Mackie on Practical Reason

Author(s): David Phillips

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 10, No. 5, Moral Skepticism: 30 Years of
Inventing Right and Wrong (November 2007), pp. 457-468
Published by: Springer
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EthicTheoryMoralPrac(2007) 10:457-468
DOI 10. 1007/s10677-007-9096-0

Mackie on PracticalReason

David Phillips

Accepted:26 June2007 /Publishedonline:30 November2007

SpringerScience+ BusinessMedia B.V. 2007

Abstract I argue thatJohnMackie's treatment of practicalreason is both attractiveand

unjustlyneglected.In particular,I argue thatit is importantlydifferentfrom,and much
moreplausiblethan,thekindof instrumentalist approachfamouslyarticulatedby Bernard
Williams.This mattersforthe interpretation of the argumentsforMackie's most famous
thesis:moralscepticism,the claim thatthereare no objectivevalues. RichardJoycehas
recentlydefendeda versionor variantof moralscepticismby invokingan instrumentalist
theorylike Williams'.I arguethatthisis a seriousstrategicmistake.

Mackie Moralskepticism Practicalreason

Keywords Instrumentalism
RichardJoyce Williams

My topicin thispaper is JohnMackie's treatment of practicalreason.I will arguethathis

approach is both attractiveand unjustlyneglected.In particular,I will argue thatit is
importantly from,and much more plausible than,the kind of instrumentalist
different
approachfamouslyarticulated by BernardWilliams.1This mattersforthe interpretation of
theargumentsforMackie's mostfamousthesis:moralscepticism,theclaim thatthereare
no objectivevalues. RichardJoycehas recentlydefendeda versionor variantof Mackie's
view by invokingan instrumentalist theorylike Williams'.WhileJoycedoes a nicejob in a
numberof ways of framingMackie's argument, I shall arguethatit is a seriousmistaketo
invokeinstrumentalism in its defense.
I will begin withinterpretive issues, arguingthatMackie develops a view of practical
reasonsignificantlydifferent fromWilliams'.I will thenturnto philosophicalassessment,
arguingthatthe view I attribute to Mackie is significantly moreplausible thanWilliams'

'Williams'viewsaredevelopedin fourplaces."Internal
and External Reasons"first
appearedinMoralLuck.
I shallgivepage references in Darwallet al. 1997.Williamsreturned
to thereprint to thetopicin Williams
1989and Williams1995. His finalreflections
on thetopicare to be foundin Williams2001.
D. Phillips(El)
Department of Philosophy, of Houston,Houston,TX 77204-3004,USA
University
e-mail:DPhillips@uh.edu
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458 D. Phillips

view. Finally,I will ask whatthisshows about how to understand

Mackie's argumentsfor
moralskepticism.

1 Mackie and Williams on Practical Reason

Begin withWilliams,who develops the most famousrecentversionof the view thatall

reasonsare desire-based.He distinguishesinternalfromexternalreasons,and arguesthat
theonlytrueor genuinereasonsare internal. The simplestaccountof internalreasons,as he
notes,is one accordingto which"A has a reasonto 4> ifA has some desirethesatisfaction
of whichwill be servedby his c|)ing"(Williams1981,p. 363). Williams'accountof internal
reasonsgoes beyondthissimple"sub-Humean"model in two majorrespects:the agent's
"subjectivemotivationalset,"S, can containmorethanjust desires,and deliberationis not
restrictedto straightforward
means-endscalculation.
He thenconsiderswhetherthereare any genuineor correctexternalreasonsstatements,
and concludesthatthereare not:
The sortof considerationsofferedhere stronglysuggestto me thatexternalreason
statements,when definitelyisolated as such, are false, or incoherent,or really
somethingelse misleadinglyexpressed... The formulationin termsof reasons does
have an effect,
particularlyin its that
suggestion the is
agent being irrational,and this
suggestion,once thebasis of an internalreasonclaim has been clearlylaid aside, is
bluff.(Williams 1981, pp. 369-70)
In "Internaland ExternalReasons," Williamsarguesforhis view by focusingon a case
fromHenryJames,thatof Owen Wingrave.As Williamsdescribesthecase, Owen's father
claimsthatOwen has a reasontojoin thearmy,butthereis nothingin Owen's S suchthatif
he deliberatedhe would be motivatedto join the army.The argumentbegins with the
following(internalism)constraint:
In consideringwhatan externalreasonstatement mightmean,we have to remember
thedimensionof possible explanation.If somethingcan be a reasonforaction,thenit
could be someone'sreasonforactingon a particularoccasion,and itwould thenfigure
in an explanationofthataction.(Williams 1981, p. 367)
The argument thengoes as follows:No externalreasonstatement could by itselfofferan
explanation of someone's action ex
(because, hypothesi, it can be trueindependently of the
agent's motivations).So externalreasons statementsmustexplain action in conjunction
withsome "psychologicallink"(Williams 1981, p. 367). The obvious candidateto be that
psychologicallink is belief. One possibilityis thatthe distinctiveexplanatoryrole of
externalreasons statementsis played by explanationsinvokinga person's belief thata
particularconsiderationconstitutesa reason.But thispossibilitymustbe rejected,because a
person who had such a belief"appearsto be one aboutwhom...an internalreasonstatement
could trulybe made" (Williams 1981, p. 367). So the distinctiveexplanatoryrole of an
externalreason statement "will have to be revealedby consideringwhat it is to come to
believe such a statement" (Williams 1981, p. 367, italicsin original).But Williamsargues
thatthispossibilitytoo mustbe rejected.
Given the agent's earlierexistingmotivations,and thisnew motivation, whathas to
hold forexternalreasonstatements to be true,on thisline of interpretation,
is thatthe
new motivationcould be in some way rationallyarrivedat, grantedthe earlier
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Mackieon practicalreason 459

motivations. Yet at thesame timeitmustnotbearto theearliermotivationsthekindof

rationalrelationwhichwe consideredin theearlierdiscussionof deliberation - forin
thatcase an internalreasonstatementwould have been truein thefirstplace. I see no
reasonto supposethattheseconditionscould possiblybe met.(Williams1981,p. 368)
For currentpurposes,the key featureof Williams' positionis this: he gives a very
special statusto internalreasonsclaims. They can, he claims,be trueor correctin a way
thatno otherreasonsclaims can be.
Mackie's treatment, I shall suggest,contrastswith Williams' in this key respect.For
Mackie, internalreasons claims have no such special status and in particularare not
speciallyauthoritative.The storyabout theirauthority is ultimatelythe same as the story
about the authority of othernormativeclaims: theyare authoritative only when a certain
backgroundis presupposed;theylack the special authority that,Mackie themoralsceptic
thinks,nothingin theworldhas.
To show thatthisis Mackie's view,beginby notingthecommonfeaturesof an approach
to moral termsand conceptsfoundin a numberof places in the firstthreeChaptersof
Ethics.On thisapproach,moralclaims(or,moregenerally, value claims)can be assessed as
trueor falseonlywhencertainnormativeitems(standards,requirements, desires,ends,etc.)
are presupposed.For thisreason,employinga termMackie does not employ,I will call it
'the presupposition approach'.It makes an earlyappearancein Section5 of Chapter1:
One wayofstating thatthereareno objectivevaluesis tosaythatvaluestatements cannot
be eithertrueorfalse.Butthisformulation,too,lendsitselftomisinterpretation.Forthere
are certainkindsof value statements
whichundoubtedly can be trueor false,even if,in
thesenseI intend,thereareno objectivevalues.Evaluationsofmanysortsarecommonly
made in relationto agreedand assumedstandards.(Mackie 1977, pp. 25-26)
Considernextwhat Mackie says in introducing
the (familiar)notionof a hypothetical
imperative:
'If you wantto do X, do Y' (or 'You oughtto do Y') will be a hypothetical
imperative
ifit is based on thesupposedfactthatY is, in thecircumstances, theonly(or thebest)
available means to X, thatis, on a causal relationbetweenY and X. The reasonfor
doing Y lies in its causal connectionwith the desired end, X; the oughtnessis
contingent upon thedesire.(Mackie 1977, pp. 27-28)
Then noticeMackie's proposed"generaldefinition
of 'good'":

(etc.) ofthekindin question.(Mackie 1977,pp. 55-56,

Such as tosatisfyrequirements
italicsin original)
Mackie goes on to suggest that contexttells us what kind of requirements are in
question.Finally,noticeMackie's accountof the meaningof 'ought' and of the different
kindsof 'ought' claims.His "firstattemptat a generalequivalentof 'a oughtto G'" is:
Thereis a reasonfora's Ging. (Mackie 1977, pp. 73-74)
Then he allows forseveraldifferent sortsof reasonswithwhichto fillin thisformula:
hypotheticallyimperativereasons, institutional reasons, epistemic reasons, prudential
reasons,reasonsprovidedby the wants and needs of others.He also mentionsthe kind
of "intrinsicrequirements" in which, of course, he disbelieves. I suggestthat in these
passages thereis a commongeneralidea: thatvalue claims can be trueor correct
different
onlywhen some normativeitemis presupposed.
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460 D. Phillips

Care is needed in seeing just what follows from Mackie's developmentof this
presupposition approach.One of Mackie's themesis thattoo muchof themoralphilosophy
contemporary thewritingof Ethicswronglyfocuseson linguisticand semanticissues,
with
excluding importantand independentmetaphysicalissues. Thus we should not expect
Mackie directlyto inferanythingmetaphysicalfromtheselinguisticor conceptualclaims.
He thinksthatthe truthof these linguisticor conceptualclaims is compatiblewith the
falsityof moralscepticism.Indeed,thestructure of his case forhis errortheoryrequiresthat
he distinguish, in Michael Smith'sterminology (Smith 1994, pp. 63-66), rationalismas a
conceptual claim (which Mackie accepts) from rationalism as a substantive
claim(whichhe
rejects).Nonetheless, thereis an important lesson suggestedby Mackie's embraceof the
presuppositionapproach: that thereis nothingspecial about hypotheticalimperativesor
internalreasons.Hypothetical oughtclaims or internalreasonsclaims are truecontingently
on certaindesires, in just the same way as institutional ought claims (e.g. involving
promising)are truespeakingfromwithintheinstitution of promising,and injust thesame
way as claims about the goodness of apples are true given presupposedstandardsor
requirements thatapples mustmeet. In none of thesecases are normativeclaims trueor
correctin a presupposition-independent way. Mackie will go on to argue,in effect,thatno
normativeclaims are trueor correctin a straightforward, or presuppositionindependent
way. Again,though, thisfurther claim is the of
product independent arguments againstthe
existenceof categoricalimperatives(specifically,the argumentsfromrelativity and from
queerness); Mackie certainlydoes not take it to follow just fromthe presupposition
approachitself.
Read thisway,Mackie's view is importantly different fromWilliams'.Mackie does not
pick out hypotheticalimperativeor internalreasons claims as having a special kind of
authority or validity,as Williamsdoes. They are in centralrespectsjust like otherfamiliar
evaluativeclaims; and in no such cases (he will go on to argue) is therethis kind of
authority.

2 Why Mackie's Treatmentis Better

The presuppositionapproach is philosophicallysuperiorto Williams' approach. The

problem with Williams' approach can be developed as a dilemma. To articulatethe
dilemma,begin by distinguishing between debunkingand non-debunking accounts of
normativepracticalreasonsclaims. Non-debunking accountsseek to capturethe ordinary
meaningof such claims. Debunkingaccountstake it insteadthattheordinarymeaningof
such claims involvessome metaphysicalerror,and so seek to offerinsteadthe best non-
erroneousreconstructionof such claims.
In outline,the dilemma is this: EitherWilliams offersa non-debunking account of
normativepracticalreasonsclaims, or he does not. If, as most interpreters
suppose,2he
offersa non-debunking account of practicalreasons claims, then Williams faces three
problems: that
first, each person'sown (contingent,idiosyncratic) subjectivemotivational

2 Scanlonis
quiteexplicitin interpreting
Williamsas developinga non-debunkingview.At p. 365 of What
WeOwe to Each Other,he writes:"I will assumethat[Williams']claimthatthereareonlyinternal reasons
does notreflect
skepticism aboutreasonsin thestandardnormativesense."Parfit
(1997) is equallyclear,in
"Reasons and Motivation," thathe sees Williamsas developinga reductive, but not a debunkingor
accountof normativepracticalreasons. Korsgaard,however,may take Williamsto be
eliminativist,
developinga debunking view; hercelebratedcritiqueof his workcomes,afterall, in an articleentitled
"ScepticismaboutPracticalReason."Page referenceto Korsgaardare to thereprint
in Darwallet al. 1997.
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Mackie on practical reason 461

set is made a sourceof authority, a role itis ill-suitedto play; second,thathis view conflicts
withfirmintuitions about the reasonspeople have; and third,thathis view conflictswith
the phenomenologyof deliberation.If, contraryto most interpreters, Williamsis read as
a
offering debunking account of practical reasons claims, then theproblemis thatthereare
betterdebunkingaccountsavailable,includingMackie's account,whichallows us to make
sense, in a way Williams'accountdoes not,of externalreasonsjudgments.
To develop theargumentmorefully,beginwiththefirsthornof thedilemma.Suppose
thatwe readWilliamsas offering a non-debunking accountof practicalreasonsclaims.The
firstproblemthenis thatWilliamsmakestheagent'ssubjectivemotivational set thesource
of authority;and, on reflection,that is a role that subjectivemotivationalsets are, in
themselves,ill-equippedto play.The idea of a normativepracticalreasonis the idea of an
authoritative considerationapplyingto an agent. Williams' view has no problemwith
applicationto an agent.But itdoes have a problemwithauthority. Whatsomeone'sdesires
are is, to a significantextent,an arbitrary, contingent factabout her.Why are her desires
therefore a source,or theonly source,of authority?
The second problemis thatWilliams' view conflictswith firmintuitionsabout the
reasonswe have. Any numberof possible examples can be used to illustratethispoint.
Considertwo. First,suppose thatAlice wants to smoke cigarettes.She does not enjoy
smokingcigarettes.She knowsaboutthelikelydeleteriousconsequencesforherhealth.But
herdesireto smokecigaretteswould,forall that,survivethekindof procedurally rational
reflection forwhichWilliams' view allows. He is thencompelledto say thatAlice has a
reasonto smokecigarettes. Her desireis itselfa sourceof authority. But surelythemerefact
thatAlice has thisdesire,and thatprocedurallyrationalreflection would not cause her to
lose thedesire,does notshow thatshe has a good reasonto smoke cigarettes.
Second, considera famousexample fromParfit,the example of the person who is
Future-Tuesday-Indifferent (Parfit1984, pp. 123-4). She cares equally about pains and
pleasure in the future,exceptthatshe doesn't care at all about pain or pleasureon future
Tuesdays. So she would preferagonyon a futureTuesdayto milddiscomfort on any other
day of theweek. She understands thatthedays of theweek arejust conventionalcalendar
divisions,and has no otherbizarremetaphysical beliefsin thelightof whichherattitudeto
Tuesdays would be more comprehensible.Her indifference to pain on futureTuesdays
would surviveprocedurallyrationalreflection. Again, Williams' view compels us to say
thatthispersonhas no reasonto care aboutpains on futureTuesdays.Again thatconflicts
withour firmintuitionsabout the reasons thispersonhas. Someone mightrespondthat
almostall normalpeople will turnout to have elementsin theirsubjectivemotivational sets
such that,on Williams'view,theydo have reasonto care about pain on futureTuesdays.
But Parfit'spoint is thatwe thinkthateven people who (by hypothesis)lack any such
elementnonethelessdo have reasonto care about pain on futureTuesdays.
The thirdproblem is that Williams' view conflictswith the phenomenologyof
deliberation.When we deliberate,we typicallydo not takethe value of the optionsabout
whichwe deliberateto dependon our desires.Instead,we takethedesiresto be responses
to the value. Let me quote two recentcharacterizations of thisproblem.The firstis from
Stephen Darwall, who invokes (and criticizes)terminology introduced by Pettitand Smith
1990:

Whata deliberating agenthas in view is rarelyhis own will or desiresas such,even if

takingsomethingas a reason is intimatelytied to desire. Someone who wants to
escape a burningbuildingdoesn't evaluate her options by consideringwhich is
likeliestto realize what she wants or wills. She is focused,rather,on her desire's
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462 D. Phillips

object:gettingout alive. The factthata successfulroutewould realizesomethingshe

wantsis apt to strikeheras beside thepointor,at best,as a trivialbonus.
This pointis sometimesputby sayingthatdesiresare in the"background"ratherthan
the foreground, of the practicalscene a deliberatingagent faces. The metaphoris
somewhatmisleading,however,since an agent'sdesiresare normallynot so muchin
thebackgroundof her deliberativefieldas outsideof it altogether.If we mustlocate
themspatially,a betterplace mightbe withinor behindthestandpoint fromwhichthe
agent views her alternativesratherthan towardsthe back of the scene she views.
(Darwall 2001, pp. 129-30)
The problemis also articulatedby Scanlon:
- to workto
If I takemyselfto have reasonto do somethingbecause it is worthwhile
alleviatesome or
forexample, to preventthedestruction
people's suffering, of some
greatbuilding- thisreason does not seem to depend on my seeing it as a reason.
Rather,I thinkthatI would be mistakennot to see thatit is worthwhileor excellent,
and mistakennotto care about such things...
Consequently, theclaim thatthereasons
they give me derive solely frommy desires, or fromwhat I care about, seems
(Scanlon 1998, p. 42)
deflationary.
It is important to be clear abouttheexact characterof thisproblem.The problemis not
thatWilliams' view requiresdeliberationto have thewrongfocus.An agentwho accepts
Williams' view need not focus on her subjectivemotivationalset when deliberating.She
can properlyfocuson theoptionsbetweenwhichshe has to choose and thevalues of those
options.On herview thesevalues are ultimately theproductof hersubjectivemotivational
set; but thatdoes not mean that,while deliberating, she mustfocus on thatfactor on her
subjectivemotivationalset.
The problem is ratherthat (as the quotation from Scanlon suggests) a serious
commitment to deliberationcannoteasily coexist,in manynormalagents,withacceptance
of Williams'view. Deliberationneed not focuson thesourceof value. But some accounts
of thesourceof value,includingWilliams'seem to undermine muchnormaldeliberation, in
the sense thatnormalagents,in deliberating, assume theirfalsity,and would thinksuch
deliberation pointlessif theycame to accept theseaccounts.
Given theseveryseriousproblems,therewould have to be verypowerfularguments on
the otherside to persuadeus to accept Williams' view. But his argumentshave no such
power.The argumentexplicitlyofferedin "Internaland ExternalReasons" tradeson the
internalism constraint identified earlier:
If somethingcan be a reasonforaction,thenit could be someone's reasonforacting
on a particularoccasion, and it would thenfigurein an explanationof thataction.
(Williams 1981, p. 367)
Williamstakesthisto showthattheonlygenuinereasonsareinternal inhis favoredsense,that
theyderivefromtheagent'ssubjectivemotivational set.But indoingso he failsto see thatthe
internalism
constraintmightjust as well be formulated
insteadas Korsgaardformulates it:
Practical-reason
claims,iftheyare reallyto presentus withreasonsforaction,mustbe
capable of motivating
rationalpersons.(Korsgaard1986, p. 377)
On thisreformulation,it does not followfromtheinternalism constraint
thatsomeone's
failingto be motivatedby a consideration shows thatit is nota reasonforher.For thereis

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Mackie on practical reason 463

always an alternativediagnosisavailable: thepersonis irrational.

Hence no argumentfrom
the existenceof an internal ism constraintsupportsthe idea thatall genuinereasons are
internalin Williams'favoredsense thattheydependon elementsof theagent'ssubjective
motivational set.
Relatedly,Williams' writingsometimes suggests that he supposes that the only
alternativeto his broad assimilationof normativeto motivatingreasonsis the implausible
suppositionthatthereis no connectionbetweenthe term"reason" as used of motivating
reasons,and the term"reason"as used of normativereasons.In Williams 1989 he makes
more explicitthan in Williams 1981 this general reason for acceptingthe internalism
constraint:theinternalism constraintshouldbe acceptedbecause theremustbe a connection
betweennormativeand explanatoryreasons,and the internalism constraintcharacterizes
such a connection.As he putsit:

of explanatoryand normativereasons.It mustbe a

The firstpointis the interrelation
mistakesimplyto separateexplanatoryand normativereasons.(Williams 1989, p. 5)
But thisagain is a mistake.It is perfectly possible to explainthe connectionsbetween
thetwo senses of "reason"withoutsupposingthatnormativereasonsare constructable out
of the agent's currentor appropriately correctedmotivations.Roughly,the connectionis
this:to say thatI have a motivating reason to do X is to say thatI have some beliefand
desirethatwill together motivateme to do X; to say thatI have a normativereasonto do X
is to say thatthereis a beliefdesirepairwhichwould,if I had them,motivateme to do X,
and where both belief and desire are correct.Such an account makes the connection
betweennormativeand motivating reasonsappropriately non-accidental, butdoes notentail
thatnormativereasonsare constructable out of currentmotivations.
At thispoint,despitethe generalview among Williams' interpreters thathe intendsto
a
give non-debunking account of normative reasons, might temptedto trytheother
we be
option. What if Williams does not reallysuppose thatthereare any normativereasons?
Whatifhe is reallytrying just to make thebestsense he can of normative reasonsclaimson
theassumptionthatnone are ever straightforwardly trueor correct?
Here,though,we encountera different problem.The problemis thatWilliams'proposed
accountis not thebest debunkingaccountof normativepracticalreasonsclaims. It is not
the best debunkingaccountfora reason Williams' argumentemphasizes:it forcesus to
understand externalreasonsstatements as false,or incoherent, or somethingof thesort.But,
given thatwe really make external reasons statements, it is an undesirablefeatureof a
debunking account that it make no sense of them. If we are anywayin the business of
interpreting normative reasons claims on the assumption that there are no valid normsof
practicalreason,thenthereare betterways to treatexternalreasonsstatements.
To see this more concretely,consider again the Owen Wingravecase. Instead of
interpreting Owen's father'sclaim thatthereis a reason for Owen to join the armyas
problematically or incoherently invokingOwen's subjectivemotivationalstate,we can
betterinterpret itas invokingthevalues of familyhonorand military dutyto whichOwen's
fatheris indeedcommitted. Doing this a
gives unitary semantics to reasons The
statements.
differencebetween internaland externalreasons claims is then a matterof what gets
invoked:standardsor aims constructed outof theagent'sown subjectivemotivational states
in thecase of internal reasonsstatements, othercontextually indicatedstandardsand aims in
thecase of externalreasonsstatements.
Williams'accountof a subjectivemotivationalset can then,indeed,supplya model for
thekindof setof standards, or,as we maysay,"normativeset",thatcan be used to interpret

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464 D. Phillips

externalreasonsstatements. Much of whatWilliamssays aboutsubjectivemotivational sets

can usefullybe transmuted intoparalleland moregeneralclaims aboutnormativesets. He
says thatS will typicallycontainmuchmorethandesires;correspondingly, normativesets
maycontainmuchmorethannormshavingtheverystraightforward structureof desires.He
says thatitmaybe somewhatvaguejust whatS does containand thatS will be rvisablein
thelightof deliberation. Much thesame can be said of normativesets like thestandardsof
familyhonorand militarydutyinvokedby Wingravesenior'sexternalreasonsclaim. And
therewill be a parallelbetweenthe kindof verdictsthatsubjectivemotivationalsets and
normativesets give about reason claims. Accordingto Williams' accountof an internal
reasonclaim,an agenthas an internalreasonto do A if she would be motivatedto do A
given full information. Accordingto the parallel account of externalreasons claims, an
agenthas an externalreason to do A if the normativeset invoked,afterfulldeliberation,
recommendsdoing A. But thecrucialpointis thatit is not sensibleto employthe model
only when in interpreting internalreasons statements.In an obvious modifiedform,the
model can be appliedto externalreasonsstatements too. So supplemented, Williams'view
startsto sound much more like Mackie's, and becomes much more attractive.But to
interpretand supplementWilliamsin thisway is to lose whatis distinctive in his position.
We can now explicitly make the comparison between Williams' view and the
presupposition view which (I argued) is to be foundin Mackie. The comparisonis very
much to Mackie's advantage.On the standard,non-debunking, reading,Williamsadmits
thatthereare truenormative reasonsclaims,buttakestheonlysourceof authority to be the
agent's subjectivemotivationalset. His positionthenfaces the threeseriousproblemswe
identified:thatit gives an inadequateaccountof theauthority of normativereasons,thatit
conflictswith intuitionsabout the reasons we have, and that it conflictswith the
phenomenology of deliberation.On thedebunkingreading,Williams'treatment of external
reasons statements, whereby no straightforward sense can be made of them, is again
unnecessarily costly.By contrast, Mackie's positionis a consistentdebunkingview.It treats
all practicalreasonsclaims in a unitaryway. They can be trueor correctonly relativeto
certainassumed aims, purposes,ends, or norms,whichcannotthemselvesbe straightfor-
wardlytrueor correct.The prominenceof Williams'view,and therelativeinconspicuous-
ness of Mackie's view,in discussionsof skepticalviews of practicalreason,reflectsa quite
mistakenestimateof theirrelativeplausibility.

3 How to Argue for Moral Scepticism

Mackie's errortheoryis generatedby the combinationof two claims: (1) thatordinary

moraljudgmentspresupposethe existenceof objectivevalues, and, (2) thatthereare no
objective values. Focus for now only on the argumentfor (2), the thesis Mackie calls
"moralskepticism".
Mackie distinguishes two differentargumentsformoralskepticism,the argumentfrom
relativity and theargument from queerness.In introducing
theargument fromqueerness,he
says it is "even more important" and "more generallyapplicable" thantheargumentfrom
relativity. Mackie gives an illuminatingsummaryof the case formoralskepticismas he
sees it. In thesummarythe firstconsiderationis theargumentfromrelativity; the second,
third,and fourthare elementsof theargumentfromqueerness:
The considerations
thatfavourmoralscepticismare: first,the relativity
or variability
of some important pointsof moralthinking
starting and theirapparentdependenceon
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Mackieon practicalreason 465

actual ways of life;secondly,the metaphysicalpeculiarityof the supposedobjective

values, in thattheywould have to be intrinsically action-guidingand motivating;
the
thirdly, problem of how such values could be consequentialor supervenientupon
naturalfeatures;fourthly, the corresponding epistemologicaldifficultyof accounting
forour knowledgeof value entitiesor featuresand of theirlinkswiththefeatureson
whichtheywould be consequential;fifthly, thepossibilityof explaining,in termsof
severaldifferent even if therewereno such objective
patternsof objectification...how
values people not only mighthave come to suppose thatthereare but also might
firmly persistin thatbelief.(Mackie 1977, p. 49)
There are importantways in which Mackie's presentationof the case for moral
scepticismcan be improved.About two of theseways, I take myselfto agree withJoyce.
First,I thinkthatthe argumentfromqueernessand the argumentfromrelativity have a
commontarget,a view aboutpracticalreason.Accordingto thisview,thereare categorical
imperatives, authoritative normsof practicalreason.The argumentfromqueernessand the
argument from relativity supposedto give us reasonto suppose thatthereare no such
are
authoritative norms.Thus it is a mistaketo suggest,as Mackie's writingsometimesdoes,
thatit is distinctively moralnorms,ratherthanauthoritative normsof practicalreasonmore
generally, that are his Secondly,
target. I thinkit is a mistaketo think(as Mackie sometimes
suggests,for instancein the second item in the quotationabove) thatthe problemwith
categoricalimperativesis a motivational problem.As Brinkand othershave argued,3it is
possible to make moral judgments objective withoutthinkingthat they necessarily
motivate;and as Korsgaardand Smithhave argued,the most sensible construalof the
necessityin motivationalinternalismis as rationalnecessity:thatsuch judgmentswill
motivateyou ifyou are rational.Whenmotivational internalismis understoodin thisway,it
is queer only if rationalityitselfis queer. It is a mistaketo suppose thatmotivational
necessitywould have to be automaticin a way thatwould bypassan agent'srationality.4
But in a crucialway, I thinkJoyce'sreconstruction of the case formoralscepticismis
mistaken.JoycedevotesChapter5 of TheMythofMorality,entitled"Internaland External
Reasons," to a defense of a variantof Williams' view. At the end of the Chapter,
summarizing theways in whichhe differsfromWilliams,Joycewrites:
I would not in factgo as faras to say bluntlythatany use of an externalreason is
false. We mustrecall the discussionof institutionalreasons fromChapter2: reason
claims thatare legitimatedby the rules of an institution, and which may well be
externalin nature.My objectionis onlywithexternalreasonclaimsthatdo notknow
theirplace - thatoverstepthemselvesby claimingto transcendall institutions.
Such, I
have argued,are moralreasons.Williams'constraint on reasonclaims- thata reason
mustbe a potentialmotivator - is bestconstruedas a necessaryconditionof normative
reasons.(Joyce2001, p. 133; italicsin original)
theproblemson thesecondhornofthedilemma
In thispassageJoycerecognizes,in effect,
we presentedforWilliams.But he showsno recognition of theproblemson thefirsthorn.
But it is not just that,as we have already seen, Williams gives a very problematic
account of normativepracticalreasons claims. Using Williams' account of normative

3 See bothBrink1984 and Brink1989.

4 On thisissuesee Garner1990.

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466 D. Phillips

reasons to supportMackie is a grave strategicerror.Mackie wants to offernaturalistic

objectionsto theexistenceof genuinerequirements of reason.If, like Williams,you allow
thatthereare genuinerequirements of reason(albeitrequirements derivedfroman agent's
desires),the whole strategyof principlednaturalisticobjectionto straightforwardly true
normative practicalreasonsclaims is undermined.The criticis perfectlyplaced to respond:
you too admitthatthereare authoritative reasons. So you cannot launch a naturalistic
objectionto thenotionof authoritativereasons.And once you have admittedthatthereare
authoritativereasons,we can show you (by rehearsingthe kind of problemsdiscussed in
Section2) whyyou shouldrejecttheview thatsuch reasonsare derived,or solelyderived,
fromtheagent'sdesires.

4 Objections

A firstobjectionis thatthereis reallyno difference betweenholding(as Williamsand Joyce

do) that the only real or genuine reasons are internal,and holding(as I suggestMackie
does) thatcategoricalimperatives are problematicwhile hypothetical imperatives are not.
But thereis an important difference.
There are two verydifferent to
ways develop the
idea thathypothetical imperativesare unproblematic. One way is Williams' and Joyce's
way. It is to take thereto be genuinereasonsgroundedin agent'sdesires.The desiresare
thesource,theonlysource,of genuinepracticalreasons.This line of thoughtfacesthethree
problemswe have alreadyidentified. The secondway to develop theidea thathypothetical
imperativesare unproblematic, which,I suggested,is Mackie's way and is much more
sensible,is to takeit thatthekey idea in hypothetical is theidea of hypothesis,
imperatives
or presupposition.Such imperativesbind only on a certainhypothesis,the hypothesis
involvedin havinga desire,thata certainend is good. But thenwe are in a positionto see
thatan agent'sdesiresare nottheonlypossiblesourceof suchhypotheses.Such hypotheses
may derive frompresupposedframeworks, institutions,or contexts,which are not the
product of the desires of the agent. This latterway of understandinghypothetical
imperatives is clearlysuperior,I suggest.For it does notinvolvean arbitraryprivilegingof
the agent's own currentdesires, and does not require the supporterof hypothetical
imperativesto admit the problematicidea thatthereare framework- or presupposition-
independent good practical reasons.
Darwall develops thecontrastI have in mindin an illuminating way:
It is a familiarthoughtthatinstrumentalreasoningissues "hypothetical" ratherthan
"categorical"imperatives.However, care is in
required interpreting this idea...What
we should say is thatthe imperativesor prescriptionsthatfollowfrominstrumental
reasoningare imperativesofpracticalconsistency.Theytelltheagenteitherto takethe
meansor to give up theend or thebeliefthatthemeansin questionis theonlymeans.
Theydo nottelltheagent,If A is yourend,and B theonlymeans,thenyou shoulddo
B. Thereis a sense in whichtheydo recommendB hypothetically, butin thissense B
is recommendedconditionallyon a "hypothesis"thattheagentassumes in havingA
as her end, namely,thatA is to be done. The imperatives, then,do not recommend
doingB simplyon theconditionthattheagenthas A as end. In thisway,theyarejust
like hypotheticaltheoretical
reasoning.(Darwall 2001, pp. 141-142)
A second objectionis thatmy comparisonbetween Williams' view and the view I
attributeto Mackie is unfair,because, in developingthe firsthorn of the dilemma for
Williams,I take Williamsto be in a moredemandingand difficult businessthanMackie:
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Mackieon practicalreason 467

the business of analyzingor offeringa nondebunkingaccount,ratherthan revisingor

offering a debunkingaccount,of normativepracticalreasonsclaims.
In responseto thisobjection,I would arguefirstthatthecomparisonis notunfair.WhatI
have arguedis thatWilliamsaccountfailswhicheverway you read it,while Mackie's is a
plausible debunkingaccount.This mattersin two ways. First,it mattersin the general
contextof debatesaboutpracticalreason.Williams'aim appearsin partto be to developan
alternative to the view of the "externalreasons theorist,"
a characterWilliamsintroduces
towardsthe end of Williams 1981. Williams characterizesthe externalreasons theorist
initiallyas someonewho "wantsto oppose Hume's generalconclusionand to make a lot
out of externalreasons statements" (Williams 1981, p. 368). Mackie's alternativeto the
view of theexternalreasonstheoristis clearlysuperiorto Williams'alternative, and ought
to be takenmuchmoreseriouslyin debatesaboutpracticalreason.Second, thesuperiority
of Mackie's view over Williams' view mattersin the particularcontextof argumentsfor
moralscepticism,thethesisthatthereare no objectivevalues. Given thatsuperiority, it is a
mistaketo burdenarguments formoralscepticismwiththepeculiarcostsof Williams'view.
Thereis, however,a further possibility.Mackie famouslyembracesan errortheory.He
thinksthat the (mistaken)idea that there are objective values is built not only into
philosophicaltheorybut also intoordinarylanguage.As he puts it:
It also has
Objectivismaboutvalues is notonlya featureof thephilosophicaltradition.
a firmbasis in ordinarythought,and even in the meaningsof moralterms.(Mackie
1977, p. 31)
But we mightrejectthis idea. We could thenask how Mackie's view of normative
practicalreasonsclaims would fareas a non-debunking view. In particular,
we could ask
how well it would fareagainstthe threeobjectionsbroughtagainstWilliams'view on the
firsthornof thedilemma.
Here again,Mackie's presupposition approachis clearlysuperiorto Williams'approach.
Considerin turnthe threeproblemsforWilliams.Firstthereis the problemthatdesires
seem too arbitrary and contingent to be sourcesof authority.The presupposition approach
would takethesourcesof authority to be assumedor presupposedstandards,ends,criteria
etc. These are bettersources of authority than desires.On the presuppositionapproach,
none of themis straightforwardly or presupposition-independently correct.In thatsense
theirauthority is not complete.But theycan be whateverstandards,ends, criteriaetc we
moststandardly taketo be relevantand appropriate in particularnormativecontexts.In this
way they are bettersources of authoritythan desires.
Second, thereis the problemof conflictbetween Williams' view and our intuitive
judgmentsabout whatwe have reasonto do, as exemplifiedby the cases of the irrational
smokerand thepersonwho is future-Tuesday-indifferent. Again,thepresupposition approach
does betterthanWilliams'view.Itdoes notforceus todenythatthefuture-Tuesday-indifferent
personhas reasonto careaboutpain on future Tuesdays.Rather,ittellsus thatthisclaimwill
be truewheninterpreted presupposing thenormswe aremostlikelyto invokehere- normsof
prudence. If common sense tells us that these norms of prudence are themselves
presupposition-independently correct,thencommonsense in thisrespectconflictswiththe
presupposition approach. But unlikeWilliams'approach,thepresupposition approachcan do
a reasonablejob of accommodating theordinaryintuition thatfutureTuesdayindifference is
irrational,
by understanding thisintuitionas invokingnormsof prudence.
Third,thereis theproblemof conflictbetweenWilliams'view and thephenomenology
of deliberation,the problemthat much normal deliberationwould be underminedby
acceptingWilliams'view.Again,Mackie's presupposition approachdoes better.It is notin
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468 D. Phillips

thesameway incompatible withseriousdeliberation.In deliberating

we oftenassumethatthe
values of optionsare nottheproductof our subjectivemotivational sets;we assumethatthe
options have value independent of our motivational
subjective sets. It is notnearlyso clear
thatwe assumea morespecificpositiveview: thatthatvalue is builtintothe fabricof the
world,ratherthanbuiltintonormative systemswhichwe accept.So, again,Mackie's looksa
more promisingnon-debunkingapproach to nonnativepractical reasons claims than
Williams'.Normaldeliberation does notobviouslyassumethatthepresupposition approach
is mistaken,whilemuchnormaldeliberation does assumethatWilliams'view is mistaken.
Thus, I suggest,Mackie's approachto practicalreasonis notonlysuperiorto Williams'
as a debunkingapproach;it is also superioras a nondebunking approach.But thisresult,
while interesting,is not directlyrelevantto thequestionhow best to reconstruct Mackie's
case for moral scepticism.For Mackie holds that ordinarymoral thoughtinvolves a
commitment to objectivevalues, and hence has to develop an errortheory.

5 Conclusions

Mackie's approach to practicalreason is distinctiveand unjustlyneglected.It is much

superiorto Williams'morefamousview. And it is a seriousmistake,forbothgeneraland
more particularstrategicreasons,to reconstructMackie's argumentformoral scepticism
withWilliams'view as a premise.5

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5
Many thanks to Carl Feierabend, Bredo Johnsen,Bill Nelson, an audience at the Universityof Houston,
and the editorsof this special issue for helpfulcomments on earlier versions of this paper.

Springer

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