IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL APPEAL: EA/2017/xxxx

GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER

(INFORMATION RIGHTS)

BETWEEN:

Appellant
and

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

Respondent

APPELLANTS GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Introduction

1. This is an appeal under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 against a
Decision Notice FS50622653 issued by the Commissioner on 28 June 2017. These
grounds of appeal are served together with the appellants notice of appeal, in
accordance with rule 22 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier) (General Regulatory
Chamber) Rules 2009.

Background

2. The appeal concerns requests for information made to Humberside police (HP). A
brief summary from the point of view of HP is provided in the Commissioners Decision
Notice (the DN) under Evidence from the parties, 22-24. However, a more
 detailed account of relevant historic events is contained in the Commissioners
Response to Tribunal EA/2017/0062 [Exhibit 1].

Grounds of Appeal

3. The Commissioner states in paragraph 18 of the DN that in some cases it will be

obvious when a request is vexatious but in others it may not and quotes the following
from the Commissioners guidance:

In cases where the issue is not clear-cut, the key question to ask is whether the
request is likely to cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption,
irritation or distress.

4. There is clearly no question about the matter in the present case; the request was not
vexatious. The Appellant has unquestionably been the victim of a miscarriage of justice
caused initially by HPs false arrest and subsequently by the force breaching the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 by failing to apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors
and the Director of Public Prosecutions Guidance on Charging [Exhibit 2]. The failure
to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry initially, and when new evidence became
available to the force, to fail again, are good enough reasons why the Appellant should
conduct his own investigations.

5. The issue therefore is clear-cut and in accordance with Commissioners guidance the
question as to whether the request is likely to cause a disproportionate or unjustified
level of disruption, irritation or distress does not enter into the equation.

The value or serious purpose of requests / motive of the requester

6. The Appellant is in the unfortunate position to be fighting the injustice of three cover-
ups involving holders of public/judicial office, police etc., who are liable to
imprisonment for misconduct related offences. He therefore has only FOI legislation
available for carrying out investigations which the negligent/criminal public bodies
should have investigated on his behalf in return for the taxes he pays.

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7. It will be no revelation to the Tribunal that each public body, in response to every
request concerning these matters has exploited Section 14 to avoid disclosing the
information requested. However, despite having all the section 14 complaints upheld by
the Commissioner concerning HP, North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) and the
Ministry of Justice on the grounds that they had no serious purpose it is worth noting
paragraph 24 of the Commissioners DN:

HP also explained that there had been an article in the Grimsby Telegraph on 12
January 2016, which referred to an incident where it was suggested that a police
officers witness statement included the phrase you cant make me. HP
explained that this was the same police officer who had arrested the complainant.

8. Ironically the outcome was useful, despite the Commissioner upholding the section 14
exemption. It revealed that a police officer who the Appellant had alleged to have
inaccurately set out his Witness Statement relating to his wrongful conviction to include
the phrase "you can't make me" was the same constable involved in a separate incident
where it was reported that the exact phrase was said by another defendant who was
subsequently convicted.

9. The possibility therefore is that standard (not necessarily true) phrases are incorporated
into Witness Statements to the detriment of defendants. The Appellant has recently
succeeded in having the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) take over a
complaint into this matter which HP wrongly deemed suitable to be dealt with by Local
Resolution and had delayed its outcome by taking 510 days to complete. This
information was useful as it has been submitted as further evidence to the IPCC and
Criminal Cases Review Commission in support of the Appellants allegations against
the police for wrongful arrest, false statements and miscarriage of justice. The
information is also usefully available for any other actions that may be appropriate
where further evidence is required to support these allegations.

10. The useful information inadvertently released in the DN is evidence that the Appellants
motive for making the request did have a serious purpose, so it follows that if the
request had been complied with the potential usefulness of a full disclosure is self
evident.

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 Abuse of the Police Reform Act 2002 (complaints)

11. The Commissioner notes in paragraph 41 of the DN the explanation by HP that the issue
in relation to the present request had been dealt with and the complainant updated. The
Appellant received the outcome to the complaint on 3 April 2017. This was 510 days
after it had been submitted to HPs Professional Standards Department (PSD) on 8
November 2015. The issues are still ongoing and currently being dealt with by the IPCC
because the PSD negligently considered the complaint was suitable to be dealt with by
way of Local Resolution. This is just one of a string of matters that have been
mishandled by the PSD.

12. The force must be satisfied in accordance with the Police Reform Act 2002 that a
complaint is suitable for local resolution. The criteria for whether a complaint can be
dealt with by Local Resolution are set out in paragraph 6 (sub-paragraphs 6 to 8) of
Schedule 3 of that Act. Paragraph 6 provides so far as is relevant, as follows:

Handling of complaints by the appropriate authority

6. (1) This paragraph applies where a complaint has been recorded by the
appropriate authority.
........
(4) If the appropriate authority determines that the complaint is suitable for
being subjected to local resolution, it shall make arrangements for it to be
so subjected.

(5) If the appropriate authority determines that the complaint is not so

suitable, it shall make arrangements for the complaint to be investigated
by the authority on its own behalf.

(6) A determination that a complaint is suitable for being subjected to local

resolution may not be made unless the following conditions are both met.

(7) The first condition is that the appropriate authority is satisfied that the
conduct complained of (even if it were proved) would not justify the
bringing of any criminal or disciplinary proceedings against the person
whose conduct is complained of.

(8) The second condition is that the appropriate authority is satisfied that the
conduct complained of (even if it were proved) would not involve the

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 infringement of a person's rights under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention
(within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998).

(9) ........

13. HP could not conceivably have been satisfied that if proven the conduct complained of
would not have justified the bringing of criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings against
the arresting officer complained about. The complaint concerned the Appellants
suspicion that the arresting officer had incited a witness to commit perjury and had made
a wrongful/unlawful arrest, leading to false imprisonment.

14. The witnesses had committed criminal offences by making false allegations which they
backed up with detailed statements to the police and so should have been prosecuted as
they were liable to imprisonment for perverting the course of justice. The officer whom
the complaint was referred to had not opened the file until 370 days after he had been
allocated it so the delay could not have been attributed to the complexity of the matter.

15. The Appellant contacted the PSD directly a number of times in connection with the
delay roughly 400 days after the conduct complaint had been submitted. Each time the
PSD stated that they would get the resolving officer to provide an update regarding how
the investigation was progressing. The IPCC states that an update should be provided
every 28 days from when a complaint has been formally recorded under the Police
Reform Act 2002. On that basis the number of updates should have far exceeded 10 at
around the time the PSD was contacted.

16. The PSD considered it had done everything within its power to ensure the investigation
was being dealt with in a timely and professional manner. However, there is no evidence
that the PSD's involvement extended to anything more than asking the appointed officer
for updates and to remind him that an update be sent to the Appellant. The PSD
defended the officer implying his workload left him no time to deal with the complaint
which suggests that the PSD were conscious that the allocation to this officer was
inappropriate and could have been deliberately engineered to cause the maximum
amount of delay. For example, it would benefit the force to ensure that by the time
investigations had completed any legal proceedings regarding a breach of Human Rights
that the Appellant intended bringing upon the outcome, would be statute barred.

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 Open up issues that have already been dealt with

17. The Commissioner notes in paragraph 47 that FOIA should not be used as a way to open
up issues that have already been dealt with. It is not for the Commissioner to make
judgment as to whether a request is vexatious on this basis and has clearly acted ultra-
vires her powers in doing so. The matter which the Commissioner considers has been
dealt with has evidently not been dealt with because it is currently being looked into
by the IPCC on account of HP grossly abusing the complaint process under the Police
Reform Act 2002. If the Commissioner considers that a victim of a miscarriage of
justice should just accept it and give up hope of ever proving their innocence then that
should kept to herself. Clearly it is not for the Commissioner to dictate that the
Appellant in this case should just accept it.

Pseudonyms created to cause annoyance

18. Commissioners DN sets out in paragraphs 29 & 30 the spurious claim by HP that the
pseudonyms used by the Appellant were created to cause annoyance. HP makes this
assertion on the basis that it had asked for identification in relation to the requests using
pseudonyms and had not received any. If the Appellant had responded to these requests
(if they were from him) by providing his identity then HP would have some justification
in its assertions. The Appellant has noticed (relatively recently) more than 20 requests to
HP from someone using the same pseudonym on the whatdotheyknow website which all
could be considered frivolous. Identification appears to be asked for which fits HPs
description of the requests. If HP assumes these are the Appellants then it is barking up
the wrong tree.

Suspended account owing to the tone and often abusive manner

19. The Commissioners DN sets out in paragraph 21 the spurious claim by HP that the
Appellants account (Whatdotheyknow) through which he made FOI requests was
suspended owing to the tone and often abusive manner of the requests and subsequent
correspondence. The reasons which have been given by Whatdotheyknow were not

5
 those stated by HP, the reasons were for misusing their service, for example by
requesting his own personal information.

Allegations of NELC Fraudulent use of Council Tax bailiffs

20. The Commissioners DN at paragraph 22 sets out the representations by HP concerning

a longstanding history of the Appellant contesting the forces view that private bailiffs,
who on behalf of local authorities, commit fraud offences should be considered civil
matters and not involve the police. As far as the Appellant is concerned, this matter has
no apparent irrelevance to the present request, but in case the Tribunal requires the
history, a reasonable amount of it is provided in the following paragraphs.

Background

21. NELCs bailiff contractor Rossendales fraudulently demanded an amount of money

from the Appellant in a notice threatening removal. A total 294.50, with no breakdown
of costs was hand written on the notice which was left breaching the Data Protection Act
1998 (sensitive personal data). The Appellant found the threatening letter by chance
wedged outside the entrance door to the apartment block of his residence dated 03/09
[Exhibit 3]. The bailiff visited the Appellants premises and allegedly created a Notice
of Seizure of Goods & Inventory advising him that he had levied against a vehicle
which was in the car park at the apartment complex. The Appellant had no knowledge of
a levied vehicle or Notice of Seizure.

22. The issues arose subsequent to the Appellant resigning from his job for health reasons.
He intended supporting himself financially until deciding on another direction. Living
expenses, Council tax, mortgage etc., where met from savings which enabled him to
pursue skills, unhindered, which were necessary to achieve his planned change in
direction without the distractions associated with being beholden to the state.

23. Minor cash flow issues arising from wages no longer being paid into the Appellants
bank resulted in occasional payments failing to be made by the due date, so triggering
the councils automated Council Tax recovery process through the courts. Action was
taken, not for non-payment, but because the law provides for the instalment facility to be
withdrawn after two late payments, meaning payment in full is demanded immediately.

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 Failure thereafter to raise the lump sum permits the council to obtain a liability order
through the court which in turn gives it powers to instruct bailiffs. It was considered
outrageous to be threatened by NELC whilst choosing not to claim benefits, so the
Appellant continued paying the few remaining instalments as normal. NELC then took
arguably lawful (but unnecessary) court action, adding costs and irresponsibly
instructing its bailiff contractor, Rossendales.

24. By the time bailiffs were instructed, the Council Tax was settled. However, hundreds of
pounds were added fraudulently by Rossendales which was reported to the Police
[Exhibit 3, letter 3 March 2009]. HP's Economic Crime Section fobbed off the incident
as a civil matter to be taken up with NELC but said it would review the matter if the
dispute revealed new evidence of criminal activity [Exhibit 3, letter 19 May 2009].
NELCs formal complaint procedure uncovered fraud and other illegality far exceeding
what was first thought [Exhibit 3, letter 26 April 2010], however, NELC defended
Rossendales actions throughout the whole process. The Chief Executive failed to
uphold the complaint and was therefore complicit. On escalating the concerns, the Local
Government Ombudsman concluded that the matter was for the police to deal with.

25. It was discovered Rossendales were notorious for defrauding householders pursued by
councils. Each fresh piece of evidence was countered by HP with a new excuse why
they would not investigate. When escalated to the IPCC, the Police watchdog could do
nothing because the law prevented it as a consequence of HP refusing to record or
record wrongly complaints made about the matter.

26. Excuses for NELC/Rossendales were made by the organisation which oversees
complaints about breaches of confidentiality. The Information Commissioner found on
the balance of probabilities that a letter left by Rossendales threatening to remove goods
WAS NOT left in the place where the Appellant found it (outside the communal
entrance to his property) and therefore did not consider the bailiff breached the Data
Protection Act. Ironically, it was NELCs suggestion that previous letters which the
Appellant had never seen (its defence against alleged phantom visits) that they would
have been left in the same way, though not so luckily discovered by the Appellant
before disappearing.

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27. It was the Appellants belief that the matters were criminal and that it was indefensible
for HP to claim that the allegations were Civil, just on account of them originated from
Council Tax. Applying its principle consistently would mean that the police could not
consider a serious assault on a bailiff by an aggrieved householder to be a criminal
offence on account of the incident originating from Council Tax. The scenario is clearly
absurd; the assailant would be prosecuted under the relevant criminal legislation, as one
would expect in the case of the bailiff (or any other person) dishonestly charging for
work that has not been done 1 . It is entirely irrelevant in both cases that the matter
originated from Council Tax.

Pursuing further evidence

28. Private bailiff firms contracted to local authorities were circumventing justice and a
significant factor allowing them to do so was thought to have been the evidential
standards required in criminal cases. For example, proving a negative i.e., presenting
evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that a bailiff had not attended in respect of an
enforcement visit which raised a fee (phantom visits) was presenting difficulty.

29. It was considered a way round the burden of proof, and to highlight the prevalence of
the abuse, would be to explore how data already held could be used in conjunction with
the number of times certain enforcement fees were charged (if obtainable). The data
identified as particularly useful and which was already held related to the number of
times levied goods were removed by bailiffs [Exhibit 4].

30. Bailiff fees relevant at the time were listed in Schedule 5 of the Council Tax Regulations
including two which could be applied to the debtors account under certain
circumstances where a bailiff had levied goods. The categories were; i) a redemption
fee, and; ii) an attendance with a vehicle.

31. The redemption fee was headed H and covered out of pocket expenses in relation to
advertising levied goods but where no sale took place by reason of payment, i.e. the
goods were returned. The fee was only lawful when levied goods had been physically

1
House of Lords (27 April 2007): The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Scotland of Asthal): A bailiff
or any other person who dishonestly charges for work that has not been done will be committing an offence
under the Fraud Act 2006.

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 removed;2 however, Rossendales routinely added them to debtors accounts. NELC was
complicit as it allowed in all cases where goods had been levied that the bailiff firm
charged the fee.

32. The attendance (with a vehicle, but where no items are removed) was described under
header C as an attendance with a view to the removal of goods (van fee). The
bailiff would have needed to attend for the purpose of removing goods, therefore the fee
would only have been lawful following a levy where goods had been seized.

33. An opportunity for the bailiff to assess the debt and if appropriate levy goods was
catered for separately in the fee schedule (fees could be charged for two calls max. to a
debtors home). However, it was discovered that van fees were raised routinely on the
same day that the separately prescribed charge had been made for levying goods. Also
significant is the vehicle in which the bailiff attended was his regular transport 3.

34. It was known from data already held that the number of instances where bailiffs remove
goods was consistently negligible indicating that any records held by NELC of the
redemption fee being applied should be no more than one or two each year. However,
once obtaining records from NELC (after an 18 month fight) it was found that the
annual average of the fee being charged to return goods was 230. Data revealed that
during approximately six years from 2007 the redemption fee was added to the debt of
1,418 householders. Based on the statutory minimum NELC allowed its bailiff
contractor to impose fees of 34,741 to return levied goods to the debtor in
circumstances where no goods had been removed [Exhibit 4, letter 19 July 2013].

35. During the same period, attendance with a vehicle fees, valued 603,590 were charged
to 4,643 householders. However, 2,232 of these (290,160), incurred NELC sanctioned
130 on the same visit as a levy, not on a follow-up to a levy which can be the only
interpretation of the law which defines an attendance as "a view to the removal of
goods" [Exhibit 4, letter 24 July 2013].

2
North East Lincs Council Freedom of Information Ref: 6688_1314 (6 March 2014): A redemption charge is
imposed for the return of goods where they had been removed.
3
Milton Keynes Council Bailiff Contract: (For attending to remove goods when no goods are removed): This fee
will only be charged where the debtor has been given sufficient opportunity, after the levy, to pay the sums due
to prevent removal vehicles attending. This fee will only be charged provided that the vehicle used is sufficient
to remove all the goods previously seized.

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36. Humberside police were engaged in the matter protracting over two and a half years
from February 2013 to its eventual conclusion in September 2015. The force was
contacted outlining in a letter and supporting documents the concerns regarding the
fraud which the Appellant considered would be conclusive if the data (as anticipated)
could be obtained [Exhibit 4, letter 8 February 2013]. This was at a stage where the
Appellant had been trying unsuccessfully to obtain the data for approximately one year.
NELC first claimed it was not held, but admitted it was held after all on being
challenged. However, it refused to disclose it owing to its initial estimation of 9,600
staff hours (240,000) it would take to manually review the accounts passed to bailiffs
to extract the information.

37. Because of NELCs routine denial of any wrongdoing when the trouble was taken to
raise matters through its formal complaint procedure, the Appellant viewed that it was
only fair that NELCs intransigence was not hidden from the public. If NELC was
unwilling to accept responsibility for its contractor bailiffs attempts to defraud him then
at least if it was recorded publicly it would count for something. A webpage was set up4
dealing specifically with the fraudulent charging of bailiff fees at around the same time
data was being requested from NELC. Updates relating to the project were made
publicly available on the webpage, which included the release of data obtained from a
selection of local authorities who had not been as possessive of it as NELC. The
webpage on the consumer help website would function as the public record in this
matter.

38. Humberside Polices Economic Crime Unit (ECU) wrote stating that without the
detailed information that the Appellant had tried to obtain being made available it could
not take the matter any further [Exhibit 4, letter 12 March 2013]. A reference was made
to the judgment of the court of appeal case, R v Ghosh, in which the definition of
dishonesty used for criminal prosecutions was considered an obstacle to demonstrate
that a criminal act had been committed, even if all the specific information had been
possible to obtain. Evidently the ECU assumed that because the Information Rights
Tribunal upheld NELCs decision not to release the data it assumed that the Appellant
had given up trying to obtain it.

4
Topic created on a Consumer help website dealing with relevant bailiff issues

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39. Redemption fee data requested from another authority was released without any
obstruction on 26 March 2013. The ECU was forwarded the document which revealed
that NELCs bailiff contractor had imposed the fee 1,395 times over a four year period
(value 34,177) and in none of the cases had any goods been removed [Exhibit 4, letter
27 March 2013]. This was a good enough reason to continue pursuing the information
reinforced by another local authority at around the same time being able to disclose the
requested data after obtaining it from its bailiff contractor, Rossendales.

40. By 13 June 2013, NELC had reversed its decision and disclosed the redemption fee data
which it stated was held by Rossendales on NELCs behalf. Similarly it withdrew its
refusal notice to provide the Van fee data later in July. Humberside polices ECU was
updated including data provided by three authorities for Van fees over approximately a
four year period [Exhibit 4, letter 19 July 2013]. Rossendales was the contractor in all
three cases and the aggregate value of van fees applied relating to the same day a levy
was made was 208k. A table detailing redemption fees for twenty billing authorities
revealed a total 705k had been imposed in respect of returning goods where no goods
had been removed. The ECU was sent a further update on 24 July regarding Van fees
for NELC. The value van fees applied relating to the same day a levy was made was
290k over a six year period.

41. There was no significant feedback from the ECU over approximately eight months since
its March letter, up until its 9 November 2013 email outlining the reasons why the force
would not be pursuing an investigation into the matter (despite chasing to be updated).

42. It should be noted that the ECUs decision coincided two days after information was
published on the same consumer website relating to Wrexham Council defending the
application of the redemption fee where goods were levied but not removed. It is known
that officers at NELC view content published by the Appellant in the hope it can be used
against him. If any proof is needed it can be found in a Witness Statement submitted by
NELC to Grimsby Magistrates court where material obtained from a consumer help
website published by the Appellant was used to prejudice the judge. The fact that it
ultimately exposed NELC for presenting perjured evidence is immaterial, as what
matters here is that it is proof that officers do view the published content.

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43. The force admits that NELC, against who the allegations were made, had been relied
upon to reassure them that there had been no criminal wrongdoing by the bailiffs. This
justifies questioning whether NELC had influenced the force from information
published on the website. Wrexham Council had presented Counsel Opinion (David
Holland QC) in order to support charging the redemption fee where no goods are
removed. The Opinion was available to view publicly once the Appellant had arranged
the document files into a format compatible with the website (7 November 2013).

44. Coincidentally the case referred to in the Counsel Opinion uploaded on 7 November was
the case authority on which the ECU relied to justify not investigating. The ECUs
decision of 9 November 2013 contained the following:

With regard to the Schedule 5 charges connected with distress - it appears that the
bailiffs do not have to physically remove the goods (Evans v South Ribble
Borough Council 1992.)

45. It would not be unreasonable to question whether the web-pages had been monitored
either by NELC and/or HP until this information (even though irrelevant) appeared on
the website. Given that the force had as far as the Appellant was concerned done nothing
in respect of investigating the allegations it would not be too implausible to speculate
that the ECU waited for an opportune moment, i.e., when something materialised on the
website which it considered would support its decision not to investigate.

46. The ECU had evidently done no research into the allegations by implying that the matter
hinged on whether in law goods which are seized when levying distress have to be
removed from the debtors premises. The Evans v South Ribble judgment defines the
distress process from which it is clear that seized goods i.e., those which are in the
custody of the law may either be moved to a pound or remain on the debtors premises.
However, this was never in dispute. What was central to the allegations was that for the
purposes of charging a redemption fee, the category under which goods were seized had
to fall under the one where items had been removed. Goods secured which are left on
the debtors premises can not be made available for collection.

47. In response to the Appellant asking for this point to be clarified, the ECU seemed to
have confirmed in an email of 11 November that it had completely misunderstood what
was being alleged.

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 I mentioned that bailiffs do not have to physically remove goods to be entitled to
charge the 24.50 (Evans v South Ribble Borough Council 1992) because you
have stated in your submission 'The fee can lawfully be imposed, only when levied
goods have been physically removed.' I wanted to point out the difference to you.
My understanding is that the fee can be legitimately charged even when goods
have not been physically removed.

48. Evidently a levy fee (24.50) under head B of the Schedule 5 charges was focussed on
by the ECU rather than the redemption fee under head H, hence the irrelevant
reference to the South Ribble case. This outcome could have only resulted from the
force not wanting to investigate and therefore making no effort to. If the ECU really was
caused such confusion by the allegations it could have contacted the Appellant for
clarification. It was much more convenient for the ECU to claim ignorance and at the
same time drag out the matter over a nine month period than to properly investigate.
Once HP makes a decision against investigating, any challenges to its findings are
completely ignored which is why when it has no intention from the outset of
investigating it avoids making enquiries that would justify it doing otherwise.
Grievances about failures to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry, such as in this case,
are channelled instead through the forces statutory complaint procedure which falls
under the Police Reform Act 2002 and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act
2011. The exercise achieves nothing as the highlighted failures are not reviewed. The
process merely focuses on whether the resolving officer considers procedure was
correctly adhered to (see below paras 49 to 61).

Complaint and appeal process

49. HP was engaged in a complaint and appeal process protracting over approximately two
years from November 2013 to its eventual conclusion in September 2015. The force
made a decision in November 2013 that it would not investigate allegations on the
spurious grounds that it believe that no criminal offences had been committed and
maintained its decision in the face of comprehensive representations contending its
reasons.

50. A letter sent to the ECU on 24 November 2013 expressing dissatisfaction with the
outcome was taken by the force to be a complaint regarding the forces decision not to
investigate the allegation of fraud. A document has been compiled which contains a
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 number of relevant correspondence arranged chronologically spanning the period of the
complaint and appeal process [Exhibit 5].

51. The complaint was recorded wrongly as 'Direction & Control' (organisational issue)
whilst in fact should have been classified as a 'Conduct Matter'. The outcome letter
dated 4 February 2014 sent by the Temporary Detective Inspector in charge of the ECU
as well as upholding the November decision not to investigate also stated the following:

Please be aware that as your complaint refers to an organisational issue there is

no right of appeal against the outcome of this process. This is in accordance with
Paragraph 8A Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002.

52. North Yorkshire Police Authority v IPCC [2010] EWHC 1690 (Admin) held that a
direction and control (decision), is essentially concerned with matters which are of a
general nature, and "a decision which is made by a chief officer which is confined to a
particular subject falls outside the definition of direction and control." The IPCC agreed
with the Appellants assertions that HP had wrongly classified the complaint (possibly
to avoid having an appeal to deal with). However, it was implied at that time by the
Detective Inspector dealing with the complaint, that an appeal right was academic
because the force would at no point consider the fraud allegations for an investigation
(email 26 February 2014).

53. The force acknowledged the IPCCs decision to uphold the appeal in a revised letter of 1
May 2014 (almost identical outcome as February). The only material difference being
that the revised letter informed that the matter had been reclassified and included the
options available to the Appellant regarding the right of appeal and that the complaint
was assessed as being suitable to be dealt with by way of Local Resolution.

54. The revised outcome clearly indicated that none of the additional evidence which had
been provided had been considered which was confirmed by the reiteration of an untrue
statement that had been pointed out in the letter dated 25 February 2014. The outcome
letter dated 4 February 2014 included the following statement:

"I have also liaised with Detective Inspector Welton, who dealt with the same
complaint you made to Humberside Police in 2009.

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 You may recall he visited you at your home and explained the reasons why your
allegations were not of a criminal nature."

55. The Detective Inspector had not visited the Appellants home in 2009. The statement
was completely untrue as there was no visit then and there has never been a visit.
Further correspondence was sent regarding the incorrect recording of the complaint on
25 February 2014 addressed to the Detective Inspector in charge of the ECU clearly
pointing out that the claim of a visit was untrue, however, the same statement was
reiterated in the revised letter sent by the resolving officer dated 1 May 2014. No
attempt was made to explain the anomaly and despite several queries made since there
has been nothing to account for the untrue statement. The revised letter dated 1 May
2014 stated the following (referring to an incident):

"I have also liaised with Detective Inspector Welton, who dealt with the same
complaint you made to Humberside Police in 2009. You may recall he visited you
at your home and explained the reasons why your allegations were not of a
criminal nature.
........
Whilst there are some differences between the officers explanation and your
account, I do not question your genuine belief and perception of the incident."

56. Beside there never being a visit in 2009, it was not the same complaint. The complaint
then related to the Appellants own case (see above paras 20 to 27), whereas the issues
in 2013 to 2015 related to thousands of cases (potentially millions) involving hundreds
of thousands of pounds (potentially millions). It is not unreasonable for someone who
has been told that a certain police officer has visited them, when the visit has never
happened, to expect an explanation especially when the alleged purpose of the visit was
to inform the Appellant of something which was material to the forces decision not to
investigate.

57. Despite the visit being contested several times HP continually refuses to explain the
anomaly but worse than that reiterates it whenever the opportunity arises. The most
recent is in a letter of 5 July 2017 setting out its reasons why a reported conduct matter
would not be recorded on the grounds of Repetition and Abuse of process 5:

5
HPs decision not to record the matter has been appealed and is currently with the IPCC. The anticipated
outcome is that the appeal will be upheld because the chances are highly remote of the IPCC being persuaded by
HPs reasons not to record the matter. The IPCC upheld an appeal on 7 July 2017 relating to another conduct
matter raised with HP on 16 May 2017.

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 An Inspector visited your home and explained to you your allegations were not of
a criminal nature but related to mal-administration.

A similar statement was made by HP in a letter of 9 November 2016 to a Lead Case

Officer at the Information Commissioners Office:

The very nature of this request goes right back to 2011 when the requests began
with accusations against North East Lincolnshire Council and Humberside Police
for failing to investigate the applicants complaints. The matter was fully
investigated at the time and deemed not to be a criminal matter. The applicant was
visited by a Detective Inspector in relation to this to explain the reasoning.

58. Returning again to the appeal process where there is no longer any logical order. The
Appellant submitted an Appeal (19 May 2014) in accordance with the Local Resolution
outcome letter of 1 May. However, the Detective Inspector in charge of the ECU
emailed the Appellant on 26 June 2014 setting out conditions of the Local Resolution
procedure which had already been completed, including how as the as the resolving
Officer, she would review the findings of the Detective Sergeant who had dealt with the
allegations.

59. Another letter was sent by HP to the Appellant on 6 August 2014 upholding the appeal
of 19 May 2017 but follows no apparent logic. However, it is not proposed to attempt to
decipher it as the correspondence may be referred to by the Tribunal. HP next informed
the Appellant in a letter of 27 August 2014 that the appeal which had apparently been
dealt with had been referred to a Temporary Detective Chief Inspector who would be in
contact with him in due course.

60. No contact had been made by 19 December 2014 at which point the Appellant emailed
the IPCC. The organisation was unable to intervene in the appeals process but forwarded
the email on to HPs Professional Standards Department for them to respond. HP
eventually contacted the Appellant on 31 March 2015, seven months after the August
2014 letter. The matter had been allocated to different Detective Chief Inspector to deal
with.

61. The outcome was received on 1 July 2015 but with nothing that could support the
investigations findings. Completely irrelevant content appeared under a heading

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 LESSONS LEARNED, which gave another indication that the matter was improperly
dealt with. A further appeal right was exercised by the Appellant with the submission
made on 24 July 2015. HP formally acknowledged receipt of the appeal by letter dated
29 July in which it encouragingly referred to the appeal as a re-investigation into the
complaint. Unfortunately it was set-out in the covering letter to the appeal outcome of 4
September 2015 that the role of the officer assessing the appeal was not to re-investigate
the complaint but to review the investigation outcome into the complaint. The only
useful purpose then that the two year complaint and appeal process served was to
artificially lower unemployment figures.

62. The earlier matter which was dealt with by HP in 2009 (see above paras 20 to 27)
escalated to the PSD which was similarly mishandled. Time constraints for submitting
this Appeal do not permit the matter being detailed, however, the complaint was
incorrectly recorded as Direction and Control ensuring no appeal right and there was
no logical order again to correspondence.

Conclusion

63. The Appellants motive for making the request did have a serious purpose which by
definition could not have been made with the intention of causing annoyance; and so in
accordance with Commissioners guidance it was immaterial whether the request would
cause disruption, irritation or distress.

64. The motive for HP applying section 14(1) has been to avoid disclosing information that
would potentially expose it for neglecting to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry in
respect of allegations of misconduct.

27 July 2017

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