Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL.
LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO
FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO
OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME
JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL.
MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L.
PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO
A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON
PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO
FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO
FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO,
and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS
OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN
REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T.
MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT
JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio,
Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues
arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the
failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the
conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the
creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its
ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed
oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its
ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a
petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are
likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted
pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and
96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the
petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
 Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of
witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the
PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion
for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from
notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel
gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of
War 71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of
his knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries
as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition
of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by
a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution
witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the
motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-
affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their
right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been
discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM
No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After
considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in
contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained
that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be
taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc
Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-
martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not
apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-
Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14,
this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot
as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P.
Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their
side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI
Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was
resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly
warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date
above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to
heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges
to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now
settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of
1
jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction.
 The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695,
93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70

(The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408)
can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise
of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and
does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a
defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation.
In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the
same contention, reversing a court- martial conviction where failure to
comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not
persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the
standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required
analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that
the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General

of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation,
court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been
expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This
later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70
are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to
the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70
but left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under
article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in
criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation
does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than
2
two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77,
as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-
respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio
Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of
Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets
were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided
under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in
the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
 investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the
dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the
witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to
subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in
accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles
of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato
de Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding
officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the
Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may
appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior
competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been
shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen.
De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is
significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he
would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal
respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other
respondents by the Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by

the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than
one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented
and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for
cause.

3
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing
army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory
challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in
any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no
mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a
court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-
 Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the
Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in
military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the
formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been
indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War
18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with
the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge,
thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to

insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by
a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify
the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing
threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39
was embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the
dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending
therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein.
With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the
reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic

canon
of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.Cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As
a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains
withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative,
having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the
"iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present
government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent
in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the
accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in
the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary
can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a
problem only the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts
of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also
4
cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation
Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the
remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion"
as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action
suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions
5
forhabeas corpus and quo warranto. In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of
a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from
the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities
outside of and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

 National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release
on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order
were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this
Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not
apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have
been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more
than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
due process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the
private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the
PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20,
1991, the private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were
required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this
was explained by the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation
only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass review
and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against
him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is
wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to
release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is
arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the
person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be
6
punished as a court martial may direct.

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the
government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately
denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules
of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991.
Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in
Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
(AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional
grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by
him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion
or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts
complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the
right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the
private respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is
GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny
bail to accused military personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of
1
"those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." The Charter
2
also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." To
deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all
persons" the coverage of the right.

I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of
the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer
number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume
their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including
this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
3
and justice." But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis
justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced
by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted
the same right.

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit,
however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of
laws, not tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny
bail to accused military personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of
1
"those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." The Charter
2
also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." To
deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all
persons" the coverage of the right.

I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of
the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer
number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume
their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including
this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
3
and justice." But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis
justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced
by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted
the same right.

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit,
however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of
laws, not tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

Footnotes

1 28 SCRA 540,
2 168 SCRA 264.
3 32 SCRA 106.
4 186 SCRA 287.
5 Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Sec. 9l and Sec. 21(l), B.P. 129.
6 Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559, April 26, 1991.
SARMIENTO, J.
1 CONST., art. III, sec. 13.
2 Supra.
3 Decision, 20.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on
2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are
those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act
shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of
the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including
those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application
on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the
same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year
of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative
1
results. Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does
not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a
government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two
consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than
meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget
and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government
corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular
benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we
should not be entitled to RA 6683.

2
xxx xxx xxx

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxx

 We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of
Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years
of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said
applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of
December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from
the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this
Commission shall sustain its original decision.

3
xxx xxx xxx

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that
she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No.
89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment
status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No.
88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:

"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:

a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to

perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e.
membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including

those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-
INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated

from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616,
4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or
P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment

of this law and have received the corresponding benefits of that
retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory

separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing
within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein
authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and
their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms.
Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the
Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position
which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were
given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful,
continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic)
4
purpose of the law.
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of
Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management
and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was
completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla.
She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and
transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-
career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not
even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the
term of office (i.e., duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
5
reorganization to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with
the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the
government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a
short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its
personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact,
6
there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span.

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to
define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807
(promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement
Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage,
unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:

1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is
made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in
7
pursuance thereof;

2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such
temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a
qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
 (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include
the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical
positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own
merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by
the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a
separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing

governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

9
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.

Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of
the President and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff;

4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance

with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills
not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in
no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under
his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.

10
5. emergency and seasonal personnel.

There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable,
sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber
Co., 96 Phil. 945)

Consider petitioner's record of service:

Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer

holdingemergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R
 11
Division. From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she
was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was
with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June
1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project)
retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was
changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status
became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The
12
appointment paper attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with
the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that
is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said
project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).

Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service.

Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring
officers and employees of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous
services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in
the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that
services rendered oncontractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual,
emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved
by the Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency
or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered
as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)

1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records

and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit
the necessary proof of said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984,
the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or
contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May
13
1989 CSC letter of denial characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA
project which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the
Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-
terminous employee
 (3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is
characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his
pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent

with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-

existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.

c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent

with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination
of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed
automatically abolished; and

d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3

years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration
thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-
terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of
tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is
limited to a specific period.

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be
noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the
AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature
would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning
14
and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned or casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
15
intentionally. Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

16
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and
re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent
employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years.
Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
17
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were
we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government
employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the
rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.
The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And
every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power,
right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the
18
Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to
Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended
19
appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, he explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary
separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received,
but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of
the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a
qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:

Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular,
temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of
separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts
and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP
are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated
positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project
and separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the
officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only
have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument
that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas,
retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the
benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy
be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions?
There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would
merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made
thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should
be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the
expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this
connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No.
20
6850, requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of
government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive,
elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractualor co-terminous including military and police service, as
21
evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. A similar regulation should be promulgated for the
inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping
with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public
22
servants" After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions,
medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's
application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,
as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to
the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for
the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of
substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2)
years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early
retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Footnotes

1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17 March 1989.

2 Annex "E", Rollo, P. 11
3 Annex "F", Rollo, p. 14.
4 Rollo, p. 24-25.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY, RETIREMENT AND VOLUNTARY SEPARATION FROM THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS WELL AS INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988, Rollo, 61.
7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, S. of 1991, 5 April 1991.
8 Ibid., also
Perez
v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978; Ata v. Namocatcat, G.R. No. L-35703, 30 October 1972,
47 SCRA 320.
9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September 1987)
10 Ibid, Section 9, p. 77.
11 Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7.
12 Rollo, p. 70.
13 Page 3, this decision.
14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed. p. 161.
15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664.
16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910.
17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February 1968.
18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-119 citing In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of
Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. L-37251, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. L-30375,
September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245 (1978), also Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32560, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957)
and People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949).
19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 8 March 1988, 6:30. p.m.
20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to Government Employees Under
Provisional or Temporary Status Who have rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service and for
other Purposes.
21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series of 1990, 21 May 1990.
22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing
the information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is
complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that
Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable
cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
 justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support
thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off.
Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the
prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court
dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice the
peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote.

When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the
omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were
specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no
necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed
itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and
was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts
of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is
because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is
clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a
judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive
sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which
was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No.
1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its
subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the
Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387.
(Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.)
During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on
enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election
Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357,
605, 666, 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during
the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law,
the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during the
time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election,
except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary
or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any
municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being
disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the
foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to
vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)

Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the
Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any
manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to
hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the
foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to
vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the
provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote. (Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau
of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this
section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months
nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the
right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in
Section 48:

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer
or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the national,
provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
 candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if
entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully,
however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357
and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of
the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First
Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when
the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the
said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the
broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might
have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to
seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions
drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as
under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last
mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an
officer of a province but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily
removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals.
They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of
Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is
that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the
said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have
been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown
that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded
from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law,
or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to
the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should
be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since
proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be
strictly interpreted against the state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the
spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the
law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice
Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in
nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from
a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such
omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation
of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various
courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the
principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a
strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v.
U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well
said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of
the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with
their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory
Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has
been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S.
354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to
enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges,
such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who
were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the
evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not.
This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice
of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu
thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but
all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court
of Industrial Relations. . . . .

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the law as
to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather than strengthen
the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself
why justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the
appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction
over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear
and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for
an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt.
We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to
create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)

Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or executive
department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court
did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the
President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of
note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in
engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25,
1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included
among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said
House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from
partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No.
180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was
a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed
amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If
the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in
debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not covered by
the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and
emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan politics.
They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they
were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was
Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said
the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term
"justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview
of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has
been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated
should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22
Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and
SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL,
MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.

Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.

Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.

Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:

This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735
covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625
hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).

On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land
located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the
south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The
land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by
means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they
discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all
surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration.

They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain
irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.

Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it.
The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants
Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.

On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares
of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that
first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No.
735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors
are included therein.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from
proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed
memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to
the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in
validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support
their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs.
Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65
SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil.
447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre,
117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal,
114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their
action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid
and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming
the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity
Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil
Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J, took no part.