ROBERT NOZICK

THE EXPERIENCE
MACHINE
Phil 100, Intro to Philosophy
Benjamin Visscher Hole IV
Week One What is Philosophy? (6/20-6/24)
Plato Apology (p. 26-36)
Baker An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking (p. 2-18)

Week Two The Death of Socrates & the Theory of the Forms (6/27-7/1)
Plato Phaedo

Week Three Personal Identity (7/4-7/8)

BonJour/Baker Personal Identity & Free Will (p. 215-217)
Locke Personal Identity (p. 220-225)
Reid Of Mr. Lockes Account of Personal Identity (p 226-228)
Parfit Personal Identity (p. 237-248)

Week Four Descartes & Epistemology (7/11-7/15)

BonJour/Baker Knowledge & Skepticism (p. 42-46)
Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy (p. 46-63)

Week Five Does God Exist? (7/18-7/22)

BonJour/Baker Faith & God (p. 516-518)
Aquinas The Five Ways (p. 518-520)
Paley The Argument from Design (p. 527-533)
Anselm The Ontological Argument (p. 554-555)
Hume The Problem of Evil (p. 560-569)

Week Six Intro to Ethical Theory (7/25-7/29)

Timmons Moral Theory Primer (PDF)
Rachels The Challenge of Cultural Relativism (p. 420-427)

Week Seven Utilitarianism (8/1-8/5)

Nozick The Experience Machine (p. 605-607)
Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals & Legislation (p. 323-328)
Mill Utilitarianism (p. 329-336)

Week Eight Kantian Ethics & Social Contract Theory (8/8-8/12)

Kant Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (p. 353-363)
BonJour/Baker The Legitimacy of Government and the Nature of Justice (p. 447-448)
Hobbes The Social Contract from the Leviathan (p. 449-458)

Week Nine Topics in Applied Ethics (8/15-8/19)

Singer Fame, Affluence & Morality (p. 348-352)
Thomson A Defense of Abortion (p. 385-395)
FINAL EXAM Cumulative
(8/19) Like an extended weekly quiz:
Similar difficulty
Similar kinds of questions
A lot more content
A little more than twice as long
UTILITARIANISM

An act is right if and only if (and

because) it would (if performed) likely
produce at least as high a utility (net
overall balance of welfare) as would
any other alternative action one might
perform instead (Timmons, 8).
UTILITARIANISM
WHAT IS WELFARE?

Theory of the good Theory of the right

Hedonism: Pleasure is the Right action consists in

one and only value and whatever maximizes the
pain is the one and only greatest net pleasure for
disvalue. all those affected.
HEDONISM

Hedonism: Pleasure is the Voltaire

one and only value and I have told myself a
pain is the one and only hundred times that I should
disvalue. be happy if I were as brainless
as my neighbor, and yet I do
not desire such happiness.
HEDONISM

Hedonism: Pleasure is the Nozick

one and only value and Is pleasure really the one and
pain is the one and only only value?
disvalue.

thought experiments are

employed by philosophers
to examine the implications of
theories and to explore the
boundaries of certain concepts
(Honderich, T., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd eds, OUP
2005, pg. 919)
NOZICK

Suppose there were an experience

machine that would give you any
experience you desired. Superduper
neuropsychologists could stimulate
your brain so that you would think
and feel you were

Should you plug into this machine

for life, preprogramming your lifes
experiences? (606)
NOZICK

Hedonism: Pleasure is the Main Argument

one and only value and 1. If hedonism is true, then
pain is the one and only
disvalue.
we would plug into the
experience machine.
2. But we would not plug
into the machine.
3. Therefore, hedonism is
not true.
NOZICK

Premise Two: But we Discussion Question: Would

would not plug into the you plug into the machine?
machine.

List 3-4 reasons why or why not.

NOZICK

Premise Two: But we First, we want to do

would not plug into the certain things, and not just
machine.
have the experience of
doing them (606).
NOZICK

Premise Two: But we A second reason for not

would not plug into the plugging in is that we want
machine.
to be a certain way, to be a
certain kind of person
(606).
NOZICK

Premise Two: But we Thirdly, plugging into an

would not plug into the experience machine limits
machine.
you to a man-made reality,
to a world no deeper or
more important than that
which people can
construct (606).
NOZICK

Reason Two: we want to Consider the Transformation

be certain way, to be a Machine .
certain sort of person
Surely one would not use
the transformation machine
to become as one would
wish So something
matters in addition to ones
experiences and what one is
like. (607)
 1. Consider a deathbed lie. Is it better
to know the truth?
DISCUSSION (adapted from the Grace & Bob example, 607)

POINTS 2. Nozicks third reason for refusing to

plug into the machine appeals to our
desire to connect to a deeper reality,
and he suggests that the transcendent
reality advocated by some religions
might satisfy this desire. Does it seem
then that the third reason will appeal
to only religious people, or might
something like nature count as a
deeper reality even for an atheist?
(607)

3. Would Socrates plug into the machine?

Why or why not?
OBJECTION The Reductionist Move
The Fetishism Problem
All other apparent values are only
instrumentally valuable.

Hedonism: Pleasure is the one and only

value and pain is the one and only disvalue.
THE HAPPY ROBOT
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

We can imagine a person living the most ideally valuable

life in Nozicks terms. She seems to have it all, being a
Harvard professor of neuropsychology as well as an
accomplished cellist and winner of the Boston marathon.
She has the most lovingly supportive husband and an
(adopted) teenage daughter. Her life is filled with deep,
loving, meaningful relationships. It is a tragedy when she
dies unexpectedly. To everyones astonishment, an
autopsy reveals that she is not human at all but a robot.
(71-72)
Donner, Wendy. The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy. Cornell University Press: New York (1991).
THE DELUDED SADIST
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

Imagine a universe consisting on one sentient being only,

who falsely believes that there are other sentient beings
and that they are undergoing exquisite torment. So far
from being distressed by the thought, he takes a great
delight in these imagined sufferings. Is this better or
worse than a universe containing no sentient being at
all? Is it worse, again, than a universe containing only one
sentient being with the same beliefs as before but who
sorrows at the imagined tortures of his fellow creatures?
I suggest, as against Moore, that the universe containing
the deluded sadist is the preferable one. (J.J.C. Smart)