G.R. No.
71855 January 20, 1988 courts of the Philippine Islands have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly
RIZALITO VELUNTA, petitioner, vs. THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY AND
COLONEL SIMEON KEMPIS JR., PRESIDENT GCM
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the General Court Martial, RECOM VIII, from assuming
jurisdiction over a criminal case for homicide wherein the petitioner is indicted for the death of one Romeo
Lazano.
The petitioner is a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of
Patrolman.
On April 16, 1982 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos-
Tarcela-Lucente Streets, Tacloban City, the petitioner tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a motorized
tricycle driver, for violations of traffic rules and regulations. An altercation occurred between them which
resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano.
On October 30,1982, Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, widow of Romeo Lozano, filed an administrative complaint
against the petitioner with the National Police Commission NAPOLCOM, Region VIII, Tacloban City for
grave misconduct. After hearings on the merits, the Adjudication Board No. 8, NAPOLCOM, Manila
rendered a decision dated August 9,1984 finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and meted the
penalty of "Dismissal from the Service." On a motion for reconsideration, the Adjudication Board modified
its decision by finding the petitioner guilty only of Less Grave Misconduct and modified the penalty from
dismissal to suspension from service for six months without pay.
During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano also filed a complaint for homicide with the
City Fiscal's Office of Tacloban.
On May 14,1982, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban City issued a resolution in I.S. No. 82-203
finding the existence of prima facie evidence that the petitioner, then a member of the Integrated National
Police stationed in Tacloban City "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill," shot with his service pistol
one Romeo Lozano, a tricycle driver at the left cheek causing the latter's death. Finding that the offense was
committed during the performance of official duties, the City Fiscal recommended that the case be referred
to the Tanod-bayan for further investigation.
With the approval of Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez, Second Assistant Fiscal Jose B. Sano of Tacloban
City, as deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, endorsed the filing of an information for homicide against the
petitioner. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D. 1850 which authorizes the Chief
of the Philippine Constabulary to convene court martials to try, hear, and decide cases for criminal acts
committed by members of the Integrated National Police.
As stated at the outset, the petitioner challenges the assumption of jurisdiction by the General Court Martial
over the criminal case for homicide against him. According to the petitioner, the General Court Martial has
no more jurisdiction to continue the hearing against him as a result of the provisions of Executive Order No.
1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, which became effective last July 10, 1985 whereby
supervision and control over all units and members of the Integrated National Police have been transferred
to NAPOLCOM and placed directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines, thereby removing
police officers from the supervision and control of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary under the
Department of National Defense.
It is further argued by the petitioner that P.D. 1850 which authorized the Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary to convene courts martial to hear and try cases against members of the Integrated National
Police for offenses committed while in the performance of their duties has been expressly repealed by
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 as of July 10, 1985.
We find the contention of the petitioner to be ummeritorious.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and
deciding cases. (Conchada v. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94). As early as 1914, it was declared that the
conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers
effective. (West Coast Life Insurance Co. v. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401) We have to look for an express provision
of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner.
In the instant case, P.D. No, 1850 which vests jurisdiction on courts martial over criminal cases involving
the members of the Integrated National Police, provides:
SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed
Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding (a) uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military
law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided,
that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil
or judicial authorities when court martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38
of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court martial jurisdiction over the person of
the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of
their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached before hand unless
otherwise provided by law.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen and jail guards.
Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040, on the other hand, are invoked by the petitioner.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 1012 states:
The provision of special or general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the operational supervision
and direction exercised by the Philippine Constabulary over all units of the Integrated National Police
(INP) force stationed or assigned in the different cities and municipalities all over the country, is
hereby transferred to the city or municipal government concerned until further orders from the
President of the Philippines. The term "operational control and direction" shall be as defined in Section
1 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 1162.
Whenever the power of operational supervision and direction is abused, such that the effectiveness of the
overall peace and order campaign is negated, the President of the Philippines motu proprio, or upon
recommendation of the provincial commander, provincial superintendent with the concurrence of the
Regional Unified Commander, may terminate the authority of the local executive(s) to exercise operational
supervision and direction over units of the Integrated National Police, however the judgment of the President
the exigencies as require. (sic).
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 1040 provides:
The National Police Commission shall henceforth be under the Office of the President of the
Philippines as may be directed by and under the control of the President of the Philippines, it shall
exercise administrative control and supervision over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP)
force throughout the country.
It is specifically stated under Executive Order No. 101 2 that it is only the "operational supervision and
direction" over all units of the Integrated National Police force stationed or assigned in the different cities
and municipalities that was transferred from the Philippine Constabulary to the city or municipal
government concerned. Likewise, under Executive Order No. 1040 it is the exercise of "administrative
control and supervision" over all units of the Integrated National Police forces throughout the country that
was transferred to the President of the Philippines. The latter executive order also defines operational
supervision and direction in P.D. No. 1160, 1 (e) as follows:
(e). Operational Supervision and Direction. It is the power to see to it that the units or elements of
the Integrated National Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws and the rules,
regulations and policies promulgated by competent authority, and the power to employ or deploy such
units or elements, in coordination with the Provincial or District Police Superintendent, Station
Commander or Officer-in-Charge to insure public safety and the effective maintenance of peace and
order within the locality.
The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the Integrated National Police and
jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police
officer so that the appropriate penalty for the commission of a crime or offense may be imposed is easily
discernible. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance
while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them.
The allegation of the petitioner that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by the clear and precise provision
of Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 is inaccurate, Section 3 of the executive order provides:
All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other enactments, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of tills Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended and modified
accordingly.
The aforecited provision does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850. Neither is there any inconsistency
between P.D. No. 1850, which confers upon courts-martial, jurisdiction over crimes and offenses involving
members of the Integrated National Police, and Executive Order No. 1040 which gives the city and
municipal governments, (as the case may be), operational supervision and direction over members of the
Integrated National Police. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the
intent of the legislators is manifest. (PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 72 SCRA 396; Jalandoni v.
Endaya, 85 SCRA 261; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 10; and The Philippine American Management Co.,
Inc., v. The Philippine American Management Employees Asso. (49 SCRA 149).
When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had
jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court
martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction. It is an established rule that jurisdiction once
acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law.
The provision of the Constitution, Article XVI, Section 6, on the State maintaining a police force national
and civilian in character is still in the process of being implemented. Police forces continue to remain part
of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law.
(Barcellano v. Major General Renato de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 75952, October 20,1987)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 106560. August 23, 1996]
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS and SALVADOR BIJIS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental assail the decision of the public
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao
Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate. The dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals decision[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 09689 reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification in that the actual
damages of P50,000.00 are hereby reduced to P40,000.00 and the moral damages P100,000.00
awarded to Erlinda Irigo are deleted. Costs de officio.
"SO ORDERED."
The antecedents:
In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao
Oriental, composed of 1.) the Provincial Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as Chairman, 2.) Provincial
Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice Chairman, and 3.) Division Superintendent of Public Schools in said
province, Benjamin Miano,[2] as member, proclaimed the winners for Governor, Vice-Governor, and
Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 election. The candidates proclaimed
were:
PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES
Name No. of Votes
For Governor:
Leopoldo Lopez 59,309 votes
Francisco Rabat 51,191 votes
For Vice-Governor:
Modesto Avellanosa 46,353 votes
Josefina Sibala 54,083 votes
For Provincial Board Members
1. Cirilo R. Valles 42,394 votes
2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil 41,557 votes
3. Antonio Alcantara 39,104 votes
4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo 37,301 votes
5. Orlando Rodriguez 34,914 votes
6. Alfredo Abayon 34,191 votes
7. Justina Yu 32,360 votes
8. Pedro Pena 30,679 votes
The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when another candidate for the
Board, Erlinda Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena.
Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and proclamation statements of winning
candidates were finished, a verbal protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang, daughter of candidate
Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, addressed to the Tabulation
Committee.
At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of January 22, 1988, the Board resumed its session and undertook the
following activities:
"1. Opening of Ballot Box No. CA-301596 and sealed by Metal Seal No. 204767 at exactly 10:25 a.m.
"2. Continued preparing all reports called for submissions to COMELEC, Regional Office and Manila.
"3. Reconciliation of entries in the tally sheets. (Exhs. "E" and "E-1")
Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the attention of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers during official session, the same was not given appropriate official recognition. (Exh.
"7-B", p. 2, Minutes of Provincial Board of Canvassers, January 21, 1988)
The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed her written
protests[3] with the Board of Canvassers. (Exh. "F")
Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental filed with the COMELEC
a complaint against the three board members for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and RA
6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987). After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
COMELEC, criminal charges were filed against the Board Members. The pertinent portions of the
information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation of 2nd Paragraph of Section 231 in Relation to Section
262 of the Omnibus Election Code read:
"That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused as
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections, conspiring with, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda
Irigo as elected Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the eighth
highest number of votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro Pena who
obtained only 30,699 votes."
"CONTRARY TO LAW"[4]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, Criminal Cases Nos. 1885 and 1887 are
hereby DISMISSED, with costs de oficio, and the accused considered acquitted. Their bail bonds are
ordered canceled and released.
"In Criminal Case No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador Bijis and Benjamin
Miano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals for violation of Section 231, second paragraph, of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines",
and hereby sentences each of them to ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT which shall not be subject to
probation. In addition, they are sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of
the right of suffrage. Said accused are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Erlinda Irigo the amounts of
P50,000.00 as actual damages, P15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and P100,000.00 as moral damages,
plus the costs of the proceedings.
"Let copies hereof be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Commission on Elections, and the Honorable
Secretaries of Justice and Education, Culture and Sports.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 43-44, Decision)
The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision assailed in this petition.
Petitioners impute to the respondent court the following errors:
I "But there is one incontrovertible fact that the respondents miserably failed to dispute. This undeniable
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:
a. It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass, and not mere erroneous
proclamations, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
b. A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest to the Board of
Canvassers itself.
c. The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.
d. Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged protest to the Board
of Canvassers.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to the case.
We find the petition without merit.
On the first assigned error, the issue hinges on the question of what is being penalized by the pertinent
provision of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioners argue that they are not liable under the said law because
they complied with all the requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code - 1. a certificate of
canvass was prepared, 2. the same was duly supported by a statement of votes of each of the candidates, and
3. it was on the basis of the certificate of canvass that the winners were proclaimed. Only, the certificate
was erroneous.
According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an incorrect
certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made by the Board; what it does punish is that, having
thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board for some reason fails to make the corresponding
proclamation on the basis thereof.
On the other hand, the People's counsel maintains that petitioners' challenges on this particular issue is a
question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that there was a failure to
proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was merely an erroneous
proclamation of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that in proclaiming an erroneous winner they
actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this case, Erlinda Irigo. Respondents further argue that
the situation presented by petitioners would not exculpate them from criminal responsibility for, whichever
way the matter may be looked into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to
proclaim the winning candidate, the result is the same - the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and
hence, injustice is the end result.
We agree with the respondents.
The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the
imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and received
by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates
who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to
comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense."
To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing
boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by just putting up the
inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names of
candidates"[5] in one municipality or that "the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made
by the tabulation committee." That would be a neat apology for allowing the board to be careless in their
important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their "duty" of
proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass - even "erroneous" certificates
- which they made.
At this point, it is appropriate to quote certain portions of the Resolution in IPD Case No. 88-100, disposing
of the complaint filed with the COMELEC issued by Regional Election Director Resurreccion Borra of
Region XI, in relation to the preliminary investigation conducted by him on said case. Director Borra
testified on this resolution[6] (Exh. Z) under cross-examination by the prosecution, certain portions of which
are material to the case:
fact is conveniently ignored by Respondents' Memorandum. In the exhibits of the complainant, the
computerized tabulation of votes based from the statements of votes by precinct in each of the 121
Municipalities of Davao Oriental for all of the 600 precincts and even admitted by the Respondents
thatthere was no error in the tabulation of votes in CA 26-A. Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and
Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes or a margin of 450 votes by Irigo over Pena. From the ranking, Irigo
would have been ahead of Pena, and she should have been No. 8 in the winning list of 8 candidates
instead of Pena. But in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates
for Provincial Offices, Pedro T. Pena was included as No. 8 in the winning list and proclaimed as No.
8 Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Complainant, in presenting the computerized summary tabulation of votes for each precinct per
municipality of the Province, admitted that the PBC prepared the statements of votes. x x x The
statements of votes (CE 26-A) should have been the basis for the proclamation of the winning
candidates for Provincial Offices. Complainant's documentary and testimonial evidences showed that
the PBC proclaimed Pedro Pena who was not among those candidates who obtained the 8 highest
number of votes cast in the province per municipality by precinct which violated the legal requirement
of the 2nd paragraph of Section 231 of BP No. 881 as amended.
"The respondents were not able to explain their failure to comply with the requirement that (sic) the
basis for the proclamation of Pena when he was not among the eight candidates who obtained the
highest number of votes as evidenced by the statements of votes. In fact they admitted that the basis
was not the statement of votes but the erroneous ranking by the Tabulators. x x x"[7]
It appears from the foregoing resolution of Director Borra that it was difficult to make a mistake in selecting
the 8 candidates with the highes votes for purposes of making the certificate of canvass because there was
no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is the statement of votes) shows that Erlinda
V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through
utter carelessness, if not made deliberately. This situation only illustrates that the questioned provision
cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioners for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for
which the law was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez,[8] the court observed:
"Experience and observations taught legislature and courts that, at the time of a hotly contested
election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and unscrupulous politicians will lead them beyond the limits
of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation, despoil the purity of the
ballot and defeat the will of the people at the polls. Such experience has led the legislature to adopt
very stringent rules for the purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his
ballot to guard the purity of elections." "The infinite ingenuity of violent spirit in evading the rules and
 regulations of elections and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has made necessary the
establishment of elaborate and rigid rules for the conduct of elections. The very elaborateness of these
rules has resulted in their frequent violation and the reports of the courts are replete with cases in which
the result of an election has been attacked on the ground that some provisions of the law have not been
complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of the election laws have a purpose and should be
observed.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the protest made
by candidate Irigo's daughter Maribeth Irigo Batitang was the verbal protest contemplated under Sec. 245
of the Omnibus Election Code, such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made to the Board of
Canvassers itself; and that the failure of the member of the verification/tabulation committee concerned to
apprise the Board prior to the proclamation cannot be taken against the members of the Board.
We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his aforementioned
resolution:
"The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not trigger on the part of
the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible action of verifying the basis of the
protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to the Committee on Tabulation the blame for
their errors as the PBC members themselves were the ones who certified under oath the said Certificate
of Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee members were totally under their direct supervision
and control."
Petitioners also raised the issue that it was only after the proclamation had been made that the Board was
informed of the fact that an error may have been committed in the tabulation; and that however, having
discharged its function of making the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidates, the Board of
Canvassers became functus oficio and could no longer correct the erroneous proclamation.
As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio" after
it proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the point. What matters is whether or not petitioners
committed an election offense. Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo's watcher made a timely verbal protest
to the Tabulation Committee.
Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated
representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never presented as a witness; that Erlinda Irigo, upon
whose testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the fact of protest, was not present during the
canvassing proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo's testimony on this point is inadmissible as being hearsay and should
not have been considered by the trial court; that no other evidence having been adduced with respect to the
protest allegedly made by Irigo's representative, such fact should be deemed as not having been established;
and that there was thus no basis, therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the Board was
deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable
for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo's testimony is hearsay evidence, there is
still ample evidence which proves that the Board was deemed to have been informed of the verbal protest
and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
The resolution[9] of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary
investigation. The import of those deliberations show that petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers, admitted that the tabulation committee was under the supervision of the Board.[10] As
regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted that he signed the minutes of the Board
to the effect that on January 22, 1988 in the morning after the proclamation, the Board's business was
"reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet,"[11] thus showing that the proclamation in question had been
made even before the votes were reconciled on the tally sheets. And as to accused Miano, Secretary of the
Board, he admitted having stated in the minutes[12] that an oral complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang,
representative of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was lodged with the tabulation committee and not
with the Board; and that he did not care to examine the partial results for each provincial candidate, including
Erlinda Irigo and Pedro Pena.[13]
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof.[14]
On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was filed by Francisco Rabat,
the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the
Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness;
and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners'
allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a complaint that a public
crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. [15] The Omnibus Election Code does not
specifically provide that a particular person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by
Francisco Rabat is valid.
The counsel for the people points out and we agree-
"Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability during the trial if he
has not waived it.[16]
"In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose rights were trampled
upon, by the indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th
seat of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
"The persistence of Erlinda Irigo's lawyers to participate, as in fact they participated, in the proceedings a
quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of petitioners' counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda
Irigo intended to claim damages from petitioners."[17]
In U.S. v. Heery,[18] this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly waived the civil liability of
the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of
the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages. Thus, the
arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs.
Irigo.
After the People's counsel has filed respondents' comment, petitioners filed their Reply wherein they raised
for the first time (not even in their Petition), the issue that the crime under which petitioners were convicted
no longer exists because Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) and 7166 (Electoral
Reforms Law of 1991) were subsequently approved on January 5, 1988 and November 26, 1991,
respectively; that these two laws amended the Omnibus Election Code by deleting certain provisions thereof
or adding new ones; and that among those amended was Section 231, which was modified by Section 28 of
RA No. 7166 by removing the specific manner by which the proclamation of winning candidates by the
Board of Canvassers should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of
the old Omnibus Election Code under which Petitioners had been convicted.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need
not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.[19] However, since RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had rendered its decision, and while
the case was already pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and in order to settle the issue once and for
all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling on the issue.
Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by R.A.
7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 7166 which we quote:
"Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. - Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the Omnibus Election Code are
hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code of the violations of
Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 as among election offenses is also hereby repealed. This
repeal shall have retroactive effect.
"Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and 157 and all other laws,
orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly."
The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly," certainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or
acts that are intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express it.[20]
Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA 7166.
While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the Canvassing
by the Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior
act.[21] The provisions of the subject laws are quoted below for comparison:
"Sec. 231. - Canvass by the board. - The board of canvassers shall meet not later than six o'clock in
the afternoon of election day at the place designated by the Commission to receive the election returns
and to immediately canvass those that may have already been received. It shall meet continuously
from day to day until the canvass is completed, and may adjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting
the other election returns from other polling places within its jurisdiction. Each time the board
adjourns, it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far for each candidate for each office,
furnishing the Commission in Manila by the fastest means of communication a certified copy thereof,
and making available the data contained therein to the mass media and other interested parties. As
soon as the other election returns are delivered, the board shall immediately resume canvassing until
all the returns have been canvassed.
"The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with
the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and
received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected
the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city municipality or
barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense.
"Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their canvass within thirty-
six hours in municipalities, forty-eight hours in cities and seventy-two hours in provinces. Violation
hereof shall be an election offense punishable under Section 264 hereof.
"With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city boards of
canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes
received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy thereof to the Speaker of
the Batasang Pambansa. The second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission, the third copy shall
be kept by the provincial election supervisor or city election registrar; the fourth and the fifth copies
to each of the two accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC)."[22]
"Sec. 28. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers. - (a) The city
or municipal board of canvassers shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives and/or elective provincial and city or municipal
officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President,
Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial
officials and thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as the case may be.
"(b) The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall canvass
the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and elective city officials. Upon completion of the canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of
canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of
House of Representatives and city officials.
"(c) (1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a
district board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President,
Senators, Members of the House of representatives and elective municipal officials. Upon completion
of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators
and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and municipal officials.
"(2) Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area shall have a
municipal hoard of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President,
Senators, xxx
"(3) The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2) municipalities in
the Metro Manila Area shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President, xxx
"(d) The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-
President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial officials as well
as plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is conducted simultaneously with the same election, as submitted
by the board of canvassers of municipalities and component cities. Upon completion of the canvass,
it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators and thereafter,
proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and provincial officials as well as the
plebiscite results, if any."[23]
While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In order to effect
a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the
existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be
made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. [24] "It is
necessary, says the court in a case,[25] before such repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes
or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the
former. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the
later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice."[26] For it is a well-settled rule of statutory
construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. [27] The presumption is against
inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. [28] For the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. [29]
In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present. Neither is
there any inconsistency between the two subject provisions. The explanation of a legal scholar[30] on the
subject, particularly on Section 1 of BP 881 is enlightening:
"The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines is Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which was enacted into
law on December 3, 1985. It codified all previous election laws. It has undergone some amendments,
basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reform
Law of 1987," and Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections on
May 11, 1992.
"The Omnibus Election Code is the basic law on elections. While legislations have been enacted every
time an election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus Election Code remains the
fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of legislations are designed to improve the law and to
achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
Consistently, while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony xxx, this provision cannot be applied to benefit the
petitioners because Section 231 of BP 881[31] was not repealed by subsequent legislations, contrary to
petitioners contention that Section 231 was so repealed by R.A. Nos. 6646 and 7166.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., no part. Complaint against petitioner Aguetas was initiated when I was a COMELEC
Chairman.
Panganiban, J., no part. Private complainant Erlinda Inigo was a former client in the antecedent election
case.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on
Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for
reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total
amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he
requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section
699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. When
a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district
is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the
proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned
shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also
authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital
fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation
leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary
of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI,
"recommending favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the
Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of
petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21,
1990, returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the
COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April
26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter".
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary
Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of
1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director
Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court if he so desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion
No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the
Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing
a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned
that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability
of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that
employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation
Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account
of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision
which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to
be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,
identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent
of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing
clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It
is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found
in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and old laws. 6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention
on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that
the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not
a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first
enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject
matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the
new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness
benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further maintained that to
allow the particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code
itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code
which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and
rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx\
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. This
contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of
itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative
or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to
repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former
laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover
the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is
deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute. 14 When
both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that
are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal
under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior
act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover
only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably
because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC
decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this
controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular
provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in
the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the
Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted with
the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle is subject to
limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the decision is
vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know
the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored,
and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating
to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject
matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every
effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the
later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits
under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article
173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the
Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this
Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby
ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995
ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC., petitioners, vs.THE HON. AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
ARE THE INCREASED REAL ESTATE TAXES imposed by and being collected in the Municipality (now
City) of Pasig, effective from the year 1994, valid an legal? This is the question brought before this Court
for resolution.
The Parties
Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the Municipality
(now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in said Municipality 1 .
Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163. Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, sitting in Pasig, whose Decision dated 14 July 1994 and
Order dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled "Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture
Tube, Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Finance. et al.") are sought to be set aside. Respondent Secretary of
Finance is impleaded as the government officer who approved the Schedule of Market Values used as basis
for the new tax assessments being enforced by respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of
Pasig and the legality of which is being questioned in this petition 2 .
The Antecedent Facts
On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real properties of
petitioners located in Pasig, Metro Manila. In a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners through counsel
"request(ed) the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments" 3 .
Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for
a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new tax assessments
and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a Decision 4 dated 14 July
1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit" in the following disposition.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioners' prayer to declare unconstitutional the schedule
of market values as prepared by the Municipal Assessor of Pasig, Metro Manila, and to enjoin permanently
the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila, from collecting the real property taxes based thereof (sic)
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Cost (sic) de oficio.
Subsequently, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by respondent Judge in an
Order 5 dated 30 September 1994.
Rebuffed by said Decision and Order, petitioners filed this present Petition for Review directly before this
Court, raising pure questions of law and assigning the following errors:
The Court a quo gravely erred in holding that Presidential Decree No. 921 was expressly repealed by R.A.
7160 and that said presidential decree including its Implementing Rules (P.D. 464) went down to the statutes'
graveyard together with the other decision(s) of the Supreme Court affecting the same.
The Court a quo while holding that the new tax assessments have tremendously increased ranging
from 418.8% to 570%, gravely erred in blaming petitioners for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies provided for by law.
The Court a quo blatantly erred in not declaring the confiscatory and oppressive nature of the assessments
as illegal. void ab initio and unconstitutional constituting a deprivation of property without due process of
law. 6
In a resolution dated 21 November 1994, this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required
respondents to comment thereon. Respondents Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Assessor, through
counsel, filed their Comment on 19 December 1994, and respondent Secretary of Finance, through the
Solicitor General, submitted his on 11 May 1995. Petitioners filed their Reply to the Comment of respondent
Assessor and Treasurer 06 January 1995, and their Reply to that of the respondent Secretary on 18 May
1995. After careful deliberation on the above pleadings, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition,
and, inasmuch as the issues are relatively simple, the Court dispensed with requiring the parties to submit
further memoranda and instead decided to consider the respondents' respective Comments as their answers
and memoranda. Thus the case is now considered submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The issues brought by the parties for decision by this Court are:
1. Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, repealed
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 921;
2. Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief;
and
3. Whether the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and therefore unconstitutional.
In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the court a quo ruled that the schedule of market values
and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having
been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It
held also that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which required,
in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan
Manila area. The lower court also faulted petitioners with failure to exhaust administrative remedies
provided under Sections 226 and 252 of R.A. 7160. Finally, it found the questioned assessments consistent
with the "tremendously increased . . . price of real estate anywhere in the country." 7
Stated the court:
This Court is inclined to agree with the view of defendants that R.A. 7160 in its repealing clause provide
(sic) that Presidential Decree Nos. . . . 464 . . . are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
Hence said presidential decrees including their implementing rules went down to the statutes' graveyard
together with the decisions of the Supreme Court on cases effecting (sic) the same.
This Court is also in accord with respondents (sic) view that petitioners failed to avail of either Section 226
of R.A. 7160, that is by appealing the assessment of their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal
within sixty 160) days from the date of receipt of the written Notice of Assessment, and if it is true that
petitioner (sic) as alleged in their pleadings was not afforded the opportunity to appeal to the board of
assessment appeal, then they could have availed of the provisions of Section 252, of the same R.A. 7160 by
paying the real estate tax under protest. Because of petitioners (sic) failure to avail of either Sections 226 or
252 of R.A. 7160, they failed to exhaust administratives (sic) remedies provided for by law before bringing
the case to Court. (Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. vs. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276). Therefore the filing of this case
before this Court is premature, the same not falling under the exception because the issue involved is not a
question of law but of fact (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
Petitioners also alleged that the New Tax Assessments are not only oppressive and confiscatory but also
destructive in view of the tremendous increase in its valuation, from P855,360.00 to P4,121,280.00 a marked
increase of 418.8% of one of its properties, while the other, from P857,600.00 to P4,374,410.00, an
increased (sic) of 510%. This Court agree (sic) with petitioners (sic) observation, but the reality (sic) the
price of real property anywhere in the country tremendously increased. This is shown in the Real Estate
Monitor of Economic Incorporated (copy attached with the memorandum of respondents). For example real
properties in Pasig in 1991 located at the Ortigas Commercial Complex command (sic) a price of P42,000.00
per square meter which price is supported by a case filed before this Court (civil case no. 64506, Jesus
Fajardo, et al. vs. Ortigas and Co.) for Recovery (sic) of agents (sic) commission. The property subject of
the sale which was also located at the Ortigas Commercial Complex at Pasig, Metro Manila was sold to a
Taiwanese at P42,000.00 per square meter. It is therefore not surprising that the assessment of real properties
in Pasig has increased tremendously. Had petitioners first exhausted administrative remedies they would
have realized the fact that prices of real estate has (sic) tremendously increased and would have known the
reason/reasons why. 8
In its Order dated 30 September 1994 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the court a quo ruled:
This Court despite petitioners' exhaustive and thorough research and discussion of the point in issue, is still
inclined to sustain the view that P.D. 921 was impliedly repealed by R.A. 7160. P.D. 921 to the mind of this
Court is an implementing law of P.D. 464, Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of said P.D. provide how certain
provisions of P.D. 464 shall be implemented. Since P.D. 464 was expressly repealed by R.A. 7160. P.D.
921 must necessarily be considered repealed, otherwise, what should Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of P.D. 921
implement? And, had the law makers intended to have said P.D. 921 remain valid and enforceable they
would have provided so in R.A. 7160. Since there is none, P.D. 921 must be considered repealed. 9
Re: The First Issue:
Repeal of P.D. 921?
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to revisit the following provisions of law:
1. Section 15 of P.D. No. 464, promulgated on 20 May 1974, otherwise known as the Peal Property Tax
Code:
Sec. 15. Preparation of Schedule of Values. Before any general revision of property assessments is
made, as provided in this Code, there shall be prepared for the province or city a Schedule of Market
Value for the different classes of real property therein situated in such form and detail as shall be
prescribed by the Secretary of Finance.
Said schedule, together with an abstract of the data (on) which it is based, shall be submitted to the Secretary
of Finance for review not later than the thirty-first day of December immediately preceding the calendar
year the general revision of assessments shall be undertaken. The Secretary of Finance shall have ninety
days from the date of receipt within which to review said schedule to determine whether it conforms with
the provisions of this Code.
2. Subsequently, on 12 April 1976, P.D. 921 was promulgated, which in Section 9 thereof, states:
Sec. 9. Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real Property within the Metropolitan Area. The
Schedule of Values that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes
of real properties located within the Metropolitan Area shall be prepared jointly by the City Assessors
of the Districts created under Section one hereof, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman,
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended, otherwise
known as the Real Property Tax Code, and the implementing rules and regulations thereof issued by
the Secretary of Finance.
3. Section One of P.D. 921, referred to above, provides:
Sec. 1. Division of Metropolitan Manila into Local Treasury and Assessment Districts. For
purposes of effective fiscal management, Metropolitan Manila is hereby divided into the following
Local Treasury and Assessment Districts:
First District Manila
Second District Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan
Third District Caloocan City, Malabon, Navotas and Valenzuela
Fourth District Pasay City, Makati, Paranaque, Muntinlupa, Las Pias, Pateros and Taguig
Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Pasay City shall be the respective Centers of the aforesaid
Treasury and Assessment Districts.
4. On 01 January 1992, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
took effect. Section 212 of said law is quoted as follows:
 Sec. 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. Before any general revision of property
assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair
market values by the provincial, city and the municipal assessors of the municipalities within the
Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local
government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. The schedule of fair
market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or
municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial capitol, city or
municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public place therein.
5. The repealing clause of R.A. 7160 found in the Section 534 thereof is hereby reproduced as follows:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause.
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) . . . ; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 626, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed
and rendered of no force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (emphasis supplied)
It is obvious from the above provisions of R.A 7160, specifically Sec. 534, that P.D. 921 was NOT
EXPRESSLY repealed by said statute. Thus, the question is: Was P.D. 921 IMPLIEDLY repealed by R.A.
7160?
Petitioners contend that, contrary to the aforequoted Decision of the lower court, "whether the assessment
is made before or after the effectivity of R.A. 7160, the observance of, and compliance with, the explicit
requirement of P.D. 921 is strict and mandatory either" because P.D. 921 was not impliedly repealed by
R.A. 7160 and is therefore still the applicable statute, or because the Supreme Court, in three related
cases 10 promulgated on 16 December 1993 after the Local Government Code of 1991 already took effect
ruled that a schedule of market values and the corresponding assessments based thereon
"prepared solely by the city assessor . . . failed to comply with the explicit requirement (of collegial and
joint action by all the assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area under P.D. 921) . . . and are on that account
illegal and void."
On the other hand, respondents aver that Section 9 of P.D. 921 and Section 212 of R.A. 7160 are clearly
and unequivocally incompatible because they dwell on the same subject matter, namely, the preparation of
a schedule of values for real property within the Metropolitan Manila Area. Under P.D. 921, the schedule
shall be prepared jointlyby the city assessors of the District, while, under R.A. 7160, such schedule shall be
prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan
Manila area . . . ". Furthermore, they claim that "Section 9 (of P.D. 921) merely supplement(ed) Section 15
of P.D. 464 in so far as the preparation of the schedule of values in Metro Manila (is concerned)." Thus,
"with the express repeal of P.D. 464 . . . P.D. 921 . . .can not therefore exist independently on its own." They
also argue that although the aforecited Supreme Court decision was promulgated after R.A. 7160 took effect,
"the assessment of the Municipal Assessors in those three (3) cited cases were assessed in 1990 prior to the
effectivity of the Code." Hence, the doctrine in said cases cannot be applied to those prepared in 1994 under
R.A. 7160.
We rule for petitioners.
R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (Section 534) and, if the intention of the legislature was to abrogate
P.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of no force and
effect several other presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification of P.D. 921 can only be possible
under par. (f) of said Section 534, as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The foregoing partakes of the nature of a general repealing provision. It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be
overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts
in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.
In Villegas v. Subido, 11 the issue raised before the Court was whether the Decentralization Act had the effect
of repealing what was specifically ordained in the Charter of the City of Manila. Under the Charter, it was
provided in its Section 22 that "The President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments shall appoint . . . the City Treasurer and his Assistant." Under the Decentralization Act, it
was provided that "All other employees, except teachers paid out of provincial, city or municipal general
funds and other local funds shall . . . be appointed by the provincial governor, city or municipal mayor upon
recommendation of the head of office concerned."
The Court, in holding that there was no implied repeal in thiscase 12 , said:
. . . It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not favored and will
not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far
back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision (10 Phil. 423, Cf. U.S. v. Academia, 10 Phil. 431
[1908]). It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes
or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the
former. (Cf. Calderon v. Provincia del Santisimo Rosario, 28 Phil. 164 [1914]). There must be a
showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must
be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative
purpose to repeal. [Citing numerous cases]
More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be
construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest.
This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in
the special act. This principle has likewise been consistently applied in decisions of the Court from Manila
Railroad Co. v. Rafferty (40 Phil 224), decided as far back as 1919. A citation from an opinion of Justice
Tuason is illuminating. Thus: "From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law
is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. An this is true although the terms of the general act are broad
enough to include the matter in the special statute. . . . At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions
of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute,
considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. . . . A general law is
one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging
to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class." (citing Valera
v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823, 827-828 [1948].)
In the relatively recent case of Mecano vs. Commission on Audit 13 , the Court en banc had occasion to
reiterate and to reinforce the rule against implied repeals, as follows:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the law
maker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must
be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the
same from the time of the first enactment.
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency take place when the two statutes cover the same subject
matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other.
In the same vein, but in different words, this Court ruled in Gordon vs. Veridiano 14 :
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the
same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided.
The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally
the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due
respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the
interpretation of the laws above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
In the instant case, and using the Courts' standard for implied repeal in Mecano, we compared the two laws.
Presidential Decree No. 921 was promulgated on 12 April 1976, with the aim of, inter alia, evolving "a
progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the tax payers . . . " 15 in Metropolitan
Manila. Hence, it provided for the "administration of local financial services in Metropolitan Manila" only,
and for this purpose, divided the area into four Local Treasury and Assessment Districts, regulated the duties
and functions of the treasurers and assessors in the cities and municipalities in said area and spelled out the
process of assessing, imposing and distributing the proceeds of real estate taxes therein.
Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise "known and cited as the Local 'Government Code
of 1991'"16 took effect on 01 January 1992 17. It declared "genuine and meaningful local autonomy" as a
policy of the state. Such policy was meant to decentralize government "powers, authority, responsibilities
and resources" from the national government to the local government units "to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals." 18 In the formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy,
''(l)ocal government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and
resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them." 19
From the above, it is clear that the two laws are not co-extensive and mutually inclusive in their scope and
purpose. While R.A. 7160 covers almost all governmental functions delegated to local government units all
over the country, P.D. 921 embraces only the Metropolitan Manila area and is limited to the administration
of financial services therein, especially the assessment and collection of real estate (and some other local)
taxes.
Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the
Metropolitan Manila area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein: while
Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal
assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property
situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned.
. . ."
It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and
consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing these two provisions,
we arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule, as follows:
1. The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare his/her
proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.
2. Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9, P.D. 921. In the instant
case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong
and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different assessors shall compare
their individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for
their district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve "a progressive
revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers".
3. The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a newspaper of general
circulation and submitted to the sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A.
7160.
By this harmonization, both the preamble of P.D. 921 decreeing that the real estate taxes shall "not unduly
burden the taxpayer" and the "operative principle of decentralization" provided under Sec. 3, R.A. 7160
encouraging local government units to "consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources" shall
be fulfilled. Indeed the essence of joint local action for common good so cherished in the Local Government
Code finds concrete expression in this harmonization.
How about respondents' claim that, with the express repeal of P.D. 464, P.D. 921 being merely a
"supplement" of said P.D. cannot "exist independently on its own"? Quite the contrary is true. By
harmonizing P.D. 921 with R.A. 7160, we have just demonstrated that it can exist outside of P.D. 464, as a
support, supplement and extension of R.A. 7160, which for this purpose, has replaced P.D. 464.
Since it is now clear that P.D. 921 is still good law, it is equally clear that this Court's ruling in the
Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cases (supra) is still the prevailing and applicable doctrine. And, applying the
said ruling in the present case, it is likewise clear that the schedule of values prepared solely by the
respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void.
Re: The Second Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
We now come to the second issue. The provisions of Sections 226 and 252 of R.A. 7160 being material to
this issue, are set forth below:
Sec. 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Any owner or person having legal interest in the
property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the
assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of
assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition
under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such
affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.
Sec. 252. Payment under Protest. (a) No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays
the tax. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts the words "paid under protest". The protest in
writing must be filed within thirty (30) days from payment of the tax to the provincial, city treasurer
or municipal treasurer, in the case of a municipality within Metropolitan Manila Area, who shall decide
the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt.
(b) The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest shall be held in trust by the treasurer concerned.
(c) In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or portion of the tax
protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit against his existing or future tax liability.
(d) In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty-day period prescribed in subparagraph
(a), the taxpayer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of this Code.
Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the questioned
assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid the taxes
under protest, per Sec. 252.
We do not agree. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial
action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve
questions of fact but only of law. 20 In the present case, the parties, even during the proceedings in the lower
court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal" 21 , and thus, no evidence
was presented in said court.
In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b)
that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . .
." It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the
protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where there is a question as to the
reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a
real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal
treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very
authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the
treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks
on the very validity of any increase.
Finally, it will be noted that in the consolidated cases of Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cited earlier, the
Supreme Court referred the petitions (which similarly questioned the schedules of market values prepared
solely by the respective assessors in the local government units concerned) to the Board of Assessment
Appeal, not for the latter, to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, but rather to act only as a fact-finding
commission. Said the Court 22 thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa:
On November 5, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution clarifying its earlier one of May 16, 1991. It
pointed out that the authority of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals "to take cognizance of the
factual issues raised in these two cases by virtue of the referral by this Court in the exercise of its
extraordinary or certiorari jurisdiction should not be confused with its appellate jurisdiction over
appealed assessment cases under Section 36 of P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax
Code. The Board is not acting in its appellate jurisdiction in the instant cases but rather, it is acting as
a Court-appointed fact-finding commission to assist the Court in resolving the factual issues raised in
G.R. Nos. 97618 and 97760."
In other words, the Court gave due course to the petitions therein in spite of the fact that the petitioners had
not, apriori, exhausted administrative remedies by filing an appeal before said Board. Because there were
factual issues raised in the Mathay, et al. cases, the Supreme Court constituted the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals as a fact-finding body to assist the Court in resolving said factual issues. But in the
instant proceedings, there are no such factual issues. Therefore, there is no reason to require petitioners to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided in R.A. 7160, nor to mandate a referral by this Court to said
Board.
Re: The Third Issue:
Constitutionality of the Assessments
Having already definitively disposed of the case through the resolution of the foregoing two issues, we find
no more need to pass upon the third. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, regulation, ordinance
or act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other
grounds. In the recent case of Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority 23 , this Court declared:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature
will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a
proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the
resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. (emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted decision in Macasiano merely reiterated the ruling in Laurel vs. Garcia 24, where this
Court held:
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly
raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People
v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application
of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]). 25 (emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing ruling, the question may be asked: what happens to real estate tax payments already
made prior to its promulgation and finality? Under the law 26 , "the taxpayer may file a written claim for
refund or credit for taxes and interests . . . ."
Finally, this Tribunal would be remiss in its duty as guardian of the judicial branch if we let pass unnoticed
the ease by which the respondent Judge consigned "to the statutes' graveyard" a legislative enactment
"together with the (three) decisions of the Supreme Court" promulgated jointly and unanimously en banc.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior
authority should have constrained him to be more circumspect in rendering his decision and to spell out
carefully and precisely the reasons for his decision to invalidate such acts, instead of imperiously decreeing
an implied repeal. He knows or should have known the legal precedents against implied repeals. Respondent
Judge, in his decision, did not even make an attempt to try to reconcile or harmonize the laws involved.
Instead, he just unceremoniously swept them and this Court's decisions into the dustbin of "judicial history."
In his future acts and decisions, he is admonished to be more judicious in setting aside established laws,
doctrines and precedents.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the questioned Decision
and Order of respondent Judge, DECLARING as null and void the questioned Schedule of Market Values
for properties in Pasig City prepared by respondent Assessor, as well as the corresponding assessments and
real estate tax increases based thereon; and ENJOINING the respondent Treasurer from collecting the real
estate tax increases made on the basis of said Schedule and assessments. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, petitioner, vs. HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, 1 otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations
over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, 2 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in this petition.
The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against
petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case
No. MDE-14. 3
Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of Juan Hagad, now
resigned, 4 who took the initiative in instituting this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992, against
herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod
Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B.
Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The
respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended, 5 Articles 170 6 and 171 7 of the
Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713. 8Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials,
acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing
the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal Case No.
OMB-VIS-92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.
A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was executed by Mandaue
City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of the accusations against respondent
officials. The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G.
Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive
suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction
to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local
officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President.
In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code
of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that,
in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had
remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed by the Deputy
Ombudsman to file their respective memoranda.
In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of
administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an
independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and
that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman superior
powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.
In an Order, 9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss
and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M.
Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. 10 Respondent
officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an
Order 11 of 21 September 1992.
On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a
restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992, denied
the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, holding
thusly:
So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction that endeavor should
be made to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in order that each shall be effective, it is the
finding of this Court that since the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and
vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against
a responsible public official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code
provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective official can be
subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be
an exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation
against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation
against local elective officials is already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of
Republic Act No. 7160.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued:
1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court into an Order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of the petitioners of the bond in the
amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may
be adjudged to the adverse party and/or damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if
the Court will finally adjudge that the petitioners are not entitled thereto, and
2) Denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 12
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992. 13 A motion for reconsideration made by
petitioner was denied by the trial court.
The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary
injunction of 21 October 1992 both issued by the trial court and prays that respondent judge be directed to
desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.
There is merit in the petition.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987
Constitution, 14 thus:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient; while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19
of R.A. No. 6770 that reads:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited, to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman, viz.:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the
Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or
employee under investigation by it. Said section of the law provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but
not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of
such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over
local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section
60 15 thereof, on various offices. In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces
and highly urbanized cities, the Code states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring
local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent
component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President.
Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive
suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . . " under sub-paragraph (b) thereof:
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence
of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several
administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for
more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at
the time of the first suspension.
In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a matter
of national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having
conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians)
disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the
power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate.
In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy that should have been pursued
by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court rather than their petition for prohibition
filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in
question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down
the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must
generally assume their congruent application. 17 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, 18 and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. 19 The rule is expressed
in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 20 The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not
to have enacted conflicting statutes. 21 Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, 22and
all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 23
Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of
the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom." 24
Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the
provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of the precursor local Government
Code of 1983, 25 under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. Verified complaints against local elective officials shall
be prepared as follows:
(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local Government.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of
Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the
respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an
elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when
the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond
sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay
in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective
provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and
24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in
fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of
the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of
the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of
the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently.
In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case
filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials,
whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter
period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an
elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of
culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he
caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.
The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension
after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and
(b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as it may,
we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed
on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally,
such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. In the early case
of Nera vs. Garcia, 26 reiterated in subsequent cases,27 we have said:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of
dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed.
This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had
found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 28 that the evidence of guilt was strong.
Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:
After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this stage, it is the holding of this
office that the evidence of guilt against the respondents in the instant case is strong. There is no question
that the charge against the respondents involves dishonesty or gross misconduct which would warrant their
removal from the service and there is no gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of veritable
documents like city ordinances are very serious charges that affect the very foundations of duly established
representative governments. Finally, it is likewise the holding of this office at this stage that the continued
stay in office of respondents may prejudice the judicious investigation and resolution of the instant case. 29
Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that respondent official's petition for
prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September
1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No.
6770 reads:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on matters
involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the
Ombudsman; thus:
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. . . .
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
[G.R. No. 131529. April 30, 1999]
IRINEO V. INTIA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT respondent
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
In this special civil action under Rule 64 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 65 thereof, petitioners
seek the reversal of the Decision[1] dated November 4, 1997 of public respondent Commission on Audit
(COA) which affirmed the disallowances made by respondent Corporate Auditor for Philippine Postal
Corporation (PPC) of the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of certain officials of
PPC.The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
Upon all the foregoing considerations, this Commission affirms the disallowances made by the
Auditor as concurred in by the Director, Corporate Audit Office II, this Commission. Accordingly, the
instant appeal has to be, as it is hereby denied for lack of merit.
The facts are as follows
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7354, otherwise known as The Postal Service Act of 1992, was enacted
and approved creating the Philippine Postal Corporation and defining its power, functions, and
responsibilities.
Pursuant to the powers granted to it by the said charter, the PPC Board of Directors issued and approved
Board Resolution No. 95-50,[2] entitled Approving the three-year progressive increase of Representation and
Travel Allowance (RATA) benefits equivalent to 40% of the basic salary of the officials of the Philippine
Postal Corporation, subject to the existing rules and regulations. The resolution reads in part BOARD
RESOLUTION NO. 95-50.
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that the three year progressive increase of the xxx (RATA) benefits
of officials of the Philippine Postal Corporation xxx equivalent to 40% of their basic salary, be approved
subject to the existing rules and regulations.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the increases of RATA for 1995 of the following officials to be implemented
in the following manner, be confirmed xxx xxx xxx (c) of the 40% basic salaries of all officials holding
positions below the Assistant Postmaster Generals up to Division Managers
RESOLVED STILL FURTHER that an additional fifty percent (50%) increase of the remaining balance
thereof be implemented in 1996;
RESOLVED STILL FURTHER that the increase of the aforesaid benefit equivalent to 40% of the basic
salary of all concerned officials be fully implemented in 1997.
x x x x x x x x x.
On April 26, 1995, to implement the foregoing board resolution, then Postmaster General Eduardo P. Pilapil
issued Circular No. 95-22,[3] entitled Guidelines Implementing Board Resolution No. 95-50 prescribing new
rates of RATA of PPC officials. To reproduce the relevant parts of the circular:
CIRCULAR NO. 95-22
1 The following Officials and employees are entitled to RATA:
xxxxxxxxx
1.6 Regional Operations Managers
1.7 Division Managers Chiefs of equivalent
2 Payment of RATA, whether commutable or reimbursable, shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed below for the total allowances (50 50 share for each type of allowances):
Position 1995 1996 1997
xxx xxx xxx
2.7 Operations Managers
or equivalent (SG 26) P5,100 P5,400 P5,740
2.8 Division Managers Chiefs or equivalent
(SG 25) 4,700 4,900 5,234
(SG 24) 4,200 4,400 4,734
Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 8174, otherwise known as The General Appropriations Act of 1996 was
approved, Section 35 of which fixes the monthly RATA rates of government officials, to wit:
SEC. 35. Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent
rank as may be determined by the Department of Budget and Management while in the actual performance
of their respective functions are hereby granted monthly commutable representation amd transportation
allowance payable from the programmed appropriation provided for by their respective offices not
exceeding the rates indicated below, which shall apply to each type of allowance:
xxxxxxxxx
e At P1,750 for assistant Bureau Regional directors or equivalent;
f At P1,625 for Chief of Divisions, identified as such in the Personal Services Itemization x x x
On October 23, 1996, respondent Corporate Auditor for Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) served the
following Notices of Disallowance (ND) on PPC:
(a) ND No. 96-0002-101(96) dated September 23, 1996, covering the RATA of petitioners for the
month of April 1996 in the total amount of P65,650.00
(b) ND No. 96-0004-101(96) dated September 23, 1996 covering the RATA of petitioners for May
1996 amounting to P65,650.00
On December 12, 1996 the Auditor served another notice, ND No. 96-0007-101(96) dated November 27,
1996, covering the RATA of petitioners for June 1996 in the amount of P64,525.00
Subsequently, respondent Auditor served other Notices of Disallowance covering the RATA allegedly paid
I excess of that authorization under Section 35, R.A. 8174.
On February 7, 1997, the new Postmaster General, Ireneo V. Intia, Jr. requested respondent Auditor to hold
in abeyance the settlement of the above disallowances pending receipt of the legal opinion they had sought
from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC). To this, respondent Auditor replied that
the proper remedy of petitioners is appeal under Section 37, Title VII of the COA Manual on Certificate of
Settlement and Balances (CSB).
Accordingly, petitioners filed their Memorandum of Appeal with respondent Commission for the reversal
of the Auditors decision and the allowance of the implementation of PPC Circular No. 95-22 as authorized
by Board Resolution No. 96-50. They relied on the following grounds.
1 Sections 21, 22 and 25 of R.A. No. 7354 (The Postal Service Act of 1992), expressly empower the PPC
to establish its own progressive compensation structure and fix the salaries and emoluments of personnel
including the grant of additional benefits like RATA without being subjected to the rule and regulations of
the Compensation and Position Classification Office or the Salary Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758)
2 The legal opinion of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) dated March 14, 1996 on which
the COA based its decision and which states that pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. No. 1527, the compensation
structure of PPC is subject to review and approval by the DBM, is not correct because Section 6 P.D. 1597
is unconstitutional as it violates the rule against the passage of irrepealable laws.
3. Section 13 of R.A. No. 7354 categorically exempts PPC from submitting to Congress its annual budget
unless the PPC requires subsidy guaranty of its liability from the National Treasury.
4. Paragraph 1 of the special provisions in R.A. No. 8174 admits that corporations exempted from the
provisions of R.A. No. 6758 like PPC shall pay the salaries and allowances not in accordance with the Salary
Standardization Law.
5. RATA is included in the term emoluments, the payment of which PPC is authorized to make under R.A.
No. 7354.
On November 4, 1997, respondent Commission rendered the decision now subject of the instant petition.The
assailed decision is reproduced in part:
 After a careful and judicious evaluation of the facts and pertinent laws, rules and regulations herein
obtaining, this Commission finds the appeal devoid of merit. It must be noted that Sections 21, 22 and
25 of R.A. 7354 never intended to exempt the PPC from the ambit of R.A. 6758. What these specific
sections provide, especially Section 25, is the exemption of the PPC from the coverage of the rules
and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office which relates only to the
qualification, position and salary grade of the employees concerned and not to the payment of
additional benefits including the increase in the Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA) Section 22 which provides for a progressive corporation (sic) structure for PPC personnel
authorizes the Corporation to grant salary increases subject to either of two conditions stated
therein As to the constitutionality of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1587, the matter is beyond the competence
of this Commission to rule upon Thus, in the absence of a contrary ruling by competent authority, this
Commission finds no cogent reason to hold the same as being unconstitutional as alleged by herein
appellants.
Insofar as the validity of the resolution fixing the allowances (e.g. RATA) of its employees by PPCs Board
of Directors is concerned, this Commission fully adopts the stand taken by the DBM in its legal opinion,
dated March 14, 1996, which states that:
Accordingly, the Resolutions or Circulars of the PPC granting additional benefits or compensation to
itsemployees without the requisite review and approval by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the DBM is believed to be an ultra vires act of the corporation which cannot be
given legal effect and recognition Additional benefits or compensation that may be granted to
government officials/ employees require a law and may not be done by a mere expedient of a resolution
or a circular of a GOCC, as in the case of the PPC.
The above legal opinion, according to the DBM is based on the following reasons:
1. While there may be a semblance of exemption for the PPC from the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Bureau, such exemption is subject to the qualification
that PPCs own system of compensation and classification conforms as closely as possible with that
provided for under R.A. No. 6758.
2. Such PPC exemption should be appreciated in correlation with the provision of Section 6 of P.D.
1597 xxx.
While it is true that Section 13 of R.A. No. 7354 exempts the PPC from submitting to Congress its annual
budget unless it seeks subsidy guaranty of its liability from the National Treasury, it is also true that Section
18 of the same Act provides that the PPC thru its board shall submit to both Houses of Congress, together
with the Auditors Report on the relevant accounts, an annual report generally dealing with the activities and
operations of the Corporation during the preceding year xxx The exemption under Section 13 of R.A. No.
7354 does not in any way intend or show that the Corporation is exempt from R.A. 6758. [4]
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioners filed this petition before this Court, assigning the
following errors
I THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PPC IS NOT EXEMPT FROM THE SALARY
STANDARDIZATION LAW (R.A. NO. 6758).
II THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONFORMING WITH THE DBM THAT THE RESOLUTION AND
CIRCULATION OF THE PPC GRANTING ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO ITS EMPLOYEES
WITHOUT THE REQUISITE REVIEW AND APPROVAL BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE DBM IS AN ULTRA VIRES ACT OF THE CORPORATION.
III. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MONTHLY RATA OF PPC
OFFICIALS MUST CONFORM TO THE AMOUNT PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 35 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8174.
As to the first issue, petitioners argued that Sections 21, 22, and 25 of the PPC charter (R.A. No. 7354)
exempt it from the Salary Standardization Law or the Compensation and Position Classification Office rules.
The said provisions read:
Section 21. Powers and Functions of the Postmaster General. As the Chief Executive Officer, the
Postmaster General shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x x x x x x.
c) subject to the approval of the Board to determine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel, define
their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments in accordance with the approved
compensation structure of the Corporation.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 22 Merit System The Corporation shall establish a human resources management system which
shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such
system shall aim so establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the postal organization in
accordance with sound principles of management
A progressive compensation structure, which shall be based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporations human
resources development program. The Corporation, however, may grant across the board salary increase or
modify its compensation structure as to result in higher salaries, subject to either of the following conditions
a) there are evidences of prior improvement in employee productivity, measured by such quantitative
indicators as mail volume per employee and delivery times
b) a law raising the minimum wage has been enacted with application to all government employees or
has the effect of classifying some positions in the postal service as below the floor wage.
Section 25. Exemption from Rules and Regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office.
All personnel and positions of the Corporation shall be governed by Section 22 hereof, and as such shall
beexempt from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification
Office. The Corporation, however, shall see to it that its own system conforms as closely as possible with
that provided for under Republic Act No. 6758.
Petitioners averred that since the PPC has the power under Sections 21 and 22 of R.A. No. 7354 to fix its
own compensation scheme and Section 25 of said charter expressly exempts it from the rules of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office, it is clear that PPC Board Resolution No. 95-50 and PPC
Circular 95-22 are valid corporate acts that can be the basis of the payment of RATA of PPC officials
without prior approval from the DBM.
As for the DBM legal opinion which was the basis for the disallowance of the payments of the RATA,
petitioners assailed the same for being erroneous. According to the DBM, notwithstanding the exemption
of PPC from the rules of CPCO granted under Section 25 of R.A. 7354, the DBM has the power to review
and approve the compensation structure of PPC because of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597.
Sec 6 Exemption from OCPC Rules and Regulations. Agencies, positions or groups of officials and
employees of the national government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, who are
hereafter exempted by law from OCPC coverage, shall observe such guidelines and policies as may be
issued by the President governing position classification, salary rates, levels of allowances, project and other
honoraria, overtime rates, and other forms of compensation and fringe benefits. Exemptions
notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the President, through the Budget Commission, on their position
classification and compensation plans, policies, rates and other related details following such specifications
as may be prescribed by the President. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners, however, argued that Section 6, P.D. No. 1597 has already been repealed by Section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 which reads:
Sec. 35. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations, inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
They pointed out that R.A. No. 7354 (The Postal Service Act of 1992) being a special and later law, it
prevails over P.D. No. 1597, a general law which refers to all government agencies and GOCCs covered by
and those exempted from the rules of the CPCO. For these reasons, petitioners claimed that the power of
the DBM to review and approve PPCs resolutions and circulars implementing the latters compensation plans
is no longer in force.
Petitioners likewise posited that Section 6, P.D. No. 1597 has no legal effect, it being in the nature of an
irrepealable provision of law. They pointed to the phrase agencies x x x of the national government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, who are hereafter exempted by law from
coverage x x x, as violative of the Constitutional provision that legislative power shall be vested in the
legislature and the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. In effect, petitioners
maintained. Section 6 limits the lawmaking powers of Congress by providing for conditions to be applied
to agencies or GOCCs that are yet to be created
Even assuming arguendo that Section 6, P.D. No. 1597 has legal effects, petitioners theorized. It cannot be
considered as requiring prior approval of the DBM since said provision only requires the PPC to observe
the guidelines on compensation schemes and to report to the President about its position classification and
compensation system
Furthermore, petitioners asserted that scrutinizing the Senate deliberations, it is clear that the management
and budgetary system of the PPC was being taken out of the control of the DBM.
As to the applicability of Section 35 of R.A. No. 8174 limiting the amounts of RATA granted to certain
employees, petitioners argued that said provisions does not apply to the monthly RATA rates of PPC
corporate officials, as PPCs budget is not covered by the Appropriations Act or R.A. No. 8174. This, they
said, is clear from Section 13 of the PPC Charter (R.A. No. 7354):
Sec. 13. Annual Budget x x x Unless the Corporation shall require a subsidy and/or a guarantee of its
liability from the National Treasury, its budget for the year need not be submitted to Congress for
approval and inclusion in the General Appropriations Act.
On the other hand, in its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that Section 6 of P.D. 1597 is
valid and subsisting, there having been no express or implied repeal of the assailed provision Moreover, the
Solicitor General explained that although Section 25 of the PPC charter exempts the corporation from the
CPCO rules and regulations, under Section 6 of PD No 1597, however, it is still required to report the details
of its compensation system to the President through the DBM. The two provisions in question are thus
compatible and reconcilable.
With respect to the argument that the PPC is exempted from the coverage of the CPCO rules and regulations,
the Solicitor General observed that the said exemptions is not absolute as it refers only to exemption from
the application of rules and regulations relating to position and compensation classification.Moreover, the
Solicitor General added, the term compensation in said law refers to the salary structure of government
personnel and not to allowances.
From the foregoing, the issues of the present controversy may therefore be summed up as follows: (1)
whether the PPC Board of Directors can, by itself, grant through a resolution an increase in allowances to
its officials without said resolution going to the DBM for review and approval and (2) whether the RATA
granted to PPC officials falls within the amounts provided in the General Appropriations Act.
This Court rules in the negative on both issues.
First, it is conceded that the PPC, by virtue of its charter, R.A. No. 7354, has the power to fix the salaries
and emoluments of its employees. This function, being lodged in the Postmaster General, the same must be
exercised with approval of the Board of Directors This is clear from Sections 21 and 22 of said charter.
Petitioners correctly noted that since the PPC Board of Directors are authorized to approve the Corporations
compensation structure, it is also within the Boards power to grant or increase the allowances of PPC
officials or employees. As can be gleaned from Sections 10 and 17 of P.D No. 985 (A Decree Revising the
Position Classification and Compensation System in the National Government, and Integrating the Same),
the term compensation includes salaries, wages, allowances, and other benefits
Sec 10 The Compensation System. The Compensation System consists of (a) a Salary Schedule, (b) a
Wage Schedule; (c) policies relating to allowances, bonuses, pension plans, and other benefits
accruing to employees covered x x x. (emphasis supplied).
Sec 17 Powers and Functions. The Budget Commission principally through the OCPC shall, in addition to
those provided under other sections of this Decree, have the following powers and functions:
xxxxxxxxx
(g) Provide the required criteria and guidelines, in consultation with agency heads as may be deemed
necessary and subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Budget, for the grant of all types of allowances
and additional forms of compensation to employees in all agencies of the government.
Besides, allowances such as RATA are included in the term emoluments which, under Section 21 of RA
7354, the Postmaster General is authorized to grant to PPC personnel with the approval of the Board of
Directors. Blacks Law Dictionary defines emolument as that which is received as a compensation for
services, or which is annexed to the possession of office as salary, fees and perquisites.
The Commission on Audit was, therefore, in error when it held in its decision that the exemption of the PPC
from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office x x
x relates only to the qualification, position and salary grade of the employees concerned and not to the
payment of additional benefits including the increase in the Representation and Transportation Allowances
(RATA).
While the PPC Board of Directors admittedly acted within its powers when it granted the RATA increases
in question, the same should have first been reviewed by the DBM before they were implemented Section
21, 22, and 25 of the PPC charter should be read in conjunction with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597:
Sec 6 Exemption from OCPC Rules and Regulations. Agencies, positions or groups of officials and
employees of the national government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, who are
hereafter exempted by law from OCPC coverage, shall observe such guidelines and policies as may be
issued by the President governing position classification, salary rates, levels of allowances, project and other
honoraria, overtime rates, and other forms of compensation and fringe benefits. Exemptions
notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the President, through the Budget Commission, on their position
classification and compensation plans, policies, rates and other related details, following such specifications
as may be prescribed by the President. (emphasis supplied).
Contrary to petitioners position, said provision still applies and has not been repealed either expressly or
impliedly. Their reliance on the general repealing clause in Section 35[5] of R.A. No. 7354 is erroneous. The
holding of this Court in Mecano vs. COA[6] is instructive: The question that should be asked is: What is the
nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing
provisions, as stated in Opinion No. 73, s. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was no to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.
As the Solicitor General correctly observed, there is no express repeal of Section 6 P.D. No. 1597 by RA
No. 7354. Neither is there an implied repeal thereof because there is no irreconcilable conflict between the
two laws. On the one hand, Section 25 of R.A. No. 7354 provides for the exemption of PPC from the rules
and regulations of the CPCO On the other hand, Section 6 of P.D. 1597 requires PPC to report to the
President, through the DBM, the details of its salary and compensation system. Thus, while the PPC is
allowed to fix its own personnel compensation structure through its Board of Directors, the latter is required
to follow certain standards in formulating said compensation system. One such standard is specifically
stated in Section 25 of R A No. 7354.
Section 25 Exemption from Rules and Regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office.
All personnel and positions of the Corporation shall be governed by Section 22 hereof, and as such shall be
exempt from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification
Office. The Corporation, however, shall see to it that its own system conforms as closely as possible with
that provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 (emphasis supplied)
To sustain petitioners claim that it is the PPC and PPC alone that should ensure that its compensation system
conforms as closely as possible with that of R.A. No. 6758 will result in an invalid delegation of legislative
power. If such interpretation is adopted, the law would, in effect, be granting PPC unfettered discretion to
fix its compensation structure, something the legislature could not have intended.
As the Solicitor General put it, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597 is the detail intended to fill the gap in such laws
as R.A. No. 7354 in order to ensure that delegation of legislative authority will be canalized within banks
to keep it from overflowing.

It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board
of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to
ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under
R A No. 6758
Section 25 of R.A. No. 7354 and Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597 can thus be read together and harmonized to
give effect to both provisions. This Court has held that statutes should be construed in light of the objective
to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.[7]
Clearly, therefore, no implied repeal can be deduced in this case. Worth reiterating is the rule in statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be
construed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so
intended it.
As regards petitioners argument that P.D. No. 1597 cannot be given any legal effect as it is unconstitutional
because it is in the nature of an irrepealable law, suffice it to say that this Court will refrain from striking
down a law if the case can be decided on other grounds. The Court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case. Thus, the Supreme Court held It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.[8]
With respect to the second issue of whether the RATA granted to PPC officials must fall within the amounts
provided for in the General Appropriations Act as stated earlier we rule in the negative
Section 13 of the PPC charter expressly provides for PPCs fiscal autonomy. Thus, unless PPC requires a
subsidy and/or a guarantee of its liability from the National Treasury its annual budget need not be submitted
to Congress for approval and included in the General Appropriations Act.
The intention of the lawmakers here is to promote the efficiency of the postal service by allowing the PPC
to use its profits from its operations to upgrade its facilities and equipment and provide incentives for its
personnel to render better services. Specifically, fiscal autonomy allows the PPC to attract and keep
professional and competent people within its ranks.
To sum up, the PPC being a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter, it falls
within the scope of the Civil Service.[9] Thus, as regards personnel matters, the Civil Service Law applies to
the PPC. Its Board of Directors is authorized under its charter to formulate and implement its own system
of compensation for its personnel, including the payment of RATA. In the exercise of such power, it is not
required to observe the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification
Office. Neither is it required to follow strictly the amounts provided for in the General Appropriations Act
as its annual budget is not covered thereby. However, since the PPC charter expressly exempts it from the
rules and regulations of the CPCO. Said Board is not required to follow the CPCOs guidelines in formulating
a compensation system for the PPC employees.[10]
In other words, the general rule is that the PPC is covered by the Civil Service Law as regards all personnel
matters except those affecting the compensation structure and position classification in the corporation
which are left to the PPC Board of Directors to formulate in accordance with law. It must be stressed that
the Boards discretion on the matter of personnel compensation is not absolute as the same must be exercised
in accordance with the standard laid down by law, that is, its compensation system, including the allowances
granted by the Board to PPC employees, must strictly conform with that provided for other government
agencies under R.A. No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) in relation to the General Appropriations
Act. To ensure such compliance, the resolutions of the Board affecting such matters should first be reviewed
and approved by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision dated
November 4, 1997 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) The exemption of the Philippine Postal Corporation from the coverage of the rules and regulations
of the Compensation and Position Classification Office includes, not only the fixing of the
qualification, position, and salary grade of the Corporations employees but also the payment of
additional benefits, including increases in their Representation and Transportation Allowance;
(b) The Representation and Transportation Allowance granted to the concerned employees of the
Corporation need not be limited to the amounts provided for in the General Appropriations Act, and
(c) However, the compensation system set up must conform as closely as possible with that provided
for other government agencies under R.A. No. 6758 in relation to the General Appropriations Act and
must, moreover, be reviewed and approved by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant
to Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., in the result.
Vitug, J., concur but except from the view that the compensation system requires the approval of DBM.
G.R. No. 147192 June 27, 2006
GSIS, Petitioner, vs. CITY ASSESSOR OF ILOILO CITY, Respondent
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision 1 and
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing a petition for annulment of judgment 3 filed by
petitioner, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), in Cadastral Case No. 84 and another
unnumbered cadastral case decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 36 and 31, of Iloilo City,
respectively.
In the two cadastral cases, private respondent Rosalina Francisco petitioned for the issuance of new transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) in her name over two parcels of land, to wit:
TCT No. 41681
A parcel of land known as Lot No. 6, Block 2, of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-184005 being a
portion of Lot 2214-B, Jaro Cadastre, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo
City, Island of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag, of legal age, Filipino
citizen and resident of Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines on June 28, 1991.
TCT No. 48580
A parcel of land known as Lot No. 22, Block 2, of the Subdivision Record No. 8 situated in the District of
Jaro, Iloilo City, Island of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Rodolfo Ceres, of legal age, Filipino
Citizen and a resident of Iloilo City, Philippines, with an area of Two Hundred Ninety Four (294) square
meters, more or less.
Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in the auction sales held for the satisfaction
of delinquent real property taxes. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period and the failure of the
registered owner or any interested person to redeem the properties, the Iloilo City Treasurer issued the
corresponding final bill of sale to private respondent. The sales were later on duly annotated on the
certificates of title on file with the Register of Deeds. However, the final bill of sale could not be registered
because the owners duplicate certificate of title was unavailable at that time.
To effect registration in her name, private respondent instituted separate petitions for the entry of title in her
name over the two lots with the RTCs of Iloilo City. Both petitions were unopposed.
Finding merit in her petitions, the RTCs, in separate orders issued on separate dates, directed the issuance
of new duplicate TCTs. The dispositive portion of the April 29, 1993 order of RTC Branch 36 in Cadastral
Case No. 84 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo is hereby ordered to issue
new owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41681 in the name of GSIS c/o Baldomero
Dagdag, upon payment of the required legal fees. Accordingly, the lost copy of the subject title is hereby
declared as NULL and VOID.4
On the other hand, RTC Branch 31 also issued an order, dated November 8, 1994, in the other (unnumbered)
cadastral case, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the Register of Deeds, City of Iloilo is hereby directed to issue a new
owners duplicate certificate of Title No. T-48580 in the name of the G.S.I.S. C/O RODOLFO CERES,
the registered owner, basing the same on the Original Certificate of Title found intact and existing in
the Office of the Register of Deeds and the latter to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-48580
together with the encumbrances therein and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of
ROSALINA FRANCISCO of legal age, single, Filipino Citizen and resident of Brgy. Tacas, Jaro,
Iloilo City, Philippines. The owners duplicate certificate of title No. T-48580 which was not
surrendered is hereby declared null and void.5
No appeal was made from both orders of the courts a quo, hence, they became final and executory.
In a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court, petitioner, as the alleged previous owner of the parcels
of land sold at public auction, assailed the orders of the RTCs of Iloilo City before the CA. It claimed that
the assessment of real property taxes on it (GSIS) was void since, under its charter (RA 8291), it was exempt
from all forms of taxes (including real property taxes on the properties held by it) that were due to the local
governments where such properties were located. Furthermore, it claimed that the proceedings in the
assessment and levy of said taxes, as well as the sale of the properties at public auction, were held without
notice to it, hence, its right to due process was violated.
The appellate court gave no credence to the arguments of petitioner and dismissed its petition. According
to the CA, the exemption of GSIS under its charter was not applicable pursuant to Section 234(a) of RA
7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Under that law, the tax-exempt
status of GSIS cannot be invoked where the actual use or beneficial ownership of the properties under its
title has been conveyed to another person.6The CA added that there was also no basis for GSISs claim that
it was denied due process.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA, hence, it brought this case to
us via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In this petition, petitioner essentially faults the CA for ruling that its properties were not exempt from all
forms of taxes under its charter (RA 8291) and that the proceedings on the assessment and levy of its
properties were legal.
In support of its position, petitioner points to Section 39 of RA 8291 which reads:
Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared that the actuarial
solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the
contribution rates are necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept low as possible in
order not to burden the member of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets,
revenues, including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid shall be exempt from all taxes, assessment
fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically
revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered
paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions, or jurisprudence contrary
to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective
and without legal force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx
The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the
benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes
issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including the Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary
accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions
or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or otherwise, is in favor of GSIS.8 (italics
supplied)
We find no reversible error in the decision and resolution of the CA.
Even if the charter of the GSIS generally exempts it from tax liabilities, the prescription is not so
encompassing as to make the tax exemption applicable to the properties in dispute here.
In the early case of City of Baguio v. Busuego,9 we held that the tax-exempt status of the GSIS could not
prevent the accrual of the real estate tax liability on properties transferred by it to a private buyer through a
contract to sell. In the present case, GSIS had already conveyed the properties to private persons thus making
them subject to assessment and payment of real property taxes. 10 The alienation of the properties sold by
GSIS was the proximate cause and necessary consequence of the delinquent taxes due.
The doctrine laid down in City of Baguio is reflected in Section 234 (a) of the LGC,11 which states:
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment
of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, claims that RA 8291, which took effect in 1997, abrogated Section 234 (a) of the LGC
of 1991.
We disagree.
The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention to revoke must be clear and
manifest.12 RA 8291 made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of RA 7160, particularly
Section 234 (a) thereof.
Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To bring about an implied repeal, the two
laws must be absolutely incompatible. They must be clearly repugnant in a way that the later law (RA 8291)
cannot exist without nullifying the prior law (RA 7160).13
Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or impliedly, that particular provision of the
LGC. The two statutes are not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable as to compel us
to uphold one and strike down the other.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will
form a uniform system of jurisprudence.14 The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws.15 Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended
Section 234 (a) to run counter to Section 39 of RA 8291.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Courts 2003 decision in National Power Corporation v. City of
Cabanatuan16where we declared that the tax provisions of the LGC were the most significant provisions
therein insofar as they removed the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national
government (like petitioner) from the coverage of local taxation. In that case, petitioner National Power
Corporation (NPC) claimed that it was an instrumentality of the government exempt under its charter from
paying franchise tax. The Court overruled NPC and upheld the right of respondent city government to
impose the franchise tax on its privilege to transact business in its area.
Again, in the 2004 case of Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System,17 the Court declared that any
interpretation that gave Section 39 an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets and properties from
legal processes was unwarranted. These processes included the levy and garnishment of its assets for taxes
or claims enforced against it. The Court there ruled that the exemption under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter
should be read consistently with its avowed purpose the maintenance of its actuarial solvency to finance
the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members. The Court meant that the tax-exempt
properties and assets of GSIS referred to those that remained at its disposal and use, either for investment
or for income-generating purposes. Properties whose actual and beneficial use had been transferred to
private taxable persons, for consideration or otherwise, were excluded and were thus taxable.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,18 the Court ruled that the exemption of a
government-owned or controlled corporation from taxes and other charges was not absolute and could be
withdrawn, as in fact certain provisions of the LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have
expressly withdrawn the tax-exempt privilege of petitioner as a government-owned corporation.
Lastly, even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated Section 234(a) of the LGC, still it cannot be
made to apply retroactively without impairing the vested rights of private respondent. The appellate court
thus correctly stated:
xxx it has been the courts consistent ruling that a repealing statute must not interfere with vested
rights or impair the obligation of contracts; that if any other construction is possible, the act should
not be construed so as to affect rights which have vested under the old law. Private respondent[s], we
reiterate, have become the private owner[s] of the properties in question in the regular course of
proceedings established by law, and after the decisions granting such rights have become final and
executory. The enactment of the new GSIS Charter cannot be applied in a retroactive manner as to
divest the private respondent[s] of [their] ownership.19 (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976
PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALMUETE, defendants-appellee
AQUINO, J.:
Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation
of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in
Muoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her
or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each
to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch VI).
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact
date of the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already
entered their plea.
Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds (1) that it does not allege facts
sufficient to constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is no law punishing it, and (3) that the court has, no
jurisdiction over the alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion.
The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held
that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe t lie circumstances under which the
cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon
for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession
exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.
The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the
information in this case alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No.
1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder,
without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for
its threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish
such and refuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for
its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share in the last normal
harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation
by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general
provisions of law applicable to that act committed.
SEC. 57. Penal Provision. Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of
this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court. ... *
We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held in People vs. Adillo, L-23M,
November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural
Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as implemented by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was already in force when the act complained of was
committed. The repeal may be rationalized in this manner:
The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy
Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to
prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in
sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject
to certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced in the
Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with"
its provisions.
Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre because the
lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September
10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the
law itself also ceases). applies to this case.
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as
contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2
proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant
from the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the
tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing
Presidential Decree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo,supra).
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice
to the landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact
section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for
penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.
All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural Tenancy Law
with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands
are concerned.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is
an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the
Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in
force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest
legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain
operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory
act" (Crawford, Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).
A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a
substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a
'legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded
therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77
Phil. 1000; People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431.
See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252, 254).
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
[G.R. No. 137571. September 21, 2000]
TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, vs. RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, respondent
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Provisions that were not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed repealed. Hence,
having been omitted from the 1997 Rules, deemed already repealed is Section 18, Rule 41 of the pre-1997
Rules of Court, which had theretofore provided for a 48-hour reglementary period within which to
appealhabeas corpus cases. Accordingly, the period for perfecting appeals in said cases and ordinary civil
actions is now uniform -- 15 days from notice of the judgment or order.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 2, 1999
Order[1]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 26) in Special Proceedings No. 98-92014. The
challenged Order reads in full as follows:[2]
For resolution is a Motion For Reconsideration filed by petitioner thru counsel with comment/opposition
thereto filed by respondents thru counsel.
After careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by both parties, this Court finds for the
respondents. The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondents is actually fo[r] the Court Decision dated
January 7, 1999 and not for [the] Court Order dated January 29, 1999.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
Meanwhile, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to immediately transmit the record of the instant
case to the Honorable Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from today.
The Facts
From the records and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts appear undisputed.
After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a Taiwanese citizen,[3] arrived in
this country on November 5, 1998.
On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by several policemen, who subsequently turned him over to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Thereafter, on November 25, 1998, the BID Board of
Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier canceled by Taiwanese
authorities, ordered his summary deportation.
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the
ground that his detention was illegal. After respondents filed a Return of Writ controverting his claim, the
trial court issued a Decision dated January 7, 1999, granting his Petition and ordering his release from
custody.
On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court
in an Order dated January 29, 1999.
Respondents then filed a [N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-stated
case, dated January 29, 1999, a copy of which was received by the Bureau on February 11, 1999 and was
received by the undersigned counsel on February 15, 1999 x x x.[4] Dated February 15, 1999, it was received
by the RTC on February 16, 1999 at 9:45 a.m.
Petitioner filed an Opposition, claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary
period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although
respondents alleged that they had received the said Order on February 15, 1999, petitioner contended that
they had in fact received it on February 11, 1999, as evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof and by
the Sheriffs Return.[5]
In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioners contention and granted due course to the
Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing this time that the Notice should be rejected
because it had referred not to the RTC Decision but to the January 29, 1999 Order denying reconsideration.In
its assailed March 2, 1999 Order, the trial court denied his Motion.
Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of law.[6] In a Resolution dated March 22, 1999, this Court issued
a Temporary Restraining Order directing the respondents to cease and desist from deporting the petitioner
x x x until further orders.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:[8]
(a) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] now 15 days from notice of judgment
as contended by [the] lower court?
(b) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] still 48 hours from notice of judgment
as provided for in Section 18, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court? or
(c) Is the provision of Sec. 1, sub-paragraph (a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure --
prohibiting appeal from an Order denying a motion for reconsideration - mandatory or merely
discretionary on the part of the lower courts?
(d) Are petitions for writs of habeas corpus already brought down to the level of ordinary cases despite
the fact that in habeas corpus the liberty of persons illegally detained is involved?
In the main, the Court will resolve whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed. In the process, it will
determine the applicable reglementary period for filing an appeal in habeas corpus cases.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue: Reglementary Period for Appealing
Habeas Corpus Cases
Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because respondents filed it only on February 16,
1999, five days after they had received the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on February 11,
1999.[9] He argues that the reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section 18
of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be
perfected by filing with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom.
The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was omitted from and thereby repealed
by the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which completely replaced Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled rule of
statutory construction is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof
covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded. [10] The omission shows the intention of the
rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this case,[11] to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are
not reproduced in the revised statute or code.[12]
Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions[13] and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.
Stare Decisis
Petitioner insists, however, that the application of Section 18, Rule 41 under the Revised Rules of Court
must be maintained under the doctrine of stare decisis.[14], Thus he urges the Court to apply precedents that
held that the 48-hour period for perfecting an appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional. He specifically
citesSaulo v. Cruz,[15] Garcia v. Echiverri[16] and Elepante v. Madayag.[17]
The principle cited by petitioner is an abbreviated form of the maxim Stare decisis, et non quieta
movere.[18] That is, When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the
same.[19] This principle assures certainty and stability in our legal system.[20] It should be stressed that stare
decisispresupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the
same. In this case, there is one crucial difference. All the incidents of the present controversy occurred when
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court was already in effect. On the other hand, all the cited precedents had been
resolved under the pre-1997 Rules. Accordingly, stare decisis cannot compel this Court to apply to the
present case the alleged precedents decided during the regime of the pre-1997 Rules. The cited cases applied
a specific provision of the Rules in effect at the time. But because that provision had already been repealed
when the facts under present consideration occurred, the Court can no longer rely on those cases. Indeed, to
rule otherwise is to bar the effectivity of the 1997 amendments, which conflict with jurisprudence decided
under an old and repealed rule. Verily, petitioners contention effectively precludes changes and freezes our
procedural rules.
Subject of the Notice of Appeal
As earlier observed, the Notice of Appeal referred to the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-
stated case, dated January 29, 1999. Petitioner now argues that the Notice was improper because it referred
to the Order denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration, not the Decision itself which was dated
January 7, 1999. He cites Section 1 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides that an order denying a
motion for a new trial or a reconsideration may not be appealed. [21]
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that because the Notice of Appeal contained the word judgment, their
clear intent was to appeal the Decision.
We agree with respondents. In referring to the trial courts judgment, respondents were clearly appealingthe
January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they would have referred to the Order. Indeed,
judgment is normally synonymous with decision.[22] Furthermore, the wrong date of the appealed judgment
may be attributed merely to inadvertence. Such error should not, by itself, deprive respondents of their right
to appeal. Time and time again, it has been held that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive
a party of this right.[23] They are encouraged to hear the merits of appealed cases; hence, the dismissal of an
appeal on grounds of technicality is generally frowned upon.[24] Indeed, the postulates of justice and fairness
demand that all litigants be afforded the opportunity for a full disposition of their disputes, free as much as
legally possible from the constraints of technicalities.[25] To rule otherwise is to let technicality triumph over
substantial justice. Indeed, the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork
legal technicality.[26]
Other Matters
Petitioner insists that the Order deporting him is invalid, as he was not given notice or hearing.[27] We reject
this argument because it properly pertains to the appeal before the CA, not in these proceedings instituted
merely to determine the timeliness of the Notice of Appeal.
Likewise, we reject the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that the promulgation of the CA
Decision resolving the appeal rendered the present case moot and academic.[28] It should be stressed that the
validity of the proceedings before the appellate court ultimately hinges on the issue before us: whether the
Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON.
JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric
tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation
of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December
28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the
Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant
to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding
for February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant
petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date
abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further
orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor
General were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which,
in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond
having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced
reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the
provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if
there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice
of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic
Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties
upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other
government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private
parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to
undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision
of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other
things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the
President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may
designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is such
shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance
thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the
Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the
impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be
prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the
light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452
contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the nature
of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol.
1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied
repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed,
the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so
express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d)
832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631),
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there
is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to
different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in
Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The
philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a
minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may
discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice
importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different;
one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to
the government during normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time
underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three
different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when
the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency;
and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency.
Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by the private sector.
However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law
can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal
times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency,
we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal
does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a
consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented
in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in the
Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:
SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that
the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice
and corn."
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee
as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority
to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the
emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or
bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the
part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation
of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is
an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or
businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is
really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress
by no means could have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to
stave off hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found
in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy
cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the
private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case
we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to
promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to
adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by
implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law
[United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229;
Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, p.
462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compaia General de Tabacos v. Collector
of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to
create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the
old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction
of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn [Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year
Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying
value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no
other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The
reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an
authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the
matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for
any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication
is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in
order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act
3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except
them from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452,
we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House
Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the
request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of
the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such
request for authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this
reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that
considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue
relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.
SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of
emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No.
2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2,
page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by
substitution reads:
 Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the
provisions of existing law.
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No.
3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of
the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation
? It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to import rice, under Section 2 of
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by
power on the part of the President to import rice.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing
law that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 that is the reason your Committee
eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what
is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No.
2207 the President can designate any government agency to import rice?
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes is primarily a
matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly intended to supersede
the prior law, Republic Act No. 2207.
The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency power to import rice and corn, granted
to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at present,
notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No. 3452.
For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions of the respective acts:

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme REP. ACT NO. 2207 (1959) REP. ACT NO. 3452(1962)
Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any SEC. 10. ... Provided, that the Rice and Corn
between these two Acts.
person, association, corporation or government Administration or any other government agency is
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag,
agency to import rice and corn into any point in the hereby prohibited from importing rice and
informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
Philippines: Provided, however, That should there be corn: Provided, further, That the importation of
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .
an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply rice and corn is left to private parties upon
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to
of the abovementioned commodities of such gravity payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emphasis
private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee,
as to constitute a national emergency, upon Supplied)
as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
certification to this effect by the National Economic
normal conditions.
Council, based on the studies of the Office of
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.
the Philippines may authorize the importation of the
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
commodities, through anygovernment agency that he
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
may designate in such quantities as the National
xxx xxx xxx
Economic Council may determine necessary to cover
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic
the shortage, subject to the taxes, duties and/or special
Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there
charges as now provided by law: Provided, further,
has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is
That contracts for such importation shall be only on
concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which
straightsales basis, and awarded only after a public
side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .
bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally
repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy; because under
importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall import rice and
By reading the two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained corn; while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice and corn is left to private
in Republic Act No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting parties, with no restriction other than the payment of tax. Second, in procedure; under Republic Act 2207,
to a national emergency. the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities certified by the National
Economic Council as necessary, through any government agency that he may designate; while by Act
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved 3452 any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn, said prohibition being express,
by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only this, but violation of the prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000
14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals fine and imprisonment for not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act 3452).
that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.
We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the presidential power to make importations of
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question, rice and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452. If any government agency
suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to is prohibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and the violation of the prohibition is penalized
borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 by fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the importation? He cannot do so directly,
(e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a since Act 2207 specifically requires that it be done "through any government agency". How, then, may he
guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its import?
functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision
gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the importation in question. It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why this must be so. Suffice it to note that
the Administration's power to import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a mere corollary
to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such exceptional import power
necessarily depended on the continuation of that total prohibition.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between the emergency
importing authority granted to the government and the maintenance of the normal non-import policy.
SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government
agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided, however, that should
there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of the above-mentioned commodities, of
such gravity as to constitute anational emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National
Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the
President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities, through any
government agency that he may designate, in such quantities as the National Economic Council may
determine necessary to cover the shortage, subject to taxes, duties and/or special charges as now
provided by law; provided, further, that contracts for such importation shall be only on straight sales
basis, and awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that the latter was not even set apart in
a section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening portion of the section
quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to import rice and corn established
by the later part of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule disappears, the exception thereto must
necessarily cease to operate, since the exception becomes automatically functus officio for lack of basis.
The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic crop
became insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from outside to fill
the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done through governmental agencies.
But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private parties were
authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional importing power of the Government
lost all reason for its existence, because the private imports allowed by Act 3452 were contemplated and
intended to make up for the difference between demand and supply, without necessity of government
intervention. In truth, the expression in Section 10 of Act 3452
SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency is hereby
prohibited from importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the importation of rice and corn is left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emphasis supplied)
can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, and leave to private parties the task of
bringing such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production should occur.
That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in the legislative
journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing the transcript of the
Senate debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No. 3452, the following appears:
CUENCO AMENDMENT
Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period (.) to colon and add the following:
PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER
GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTING RICE AND CORN:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE AND CORN IS LEFT TO
PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THE CORRESPONDING TAXES.
Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.
Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any. The amendment
is approved. (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p. 1360)
The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following illuminating remarks:
SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your Honor, that we could proceed with
the discussion.
Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated, specifically provides that appointment of
personnel should be in accordance with the Civil Service Law as well as with the WAPCO. It seems
to me that this provision is very laudable and very, very reasonable. The second important feature in
this proposed measure is that it prohibits importation by the government. I think this should be
clarified in the sense that, at the same time, it allows importation by private parties but with the
payment of the corresponding duties. Or rather, under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which
is being set in the proposed measure is that thegovernment should not resort to importation but that
importation of the cereal is open at all times to any citizen of this country so long as he pays the
corresponding duties and other taxes which are imposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No. 59,
May 8, 1962)
It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that
All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly",. intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to Republic Act No.
2207. Hence, the Presidential power to import no longer exists.
In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the majority opinion avers that Republic
Act No. 3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and conditions. This is plainly absurd, for in normal
times, when production equals consumption, no importation need be authorized, for none will be required.
The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms.
Granting arguendothat this were true, despite the express prohibition of government imports in section 10
of the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary, or expedient, to enact an
entirely different law, instead of merely providing for the amendment of the prior statute (R.A. 2207). If
both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn sufficiency for our country, and only a change
of method was intended, why enact two statutes not only unconnected with each other, but actually
contradictory?
That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person or entity,
public or private, could import rice or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful for any
person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice and corn"; while under Act 3452, on
the contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time, with no other
restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with so diametrically opposite
philosophies, were intended to co-exist?
Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since private
importation of rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawful under Act 2207 and lawful under Act
3452), it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must have been, intended to revise,
supersede, and replace the former law (Act 2207).The established rule in this jurisdiction in such a case is
that
While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet if the later act
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as
a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351)
(quoted and applied in In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 52).
Philippines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is
discarded and repealed (In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject-matter, and the
legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to such subject-
matter and make a revision of the whole subject, that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail,
and that whatever is excluded is discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E. 841.)
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different dates, and it is
plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and to
be a complete and perfect system or provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration
that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed."
Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:
6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for one revised, operates as a repeal of the
latter without any express words to that effect; and so any distinct provision of the old law, not
incorporated into the later one, is to be, deemed to have been intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat.
Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 99:
This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly destroys the contention of the majority
opinion that because the Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports of rice and corn
in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act 3452, such power must be
still deemed to exist. No such power can now exist for the reason that the Act conferring it was totally and
unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The contradictory philosophies of both Acts testify
to that effect.
The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not contemplate situations where the shortage in
local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that Act 3452 refers only
to artificialshortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural shortages where the rice and corn crops
do not suffice to meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, the opposite of these assertions is
precisely true. Thus, Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall engage in the purchase of these
basic foods from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines ... and whenever
circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require, (the Government) shall
sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers ... .
Section 3 of Act 3452 With a view to regulating the level of supply of rice and corn throughout the
country, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it
may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies. ...
Section 12, Act 3452 "The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to declare a rice and corn
emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest. During the emergency period, the Rice and
Corn Administration, upon the direction of the President, shall, subject to constitutional limitation, conduct
raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice and con hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega: Provided,
That the Rice and Corn Administration shall pay such confiscated rice and corn at the prevailing consumer's
price of the Rice and Corn Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly the words used by the statute, "any cause, natural or artificial", "any contingencies", "rice and
cornemergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due to insufficient
production, as well as artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt the legislature from
the accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it did deny the Government was
the power to import rice and corn whenever it so chooses; instead, the law expressly prescribed "that the
Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and
corn" (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as previously observed, squarely contradicts and vacates that
permission to import previously granted under Republic Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not
now bring in rice and corn from abroad, unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, as was
done for 1964 by Republic Act No. 3848.
The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import
300,000 metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of that
permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former power under Republic Act No. 2207 no
longer existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the Administration in estoppel
to assert the contrary. Why should it seek authority to make importation during 1964 if it still possessed that
granted by Republic Act 2207?
Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature once more
re-affirmed the prohibition of further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law, Republic Act
No. 3848:
SEC. 6 Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall
be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." (Emphasis supplied) which is a virtual repetition of the
restraint imposed by Republic Act 3452. In addition, the law imposed the further condition that the
importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the National Economic Council, where Republic
Act 2207 specified no particular majority.
The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated prohibitions by claiming that said section
6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was absolutely
unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in itself, as it only permitted the
importation of 300,000 metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, any excess beyond the
quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were automatically forbidden. The enactment of section 6 of Act
3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawing Government imports, as declared in
Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant that to import rice now, the Executive must first obtain an enabling
law.
Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of rice would violate the Constitutional
restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law"
(Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has been enacted. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, sections 606 and 607, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds can be
made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the Auditor General. Nor can these
inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a Government agency to borrow the funds required for the
purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are flatly forbidden to import rice (Republic Act
3452, sec. 10), and the borrowing of funds to finance importation is essential for the execution thereof.
Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the Senate during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is not before the Court. The statements quoted are
not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of construing the legislative enactments.
The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had expressly prohibited government agencies to
import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill No. 11511) granting
the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this Court now reverses this clear policy of the
Legislature, and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the laws have expressly forbidden.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
CITY OF NAGA, petitioners, vs.CATALINO AGNA respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga, et al., declaring
Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year following its approval and requiring
petitioners to pay to private respondents the amounts sought for in their complaint plus attorney's fees and
costs. Included in the present controversy as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the
City Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the graduated tax
on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to
percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to said ordinance, private
respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1,
1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:
Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim for
refund of the following amounts, together with interests thereon from the date of payments: To Catalino
Agna, P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the difference
between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00
and P12.00 respectively. They alleged that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section
3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it was approved but in the next
succeeding year after the year of its approval, or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on
their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be refunded
to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So private respondents filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No.
360 declared effective only in the year following the year of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections
4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive and arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and
to require petitioners to refund the sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes
complained of were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00. Private
respondents further prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were not "compelled"
but voluntarily made the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was
published in accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of
Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said
ordinance; that under existing law the City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and
accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the most effective manner. As special and affirmative defenses,
the petitioners allege that the private respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that
the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justify the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable; that
petitioners Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the City of Naga,
respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private respondents are estopped from questioning the
validity and/or constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and malicious filing of the claim against them,
in such amount as the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the pre-trial
conference as well as at the trial on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of
facts: That on June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 entitled "An
ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on
all businesses in the City of Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto
on June 25, 1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated places by the Secretary of the
Municipal Board; that private respondents voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No.
360, but that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer who denied the
same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360, series of
1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and
required the petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paid their taxes to the City of
Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and
the corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the
sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in the quarter of
the year of its approval, that is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended,
otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides that "Each approved
ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after the 10th day following its passage unless
otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal
Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or veto
on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant
to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect after the 10th day following
its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take
effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved.
According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the ordinance
the Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is deemed approved." Since the
ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his veto or approval within 10 days after he
received it on June 25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25,
1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They
further contend that even under Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which
expressly provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage unless the
ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is
the fifteenth day after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier
explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance was deemed approved because
the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by
petitioners to support their stand that the ordinance in question took effect in the year of its approval, it is
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that is more relevant because it is the provision
that specifically refers to effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is deemed
to have superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) in so far as effectivity
of a tax ordinance is concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and enforceable
in 1971, the year following the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides:
Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.A municipal license tax already in existence
shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year
after the next succeeding year, but an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during
the quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is one which changes the
existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants
provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales prescribed in
the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the next succeeding year after the year of its
approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became enforceable is
mainly due to the seemingly apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there really such a conflict in the above-
mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
contemplates of two types of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a
municipal license tax already in existence and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the
first type, a municipal license tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by an ordinance
enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year. This means that the
ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a municipal license tax already
in existence will have to take effect in next succeeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to
enable the taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance.
This is different from the second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax may be created
by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
We do not find any such distinction between an ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in
existence and an ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as
effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy
Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. All
that is mentioned therein is Section 9 which reads:
Section 9 All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code. It is a well established principle in statutory construction that a statute will not be construed as
repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable
repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the
matter in hand and to comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new
statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter
and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation ... . 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section
2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-enactment and
effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia. Statutes are said to be
in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or
have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction
dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary
or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have
in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the
legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the
legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all
should be construed together.9 In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should
be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed
that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating
to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative
will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than
real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be reconciled by applying
the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code when the problem refers to the
effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where
the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales tax on gross sales
or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of
the City of Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls within the clause
of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in
the next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be refunded
of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to
September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement
of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23309 October 31, 1968
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. FRANCISCO ARCA respondent
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Original petition for certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation directed against the orders of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, denying its motions to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in Civil Case No. 55824 of said court.
On 26 December 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company1 and the Dagupan Electric
Corporation,2in their own behalf and on that of all the electric plant operators, who are members of the
Philippine Electric Plant Owners' Association (PEPOA), filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Civil Case No. 55824) to restrain enforcement by the National Power Corporation of a revised
rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold by said defendant, which schedule of new rates would
take effect 1 January 1964. The Petition alleged,inter alia, that the disputed revised rates, which would
increase the cost of electric power and energy being purchased from defendant by plaintiff Philippine Power
and Development Company by 24% and that purchased by plaintiff Dagupan Electric Corporation by 30 %,
are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary; that the said revised rates had not been previously approved
by the Public Service Commission; and that the unilateral revision by the defendant of the rate and its
imposition upon the plaintiffs of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting
them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between them. Plaintiffs
thus prayed the court for a temporary restraining order to prevent the scheduled enforcement and
implementation of the revised rates and amended contracts; that, after hearing, said injunction be made
permanent; and that they be awarded attorney's fees and costs.
Finding sufficient reasons therefor, the court issued, on 27 December 1963, the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs, upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00.
Defendant thereupon moved to dissolve the injunction, claiming that the enforcement of the new rate
schedule will not violate any right of the plaintiffs; that it will not cause them irreparable damage or injury;
that there are other legal remedies available to the plaintiffs; and that the court has no jurisdiction to pass
upon the reasonableness or necessity of the revised rates, the authority therefor allegedly belonging to the
Public Service Commission. A motion to dismiss the petition was also filed, based on the same ground of
lack of jurisdiction by the court. Upon denial of this motion on 5 February 1964, defendant filed its answer
with counterclaims, traversing the allegations of the petition and raising, as one of the special defenses, the
issue of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
By order of 4 March 1964, the court denied defendant's motion to dissolve the injunction; and when its
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on 10 June 1964, defendant National
Power Corporation filed the present petition, charging the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
in not dismissing the case and in not dissolving the temporary restraining order issued therein.
In this proceeding, petitioner does not deny that the lower court can take cognizance of some of the issues
raised by the parties in their pleadings. It is petitioner's theory, however, that for a court to acquire
jurisdictionover a case, it is not enough that it should have jurisdiction "over a portion of the subject matter
of the complaint," but upon all the issues brought up by the pleadings. And since, according to petitioner,
the court below cannot determine the reasonableness of the disputed revised rates, which is one of the issues
raised in the petition,because the matter allegedly pertains to the Public Service Commission pursuant to
Republic Act 2677, it is contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to dismiss the case and todissolve the writ of preliminary injunction involved in this controversy.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In the first place, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the authority to inquire into the rates of charges for
services rendered by the National Power Service Commission does not devolve upon the Public Service
Commission. Commonwealth Act No. 120, creating the National Power Corporation, specifically provides:
SEC. 2. The powers, functions, rights and activities of the said corporationshall be the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) ... to sell electric power and to fix the rates and provide for the collection of the charges for any
service rendered: Provided, That the rates of charges shall not be subject to revision by the Public
Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
It is true that under Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act 2677, 3 amending the Public Service Act and
approved on 18 June 1960, the Public Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to fix the rate of
charges by public utilities owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National Government or by any
government-owned or controlled corporation. But the enactment of this later legislation, which is a general
law, cannot be construed to have repealed or withdrawn the exempting proviso of Section 2, paragraph (g),
of the earlier Commonwealth Act No. 120 abovequoted. For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
"a special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law" (Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 225).
In the present case, there appears no such legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier
special law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later became Republic Act No. 2677, it
was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Public Service Commission over the public utilities
operated by government-owned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such
public services, "in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and
to the public interests."4 By the nature of the service being rendered by the National Power Corporation, i.e.,
the harnessing and then distribution and sale of electric power and energy to electric plant owners who, in
turn, resell them to the consuming public, the contingency intended to be met by the legal provision under
consideration would not exist. No other conclusion appears possible, therefore, than that the authority of the
Public Service Commission under Republic Act 2677, over the fixing of rates of charges of public utilities
owned or operated by government-owned or controlled corporations, can only be exercised where the
charter of the government corporation concerned does not contain any provision to the contrary.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general broad
enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general: one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. (Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty,
40 Phil. 225, 228; City of Manila vs. Public Service Commission, 52 Phil. 515)
But even if it were held that sections 13(a) and 14 of the Public Service Law, as amended by Republic Act
2677, have overridden and impliedly repealed the incompatible proviso of section 2(g) of the National
Power Corporation charter, and that the Public Service Commission had jurisdiction to fix its rates, the
position of this petitioner would not improve. For it is nowhere denied that the new schedule of rates that
the National Power Corporation was attempting to impose had not been previously authorized by the Public
Service Commission, hence, the respondents power companies were justified in contesting such new rates
as illegal. In doing so, they were entitled to apply to respondent court of first instance for injunctive relief
against the wrongful attempt of petitioner to enforce such unauthorized rates, since that remedy is not
obtainable from the Public Service Commission itself (Commonwealth Act 146, section 22; Ramos vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 58 Phil. 374, 376). Injunction is an exercise of judicial power, while the
Public Service Commission is but an administrative body with limited functions. 5
Thus, whether or not the Public Service Commission had authority to pass upon the petitioner's revised
rates, it is undeniable that respondents companies had the right to resort to the respondent court of first
instance in quest of injunctive relief against their enforcement which were claimed to be unauthorized by
law and violative of respondents' contracts; and it equally lay within the lower court's jurisdiction to entertain
their action. The grant of the injunction complained of was merely incidental to the authority of the court to
take cognizance of and adjudicate the main controversy submitted to it.
Neither does the petitioner make out a case of abuse of discretion. Its side of the question was given due
consideration, through its motion to lift the preliminary injunction issued. Whatever error may have been
committed in denying that motion would be at most an error of judgment, not correctible by prerogative
writ but by seasonable appeal. The argument that private respondents should have first exhausted
administrative remedies by appeal to the National Economic Council and the President is without merit, for
the petitioner itself claimed that the revised rates had been already approved by said Council; furthermore,
neither that body nor the President could adjudicate whether or not there was a violation of the contracts
between petitioner and the private respondents, as the latter averred.
As to the claim that the damages to be suffered by private respondents are not irreparable, we believe that
the same is untenable, for the losses to be suffered by the said respondents would necessarily reduce their
resources and efficiency and prejudicially involve the services rendered by them to the general public, to an
extent that can not be determined in advance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, and the preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is dissolved. Costs against petitioner National Power Corporation.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-3859 March 25, 1952
PHILIPPINE RAILWAY CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This case was submitted for decision in the court below upon an agreed statement of facts as follows:
1. The plaintiff is engaged in business as operator of a railway line on Panay Island by virtue of the
franchise granted by the Philippine Government under Act 1497 (enacted on May 28, 1906); and
defendant is the duly appointed, qualified and incumbent Collector of internal Revenue;
2. During the fourth quarter of 1946 plaintiff realized from the business covered by its franchise a total
gross receipts of P364,845.67, on which plaintiff paid a franchise tax of 1 1/2 per cent amounting to
P5,532.69, in accordance with Sec. 13 of Act No. 1497;
3. On September 5, 1947, defendant notified the plaintiff that the tax due on its gross receipts from the
business covered by the franchise is 5 per cent and not only 1 1/2 per cent of such gross receipts, and
demanded as a consequence a deficiency tax of P12,714.61 plus a 25 per cent surcharge of P3,178.65
incident to delinquency, or a total of P15,893.26, which plaintiff paid to defendant on January 20,
1948;
4. During the year 1947 plaintiff realized from the business covered by the same franchise a total gross
receipts of P976,712. Plaintiff, in order to avoid the imposition of the surcharge, paid franchise tax of
P48,835.60 computed at the rate of 5 per cent of the total gross receipts;
5. On April 26, 1948, plaintiff, thru counsel presented to the defendant a claim for the refund of the
amounts of P15,893.26 and P34,184.92, representing the difference between the franchise taxes for
the years 1946 (one quarter) and 1947 at the rate of 5 percent and the same taxes at the rate of 1 1/2
per cent.
6. On July 1, 1948, plaintiff received a letter from the Collector of Internal Revenue dated June 10,
1948, demanding from plaintiff a deficiency franchise tax of P2,108.18, plus surcharge of 25 per cent
or a total of P2,635.22 This deficiency assessment was based on the finding of an Auditor of the
General Auditing Office as a result of the annual audit of the business covered by the franchise of
plaintiff corporation, that the total gross income of plaintiff for the year 1947 was P1,019,301.89
instead of P976,712, or a difference of P42,589.89. On July 12, 1948, the plaintiff paid to the City
Treasurer of Iloilo the sum of P2,108.18, representing the franchise tax excluding the surcharge at the
rate of 5 per cent of the gross receipts or income. However, plaintiff has not yet paid the sum of
P527.04 demanded by defendant as 25 per cent surcharge on the deficiency franchise tax;
7. On June 12, 1948 the defendant denied the claim of the plaintiff for the refund of the aforesaid sums
of P15,893.26 and P34,184.92;
8. The parties reserve the right to present additional evidence at the of this case.
Plaintiff's contentions are that it is subject to 1 1/2 tax only under Section 13 of Act No. 1497 of the
Philippine Commission, which provides:
Sec. 13. In consideration of the premises and of the granting of this concession or franchise, there
shall be paid by the grantee to the Philippine Government, annually, for the period of thirty years
from the date hereof, an amount equal to one-half of one per centum of the gross earnings of the
grantee in respect to the lines covered hereby for each preceding year; after said period of thirty
years and for fifty years thereafter, the amount so to be paid annually shall be an amount equal
to one and one-half per centum of such gross earnings for each preceding year, and after such
period of eighty years the percentage and amount so to be paid annually to grantee shall be fixed
by the Philippine Government.
Such annual payments, when promptly and fully made by the grantee, shall be in lieu of all taxes of every
name and nature municipal, provincial, or central upon its capital stock, franchises, right of way,
earnings, and all other property owned or operated by the grantee under this concession or franchise.
On the other hand, the Collector of Internal Revenue, sustained by the trial court, relied upon Section 259
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 39, which reads as follows:
Sec. 259. Tax on corporate franchises. There shall be collected in respect to all existing and future
franchises, upon the gross earnings or receipts from the business covered by the law granting the franchise
of 5 per centum or such taxes, charges, and percentages as are specified in the special charters of the
corporation upon whom such franchises are conferred, whichever is higher, unless the provisions thereof
preclude the imposition of a higher tax. For the purpose of facilitating the assessment of this tax, reports
shall be made by the respective holders of the franchise in such form and at such times as shall be required
by the regulations of the Department of Finance.
The taxes, charges, and percentages on corporate franchises, shall be due and payable as specified in the
particular franchise, or, in case no time limit is specified therein, the provisions of Section one hundred
eighty-three shall apply; and if such taxes, charges, and percentages remain unpaid for fifteen days from
and after the date on which they must be paid, twenty-four per centum shall be added to the amount of such
taxes, charges, percentages, which increase shall form part of the tax.
From our view of the case the decisive question is whether the National Internal Revenue Code amended
the plaintiff's franchise. Four-square with the case at bar on this point, by reason of the exact or close
similarity between the franchises and the laws involved and the issues litigated, is Manila Railroad
Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.
In that case, the defendant as Collector of Internal Revenue had assessed a tax on certain oil and coal which
the Manila Railroad Company had imported to the Philippines for its use, in virtue of an act of Congress
which authorized the imposition by the Philippine Government of internal revenue tax upon like articles
consumed in the Philippines. Against that enactment, the Manila Railroad Company pointed to its charter,
which (like the Philippine Railway's charter) fixed certain percentage tax on its earnings and declared that
"such payments, when promptly and fully made, by the grantee, shall be in lieu of all taxes of every name
and nature." As formulated by the Court the question then was: "May a special law or charter be amended
altered, or repealed, by general law, by implication?"
The Court answered this query in the negative. Because of its controlling effects on the present case we will
quote at length from the decision.
It will be noted that Act No. 1510 is a private charter granted to the plaintiff; that said Acts of Congress
aregeneral laws. A careful reading of said Acts of Congress fails to discloses any reference to, or any attempt
to amend, alter, or repeal, said special charter (Act no. 1510); and no other Act of Congress has been called
to our attention, which in any way attempts to amend, alter, or repeal said Act (No. 1510). And it must be
borne in mind that said charter (Act No. 1510) is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal only by an Act
of the Congress of the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
Repeals of laws by implication are not favored; and the mere repugnance between two statutes should be
very clear in order to warrant the court inholding that the later in time repeals the other, when it does not in
terms purport to do so. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.), p. 182 and cases cited; Sutherland
Stat. Construction, Vol. 1, p.465 (2d Ed.);Kinney vs. Mallory, 3 Ala., 626; Banks vs. Yolo Country, 104
Cal., 258; People vs. Pacific Import Co., 130 Cal., 442; Reese vs. Western Union etc. Co., 123 Ind., 294; 7
L. R. A., 583; Cope vs. Cope, 137 U.S.., 628.)
In the case of McKenna vs. Eduardstone (91 N.Y., 231) the court said: "It is well settled that a special and
local statute, providing for a particular case or class of case, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general
in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms
of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in a special law." That the rule is but the
application of the larger rule that the statute is not to be deemed repealed, by implication, by subsequent act
upon the same subject unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each other, or
unless a clear intention is disclosed on the face of the later statute to repeal the former one.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a
prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provision of such earlier statute. (Steamboat
Company vs. Collector, 18 Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass Country vs. Gillet, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396.)
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general broad
enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that a special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as the
general law of a land, and the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. (U.S.), 425)
Said Act No. 1510 is a charter granted to the plaintiff company by the Government of the Philippine Islands.
It is a nature of a private contract. It is not a law constituting a part of the machinery of the general
government. It was adopted after careful consideration of the private rights of the plaintiff in relation with
the resultant benefits to the State. It stands upon a different footing from general law. When a charter is
grated it constitutes a certain property right . Charters of special laws, such as Act No. 1510, stand upon a
different footing from general laws. Once granted a charter becomes a private contract and cannot be altered
nor amended except by consent of all concerned, unless the right is expressly reserved. (Darmouth College
vs. Woodword, 4 Wheat., 578.) The reason for the rule is clear. The legislature, in passing a special charter,
have their attention directed to the special facts and circumstances which the Act or charter is intended to
meet. The Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of the particular case in
granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law containing
provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without making any mention of its intention to
amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis vs. Cook Country,
74 Ill. App., p. 151, Philippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting, 34 Phil. 401.)
We can press further the reasons why a statute will not be construed as in exercise of the power of
amendment or revocation unless the intention to amend or revoke the charter clearly appears, by citing two
other American decisions.
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 179, 190, 58 L. Ed. 179, the United
States Supreme Court held that Congress could not be deemed to have exercised its right to alter, amend, or
repeal reserved in the railroad company's charter, by the enactment of the posterior law of general character.
The court said: "The excercise of such power would naturally only find an impulse in some large national
purpose, and would hardly be provoked by a desire to legalize the encroachment here and thereon the right
of a transcontinental railroad.
We are constrained to believed that the Congress intends to forfeit of limit any of the rights conveyed to aid
that great enterprise, it will do so explicity and directly by a measure proportionate to the purpose, and not
leave it to be accomplished in a piecemeal and precarious way.
And in Wilmington & R. R. Co. vs. Downward et al., 32 Atl. 133, the Court of Errors and Appeals of
Delaware had this to say.: "It is only reasonable to suppose that when such a course is intended in any case
it will be marked by legislative language of purpose, direct and not inferential. While the constitution makes
no requirement of form or method for the act, yet, in view of the nature of such a stupendous power, and
the consequences to flow or ensue from its exercise, a legislature (it is fair to presume) would not leave its
purpose so uncertain as to require the aid of one of its own courts to ascertain declare it. There would be
some expression, in some form or other, that the act relied upon to create revocation was intended for that
purpose. I do not mean to be understood as saying that the legislature may not adopt its own method of
revoking a charter, but I do believe the act would seem to the body to require expression of purpose to
revoke, and would have such purpose distinctly put forth therein. And, looking at the subject in this light, I
do not think any court of this state should yield to a mere inference of design to revoke, when language
importing purpose of revocation is wanting. The proper view, I think, is that the legislature, by the act of
February 22, 1877, did not intend to revoke the charter aforesaid, but only that which is plainly expressed,
as quoted above."
We not only do not discover in the National Internal Revenue Code any intention to levy a higher percentage
tax on existing franchises, but, on the contrary, this Code evinces the purpose of respecting the tax rates
incorporated in the charters. Section 259 thereof, as has been seen, specifically exempts franchises "whose
provisions . . . preclude the imposition of a higher tax." To what provisions does this exception refer? As
applied to the plaintiff's franchise, we can think of no provisions which the Congress could have in mind
other than those which are embodied in the last paragraph of Section 13 of Act No. 1497, namely, "such
annual payment, when promptly and fully made by the grantee, shall be in lieu of all taxes of every name
and nature municipal, provincial, or central upon its capital stock, franchises, right of way, earnings,
and all other property owned or operated by the grantee under this concession of franchise."
We are therefore of the opinion that section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 39, does not apply to plaintiff's franchise. With this conclusion, it is unnecessary to go
into the controversy concerning the power of the Government to change the tax fixed in the plaintiff's charter
or to impose the new tax thereon or its other property. Nevertheless it may be of the interest to note, by way
of statement only, that inPhilippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting, 34 Phil. 401, the Court went so far as to say
that "The plaintiff had a right to believe, when it accepted said contract, that it would be relieved of all the
burdens imposed by the Government, when it promptly and fully paid the amount imposed by section 13
(No. 13 of Section 1).
Upon the foregoing considerations, the appealed judgement will be reversed and the appellee ordered to
refund to the appellant the sums of P15,893.26 and P34,184.92 with legal interest thereon from the date of
collection and to pay costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS respondent
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption
and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or
making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting
birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal
interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic
Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to
carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named,
within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic
Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the
lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-
industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the
general public over: the environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake
and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and
agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the
deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps
are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which
will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will
necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional plans
and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna
Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be
known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other
aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance
thereof to conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance
of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques
and practices.Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following
sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in
or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to
collect necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be
shared between the Authority and other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion
as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's
Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new areas of fishery development or
activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking
into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of
water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines
promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay
which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide
resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town
development, a master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore
town residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances
and other regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same
with the assistance of the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public
waters within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for
industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing
agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue
enforcement and penalty actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided,
That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be
resolved thru the NEDA Board. 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential
Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and
waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their
optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for
the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on
the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter,
Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named
and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which
include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively
regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of
Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of
Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite
Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa,
and Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water
and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal,
industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the
fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary,
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's
Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to
the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be
administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after
the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan,
the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained
by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not
be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in
this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to
Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum
lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water
(M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of
said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because
R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters
and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry
areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other
species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen
free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish
corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any
species or fish within the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits.
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation
of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the
entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost
21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in
violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23,
1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive
Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal
Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were
not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna
Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to
demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without
prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of
Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws
carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with
the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA
why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various
regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil
Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and
Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566,
for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life
Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition,
Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures,
Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
forCertiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields
Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing
Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss
were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction
were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens
and similar structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the
Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and
respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-
jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority
sought the following reliefs, viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil
Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or
modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the
government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court
of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions,
the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government
whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA
with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter
insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government
Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested
with their respective local government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the
following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-
JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS
BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN
DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of
the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other
hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant
fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws
creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna
de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly
repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature
to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and
expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law.
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is
because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of
the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication. 4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for
the Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna
de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface
water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920
km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro
Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural
ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of
attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which
requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological
integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the
protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the
inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic
Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern
the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where
lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The
garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of
fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake
water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore,
is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes.
This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local
governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under
the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government
Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region
(Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the
nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid
exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the
Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals,
231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard
that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces
of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has
the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects
are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may
well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction
of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense,
however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted
before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions
affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would
render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they
relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the
Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong,
Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC,
Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct
and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their
previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis,
Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega,
Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by
Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc.
and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M.
Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development
Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt
Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.;
AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern
Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures
subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what
the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded
from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units.
In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake
area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority, once
the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an additional local permit or license
for revenue purposes of the local government units concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the
special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will
also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic
viability.
G.R. No. L-23964 June 1, 1966
GREGORIO V. GAERLAN, JR., petitioner- appellee, vs.LUIS C. CATUBIG, respondent and appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Registered candidates for councilors, amongst others in the eight-seat City Council of Dagupan City in
the 1963 elections were petitioner Gregorio V. Gaerlan, Jr. and respondent Luis C. Catubig. Having
obtained the third highest number of votes, the City Board of Canvassers, on December 2, 1963, proclaimed
respondent Catubig one of the elected 8 councilors. Petitioner Gaerlan, on the other hand, lost his bid.
Seasonably,1 petitioner went to Court on quo warranto to challenge respondent's eligibility2 for the office,
on the averment of non-age. The judgment below gave the nod to petitioner and held respondent ineligible
to hold the office of councilor of Dagupan City, excluded him there from, and declared vacant the seat he
occupies in the City Board. Respondent appealed.
There is no quarrel as to the facts. Respondent Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the
time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22
days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he took
his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964, 3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether
respondent's age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or the date of
election,4 or the date set by law for the assumption of office the result is the same. Whichever date is
adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age.
With the foregoing backdrop, respondent calls upon us to resolve two questions: First, has petitioner a cause
of action against respondent? Second, in the affirmative, is respondent eligible to the office of councilor of
Dagupan City?
1. The thrust of respondent's argument is simply this: Petitioner Gaerlan, Jr. placed 16th out of the 16
candidates; Gaerlan thus has no right to the office, either by election or otherwise; and said petitioner cannot
validly question respondent's right to sit.
This case calls into question the applicability of Section 173 of the Revised Election Code5 which, in part,
reads:
Procedure against an ineligible person. When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial
or municipal office, his right to the office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same
office before the Court of First Instance of the province, within one week after the proclamation of his
election, by filing a petition for quo warranto. ...
The language of this statute is very plain. The right of a non-eligible person elected to a municipal office
may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office. Petitioner perfectly fits into this legal
precept. He was a registered candidate for the same office. It matters not that he has no claim or right to the
office of councilor in the event respondent be ousted. Because the clear-cut language "any registered
candidate for the same office" does not require that said candidate, if his quo warranto case prospers,
himself occupy that office. Right here, we find a forbidding obstacle to any other view of the statute. To say
otherwise would empty this legal provision of its obvious contents. Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, supra, is to be
read as controlling in the present. There, as here, the office involved was that of Councilor, the statute under
consideration the same Section 173, Revised Election Code. And again, there as here, petitioner would not
sit if the action be successful. This Court there expressly ruled:
That petitioner would not be entitled to the elective office even if respondent is ordered to vacate the
same is likewise an invalid objection against the institution of this suit, for otherwise, Section 173 of
the Revised Election Code would clearly be rendered nugatory. Under said law, the contestant's right
to the office involved is not contemplated, and thus this Court has repeatedly ruled that respondent's
declaration of ineligibility does not entitle the petitioner to said office (Luison vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-
10981, April 25, 1958; Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 727; Calano vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-
6404, January 12, 1954). Yet, in said rulings, the petitioners have never been considered to be without
any legal personality to file the necessary quo warrantoproceedings. We need not conjecture into the
philosophy of the law; suffice it to say that the legislature expressed its intentions very
plainly.1wph1.t
But respondent would want us to apply Section 6 of Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court, as follows:
SEC. 6. When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another bring an action in his own
name.
Section 6 just quoted is out of focus. Petitioner here is not "claiming to be entitled" to the office of councilor.
Besides, we are unprepared to scuttle the jurisprudence heretofore cited which is so well buttressed upon
law and reason. Moreover, distinction should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an office filled
by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment thus
... In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the
eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected
is ineligible, the courtcannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even
if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has
obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court
determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the
office.6
The foregoing, once again, emphasizes the rule that in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled
by election, the only issue is the eligibility of the candidate elected. In such a posture it is beyond debate
that the applicable statute here is Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, the specific law on the subject.
And, petitioner's standing in court is confirmed.
2. Respondent's presses the claim that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by the provisions
of Republic Act 1707 and not by Republic Act 2259.8 For ready reference, we present in parallel columns
the two conflicting legal provisions on the left side, Section 12, Republic Act No. 170, as amended, and
on the right, Section 6, Republic Act 2259.
Sec. 12 x x x the elective members of the Sec. 6. No person shall be a City Mayor,
Municipality Board shall be qualified electors Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at
of the city, residents therein for at least one least twenty-five years of age, resident of the
year, and not less than twenty-three years of city for one year prior to his election and is a
age. x x x" qualified voter.
Pertinent here it is to state that Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City
Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959
nine years later.
The problem, cast in legal setting, is whether or not Section 12 should give way to Section 6. On this point
the following reproduced in haec verba from Libarnes vs. Executive Secretary, et al., L-21505, October 24,
1963, is an authoritative expositor of the law, viz:
Again, the question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent
general laws is dependent mainly upon the intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the
floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special
laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded
from the operation thereof. In fact, the explanatory note to Senate Bill No. 2, which upon approval, became
Republic Act No. 2259, specifically mentions Zamboanga City, among others that had been considered by
the authors of the bill in drafting the same. Similarly, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2259 makes reference
to "all chartered cities in the Philippines", whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the
cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the
City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said
Act including therefor, the City of Zamboanga are subject thereto.9
The only reference to Dagupan City in Republic Act 2259 is found in Section 2 thereof whereunder voters
in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials. Therefore, by
the terms of the Libarnes decision, the age-limit provision in the last-named statute (Republic Act 2259) is
controlling.
Indeed, we find no warrant in logic to go along with respondent. Adverting to Libarnes, supra, Act 2259
(Section 8) excludes from the operation thereof a number of cities. Dagupan City is not one of them. We
are not to enter into the impermissible field of injecting into a statute a provision plainly omitted therefrom.
And until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we
should go by what the legislative body has expressly ordained.
And, this position we take here is accentuated by the fact that by Section 9 of Act 2259,
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act, are hereby repealed.
Given the fact that Dagupan City beyond peradventure is removed from the exceptions, it stands to reason
itself that its charter provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. And this, because "the last statute is so
broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to cover the whole
subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute." 10
Specifically with reference to the uniform age limit of 25 years set forth in Section 6 of Republic Act 2259,
we take stock of the phraseology employed. This section starts with "No person shall be ... Councilor unless
he is at least twenty-five years of age". This specific language gives us added reason to believe that in reality
and for the sake of uniformity the 23-year age limit in the Dagupan City Charter must have to yield.
Because in the legislative scheme, councilors are conferred the right to succeed the City Mayor in the event
the Vice-Mayor is Unavailable. 11The City Mayor must at least be 25 years of age. 12 So it is, that in the
event a councilor 23 years of age is elected and before 25 years catapulted to the position of mayor, then we
have the anomalous situation where the person succeeding as mayor will be less than 25 years. Such a
situation, it seems to us, is not contemplated by the law.
With the foregoing guideposts, we are unable to subscribe to the view that respondent's age qualification
should be governed by the provisions of the Dagupan City Charter.
We, accordingly, hold that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non-age: Because at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was
below the age of 25 years.
Upon the law and the facts, we vote to affirm the appealed judgment. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-41631 December 17, 1976
HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, petitioner vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, respondents
MARTIN, J.:
The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance
enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires
publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No.
231), which only demands publication after approval.
On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE
RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June
15, 1974.
On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787
before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of
nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not given any participation
in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7
of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.
Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge
issued an order on March 11, 1975, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila
Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.
After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring the
nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the
requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Respondent Judge ruled:
There is, therefore, no question that the ordinance in question was not published at all in two daily
newspapers of general circulation in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published
in the same manner after approval, although it was posted in the legislative hall and in all city public
markets and city public libraries. There being no compliance with the mandatory requirement of
publication before and after approval, the ordinance in question is invalid and, therefore, null and void.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is
required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before instituting an action in court.
On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion.
Forthwith, petitioners brought the matter to Us through the present petition for review on certiorari.
We find the petition impressed with merits.
1. The nexus of the present controversy is the apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Tax Code on the manner of publishing a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board
of Manila. For, while Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides:
Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city,
and shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication.
* * * Each approved ordinance * * * shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation
in the city, within ten days after its approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the
twentieth day following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance.
Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs:
Within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio
ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges shall be published for three consecutive
days in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government,
or posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal
and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units
of a local government for dissemination.
In other words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment
of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city,
the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction
of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other
conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners' compliance with
the Local Tax Code rather than with the Revised Charter of the City spawned this litigation.
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to
the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local
governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special
law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. 1 And the rule commonly said is that a prior
special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general,
one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 2 However, the rule readily yields
to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats
in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees
or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm
of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code
controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. 3 Special provision
governs. 4 This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than
the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as
against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to
have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in
force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and
overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the
reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility. 5
The case of City of Manila v. Teotico 6 is opposite. In that case, Teotico sued the City of Manila for damages
arising from the injuries he suffered when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole
on P. Burgos Avenue. The City of Manila denied liability on the basis of the City Charter (R.A. 409)
exempting the City of Manila from any liability for damages or injury to persons or property arising from
the failure of the city officers to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce
the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code makes cities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any persons by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control
or supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code controlling. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of the two laws,
the Revised City Charter establishes a general rule of liability arising from negligence in general, regardless
of the object thereof, whereas the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription for liability due to
defective streets in particular. In the same manner, the Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the
publication of "ordinance" in general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of
"ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges in particular.
In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general
or broad one. 7 A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a
statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. 8 A
subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for
the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. 9 A
chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local.
Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state, it is to have read into
it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but
to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of
such character. 10
2. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been
violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. This is because Section 47 of the Local Tax
Code provides that any question or issue raised against the legality of any tax ordinance, or portion thereof,
shall be referred for opinion to the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. The opinion of the city
fiscal is appealable to the Secretary of Justice, whose decision shall be final and executory unless contested
before a competent court within thirty (30) days. But, the petition below plainly shows that the controversy
between the parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of law: whether it is the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila or the Local Tax Code that should govern the publication of the tax ordinance. In other words,
the dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code on the
point at issue, and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the question litigated
upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply. 11 The principle may also be disregarded when it does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage. 12
3. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the
imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising
function, so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense
bears its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. Under
Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law." 13 And
one of those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in particular: "Local governments may
collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and premises * * *." 14 They can provide
for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They
can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges. 15
It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violates Presidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30,
1972, insofar as it affects livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the collection
of other fees and charges thereon "with the exception of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection fees, as
well as the delivery, stockyard and slaughter fees as may be authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources." 16Clearly, even the exception clause of the decree itself permits the collection of the
proper fees for livestock. And the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231, July 1, 1973) authorizes in its Section 31:
"Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter of animals and the use of corrals * * * "
4. The non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6039, an amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that "the
market committee shall formulate, recommend and adopt, subject to the ratification of the municipal board,
and approval of the mayor, policies and rules or regulation repealing or maneding existing provisions of the
market code" does not infect the ordinance with any germ of invalidity. 17 The function of the committee is
purely recommendatory as the underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is without binding effect
on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior acquiescence of an intended or proposed city ordinance
is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could enact such ordinance. The native power
of the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest degree. It can move in its own
initiative and the Market Committee cannot demur. At most, the Market Committee may serve as a
legislative aide of the Municipal Board in the enactment of city ordinances affecting the city markets or, in
plain words, in the gathering of the necessary data, studies and the collection of consensus for the proposal
of ordinances regarding city markets. Much less could it be said that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate
to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the
city markets. Potestas delegata non delegare potest.
5. Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to
the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let
by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption
is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the
corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues
for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the
public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency
through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use,
purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person
or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public
purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation. 18
Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act because the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance will necessarily inure to the
unwarranted benefit and advantage of the corporation. 19 We are concerned only with the issue whether the
ordinance in question is intra vires. Once determined in the affirmative, the measure may not be invalidated
because of consequences that may arise from its enforcement. 20
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of
the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No. costs.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
But qualifies his assent as to an ordinance intra vires not being open to question "because of consequences
that may arise from its enforcement."
[G.R. No. 132593. June 25, 1999]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul Decision No.
2447 dated July 27, 1992 of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying Philippine International Trading
Corporations (PITC) appeal from the disallowances made by the resident COA auditor on PITCs car plan
benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998 of the COA denying PITCs motion for
reconsideration.
The following facts are undisputed:
The PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 252 on July 21, 1973[1], primarily for the purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade
in pursuance of national economic development. On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of Directors
approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers.[2] Under such car plan program, an eligible
officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered
by PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary
deduction over a period of five (5) years. Maximum value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) to Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P350,000.00), depending on the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition, PITC will
reimburse the officer concerned fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums
and costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the
date the vehicle was purchased. The terms and conditions of the car plan are embodied in a `Car Loan
Agreement.[3] Per PITCs car plan guidelines, the purpose of the plan is to provide financial assistance
to qualified employees in purchasing their own transportation facilities in the performance of their
work, for representation, and personal use.[4] The plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility
during official trips especially within Metro Manila or the employees principal place of assignment,
without having to rely on PITC vehicles, taxis or cars for hire.[5]
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect. Section 12 of
said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary
rates save for certain additional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances which
were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate. Said section likewise provides that other
additional compensation being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Section 12, RA 6758, reads
SEC. 12. Consolidation of All Allowances and Compensation. All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance
of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay;
allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in
kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.
To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10). Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 discontinued
effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not otherwise
enumerated under paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.
Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:
5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on top
of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5[6] above shall
 be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe benefits after
said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.
On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the above-mentioned expenses (50% of the yearly car
registration and insurance premiums and 50% of the costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the
car) made after November 1, 1989 was disallowed by the resident COA auditor. The disallowance was made
on the ground that the subject car plan benefits were not one of the fringe benefits or form of compensation
allowed to be continued after said date under the aforequoted paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10[7], in
relation to paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.
PITC, on its behalf, and that of the affected PITC officials, appealed the decision of the resident COA auditor
to the COA. On July 27, 1992, COA denied PITCs appeal and affirmed the disallowance of the said car plan
expenses in the assailed Decision No. 2447 dated July 27, 1992. Relevant portions of the decision read thus:
Upon circumspect evaluation thereof, this Commission finds the instant appeal to be devoid of merit. It
should be noted that the reimbursement/payment of expenses in question is based on the Car Plan benefit
granted under Board Resolution No. 10-88-03 adopted by the PITC Board of Directors on October 19,
1988. The Car Plan is undeniably a fringe benefit as appearing in PITCs Compensation Policy under the
heading 3. Other Fringe Benefits, particularly Item No. 3.13 thereof. Inasmuch as PITC is a government-
owned and/or controlled corporation, the grant of the Car Plan (being a fringe benefit) should be governed
by the provisions of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, implementing RA 6758. Under sub-
paragraph 5.6 of said Circular, it explicitly provides:
x x x x x x x x x.
Since the Car Plan benefit is not one of those fringe benefits or other forms of compensation mentioned in
Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, consequently the reimbursement of the 50% share of PITC in
the yearly registration and insurance premium of the cars purchased under said Car Plan benefit should not
be allowed. xxx.[8]
PITCs motion for reconsideration was denied by the COA in its Resolution dated January 27, 1998.[9]
Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:
1. That the legislature did not intend to revoke existing benefits being received by incumbent
government employees as of July 1, 1989 (including subject car plan benefits) when RA 6758 was
passed;
2. That the Car Loan Agreements signed between PITC and its officers pursuant to PITCs Car Plan
Program, including the Car Loan Agreements, duly executed prior to the effectivity of RA 6758,
constitute the law between the parties and as such, protected by Section 10, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which prohibits the impairment of contracts; and
3. Finally, that the provisions of PD 985 do not apply to PITC inasmuch as under its Revised Charter,
PD 1071, as amended by E.O. 756 and E.O. 1067, PITC is not only expressly exempted from OCPC
rules and regulations but its Board of Directors was expressly authorized to adopt compensation
policies and other related benefits to its officers/employees without need for further approval thereof
by any government office, agency or authority.[10]
The petition is meritorious.
First of all, we must mention that this Court has confirmed in Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on
Audit[11] the legislative intent to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over and
above those authorized by RA 6758 to continue to receive the same even after RA 6758 took effect. In
reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this
privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay and consistent with the rule that laws should
only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fairness and justice. [12] Addressing the issue as to whether the
petitioners-officials may still receive their representation and transportation allowance (RATA) at the higher
rates provided by Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 97 in light of Section 12, RA 6758, this Court said:
Now, under the second sentence of Section 12, first paragraph, the RATA enjoyed by these PPA officials
shall continue to be authorized only if they are being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989. RA
6758 has therefore, to this extent, amended LOI No. 97. By limiting the benefit of the RATA granted by
LOI No. 97 to incumbents, Congress has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this privilege without
upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay.
The legislature has similarly adhered to this policy of non-diminution of pay when it provided for the
transition allowance under Section 17 of RA 6758 which reads:
SEC. 17. Salaries of Incumbents. Incumbents of position presently receiving salaries and additional
compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other
emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall
continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The
transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall
receive in the future.
While Section 12 refers to allowances that are not integrated into the standardized salaries whereas Section
17 refers to salaries and additional compensation or fringe benefits, both sections are intended to
protect incumbents who arereceiving said salaries and/or allowances at the time RA 6758 took
effect.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the
part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at
the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the
PITC officials who availed of the subject car plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1,
1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five year period
from date of purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.
Further, we see the rationale for the corporations fifty percent (50%) participation and contribution to the
subject expenses. As to the insurance premium, PITC, at least, up to the extent of 50% of the value of the
vehicle, has an insurable interest in said vehicle in case of loss or damage thereto. As to the costs of
registration of the vehicle in the employees name and of the chattel mortgage in favor of PITC, this is to
secure PITC of the repayment of the `Car Loan Agreement and the fulfillment of the other obligations
contained therein by the employee.
Still further, the vehicle being utilized by the officer is actually being used for corporate purposes because
the officer concerned is no longer entitled to utilize company-owned vehicles for official business once
he/she has availed of a car plan. Neither is said officer allowed to reimburse the costs of other land
transportation used within his principal place of assignment (i.e. Metro Manila) as the vehicle is presumed
to be his official vehicle.[14] In the event that the employee resigns, retires or is separated from the company
without cause prior to the completion of the 60-month car plan, the employee shall be given the privilege to
buy the car provided he pays the remaining installments of the loan and the amount equivalent to that portion
of the companys contribution corresponding to the unexpired period of the car plan. On the other hand, if
the employee has been separated from the company for cause, the company has the other option aside from
the foregoing to repossess the car from the employee, in which case, the company shall pay back to the
employee all amortizations already made by the employee to the company, interest free. [15]
Secondly, COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10[16] as basis for the disallowance of the subject car plan
benefits. DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant to Section 23[17] of RA 6758 mandating
the said agency to issue the necessary guidelines to implement RA 6758 has been declared by this Court
in De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, et al.[18] as of no force and effect due to the absence of
publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Salient portions of said
decision read:
On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the
doctrine enunciated in Taada[19], publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative
circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be
effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows
payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting
November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And
why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation
sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may
be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should
be apprised and alerted by the publication of said circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with
democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.[20]
In the case at bar, the disallowance of the subject car plan benefits would hamper the officials in the
performance of their functions to promote and develop trade which requires mobility in the performance of
official business. Indeed, the car plan benefits are supportive of the implementation of the objectives and
mission of the agency relative to the nature of its operation and responsive to the exigencies of the service.
It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for
publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the
subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were
disallowed in audit?
The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the reason that publication is required as
a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the
expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its
non-publication. As was stated in Taada vs. Tuvera[21], prior publication of laws before they become
effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it."
In view of the nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10 relied upon by the COA as basis for the disallowance of the
subject car plan benefits, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the second issue raised in the instant petition.
We deem it necessary though to resolve the third issue as to whether PITC is exempt from RA 985 [22] as
subsequently amended by RA 6758. According to petitioner, PITCs Revised Charter, PD 1071 dated
January 25, 1977, as amended by EO 756 dated December 29, 1981, and further amended by EO 1067 dated
November 25, 1985, expressly exempted PITC from the Office of the Compensation and Position
Classification (OCPC) rules and regulations. Petitioner cites Section 28 of P.D.1071[23]; Section 6 of EO
756[24]; and Section 3 of EO 1067.[25]
According to the COA in its Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998, the exemption granted to the
PITC has been repealed and revoked by the repealing provisions of RA 6758, particularly Section 16 thereof
which provides:
Section 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations. - All laws, decrees, executive orders,
corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the coverage of the
System, or that authorize and fix position classifications, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified
positions, or groups of officials, and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with the System,
including the proviso under Section 2 and Section 16 of PD No. 985 are hereby repealed.
To this, petitioner argues that RA 6758 which is a law of general application cannot repeal provisions of the
Revised Charter of PITC and its amendatory laws expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being
special laws. Our rules on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication[26]; that a statute, general in character as to its terms
and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative
purpose to do so is manifested[27]; that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express it.[28]
In the case at bar, the repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of all corporate charters that exempt agencies from
the coverage of the System was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes for which the law
was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in government owned and/or controlled
corporations to achieve equal pay for substantially equal work. Henceforth, PITC should now be considered
as covered by laws prescribing a compensation and position classification system in the government
including RA 6758. This is without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-diminution of pay
of incumbents as of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decisions of the Commission on Audit are
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Buena, JJ., on leave.
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
LEVY D. MACASIANO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, respondent
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied
for by respondents Municipality of Paraaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag for
brevity) against petitioner herein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized
the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved
by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the
use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for
flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal
council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents
do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas
are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor
Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation,
maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into
an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned
streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.
Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran.
These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the
latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition
for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner
filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing
his letter-order of October 16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990
of the Municipality' of Paraaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-
order against respondent Palanyag.
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General alleging grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuing the assailed
order.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal
council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets
is valid.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public service and
are therefore public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation or private
contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipality of Paraaque. Petitioner submits that a property
already dedicated to public use cannot be used for another public purpose and that absent a clear showing
that the Municipality of Paraaque has been granted by the legislature specific authority to convert a
property already in public use to another public use, respondent municipality is, therefore, bereft of any
authority to close municipal roads for the establishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that
assuming that the respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, it failed to comply with the
conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of the ordinance providing for
the establishment of flea markets on public streets. Lastly, petitioner contends that by allowing the municipal
streets to be used by market vendors the municipal council of respondent municipality violated its duty
under the Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of the residents of the municipality.
In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial court ruled:
. . . that Chanter II Section 10 of the Local Government Code is a statutory grant of power given to local
government units, the Municipality of Paraaque as such, is empowered under that law to close its roads,
streets or alley subject to limitations stated therein (i.e., that it is in accordance with existing laws and the
provisions of this code).
xxx xxx xxx
The actuation of the respondent Brig. Gen. Levi Macasiano, though apparently within its power is in fact an
encroachment of power legally vested to the municipality, precisely because when the municipality enacted
the ordinance in question the authority of the respondent as Police Superintendent ceases to be operative
on the ground that the streets covered by the ordinance ceases to be a public thoroughfare. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal ordinance
authorizing the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in force during
the time the said ordinance was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local
Government Code, in connection with established principles embodied in the Civil Code an property and
settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code
states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality.
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the
absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28,
1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the
use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of
this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section
10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states:
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant
to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code,
close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or
place or any part of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A
property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. (Emphasis
ours).
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close roads and
other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already
established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic
principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road,
street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property
from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public
use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial
property of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v.
Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent
municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10,
Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code. In one case, the City Council of Cebu, through
a resolution, declared the terminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road, the
same not being included in the City Development Plan. Thereafter, the City Council passes another
resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. We held therein that the
City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu
Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481).
However, those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government
has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. This limitation on
the authority of the local government over public properties has been discussed and settled by this Court en
banc in "Francisco V. Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654,
May 6, 1992." This Court ruled:
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought to be
evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property
for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce
of man, it may not be the subject of lease or others contract (Villanueva, et al. v. Castaeda and Macalino,
15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu v. Municipal Council of
Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; And Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the
City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses
are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained
away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are
under legal obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending
area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that
reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the
vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of
travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed
ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions
imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance, to wit:
 1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents
do(es) not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas
are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions
precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality that the closed streets
were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of
a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that this first condition has
been met. Likewise, the designation by respondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall
operate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and
traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the
establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of the other
observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many instances of emergencies and fires where ambulances and fire engines,
instead of using the roads for a more direct access to the fire area, have to maneuver and look for other
streets which are not occupied by stalls and vendors thereby losing valuable time which could,
otherwise, have been spent in saving properties and lives.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. Rita Hospital. However, its ambulances and the people rushing
their patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the vendors. One can
only imagine the tragedy of losing a life just because of a few seconds delay brought about by the
inaccessibility of the streets leading to the hospital.
The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy of the roads by stalls and vendors, normal transportation
flow is disrupted and school children have to get off at a distance still far from their schools and walk, rain
or shine.
Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litter left by vendors on the streets at the end of the day.
Needless to say, these cause further pollution, sickness and deterioration of health of the residents therein.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo)
Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings and observations of petitioners. Instead,
respondents want this Court to focus its attention solely on the argument that the use of public spaces for
the establishment of a flea market is well within the powers granted by law to a local government which
should not be interfered with by the courts.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by
the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be
subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every
local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety
and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the
local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards that which
might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public have a legal right to demand the demolition
of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality
have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their
specific public purpose.
The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of
basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. However, at this point, we find it worthy to note that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local Government Lode, has already been repealed by Republic Act
No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of
the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and
arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed
by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were
vested.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated
December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNP
Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J.
Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets is hereby RESERVED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to
investigate and cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired military officer, for violation of Republic Acts
Nos. 3019 and 1379.
Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of respondent
judge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated
June 23, 1989, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989, granting
private respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeks
the annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding
with Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before the trial court.
The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13,
1986, which created the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to
"investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active
service." The order further stated that" [t]he Board shall be primarily charged with the task of investigating
cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended)
and shall make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities
with respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its findings."
Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful
income, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit his
explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex "B", Petition].
Private respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable to produce his
supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.
Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988,
recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.
The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case
on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against
him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having
retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board
opposed the motion to dismiss.
In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989.
Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on March
20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to
Branch 151, respondent judges court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA
556. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.
On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondent
judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from
investigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, the instant petition.
On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his
orders dated June 23, 1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed
by private Respondent. The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.
The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER AND
INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.
II. WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE
26, 1989 ENJOINING PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pea the Board,
being a creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On
the second issue, petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of
the PCGG.
The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondents position is as follows:
1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the alleged
illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance
Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony,
business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction
to investigate him.
If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act
1379 as already pointed out before be applied. And since, he has been separated from the government more
than four years ago, the action against him under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.
2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained
wealth for the reason that he has retired more than four years ago.
3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is null and void. Nowhere in
Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman and
members, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers similar to the powers invested with the
commission .. [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118].
1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may be
investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts
Nos. 3019 and 1379. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. They cite the
PCGGs jurisdiction over
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres.
Marcos. However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate"
of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly
unlawfully acquired the properties.
A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term "subordinate."
The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad.
E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees have any interest or participation."
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is
[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.
v. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and
close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O.
No. 2.
Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May
27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-206.
The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are
self-evident, these being:
1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime" ;
a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad,
xx (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during . . . (the Marcos)
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;"
b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as
a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government of the Philippines or
any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue
advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines" ;
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and
personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" and.
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos." [Footnotes deleted].It does not
suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on
the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt practices of
any public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property
Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petition
and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city
prosecutor [Ibid].
Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, and not under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it would
have been presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A. But the record itself belies this presumption:
(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16,
1987, states: "This letter is in connection with the alleged information received by the AFP Anti-Graft
Board indicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal means of income in violation of Rep. Act
No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39].
(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant to
R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Act for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 43].
The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his
office as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Boards resolution to
link him or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife
(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear:
Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder of
COLONEL TROADIO TECSON (Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found
a prima facie evidence against subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as an Act
for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 46].
Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private respondent
accumulated his wealth for his own account. Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC
sergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the material portion of which reads:
. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advance
voucher, let us say in the amount of P5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount.
The official concerned was also made to sign the receipt portion on the voucher the amount of which was
left blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecson
and its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the face of the cash advance voucher is altered or
superimposed. The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually the
amount of P95,000.00 that appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.
. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecsons office took care of the work.
. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the Metropolitan Manila
Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got their
shares on commission basis of the looted amount while the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo, pp.
184-185.].
Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A.
2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and
authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and
in active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent.
The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited to
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, through
an order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.
3. Petitioner assails the trial courts cognizance of the petition filed by private Respondent. Particularly,
petitioner argues that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already been
settled in Pea, supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts
or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by
this Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565].
The ruling in Pea was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano
III v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC,
NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional
trial courts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.
Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil
Case No. 57092 and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.
4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence,
may be enjoined from doing so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not been
vested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null and void.
The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction is
therefore in order. Likewise, respondent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding
with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule
of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.
5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation of the AFP Anti-
Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no authority to investigate and cause the prosecution of
members and former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired members of the AFP
for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar
as they involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and "cronies."
But the PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379, as in the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and
prosecutor of all unlawful accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited
purpose, as we have explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.
6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because of prescription.
He relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that" [t]he right to file such petition [for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of resignation,
dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or employee concerned." He retired on May
9, 1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379
should be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that" [t]he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel."
Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptive
period provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is concerned, we cannot say that he had
already acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.
Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation or
legitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No.
1379, which provides:
SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of
actions cannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any property
unlawfully acquired by him.
Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and the
Solicitor General under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for
the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private citizen. (On the other
hand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still in the government
service, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the Office of the Ombudsman
[Rep. Act No. 6770]). Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondent
under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 57092. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. The PCGG is
ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37,
without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory agency.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., on leave.
[G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC
of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN,respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, correct in ruling that Subversion
is the main offense in a charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, and that, therefore, the said charge should be quashed in
view of a previous charge of Subversion under R.A. No. 1700, as amended by P.D. No. 885, against the
same accused pending in another court?
Stated differently, is the accused charged with the same offense in both cases, which would justify the
dismissal of the second charge on the ground of double jeopardy?
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal by certiorari interposed by the People under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking a review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth
Division) dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, entitled THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, Respondents.
The record discloses the following antecedent facts:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under Republic Act No.
1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45),
National Capital Region, docketed as Criminal Case No. 64079. [2] As a consequence thereof, a warrant for
his arrest was issued on July 29, 1983,[3] but it remained unserved as he could not be found.
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant
of arrest in the subversion case.[4] When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six (6)
rounds of live ammunition were found in his possession.[5]
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1789. The Information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a member of a communist
party of the Philippines, and its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No. 1026387
and with six (6) live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof from
competent government authority.[6]
The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which recommendation was approved by
the trial court in an Order dated June 19, 1990.[7] The same order also directed the continued detention of
Antonio Tujan at MIG 15 of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), Bago
Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a motion [8] invoking his right to a preliminary
investigation pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court and praying that his arraignment
be held in abeyance until the preliminary investigation is terminated.
However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio Tujans motion for preliminary investigation, his
counsel withdrew the motion since he would file a motion to quash the Information, for which reason
counsel requested a period of twenty (20) days to do so. This was granted by the trial court on that same
day.[9]
On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to quash[10] the Information in Criminal Case No.
1789on the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 64079 (for subversion) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45). The said
ground is based on Sections 3 (h) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In support of
the motion, Antonio Tujan contends that common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in subversion,[11] citing the cases of Misolas vs. Panga, et
al. (G. R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648) and Enrile vs. Salazar, et al. (G. R. No. 92163,
June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217).Antonio Tujan then avers that the present case is the twin prosecution of the
earlier subversion case and, therefore, he is entitled to invoke the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.[12]
The petitioner opposed[13] the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of
being convicted a second time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case, and (b)
the offense charged against him in Criminal Case No. 64079 is for Subversion, punishable under Republic
Act No. 1700; while the present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance
ofSubversion, punishable under a different law (Presidential Decree No. 1866). Moreover, petitioner
contends that Antonio Tujans reliance on the Misolas and Enrile cases is misplaced.[14] Tujan merely relies
on the dissenting opinions in the Misolas case. Also, the Enrile case which involved a complex crime of
rebellion with murder is inapplicable to the instant case which is not a complex offense. Thus, the absorption
rule as held applicable in the Enrile ruling has no room for application in the present case because (illegal)
possession of firearm and ammunition is not a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion,
nor is subversion a necessary means of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.[15]
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the motion to quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 1789, the dispositive portion of the order reading:
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby GRANTED, but only in so far as the accused
may be placed in jeopardy or in danger of being convicted or acquitted of the crime of Subversion and as a
consequence the Information is hereby quashed and the case dismissed without prejudice to the filing of
Illegal Possession of Firearm.
SO ORDERED.[16]
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in quashing the information and dismissing the
case:
xxxxxxxxx
In other words, the main offense the accused is being charged in this case is also Subversion considering
that the alleged Illegal Possession of the Firearm and Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been previously held by the Supreme Court, the fact that
the accused has been previously charged of Subversion before another court before the institution of this
instant case is just a continuing offense of his former charge or that his acts constituting subversion is a
continuation of the acts he committed before.
The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by the prosecution that this case is very different
from the other case and that double jeopardy will attach in this particular case.
This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that double jeopardy will attach to the accusation
of subversion, punishable now under Republic Act 1700, as Rule 117 of the Rules of Court particularly
Section 1 thereof, provides:
Time to move to quash- At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information.(1a)
In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should be arraigned first before he can move to quash
the information. It is before he pleads which the accused did in this case.
On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the possession of firearms and ammunitions is not a
necessary means of committing the offense of subversion or vice versa, then if the court follows such
argument, there could be no offense of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in furtherance of
Subversion, for even the prosecution admits also that in subversion which is an offense involving
propaganda, counter propaganda, a battle of the hearts and mind of the people does not need the possession
or use of firearms and ammunitions.
The prosecution even admits and to quote:
The defense of double jeopardy, while unquestionably available to the accused, had not been clearly
shown to be invokable(sic) at this point in time.
But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for under Section 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a firearm and ammunition which is separate
and distinct from the crime of subversion and is not a necessary ingredient thereof and the court
believed so, the prosecution will have to file another information as they may wish. The court
therefore has to grant the motion to quash on the aforestated grounds, subject to Section 5 of
Rule 117, considering that the only offense to which the accused in this case may be placed in
jeopardy is Subversion and not Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions.
The prosecution may file any information as warranted within ten (10) days from receipt of this order
otherwise the court will order the release of the accused, unless he is in custody for some other
offense.[17] (Emphasis ours)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[18] was also denied in an order dated December 28, 1990.[19]
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 24273. However, the appellate court found that the trial court did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the questioned Information. In
dismissing the petition, the appellate court, in its decision dated May 27, 1991, basically reiterated the
aforequoted ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in
accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and
prove its case against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
We agree with the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation of P.D. No. 1866 filed
against private respondent Antonio Tujan. It ruled:
The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion) filed before the Makati court shows that the main case is subversion considering that there is
an allegation that the alleged illegal possession of firearms was made in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion.Also, the information alleged likewise that the accused is a member
of a communist party of the Philippines and its front organization. Basically, the information refers to the
crime of Subversion qualified by Illegal Possession of Firearms. x x x.[20]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which Antonio Tujan is charged in Criminal Case
No. 1789 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), provides as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfullymanufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions
of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside
his residence without legal authority therefor. (Emphasis ours)
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the first paragraph of Section 1,
the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same Section
makes the use of said firearm and ammunition in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion a circumstance to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the
allegation in the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in the possession
of Antonio Tujan, a member of the communist party of the Philippines and its front organization, was used
in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion does not charge him with
the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same Information, but simply describes the mode
or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed[21] so as to qualify the
penalty to death.
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being used in furtherance of subversion.[22] There is nothing
in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by implication that the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from
the title of the law itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it:
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/ UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE
OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES. (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 64079,
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), is based on a different law, that is, Republic Act No.
1700, as amended. Section 3 thereof penalizes any person who knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates
with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization x x x. Section 4 of said law
further penalizes such member [of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any
subversive association] (who) takes up arms against the Government. Thus, in the present case, private
respondent Antonio Tujan could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A. No. 1700,[23] or both.
This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent Antonio Tujan was placed in double jeopardy
with the filing of the second Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance
of Subversion.
We rule in the negative.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis ours)
Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x.
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which he may raise in a motion to quash to
defeat a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The pertinent provision of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
xxxxxxxxx
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged. (2a) (Emphasis ours)
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; [24] and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. [25]
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondents motion to quash filed in the trial court did not
actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the
private respondent has not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for subversion. Besides, as earlier
discussed, the two criminal charges against private respondent are not of the same offense as required by
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with
the law and jurisprudence and thus should be reversed.
While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as amended, and the one for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can
co-exist, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing
R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the
said repealing law being favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect.[26]
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondents case has never been raised as an issue
by the parties obviously because the said law came out only several months after the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated and while the present petition is pending with this Court we should
nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of justice by applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it
regardless of whether or not the accused or any party has sought the application of the beneficent provisions
of the repealing law.[27]
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond question. The repeal
by said law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving
clause in the repeal. The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear.Thus, it
would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that
no longer exists.[28]
As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo:[29]
There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable attitude towards the accused
exists relative to statutes that have been repealed than has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity
with the Spanish doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot
be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, 296) (Emphasis ours)
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior
law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. [30] It is a recognized rule in
this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.[31]
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has
no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this
charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier discussed,
subversion is no longer a crime.
Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is now bailable under
Republic Act No. 8294 which was enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. No. 8294 has amended Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, by eliminating the provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed firearm is used in
furtherance of subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.[32] Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294), the
penalty prescribed for simple illegal possession of firearm (.38 caliber) is now reduced to prision
correccionalin its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00).[33] The
reduced penalty of imprisonment - which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years
- entitles the accused-private respondent to bail. Considering, however, that the accused-private respondent
has been detained since his arrest on June 5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our record has shown), or more
than seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in order. This is so because even if he were convicted for
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the length of his detention while his case is pending has
already exceeded the penalty prescribed by the new law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No.
24273, including the orders dated October 12, 1990 and December 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 148), National Capital Region, in Criminal Case No. 1789, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A. Tujan in Criminal Case No. 64079
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is hereby DISMISSED.
 The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion
against the same accused in Criminal Case No. 1789 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, is
DEEMED AMENDED to Simple Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The accused-appellant
is hereby ordered RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from detention for the reason stated above, unless he is
being detained for any other offense.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing. and Purisima, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23587-88 June 10, 1976
LUCAS RAMIREZ, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Norberto J. Quisumbing, Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Gatchalian & Sison for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Octavio R.
Ramirez for respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Before Us is a joint petition for certiorari to review the decision dated May 22, 1964 of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance, Manila Branch XVI, in its Criminal Cases Nos. 33438,
33439 and 33440 convicting the spouses Lucas Ramirez and Encarnacion Fajardo Ramirez of the crime of
falsification of public, official and/or commercial documents punishable under Section 172, paragraph 1, of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing each of them in each case to not less than six (6) months of arresto
mayor and not more than three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty- one (21) days of prision correccional
to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and one-half of the costs in each case.
The record discloses the following facts:
On December 9, 1949, the Central Bank of the Philippines, beset by an exchange crisis and pursuant to
Section 14 (Exercise of Authority) and 74 (Emergency Restrictions on Exchange Operation) of Republic
Act 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, issued Circular No. 20 designed to protect the
international reserve during the said crisis. It subjected all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to a
previous licensing by the Central Bank. To implement the said circular, guiding principles governing the
licensing of foreign exchange for the payment of imports were promulgated and embodied in Circular No.
44 issued on June 12, 1953, and made effective July 1, 1953. It created the Bankers Committee to process
applications of new importers who were made to accomplish and submit, among others, through local
authorized banks, documents such as Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Statements, Schedule of Monthly
Sales and Merchandise Inventory to show that they met the criteria set by the Central Bank for new
importers. These documents were further required to be certified to by an independent Certified Public
Accountant. Further restrictions were imposed by subsequent circulars, all of which were devised to combat
the then prevailing exchange crisis.
Against this backdrop, Criminal Cases Nos. 33438, 33439 and 33440, each entitled People vs. Lucas
Ramirez, Encarnacion Ramirez and Ligaya Bernardino, People vs. Lucas Ramirez, Encarnacion Ramirez
and Salustia Lasin and People vs. Lucas Ramirez, Encarnacion Ramirez and Natalia Caparaz, respectively,
were filed, all for falsification of public, official and or commercial documents, spawned by a raid of Room
308 of the Quisumbing bldg. at Dasmarinas Street, Manila, which room was then leased by Mrs.
Encarnacion Fajardo Ramirez. The search which was conducted by the NBI agents and Jose Aquino, a
Central Bank confidential agent, yielded voluminous documents among which were duplicates of the papers
submitted by applicant-importers Bernardino, Lasin and Caparaz duly certified by Segundo Esguerra, A
CPA but which were allegedly falsified.
Criminal Case No. 33438 was eventually dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish falsification
and also because one of the accused, Bernardino, remained at large.
In Criminal Case No. 33439 the information reads as follows:
That on or about the period comprised between December 28, 1953 and May 12, 1954, inclusive, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with others whose true
names and Identities are still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of falsification in the following manner, to wit: the said accused for the purpose
of securing and obtaining dollar allocations or foreign exchange license for import payments, from the
Central Bank of the Philippines, an agencies of instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, thru its lawfully authorized agent, the Philippine Bank of Communications, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, concoct, execute and accomplish or cause to be prepared,
concocted and executed and accomplished the following public, official and commercial documents:
1. Application of Salustia Lasin to qualify as new importer, together with:
a. Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1953;
b. Profit and Loss Statement for the year ending December 31, 1953;
c. Schedule of Monthly Sales as of December 31, 1953;
d. Merchandise Inventory as of December 31, 1953. Income Tax Return for 1953.
2. Information Sheet of Salustia Lasin as a new importer which documents have been executed under
oath before a notary public and or officer authorized to administer oaths, as required by law and the
regulations duly promulgated by the Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 265, and other records or documents connected therewith and required by to law to
kept by merchants, by stating, narrating, making it appear and representing in the said documents that
the accused Salustia Lasin was qualified, under the law and regulations of the Central Bank, as a new
importer, being actively engaged in the general merchandise (textile) business, with an establishment
at Nos. 1514-1515, Divisoria Market, in said city, continuously since July 1, 1953 operating on a paid-
up capital of P23,500.00 with adequate distribution facilities, and that her purchases and gross sales
of merchandise during the period from January 1, 1953 to December 31, 1953 amounted to
P147,062.35 and P149,246.30, respectively and such other information or narration of facts pertinent
thereto and in connection therewith, the said information, data and narration of facts being material
for the purpose of said application, the said accused knowing fully well that their manifestations were
all false and untrue and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining the said dollar allocations and
foreign exchange license for import Payments from the Central Bank of the Philippines; and the said
accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, submitted and filed the aforesaid documents with the said
Central Bank of the Philippines thru its aforesaid duly authorized agent bank, vested by law with
authority to determine and authorize the issuance of such dollar payments, securing and obtaining as
a result thereof the approval of the application of said accused as a new importer and the issuance to
her of a dollar allocation or foreign exchange license for import payments in the amount of $8,975.00,
every semester, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines and or the Central Bank
of the Philippines.
Criminal Case No. 33440 likewise charged the spouses Lucas and Encarnacion Ramirez with the same
offense, with Natalia Caparaz as co-accused. In the Information it was alleged that the foreign exchange
allocation in the amount of $8,177.75 every semester was obtained by Caparaz through the submission of
falsified documents.
Record likewise showed that Salustia Lasin and Natalia Caparaz who were indicted in the information were
discharged and made state witnesses. After trial the lower court convicted petitioners herein of the charges
concerning the dollar application of Caparaz and Lasin. Both spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and also denied their motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
Before We take up the assigned errors, We note, as was brought up by defense counsels Quisumbing,
Ordonez and Gatchalian in their well-written brief, the fact that-on January 21, 1962, while this case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 133 which lifted and abolished the
foreign exchange controls instituted by earlier circulars. This particular circular dispensed with the need for
prior specific licensing from the Central Bank for the sale of foreign exchange for imports. Before Us now
therefore are posed these questions:
1. Did the Honorable Court of Appeals err in not acquitting the petitioners herein?
2. Did the Honorable Court of Appeals err in not ruling that prosecution against petitioner spouses
may no longer be had for falsification of documents required by the Central Bank Circular No. 20 as
a consequence of the repeal of said Circular by Circular No. 133?
 I $8,975.00 she was only given a share of P500.00 (t.s.n. May 15, 1959 pp. 33, 34). All the above facts
A review of the proceedings and exhibits presented in the lower court reveals that there is truth in the
findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the spouses Lucas and Encarnacion
Ramirez were guilty of the crime charged. Although their names never appeared in the allegedly falsified
documents, this was so because they concocted, schemed and executed the plot to falsify the said documents
submitted to the Central Bank very carefully and meticulously without involving their names, but this plot
was betrayed by their active participation (other than signing their names) in the commission of the offense
at bar which was positively proved.
During the trial the fact of illiteracy of the applicant-importers Salustia Lasin and Natalia Caparaz was
elicited and established. Capitalizing on the illiteracy of Lasin and Caparaz who neither could read nor write
except to sign their names but who were eager beavers to be among the importers, spouses Lucas and
Encarnacion Ramirez had ready- made applications with manufactured figures and data signed by them
(applicant importers). These applications had every appearance of genuineness and since the same appear
to be duly certified to by Segundo Esguerra, an independent Certified Public Accountant, in compliance
with a CB regulation, the applicant importers qualified as new importers and in fact obtained dollar
allocations.
Petitioners herein would pass the buck to Segundo Esguerra the CPA whose signature appeared in all the
statements filed in the CB. Thus petitioner Ramirez declared during the trial that Segundo Esguerra with
another lawyer, Osmundo Miranda, now deceased, sub-leased a portion of the room at 308 Quisumbing
Bldg. leased by her which Esguerra used as his office after the regular office hours (Esguerra was said to be
working for H. R. Lopez, Inc. as Accountant) and that he used to stay there from 11:30 A.M. to 2:00 P.M.,
then from 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. daily (t.s.n. November 4,1960 pp. 37-41). She would also have us believe
that the alleged falsified papers were found at the outer room which was then occupied by Esguerra and the
late Atty. Mirandaa fact which she failed to prove. When the raid occurred it was Lucas Ramirez who
came to the scene, opened the main door and unlocked all the cabinets and drawers in Room 308. As found
out by the Court of Appeals:
... Los agentes de la ley antes de verificar el registro del cuarto Num. 308 del edificio Quisumbing
estuvieron en la residencia de los esposos aqui acusados y Lucas Ramirez fue quien les acompano al
referido cuarto, y segun las pruebas de la accusacion, Ramirez tenia las llavez de los armarios y mesas
que estaban dentro del cuarto y fue quien abrio los cajones de dichas mesas donde se encontraron los
duplicados y los documentos falsos. (Emphasis supplied) (Criminal Record, Decision of the court of
Appeals, Third Div.)
The testimony of Jose Aquino, CB agent (t.s.n, March 10, 1958 pp. 3-5) that he remembered that there were
divisions in Room 308 with several tables but without Identifying who the occupants of the tables were did
not in any way lend support to the contention of accused Encarnacion Ramirez that she subleased a portion
of her room to Esguerra and deceased Miranda. No contract of sub-lease was presented, and even
assuming arguendo that the same was sub-leased, no reason was offered why Lucas Ramirez had the keys
not only to the main door but all the cabinets and drawers as well. What is apparent is that Esguerra held
office at Room 308 Quisumbing Bldg. not as sublessee but on agreement with Lucas Ramirez who was
himself a CPA and an Auditor of H.R. Lopez Inc., a firm where Esguerra was also employed as an
Accountant. In fact Esguerra admitted that he went to 308 Quisumbing Bldg. after office hours (t.s.n. March
20, 1959 pp. 12-13.) on instructions of Lucas Ramirez and signed statements for a fee of P100.00 per
certification (t.s.n. October 5, 1956, Criminal Record p. 352, 357). It surprises Us why Esguerra was not
subjected to further investigations if he were equally guilty of the crime charged. Accused Encarnacion
Ramirez too tried to wash her hands by testifying that she did not know Natalia Caparaz nor did she meet
her before the hearing (t.s.n. p. 21 Nov. 4, 1960). On further examination, however, she admitted having
known her as she (Caparas) was introduced to her (Ramirez) by a mutual friend, Apolonia Alcantara (t.s.n.
p. 31 Nov. 4, 1960). Also during the raid, the NBI and CB agents found among the papers powers of attorney
executed by Lasin and Caparaz in favor of Encarnacion Fajardo Ramirez, authorizing the latter to manage
the disposal of the dollar allocations. Likewise it was shown during the trial that the spouses petitioners
herein benefited from the dollar allocations obtained by Caparaz and Lasin and in fact retained the lion's
share therefrom. Thus from the allocation obtained by Caparaz in the amount of $8,177.75, she (Caparas)
was only given the amount of P400.00 as reimbursement of her expenses and P65.00 as her share of the
dollar allocation (t.s.n. pp. 10-11 March 20, 1959). Similarly when Lasin's application was approved for
positively affirm the guilt of spouses-petitioners herein.
II
Anent the second error, it is the contention of petitioners herein that with the advent of full decontrol
envisaged in Circular No. 133 issued on January 21, 1962, the crime for which petitioners were indicted has
already been extinguished. Pertinent provisions of Circular 133 are hereunder quoted for easy reference,
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Only authorized agent banks may sell foreign exchange for imports. Such exchange should be sold at the
prevailing market rate to any applicant, without requiring prior specific licensing from the Central Bank,
subject to the following conditions:
a. All imports must be covered by letter of credit except small transactions involving not more than $100.00;
b. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
4. The free market rate shall not be administratively fixed but shall be determined through transactions in
the free market,
xxx xxx xxx
8. All existing circulars, rules and regulations and conditions governing transactions in foreign exchange
not inconsistent with the provisions on this Circular are deemed incorporated hereto and made integral parts
hereof by reference.
It is very clear that Circular 133 lifted the restrictions imposed by Circular 20 and subsequent circulars
thereto. In short Circular 133 repealed Circular 20. This is so because Circular 20 and Circular 133 are
diametrically opposed to each other. While Circular 20 restricted the sale of foreign exchange and subjected
all transactions therein to specific licensing by the Central Bank, Circular 133 practically did away with
prior licensing. As aptly elucidated in the case of People vs. Sandico 1, Jr. et al.
... The Solicitor General's opposition to the motion for dismissal is predicated primarily upon his contention
that Circular 20 has not been repealed by Circular 133, and that far from being incompatible, the two actually
complement each other. This contention is without merit. In the first place, while Circular 20 restricts sales
of foreign exchange and subjects all transactions therein to specific licensing by the Central Bank, Circular
133 neither restricts sales of foreign exchange nor subjects transactions therein to licensing. As a matter of
fact, Circular 133 provides that foreign exchange shall be sold at a free market rate to any applicant without
requiring prior specific licensing from the Central Bank, and that the free market rate shall not be
administratively fixed but shall be determined in the transactions in the free market. From the contradictory
concepts of the two systems may be seen the incompatibility between the two circulars. Circular 133 was
promulgated precisely to remedy the evils brought about by the control system; it is therefore not ancillary
to Circular 20. If life is to be given to the remedy of decontrol as a policy for economic survival, Circular
20 must give away to the supervening Circular 133. The purpose of Circular 133 cannot be achieved by
applying the provisions of Circular 20; the two circulars cannot operate hand in hand. It may be true that
Circular 133 contains no specific provision which is in direct conflict with Secs. 4-a and b of Circular 20,
the particular sections under which the appellants were charged and convicted. But it is obvious nonetheless
that the respective purposes of these two circulars are diametrically opposed to each other, because while
Circular 20 restricts the sale of foreign exchange and subjects all transactions therein to specific licensing
by the Central Bank, the purpose of Circular 133 is clearly to abolish such restrictions and do away with
licensing. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that the purpose of Circular 20 was abandoned by the promulgation
of Circular 133, and Secs. 4-a and b thereof have lost all meaning and function.
Also under paragraph 8 of Circular 133 (supra) it is so provided that circulars consistent with the provisions
of Circular 133 are deemed incorporated thereto. However since Circular 20 is inconsistent and runs counter
to it then by necessary implication the same is abrogated and repealed. And as Sutherland 2 an eminent
authority on Statutory Construction says-"When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation
coterminous with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect while the prior law
remains in operative existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, the latest legislative
expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict."
The decisive question to determine now is whether or not repeal of Circular 20 obliterated petitioners' crime.
Petitioners heavily relied on the case of People vs. Quasha 3 where this Court opined:
... The majority of the court however, are also of the opinion that, even supposing that the act imputed to
the dependant constituted falsification at the time it was perpetrated, still with the approval of the Parity
Amendment to the Constitution in March, 1947, which placed Americans on the same footing as Filipino
citizens with respect to the right to operate public utilities in the Philippines, thus doing away with the
prohibition in Section 8, Article XIV, of the Constitution in so far as American citizens are concerned, the
said act has ceased to be an offense within the meaning of the law, so that defendant can no longer be held
criminally liable therefor. ...
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision said:
Finalmente, los apelantes contienden que con la abolicion de la adjudicacion de dolares, los actos cometidos
por los esposos en el supuesto de que fuesen estos culpables ya han dejado de ser punibles, citando para este
efecto la causa de Pueblo vs. Quasha, 49 O.G., 2826. Entendemos que la contencion carece de merito porque
en la presente causa los esposos estan acusados de falsification de documentos official y commercial y no
de una infraction de los reglamentos del Banco Central sobre la adjudicacion de dolares y la causa de
Quasha, supra, no es aplicable al caso de autos donde en parte se sostuvo que debido a la enmienda de la
Constitution concediendo a los americanos iguales privilegios que los filipinos en la Llamadad clausula de
paridad, no era necesario expresar en la escritura de incorporacion la nacionalidad de los incorporadores
americanos en una corporacion de utilidad publica puesto que tenian los mismos derechos y privilegios que
los filipinos en una corporacion de tal indole.
We believe that the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals is altogether hair-splitting. If We will recall, the
crime of falsification stemmed from the violation of the legal requirements of the Central Bank, specifically
Circulars 20 and 44, where applicant- importers were obliged to disclose the truth on the figures and data
appearing in the documents submitted but which they allegedly falsified to qualify them as new importers.
These requirements incorporated in Circular 20 and subsequent circulars were issued during an emergency
in an effort to curb the outward flow of foreign exhange. Eventually, a free market ensued and the emergency
measures were lifted. Consequently, there is no more obligation now to submit to the Central Bank such
documents in support of an application for foreign exchange.
Although the acts imputed to the accused constituted, at the time they were committed, falsification of
commercial documents penalized under Sec. 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, the promulgation
of Central Bank Circular 133 abolishing the requirement of specific licensing under Central Bank Circular
No. 20 wiped away the legal obligation of the applicants for foreign exchange to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated in the documents supporting their application. As there is no more legal obligation of the
applicant to disclose such truth, an untruthful statement therein no longer constitutes the crime of
falsification perpetrated by making false statements in a narration of facts (Francisco, Revised Penal Code,
p. 194, 1963 ed.; U.S. vs. Lopez, 15 Phil. 515 and People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).
It may be argued that the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 20 by Central Bank Circular No. 133 did not
extinguish the criminal liability for falsification of commercial documents because the Revised Penal Code
where such offense is punishable was unaffected thereby and remains valid and subsisting. True that the
pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code on falsification was not repealed by Circular No. 133, but the
stubborn fact remains that the repeal of Circular No. 20 which imposed the obligation to state the truth in
the papers supporting the application for foreign exchange extinguished that obligation, leaving no more
foundation on which the falsification of such papers would rest. The root cause of the falsification, which
was Central Bank Circular No. 20, having been totally removed, the offense arising out of a disregard or
violation of said circular has no more leg to stand on.
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on
appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not
according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment. The court will, therefore,
reverse a judgment which was correct at the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there has been
an intermediate change in the law which renders such judgment erroneous at the time the case was finally
disposed of on appeal (111 A.L.R. 1318; see cases cited therein). Thus, if pending the appeal from a
judgment of the lower court the law is changed, or the statute under which it was decided has been repealed,
the appellate court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered. The court
must conform its decision to the law then existing and may, therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct
when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears that pending the appeal a statute which was
necessary to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal (Vance v.
Rankin (1902) 194 I11. 625, 62 N.E. 807, 88 Am. St. Rep. 173; Wall v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co. (1919) 290
I11. 227, 125 N.E. 20).
Likewise it was held that while as a general rule it is the province of an appellate court to inquire only into
the question whether a judgment was erroneous when rendered, if subsequent to the judgment of the lower
court and before the decision of the appellate court is handed down a law intervenes changing the applicable
rule, the judgment of the lower court, although correct under the law prevailing at the time it was rendered
must be set aside by the appellate court and a judgment in conformity with the new law must be entered
(U.S. v. The Peggy (1801) 1 Cranch (U.S.) 103, 2L. Ed. 49).
It may be argued that the function of the appellate court is not to consider the merits of a cause on the basis
of supervening extraneous circumstances but merely to review the judgment of the lower court with a view
to determining whether it was erroneous or correct when it was rendered. But because judgment is suspended
by appeal, it is without finality; that to give it finality the appellate court must itself pronounce its judgment,
and that in so doing it must be governed by the existing law. When the previous law under which alone
validity could be given to the judgment has been repealed, the sole prop and foundation for support of the
judgment has been removed, and of necessity it must be declared null and void (Yeaton v. United States
(1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 281, 3 L. Ed. 101).
In view of the failure of the Court en banc after its first deliberation to reach a decision on this case due to
the absence of the required number of justices to promulgate a decision, and of the abstention of two justices
from participating therein, the case was set for rehearing en banc in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 125 of the
Rules of Court. On September 4, 1975, the case was reheard en banc and subsequently the justices present
were requested to cast their respective votes on the final outcome of the case.
On April 8, 1976, the Court for the second time, formally voted on the case, and the result of the voting
among the eleven justices present was as follows:
1. For AQUITTAL of the accused appellants
1) Esguerra
2) Muoz Palma
3) Concepcion
4) Martin, JJ.
2. For CONVICTION of the accused appellants
1) Castro, C.J.
2) Teehankee
3) Barredo
4) Makasiar
5) Aquino, JJ.
3. For ABSTENTION
1) Fernando
2) Antonio, JJ.
It resulted that the majority of eight required by the constitution in ordinary cases heard en banc to decide a
case has not for the second time been obtained. Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 125 of the Rules
of Court, if after the case is reheard and in the rehearing no decision is again reached, the judgment of
conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the defendant shall be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the accused appellants, Lucas Ramirez and Encarnacion Fajardo Ramirez, are hereby
acquitted of the offense charge, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Munoz Palma and Martin, JJ, concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., votes to acquit.
Fernando and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J, dissenting:
The burden of my dissent may be simply stated thus: the repeal of Circular 20 by Circular 133 did not
obliterate the crime of falsification punished by Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code which the herein
petitioners were charged with and found guilty of in the court a quo. It is unmitigated non-sense to say that
a mere circular issued by the Central Bank can operate to amend a statute passed by Congress; and since the
herein petitioners were charged with the crime of falsification and not with a violation of Circular 20, no
amount of sophistry can give validity to the conclusion that Circular 133 has operated to repeal Article 172.
Advertence is made by Mr. Justice Esguerra in his opinion to People vs. Sandico, Jr., et al. (Court of Appeals
Reports, Vol. 2, July 20, 1962, pages 488, 492, 493). I was the Associate Justice who penned the decision
in that case. If my complete opinion therein is to be examined very closely, it will be readily seen that the
portions thereof cited by Mr. Justice Esguerra are unassailable, because the accused were charged, not with
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, but with a violation of Circular 20 in relation to Section 34
of Republic Act 265, or, more specifically, with having "transacted, negotiated or otherwise dealt in foreign
exchange by purchasing, dealing in or transacting with persons or entities who are not authorized agents of
the Central Bank of the Philippines, and by disposing, exporting and/or otherwise failing to sell said foreign
exchange to any designated agent of the Central Bank within the requisite period."
Reliance on People vs. Sandico as a basis for the acquittal of the petitioners in the case at bar is not only
improper; it is likewise grossly misleading.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the decision reversing the judgment of conviction of petitioners-accused of the crime of
falsification of public and commercial documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code because of
the Court's failure to attain the necessary 8 out of 9 votes for affirmance of the conviction (with 5 votes for
affirmance and 4 votes for reversal) pursuant to Rule 125, section 3 of the Rules of Court.
As stated in the main opinion 1 the decisive question is whether or not repeal of 1949 Circular 20 subjecting
all transactions in foreign exchange transactions to licensing the Central Bank (allegedly by 1962 Circular
No. 133 which provided for sales of foreign exchange at the prevailing free market rate without requiring
specific licensing from the Central Bank but subject to certain conditions such as letters of credit to cover
all imports with special time deposits varying from 25%-to 150% ( depending upon the classification of the
imported goods) "obliterated petitioners' crime" of falsification.
Even assuming that Circular No. 133 repealed Circular No. 20 (which in my opinion it did not, since it
merely liberalized at the time the sales of foreign exchange with the adoption of a free market rate), the
adoption of Circular No. 133 by the Monetary Board could by no means obliterate the crime
of falsification under which the petitioners were charged, found positively guilty beyond all doubt (as
reaffirmed in the main
opinion) 2 and convicted.
Had the petitioners-accused simply violated the Circular by obtaining the dollar allocations without being
entitled thereto but without falsification of documents, then they would have been criminally charged and
convicted of willful violation of the circular under Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 which imposes the
penalty of a fine up to P20,000.00 and imprisonment up to five years. 3 And the alleged repeal of Circular
No. 20 might arguably be cited now for erasing their criminal liability thereunder for willful violation.
But petitioners without presenting themselves nor using their own names had fabricated documents and
records to have their two illiterate dummies secure semestral dollar allocations as fake new importers in the
amounts of $8,177.75 (for Caparaz) and $8.975.00 (for Lasin) per semester, which were actually for their
use and benefit 4 and were therefore charged, tried and convicted for falsification of public and commercial
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code 5 on the very strength of the testimonies of the two
dummies who were utilized as state witnesses for the prosecution.
Clearly,, the crime of falsification which remains a serious crime has not been obliterated by the alleged
repeal of Circular No. 20, and petitioners' criminal liability has neither been obliterated nor extinguished.
The main opinion in holding that "the root cause of the falsification, which was Central Bank Circular No.
20, having been totally removed, the offense arising out of a disregard or violation of said circular has no
more leg to stand on"6 disregards that petitioners' motive in committing falsification (to get dollar
allocations thru their dummies as fake new importers) does not erase or justify the crime of falsification of
public documents with the removal of the motive (Circular No. 20) since in the falsification of public
documents, whether by public officials or private persons, the Idea of gain or intent to prejudice a third
person is secondary and the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction
of the truth as therein solemnly declared.
The removal (repeal) of the circular might leave a prosecution for violation thereof under Section 34 of the
Central Bank Act without any leg to stand on, but petitioners stand charged with falsification. Since all the
nine (of eleven) members of the Court who have participated in this case are unanimously agreed that
petitioners' guilt of the crime of falsification of public and commercial documents has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, their conviction by the trial court as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals must
stand.
Makasiar, J., concur.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. I do not agree with the opinion that the supposed repeal of Circular 20 by Circular 133 of the
Central Bank obliterated the crime of falsification punished in article 172 of the Revised Penal Code which
the petitioners had committed. They were not charged under Circular 20. Circular 133 did not repeal article
172.
The facts of the instant case are different from those of People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333. This Court is not
bound by the opinion of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Sandico, 2 Court of Appeals Reports 488 cited
in the majority opinion. The alleged repeal of Circular 20, as a supervening fact, may be a basis for executive
clemency. That repeal did not extinguish the petitioners' criminal liability under articles 172.
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concurs.
G.R. No. L-58284 November 19, 1981
BERNABE BUSCAYNO petitioners, vs. MILITARY COMMISSIONS respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives
classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Armed Group personalities", were wanted by the
authorities since 1971.
In Department Order No. 610 Undersecretary of National Defense Efren I. Plana fixed P150,000 and
P50,000 as the prizes to be paid to any person who kills, captures or causes the killing, capture or surrender
of Buscayno and Sison, respectively, or who furnishes information directly leading to and which is the
proximate result of their killing or capture. (p. 96, Rollo of L-47185.)
Buscayno and Sison were included in the so-called "National Target List" of active participants in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power and to take over the government by force whose arrest was
ordered under 'General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972. The list was prepared by Colonel Hamilton
B. Dimaya. (p. 95, Rollo of L-47185.)
Buscayno's case Even before Buscayno's arrest, he and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. (arrested on September
23, 1972) were charged before Military Commission No. 2 in an amended charge sheet dated August 14,
1973 with subversion or violation of the Anti-Subversion Law, Republic Act No. 1700.
It was alleged that as ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arms, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan and the New People's Army, constituting an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government by force or placing it under the control of an alien power, they committed the
following acts (Criminal Case No. MC-223, pp. 71-75, Rollo of L-47185):
1. In April 1969, Aquino at 25 Times Street, Quezon City gave P15,000 to the said organizations for
the purpose of staging an NPA-sponsored demonstration in Manila which was in fact carried out in
Congress, Malacaang and the American Embassy on April 19, 1969 to achieve the objectives of the
said organizations.
2. Aquino in 1967 gave to Buscayno in Concepcion, Tarlac a .45 caliber pistol with magazine and
ammunition to be used against the government.
3. Aquino in August, 1967 in the house of Leonida Arceo located at Barrio San Francisco, Tarlac,
Tarlac gave to Buscayno two .45 caliber pistols to be used against the government.
4. Aquino in October, 1969 in Barrio Alto, Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac, gave to
Commanders Arthur Garcia and Jose Buscayno two armored vests and a pair of walkie-talkies to be
used against the government.
5. Aquino on November 1 and 2, 1965 in San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac, gave to Commander Alibasbas
through Commander Danilo several firearms and ammunition which were taken from the house of
Manuel Rodriguez and which were to be used against the government and in fact the said firearms
were recovered from Commander Alibasbas and his group when they were killed in Barrio Almendras,
Concepcion, Tarlac.
 6. Aquino in 1970 and 1971 at 25 Times Street, Quezon City provided shelter and medical treatment
for Roberto Santos alias Commander Felman Benjamin Sanguyo alias Commander Pusa and eight
other sick or wounded officers or members of the HMB and NPA.
Aquino, Buscayno, Peter Ilocano and Puriok, as conspirators, were also charged with murder before
Military Commission No. 2 in a charge sheet dated August 7, 1973. It was alleged that during the last days
of November to December 2, 1967 they took Cecilio Sumat a barrio captain of Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac,
from his house and killed him in Barrio San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac (Criminal Case No. MC-2-22, pp. 76-
77, Rollo of L-47185).
In Criminal Case No. MC-1-92, Buscayno, with ninety-one other persons including Sison and his wife,
Juliet de Lima, Saturnino Ocampo and Mila Astorga-Garcia, were charged with rebellion before Military
Commission No. 1 in a charge sheet dated March 18, 1977.
It was alleged that on or about February 4, 1972 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto the ninety-
two accused as officers and leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New
People's Army, and as conspirators rose publicly and took up arms against the government in Navotas, Rizal
and elsewhere in the Philippines for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said government or its
laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof or of its armed forces by organizing the Karagatan
Fishing Corporation and operating the M/V Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure firearms and ammunition
for the CPP and NPA as in fact war materials and armanents were landed at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela
on July 2, 1972 from Communist China and were used against the army.
The second specification in Criminal Case No. MC-1-92 is that Buscayno, Sison and others during the
period from August, 1973 to February, 1974 committed rebellion in Manila, Baguio, La Union, Pangasinan,
Bulacan and elsewhere in the Philippines by acquiring, purchasing and operating vessels, motor vehicles,
beach houses, lots and other real and personal properties for use in distributing firearms and ammunition for
the CPP and NPA to be utilized in resisting the army and overthrowing the government. (pp. 78-91, Rollo
of L-47185.)
The said case was refiled in Special Military Commission No. 1 as Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1 with an
amended charge sheet dated November 8, 1977 (pp. 189-205, Rollo of G.R. No. 58284).
Buscayno was arrested on August 26. 1976 in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga by operatives of the
armed forces. He was detained in the Constabulary Security Unit at Camp Crame. When the trial counsel
informed Buscayno that his presence at the hearing on September 15, 1976 before Military Commission
No. 2 was necessary, Buscayno in a letter dated September 7, 1976 addressed to the President of the
Commission declared that he had no intention of appearing before the tribunal; that he did not need a lawyer;
that he would not contest the tribunal's jurisdiction and that any reference by the prosecution witnesses to
Buscayno alias Commander Dante would be to him and to no other person.
At Buscayno's arraignment in the subversion and murder cases, he waived his right to be present and to have
counsel. He said that he was not challenging any member of the tribunal. He just wanted to have a record
of the trial. He pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had finished the presentation of its evidence,
Buscayno was asked whether he wanted to present evidence. He answered in writing that he did not want
to present evidence.
On July 18, 1977, Juan T. David entered his appearance as counsel for Buscayno in Criminal Case No. MC-
2-23 for subversion. On October 25, 1977, lawyer David filed in this Court in behalf of Buscayno a petition
for habeas corpus and prohibition.
As no restraining order was issued, the Commission continued its proceeding against Buscayno and Aquino.
On November 25, 1977, after Buscayno failed to present any evidence in spite of having been given another
chance to do so, his case was deemed submitted for decision. After deliberation, the Commission found all
the accused guilty as charged and imposed death by firing squad. The complete records of the cases were
transmitted to the Secretary of National Defense.
However, four days later or on November 29, the President of the Philippines directed the Commission to
reopen the trial and give Aquino and Buscayno another chance to present their evidence. According to the
petitioners, on December 15, 1977, this Court enjoined the Commission from rehearing the two cases (p.
20, Petition) but no restraining order was actually issued.
This Court in its decision dated January 15, 1981 dismissed Buscayno's petition (L-47185, 102 SCRA 7).
We reiterated the rule that a military tribunal has jurisdiction to try civilians and that the proceeding in a
military commission is not violative of procedural due process and would not be vitiated by partiality.
(Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 546; Gamaua vs. Espino, L-36188-37586,
February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402.) *
On March 27, 1981, Military Commission No. 2 convened to hear Buscayno's evidence in the subversion
and murder cases. His counsel asked for postponement on the ground that he requested the President of the
Philippines to transfer the two cases to the civil courts and that he should be furnished with the transcripts
of the hearings held on November 25 and December 5, 1977. The truth is that he was furnished with those
transcripts on January 8, 1978.
The postponement was granted. The hearing was reset for April 23. At the hearing on that date, Buscayno's
counsel again asked for postponement because the President had not yet acted upon his request for the
transfer of his cases to the civil courts. He challenged the competency of the president of the Commission
on the ground of lack of adequate knowledge of the two cases. The challenge was rejected. Buscayno did
not present any evidence. The Commission considered the cases re-submitted for decision.
On May 4, 1981, the Commission denied Buscayno's motion for the reconsideration of the ruling that his
case was already submitted for decision. It reaffirmed its 1977 decision imposing on Buscayno the penalty
of death by firing squad.
Cases against Sison and spouses. They were arrested on November 10, 1977 by virtue of arrest, search
and seizure orders issued by the Secretary of National Defense.
As already stated in connection with the Buscayno case, the Sison spouses and ninety-one other persons
including Buscayno and Victor Corpus were charged with rebellion on two counts before Special Military
Commission No. 1 as shown in the amended charge sheet dated November 8,1977.
Even before her arrest, Juliet Sison, with fifty-five other persons including Victor Corpus, was charged with
subversion before Military Commission No. 6 (Case No. 55), as shown in the charge sheet dated November
16, 1972.
It was alleged therein that the fifty-six accused, in 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
became and have remained officers and ranking leaders of the CPP and the NPA, the CPP's military arm,
and the CPP's front organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Samahang Demokratikong
Kabataan (SDK), Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), Student Alliance for National Democracy
(STAND), Movement for Democratic Philippines (MDP) and Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan
(MAKIBAKA), whose objective is the overthrow of the government for the purpose of establishing a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power.
It was specified that the accused engaged in extensive indoctrination, agitation and promotion of rallies (ten
instances) and in propagandas, speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures, all intended to promote the
communist pattern of subversion (eleven instances).
The same charge sheet indicated that the accused rose publicly and took up arms against the government,
engaging in war against the forces of the government and committing serious violence (eight instances).
Juliet Sison was pinpointed as a ranking leader of the Kabataang Makabayan operating in the Bicol region,
helping her husband Jose as KM chairman and editing the periodical Ang Bayan in Isabela in 1971-72
(Annex 3 of Return).
Jose Ma. Sison, with Juanito Canlas, Cesario Diego, Saturnino Ocampo, Antonio Liao, Mila Roque, Alfredo
Granada, Ramon Isberto, Ester Ceniza and Evelyn Sarmiento were charged with subversion under
Presidential Decree No. 885 (which superseded Republic Act No. 1700) before Military Commission No.
25 in Case No. 113 as shown in the charge sheet dated October 3, 1978.
It was alleged that the ten accused, in or about 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
continuously thereafter, in Capas, Tarlac and elsewhere in the Philippines, wilfully organized and joined as
officers and ranking members of the CPP and the NPA for the purpose of overthrowing the government
through armed revolution, violence and subversion with the covert assistance and support of a foreign power
in order to establish therein a totalitarian regime subject to alien control and domination (Annex 4 of Return).
In the rebellion case, Case No. SMC-1-1, the Sison spouses and the Buscayno spouses assailed the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal to try civilians like them.
On January 3, 1979, the Sison spouses, together with the Buscayno spouses, Peter Mutuc, Edgar Pilapil,
Eduardo Lingat, Joaquin Rivera, Leonila Lumbang and Juanito Canlas, filed in this Court a petition for
habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus (L-49579).
That petition, like Buscayno's petition in L-47185, was dismissed in this Court's decision dated January 15,
1981 (102 SCRA 33).
The instant case. On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus catchall
petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory
verbiage
They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2 dated May -1. 1981, convicting Buscayno of
subversion and murder and sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared void because he was denied
his constitutional right to present evidence and that he be released from detention.
They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the
rule on double jeopardy, that Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the
trial of the petitioners and that the petitioners be released. They also prayed that they be granted bail.
The petitioners also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the three Commissions
from trying the petitioners, enjoining Military Commission No. 1 from continuing with the perpetuation of
testimonies and from requiring the petitioners to attend the perpetuation proceedings and enjoining the
Review Board-AFP from reviewing the decision in the subversion and murder cases.
Habeas corpus and petitioners' release on bail. - This is Buscayno's third petition for habeas corpus and
the second petition of the Sison spouses. The ultimate issue is whether they are legally detained. We find
that they have not been illegally deprived of their liberty and that there is no justification to order their
release.
Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981, which terminated martial law, sanctions the continued
confinement of the petitioners. It provides (77 OG 441):
... Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President/Prime Minister of the Philippines, ... proclaim
the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines;
Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and
Provided, that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein,
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other places the
suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present detained as
well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith;
General Order No. 8 is also hereby revoked and the military tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved upon final determination of cases pending therein which may not be transferred to
the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double jeopardy, or
other circumstances which render further prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible;
Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that persons, like petitioners who are under detention for
rebellion and the capital offense of subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them, they are not entitled to bail
(Lansang vs. Garcia, L-33964, December 11, 1971 and eight other cases, 42 SCRA 448).
Review of rulings of the military commission. Ordinarily, this Court cannot review the rulings and
proceedings of the military commission. The National Security Code, Presidential Decree No. 1498, which
was issued on June 11, 1978 (74 OG 11066), provides in its sections 86(f) and 87(e) that what this Court
can review are the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in cases appealed to it from the military
commission.
Generally, this Court does not exercise over military commissions the supervisory jurisdiction which it
possesses over civil trial courts whose interlocutory rulings and decisions may be reviewed by this Court.
(See Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171; Martelino vs. Alejandro, L-30894, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 106).
So, the issue as to whether Buscayno was denied his constitutional right to present evidence should first be
passed upon by the reviewing military authority and not by this Court. The propriety of the perpetuation
proceedings in the rebellion case and the conduct of the trial in the Commission cannot at this stage be
passed upon by this Court.
We have definitively ruled that the petitioners can be tried by the military commissions and that their cases
are within the jurisdiction and competence of military tribunals.
Nevertheless, two legal issues regarding double jeopardy and the alleged repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law
may be resolved in the interest of justice, to dissipate any uncertainty and for the guidance of the parties.
Alleged repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law. Juliet de Lima Sison contends that her criminal liability for
subversion was extinguished when Presidential Decree No. 885 (which took effect on May 11, 1976, 72 OG
3826) repealed Republic Act No. 1700. This contention is bereft of merit.
That decree, which is the Revised Anti-Subversion Law, in repealing or superseding Republic Act No. 1700,
expressly provides in its section 7 that "acts committed in violation" of the former law before the effectivity
of the said decree "shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of the former Act"
and that nothing in the said decree "shall prevent prosecution of cases pending for violation of" Republic
Act No. 1700. That saving or transitory clause is reenacted in section 14(i) of the National Security Code.
It is similar to article 366 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that felonies and misdemeanors
committed prior to the effectivity of the Revised Penal Code shall be punished in accordance with the old
Penal Code and the laws in force at the time of their commission.
The fact that Presidential Decree No. 885 does not mention the CPP does not mean that that party is no
longer regarded as a subversive organization. The purpose of the party is the decisive factor in determining
whether it is a subversive organization.
The issue of double jeopardy. The petitioners invoke their constitutional right not to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. As may be gleaned from section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, "same offense" means the offense charged, or an attempt to commit it or a frustrated stage thereof,
or "any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information."
For an accused to be in jeopardy, it is necessary (1) that a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction is filed against him; (2) that the charge is
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and (3) that after he had pleaded to the charge, he was convicted
or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
(People vs. Pilpa, L-30250, September 22, 1977, 79 SCRA 81).
To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be terminated by means of a final conviction, acquittal
or dismissal without his express consent, If the case is not yet terminated, then jeopardy does not set in.
After the accused has been put in jeopardy, the filing against him of another charge for the same offense or
for an attempt or frustrated stage thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included in the
offense originally charged places him in double jeopardy.

That is forbidden by section 22, Article IV of the Constitution or by the rule against double jeopardy: nemo
bis punitur pro eodem delicto (no one is twice punished for the same offense) or non bis in Idem which is
analogous tores judicata in civil cases.
As stated earlier, Buscayno was charged with subversion together with Aquino in a 1973 charge sheet. Jose
Ma. Sison was charged with subversion in a 1978 charge sheet. His wife, Juliet de Lima, was charged with
subversion in a 1972 charge sheet. The three petitioners were all charged with rebellion in an amended
charge sheet datedNovember 8, 1977. Only the subversion case against Buscayno was decided but the
decision is still subject to review.
Because no case against the petitioners has been terminated, it is once evident that they cannot invoke the
rule on double jeopardy. The petitioners have not yet been placed in jeopardy.
In Bulaong vs. People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746, Agaton Bulaong was charged with rebellion
in the Laguna Court of First Instance and later with subversion in the Manila Court of First Instance in
connection with his activities as an officer of the CPP and HMB He was convicted of rebellion by the
Laguna court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. He appealed to this Court. The
subversion case was still pending in the Manila court.
In this Court, he contended that because rebellion is an offense cognate with subversion and that the two
informations contain the same facts, he could not be tried for rebellion and subversion without being placed
twice in jeopardy for the same acts.
It was held that the defense of double jeopardy should be interposed by Bulaong in the subversion case. He
could not plead double jeopardy in the rebellion case because the subversion case had not yet been
terminated. (See Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, L-46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; Jimenez
vs. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. 54577, January 15, 1981, 102 SCRA 39).
Petitioners contend that rebellion is an element of the crime of subversion. That contention is not correct
because subversion does not necessarily include rebellion. Subversion, like treason, is a crime against
national security. Rebellion is a crime against public order.
Republic Act No. 1700 (quoted in full in People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA
382), which took effect on June 20, 1957 and which outlaws the Communist Party and similar associations
because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security,
punishes the following acts:
1. By arresto mayor, anyone who knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party or its successor or any subversive association
as defined in the law. Prision correccional shall be imposed for a second conviction. Prision
mayor shall be imposed for subsequent convictions.
2. By prision mayor to death, being an officer or a ranking leader of the Communist Party or of any
subversive association as defined in the law.
3. By prision mayor to death, any member of the Communist Party or similar subversive association
who takes up arms against the government.
4. By prision correccional to prision mayor, one who conspires with any other person to overthrow
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the government of any of its political
subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means for the purpose of placing
such Government or political subdivision under the control and donation of any alien power.
5. By prision correccional any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought
under the Anti-Subversion Law.
As already noted, Republic Act No. 1700 was superseded by Presidential Decree No. 885 which reads as
follows:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 885
OUTLAWING SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS; PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Whereas, there are certain associations or organizations in the Republic of the Philippines, not covered
by Republic Act No. 1700, which are seeking to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines or to dismember a portion thereof; and
Whereas, in order to protect the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the people, it has
become necessary to revise Republic Act No. 1700 to broaden its coverage;
Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers in me
vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree as follows:
Section 1. Short Title This decree shall be known as the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
Sec. 2. Subversive Associations and Organizations - Any association, organization, political
party, or group of persons organized for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines or for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, with the open or
covert assistance or support of a foreign power or the open or covert support from a foreign
source of any association, group or person, whether public or private, by force, violence,
terrorism, arson, petition, deceit or other illegal shall be considered and is hereby d a subversive
organization. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 31, effective on June 6, 1979 and P.D. No.
1736, Sept. 12, 1980.).
Sec. 3. Penalties (a) Members. Whoever knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates
with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization as defined in
Section 2 hereof shall be punished by arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently from
holding any public office, appointive or elective, and from exercising the right to vote; in case
of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall be prision correccional and in all subsequent
convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed.
The following acts shall constitute prima facie evidence of membership in any subversive association:
(1) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists records, correspondence,
or any other document of the organization;
(2) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;
(3) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans, or in
any other forms;
(4) Executing orders, plans or directives of any kind of such association or organization;
(5) Acting as an agent, courier, messenger, correspondent, organizer, or in any other capacity, on
behalf of such association or organization;
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of
any plan or enterprise thereof;
(7) Transmitting orders, directives, or plans of such association or organization orally or in writing or
any other means of communication such as by signal, semaphore, sign or code;
(8) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the
objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
(9) Mailing, shipping, . circulating, distributing, or delivering to other persons any material or
propaganda of any kind on behalf of such association or organization;
(10) Advising, counselling, or in other way giving instruction, information, suggestions, or
recommendations to officers or members or to any other person to further the objectives of such
association or organization;
(11) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such
association or organization.
(b) Officers or Ranking Leaders. If such member is an officer or a ranking leader of any subversive
association or organization as defined in Section 2 hereof, or if such member takes up arms against
the Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to death with all the accessory penalties
provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code.
(c) Deportation Any alien convicted under this decree shall be deported immediately after he shall
have served the sentence imposed upon him.
Sec. 4. False Testimony. Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought
under this decree shall be punished by prision correccional.
 Sec. 5. Sufficiency of Evidence. Except as provided in Section 7 hereof, the two-witness rule
heretofore provided in Republic Act Numbered Seventeen hundred is hereby obrogated and the
accused may be convicted on the testimony of one witness if sufficient under the rules of evidence, or
on his confession given in open court.
Sec. 6. No Restriction of Thought. Nothing in this decree shall be interpreted as a restriction on
freedom of thought, of assembly and of association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Sec. 7. Repealing Clause. This decree supersedes Republic Act Numbered Seventeen Hundred, but
acts committed in violation thereof and before the effectivity of this decree, shall be prosecuted and
punished in accordance with the provisions of the former Act. Nothing in this decree shall prevent
prosecution of cases pending for violation of Republic Act Numbered Seventeen Hundred.
Sec. 8. Sequestration of Property. The sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the Government and its duly constituted authorities,
is hereby authorized, in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense.
As used herein, the terms "sequester" and "sequestration" shall mean the seizure of private property
or assets in the hands of any person or entity in order to prevent the utilization, transfer or conveyance
of the same for purposes inimical to national security, or when necessary to protect the interest of the
Government or any of its instrumentalities. It shall include the taking over and assumption of the
management, control and operation of the private property or assets seized.
Sec. 9. Effectivity. This decree shall take effect thirty days after its publication in the Official
Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 3rd day of February, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-six.
Presidential Decree No. 885 is incorporated in section 14 of the National Security Code.
On the other hand, rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, Philippine
territory or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Rebellion is distinct from participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly
constituted government (People vs. Hernandez, 120 Phil. 191, 220).
The petitioners were accused of rebellion for having allegedly undertaken a public uprising to overthrow
the government. In contrast, they were accused of subversion for being allegedly officers and ranking
members of the Communist Party and similar subversive groups. The alleged overt acts of resisting the
armed forces were only incidental to the main charge of being leaders of subversive or revolutionary
organizations collaborating with an alien power to make the country a satellite thereof, like Cuba, North
Korea and North Vietnam in relation to Soviet Russia.
The issue on double jeopardy raised by the petitioners was resolved by this Court in People vs. Liwanag
alias Linda Bie, L-27683, October 19, 1976, 73 SCRA 473. In that case, Silvestre Liwanag was charged in
1960 with subversion for being an officer and ranking member of the CPP and HMB.
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy because he had already been
convicted of rebellion based on the same overt acts allegedly constituting the crime of subversion. The trial
court denied the motion. After trial he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He appealed to
this Court where he again raised the issue that the charge of subversion placed him in double jeopardy.
It was held that there was no double jeopardy because Liwanag was convicted of rebellion for acts
committed before the Anti-Subversion Law took effect while the subversion charge referred to his act of
having remained an officer and ranking leader of the CPP and HMB from the time the Anti-Subversion Law
took effect on June 20, 1957 up to his capture in 1960. Moreover. the crime of subversion is distinct from
rebellion.
In the instant case, the rebellion charge against the petitioners embraced the acts committed by them on or
about February 4, 1972 and during the period from August, 1973 to February, 1974. The subversion charge
against Buscayno involved his acts committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The subversion charge
against the Sison spouses referred to their acts committed in 1968 and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto. The common denominator of the rebellion and subversion charges is that the petitioners committed
overt acts as alleged communists or leftists. The overt acts in the two charges are different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long time. It may be committed by non-
communists without collaborating with the agents of an alien power. In contrast, the crime of subversion
came into existence when the communists sought to dominate the world in order to establish a new social
economic and political order.
The constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Law was upheld in People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December
27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382 and 56 SCRA 793. Long before the passage of the Anti-Subversion Law
membership in illegal associations has been penalized (Art. 146, Revised Penal Code).
A statute which punishes membership in a party or association that advocates the overthrow or destruction
of the government by force or violence is justified on the ground of self-preservation (Dennis vs. U.S., 341
U.S. 494, 509; Scales vs. U.S. 367 U.S. 203).
The unavoidable conclusion is that in the present posture of the pending cases against the petitioners their
plea of double jeopardy cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., concur in the result.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Except as to the statement that "ordinarily, this Court cannot review the rulings and proceedings of the
military commission" (p. 11) in respect of which I reserve my vote.
Abad Santos, J., concur.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition that with the approach taken the conclusion reached by the Court
expressed with his usual clarity in the able ponencia of justice Aquino was inevitable I find myself unable
to agree with my brethren on the question of the scope of our power of review over military tribunals,
especially so where the accused are civilians. Moreover, while it is not inaccurate to state that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries with it the suspension of the right to bail. 1 I am for a
reexamination of such a doctrine, Moreover, even if I did not succeed, it is my submission that there may
be a question of unconstitutional application of such a principle if, notwithstanding the advanced stage of
pregnancy of Mrs. Juliet Sison, she is not released on bail.
I am led to concur in the result primarily on the concept of the law of the case, the present petitioners having
failed in their previous petitions to transfer their cases to civilian tribunals. 2 I likewise concur with my
brethren on the lack of merit in the petition insofar as it contended that there was double jeopardy. Also,
while being the lone dissenter in People v. Ferrer, 3 where the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act was
challenged, I must perforce yield to the prevailing doctrine that it is not unconstitutional.
Hence this separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
1. On the question of the power of this Court to review actuations of military tribunals, I adhere to our
decision in Go v. Gen. Olivas. 4 That petition for habeas corpus was dismissed on the basic principle that
no jurisdictional question was raised by the person detained. Nonetheless, this Court made clear what are
the guiding principles to determine its jurisdiction whenever the actuation of a military tribunal is challenged
before it. Thus: "1. This Court in Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2 ruled that there is no constitutional
objection to military tribunals conducting trials of civilians for certain specified offenses, among which is
kidnapping. That does not preclude the judiciary, of course, from granting in appropriate cases applications
for the return of habeas corpus. There is, however, this limitation. The jurisdictional question must be
squarely raised. That is a doctrine implicit in the In re Carr 1902 decision, the opinion being penned by
Justice Willard. The leading case of Payomo v. Floyd, a 1922 decision, made it explicit. As set forth by
its ponente, Justice Street: "The next point to be observed upon it that, where the detained person is held in
restraint by virtue of a judgment rendered by a military or naval court, tribunal, or officer, no court
entertaining an application for the writ of habeas corpus has authority to review the proceedings of that
tribunal, court, or officer in the sense of determining whether the judgment was erroneous. The only question
to be considered is whether the court, tribunal, or officer rendering the judgment had jurisdiction to entertain
the case and render judgment at all. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case where
the writ of habeas corpus had been sued out to liberate a person detained by virtue of the sentence of a court-
martial, the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power by the writ of habeas corpus over the
proceedings of a court-martial and no mere errors in their proceedings are open to consideration. "The single
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. That being established, the habeas corpus must be denied and the petitioner
remanded. That wanting, it must be sustained and the petitioner discharged." ... As otherwise stated the rule
is that the proceedings of a military or naval court cannot be reviewed upon habeas corpus when it appears
that such tribunal had jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the offender was a person amenable to
its authority." The first Supreme Court decision after the Liberation in 1945, Cabiling v. Prison Officer,
reiterated such a doctrine. As set forth in the opinion of Chief Justice Moran: "It is alleged in the petition
for habeas corpus filed in his behalf that he is illegally detained, the General Court-Martial having no
jurisdiction to try and convict him for the crime charged. ... [The only] question to be determined is whether
or not the General Court-Martial was vested with jurisdiction to try and convict the petitioner for the crime
of murder. There seems to be no doubt that it had such jurisdiction. According to Article of War 12 "General
Courts-Martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law for any crime or offense made
punishable by these articles, ... " The petitioner, being a staff sergeant of the Philippine Scouts, United States
Army, is a person subject to military law, under Article of War 2, and in time of war, the crime of murder
committed by a person subject to military law, comes within the jurisdiction of a court-martial, in
accordance with Article of War 92." 2. What minimizes the difficulty facing a detained person, triable by a
military tribunal, is this categorical pronouncement by Justice Antonio, speaking for the Court, in the
aforesaidAquino v. Militar00y Commission decision: "It is important to note here that an accused being tried
before a military tribunal enjoys the specific constitutional safeguards pertaining to criminal trials. Thus, he
is entitled to be heard by himself and counsel to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf, and to be exempt from being a witness against himself. As in trial
before civil courts, the presumption of innocence can only be overcome by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. These tribunals, in general, are "bound to observe the fundamental rules
of law and principles of justice observed and expounded by the civil judicature" ... There is, therefore, no
justification for petitioner's contention that such military tribunals are concerned primarily with the
conviction of an accused and that proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of
petitioner's constitutional rights." Such being the case, the well-settled doctrine announced as early as 1924
by Justice Malcolm in Conde v. Rivera and subsequently reiterated, the latest case being Gumabon v.
Director of Prisons that came out in 1971, to the effect that a denial of a constitutional right may oust the
Court of jurisdiction, finds pertinence. In this petition, however, counsel failed to invoke such a principle,
relying instead on Jovito Go not falling within Proclamation No. 1081. There is plausibility to the argument
that under the ruling inAquino v. Ponce Enrile, the offense for which Go was indicted is not included in the
crime of insurrection or rebellion which supplied the basis for preventive detention under martial law
proclamation. That is not decisive of the controversy before us in view of the fact, as mentioned above, that
a military tribunal is vested with jurisdiction where the prosecution is one for kidnapping." 5
2. I am for the reexamination of the doctrine that the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus carries
with it the suspension of the right to bail. That was my view as one of the counsel in Hernandez v.
Montesa, 6 heard and thereafter decided in one opinion with Nava v. Gatmaitan. As set forth in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the majority was of that view but unfortunately there was one vote
short of the necessary six affirmative votes at that time. It is quite understandable if I find nothing
objectionable in his opinion when he cited extensively from Tanada and Fernando on the Constitution of
the Philippines Annotated. 7
3. A few additional observations. The petition made mention of the efforts of counsel to have the President
transfer the cases to the civil courts. The success of such endeavor would be for me a cause for gratification.
It would mean that the lifting of martial law would likewise put an end to the jurisdiction of military tribunals
over civilians, necessitated by the past period of emergency. At any rate, to the extent that the evidence
before respondent Military Commission found in the records was offered with due regard to the
constitutional rights of an accused, it could still be relied upon by the court to which the cases may be
transferred. In the event that such efforts would not be attended to with success, it would be desirable, to
my way of thinking, if there be only one military commission to continue with the trial of petitioners. There
is this last point. The opinion of the United States Supreme Court inDennis v. United States 8 and Scales v.
United States 9 were cited in the ponencia. The later case, as made clear in the opinion of Justice Harlan
while upholding the applicability of the Smith Act likewise emphasized that such statute requires proof of
a specific intent to bring about the violent overthrow of the government and proof of "active" as
distinguished from mere "nominal" or "passive," membership. Nonetheless, the more liberal view which for
me expresses the current state of American constitutional law is that set forth in Brandenburg v.
Ohio 10 decided in 1969 at the end of the last term of the Warren Court. To cite from the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court: "These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 11
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The principal questions presented in the case at bar assert (1) the constitutional right of civilians like
petitioners to the judicial process of civilian trials by the regular civil courts composed of judges trained in
the law whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and are
nurtured by the judicial tradition as against the executive process of trial by military tribunals composed of
military officers, specially so with the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981 through the President's
Proclamation No. 2045, and (2) petitioners' constitutional right to bail unless it could be shown that evidence
of guilt for the capital offense of subversion for which they are charged were strong. I dissent from the
majority decision's dismissal of the petition and denial of these constitutional rights invoked by them.
I. On the first question of the right of civilians to trial by judicial process, I dissent o the grounds stated in
my separate opinions in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 1 and in the latest cases this year of Buscayno
vs. Enrile 2 , Sison vs. Enrile 3 , and Luneta vs. Special Military Commission No. 1. 4
These cases were all decided before the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 2045 on January 17, 1981
revoking his previous proclamations of martial law (Nos. 1081 and 1104) as well as General Order No. 8,
and directing that "the Military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final
determination of cases pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable
prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render further
prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible."
In Sison particularly, the Court in dismissing the petition, unanimously noted that "(T)he President of the
Philippines has announced that the military tribunals are being phased out. It is reported that the Ministry
of Justice is now taking steps to transfer cases pending before the military tribunals to the civil courts.
Hence, the issues raised by the petitioners have become moot and academic."
With the official lifting of martial law under Proclamation No. 2045 and the revocation thereunder of
General Order No. 8 creating military tribunals, and pursuant to the Court's abovequoted pronouncement
in Sison on the phaseout of military tribunals, there is no longer any justification for continuing to subject
petitioners-civilians to trial by military commissions in derogation of the judicial power vested exclusively
in the civil courts.
As stressed in my separate opinion in Aquino, civilians like petitioners placed on trial for offenses under
general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Judicial power is
vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly
established by law. Military commissions or tribunals are not courts and do not form part of the judicial
system. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government, the military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning.
As was held in a leading U.S. Supreme Court case, 5 "the assertion of military authority over civilians
[discharged servicemen] cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of
martial law." The late Justice Hugo Black speaking for that Court aptly pointed out that "the presiding officer
at a court martial [or military commission] is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected
by tenure and undiminished salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer.
Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences,
the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes
it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command authority over
its members is a pervasive one in military law, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger," and "(A)
Court-Martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized
part of the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is preserved," and ex-servicemen should be
given "the benefits of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians. ... Free countries of the world
have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to
maintaining discipline among troops in active service."
Finally, it should be noted that there has been no showing by respondents that the cases against petitioners
fall within the only exception provided in Proclamation No. 2045 6 wherein the military tribunals which
are therein dissolvedmay make a "final determination " to wit, "cases pending therein which may not be
transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the State in view of rules on double jeopardy,
or other circumstances which render further prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible." Certainly,
neither the respondents nor the State claim, much less have shown, that the transfer of petitioners' cases to
the civil courts would result in "irreparable prejudice" to the State because of double jeopardy or that such
transfer to the civil courts would render further prosecution "difficult, if not impossible" in the face of
petitioners' assertion and insistence that the military tribunals have no jurisdiction over them as civilians.
II. On the second question on the right of petitioners to bail, absent a showing of strong evidence of guilt of
the capital offense of subversion, notwithstanding the saving. clause in Proclamation No. 2045 maintaining
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as to them as persons detained for rebellion and
subversion, I reiterate my adherence to the majority holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava vs. Gatmaitan
and Hernandez vs. Montesa 7 (although it000 failed one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative
votes at the time ) as expounded by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo that after
formal indictment in court by the filing against them of an information charging rebellion with multiple
murder, etc., accused persons covered by the proclamation of suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail. As stressed by then Chief Justice Paras, "(T)he right to bail,
along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph
17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be
contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the
distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other
rights (even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute
freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable."
I cannot improve on the presentation of the rationale of the failed majority in the cited right to bail cases as
made in the oft-cited work of Tanada and Fernando, and herewith reproduce the same:
In Nava v. Gatmaitan and Hernandez v. Montesa, the question presented before the Supreme Court
was the effect on the right to bail of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. For lack of one vital
vote, to make a majority of six as required by the Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to speak in unmistakable language that constitutional rights mean what they say and that
the Constitution is supreme, emergency to the contrary notwithstanding. Respondent judges in the
above two petitions ruled that the petitioners were included among those coming within the terms of
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and were for that reason not entitled to
their constitutional right to bail Upon the matter being taken before the Supreme Court, five of the
nine Justices who voted on the question were of the opinion that petitioners under the Constitution
have the right to bail unless it could be shown that evidence of guilt for the capital offense of which
they were charged were strong. In thus arriving at that conclusion, the above five justices merely
applied literally the terms of the controlling constitutional provision.
As Chief Justice Paras expressed it:
* * * The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail they
would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of Ex Parte Milligan. 4
Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest
to remain forever inviolable.
Justice Tuason had no doubts on the matter either:
To the plea that the security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail,
the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for courts to tamper with the
fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible,
yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency or the so-called "judicial statesmanship." The
Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its responsibilities limitations would
do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let
the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the Constitution stands, the
courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual
rights.
From Justice Bengzon, . . . .
there is a cogent and forceful presentation of the argument that respect for constitutional rights would
aid in the fight against Communism in the Philippines.
And in my opinion, one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a sincere demonstration of this
Government's adherence to the principles of the Constitution together with an impartial application
thereof to all citizens, whether dissidents or not. Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that their
comrades now under custody are being railroaded into Muntinlupa, without benefit of those
fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed essential for the protection of all
persons accused of crane before the tribunal of justice. Give them the assurance that the judiciary, ever
mindful of its sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced devotion, uphold any doubtful claims
of Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but will always cling to the principles
uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the Constitution,
"the Courts will favor personal liberty." (Ex parte Burford 3 Cranch, & U.S., Law Ed. Book 2, at p.
495). 8
III. A final word on the statements in the main opinion 9 that would deny to this Supreme Court the
right to "review the rulings and proceedings of the military commission" or at best limit such review
"to decisions of the Court of Military Appeals10 in cases appealed to it from the military commission."
It must first be noted that these statements do not carry the affirmance of a majority of the Court that
would unsettle or overthrow this Courts consistent exercise of its judicial power and jurisdiction
through the prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition or habeas corpus over cases, including
military commissions (in whatever stage of the proceedings), where a violation or denial of
constitutional rights is asserted by the aggrieved party, although not always with successful results. In
this very case, the Court did again exercise, with the required concurrence of at least eight (8)
members, its jurisdiction over proceedings in the military commissions per its Resolution of October
22, 1981 through the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent military
commissions "from proceeding with the trial of petitioners ... until otherwise ordered by the Court."