PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL DUE

TO MALICIOUS NODE ATTACK IN MANETS USING NS2

SIDDLINGAPPAGOUDA C BIRADAR
Department of ECE, Faculty of Don Bosco Institute of Technology, Bangalore,560085,India

PRAHLAD KULKARNI
Department of TCE, Faculty of Dayananda Sagar College of Engineering,Bangalore,560085,India
siddubiradarr@gmail.com, ptkul1@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: The mobile ad hoc network (MANETs) consists of a collection of wireless mobile
nodes that are capable of communicating with each other without the use of infrastructure
network. In MANETs, routing attacks are particularly serious about attacks due to malicious
nodes. There are different types of security attack such as active and passive attacks. Attack due to
malicious node is a one in which a intermediate router that is supposed to
relay packets instead discards them which leads to data loss as a result the performance of the
network reduces. This usually occurs from a router becoming malicious router. The packet
drop attack is very hard to prevent. This paper describes the effect of security attack due to
malicious node on Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocols in MANETs using
certain performance metrics parameters.

KEYWORDS: MANETs, AODV, Malicious Node, Network Simulator 2.

INTRODUCTION

A MANETs is a type of wireless ad-hoc network, and is a self-establishing network of mobile

nodes connected by wireless links which leads to the formation of random topology [9]. The nodes
are free to move irregularly and adjust themselves immediately; thus, the network's wireless
topology may change randomly and unpredictably. Such a wireless network topology may be
connected to the larger Internet. Wireless networks are presently growing rapidly in the network
industry. They can arrange mobile users with universal communication facility and information
access with irrespective of its location. General wireless networks are many times connected to
wire network so that the internet connections can be increased to mobile users. So this type of
wireless network needs a proper wireline courage infrastructure. All mobile hosts in a
communication cell can reach a base station on the wireline network in one-hop radio
transmission. Along with the conventional wireless networks, other kind of model, based on radio
to radio multi-hopping, has neither fixed base stations nor a wired courage infrastructure. In some
environments application, such as battleground communications, emergency recovery etc., The
wired network is not available easily and multi-hop wireless networks provide the only achievable
means for communication and information access. This type of network is called Mobile Ad hoc
network. It is also need to play an important role in private areas such as campus recreation,
conferences, and electronic classrooms etc [4]. Mobile hosts and wireless networking hardware are
becoming widely available, and extensive work has been done recently in integrating these
elements into traditional networks such as the Internet. Usually sometimes, mobile customers may
want to communicate with each other without the boundaries of fixed infrastructure like fixed
backbones or confined within a certain area. For example, a group of students may want to
communicate with each other to share some lecture notes, assignments etc.; friends or business
associates may meet somewhere and may want to share some files; some disaster recovery team
may want to setup a network in some emergency to share the details of the situation with each
other. In such situations, a temporary network can be setup without a centralized infrastructure.
These are some examples where MANETs can be employed efficiently and effectively [3].

AODV

In order to discover routes for data transfer, AODV routing protocol uses on-demand technique.
That is source node creates path to transfer the data packet to destination. In order to identify most
recent route, it make use of destination sequence number. But in AODV routing protocol the
intermediate and source node keeps the next-hop information. Initially while finding the route in
on-demand routing protocol, source node broadcast RouteRequest packet in the wireless ad-hoc
network, when a route is not available for required destination. Source node may obtain many
numbers of routes to different destinations by means of RouteRequest packet. AODV routing
protocol uses destination sequence number (DestSeqNum) to determine latest path to destination
which is main difference between AODV and other on-demand routing protocols. If the
DestSeqNum of the current packet is greater than the last DestSeqNum stored at the node then
only the node updates its information in the routing table. Destination identifier (DestID) and
source identifier (SrcID) are carried by RouteRequest Packet [7].

Along with it, it also carries time to live (TTL), broadcast identifier (BcastID) and destination
sequence number (DestSeqNum) field which helps to identify the shortest path between source and
destination node. DestSeqNum checks the latest of the route that is accepted by the source node.
When a RouteRequest received by the intermediate nodes it either send it further or builds a
RouteReply if it is correct route to the destination. The correct route is determined by intermediate
node only by comparing the destination sequence number in the RouteRequest packet with
sequence number at intermediate node. If duplicate RouteRequest are received multiple times then
they are discarded, this process is indicated by SrcID-BcastID pair. The intermediate node that are
present between source and destination node have valid routes or the route reply packets from the
destination itself allowed to send to the source [8]. While forwarding the RouteRequest the
intermediate node enters into the last node address and its BcastID. In case if a RouteReply is not
received a timer is used in order to delete this entry. This plays an important role while finding
active path at the intermediate node as AODV protocol does not all data packets of source routing.
The node stories information about previous node only when it receives the RouteReply packet
which helps to forward the packets further to next node as a next hope towards the destination.

MALICIOUS NODE

The malicious node those are present in the network waits for its neighbors to advertise RREQ
packet for having shortest path to the destination node [6]. The malicious node advertises its routes
available irrespective of checking its route table by sending RREP packet to source node. Source
node assumes that it has received fresh route towards destination and starts sending data packets
through malicious node [2]. A malicious node takes all the packets that are coming towards it and
doesnt allow them to reach destination as a results the packets are dropped or discarded by the
malicious node.

Fig. 1 shows how the malicious node affect the routing system and reduce the performance, here it
consists of 5 nodes in which node A acts as source in which it want to send data packets to

536
destination that is node E and initiate the route discovery process takes place. So if node C
acts as a malicious node then it will tells that it has active route to the specified destination as soon
as it receives route request packets [6]. It will then send the response to source node A before
any other node. In this way source node A will think that this is the active route and thus active
route discovery is complete. Node A will rejects all other replies and will start sending data
packets to node C. Thus all the packets that are sent to the malicious node C are dropped as a
result the performance of the system reduces drastically [8]

A C E

B D

Fig. 1.Attack due to Malicious Node.

Tab1: Simulation parameters used in this evaluation

Simulator NS-2.35
Protocol AODV
Simulation duration 0-100 seconds
Simulation area 600m x 100m
Number of nodes 25
Number of Malicious nodes 3
Queue size 50
Transmission range 250
Interference range 550
. Packet Size 1500 bytes/packet
Application Type CBR
Agent Type UDP

PERFORMANCE METRICS

While simulating the AODV routing protocol, we considered three performance metrics they are
Average Jitter, Average End-to-End Delay, and Throughput.

537
Average Jitter
It is the average of the variation in delay over time from point to point. It is measured in
milliseconds and its the shaky pulse which is the variation in the delay [5].

Average end-to-end delay

It is defined as the average time taken by a data packet to arrive at the destination. It also includes
the delay caused by route discovery process and the queue in data packet transmission. Only the
data packets that successfully delivered to destinations that counted.
End to end delay = (arrive time - send time)

Throughput
Throughput is the average number of packets successfully delivered per time taken i.e. average
number of bits delivered per second.
Throughput=Total number of received packets at destination/time taken

SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The simulation results are shown in the following section in the form of varying graphs. The
performance of AODV routing protocol with and without attack due to malicious node based on
performance parameters like average jitter, average end-to-end delay and throughput are as shown
in the figures. Fig3 shows the creation of clusters with 20 mobile nodes as it is shown in the
NAM console which is a built-in program in NS-2-allinone package after the end of the simulation
process.

Fig3. Simulation of AODV Protocol Fig4. End to end delay during without attack

538
Fig5. End to end delay during attack Fig6. No.of packets during without attack

Fig7. No.of packets during with attack Fig8. Average Jitter during without attack

539
Fig9. Average Jitter during with attack Fig10. Average Jitter during without attack

Fig10. Average Jitter during with attack

As the network topology consist of 25 nodes among them node 6, node 8 and node 10 are made as
malicious nodes at simulation time 100 sec. where in which these malicious nodes start dropping
the packets that are routed to it. As a results throughput starts decreasing from simulation time 0 to
100 sec as shown in fig11.

Fig4 and Fig5 shows average end to end delay during with or without attack remains varying for
simulation time 0 to 100 sec. average end to end delay remains high during attack.

Fig8 and Fig9 shows average jitter during with or without attack, In which average jitter is high
during without attack for simulation time 0 to 100 sec.

540
CONCLUSION

After simulation and comparison of with and without attack due to malicious node, the
experimental results show that the effect of malicious nodes that exist in wireless network. The
performance of network starts reducing during the analysis of AODV protocol in case of attack.

REFERENCES

Singh Harmandeep, Singh Gurpreet and Singh Manpreet, Performance Evaluation of Mobile
Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols Under Blackhole Attack, International Journal of Computer
Applications, Vol. 42(18) , pp.1-6,2012.
Chandra Subash, Mandhata , Dr.Suryn Patro, A counter measure to attack on AODV based
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, International Journal of Computer & Communication Technology
(IJCCT), Volume-2, Issue-VI, 2011.
S.Kannan, T. Kalaikumaran, . S.Karthik, V.P. Arunachalam A Review on Attack Prevention
methods in MANET Journal of modern mathematics and statistics 5(1) :37-42, 2011, ISSN
1994-5388, Medwell journals, 2011.
Rakesh kumar Sahu, Narendra S chaudhari Performance evaluation of ad hoc network under
Blackhole attack 978-1-4673-4805-8, IEEE 2012.
Jaydip Sen, M. Girish Chandra, Harihara S.G., Harish Reddy and P. Balamuralidhar, A
Mechanism for Detection of Gray Hole Attack in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Proceedings of
IEEE 6th International Conference on Information, Communications and Signal Processing, pp.1-
5, 2007.
Sima ,A. Kush, Malicious Node Detection in MANET in Computer Engineering and
Intelligent Systems ISSN 2222-1719 Vol 2, No.4,pp. 6-13, 2011.
Tsou P-C, Chang J-M, Lin Y-H, Chao H-C, Chen J-L, Developing a BDSR Scheme to Avoid
Blackhole Attack .
Rajput S, Rankinath P, Based on Proactive and Reactive Architecture in MANETs. Paper
presented at the 13th International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology,
Phoenix Park, Korea, pp. 13-16 Feb. 2011.

541