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VIVA
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BRILL Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 www.brill.nl/viv
Christophe Erismann
University of Cambridge
Abstract
In his major work, the Periphyseon , the ninth century Latin philosopher John Scottus
Eriugena gives, with the help of what he calls "dialectic", a rational analysis of reality.
According to him, dialectic is a science which pertains both to language and reality.
Eriugena grounds this position in a realist ontological exegesis of the Aristotelian
categories, which are conceived as categories of being. His interpretation tends to
transform logical patterns, such as Porphyry's Tree or the doctrine of the categories,
into a structure which is both ontological and logical, and to use them as tools for the
analysis of the sensible world. The combination of dialectic interpreted as a science of
being, capable of expressing truths about the sensible world as well as about discourse,
with an ontological interpretation of logical concepts allows Eriugena to develop his
metaphysical theory, a strong realism. Eriugena not only supports a theological realism
(of divine ideas), but also, and principally, an ontological realism, the assertion of the
immanent existence of forms. Eriugena claims that genera and species really subsist in
the individuals: they are completely and simultaneously present in each of the entities
which belong to them.
Keywords
Eriugena, categories, universais, realism
The ninth century Irish philosopher John Scottus Eriugena1 provides one
of the rare medieval examples of a Neoplatonic approach to logic.2 His
l) Eriugena was the translator into Latin of several works by late Greek Neoplatonic authors
(Maximus the Confessor and Pseudo-Dionysius). As a master of Liberal Arts in the Palatine
school, he was also engaged in the study of grammar and logic.
2) On the existence, during the Middle Ages, of a Neoplatonic tradition in logic, see De Libera
(1981).
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204 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
3) The attempt mentioned in Periphyseon 469AB to subsume the ten categories under two
other, even higher, genera ( motus and situs) is illustrative of Eriugenas relation to the Platonic
tradition.
4) On the Neoplatonic project of harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle, see Karamanolis (2006).
5) Boethius (1880), 79:9-80:9. See Zambn (2003).
6) Cf Samstag (1929), 8: 'Die Dialektik ist die philosophische Grundwissenschaft oder Sein-
slehre und die ontologische Methode des Johannes, der damit seine Zugehrigkeit zum Piatonis-
mus sehr entschieden zu erkennen gibt'.
7) On Eriugena and the Categoriae decern , see Marenbon (1980).
8) On the presence of Neoplatonic elements in the Isagoge and their use by Eriugena, see Eris-
mann (2004).
9) For remarks on the way in which the availability of texts can determine the understanding of
metaphysics, see De Libera (1999b). On the peculiarity of early medieval metaphysical thought
in this respect, see Erismann (2005).
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 205
10) Hie only ancient philosophical works available were the fragment of the Timaeus translate
Calcidius, the different parts of the Logica vetus , i.e. principally the Categories (or the parap
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206 C Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
Categoriae decern ), Porphyry's Isagoge , the De interpretation , and Boethius' works ( Opusc
Sacra , Consolatio and some logical commentaries and monographs).
n) This point highlights Eriugena's 'Platonism'. He is in line with the Greek Neoplatonic thi
ers who understood the structure of reality, in the words of Gersh (1978), 125, as a continu
series of causes and effects in which each term is related dynamically to the previous one
it "remains" in its prior (manifests an element of identity with it), it "proceeds" (manifests
element of difference), and it "reverts" (strives to re-establish the identity)'.
12) Cf Eriugena, Periphyseon 463C [I, 33: 919]: 'Deus autem nec genus nec species est';
589A [II, 87: 2054-2056]: 'Similiter neque genus est neque forma neque species neque numer
eque OYCIA siue generalissima siue specialissima subsisti. Passages from the Periphyseon
quoted from the edition of E. Jeauneau. All references are to the Patrologia Latina and, in brac
ets, to the edition of CCCM [volume, page: lines].
13) Periphyseon book I; e.g. 463B [I, 33: 903-905]: 'dum ad theologiam (hoc est ad diui
essentiae inuestigationem) peruenitur, kategoriarum uirtus omnino extinguitur' and 4
[I, 33: 916-920]: 'Clare conspicio nulla ratione kategorias de natura ineffabili proprie p
praedicari [...]. Nulla igitur kategoria proprie deum significare potest'.
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 207
The second reason lies in the fact that Eriugenas ontology is based on th
categories understood in a Porphyrian way, as the principles of multiplicity,14
and on the division of substance known as Porphyry's Tree ( Isagoge 4: 21-25
and 5: 1-5). The result of Eriugenas syncretism is that the categories apply to
the sensible world and are integrated into a wider metaphysics.
Eriugena gives an analysis of the sensible world, in which universais and
particulars, general and particular entities, are combined in a hierarchy
that runs from the unique genus generalissimm down to the multiplicity of
individuals - the individuals being understood, following Porphyry {Isagoge 6:
19-24), as the numerical multiplication of a unique and common specific
essence. Eriugenas masterpiece is based on the identification of the dialectical
process of diuisio or diairetike with the ontological process of processio or
proodosP As a result, the logical operation of division corresponds exactly to
the ontological procession, that is, to the movement of creation of the world.
The logical division of ousia into genera, species, and individuals,16 and the
arrangement into categories (among which space and time) are the determina-
tions of the sensible world. Dialectic has two natures: it is an internal rule of
reality, or law of nature, and a paradigm for correct reasoning. The correctnes
of dialectical reasoning is guaranteed by its ontological foundation. Dialectic
as a means of human reasoning is truth-attaining because the human mind
recreates a movement of division or synthesis which is present in things.17
Eriugenas ontology of the sensible world has two main foundations: on the
one hand, the Neoplatonic understanding of dialectic, confirmed by Augus-
tine, and on the other, the realist interpretation of the Categoriae decern - th
text through which Eriugena knew the doctrine of the categories - and of Por
phyry's Isagoge. Before pursuing these issues further, it may be useful to explain
what is meant by a Neoplatonic understanding of dialectic, and to outlin
the ways through which Eriugena came to be in contact with such a doctrine.
14) See Isagoge 5: 9-12 (1966 11:1) where the genus generalissimm, is said to be a supremum e
primm principium.
15) This idea of assimilating the logical division to the ontological procession is typically Neopla-
tonic. The first occurrence is probably Iamblichus (quoted in the Scholia Platonica {ad Soph. 216A)
"The diairetike imitates the procession from the One"; see Bechtle (2002), 175-218. This idea i
developed by Proclus ( Theol Plat. I 9); see Lloyd (1982), 22-23.
16) See Moran (1989), 139: 'Dialectic is not just how the mind proceeds, it is also the way the
hierarchy of reality itself is ordered'.
17) See Beierwaltes (1986), 220-1: 'Being therefore possesses a dialectical structure that can be
adequately translated into dialectic as a methodology'.
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208 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 209
for our problem. If dialectic is not a human construct, but an inquiry into
internal rationality of reality, its subject necessarily lies outside the frame
of speech; dialectic pertains to things themselves.21 This is one of the tex
foundations for the status which Eriugena gives to dialectic - that of a law
nature.
[. . .] that art which divides the genera into species and resolves the species into genera,
which is called dialectic did not arise from human contrivance, but was first implanted in
the nature of things (in natura rerum) by the originator of all the arts that are properly so
called, and was discovered by the wise who make use of it in their subtle investigations of
reality.22
Two things are immediately noticeable: the foundations of dialectic must not
be sought in discourse or in concepts but in the nature of things. Dialectic has
not been invented nor artificially developed, but has been discovered through
a close study of reality. Likewise, its scope is not limited to discourse but per-
tains more fundamentally to the make-up of things. Thus, in a Neoplatonic
way, Eriugena holds that dialectic, whose role is to combine and distinguish
the natures of existing knowable things, and to give to each thing its definition,
allows a true theoretical inquiry of things ( uera rerum contemp lati) . 23
Dialectic is called 'ratio discretionis naturarum' (48 IB) and 'doctrina cog-
nitionis et diiudicationis naturarum' (827A). The word 'natura is sometimes
used by Eriugena - as in this case - to mean the state of creatures submitted
to spatiotemporal categories. Dialectic deals with the categories and their sub-
divisions into genera and species: 'it is the function of that part of philosophy
which is called dialectic to break down these genera [i.e. the ten categories]
into their subdivisions from the most general to the most specific, and to
21) Note the interference between Augustinin texts as to their interpretation: the reading of the
De doctrina Christiana probably influenced the understanding of the other treatise ascribed dur-
ing the Middle Ages to Augustine, the Categoriae decern .
22) Periphyseon 749 A [IV, 12: 284-288]. English translations of the Periphyseon are originally by
Sheldon-Williams, in O'Meara (1987), but have been frequently modified.
23) Periphyseon 486B [I, 62: 1879-1883].
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210 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
collect them together again from the most specific to the most general'.24
These categories are categories of what is, categories of being in the strong
sense of the word.
Eriugena 'raises the notion of dialectic from the simple level of a scientia
sermocinalis to that of an ontological inquiry' (D'Onofrio 1986b, 239). Far
from producing arbitrary patterns of thought, dialectic is, according to Eri-
ugena, an art which can be discovered in the nature of things. It is not only a
logical operation, but also the reflection of a natural process. Eriugena expresses
this idea in a remarkably powerful phrase - the naturalis ratio which governs
dialectic is nothing but the rerum necessitas (917A).25 Etienne Gilson (1942,
207) understood this clearly: 'division and analysis are not simply abstract
methods of arranging and disarranging ideas, but are the law of being itself. The
universe is a vast dialectic ruled by an internal method.' Through its method
of division and analysis - the logical classification and ontological hierarchy of
existing beings as species and genera - dialectic follows the ordered and hier-
archical structure of reality. The ontological ordering of beings into genera,
species and individuals is not an artificial conjecture of the human mind,
but a transposition of the structure of reality: the logical and ontological
classifications are similar and express an identical reality.
Eriugena often insists on the natural character of dialectical movements -
on division as a process. Far from being the result of human intellectual activ-
ity, these movements are the work of nature and belong not to the logical, but
to the ontological order:
[. . .] if someone, by exercising reason in accordance with that art which is called analytike ,
unites the individuals into their species and the species into their genera and the genera into
OUSIA by gathering them together, they are said to suffer. It is not because he himself
gathers them, for they are gathered, as also they are divided, by nature; but because he
seems to gather them by an act of his reason. And similarly, when he divides them, he is said
to act, and they to suffer.26
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 211
dialectic and the structure of the sensible world, as well as the background of
Porphyry's Tree and of the five predicables, are obvious:
But science is the power by which the contemplative mind, whether human or angelic,
discourses on the nature of the things which proceed from the primordial causes through
generation and which are divided into genera and species by means of differences and
properties, whether it is susceptible to accidents or without them, whether joined to bodies
or altogether free from them, whether it is distributed over places and times or, outside
places and times, is unified and inseparable by reason of its simplicity; and this species of
reason is called physics.27
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212 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
Does not that art which the Greeks call "Dialectic" and which is defined as the science of
disputing well, concern itself with OUSIA as its own proper principle, from which eve
division and multiplication of those things which that art discusses takes its origin, descen
ing through the most general genera and the genera of intermediate generality as far as t
most special forms and species, and also never ceasing to return, according to the rules
synthesis, by the same steps by which it descended until it reaches that same OUSIA from
which it issued, does not cease to return to it; and it yearns to rest in it forever, and to b
gathered in with it in a movement that is entirely or mostly intelligible?31
The fact that ousia is the principal subject of dialectic shows its strong link
ontology. For Eriugena, dialectic is first of all the science of essence. The pr
macy of ousia in dialectic is a postulate inherited from Middle Platonism,
philosophical current which strongly influenced Porphyry,32 who himself
one of Eriugenas sources. Take, for instance, Alcinous, according to whom t
task of dialectic is firstly to examine the essence of all things and to search
nature of each thing by division and definition.33
Eriugenas philosophical position is based on the identification of the dia-
lectical movement of diairetike and analytike with the ontological movem
of proodos and epistrophe. The dialectical divisio overlays the ontological proces
differentias usque ad ultimas species separari, atque ea quae multa sunt, in unum generum r
one collidere.'
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 213
Eriugena sees the diairetical descent from the universal to the particular
analogous to the ontological relation between them. In the same way as t
mind conceives the division of a genus into its species, in nature, the ge
unfolds in order to create its subdivisions by transmitting its being. The p
ence of the genus animal in this cat is the ontological cause of its anima
The most universal entity causes the being of those which are inferior, and
applies from the top to the bottom of the ontological hierarchy constitute
Porphyry's Tree.
The creation of nature is seen as the unfolding of the logical hierarchy f
the genus generalissimm down to the individuals. This Tree is presente
being the divine plan and is called upon by Eriugena in the exegesis of cer
verses from Genesis (cf Periphyseon 748CD). Eriugena thus assigns to diale
the task of reconstructing in thought and language the movement of real
i.e. the multiplying procession of the one into the multiple and the unify
conversion of the multiple into the one. It is then easy to postulate the ex
coincidence between notions and the substance of things.34
Eriugena gives a realist ontological exegesis of the texts of the Logica vetu
maintains that the subject of the Categorie s55 and of the Isagoge is prim
things, and not words or concepts. In the words of the Neoplatonic school,
Eriugena, the skopos of the Categories is things. Convinced that the scop
dialectic covers the fields of philosophy of language, metaphysics, and in
restricted manner, physics, Eriugena makes dialectic into the means of inq
and analysis of the ontological structure of reality, of its reflection in o
thought, and of the way we express it through language. Two claims fol
from this:
1 . The categories are the highest genera of being. They are the principles of
reality.
2. Porphyry's Tree corresponds to the ontological structure of reality. The
world is a realization of this division of substance.
34) See Periphyseon 769A [IV, 41: 1093-1095]: 'Quid ergo mirum, si rerum notio, quam mens
humana possidet, dum in ea creata est, ipsarum rerum quarum notio est substantia intelligatur.
35) On Eriugena on the categories, see von Perger (2005).
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214 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
For since, according to Aristotle, there are ten genera of things (< decern genera rerum) which
are called categories, that is, predicaments, and we find that none of the Greeks or the
Latins oppose this division of things into genera [. . .].36
Aristotle, the shrewdest among the Greeks, as they say, in discovering the way of distin-
guishing natural things ( naturalium rerum), included the innumerable variety of all things
which come after God and are created by Him in ten universal genera which he called the
ten categories, that is, predicaments. Nothing can be found in the multitude of created
things {in multitudine creatarum rerum) and in the various motions of minds which cannot
be included in one of these genera.37
There are ten genera of things (< decern genera rerum) which are called "categories" by the
Greeks, and "predicaments" by the Latins: substance, quantity, quality, relation, position,
state, place, time, action, passion.38
The categories are categories of being in the strong sense. They are the highes
genera of things and not only logical entities. This conception of the categories
is associated with the claim that genera and species have real being. For some-
one who holds that the subject of the Categories is things, this determines, at
least in part, the answer given to the problem of universais, in a realist direc-
tion. This is precisely Eriugena's choice.
Secondly, the structure of Porphyry's Tree is not only a logical structure of
thought, but also the exact reproduction of reality. It is the structural pattern
according to which reality was created by God, exists in the sensible world,
and is thought by man. According to Eriugena, the world is a complete real-
ization of Porphyry's Tree; the hierarchy of genera and species is real. Genera
and species are not only logical categories, but ontological degrees of reality.
General ousia is the cause of the being of all its subdivisions, genera, species
and individuals (cf 605AB: Omnis substantia a generali essentia defluit ).39 The
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 215
At the top, there is the most general genus which is called ousia by the Greeks, and essence
by us, above which it is impossible to go. For it is an essence which embraces all nature;
everything which is, subsists through participating in it, and for this reason, it is called the
most general genus. It descends through divisions, through genera and species, until [it
reaches] the most special species, which is called atomos by the Greeks, that is, the individ-
ual: for instance, one man or one ox.40
For Eriugena, Porphyry's Tree is the backbone of reality. Its subsequent logical
structure reflects the nature of things. Dialectic must express in its logical
formulations the ontological priority of animal regarding man and the fact
that animal causes the animalhood of man.
A Realist Ontology
Thus Eriugena admits into his ontology three types of substantial entities:
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216 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
41) For a summary of this thesis, see Proclus (1987), 40-41: 'Every universal, that is, every o
that includes a many, either appears in the particulars and has its existence in them and i
inseparable from them, holding its place in their ranks moving as they move and remaini
motionless when they are stationary; or exists prior to the many and produces plurality b
offering its appearances to the many instances, itself ranged indivisibly above them but enablin
these derivatives to share in its nature in a variety of ways; or is formed from particulars b
reflection and has its existence as an after-effect, a later-born addition to the many'.
42) CfNorris Clarke (1982), 116.
43) Periphyseon 703AB [III, 120: 3489-121: 3501].
44) Periphyseon 491AB [I, 68: 2088-2091].
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C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218 217
N. - How does it seem to you? Is not OUSIA wholly and properly contained wit
the most general genera and in the more general genera as well as in the genera themse
and in their species and again in those most special species which are called atoms, that
individuals?
A. - I see that there nothing else in which OUSIA can be naturally present except in
genera and species which extend from the highest down to the lowest, that is from the m
general to the most special, that is, the individuals, and up in turn from the individuals
the most general genera. For universal OUSLA subsists in these as if in its natural parts
45) Eriugena criticizes the notion of primary substance by using the argument that, since a
substantial being of the individual is given by the species, nothing distinguishes substantiall
individual from its species. See Periphyseon 470D-471A [I, 42:1224-1235].
46) Periphyseon 942C [V, 115: 3697-3703].
47) Here the scheme originates in Porphyry {Isagoge 7: 19-27) and was transmitted thro
Boethius' De trinitate (2000, 167: 46-168: 63).
48) See Gracia (1984), 129-135.
9) Periphyseon 472C [1,44: 1295-45: 1305].
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218 C. Erismann / Vivarium 45 (2007) 203-218
50) Periphyseon 479C [I, 53: 1590-1592]: 'Nam genera et species et ATOMA propterea sempe
sunt ac permanent quia inest eis aliquod unum indiuiduum, quod solui nequit neque destru
Cf Categoriae decern 57, AL I, 1-5, 145: 28: 'ipsa autem usia genus non habet cum omnia i
sustinea.
51) See Erismann (2002).
52) I am grateful to John Marenbon for his helpful suggestions and I am indebted to his pione
ing work on the philosophy of Eriugena. I would like to thank the British Academy for suppor
ing my research.
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