PUBLICATIONS occasional

PAPER
JULY 2017
ISSUE 10.7

RECONSTRUCTING
DUTERTISMO
 OCCASIONAL PAPER JULY 2017

02
RECONSTRUCTING
DUTERTISMO
DUTERTISMO
Dutertismo's fundamental appeal lies not in Duterte's persona but in the
overall capacity of his administration to deliver concrete, tangible and
expeditious results to Filipinos, especially the marginalized
and vulnerable sectors of the society.

The electoral victory as well as continuing mass popularity of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
deserves careful scrutiny. As a self-professed socialist and anti-establishment candidate that ran
on the platform of bringing Tunay na Pagbabago or Radical Change during the campaign,
Duterte staged a melodramatic display of rage against dysfunctional post-EDSA governance.
Having been admired for transforming Davao City from a killing field to a more politically and
economically stable city, President Duterte promised to replicate this success nationwide.

In the process of currying the publics support, Duterte has unleashed a wave of popular fury,
reshaping the contours of contemporary political discourse and raising the possibility of altering
the configurations of power in post-EDSA Philippines. To better appreciate Dutertismo,
the phenomenon sending shockwaves in domestic and international politics, it is crucial
to explore both the material and symbolic sources of Dutertes legitimacy.

More specifically, this paper aims to:

1) Map the political, economic and social terrain, contextualizing Dutertes rise to power;
2) Critique the charge that Dutertismo is a purely theatrical phenomenon, and
3) Suggest a reinterpretation of Dutertismo as a movement aimed at altering the
post-EDSA configurations of power and at laying a blueprint for a
new order and narrative for future Philippine state

Image Credit: news.abs-cbn.com

* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

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OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017
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Contextualizing Dutertes Phenomenal Rise to Power
Class divides in the Philippines inform citizens political choices.
This argument was raised by Nathan Quimpo, who found that
major stakeholders in Philippine politics have conflicting notions
of democracy. Under Quimpos contested democracy framework,
these stakeholders are composed of two main blocs: the patrimonial
oligarchic elite (heirs of wide tracts of land under the Spanish-era
hacienda system) and the new bourgeois class (entrepreneurs that
flourished under the Ferdinand Marcos regime), on one hand,
and the emergent Left composed of non-militant peoples
organizations and non-government organizations, on the other.1
According to Quimpo, the oligarchic class perpetuates elite
democracy, wherein its members employ various methods at their
disposalfrom nurturing modest patron-client ties to resorting
to guns, goons and goldto win elections from the national level
down to regional and local levels.2 Once elected, Quimpo says,
they entrench themselves in power and enrich their families through
plunder or rent-seeking activities.3 Since at least the 1986 People
Power Revolution, Philippine politics has arguably been defined
by this form of democracy. This dominance has had two main
characteristics: first, the consolidation of warlord political
families in the countryside and, second, the adoption of
doctrinaire economic liberalism (expounded below).
On the other hand, the emergent Left aims to establish
democracy from below, wherein its members organize into social
movements, non-governmental organizations and progressive,
anti-trapo(traditional politician) groups against perceived oppressive
hierarchical structures.4 They clamor for better status and conditions
C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
relative to the elite, as illustrated in their repeated calls for
greater participation in decision-making processes as well as
for social and economic equality.5 They are distinguished from
the radical Left (i.e. the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army-National Democratic Front) by acknowledging
the possibility of a peaceful transition to a more participatory
and egalitarian brand of democracy. In contrast to the elite-led
democracy of the post-EDSA generation, however, their vision
had not succeeded in installing its members at the highest
echelons of Philippine politics. President Duterte, it
can be argued, is the first exception to the rule.
Warlord Politics in Philippine Democracy
The 1986 People Power Revolution raised hopes for the eventual
consolidation of democracy in the Philippines. However, early
signs were not encouraging. Congressional and local elections
in 1987-1988 ushered in what E.U. Gutierrez called the return of
the oligarchs, the rapacious politicians of the pre-authoritarian
era who were less interested in rectifying the structural ills
of the state than in institutionalizing corruption
and violence for personal gain.6
By 1993, Alfred McCoy had characterized post-EDSA Philippine
politics as a series of synergistic interactions between the state
and politico-economic dynasties, where the latter strengthen
their power through the privatization of public resources, thereby
weakening the formers economic resources and bureaucratic
apparatus.7 McCoy further noted that, while the politico-
economic dynasties in Manila mostly engaged in rent-seeking
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OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017

04 Main global trafficking flows of opiates

as of 2013

activities, the elite in the provinces resorted to violence to quell unrest while sustaining
capital accumulation for their families.8 McCoy pointed out that these warlords
dominate in rural areas where the central government presence is weak.9

Not only do rural warlords continue to be important facets of the Philippine political
landscape, they have grown in sophistication over time. A quarter-century since the EDSA
Revolution, in 2010, Francisco Lara, Jr. revealed that warlord clans have distinguished
themselves by tapping into a new source of politico-economic power: the lucrative global
drug and arms trade.10 In connection with this, discoveries of small-scale drug laboratories
in Cotabato City and several towns in Lanao del Sur, as well as cocaine shipments in
Davao City and coastal areas along Eastern Visayas, indicate that the Philippines has
evolved into a supplier and/or consumer of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and methylene dioxy-methamphetamine (ecstasy), and into a
trans-shipment point for high-value drugs such as cocaine and heroin.11
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime via Bloomberg

The increased role of these narco-politico-warlords as power brokers in the illicit trade
may have contributed to the booming consumer market for drugs, not only in the rural
areas but also in urban centers. Based on a 2016 Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) Annual Main global trafficking flows of cocaine
Report, there was an uptick in drug consumption nationwide from 1999 to 2004 before as of 2013
it dropped in 2008 and 2012.12 At its peak in 2004, there were 6.7 million drug
users; the figure went down to 1.7 million in 2008 (1.9% of the population) and
then 1.3 million in 2012 (1.3% of the population).13

The need to protect illicit drug trade flows from state intervention provide an impetus for
warlord clans to invest in firepower and paramilitary forces.14 The tragic Maguindanao
massacre, for example, brought to light the unfettered access of clans such as the
Ampatuans to high-powered firearms usually used by law enforcement agencies and the
military.15 The massacre also reflected the breadth of these clans political alliances, not
only with drug syndicates and other gangs inside and outside the Philippines, but also
with corrupt elements within government offices who turn blind eyes to these
dangers in exchange for electoral support and monetary rewards.16

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime via Bloomberg

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OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017
05
Methamphetamine flows as perceived by recipient countries
2011-2013
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime via Bloomberg
The Triumphalism of Doctrinaire Neoliberalism
The rise of the modern-day Philippine principalia engaged in rent-
seeking activities and political violence coincided with the era of
economic globalization.17 This led elites to espouse doctrinaire
neoliberalism as the core ideology for post-EDSA governance,
providing an ideological basis for the emasculation of the generative,
redistributive and protective powers of the state. This neoliberal
C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Official estimates of drug users in the Philippines
ideology pushes capitalist logic to the extreme, by envisioning
the near-complete eradication of regulative elements
(i.e. national protectionist laws) that constrain competition.18
The Philippines adoption of doctrinaire neoliberalism arguably led
to deindustrialization and decline in its manufacturing and heavy
industries.19 The Philippine industrial sector has been relatively
stagnant for three decades, with the industrial share of GDP reaching
(1999-2012)
Source: Dangerous Drugs Board
its peak between 1979-1984 and averaging nearly 40%, before
slowly receding to around 30% by 2000.20 Having failed to
industrialize, the Philippines has become reliant on the
services sector as the largest contributor to growth.21
Unfortunately, the countrys leapfrogging from a manufacturing-
to service-oriented economy has failed to generate jobs sufficient
to uplift a larger segment of the population from poverty and
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OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017

06
stimulate long-term economic growth.22 Poverty incidence among
Filipinos in 2015 was still at a high 21.6%, although this is a decline Poverty incedence among population
from the 2012 figure of 26.6%.23 Meanwhile, the incidence of (in percent)
subsistence poverty was estimated at 8.1% in 2015, a slight decline
from the incidence in 2012 of 10.4%.24 Over the same time, the
fortunes of the countrys top 50 richest families increased, worsening
the inequality gap. Their collective wealth went up by about 13% in
2014, reaching $74.2 billion (or 25.7% of GDP)up from
$65.8 billion in 2013 or 24% of GDP.25

Post-authoritarian administrations introduced policy reforms that

paved the way for the Philippines transformation into a neoliberal state.
The large-scale privatization of public utilities began under Corazon
Aquino, with the bulk taking place under the watch of Fidel Ramos,
between 1994 and 1998.26 The Ramos administration oversaw the
Water Crisis Act and Omnibus Energy Bill, as well as the privatization Source: PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY
of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Services and the
National Power Corporation.27 Joseph Estrada expanded the scope
of privatization by directing other government entities, including local
government units (LGUs), to determine other assets or activities that Subsistence incedence among population
(in percent)
would be better managed by the private sector.28 Under President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act formalized the privatization of NAPOCOR.29

More recently, the Benigno Aquino administration signed the Universal

Health Care Law in 2013 that, in principle, vowed universal health
access through subsidy of medical care, but rendered health services
costlier.30 Under Aquinos watch, the Enhanced Basic Education Act of
2013 was also passed. In principle, the bill aimed to provide affordable
quality education to Filipino children, but opened up opportunities for
private enterprises to participate with a heavy price tag.31 The retreat
of the state and the increase in the role of private corporations
led to skyrocketing costs for public goods, such as
water, electricity, health, and education. Source: PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017 Combined wealth of 50 richest Filipino families relative to Philippine GDP

07
Duterte: The New Vanguard of Democracy from Below?

Together, patrimonial oligarchic rule and the spread of doctrinaire neoliberalism

combined to thwart the emergence of the Philippine developmental, autonomous
state. The failure of the People Power Revolution to realize its promise of political and
socio-economic progress may have led to national introspection on the viability of
liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism as the pillars of the state. As a result of
the deficiencies of the post-EDSA system, a plurality of Filipinos have begun
to question the People Power Revolution as a genuinely revolutionary and
democratic moment in Philippine history, prompting them to
seek alternative systems and styles of governance.

Within this context, running on the platform of Radical Change, Davao City
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte projected himself as the Filipino peoples last card32 the
torchbearer of the emergent Left and a modern-day Messiah able to discipline the
patrimonial oligarchic elite and overhaul doctrinaire neoliberalism. As Nicole Curato
notes, Duterte sent a powerful campaign message that resonated well with the
electorate: the full restoration of law and order through suppression of criminality
and drugs.33 He vowed to adopt the successful socio-economic programs of
his predecessor and rival candidates,34 promote reindustrialization,35 and, finally,
embark on an ambitious project for systemic change: the transition of the countrys
political system from unitary-presidential to federal-parliamentary form.36

Coming from the impoverished island of Mindanao long neglected by Imperial

Manila, Duterte appeared to see the necessity of devolving political power and
redistributing socio-economic opportunities, not only along class lines but also along
geographical lines. He substantiated his claim with the narrative of a successful
transformation of Davao City from a notorious killing field to one of the countrys
most politically stable and economically developed cities.37 Despite his lack of
political machinery and financial resources, as well as occasional expletive-laden
outbursts that shocked conservative sensibilities, Duterte gradually climbed
the polls, besting his rival candidates with 16,601,997 votes.38

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.ph
Sources: World Bank, Philippine Statistics Authority, Forbes Magazine via CNN Philippines
OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017

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One year after his election victory, Duterte continues to enjoy both high
approval rating among Filipinos. Based on the latest Social Weather Station SHARE OF VOTES IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(SWS) Survey conducted from 23-26 June 2017, Duterte attains new record-
high net satisfaction rating of +66 (% satisfied minus % dissatisfied).39 This is
classified as very good and marks a new personal record high,
a 3-point increase as compared to March surveys +63.40

Deconstructing Dutertismo

In light of post-EDSA Philippines shortcomings, how might we make sense

of Dutertismo as phenomenon? To date, most popular commentary on
Dutertismo has been focused on the phenomenons aesthetic or theatrical
appeal, with sociologists Randy David, Walden Bello and Nicole
Curato providing the pioneering definitions for the term. In my view,
these perspectives fall short in appreciating one major source Source: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
of Dutertes appeal: the ability to make change happen.

To David, Dutertismo is pure theateran experience of the senses dutertes net satisfaction ratings for 2nd QUARTER 2017
rather than the rational application of ideas to societys problems.41 In
discussing the phenomenon, David focuses on Dutertes melodramatic
patriotic gesturing during his election campaign, wherein he would share
his deep frustration with the dysfunctional central government, lament the
disintegration of law and order, and end his rallies by kissing the Philippine
flag.42 David juxtaposes these grandiose theatrical displays with what he
perceives to be Dutertes disdain for humanist values and liberal politics, as
well as a lack of a coherent philosophy of government or political program
to tackle the countrys structural ills.43 David concludes that Dutertismo is
the Philippine incarnation of Fascisma revolution without underlying
ideas, against ideas, against everything nobler, better,
decent, against freedom, truth and justice.44

Bello characterizes the Duterte phenomenon as the collective projection of

Source: SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS SURVEY
the Filipinos citizens anger, frustrations, and resentments that accumulated

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OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017
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under a succession of corrupt or inept administrations by competing
dynasties [].45 In other words, Bello characterizes Dutertismo as
sociological transference or a phenomenon whereby the people
redirect their collective rage against the post-EDSA system onto
Duterte, a political outlier who they believe reflects their aspirations.46
Bello concludes that Dutertismo is spontaneous electoral
insurgency that seeks to dramatize the overthrow of political,
economic and cultural hegemony of the oligarchic class.
For her part, Curato sets her sights on the nexus built between
Duterte and his supporters through narrative formation. Curato
equates Dutertismo as performance of crisis that paints a bleak
picture of the Philippines as a developing country besieged by
destructive forces from within, on the brink of total disintegration
and, hence, in need of a strongman savior.47 This is in contrast to
the narrative presented by Dutertes rival candidates, who gave an
impression of a Philippines on track to becoming a developed
state but still in need of another reformist push.48
Curato notes that while the other candidates presented themselves
as capable of delivering on the promise of inclusive growth, Duterte
redirected the focal point of discourse on the basic issue of order.49
Duterte built his narrative on the premise that sustainable economic
development is impossible to attain without first ensuring peace
and stability.50 However, rather than providing a comprehensive set
of policies and strategies, Curato says that Duterte only gave his
constituents one vision for the country to aspire for: Davao City.51
Curato notes that, with Duterte promising to replicate the Davao
model, he gave Filipinos either a model for governing a
democracy in crisis or an authoritarian fantasy.52
C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
The common thread cutting across the definitions of David, Bello,
and Curato is the impression of Dutertismo as a theatrical display of
rage of the masses against the oligarchic class and the neoliberal
idea that have become the pillars of the post-EDSA system. From
their vantage point, Dutertismo should be dismissed as a hollow
signifier devoid of any substance aimed at addressing the
structural ills of the post-authoritarian state. However, by defining
the phenomenon only in symbolic terms, the three neglect the
material and socio-cultural drivers behind the very existence of the
phenomenon. These perspectives fall short in locating the critical
source of the current administrations political legitimacy:
Dutertes actual ability to translate word into action.
Reconstructing Dutertismo
I argue that Dutertismos fundamental appeal lies not in Dutertes
persona but in the overall capacity of his administration to deliver
concrete, tangible and expeditious results to Filipinos, especially
the marginalized and vulnerable sectors of the society. In my view,
the metamorphosis of Dutertismo from collective fury to a force to
consolidate state powers will be determined mainly by the marked
improvement in the living conditions of the Filipino people in the
short term as well as the introduction of radical political,
economic and social reforms that underpin long-term change.
Not only projection of strength, Dutertismo has two dimensions.
First, it is a state-building project aimed at fostering a renewed
sense of public order and at reengineering state institutions to alter
the post-EDSA configurations of power and create conditions more
favorable for state capital accumulation and redistribution. Second,
it provides a legitimizing narrative for a movement to overhaul
the liberal reformism of the post-EDSA narrative.
Dutertismo as State-Building Project
The post-EDSA eramarked by the return of the modern-day
principalia and the triumphalism of doctrinaire neoliberalismis
the Philippines most recent lost decade. Due to the relative
failure of post-EDSA administrations to establish a highly
capable state, a plurality of Filipinos have grown disillusioned
by institutionalized corruption, pervasive political violence,
deindustrialization and the erosion of social security nets.
Consistent with Quimpos diagnosis, Rommel Banlaoi has
characterized the Philippines as a weak state because its
bureaucratic and political apparatuses have been captured
by the family or clan for the primary purpose of personal
aggrandizement.53 To Banlaoi, the Philippine state has failed to
insulate itself from the parochial interests of traditionally powerful
families and clans that compete in exercising control.54 Under
this scheme, preferential access to state resources and state-
conferred opportunities has traditionally been given to the politico-
economic elite, and friends and relatives of the regime in power.55
Using this framework, the Duterte administrations recent
policies and programs can be viewed as an integral part of
a two-fold project to weaken the clout of the post-EDSA
patrimonial oligarchic eliteand, by extension, the influence of
their guiding doctrinaire neoliberal ideologyand to strengthen
five key capacities of the state: to extract resource and produce
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10
revenue; to make and implement policies and enforce laws; to
regulate the market, redistribute wealth, and deliver
public goods; to maintain social order and public THE DUTERTE ADMINISTRATIONS STATE-BUILDING OBJECTIVES AND FUKUYAMAS STATE FUNCTIONS
safety; and to keep public agencies running.56

This perspective may help explain Dutertes introspective form of

leadership, particularly the pursuit of the following: Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act,57 Universal Health Care,58
genuine tax reform,59 Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program,60 Php
8.3-billion additional allocation for free tuition fees in state colleges
and universities,61 and Php 3.6-trillion worth of mega-infrastructure
projects.62 Also included are Dutertes anti-corruption measures,
such as: Freedom of Information (FOI),63 8888 and 911anti-
corruption hotlines,64 relaxation of Bank Secrecy Law,65 and
the review and reinforcement of Mining Act.66 These capacities
put Dutertes emphasis on the anti-criminality campaignthe
controversial War on Illegal Drugs through Project Double
Barrel Alpha and Project Tokhang67into context.

Lastly, Dutertes quest for state-building is arguably critical to his

pursuit of an independent foreign policy.68 Given the pressing
internal security and governance challenges, on the one hand,
and the burgeoning need for foreign capital and access to foreign
markets to boost his administrations ambitious development and
industrialization agenda, on the other, Duterte may find it necessary
to stabilize the Philippines external security environment.

These merits of Dutertes leadership align with Francis Fukuyamas

exposition on the relative strength and weakness of nation-states.
In Fukuyamas scheme, a relatively strong state is one that is able
to clearly define its scope and exercise considerable strength to
implement public policies within it. Conversely, a relatively weak state
is one that defines for itself a given scope of functions but possesses

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OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017
11
insufficient strength to carry out such policies within its scope (see
table for exposition on the scope of state functions). As in South
Korea and Taiwan, states with strong institutions are more effective
at consolidating their democracies.69 Meanwhile, weak states,
such as Tajikistan, are usually susceptible to military coups, ethnic
conflicts and foreign interference. For this reason, they are prone to
long-term domestic instability that imperils their institution-building
and, later, consolidation.70 It can be argued that, in principle,
Dutertes thrust to rebuild Philippine institutions may
help pave the way for a more robust democracy.
Dutertismo as Myth Formation
Dutertes persona has both a material and a narrative appeal. In
contrast to David, Bello, and Curato, however, I argue that Dutertes
narrative is not ahistorical or otherwise divorced from Philippine
experience. Instead, the narrative is effective because it takes
advantage of critical flaws in the post-EDSA system, which failed
to produce promised reforms, and because the narrative
legitimizes a movement eager for more radical change.
Returning to the foundations of the Philippine state, Banlaoi has
argued that the Philippines is a premature state because its unifying
narrative has been predominantly based on anticolonial sentiment
rather than common history, religion, or language.71 Moreover, even
anticolonial sentiment in the Philippines was not anchored on a
C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
popularly accepted notion of nationalism, but rather on a narrow
elite conception articulated by 19th century, Western-educated
Filipino thinkers.72 A generation later, anti-authoritarian
sentiment was not commonly shared due to the divergence
of experiences and the modalities of memory and forgetting
with regard to Marcoss authoritarian regime.
Today, Duterte is arguably introducing a new socio-cultural narrative
to legitimize his brand of state-building and provide a center-left
interpretation of Philippine history. For Duterte to successfully
introduce his counter-narrative, however, he needs to explicitly raise
to the forefront the failures of the post-EDSA narrative and foment
a crisis of legitimacy around the patrimonial oligarchic class and
neoliberal capitalist ideology. Such a crisis would provide Duterte
an opening to introduce a new dominant narrative
to consolidate his power base.
While he takes advantage of inter-class discord, Duterte is also re-
channeling public energies to avoid intensifying conflicts between
social classes and to instead lay down the foundation for a new
mode of relations that renders inter-class synergy possible. To do
this, Duterte has identified new scapegoats for public dissatisfaction.
These are the three societal evils, namely criminals, drug pushers,
and corrupt public officials.73 In light of the Marawi crisis, he
includes Islamist-inspired terrorists, such as the Maute, Abu Sayyaf,
and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in the list. They are
framed as obstacles to successful nation- and state-building,
culprits that threaten domestic law and order and
hinder the countrys economic take-off.
Finally, in order to secure the state, facilitate its metamorphosis,
ensure its long-term security and prosperity, and preserve the
interest of the next generation, Duterte asserts that it is both
politically and morally justified to ostracize or even kill these newly
defined enemies of the state.74 To put succinctly, the interweaving
of themes on the imminence of class war and state collapse, the
identification of new enemies of the state, and the need for
a Messiah to crush the societal evils and restore societal
normalcy lies at the very core of Dutertismo as an emerging
narrative for the post-post-authoritarian state.
These steps are not unique to Duterte, and find consonance with the
those outlined in Rene Girards myth-building playbook. In his work,
Girard offers a series of concepts that could help us understand the
socio-cultural aspect of Dutertismo, among them, sacrificial crisis
and surrogate victimageor the process of identifying
and expulsing scapegoats as a way to unify the remainder
of the population around a point of virtue.75
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Conclusion

The rise of Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte has become a Gordian knot, a political puzzle that warrants untangling
owing to its practical and long-term impact on the state and trajectory of Philippine politics and, by extension, Asian geopolitics.

Dutertismoa term coined to capture the sudden, spontaneous, and nationwide explosion of popular fury in the
Philippines against the post-EDSA systemhas been predominantly conceptualized as an
aesthetic phenomenon devoid of political and economic substance.

Randy David defines Dutertismo as one-man melodramatic patriotism bordering on Fascism. Walden Bello views it as citizens
sociological transference of anti-elite resentment. Nicole Curato understands it as Philippine reincarnation of populism. A
synthesis of their schemas paints Dutertismo as a movement aimed at establishing a theater state with Filipino characteristics.

However, beyond the campaign season and upon closer look at the developments during Dutertes first year in office,
Duterte has so far displayed results-oriented political leadership, a hands-on approach to state governance similar to what he
accomplished in Davao City. He has sublimated popular rage into imperfect yet concrete policies and strategies
with hybrid socialist and neoliberal features that appeal to both upper and lower classes.

Dutertismo can be understood as movement that aims to catch up with state capacity buildinga fundamental task
neglected by previous administrations. Second, it is a myth-building project designed to propagate a center-leftist brand of
Philippine historiography and provide a fresh narrative of legitimation for the state-building project. This tool for
socio-cultural consolidation may be necessary given the massive epochal and structural shift envisioned
from post-EDSA (unitary-presidential) to post-post-EDSA (parliamentary-federal) governance.

Building on these two definitions, I conclude that Dutertismo holds two distinct possibilities for the future of Philippine
nation- and state-building: either it becomes a positive force for liberating the Philippine state from the hold of the
post-EDSA patrimonial oligarchic class and the hegemonic influence of doctrinaire neoliberal ideology, leading to genuine
democratization, or it falls prey to its internal contradictions, ending up a target of popular rage it once sought to overcome.

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REFERENCES
1
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral 17
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Au-
32
Nestor Corrales, Duterte: I am the Filipino peoples last card, Inquirer.net,
Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines, Comparative Politics, Vol thoritarian Features, Pacific Review, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (03 July 2009): 5. 21 February 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/766817/
37. No. 2 (Jan. 2005): 243. url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20072884 duterte-i-am-the-filipino-peoples-last-card.

18
Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Dont Tell You about Capitalism (New
2
Ibid. York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 168 33
Nicole Curato (2017) Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte
and the New Terms of Philippine Populism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:1, 149,
3
Ibid.
19
Business Dictionary, s.v. Deindustrialization, accessed 29 January 2017, DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751.
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/deindustrialization.html. 34
Pia Ranada, Duterte to unimpressed businessmen: I will hire economic
4
Ibid, 242. minds, Rappler, 03 May 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, http://www.rappler.com/
20
Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos, Gemma Estrada and Jesus Felipe, Exploring nation/politics/elections/2016/131628-duterte-businessmen-hire-economic-minds.
5
Ibid. the Philippine Economic Landscape and Structural Change using the Input-Output
Framework, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection, Working Paper No.
35
Judy Quiros, Duterte says hell bring steel industry back to life, In-
6
E.U. Gutierrez, I.C. Torrente, and N.G. Narca, All in the Family: A Study of 631 (10 November 2010): 2. quirer.net, 10 January 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.
Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democ- net/754134/duterte-says-hell-bring-steel-industry-back-to-life.
racy, 1992), 160. 21
Ibid, 31.

36
Marc Jayson Cayabyab, Duterte wants federal government with prime
7
Alfred McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and 22
Ibid, 32. minister, president, Inquirer.net, 25 July 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, http://
Family in the Philippines, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines newsinfo.inquirer.net/799182/duterte-wants-federal-govt-with-prime-minister-presi-
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 10.
23
Philippine Statistics Authority, Poverty incidence among Filipinos registered dent.
at 21.6% in 2015, Philippine Government.
8
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Au-
37
Nicole Curato (2017) Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte
thoritarian Features, Pacific Review, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (03 July 2009): 9. 24
Ibid. and the New Terms of Philippine Populism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:1, 149,
DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751.
9
Alfred McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and
25
Paolo Taruc, A Tale of Two Economies: Exclusive Growth in the Philip-
Family in the Philippines, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, pines, CNN Philippines, 21 September 2015, accessed 29 January 2017, http://
38
Final results: 2016 presidential and vice presidential canvass, Inquirer.
10. cnnphilippines.com/business/2015/02/26/a-tale-of-two-economies-exclusive-growth. net, 27 May 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/787867/
html. philippine-elections-final-results-2016-congressional-canvass-presidential-vice-presi-

10
Francisco Lara, Jr., Warlords in drugs trade legitimized by foreign aid, dent-race.
GMA News Online, 13 March 2010, accessed 29 January 2017, http://www.gma- 26
Luis Corral, IFIs and Privatization in the Philippine Power and Water Sec-
network.com/news/story/186032/news/specialreports/warlords-in-drugs-trade-legiti- tors, Asian Labor Network on IFIs (ALNI)-Philippines (November 2013): 2.
39
Raynan F. Javil, Public satisfaction with Duterte peaks, Business World
mized-by-foreign-aid. Online, 07 July 2017, accessed 17 July 2017, http://www.bworldonline.com/content.
27
Ibid. php?section=TopStory&title=public-satisfaction-with-duterte-peaks&id=147918.
11
Ibid.
28
Ibid. 40
Ibid.

12
How serious is the Philippine drug problem? Rappler, 19 September
2016, accessed 30 January 2017, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331- 29
Ibid.
41
Randy David, Dutertismo, Inquirer.net, 01 May 2016, accessed 30 Janu-
data-drug-problem-philippines. ary 2017, http://opinion.inquirer.net/94530/dutertismo.

30
PhilHealth: The myth of universal health care under Aquino, Ibon, 30 July
13
Ibid. 2015, accessed 29 January 2017, http://ibon.org/2015/07/philhealth-the-myth-of- 42
Ibid.
universal-health-care-under-aquino/.
14
Ibid. 43
Ibid.
31
Curtis B. Riep, Commercialization of Education in the Philippines, Educa-
15
Ibid. tion International, 01 February 2016, accessed 29 January 2017, https://worldsofedu- 44
Ibid.
cation.org/new/en/magazines/articles/326.
16
Ibid.

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER JUly 2017

14

45
Walden Bello, Chronicling an Electoral Insurgency: Dutertismo Captures gmanetwork.com/news/story/583713/money/economy/duterte-approves-p21-b- 73
Victor Andres Manhit, Analysis: Understanding the Duterte vision for the
the Philippines, Transnational Institute, 19 May 2016, accessed 30 January 2017, rice-deal-for-filipino-farmers. Philippines, Philippine Star, 30 June 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.
https://www.tni.org/en/article/chronicling-an-electoral-insurgency-dutertismo-cap- philstar.com:8080/headlines/2016/06/30/1598167/analysis-understanding-duterte-
tures-the-philippines. 61
Janvic Mateo, Free tuition in state schools next year, Philippine Star, vision-philippines.
17 December 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.philstar.com/head-

46
During his electoral campaigns, Bello notes that Duterte enthralled his au- lines/2016/12/17/1654307/free-tuition-state-schools-next-year. 74
Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, drugs and diplomacy, Al Jazeera, 16
dience by frequently peppering his talks with cuss words, such as putang ina, son October 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/
of a bitch, bakla (gay), or cono (cunt) as a show of indignation against the Filipino 62
Czeriza Valencia and Evelyn Macairan, Build! Build! Build! P3.6-T Rody in- talktojazeera/2016/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html.
patrimonial oligarchic class. (Ibid.) frastructure program unveiled, Philippine Star, 19 April 2017, accessed 17 July 2017,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/19/1691735/build-build-build-p3.6-t- 75
Ibid, 61.

47
Nicole Curato (2017) Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte rody-infrastructure-program-unveiled.
and the New Terms of Philippine Populism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:149,
DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751
63
Alexis Romero, Duterte signs historic EO on Freedom of Information,
Philippine Star, 24 July 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.philstar.com/
48
Ibid. headlines/2016/07/24/1606146/duterte-signs-historic-eo-freedom-information.
49
Ibid, 148.
64
Dial 8888, 911: Govt opens complaints, emergency hotlines, ABS-
CBN News, 01 August 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/
50
Ibid. news/08/01/16/dial-8888-911-govt-opens-complaints-emergency-hotlines.
51
Ibid, 149. 65
Jess Diaz, Duterte eyes easing bank secrecy law, Philippine Star,
20 August 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.philstar.com/head-
52
Ibid, 150. lines/2016/08/20/1615260/duterte-eyes-easing-bank-secrecy-law.

53
Rommel Banlaoi, Globalization and Nation-Building in the Philippines,
66
Germelina Lacorte, DENR chief calls for review of mining law in PH, In-
Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional and Global Challenges in the quirer.net, 05 August 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.
Post-9/11 World (London: CRC Press, 2010), 30. net/803123/denr-chief-calls-for-review-of-mining-law-in-ph.
54
Ibid.
67
Joseph Tristan Roxas, PNP implements Oplan Double Barrel Alpha, GMA
News Online, 25 October 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.gmanetwork.
55
Ibid. com/news/story/586421/news/nation/pnp-implements-oplan-double-barrel-alpha

56
Wu Fengshi, State Capacity Building (presentation, Comparative Politics
AS6001 class, Singapore, 19 September 2016).
57
Elizabeth Marcelo, Duterte vows full implementation of RH law, GMA
News Online, 25 July 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.gmanetwork.
com/news/story/575011/news/nation/duterte-vows-full-implementation-of-rh-law.
68
Arianne Merez, Dutertes independent foreign policy: A move to diversify
allies, ABS-CBN News, 30 June 2017, accessed 17 July 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.
com/news/06/30/17/dutertes-independent-foreign-policy-a-move-to-diversify-allies.
69
Wu Fengshi, State Capacity Building (presentation, Comparative Politics
AS6001 class, Singapore, 19 September 2016).

58
Philippine Information Agency, DOH calls for universal health care for Filipi- 70
Ibid.
nos, Philippine Government.

71
Rommel Banlaoi, Globalization and Nation-Building in the Philippines,

59
Melissa Luz Lopez, Duterte tax plan right way to goIMF Business Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional and Global Challenges in the
World, 15 September 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.bworldonline. Post-9/11 World (London: CRC Press, 2010), 29.
com/content.php?section=TopStory&title=duterte-tax-plan-&8216right-way-to-
go&8217----imf&id=133446. 72
Ibid.

60
Jon Viktor Cabuneas, Duterte approves P21-B rice deal for Filipino farm-
ers, GMA News Online, 04 October 2016, accessed 03 February 2017, http://www.

C 2017 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.ph
10.7
VOLUME

ABOUT
Mark Davis Madarang Pablo
is a Senior Research Associate at the Stratbase ADR Institute. In
2017, he graduated with an Master of Science in Strategic Studies
from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University in Singapore. Prior to joining ADRi, Mr. Pablo
specialized in Strategic Studies. He began his career as a Defence
Researcher/Analyst in the Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy
Management (OSSSM), the think tank of the General Headquarters,
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from 2013-2015. He graduated
Cum Laude from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2012 with a
bachelors degree in Political Science and Philosophy.

Stratbase ADR Institute

is an independent international and strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the
issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia
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