Disclosure Theory

I. Interpretation: All debaters with coaches must disclose tags and citations for all
evidence read for offensive positions that have been broken on the NDCA wiki
at least one hour before the round.
II. Violation: My opponents cites are not on the wiki! All my case citations for
both sides are online.
III. Standards:
A. Argument quality
1) Disclosure controls for the element of surprise. A world without disclosure
rewards debaters for running arguments not because they are good, but
because their opponents won't know how to respond. Disclosure forces
debaters to commit to quality; under my interpretation, debaters would
have to write cases knowing that their opponents will have the opportunity
for thoughtful preparation.
2) Disclosure improves second-line argumentation. In the status quo, debaters
are forced to spend more time researching and writing answers on the first
line of argumentation; having frontlines for your case in the 2NR or the 1AR
is an advantage, not an expectation. If both sides had equal information to
prepare first-line answers, debaters would have to devise more creative and
thoughtful second-line arguments. The quality of analytics would increase in
later rebuttals, which would teach debaters not only to construct, but also to
defend, their arguments.
3) Disclosure encourages cross-pollination. Academic citations conclusively
demonstrate that publishing online increases readership; if debaters
disclosed, it would be easier to build on existing arguments in creating new
ones. Von Hippel1:
In the case of academic publications, we see evidence that free revealing
does increase reusea matter of great importance to academics. A
citation is an indicator that information contained in an article has been
reused: the article has been read by the citing author and found useful
1
 Disclosure Theory

enough to draw to readers' attention. Recent empirical studies are

finding that articles to which readers have open accessarticles available
for free download from an authors website, for exampleare cited
significantly more often than are equivalent articles that are available
only from libraries or from publishers fee-based websites. Antelman
(2004) finds an increase in citations ranging from 45 percent in
philosophy to 91 percent in mathematics. She notes that "scholars in
diverse disciplines are adopting open access practices at a surprisingly
high rate and are being rewarded for it, as reflected in [citations]."

The analogy is that the strongest arguments would rise to the top in a world
with disclosure; citation frequency would indicate the relative quality of an
argument to all debaters in the community. This would have a powerful
signaling effect, especially to novices, that would make the best arguments
most visible to everyone in the community. When better arguments win more
rounds, debaters have to increase their breadth and depth of research to find
different arguments, mine alternative sources, and explore other fields.

Argument quality is key to education on its most basic level: debate teaches
students how to argue effectively. Theory should be a forward-looking
consideration because competing interpretations are just competing plans for
debate. Theory is about competing rules for making debate better.

B. Evidence ethics: Lets be realistic: disclosure is the only way to prevent evidence
distortion before it occurs. Without transparency and publicity, competitors
have no way to check their opponents' evidence until after the debate, after the
wrong has occurred, and decisions disclosed. At a fast-paced national
tournament, the window of opportunity to redress such wrongs is slim to none.
They might argue that evidence distortion doesn't happen often enough to
 Disclosure Theory

justify disclosure, but without a public and transparent system, we have no way
to know that! Moreover, the cases that do occur are in high-stakes debates; at
least three TOC elim victories were based on distorted evidence, which was not
provable until after the fact. We should give each other a chance to evaluate
each other's evidence, to identify errors, and to correct them before they occur.
Disclosure not only prevents distorted evidence from winning; it presents a
powerful incentive to represent evidence ethically. If you make it to elims and
everyone can check your evidence, you won't risk miscutting a card. If you do,
other debaters are likely to catch it. Without disclosure, the incentive structure
is weak, and the prevention system is nonexistent. Misrepresentation of
evidence harms the educational process because it rewards students for
butchering academic articles and avoiding research. It also creates an unfair
competitive advantage for debaters. To win this argument, they must prove that
nondisclosure is more likely than disclosure to prevent evidence distortion;
thats a tough sell.
C. Preparation asymmetry: My opponent walked into this debate with a structural
advantage: they had access to my evidence, but I didnt have access to theirs. If
they really cared about making this debate fair, they should have disclosed his
outline and cites. They are going to say that this is a structural disadvantage of
my own doing, that I shouldnt have disclosed, and that they shouldnt be
punished for opting out. Thats an unreasonable expectation because they
know that others have disclosed. They can always opt in to make this debate
fair, and my interpretation gave him a lenient one-hour limit to equalize the
situation. Whatever their reservations about disclosure, they could have
changed them in the interests of fairness and reciprocity. On the other hand, it
would be unfair for me to opt out after already agreeing to participate and
reaping the research benefits of mutual disclosure. Preparation asymmetry
 Disclosure Theory

skews the debate because it affects our relative capabilities to form coherent
strategies and specific responses. They might say they didnt exploit this
asymmetry, but thats unverifiable; dont vote on speculative defense.
IV. This argument is a voting issue for fairness, which precedes substance because
it biases your evaluation of the round, and education, which precedes
substance because it is the fundamental goal of debate. Theory is an issue of
competing interpretations, meaning you ought to demand that my opponent
present a principled case to support an alternative interpretation of the rules
for the debate; if they do not prove that nondisclosure is good, vote them
down.
A. Direct abuse The preparation asymmetry has already occurred. I had to
commit to this argument to ensure the best chance of victory, which
prevented me from reading my topic-specific arguments.
B. Deterrence Punishing the abusive debater with a loss deters the use of
abusive strategies in the future. This is empirically verified by the
progression of college policy debate, and it doesnt matter if nothing
happens as a result of this particular round, nor does it matter if my
opponent themselves is undeterred by your decision its all about the
trend within the debate community. Increased deterrence is better than
doing nothing.
C. Role of the Judge Its not what you do, its what you justify. Debate
practice is determined by how judges evaluate rounds. Sending a message
against bad styles leads to good debating, creating more substantive and
less procedural debate in the long run. Even if youre averse to voting for
theory, you should realize that endorsing my theory argument would make
theoretically illegitimate practices less common in the future. Regardless of
the deterrent effect of the judges ballot, punishing the abusive debater with
 Disclosure Theory

a loss is key to maintaining the educational role of the critic, which is the
most fundamental obligation of every judge in the activity.
D. Competitive incentives are key Punishing the abusive debater with a loss is
key to restoring competitive equity. Simply rejecting the argument, docking
speaker points, or getting didactic in the oral critique is not enough only
the ballot sends a meaningful message. Not voting on this argument creates
an incentive for bad debate. If debaters know they can just kick the
argument and get out of the link to theory, or even worse, go for an RVI,
they will continue to use abusive strategies for the positive time trade-off on
theory.
E. Positive feedback loop If I win that disclosure is good, only the ballot will
yield results. Vote [[aff/neg]] for norm enforcement just as theyd lose for
not being topical, they should lose for not disclosing. Changes in communal
norms are strongest when tied to competitive incentives because debaters
are caught in a prisoners dilemma: if they act alone, they lose. Debaters
have no incentive to disclose without mutual assurance by their opponents
or tournament-imposed rules; in the absence of coercion, only the ballot can
address the collective action problem.