Republic of the Philippines

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES

Ninth Judicial Region
Branch II
Dipolog City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

-versus- CRIM. CASE NO. A-51006

-for-
Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide

MELCHE B. SUGANOB
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, by counsel, most respectfully moves for

the Reconsideration of the Two Resolutions issued by this Honorable Court
dated June 28, 2017 and June 30, 2017 respectively, the dispositive
portion of which read as follows:

THE RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF RECONSIDERATION

First resolution:

Considering the foregoing development, the Court finds

that the circumstances upon which the private
complainants Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was
anchored is no longer extant. The Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition has become moot and academic and is hereby
denied.

Second resolution:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds

that no probable cause was established to support the
charge against the accused as to require her to stand
trial.
Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.

The bond earlier posted for her temporary liberty is

hereby ordered released in her favor and/or to the
bondsperson.

SO RESOLVED.

1 Motion for Reconsideration

 Private complainant has 15 days to file a motion for
reconsideration as provided for by law hence the timeliness of the
instant motion for reconsideration.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN

RESOLVING AND FINDING THAT THE GROUND ON WHICH THE
MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY INHIBITION IS NO LONGER EXTANT.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITED A PALPABLE ERROR WHEN IT

DISMISSED THE AFOREMENTIONED CASE ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JUDICIAL PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD THE ACCUSED ON
TRIAL.

ARGUMENTS/ DISCUSSIONS

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE

COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING AND
FINDING THAT THE GROUND ON
WHICH THE MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY
INHIBITION IS NO LONGER EXTANT.

1. As a general factual backdrop, records show that Private

Complainant filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition on June 21, 2017
respectfully asking the Honorable Presiding Judge to inhibit the trying
of the instant case. The ground it mainly relied on is the relationship
of the counsel for the accused on record and the presiding judge of
this instant case pointing specifically to the fact that they are long
time and are close childhood friends which became partners and/or
were working together in the same law office at one point in time. In
fact, when the Honorable Presiding Judge was still in private
litigation, he and the lawyer for the accused have been also
representing the same political side and views.
2. Incidentally, on June 23, 2017, the counsel for the accused filed a
Comment to Private Complainants Motion for Voluntary Inhibition
(With Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused). Such that on

2 Motion for Reconsideration

 June 28, 2017, the day when the case was set for hearing, Atty.
James Verduguez no longer appeared as counsel for the accused
Melche Suganob, rather another lawyer in the person of Atty. Ma.
Pamela Aloha C. Anzalan appeared as new counsel on record. On
the same day in the afternoon, a Resolution on the matter was issued
by the Honorable judge stating thereto that the ground anchored for
the motion for voluntary inhibition no longer exists.
3. With all due respect, Private Complainant believes that said ground
still exists. As a primary statement and as manifested by the Private
Complainant in open court, the latter did not question the
representation of the lawyer for the accused, rather it is the presiding
judge trying the case that she seeks to inhibit for after all the person
whom the private complainant seeks to avoid bias and to dispel any
notion of partiality and impropriety is that of the presiding judge and
not of the counsel for the accused.
4. Indeed, Atty. James Verduguez withdrew as counsel for the accused
with the entry of appearance of the new counsel Atty. Ma. Pamela
Aloha C. Anzalan. This development however did not make the
instant motion for voluntary inhibition moot and academic. This is so
because Atty. Anzalan is an associate if not a partner of Atty.
Verduguez. Both counsels hold and come from the same law office.
Incidentally, the ground anchored upon has not become non-existent.
It is still tantamount as if Atty. Verduguez also represents the case
because they come from one and the same law office. Even still, it is
the Honorable Presiding Judge which the Private Complainant seeks
to inhibit in the trial of this case.
5. Much as the Private complainant would want to believe in the
fairness, equitable judgment and impartiality of the Honorable Judge,
incidents which transpired during the hearing of the instant case and
in the past cannot but make the Private Complainant perceive an
impression of manifest partiality and biased in resolving the case at
bar. The opposite political affiliations of the private complainant and
that of the presiding judge at at time when the former as still in the
private practice is among those reasons which Private Complainant
feels uncomfortable and fearful of any bias that might be the outcome
of the case. In addition, incidents that transpired from the time that
the case was lodged before the MTCC Branch II private complainant
3 Motion for Reconsideration
 cannot help but feel of the bias especially on the seem to be insistent
aspect of settling the case amicably. During the hearing, last May 30,
2017 and June 14, 2017 despite the clear language of Private
Complainant Alma Erojo that she has at that moment no option of
settling the case, the Honorable Presiding Judge took upon himself
and talk for the accused the idea of offering the bail posted by the
accused with an addition of another P20,000 to settle the civil aspect
of it. During the hearing, accused never exerted efforts in settling the
case. In fact, she rarely spoke. It was the Honorable Judge presiding
the case who almost spoke for her. Indeed, during the attempt
settlement, the judge said that the decision of the case is on fifty-fifty
status and rightfully so, but the fact that the case was called twice for
a hearing to determine probable cause, and at the same time the
insistence of settlement even before and after the June 14, 2017
hearing and the copy of the CCTV has already been submitted in
Court somehow creates an impression that in the process, if parties
will not settle the case, the case will still be dismissed for lack of
probable cause, so better settle it amicably. And indeed, the case was
dismissed on the ground of lack of probable cause. Without being
misinterpreted, Private Complainant is aware of the fact that, Courts
are encouraged or the presiding judge should and may help in the
settlement of the civil aspect of the case but this should be based on
a condition precedent that both parties are willing to settle the case.
Such however was never the case at bar.
6. Incidentally, the resolution for the determination of the Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause which dismissed the instant case
also seemed to bolster and support the fear of bias and partiality by
the Private Complainant. This will be discussed in the second
assignment of error.
7. The Rules of Court specifically, Section 1 of Rule 137 provides that

Section 1. Disqualification of Judges

No Judge or Judicial Officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator or guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court
4 Motion for Reconsideration
 when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest signed by them and
entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other that those mentioned above. ( emphasis ours)

8. The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and

voluntary. The instances mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited
Rule conclusively presume that judges cannot actively and impartially
sit in a case. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the judges concerned whether to
sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their
conscience as guide. (emphasis ours)

The second paragraph also therefore makes it voluntary on the part

of the Presiding judge to inhibit himself on the case or not. To be
sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, and out of
such suspicions a suggestion is made of record that they might be
induced to act with prejudice for or against a litigant, they should
conduct a careful self-examination. Under the second paragraph of
the cited Section of the Rules of Court, parties have the right to seek
the inhibition or the disqualification of judges who do not appear to be
wholly free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a
case. Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on
their own sound discretion. (emphasis ours)

That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily

to their sense of fairness and justice.

9. This is exactly the situation in the case at bar. Private Complainant

seeks the inhibition of the presiding judge because aside from the
relationship of the counsel for the accused and the Presiding Judge
the facts incidents and circumstances surrounding the case also
already creates the impression that the latter is not wholly free,
disinterested and impartial or independent in handling the instant
case.

10. The case of further explains that Judges are exhorted to

exercise their discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts
of justice would not be impaired. A salutary norm for them to observe
is to reflect on the possibility that the losing parties might nurture at
the back of their minds the thought that the former have
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against them.

11. Although, Supreme Court jurisprudence has upheld in several

cases that the discretion of a presiding judge to voluntarily inhibit in a
case is largely on his wide discretion which is a matter of conscience

5 Motion for Reconsideration

 with the only consideration that in resolving whether or not to inhibit in
a case, a sense of fairness and justice must be weighed, it is the
contention of the private complainant that the inhibition of the
presiding judge would best convey impartiality, fairness and justice.

12. Again, the two (2) basic dimensions of due process of law are
(a) the right of a litigant to a state of peace of mind while his case is
being litigated by a trial court, and (b) the right of a litigant to assert
the duty of a trial court to maintain a public image that meets the strict
perception-based standard of the cold neutrality or an impartial
judge or the Caesars Wife Doctrine in Legal and Judicial Ethics.

13. Also as cited in our Motion for Voluntary Inhibition in the case
of, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. JUSTICE GREGORY
S. ONG, Chairman, Fourth Division, Sandiganbayan, and MRS.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, G.R. Nos. 162130-39, May 5, 2006, the
Supreme Court held therein that (a) due process necessarily requires
that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and (b) that all the
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and
biased judge.

In addition, the Supreme Court, in the aforecited case also held

that (a) judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety for appearance is
an essential manifestation of reality; (b) that it is essential that
judges be above suspicion; and (c) that a judge has the avowed
duty to promote confidence in the judicial system. (emphasis
ours)

14. Based on the foregoing, it is the humble contention of the

Private Complainant that the Presiding Judge as a matter of propriety
he will inhibit in the trial of instant case considering that the strict
perception-based standard of cold neutrality or that of an an impartial
judge is no longer extant in this case.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITED
A PALPABLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE AFOREMENTIONED
CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JUDICIAL PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD
THE ACCUSED ON TRIAL.

6 Motion for Reconsideration

 15. Indeed, the Rules of Court under Rule 112 Section 6a thereto
specifically provides that:

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the

Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information. (emphasis ours)

16. Precisely this is the ground and the legal basis of the Honorable Judge to dismiss
the instant case. In the resolution, the presiding judge found NO probable cause to
require the accused to stand trial. This we beg to disagree. Before however dwelling
on grounds which support our claim that the instant case has probable cause for the
accuse to be held on trial, it is the humble belief of the complainant that some
appreciation of facts need to be clarified and straightened out.

17. First, contrary to the statement in paragraph 5 of the Resolution, the prosecution
and/or the private complainant never received an Order from the Honorable Court
before the schedule date for arraignment May 30, 2017 requiring them to submit a
copy of the CCTV footage. This is the reason why no copy of the CCTV was ever
submitted before the aforesaid date.

18. Second, under paragraph 6 of the Resolution, when the prosecution filed a
Manifestation before the Honorable Court, what was submitted was merely a copy of
the CCTV footage via USB. There was no framed pictures submitted with it. What
was therefore certified by SPO1 Cachin as an honest and faithful reproduction of the
CCTV footage is merely that of the USB file and not that of the framed pictures.

19. Third, under as stated in paragraph 7 of the Resolution regarding the hearing
conducted on June 14, 2017, Private complainant never intimated or manifested her
openness to consider the possibility for settlement of the civil aspect base on the
proposal of the accused. The cause for the resetting of the hearing of the case to
June 28, 2017 was because of the order of the Court to the Prosecution for the
submission of the Judicial Affidavit of their witnesses in aid for the determination of
the probable cause. This Order was done after and despite having submitted already
the CCTV footage. In fact, the statement in paragraph 9 of the Resolution saying
that there was a manifestation filed by the prosecution submitting as additional
evidence the judicial affidavit of the witness Raul Regencia is in compliance of the
order of the Court to submit the affidavits of the witnesses.

20. The main basis of the Resolution in dismissing the instant case relied heavily and
mainly on the CCTV footage of the incident. In fact, in its resolution, it stated that:

Since there is no sufficient showing in the TAR of the likelihood constitutive of

probable cause that the mishap was caused by the negligence of the accused as the
prosecutions original witness the court opted to summon/consult the CCTV
footage..

7 Motion for Reconsideration

 21. The prosecution is of a different opinion on this matter however and begs
to disagree that there is no showing in the TAR of the likelihood constitutive of
probable cause that the mishap was caused by the negligence of the accused.
Indeed, as per opinion and appreciation of the Honorable Court based on the
CCTV footage the Kia vehicle was not running fast however as per TAR or Traffic
Accident Report of the traffic investigator SPO1 Petrosian Cachin and of the two-
eyewitnesses, all categorically stated that the KIA driver herein accused was
running fast. Hence considering the conflicting views, it is the belief of the Private
Complainant the accused should ne held in trial. Weight should also be given to
the traffic accident report as this is one of the basis and proof that the traffic
officer who responded to the scene also conducted its own investigation on the
mishap. The TAR of SPO1 Cachin clearly stated thereto specifically in page 2
that Accused was running to fast with car whose registration was not renewed.

22. Contrary to the statement in the Resolution of this Honorable Court that
the CCTV footage is the only evidence that gave the accurate representation of
the scene such is not the case because even the CCTV footage cannot give an
accurate account of the incidents. For one, it lacked the authentication required
under the Rules on Evidence for it to e admissible. Second, the surroundings of
the CCTV footage was dark and the resolution of the same was not clear. Third,
the connection of the CCTV of the City of Dipolog are all wireless such that its
transmission is based on internet connection. Given the speed of our internet
here in the Philippines specifically in Dipolog, there would definitely be a time
delay as regards to the transmission of data.

23. Going now to the CCTV footage proper whereby the Honorable Court pointed out
and in fact referred to the time scale of 00.07 of the CCTV footage when the Suzuki
motorcycle just touched the very tip of the main thoroughfare of the Turno National
Highway and it was to enter/come in, making the deceased victim still very far from
the other side of the Highway which was the lane /line of travel traversed by the KIA
vehicle. At this juncture, we beg to reconsider the findings of the Honorable judge
and review the CCTV footage. If indeed we based on the time scale of the CCTV
and on the framed pictures one would see that the time scale of 00.07 actually
projected two events, first is the one pointed by the court and the second which the
court failed to see is when the vehicle is already on the middle of the road. If one
would carefully review the cctv footage one would observe that the time scale from
00.04 went to 00.05 and then jumped immediately to 00.07. The explanation for this
is the time delay brought about by the fact that the CCTV footage connection of
Dipolog City is wireless and considering the internet connection in the Philippines,
the slow speed of the internet cannot accurately portray a real time projection of the
incident. In addition, taking into account the CCTV footage, one would observe that
in accused attempt to evade the victim she swerved to the extreme right. Based on
this ground, it is the opinion of the prosecution that to rely mainly and only on the
CCTV footage in determining the lack of probable cause especially that the TAR and
two eye witnesses of case state otherwise is not only unfair but improper to dismiss
the case without having exhausted, weighed and consider the controverting pieces
of evidence.

24. Consequently, the preferential right of way accorded by law and practice
provided under Article III section 4136 at this point of time is not yet clearly
established that the same was violated by the victim. Under the last sentence,
the right of way is forfeited if the other vehicle is driving at an unlawful speed.
The TAR said Suganob was driving too fast and even the two eye witnesses.
Contrary to the statement in the Resolution, it was not Jackilou Erojo-Parajdo
who tried to justify the action of her father representing that the vehicle of KIA
was running too fast. It was the traffic investigator SPO1 Cachin who stated it in
his TAR and was eventually adopted by Erojo in support of her filing this instant
complaint.

ARTICLE IIIRight of Way and Signals

Section 42. Right of way.

8 Motion for Reconsideration

 (a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same
time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle
on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle
traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he might
otherwise have hereunder. (emphasis supplied)

25. In addition, it may be true as pointed by the Court that the face value of the
testimony of FE REGENCIA is clear and discernible that the point of the incident
which she was able to witness or observed was not the actual impact of the mishap
between the two vehicle, but only the stage of the impact, but it can also be said that
Regencia categorically stated that she saw the Kia car driving very fast. This in itself
is an indicia that Suganob might indeed be negligent when she was driving the car.
But all these are evidentiary and should be properly threshed out during trial. This is
not necessary for purposes of determination probable cause. Fact is, at the onset,
witness stated that the KIA driver was driving very fast. Besides, the actual impact of
the vehicular mishap is not the only consideration in the determination of negligence
or recklessness.

26. It is also the humble opinion of the prosecution that contrary to the statement in
the Resoution, the CCTV footage in custody of the Court cannot be as yet claimed to
be unalterable and faithful recording of the actual circumstance considering that
there was no proper authentication of the evidence. Short of saying, it is not an
accurate way to be the sole basis of determination of probable cause.

27. Needless to say, the prosecution stands by its Resolution that there is a probable
cause for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and hence the
accused should be brought to trial. Among the grounds cited was Article 2185 of the
New Civil Code providing that A person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. But what was this
traffic violation cited by the Prosecution that was committed by Suganob? It is the
fact that Suganob failed to renew the registration her vehicle. Let it be noted that her
last registration was February 22, 2012. In short, she did not renew the registration
of her car not just for the previous year or two, but rather for four consecutive years,
she did not renew the registration of her car. She should not have been on the road
driving said car in the first place. It could not even be categorized as negligence
anymore but willful violation of the law considering that 4 years has elapsed and yet
she never bothered to renew the registration of her car. This is not simple case of
negligence that can just be overturned merely by one cctv footage whose
authenticity was not yet proven in court and whose resolution and accuracy remains
to be debatable. It is therefore the humble stand of the prosecution that it is the
gross negligence of the accused in failing to renew the registration of her vehicle that
makes up the negligence constitutive of the offense charge.

28. Finally, going now in the resolution of the case on whether or not probable cause
exists to let the accused stand on trial, the case of VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as
authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD.,
Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court,
Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND, Respondents G.R. No. 178947
dated June 26, 2013 is illustrative on the matter. It held that:

Determination of probable cause may be either

executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a

preliminary investigation, where he is given broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists

9 Motion for Reconsideration

 for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not
he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 47
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself
that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.

While a judges determination of probable cause is

generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest
warrants, Section 5(a),53 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may
immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause,54

But how does a judge decide of the determination of probable cause? The
aforecited case elucidated on the matter and further stated that:

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public

prosecutors authority, it must be stressed that the
judges dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-
cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the
evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the
crime charged has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not
dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to
proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the
appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence. (emphasis ours)

Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to

remember that when a perceived gap in the evidence
leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a
purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is preferable
over a doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge's
discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of
the information in court is appropriate only when the
failure to establish probable cause can be clearly
inferred from the evidence presented and not when its
existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be
expected that upon the filing of the information in court
the prosecutor would have already presented all the
evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the
accused, the objective of a previously-conducted

10 Motion for Reconsideration

 preliminary investigation being merely to determine
whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.59 In this light, given that the lack of probable
cause had not been clearly established in this case, the
CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion, by
ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-
2004. Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a
full-blown trial where the parties could be given, as they
should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their
respective claims and defenses, on the basis of which
the court a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes
therein.

In the case of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171188
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.

JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA, Promulgated:

Respondents.
June 19, 2009
it was held that:

Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be

compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems
that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in
turn should not override the public prosecutors
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for
trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was
insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice
system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of
discretion in determining whether a criminal case should
be filed in court, and that courts must respect the
exercise of such discretion when the information filed
against the person charged is valid on its face, and that
no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public prosecutor.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is
invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judges
determination of probable cause is limited only to the
judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the
arrest warrants should be issued against the accused.

Finally, as held in the case of ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 197293

11 Motion for Reconsideration

 April 21, 2014:

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a

judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing
cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the
preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only
when he or she finds that the evidence on hand
absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause
that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand,
if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not
hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order
that justice may be served.

Considering that there are facts and pieces of evidence that remains
controverted which includes the CCTV footage, the Traffic Incident Report
and the testimonial account of the two witnesses, it is but just fair and
proper that this case be reinstated and the accused be held to stand on
trial.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that:

1. The RESOLUTION dated 28 June 2017 of this Honorable Court be

RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE AND THAT THE HONORABLE
JUDGE WILL INHIBIT IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE INSTANT
CASE.

2. Further, it is most respectfully prayed that the RESOLUTION dated

30 June 2017 of this Honorable Court be RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE AND A NEW ONE ENTERED REINSTATING THE INSTANT
CASE FOR TRIAL.

Private Complainant further prays for such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.

Dipolog City, Philippines; 13th July, 2017.

Copy Furnished:

12 Motion for Reconsideration