ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL vs NATRAPHARM
(RTC) denied respondent's application for a TRO, ruling that even if
Policy: As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any
interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident;
because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect
after the decision in the main petition.
Facts:
Respondent is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures and
sells a medicine bearing the generic name "CITICOLINE," which is indicated for
heart and stroke patients under its registered trademark "ZYNAPSE,"
Allegedly unknown to respondent, since 2003 or even as early as 2001, petitioners
have been selling a medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan bearing the generic
name "CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the
brand name "ZYNAPS," which trademark is however not registered with the
IPO. Moreover, respondent claimed that the drug CARBAMAZEPINE has one
documented serious and disfiguring side-effect called "Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome," and that the sale of the medicines "ZYNAPSE" and "ZYNAPS" in
the same drugstores will give rise to medicine switching.
Respondent sent petitioners a cease-and-desist demand letter, pointing out that
"ZYNAPSE" is the registered trademark of [respondent], and that as such owner,
it has exclusive trademark right under the law to the use thereof and prevent others
from using identical or confusingly similar marks.
Petitioners refused to heed the above demand, claiming that they had prior use of
the name "ZYNAPS" since year 2003, having been issued by the BFAD a
Certificate of Product Registration.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for trademark infringement
with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction
RTC Desision: its December 21, 2007 Order,21 the Regional Trial Court
respondent was able to first register its mark "ZYNAPSE" with the IPO
in 2007, it is nevertheless defeated by the prior actual use by petitioners
of "ZYNAPS" in 2003.
Via a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction, respondent questioned before the CA the RTC's
denial of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
CA DECISION: CA issued a Resolution24 denying respondent's
application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of merit. BUT
THIS WAS REVERSE BY THE CA. contrary to its earlier resolutions
denying the application for a TRO/preliminary injunction, the CA, in its
April 18, 2011 Decision, upheld the allegations of respondent that it is
entitled to (permanent) injunctive relief on the basis of its IPO
registration and permanently enjoined petitioners from the
commercial use of "ZYNAPS. The petition for certiorari was
granted.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review. December 2, 2011, the RTC
rendered a Decision27 on the merits of the case. It found petitioners
liable to respondent for damages. Moreover, it enjoined the petitioners
from using "ZYNAPS". Respondent moved to dismiss the present
petition in view of the December 2, 2011 RTC Decision which functions
as a full adjudication on the merits of the main issue of trademark
infringement.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the decision on the merits rendered the issues in this
case moot and academic? (YES)
2) Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a
petition for certiorari against the denial of an application for a
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC? (NO)
HELD:

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete

evidence.30 The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is
needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.31 As such, the findings of
fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are
interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is
commenced or terminated.32

By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of

Court, forms part of the judgment on the merits and it can only be properly
ordered only on final judgment. A permanent injunction may thus be granted after
a trial or hearing on the merits of the case.

As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any

interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident;
because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect
after the decision in the main petition.34

Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by issuing a

permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety of the denial
of an ancillary writ. But with the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on the
case for "Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages and Destruction,"
the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and
academic. We note that the case brought to the CA on a petition for certiorari
merely involved the RTC's denial of respondent's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, a mere ancillary writ. Since a decision on the merits
has already been rendered and which includes in its disposition a permanent
injunction, the proper remedy is an appeal.

BF HOMES, INC. and the PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND
CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
POLICY: Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and
PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151, then it was also devoid of any authority to act
on the application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction contained in the same Petition. The ancillary and
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an
incident of an independent action or proceeding.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived
by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither would the active participation
of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer jurisdiction on the RTC where
the latter has none over a cause of action. 29 Indeed, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action.30
ISSUE: W/N the RTC jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
against MERALCO?
Facts: BF Homes and PWCC filed a Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and for the Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order]
against MERALCO before the RTC. BF Homes and PWCC then alleged in their
RTC Petition that: On May 20, 2003, without giving any notice whatsoever,
MERALCO disconnected electric supply to [BF Homes and PWCCs] sixteen
(16) water pumps located in BF Home. [BF Homes and PWCC] received by
facsimile transmission a letter from MERALCO, x x x, in which MERALCO
demanded to [BF Homes and PWCC] the payment of electric bills amounting to
P4,717,768.15
Petitioners contention: Even while MERALCO was serving its reply-letter to
[BF Homes and PWCC], MERALCO, again, without giving any notice, cut off
power supply to [BF Homes and PWCCs] five (5) water pumps.
MERALCO threatened to cut off electric power connections to all of [BF
Homes and PWCCs] water pumps if [BF Homes and PWCC] failed to
pay their bills. In refusing to apply [MERALCOs] electric bills against
the amounts that it was ordered to refund to [BF Homes and PWCC]
pursuant to the MERALCO Refund cases MERALCO acted with utmost
bad faith. BF Homes and PWCC additionally prayed that the RTC issue a
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order considering that:
As indicated in its letter dated June 4, 2003 (Annex A), unless seasonably
restrained, MERALCO will cut off electric power connections to all of
[BF Homes and PWCCs] water pumps on June 20, 2003.
Meralco: MERALCO filed before the RTC its Answer with
Counterclaims. It argued that The Company reserves the right to
discontinue service in case the customer is in arrears in the payment of
bills. MERALCO sought the dismissal of the RTC Petition of BF
Homes and PWCC on the ground that Court has no jurisdiction to
award the relief prayed for by [BF Homes. That respondent is directed
to make the refund to its customers in accordance with the decision of the
ERC (formerly ERB) dated February 16, 1998. Hence, [MERALCO] has
to wait for the schedule and details of the refund to be approved by the
ERC before it can comply with the Supreme Court decision.
MERALCO opposed the application for writ of preliminary injunction of
BF Homes and PWCC because BF HOMES and PWCC] HAVE NO
CLEAR RIGHT WHICH WARRANTS PROTECTION BY
INJUNCTIVE PROCESS.
RTC Decision: RTC issued an Order on November 21, 2003 granting the
application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondent Manila Electric Company is
permanently restrained from proceeding with its announced intention to
cut-off electric power connection to [BF Homes and PWCCs] water
pumps unless otherwise ordered by this Court. Further, [BF Homes and
PWCC] are hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P500,000 to answer
for whatever injury.
CA: Court of Appeals agreed with MERALCO that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 03-0151, as said trial
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case to begin with. gainsaid
that the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Explicitly,
Section 43(u) of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power
Industry Reform Act," (RA 9136), states that the ERC shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties
imposed by the ERC
ISSUE: W/N the RTC jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
against MERALCO? (NO)
Court also deems it appropriate to already order the dismissal of the
Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151 for lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the same. Although
only the matter of the writ of preliminary injunction was brought before
this Court in the instant Petition, the Court is already taking cognizance
of the issue on the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the
Petition. The Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or
waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither would the
active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer
jurisdiction on the RTC where the latter has none over a cause of
action.29 Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.30

HELD:

Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the
EPIRA over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the
ERC in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities, and over all
cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in the energy
sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and Regulation provides
that the ERC "shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are essential
in the discharge of its functions as in independent quasi-judicial body."

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in
Civil Case No. 03-0151, then it was also devoid of any authority to act on the
application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction contained in the same Petition. The ancillary and provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an incident of an independent
action or proceeding.

The RTC not only lacked the jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction against MERALCO, but that the RTC actually had no jurisdiction at all
over the subject matter of the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC.

NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES DENNIS and CHERYLIN* GARCIA, doing business under the
name and style "Ecolamp Multi Resources,", Respondents.
Policy: Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an
adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action
or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the
main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant.isi Being
merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit
itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be
justified.
The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment
which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered
appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of
the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such
action
Issue:
(a) whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary
attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter
ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA; and (b) whether the CA erred in
ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the subsequent discharge of any
excess attachment found by said commissioner.
G.R. No. 133303 February 17, 2005
BERNARDO VALDEVIESO, petitioner, vs.
CANDELARIO DAMALERIO AND AUREA C. DAMALERIO,
respondents.
POLICY: The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey
or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or
conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the
deed. Thus, when petitioner bought the property on 05 December
1995, it was, at that point, no more than a private transaction
between him and the spouses Uy. It needed to be registered before it
could bind third parties, including respondents.
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale.17 This result is a necessary
consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered
by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle
that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land.18
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished
even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so
because an attachment is a proceeding in rem
ISSUE: whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land is
a superior lien over that of an earlier unregistered deed of sale
K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, and ANTONIO D. PINZON,respondents.
POLICY: It has been held that the failure to allege in the affidavit the
requisites prescribed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the
property of the defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is deemed
to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction.
In an action for recovery of sum of money, it should also be alleged that the
debtor is about to depart from the Philippines with the intent to defraud his
creditors.
ISSUE: Was there a valid ground for attachment? NO.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, Respondent.
Policy: t is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is
a resident temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ
of attachment because the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by
substituted service instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The
misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent does not reside in the Philippines
and its omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move to ensure that
the application for the writ will be granted.
Issue: Is Alejandro a nonresident making the attachment valid? (NO)
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or
QUEENSLAND TOURIST INN, and TEODORICO ADARNA,respondents.
POLICY: Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." 17 The phase, "at the
commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the
filing of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is the date that
marks "the commencement of the action;" 18 and the reference plainly
is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an
action is properly commenced by the filing of the complaint and the
payment of all requisite docket and other fees the plaintiff may apply
for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the
pertinent requisites laid down by law.
Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,decided
on April 18, 1989, 25 this Court had occasion to emphasize the postulate
that no hearing is required on an application for preliminary
attachment, with notice to the defendant, for the reason that this
"would defeat the objective of the remedy . . . (since the) time which
such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant
to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment
issues."
With respect to the other provisional remedies, i.e., preliminary
injunction (Rule 58), receivership (Rule 59), replevin or delivery of
personal property (Rule 60), the rule is the same: they may also issue
ex parte. 29
For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms
the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex
parteprovided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites
therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its
discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the
defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued
may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the
complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the
application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted
separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the
plaintiff's attachment bond.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid issuance of the writ considering that summons
was served simultaneously with the implementation of the writ? YES.