Crimpro Recit

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002]

JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be
unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection
clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against
him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the
former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed
with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
finding probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal
Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional
liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on
the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged
more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-
accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] alleging
that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it
appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or
combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail
as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and
be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to
post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To
Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its
Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To
Him.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To
Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve
Pending Incidents.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to
Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Petitioners
alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court
held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following:
(1) MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy
Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada;
and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001
filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for
plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is
based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby
DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be
SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for
July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused. [if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution.
Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to
make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.[if
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner,
and denying him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators,
with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the
information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle
of proportionality.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and
denies him the equal protection of the laws.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-
Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
We take off from the Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie Atong Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and
others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
ASIONG SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie
Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination
OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY
IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM
OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00],
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of
Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with
co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND
FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-
PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001 [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally
perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one
offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will
show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President
Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph
spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and
(3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts
constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the
names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form
of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-
paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act
of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to
petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling
on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the
predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with
the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a
twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or
series as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning,
the word series is synonymous with the clause on several instances. Series refers to a repetition
of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word combination
contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items.
Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4,
2001 finding probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he
was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the
minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the
April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against
petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to
have also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This
is gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at
least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent
governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1
million in February, 2000. An alleged listahan of jueteng recipients listed him as one Jingle
Bell, as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]. [if
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding
that P2 million was delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul on at least two occasions. The P2
million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is
further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
xxxxxxxxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty.
Edward Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate
sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis
Chavit Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x. [if
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to
establish any probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has
found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest
against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the
finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected
in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete
standards to guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the
offense.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Thus, he posits the following questions:
For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty
do we impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion
perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have
participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable,
compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law
does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other
words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is
supposed to have intended.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1)
he is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused
named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable
on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is
cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however,
overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged
participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be
unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080,
viz:
Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court.
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge against petitioner
for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even
remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious
results in the denial of substantive due process.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the
predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b),
(c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President.
This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information.[if
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information
vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-
accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the
second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the
elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts
that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President
Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs
correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a)
alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as
one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section
1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos
Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the
law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of
the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase
shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such
purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde
account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the
enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act
that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name
Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in
the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused
named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former
President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is
not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to
enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of
clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused
with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in
relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only
for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design
was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for
including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No.
7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple
informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies.
Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal
wealth.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] They also found that under the then existing laws such as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts
involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction
constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had
to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent
cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. [if
R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] was enacted
precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate
Bill No. 733, viz:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic
treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of
acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may
involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial
units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of
an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described
crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a
legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous
regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage
to the national economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime
of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at
bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in
the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation
and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies
commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there
is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics
or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the
rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the
ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is
even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to
be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal
law and in common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two
levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a
crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit
treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or
conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] The essence of
conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a
criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal
objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and
requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two
(2) crimes of conspiracy[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud
the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or
to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] as
follows:
Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more
persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of
such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State,
Territory, Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any
person from accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the United
States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the
United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed,
or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his
office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to
molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such
persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense
against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency
thereof. The conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States refers to an act made
a crime by federal laws.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] It refers to an act punished by statute.[if
Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws,
whether criminal or regulatory.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] These laws cover criminal offenses such
as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery,
etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail
fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other
areas of federal regulation.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to
commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate
and distinct from the substantive offense,[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] hence, the court rulings that
acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related
conspiracy.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
The conspiracy to defraud the government refers primarily to cheating the United States
out of property or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful
governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. [if
It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever,
whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif]
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the
American case law on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for
the indictment to include particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating
the manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail
falls within the scope of a bill of particulars.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] An indictment for
conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward
which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the
agreement.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state
that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To
allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] The gist of the crime of
conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to
set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such
object is charged as a substantive offense.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts
and American courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the
ground that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our
jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of
committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy
is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging
the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following averments:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate
the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name
of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place
where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense
should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be
designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] The information must also state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. [if
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. [if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the
crime of conspiracy to commit treason is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons
come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to
give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif] The elements of this
crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that
there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or
persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the
enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons
decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at
bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. [if
The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be
equally responsible for the acts of others,[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] for the act of one is the act of
all.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] In People v. Quitlong,[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif] we ruled on how
conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set
forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the
accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact
or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected
to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another
or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of
the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all
the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information
whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-
accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed,
the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one
another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with
the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough
that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case
will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to
a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment
may be held sufficient if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused
of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the
language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of
the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxxxxxxxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant
the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually
pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit
the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of
the usual usage of the words conspired or confederated or the phrase acting in conspiracy,
must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy.
In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term conspire
or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy.
Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused
can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when
properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but
may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
x x x x x x x x x.
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege
conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1)
by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc;[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif]
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence
of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a
concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. [if
A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in
general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are
sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the
crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the
instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons. Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail
due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place
of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted
hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical
Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion for
Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations. Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan.[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif]
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for
resolution and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of
December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioners motion for bail for lack of factual
basis.[if !supportFootnotes][57][endif] Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the
Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court
that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that
purpose that he be allowed to post bail.[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif]
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is
strong, to wit:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif]
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the
trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded
sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the
prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.[if !supportFootnotes][60][endif]
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary
hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent
court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence
only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not
show that evidence on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to
petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Vitug, J., please see Separate Opinion.
Kapunan, and Buena, J., joins Justices Santiago and Gutierrez in their separate
dissenting opinions.
Ynares-Santiago, J., pls. see separate Dissenting Opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., please see my Dissent.
Carpio, J., no part as before.
DIVISION
[ GR No. 85215, Jul 07, 1989 ]
PEOPLE v. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON
DECISION
256 Phil. 671
NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the
right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section
20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the
commission of an offense * * to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL),
assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,[1] the PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted into the matter on February 9, 1986. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA)
to which Ramos pertained.[2]
On the day before the investigation, February 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten note[3] reading as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN;
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES
ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS
MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(S) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos"
At the investigation on February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City,
Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk
Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of
the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were
taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed
made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had
been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame;" that he was still willing to settle his obligation,
and proferred a "compromise ** to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in
the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio
CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardess ITR Nieves Blanco;" and
that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). [1] How the investigation
turned out is not dealt with by the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise
agreement was reached, much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with
the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986
to January 29, 1986. In that place and during that time, according to the indictment,[2] he
(Ramos) -
" * * with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully * * defraud the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, * * in the following manner, to wit: said accused * *
having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way-trip
and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the
proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ** once in possession thereof
and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there * *
misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in
spite of repeated demands, ** failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party * *."
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the
direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence
dated June 21, 1988,[1] which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J.
Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as
Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission ** given on February 8, 1986," also above
referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff's Evidence." [2] Particularly as
regards the people's Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was
objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'"
By Order dated August 9, 1988,[3] the respondent Judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are
worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible
in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9,
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager * *
since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was
with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 ** for the
same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was
assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. [4] It was denied, by Order dated
September 14, 1988.5 In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's
rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, Peo. v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467,
Peo. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and Peo. v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect
that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present
Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL
Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the
tickets issued to him" and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional
provision;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was
administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the
constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of
the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge
Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER ** ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial
and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ** vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance
of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the
same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial
Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been
filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the
petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent
Judge's Orders ** and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The
Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the
institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de
parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue -- of whether or not it was
grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and
K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,[1] to which
respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as
follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the
section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination -- i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself -- set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution;[2] and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against
self-incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now
embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which
have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.[1]
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.[2] The right is NOT
to "be compelled to be a witness against himself."
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.[3] It prescribes an "option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."4 It simply secures to
a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for
some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory
in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does
not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at
the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a
particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the
judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness
knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that everyone is presumed to
know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of
things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or
effect of a question to be put to the latter.[5]
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must
be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into
play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim
it at the appropriate time.[1]
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said,
group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an
offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these
rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which,
as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil,
criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in
the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona,[2] a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law
enforcement."3
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an
offense" --
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right;[4]
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him;[5] and
3) any confession obtained in violation of ** (these rights) shall be inadmissible in
evidence.[6]
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person
in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an
adversary proceeding against the suspect.[1]
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded
to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights."[2]
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons."[3] And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."[4] The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court.5
** After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which
at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and
unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms then into silence. Section 20 of the Bill
of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance."
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope
of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one
case,[1] where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be
initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she
was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was
admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being
exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against
self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under
preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been, would already
have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public
prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his rights while under
"custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial
interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self-
incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e.,
the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to
him.[2]
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving
testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is
entitled, among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself,[1] and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him.[2]
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against
himself" signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal
case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even
by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness
either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself.[3] In other words -- unlike
an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is
put to him -- the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse
to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.[4] And, as the law categorically
states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him."[5]
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if
he does testify, then he "may be cross-examined as any other witness." He may be cross-
examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith. [6] He may
not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he
will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the
crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question
which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other
crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific
question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus,
assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not
on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated
in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which might
implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in
some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence
obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT --[1]
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the
nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with
the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his
thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced
from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make
application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or
capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to
have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed
that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the
trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that
the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day
before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a
free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the
so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger ** (of) the violation of the
right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the
complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because being
interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no proprietary or pecuniary interest to
protect, they may in their overeagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects,
whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue
ascendancy, and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his
employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that
the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or
written, by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with
opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee
may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if
he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to
reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal
action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof,
etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident
that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted
by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer
or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be
brought to bear on an employee under investigation -- or for that matter, on a person being
interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or
confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on
proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary
or coerced statements may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really
should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988,
and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The
temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus oficio is now declared
of no further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan [FULL TEXT]
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail
and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to
these two novel questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the
exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and
set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001[1] and July 3, 2001[2] issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.[3] The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners
application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the
same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued.
Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond,
and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C.
Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted
them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.[7] The TRO prohibited the
Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity
of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No.
139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17,
2000 Resolution.[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented
by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter
alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code
Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18
US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US
Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,[10] which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the
procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,
he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the
court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.[11] After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in
allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides
for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4,
Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as
bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the
applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender
a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by
the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo
T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No.
64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the
issuance of the subject bail orders.[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is
entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he
is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising
from petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the
Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court.[15] We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the
Extradition Court: (1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties
to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of
a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent
nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent,
as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid
extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons:
(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes
cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this
Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent
that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case[17]
ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a
judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3)
there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which,
unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve
to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and
thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under
existing extradition treaties.[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is
purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency.[19] As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the
lower court.[20] Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve
pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v.
Corona[22]we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an
end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time
and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego
a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties
involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court
of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings
constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to
guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition

The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty
and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to
ascertain and give effect to its intent.[25] Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the
implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,[26]
understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised
here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime[27] by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from one state to the
other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent
criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods
of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime.[30] It is
the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.[31]
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals
seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and
the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial
limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of
flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is
to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part
of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational
crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding
ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in
our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that
both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process.[34] More pointedly, our
duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in
the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited.[35] That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be
given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or
would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[36] extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore;
in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the
guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.[37] Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely
a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not
part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative
of that jurisdiction.[38] The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty,
and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its
implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity[40]with the requesting
state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our
country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering
into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under
the Treaty.[42] This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if
the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other
words, [t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it
to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the
other government is under obligation to make the surrender.[43] Accordingly, the Philippines
must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption
finds reinforcement in the experience[44] of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in
order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited
have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the
accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country.[45] Prior acts of herein
respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable --
eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present,
underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to
flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a
second time?
First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive
from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is
seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner
pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future
extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily
deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there
is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the
order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the
time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties,[46] receiving facts and arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time
to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer
be considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but,
on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as
speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination
to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From
the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good
first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others,
were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E.
Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US
Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3)
Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit
of Angela Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J Table of
Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5)
Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit
of Betty Steward and enclosed Statements in two volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who
should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. He could have
determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In
point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that probable cause did
exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee.[50]
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a
priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie
finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for
hearing upon motion of Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon
failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent from the provision. Evidently,
had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary[52]in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little
step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something
not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous
treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less
reasonable x x x .[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the

request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require
a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses
they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance
of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the
extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to
conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses.[57] In the present case, validating the act of respondent
judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage
would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be
heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of
defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to
justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different
procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified
in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in
form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the
person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.
If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding[58] is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate
must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the
issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in
extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to
bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are
the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of
extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution
granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest
warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[60] It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.[61]
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right
to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States
is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply
for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in arguing that, constitutionally, [n]o
one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings
does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that
the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out
that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough.[65] In the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate

deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be
arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting
documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the
law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination
that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of
the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its
treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of
time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation
of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the
world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, [c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a
vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against
exigent and palpable government interests.[66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who,
instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would
not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to
evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution,
the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings,
adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards
deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life
to Article 14[67] of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily
surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention
pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of
the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well
as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.[69]
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of
basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or
property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application.[70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for
and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional
liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the
above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court
realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature
of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so
that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of
fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling
enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully
examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House
of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila
district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,[72] the Court has
already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he
is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer
serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of
a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is
most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the
lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious

discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[73]
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his
extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences
of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to
rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it
would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced.
We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely
to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues
relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the
proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion
of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would
the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to
himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he
learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has
not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact
cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion,
as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has
not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of
the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime
after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been
previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on
the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this
Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary;
in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given
more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and
exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not
only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then
position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in
Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this
Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the
potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled
Manifestations by both parties and Counter-Manifestation by private respondent -- in which the
main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The
trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all
his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a
remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters.
Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his
legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in
his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated
and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any
useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings,[74] which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and
deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on
the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly disregarding basic freedoms when
a case is one of extradition. We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair.
Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the
rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request

expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced
during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether
the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting
state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory,
so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in
the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt
or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the
reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the
opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance,
whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima
facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk
and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of
bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context
of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.
Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity
is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its
authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-
independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising

out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority
to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and
over-due process every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings
become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to
comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our
country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can
unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral
justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as
it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition
proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand
twelve.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389
AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF GRANTING THE RELEASE OF AN

INDIGENT PERSON IN CUSTODY AS AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Recognizance Act of 2012.
Section 2. Statement of Policy. It is the declared policy of the State to promote social justice
in all phases of national development, including the promotion of restorative justice as a
means to address the problems confronting the criminal justice system such as protracted
trials, prolonged resolution of cases, lack of legal representation, lack of judges, inability to
post bail bond, congestion in jails, and lack of opportunity to reform and rehabilitate
offenders. In consonance with the principle of presumption of innocence, the 1987 Philippine
Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to bail or to be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. In furtherance of this policy, the right of persons, except those
charged with crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, to be
released on recognizance before conviction by the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether
the case was originally filed in or appealed to it, upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Recognizance Defined. Recognizance is a mode of securing the release of any

person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due
to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been filed shall allow the
release of the accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the custody of a qualified
member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused resides.
Section 4. Duty of the Courts. For purposes of stability and uniformity, the courts shall use
their discretion, in determining whether an accused should be deemed an indigent even if the
salary and property requirements are not met. The courts may also consider the capacity of the
accused to support not just himself/herself but also his/her family or other people who are
dependent on him/her for support and subsistence.
Other relevant factors and conditions demonstrating the financial incapacity of the accused at
the time that he/she is facing charges in court may also be considered by the courts for the
purpose of covering as many individuals belonging to the marginalized and poor sectors of
society.
Section 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the Constitution. The

release on recognizance of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense
is a matter of right when the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment: Provided, That the accused or any person on behalf of the accused files the
application for such:
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a person in custody
for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the
offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on the persons recognizance.
Section 6. Requirements. The competent court where a criminal case has been filed against a
person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the release of the detained person on
recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all of the following requirements are
complied with:
(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or incapacity either to
post a cash bail or proffer any personal or real property acceptable as sufficient sureties for a
bail bond;
(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office of the
municipality or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is indigent;
(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;
(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the accused resides of the
application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall include in its agenda the notice from the
court upon receipt and act on the request for comments or opposition to the application within
ten (10) days from receipt of the notice. The action of the sanggunian shall be in the form of a
resolution, and shall be duly approved by the mayor, and subject to the following conditions:
(1) Any motion for the adoption of a resolution for the purpose of this Act duly made before
the sanggunian shall he considered as an urgent matter and shall take precedence over any
other business thereof: Provided, That a special session shall be called to consider such
proposed resolution if necessary;
The resolution of the sanggunian shall include in its resolution a list of recommended
organizations from whose members the court may appoint a custodian.
(2) The presiding officer of the sanggunian shall ensure that its secretary shall submit any
resolution adopted under this Act within twenty-four (24) hours from its passage to the mayor
who shall act on it within the same period of time from receipt thereof;
(3) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, fails to act on the said
resolution within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed to
have been acted upon favorably by the mayor;
(4) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, disapproves the resolution, the
resolution shall be returned within twenty-four (24) hours from disapproval thereof to the
sanggunian presiding officer or secretary who shall be responsible in informing every member
thereof that the sanggunian shall meet in special session within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of the veto for the sole purpose of considering to override the veto made by the mayor.
For the purpose of this Act, the resolution of the sanggunian of the municipality or city shall be
considered final and not subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, a copy of
which shall be forwarded to the trial court within three (3) days from date of resolution.
(e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such processes as, but not limited to,
photographic image reproduction of all sides of the face and fingerprinting: Provided, That the
costs involved for the purpose of this subsection shall be shouldered by the municipality or city
that sought the release of the accused as provided herein, chargeable to the mandatory five
percent (5%) calamity fund in its budget or to any other available fund in its treasury; and
(f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of hearing therefor within twenty-
four (24) hours from the filing of the application for release on recognizance in favor of the
accused: Provided, That such hearing shall be held not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours nor
later than forty-eight (48) hours from the receipt of notice by the prosecutor: Provided,
further, That during said hearing, the prosecutor shall be ready to submit the recommendations
regarding the application made under this Act, wherein no motion for postponement shall be
entertained.
Section 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. Any of the following circumstances

shall be a valid ground for the court to disqualify an accused from availing of the benefits
provided herein:
(a) The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit prescribed under
Section 5(a);
(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid
justification;
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or under
conditional pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts surrounding his/her case
indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the
case; and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new
crime he/she is being accused of.1wphi1
Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on Recognizance. Except in

cases of children in conflict with the law as provided under Republic Act No. 9344, the
custodian of the person released on recognizance must have the following qualifications:
(a) A person of good repute and probity;
(b) A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;
(c) Must not be a relative of the applicant within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity;
and
(d) Must belong to any of the following sectors and institutions: church, academe, social
welfare, health sector, cause-oriented groups, charitable organizations or organizations
engaged in the rehabilitation of offenders duly accredited by the local social welfare and
development officer.
If no person in the barangay where the applicant resides belongs to any of the sectors and
institutions listed under paragraph (d) above, the custodian of the person released on
recognizance may be from the qualified residents of the city or municipality where the
applicant resides.
Section 9. Duty of the Custodian. The custodian shall undertake to guarantee the appearance
of the accused whenever required by the court. The custodian shall be required to execute an
undertaking before the court to produce the accused whenever required. The said undertaking
shall be part of the application for recognizance. The court shall duly notify, within a
reasonable period of time, the custodian whenever the presence of the accussed is required. A
penalty of six (6) months to two (2) years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the custodian
who failed to deliver or produce the accused before the court, upon due notice, without
justifiable reason.
Section 10. Role of the Probation Officer. Upon release of the person on recognizance to the
custodian, the court shall issue an order directing the Probation Office concerned to monitor
and evaluate the activities of such person. The Probation Office concerned shall submit a
written report containing its findings and recommendations on the activities of the person
released on recognizance on a monthly basis to determine whether or not the conditions for
his/her release have been complied with. The prosecution including the private complainant, if
any, shall be given a copy of such report.
Section 11. Arrest of a Person Released on Recognizance. The court shall order the arrest of
the accused, who shall forthwith be placed under detention, due to any of the following
circumstances:
(a) If it finds meritorious a manifestation made under oath by any person after a summary
healing, giving the accused an opportunity to be heard;
(b) If the accused fails to appear at the trial or whenever required by the abovementioned
court or any other competent court without justification, despite due notice;
(c) If the accused is the subject of a complaint for the commission of another offense involving
moral turpitude and the public prosecutor or the mayor in the area where the offense is
committed recommends the arrest to the court; or
(d) If it is shown that the accused committed an act of harassment such as, but not limited to,
stalking, intimidating or otherwise vexing private complainant, prosecutor or witnesses in the
case pending against the accused: Provided, That upon the issuance by the court of such order,
the accused shall likewise become the proper subject of a citizens arrest pursuant to the Rules
of Court.
Section 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or Commencement of Sentence;

Exception. The benefits provided under this Act shall not be allowed in favor of an accused
after the judgment has become final or when the accused has started serving the sentence:
Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to an accused who is entitled to the benefits of
the Probation Law if the application for probation is made before the convict starts serving the
sentence imposed, in which case, the court shall allow the release on recognizance of the
convict to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the
accused actually resides.
Section 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision
to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application
of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 14. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent
herewith are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same are more beneficial to
the accused.
Section 15. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
IMPORTANT POINTS:
Right to Bail and to Be Released on Recognizance
The right to bail emanates from the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until proven by an independent, competent, and unbiased court to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. However, for a person accused of a crime, who is poor and belongs to the marginalized
and depressed sector of society, this right more often than not is too costly, thereby making it
practically futile. The right to recognizance, under RA 10389, seeks to address this.
Recognizance, as an alternative to posting bail, is defined under the Act as: a mode of
securing the release of a person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who
is unable to post bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been
filed shall allow the release of the accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the custody
of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused resides.
The term used is release on recognizance. The reputable person entrusted with the
accuseds custody will then have the burden of bringing the accused to court when his
presence is required by such court.
Recognizance as a Matter of Right
In its statement of policy, the Act provides that the right of persons to be released on
recognizance is affirmed except those charged with death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
Section 5 the Act states that to be released on recognizance is a matter of right when the
offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, and the
application for such is filed before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. For
criminal proceedings before the Regional Trial Court, the application should be filed only
before conviction. Moreover, Section 12 of the Act provides that the release on recognizance
shall not be allowed in favor of the accused after the judgment has become final or when the
accused has started serving sentence.
Requirements
Among the requirements for recognizance are: (a) a sworn declaration by the person in custody
of his or her indigency or incapacity to post bail; (b) a certification issued by the head of the
social welfare and development office of the municipality or city where the accused actually
resides, that the accused is indigent; (c) the person in custody should have already been
arraigned; (d) notification by the court of the application for recognizance on the city or
municipal sanggunian where the accused resides; (e) proper documentation of the accused
through photos of all sides of the face and fingerprinting; and (f) notification by the court on
the public prosecutor of the date of hearing on the application within 24 hours from the filing
of the application.
Disqualification
An accused can be disqualified from availing of release on recognizance on any of the following
grounds:
1. the accused has made untruthful statements in his or her affidavit;
2. the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime

aggravated by reiteration;
3. the accused had previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has
violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid justification;
4. the accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon;
5. the accused is a flight risk;
6. there is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the
case; or
7. the accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new
crime he/she is being accused of.
The court may also order the arrest of an accused released on recognizance (1) if he fails to
appear at the trial whenever required by the court; (2) if there is a manifestation under oath
by any person, which found meritorious by the court after a summary hearing and after giving
the accused the opportunity to be heard; (3) if the accused has been sued for the commission
of another offense involving moral turpitude and the mayor or public prosecutor recommends
his arrest; or (4) if he commits an act of harassment against private complainant, prosecutor or
witnesses in the case pending against him.
The Act took effect on April 6, 2013, fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette
and two national newspapers.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002]

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan [FULL TEXT]

[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine

Hence, this Petition.[13]

3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

First Substantive Issue:

Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:

1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

Second Substantive Issue:

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

No Violation of Due Process

Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious

3. Not a Flight Risk?

Brief Refutation of Dissents

1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request

8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising

Republic of the Philippines

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF GRANTING THE RELEASE OF AN

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

Section 3. Recognizance Defined. Recognizance is a mode of securing the release of any

Section 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the Constitution. The

(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;

Section 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. Any of the following circumstances

Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on Recognizance. Except in

(a) A person of good repute and probity;

(b) A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;

Section 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or Commencement of Sentence;

Right to Bail and to Be Released on Recognizance

Recognizance as a Matter of Right

1. the accused has made untruthful statements in his or her affidavit;

2. the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime

5. the accused is a flight risk;

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