Computational Representation of the Theory of Mind

Khaled Bizri1, Ruiqiong Zhong2

Abstract
An outline of The Theory of Mind and its modeling of learning processes is presented. Details of
its framework and discussion of its fundamental components, Stimuli, Events and Models are
outlined. A brief description of the process of reduction of Stimuli into structured Events and the
consequent development of Models is provided. The capture, update, storage and recall of the
Events and the Models is used to outline the computing structure and the algorithms used in
developing the initial Machine Learning platform.

TM derive its biological structures from findings in Neuroscience, particularly Cognitive

Neuroscience; and from much philosophical efforts attempting to understand the mind over more
than a century.

The informatic platform is designed to accept extensibility and updates as new discoveries emerge
in diverse disciplines and fields of enquiries, while offering an experimental base for preliminary
verification of approaches in the various disciplines and fields concerned with the brain, the mind
and the optimization of approaches to learning.

The underlying mathematical foundation rests on Abstract Algebraic concepts and Set Theory,
enabling logical validation and permitting the expected and necessary extensibility and upgrade of
the computing model.

Review of Theories and Findings

Cognitive Neuroscience theories attempt to relate important biological processes most at the
microscopic level taking place in the brain to those of the transcendent domain of thoughts, sensory
data and associated with internal processes in the brain (Uttal, 2011), in particular the source of
the strategies and plans of the diverse forms the mind uses for internal exchanges and exchanges
with the external world (Milner, 1998).

Learning Theories (Schunk, 2012) propose approaches to tailoring the presentation of the sensory

1 Information School, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Quangzhou, China.

2 Stanford University, Stanford, California, United States of America.

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data to accord with several empirical concepts ranging from rote to the presentation of experiential
models loosely grouped under the rubric Constructivism with greater emphasis than before on the
learner than how perceived knowledge is acquired and processed.

The epistemological foundation of Constructivism, as all learning theories, remain a theoretical

approach bordering on a philosophical endeavor. The manner with which information however
presented is destined finally to the memory of the learner appear to be irrelevant to Constructivism.

This phenomenological emphasis of the learning theories is best expressed by the definition of
learning proposed in (Shuell 1991) and elaborated in (Schunk, 2012), Learning is an enduring
change in behavior, or in the capacity to behave in a given fashion, which results from practice or
other forms of experience.

The definition and its further elaboration as a practical approach is given in (Schunk, 2012) and
summarized in (Ertmer, 2013) as:

1. How does learning occur?

2. Which factors influence learning?
3. What is the role of memory?
4. How does transfer occur?
5. What types of learning are best explained by the theory?

Here we observe, it is the role of memory rather than what does the mind do with the information
headed for storage in the various memories of the brain. This leads to a general understanding of
learning theories to be more directed to the manner with which information is delivered rather than
what happens to information when it is delivered.

It would then be reasonable to assume that a gap exists between the findings of Cognitive
Neuroscience (Mandler, 2002, Fusi, 2016) and the process of providing knowledge according
learning theories. This gap deals with the manner with which the mind processes the information
it receives, how it is classified, categorized, stored and recalled.

Elements of the Theory of Mind

The Theory of Mind (TM) (Bizri, 2017) proposes a model for removing this gap by the
construction of a model for the receipt of data and reducing it to objects which the mind stores in
memory and uses later in its interaction with the external world.

The Model assumes that sensory data as well as other brain-generated data particularly those
related to episodes generate particular structures which the brain processes, characterizes, groups
and stores. It addresses the important problem of recall through multi-level abstractions derived
from its collective experiences yielding a view of reductions and abstraction compatible with and
extends current views this fundamental process which we discuss later.

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We recognize three components which forms the elements of processing in TM: Stimuli, Events
and Models. Exteroceptive stimuli arrive to the mind after their transduction and conversion into
the necessary biological signals where, according to the Model are reduced into structured Events
which inherit the properties of the stimulus.

We distinguish two fundamental groups in these properties, the Environment and the
Characteristics of the Event. The Environment relates to the attending conditions where the
stimulus occurred and it possesses several properties. The Characteristics of an Event define
several categories with which the Event is distinguished from another occurring in the same
Environment.

A typical example of an Event would be opening a door, where the Environment and the
Characteristics are physical, while hearing a word include both physical and ideal Environment
and Characteristics.

Events are usually chained. Each chain represents a self-contained Model which the mind
constructs, endow with the Events Environment properties and stored. Models may be similarly
linked to form an abstract parent or grand-parents, produced through reductions of the properties
of the member-Models and the production of an abstraction grouping them.

These types of Models, the Abstract Models, are themselves subject to a further abstraction
depending on the affinity and compatibility of their properties as will be discussed in the section
on Abstractions.

Dominant Properties
The properties of the Environment and the Characteristics of an event may be dominant or
descriptive variable. Dominant properties are used in identifying the Event or the Model. They are
distinguished from descriptive variables in a Stimuli during the reduction of the latter into an Event
through a process comparison with other Events.

The identification of an Event is based on its dominant properties in the Environment as well as
the characteristics. The Environment is used first in recalling a Model while the Characteristics are
used to identify specific details in the Event, comparing them with the new Event and updating
their Events own non-dominant variables if necessary.

The Model is used as the principal guide determining subsequent action, based on Events which
constitute it. When a new Event in a chain of Events is incomparable to the expected Event in the
Model, is addressed either by the creation of a new Model possessing all the previous Events up
to the most recent, or by the addition of the new Event as a Variant in parallel with the existing
Event. This occurs when the differences lie in non-dominant characteristics of the new and the
Models existing Event.

Abstractions
The concept of abstraction (Rosen, 2014) probably began with Locke (Lock, 1706). Its refutations
and the final adoption took many years culminating in different attempts at formulating a definition

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of what is abstract from a mathematical impetus, Klemke (1968), transgressing the limits of
Mathematics to Philosophy.

The undeniable abstractions in Mathematics, (Michelmore, 2014) formed ultimately a basis for
accepting that a reference to birds is one denoting a universal which is applicable to several
types not only of birds, but to total environments in which birds may be identified, which in our
theory make Models of perceptions, mental or physical, leading ultimately to the abstraction itself.

We maintain that the process of abstraction the mind is familiar with is the direct result of the
creation of compatible models for Events with nearly identical dominant characteristics, as in the
case of the point being a descriptor of several Models, from placing a dot on a piece of paper to
understanding linguistic idiomatic references, as in The point is or the command Come to
the point! among others each conjuring a definition for point, as a location.

Our approach does not deny at its core deny the entire proposition of Frege (Frege, 1918) or those
of several of its later refinements by many successors although it endorses most of the propositions
of the later and more refined definition in Lewis (Lewis, 1986) in relation to the stimuli leading to
the recall of an abstract nominatives.

Events and Models lead to the generation of the vocabulary used by the mind which are usually
available for use in exchanges with the external world. An approximation is employed to avail TM
for the time being of acquiring a vocabulary for use in the processes of Event reduction and model
selection or creation. This process is assumed for the purpose to be a part of the abstraction process
discussed above.

A key set is that pertaining to abstract nominatives. Garnering such a vocabulary has been the
subject of much efforts in different discipline attempting to reduce the sensory input into linguistic,
sociological, physiological and indeed philosophical terms. Most of these efforts began in the 20th
Century and represent, in the absence of comprehensive data, theories and speculations
particularly on the part of Philosophy.

TM proposes that building abstract concepts, such as cold, wide and high, rests on the arrival
of more than one stimulus carrying the feeling of cold, or the comparative evaluation of different
Environmental properties leading to the abstract concepts of wide and high. This is observed
in the case of a child developing an understanding of cold, wide and high in response to
different exteroceptive properties of an external stimuli.

The Background Processes

The interface of the brain and the mind is drawn up to provide both the delivery of transduced
stimuli representing exteroceptive stimuli as well as stimuli generated internally by the brain which
in our Model include the reorganization of the memory, the iterative adjustments of Events and
Models during reflection for example or in the coincidence of two compatible Events that are
brought to mind.

Such revisions occur regularly in the mind and may be seen when the child sharpens his or her
perception of a game, or an adult reviewing a relationship in the light of newer stimuli by

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combining two or more Events or associated Models, or constructing a totally new Model based
on previous Events or Models.

These processes take advantage of the multi-tasking capabilities of the brain and are performed
almost in the background of consciousness. The process itself is interruptible and the interim
results are themselves stored as a temporary Event or Model to be completed later.

The Computing Representation of TM

The fundamental component of TM is memory where Events and Models reside. Processing a
stimulus is search-intensive. Search patterns, in which the dominant properties are represented in
the construct.
A Properties Dictionary (and thesaurus) is implemented to provide the necessary object links to
entries in various tables, including the external overflow device.

The basic data structure diagram is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The Computing Structure of TM

Memory Segmentation
The Machine memory offers an opportunity for segmentation into different types of memory.
Memory in this implementation is partitioned into the five components shown in Figure 1.
Overflow is handled by timed residence of each Event or Model, forcing a transfer of the out-of-
date component to a similarly structured database.

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Recall of Events so deposited is performed by a special component, the Memory Manager,
discussed below, on the failure to find a synonym, a compatible Model or Event. In the current
implementation, this is substituted by references to memory and to external storage devices.

Fundamental Process
The data structures are involved in several processes of which the primary has 4 stages:

1. Reduction of the stimulus into an Event.

2. Search for compatible Events in memory.
3. Identification of the Model(s) associated with the Event(s) or creating a new Event.
4. Recall of a compatible Model or a compatible Event was found, otherwise add an
Event and create new Model.

The Properties Dictionary is linked to objects in both the primary memory and the external
memory. Further, Events are similarly linked to Models which they populate.
Several processes may be invoked before a final Event is selected or created and similar processes
are carried out in the selection of the appropriate Model from the set extracted by the Event
processor.

The handling of memory and the implied simulation produced here is an extension into the
aforementioned gap from established understanding of aspects of memory in Cognitive
Neuroscience (Atkinson, 1968; Thagard, 2014).

In Figure 2, a representation of the sequence of processes outlines above.

Figure 2. The Main Process Sequence Diagram

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Process Stages
The machine process was designed to proceeds as follows:

Stage I
A Stimulus is received and processed to determine its properties and a search pattern is constructed
and submitted to the Search Engine.

The search is performed in two stages. The first is the result of the initial search of the Properties
Dictionary in a set which may me null or includes subsets of compatible responses which may
include Events.

The second stage handles both the case of a null set as well as when a set populated by subsets of
existing Events. In the first case, new Event record is created subject to the constraints of the
Dominant Models, if any.

The second stage handles both the case of a null set as well as when a set populated by subsets of
existing Events. In the first case, new Event record is created subject to the constraints of the
Dominant Models, if any.

If the set is not empty, the optimally compatible Event is selected based on the Stimulus properties
and the permissible variations in the properties of the selected Event, subject to the constraints of
the dominant Models, if any.

Stage II
If the Event is a new Event, it is fashioned in the format of the standard Event and stored in short
memory, and the Properties Dictionary is appropriately updated. Otherwise, the Event is used to
access associated Models which sustain it.

The set of selected Models, which must have an order of at least one, is retained in short memory
pending he arrival of further Events.

Stage III
The Event is used to find a model. The model is then used to generate dispatch a signal to the brain
of the next step, which is bounced back to the model for the subsequent step.

If an external stimulus was received, it is processed as described above in Stage 1, but the resulting
event is compared with the model in hand to detect whether it is still a part of the model itself. If
it is, then processing proceeds to the next Event but one, as in 3.

Otherwise, a new Model is constructed which includes all the previous and subsequent Events and
the existing Model is retained for analysis and probable synthesis later.

This last process accords as well with the treatment of long-lasting Stimulus flow referred to as
long-lasting experience. We observe in our meta-model even the incorporation of inaccuracies
arising from either poor recording or perception of an Events in a Model (McGaugh 1966).

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The algorithmic flow in the Table 1, related to accessing a meeting room, which in this case is
already in the Main Memory, is depicted reflecting the results of the sequences outlined above for
an existing Event:

Stimulus Stimulus Type Propertie Search Model Sequence

s
Accessing Internal Location Principal Event Model found Predetermined
the meeting found from a from a previous by the Events
room previous access access in the Model

Table 1. Algorithmic flow of a sample Stimulus

Machine Specifications
The machine used in the tests is a standard and unmodified server operating:

1. 4-Core AMD 64-bit processors operating at 2.2GHz frequency.

2. 8GB RAM operating at 1600MHz frequency.
3. 2Tb disc drive

Memory Management
Memcached the memory management system which enable simulated override of the operating
system and permits direct program management of the memory of the computing device. The
memory block was divided into three independent sections for the Properties Dictionary, the
Events store and the Models store, with allocations sizes in that order.

Overflow onto the rotating memory is automatically performed by setting an age limit on each
entry in the three partitions and copying out-of-date entries to the rotating memory.

Adjustments to the sizes are made automatically through a refresh sequence running on a different
thread, enabling optimization of the use of the memory block, as well as extending it if physical
memory permits, within specific bounds.

Initialization and Test Procedures

The machine ran no other application software and was dedicated entirely to the tests.

Automatic dumped the content of memory onto the rotating memory upon completion of a cycle
of tests and recovered it, with possible adjustment of the sizes upon initialization.

Initialization and conversation with the machine were performed by XML and JSON scripts
respectively. Later exchanges were conducted through the insertion of JSON scripts in a special
directory which would be automatically and serially picked up by a waiting thread. This ensured
easy and continual exchanges with the machine.

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This facility is used as well to force logging messages related to Events and Models, as well as
synonym handling by the processor of the Properties Directory which acts as a thesaurus as well.

The tests were important if not vital in aiding the process of linguistic reduction of properties of
the Environment and the Events, as well as querying the Properties Dictionary in particular to
enhance its synonymic capabilities.

Results Outline
The tests progressed in two directions. One to test the recall procedures by introducing Events and
observing from the logs how it was processed. This involves an intricate and complex linguistic
preparation of the properties of the Stimuli dealing with reduction of properties.

The second and more significant direction is in testing the capabilities of the model at reductions
and abstractions.

Storage and Recall

Given the vocabulary set available, the system proved capable of recalling, using and updating
Events and Models. Errors (of judgment) were trapped and reported in the universal log. In that
respect, it is possible to affect control on all the principal elements of the system by dispatching
several management instructions through appropriate grammar in the JSON scripts.

The introduction of new vocabulary elements performed as expected and was notified in the
relevant logging message.

Note that logging messages were used extensively to tune the entire system through effective
control on contents compliant with learnings from Cognitive Neuroscience.

Testing Abstraction
The second direction of tests dealt with the ability of the system to handle abstractions and assign
descriptors for affine Models. These alphanumeric descriptors were replaced subsequently with
English ones to enable more flexible input, as such F549 was replaced through the appropriate
JSON script, to Anger, and F2986 to Point.

Tests are continuing as newer schemes for transforming patterns of thought into linguistic
structures to endow the Events and Models with properties growing in variety and leading to
greater abstraction.

Summary
Breaking up the impact of sensory and internally generated stimuli on the mind in terms of
extensible computing model acting as a platform for further work was achieved leading to
demonstrations of the appropriateness and efficacy of the construct.

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Experiments are continuing to introduce and validate the compatibility of TM with established
Cognitive Neuroscience findings and draw comparisons with prevalent Learning Theories and
their derivatives.

The result of the implementation of TM presents a platform capable of several extensions in

diverse branches in the investigation of the mind and its interaction with the external world,
ranging from Theoretical Neuroscience to Cognitive Theories in Psychology onto refinement of
Learning Theories, particularly the Constructivist approach predominant in current research efforts

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