently, the sale of the subject GOCO AND ARSENIO C.
the concept of owners openly, peacefully, publicly, property to the Santos spouses is valid insofar as it pertained BONIFACIO, in their
continuously and adversely since 1916. Because they and to his share only. Likewise declared null and void is Free capacity as the surviving
their predecessors-in-interest have occupied, possessed and Patent No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands heirs of the late
cultivated it as owners for more than thirty years, 31 only one covering the subject property. ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA.
conclusion can be drawn it has become private land and is DE BONIFACIO,
therefore beyond the authority of the director of lands. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as modified Respondents.
Epilogue by the last paragraph of this Decision, the trial court's Decision
is REINSTATED. No costs.1wphi1.nt x--------------------------------------------
We recognize that both the petitioners and the Santos spouses - - - - - - -x
fell victim to the dubious transaction between Spouses Hilario SO ORDERED.
and Andrea Robles and the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc.
However, justice and equity mandate that we declare
Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles to have DECISION
the requisite title essential to their suit for quieting of title. PHIL-VILLE G.R. No. 167391
Considering the circumstances peculiar to this complicated DEVELOPMENT AND VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
problem, the Court finds this conclusion the logical and just HOUSING
CORPORATION, This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the
solution.
Present: Decision[2] dated January 31, 2005 and Resolution[3] dated
The claim that petitioners were guilty of laches in not asserting Petitioner, March 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
their rights as owners of the property should be viewed in the 62211. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Complaint[4] for
light of the fact that they thought their brother was paying the Quieting of Title and Damages filed by Phil-Ville Development
CARPIO MORALES, J., and Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville) and denied its Motion for
requisite taxes for them, and more important, the fact that they
continued cultivating it and harvesting and gaining from its Reconsideration.[5]
Chairperson,
fruits.
The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, are as
BRION, follows.
From another viewpoint, it can even be said that it was the - versus -
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., which was guilty of laches BERSAMIN, Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation is the
because, granting that it had acquired the subject property
registered owner of three parcels of land designated as Lots 1-
legally, it failed to enforce its rights as owner. It was oblivious VILLARAMA, JR., and
G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 of the subdivision plan Psd-1-13-
to the petitioners' continued occupation, cultivation and
SERENO, JJ. 006209, located in Caloocan City, having a total area of 8,694
possession thereof. Considering that they had possessed the
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
property in good faith for more than ten years, it can even be
(TCT) Nos. 270921,[6] 270922[7] and 270923.[8] Prior to their
argued that they thus regained it by acquisitive prescription. In
subdivision, the lots were collectively designated as Lot 1-G of
any case, laches is a remedy in equity, and considering the
Promulgated: the subdivision plan Psd-2731 registered in the name of Phil-
circumstances in this case, the petitioners cannot be held
MAXIMO BONIFACIO, Ville under TCT No. T-148220.[9] Said parcels of land form part
guilty of it.
CEFERINO R.June 8, 2011 of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate originally covered by Original
In sum, the real estate mortgage contract covering the BONIFACIO, APOLONIO Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994[10] registered on May 3, 1917
disputed property a contract executed between Spouses B. TAN, BENITA B. in the name of Isabel Gil de Sola as the judicial administratrix
Hilario and Andrea on the one hand and the Rural Bank of CAINA, CRISPINA of the estate of Gonzalo Tuason and thirty-one (31)
Cardona, Inc., on the other is hereby declared null and void B. PASCUAL, ROSALIA B. others.Phil-Ville acquired the lots by purchase from N. Dela
insofar as it prejudiced the shares of Petitioners Lucio, DE GRACIA, TERESITA S. Merced and Sons, Inc. on July 24, 1984.
Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles; it is valid as to Hilario DORONIA, CHRISTINA

25
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Earlier, on September 27, 1961, a group composed of
Eleuteria Rivera, Bartolome P. Rivera, Josefa R. Aquino,
Gregorio R. Aquino, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles,
Venancio R. Angeles, Felipe R. Angeles Fidela R. Angeles
and Rosauro R. Aquino, claiming to be the heirs of Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, a co-owner to the extent of 1-189/1000% of
the properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and
994 of the Hacienda Maysilo, filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Land Registration Case No.
4557. They prayed for the substitution of their names on OCT
No. 994 in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Said petition
was granted by the CFI in an Order[11] dated May 25, 1962.
Afterwards, the alleged heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal
filed a petition for the partition of the properties covered by
OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the CFI of Rizal, Branch
12, Caloocan City. On December 29, 1965, the CFI granted
the petition and appointed three commissioners to determine
the most equitable division of the properties.[12] Said
commissioners, however, failed to submit a recommendation.
Thirty-one (31) years later, on May 22, 1996, Eleuteria Rivera
filed a Supplemental Motion[13] in Civil Case No. C-424, for the
partition and segregation of portions of the properties covered
by OCT No. 994. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120,
of Caloocan City, through Judge Jaime D. Discaya, to whom
the case was transferred, granted said motion. In an
Order[14] dated September 9, 1996, Judge Discaya directed the
segregation of portions of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue to
Eleuteria Rivera new certificates of title over them. Three days
later, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, Yolanda O. Alfonso,
issued to Eleuteria Rivera TCT No. C-314537[15] covering a
portion of Lot 23 with an area of 14,391.54 square meters. On
December 12, 1996, the trial court issued another Order
directing the acting Branch Clerk to issue a Certificate of
Finality of the Order dated September 9, 1996.
Thereafter, one Rosauro R. Aquino filed a petition for certiorari
contesting said Order of December 12, 1996 and impugning
the partial partition and adjudication to Eleuteria Rivera of Lots
23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 at the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, a writ of possession[16] was issued in Eleuteria
Riveras favor on December 26, 1996 upon the Order[17] of
Judge Discaya issued on the same date. Accordingly, Sheriff
Cesar L. Cruz served a Notice to Vacate[18] dated January 2,
1997 upon Phil-Ville, requiring it to vacate Lots 23-A and
28. Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc., which occupied Lot 28-A-
2, was also served a copy of the notice. Aggrieved, Bonifacio
Shopping Center, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43009, before the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision[19] dated February 19, 1997,
the appellate court set aside and declared as void the Order
and Writ of Possession dated December 26, 1996 and the
Notice to Vacate dated January 2, 1997. The appellate court
explained that a party who has not been impleaded in a case
cannot be bound by a writ of possession issued in connection
therewith.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1997, Eleuteria
Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio died at the age of 96.[20]
On April 23, 1997, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
Order No. 137 creating a special committee to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of OCT No. 994 and
its derivative titles.
On April 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 granting Rosauro R.
Aquinos petition and setting aside the RTCs Order of
September 9, 1996, which granted Eleuteria Riveras prayer for
partition and adjudicated in her favor portions of Lots 23, 28-A-
1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate. The appellate court
likewise set aside the Order and the Writ of Possession dated
December 26, 1996.
Nonetheless, on June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for
quieting of title and damages against the surviving heirs of
Eleuteria Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio (namely Maximo R.
Bonifacio, Ceferino R. Bonifacio, Apolonia B. Tan, Benita B.
Caina, Crispina B. Pascual, Rosalia B. de Gracia, Teresita S.
Doronia, Christina B. Goco, Arsenio C. Bonifacio, Carmen B.
Bernardino and Danilo C. Bonifacio) and the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-
507 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 122.
26
On October 7, 1997, then Senator Marcelo B. Fernan filed P.S.
Resolution No. 1032 directing the Senate Committees on
Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing
and Resettlement to conduct a thorough investigation, in aid of
legislation, of the irregularities surrounding the titling of the
properties in the Maysilo Estate.
In a Decision[22] dated March 24, 2000, the Caloocan RTC
ordered the quieting of Phil-Villes titles over Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2
and 1-G-3, declaring as valid TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and
270923 in Phil-Villes name. The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the quieting of title of the plaintiff over Lots 1-G-
1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, all the subd. plan Psd-1-13-006209, being
a portion of Lot 1-G, Psd-2731, LRC Rec. No. 4429, situated in
Kalookan City, as owner thereof in fee simple and with full faith
and credit;
2. Declaring Transfer Ce[r]tificates of Title Nos. 270921,
270922 and 270923 in the name of Phil-Ville Development and
Housing Corporation over the foregoing parcels of land issued
by the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, as valid and
effective;
3. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-314537 over
Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate situated in Maysilo,
Kalookan City, in the name of Eleuteria Rivera, issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, as null and void and with
no force and effect;
4. Ordering the private defendants to surrender to the
Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, thru this Court, the
Owners Duplicate Certificate of said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera;
5. Directing the public defendant, Register of Deeds of
Kalookan City to cancel both Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera on file with the
Register of Deeds for Kalookan City, and the
Owners Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-
314537 being required to be surrendered by the private
defendants; and
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
6. Ordering the private defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly
and severally, the sum of P10,000.00, as and by way of
attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
In upholding Phil-Villes titles, the trial court adopted the
conclusion in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 [24] dated
May 25, 1998 that there is only one OCT No. 994, registered
on May 3, 1917, and that OCT No. 994, purportedly registered
on April 19, 1917 (from which Eleuteria Riveras title originated)
does not exist. The trial court also found that it was physically
impossible for respondents to be the heirs of Eleuteria Riveras
grandmother, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the
registered owners of OCT No. 994, because Maria de la
Concepcion was born sometime in 1903, later than Eleuteria
Rivera who was born in 1901.[25] Lastly, the RTC pointed out
that contrary to the contentions of Riveras heirs, there is no
overlapping of titles inasmuch as Lot 23 lies far from Lot 23-A,
where Phil-Villes lands are located.
On April 13, 2000, Atty. K.V. Faylona, on behalf of
respondents, addressed a letter[26] to the Branch Clerk of Court
of the Caloocan City RTC requesting the complete address of
Phil-Ville and its counsel. Supposedly, respondents counsels
of record, Attys. Nicomedes Tolentino and Jerry D. Baares,
had abandoned the defense but still kept the records of the
case. Thus, the Notice of Appeal[27] on behalf of respondents
was filed by Atty. Faylona while two of the heirs, Danilo
Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino, filed a separate Notice of
Appeal[28] through their own counsel. The appeals were
consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66547.
On April 17, 2000, respondents withdrew their appeal and
instead filed before this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,[29] which was docketed as G.R. No. 142640. In a
Resolution[30] dated September 25, 2000, the Court referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the
merits since the case does not involve pure questions of
law. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the Resolution,
but the Court denied their motion. Thus, respondents petition
was transferred to the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 62211.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision[31] in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547, dismissing
the appeal as regards Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen
Bernardino. Yet, along with Danilo and Carmen, respondents
moved for reconsideration on the contention that they are not
bound by the judgment since they had withdrawn their appeal
therein. The Court of Appeals denied said motion in a
Resolution dated June 7, 2004. Danilo, Carmen and
respondents elevated the case to the Supreme Court through
a Petition for Review on Certiorari, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 163397. Said petition, however, was denied by this
Court in a Resolution dated September 8, 2004 for being filed
out of time.
Subsequently, on January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211,
setting aside the RTC judgment and dismissing Phil-Villes
complaint. The appellate court held that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to hear Phil-Villes complaint as it effectively seeks
to annul the Order dated May 25, 1962 of the CFI in LRC No.
4557, which directed the substitution of the late Eleuteria
Rivera and her co-heirs in place of Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal as registered owners on OCT No. 994. The appellate
court likewise affirmed the validity of OCT No. 994 registered
on April 19, 1917 citing the Supreme Court Decisions
in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of
Appeals[32] and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals[33] as precedents.
Phil-Ville sought reconsideration[34] of the decision, but the
Court of Appeals denied its motion in the assailed Resolution
dated March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH
DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ON THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF RESPONDENTS MAXIMO
BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R SP NO. 62211 BECAUSE OF
THE EARLIER DISMISSAL OF THEIR APPEAL IN CA-G.R
NO. 66547.
II.
27
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH
DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ON THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY RESPONDENTS
MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R. NO. SP 62211
WHICH DOES NOT RAISE PURE QUESTION[S] OF LAW OR
ISSUE[S] OF JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE THE
PROPER REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEM IS ORDINARY
APPEAL WHICH, AS STATED, HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISMISSED IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 66547.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH
DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION ON THE COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE FILED BY PETITIONER PHIL-VILLE IN CIVIL CASE
NO. C-507, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IN FAILING TO
DECLARE RESPONDENTS MAXIMO [BONIFACIO], ET AL.
ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL TO RAISE THE SAID ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION.[35]
Condensed, petitioner puts in issue the following: (1) whether
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of respondents petition; and (2) whether the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring that the trial court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. C-507.
Pertinently, however, the genuine issue in this case is whether
TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes
a cloud over petitioners titles over portions of Lot 23-A of the
Maysilo Estate.
Petitioner argues mainly that the Court of Appeals acted
without jurisdiction in resolving respondents petition for review
since it had dismissed their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547
for failure to file brief. Petitioner also points out that
respondents petition is defective because Maximo Bonifacio
alone signed its verification and certification of non-forum
shopping without proof that he was authorized to sign for the
other respondents. It contends that the ruling in MWSS v.
Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals will not invalidate its titles because it is not a party to
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
any of said cases. As well, petitioner invokes the finding in the
joint investigation by the Senate and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) that there is only one OCT No. 994, that is, the one
registered on May 3, 1917. It maintains that the trial court had
jurisdiction to hear its action since it is one for quieting of title
and not for annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962.
Conversely, respondents rely on MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that upheld
the titles emanating from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,
1917. Therefore, they insist that petitioner has no cause of
action to seek the nullification of their title which is a derivative
of said OCT. Respondents reiterate that since they had
withdrawn their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547, the Court of
Appeals decision therein applies only to Danilo Bonifacio and
Carmen Bernardino. Lastly, they believe that petitioners action
is one for annulment of judgment, which is foreign to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner argues in its first two assignments of errors that the
Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining respondents petition. However, said contention
deserves scant consideration since the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 62211, properly assumed jurisdiction over
respondents case after the same was referred to it by this
Court through our Resolution dated September 25, 2000. The
issue raised by respondents, as petitioners in G.R. No.
142640, was purely a question of fact that is beyond the power
of this Court to resolve. Essentially, respondents asked the
Court to determine the ownership of the lots purportedly
covered by petitioners titles.
Neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the
dismissal of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547 is binding on
respondents. The appellate court itself recognized the
withdrawal of appeal filed by respondents, thus:
However, defendants Maximo R. Bonifacio, et al. withdrew
their appeal so that the only appellants herein are defendants-
appellants Danilo R. Bonifacio, et al.[36]
So did the trial court err in taking cognizance of petitioners
action for quieting of title contrary to respondents assertion
that it is actually one for annulment of the CFI Order dated
May 25, 1962? To this query, we rule in the negative.
The nature of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was
filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of
such relief.[37]
In its complaint, petitioner alleges:
27. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera,
although apparently valid and effective, are in truth and in fact
invalid and ineffective[;]
27.1. An examination of Decree No. 36455 issued on April 19,
1917 in LRC Case No. 4429 and also of OCT No. 994 which
was issued pursuant thereto will show that Lot 23 covered by
the said TCT No. C-3145[3]7 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is not
one of the 34 parcels of land covered by said Decree No.
36455 and OCT 994;
27.2. That, as hereinbefore stated, the same TCT No. C-
314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is a direct transfer from
OCT No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917. The fact,
however, is that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was
issued pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in LRC Case No. 4429
and said OCT 994 was registered with the Register of Deeds
of Rizal on May 3, 1917. The Office of the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City or of Malabon or of Pasig City has no record of
any OCT No. 994 that was allegedly registered on April 19,
1917;
27.3. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera
could not cover Lot 23-A or any portion/s thereof because, as
hereinbefore recited, the whole of Lot 23-A had been totally
disposed of as early as July 24, 1923 and she and/or any of
her alleged predecessors-in-interest is not among those
named in the memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 994
as vendees or vendors of said Lot 23-A;[38]
Ultimately, petitioner submits that a cloud exists over its titles
because TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera
purports to cover the same parcels of land covered by
petitioners TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. It points
out that what appears to be a valid and effective TCT No. C-
314537 is, in truth, invalid because it covers Lot 23 which is
not among those described in the OCT No. 994 on file with the
28
Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered on May 3,
1917. Petitioner notes that the OCT No. 994 allegedly
registered on April 19, 1917 and from which TCT No. C-
314537 was derived, is not found in the records of the Register
of Deeds. In other words, the action seeks the removal of a
cloud from Phil-Villes title and/or the confirmation of its
ownership over the disputed properties as the successor-in-
interest of N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest in real property by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently
valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine
the respective rights of the complainant and the other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and
make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the
benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as
well as use, and even abuse the property.[39]
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two
requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[40]
As regards the first requisite, we find that petitioner was able to
establish its title over the real properties subject of this
action. Petitioner submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale[41] by which it acquired the subject property from N. Dela
Merced and Sons, Inc., as well as copies of OCT No. 994
dated May 3, 1917 and all the derivative titles leading to the
issuance of TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in
petitioners name as follows:
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Title No. Registration Holder 17745 1960 & Co. case, the Court declared void the titles of the Manotoks and
Date Aranetas which were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on
C-13794 April 21, 1978 Pacifico Nepomuceno May 3, 1917 consistent with its ruling
8004 July 24, 1923 Vedasto Galino & Co. Inc. in MWSS and Gonzaga. The Court disregarded the DOJ and
Senate reports on the alleged anomalies surrounding the titling
8059 September 3, -ditto- C-14603 May 16, 1978 N. de La Merced & of the Maysilo Estate.
1923 Sons, Inc.
However, on motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a
8160 October 24, -ditto- T-148220 April 22, 1987 Phil-Ville Resolution[48] dated December 14, 2007 which created a
1923 Development and Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the
Housing Corp.[42] consolidated cases on remand. The Special Division was
8164 November 6, Juan Cruz Sanchez tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
1923 Petitioner likewise presented the Proyecto de particion de la proceedings and submit to the Court a report on its findings as
Hacienda de Maysilo[43] to prove that Lot 23-A, of which well as recommend conclusions within three months from the
8321 February 26, -ditto- petitioners Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 form part, is among finality of said Resolution. However, to guide the proceedings
1924 the 34 lots covered by OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, before the Special Division, the Court laid the following
1917. It produced tax receipts accompanied by a definitive conclusions:
8734 September 11, Emilio Sanchez Certification[44] dated September 15, 1997 issued by the City
1924 Treasurer of Caloocan stating that Phil-Ville has been First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record,
religiously paying realty taxes on the lots. Its documentary that mother title was received for transcription by the Register
12946 November 21, -ditto- evidence also includes a Plan[45] prepared by the Chief of the
1927 of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which
Geodetic Surveys Division showing that Lot 23-A of the should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It
Maysilo Estate is remotely situated from Lot 23 portion of the may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT
28315 July 16, 1935 Eastern Syndicate
Maysilo Estate. Petitioner ties these pieces of evidence to the No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
Mining Co., Inc.
finding in the DOJ Committee Report[46] dated August 28, 1997 registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be
39163 November 18, Royal Lawrence and Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 considered as the date of the title or the date when the title
1939 Rutter that, indeed, there is only one OCT No. 994, that is, the one took effect.
registered on May 3, 1917.
43559 July 26, 1941 Mapua Institute of Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994
Technology On the other hand, respondents have not adduced competent dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
evidence to establish their title to the contested property or to inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made
18767 June 16, 1950 Sofia Nepomuceno dispute petitioners claim over the same. It must be noted that specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917
the RTC Order dated September 9, 1996 in Civil Case No. C- casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
57541 March 13, 1958 Leona N. de Jesus, 424, which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. C-314537 in inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to
Pacifico the name of Eleuteria Rivera had long been set aside by the invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject
Nepomuceno, Sofia Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034. Clearly, property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates
Nepomuceno, respondents claim anchored primarily on TCT No. C-314537 appearing on their respective titles.
Soledad Nepomuceno lacks legal basis. Rather, they rely simply on the Courts
de Jesus pronouncement in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that OCT No. 994 registered on Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the
81679 December 15, Pacifico Nepomuceno, May 3, 1917 and all titles emanating from it are void. cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an
1960 Sofia N. Jugo, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
Soledad N. de Jesus The Supreme Court sustained said decisions in the case acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions
of Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development in MWSS [and] Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994
(81680) December 15, Pacifico Nepomuceno Corporation[47] promulgated on November 29, 2005. In said dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the
29
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
factual setting the same as or similar to that at
bar.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a
Resolution[50] reversing its Decision of November 29, 2005 and
declaring certain titles in the names of Araneta and Manotok
valid. In the course of discussing the flaws of Jose Dimsons
title based on his alleged 25% share in the hereditary rights of
Bartolome Rivera, Eleuteria Riveras co-petitioner in LRC No.
4557, the Court noted:
However, the records of these cases would somehow negate
the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report
of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981
showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as
gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496).
It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old
in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the
other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she
could have been born only on [1903]. This alone creates an
unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein
Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years
younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as
to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim
a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.[51]
The same is true in this case. The Death Certificate[52] of
Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was 96 years old when she
died on February 22, 1997. That means that she must have
been born in 1901. That makes Rivera two years older than
her alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal who
was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for
Eleuteria Rivera to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal.
Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate shows that
Lot 23-A was awarded, not to Maria de la Concepcion Vidal,
but to Isabel Tuason, Esperanza Tuason, Trinidad Jurado,
Juan O Farrell and Angel O Farrell.[53] What Vidal received as
her share were Lot 6 and portions of Lots 10 and 17, all
subject to the usufructuary right of her mother Mercedes
Delgado. This was not at all disputed by respondents.
On the other hand, Vedasto Galino, who was the holder of
TCT No. 8004 registered on July 24, 1923 and to whom
petitioner traces its titles, was among the successful
petitioners in Civil Case No. 391 entitled Rosario Negrao, et al.
v. Concepcion Vidal, et al., who sought the issuance of bills of
sale in favor of the actual occupants of certain portions of the
Maysilo Estate.
Be that as it may, the second requisite in an action for quieting
of title requires that the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Article
476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently
valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be
prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. The fourth element
is not present in the case at bar.
While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria
Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was
subsequently shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same
parcels of land that are described in petitioners
titles. Foremost, Riveras title embraces a land measuring
14,391.54 square meters while petitioners lands has an
aggregate area of only 8,694 square meters. On the one hand,
it may be argued that petitioners land could be subsumed
within Riveras 14,391.54-square meter property. Yet, a
comparison of the technical descriptions of the parties titles
negates an overlapping of their boundaries.
The technical description of respondents TCT No. C-314537
reads:
30
A parcel of land (Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate)
situated in Maysilo, Caloocan, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by Blk. 2; on the SW.,
along line 2-3 by Jacinto Street, along lines 3-4-5 by Blk. 4;
along line 5-6 by Bustan St., and San Diego St., on the S.,
along lines 6-7-8 by Blk. 13, all of Caloocan Cadastre; on the
NE., along line 8-9 by Caloocan Cadastre; and on the N.,
along line 9-1 by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. Beginning
at a point marked 1 on plan, being S. 28 deg. 30E., 530.50 m.
from MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre; thence S. 07 deg. 20W.,
34.00 m. to point 2; S. 17 deg. 10E., 12.00 m. to point 3;
(0/illegible)
S. 15 deg. 31E., 31.00 m. to point 4; S. 27 deg. 23E., 22.50 m.
to point 5;
S. 38 deg. 41E., 43.20 m. to point 6; S. 71 deg. 35E., 10.60 m.
to point 7;
N. 84 deg. 30E., 38.80 m. to point 8; N. 11 deg. 40W., 131.20
m. to point 9;
N. 89 deg. 10W., 55.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing
an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
NINETY ONE SQUARE METERS AND FIFTY FOUR
SQUARE DECIMETERS (14,391.54). more or less. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by Old Ps. cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings
true;[54] (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, the technical description of petitioners
lands before they were subdivided under TCT No. T-148220 is
as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1-G of the subdivision plan Psd-2731,
being a portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate, GLRO Rec. No.
4429), situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of
Rizal. Bounded on the North., by Calle A. Samson; on the
East., by properties of Gregoria de Jesus, Arcadio de
Jesus and Felix de Jesus; on the South., by properties of
Lucas Bustamante and Patricio Galauran; and on the West.,
by property of Patricio Galauran; and Lot No. 1-E of the
subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being
N.69 deg. 27E., 1600.19 m. from BLLM No. 1, Mp. of
Caloocan, more or less, thence S. 21 deg. 25E., 44.78 m. to
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
point 2; thence S. 14 deg. 57E., 37.24 m. to point 3; thence S.
81 deg. 11W., 20.28 m. to point 4; thence S. 86 deg. 06W.,
15.45 m. to point 5; thence N. 67 deg. 20W., 15.91 m. to point
6; thence N. 35 deg. 19W., 37.56 m. to point 7; thence N. 27
deg. 11W., 12.17 m. to point 8; thence N. 19 deg. 26W., 23.32
m. to point 9; thence N. 13 deg. 08W., 28.25 m. to point 10;
thence S. 78 deg. 45W., 13.00 m. to point 11; thence N. 0 deg.
56E., 48.92 m. to point 12; thence N. 89 deg. 13E., 53.13 m. to
point 13; thence S. 21 deg. 24E., 67.00 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (8,694) SQUARE METERS, more
or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground points 1,2,3 and 13 by Old PLS conc.
mons. point 4,6,7,8 and 9 by Old PLS stone mons.; points 5 to
10 and old stakes points 11 and 12 by PLS conc. mons.
bearings true, declination 1 deg. 08E., date of the original
survey, Sept. 8-27, Oct. 4-21 and Nov. 17-18, 1911 and that of
the subdivision survey, Oct. 14 and 15, 1927.[55] (Emphasis
supplied).
Such disparity in location is more vividly illustrated in the Plan
prepared by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division, showing the relative positions of Lots 23 and
23-A. As it appears on the Plan, the land covered by
respondents TCT No. C-314537 lies far west of petitioners
lands under TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. Strictly
speaking, therefore, the existence of TCT No. C-314537 is not
prejudicial to petitioners titles insofar as it pertains to a
different land.
Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a
proceeding quasi in rem.[56] In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named a defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests to the obligation or loan
burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between
the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or
cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.The
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties who joined in
the action.[57]
Yet, petitioner was well aware that the lots encompassed by its
titles are not the same as that covered by respondents title. In
its complaint, Phil-Ville alleges:
27.4. That Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate, as Order which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria
described in said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant
Rivera when plotted using its tie line to MBM No. 1, Caloocan thereto. And although petitioners complaint is captioned as
Cadastre is outside Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate. This must Quieting of Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for, is
be so because Lot 23 is not [a] portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of
Estate.[58] respondents. This is consistent with the nature of the relief in
an action for declaratory relief where the judgment in the case
This brings petitioners action within the purview of Rule 63 of can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay
the Rules of Court on Declaratory Relief. Section 1 of Rule 63 damages or to perform any act.[59]
provides:
Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.-Any person interested respondents TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose Rivera constitutes a cloud over its title, it has nevertheless
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, successfully established its ownership over the subject
ordinance or any other governmental regulation may, before properties and the validity of its titles which entitles it to
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate declaratory relief.
Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
his rights or duties, thereunder. is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2005 and
Resolution dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to CA-G.R. SP No. 62211 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate March 24, 2000 of the Caloocan RTC in Civil Case No. C-507
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
brought under this Rule. (Emphasis supplied).
No pronouncement as to costs.
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the SO ORDERED.
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy
for ending controversies that have not reached the state where
another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before
they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights,
and a commission of wrongs.
In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of
title after it was served a notice to vacate but before it could be
dispossessed of the subject properties. Notably, the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the
31