Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. vs.
Court of petitioners father defies the Torrens titles
Appeals, Spouses Sabas Gepalago, G.R. No.
123713, April 1, 1998
Fact:
Both petitioner and respondent claim
ownership over a 3,625 sq.m land located at
Bohol. Petitioner claims ownership by virtue of
inheritance from their father who, during his
lifetime took an uninterrupted possession over
the land, declared the property for taxation
purpose and religiously paid the real estate tax.
The respondent claims ownership as
registered owner of said lot as a portion of the
lot owned by Pedro Luspo who mortgaged his
land to PNB and subsequently was foreclosed.
The respondents won as the highest bidder
and they became the owner of that portion of
land. The lower court ruled in favor to the
petitioners holding that they were in
continuous possession and cultivating the land
for more than 30 years. Thus they acquired the
land by prescription. Although a Torrens Title is
indefeasible and not subject for prescription it
is not when the respondents purchased the
land from PNB with prior knowledge that the
land was in possession of the petitioners
father. Upon appeal the CA reversed the court
ruling and declared the petitioners as the true
owners of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not a land registered under the
Torrens system can prescribe in the instance
case.
Held:
The court ruled that the land in dispute has
been covered by a Torrens Title more than 30
yrs before the petitioners instituted the present
action. Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise known
as theProperty Registration Decree states that
no land under the Torrens System be acquired
through prescription. Such title is indefeasible.
It is wrong to contend that the prior knowledge
of the respondents on the possession of the
inprescriptibility because there is no flaw on
the title when they purchased it from PNB that
was the registered owner of the land. The
vendee for value mainly relies on what appears
on the face of the title and is not compelled to
go beyond that. Moreover, the petitioner was
unusually silent with the previous transactions
involving the property when Luspo mortgaged
the land to PNB, when it was sold in public
auction and the sale of the land to the
vendees. The court affirmed the decision of the
CA declaring the respondents as the true
owners of the land in dispute.
Pang-oden vs Leonen ( GR 138939)
Heirs of Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals
GR 142546
FACTS
In 1985 The Heirs of Fabela filed a case for
reconveyance of property, as well as damages
against the heirs of Neri. This pertains to so-
called lot 868 in Misamis Oriental.
Apparently the subject lot belonged to
grandfather Fabela back in 1924. It then
became the subject of litigation between
Grandpa Fabela and Grandpa Neri in
connection with a Visayan agreement called
Escritura Transaccion which entrusted
said lot of Fabela to Neri as vendee a retro for
14 years. After 14 years, he was bound to
restore said property back to Fabella. Neri
never did and so the battle began.
Decades later the Heirs of Fabela decided they
wanted this lot returned. They were grossly
ignored by the heirs of Neri, hence the Fabela
clan took the case to the RTC.
In 1986, the RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of
Fabela on two grounds:
1. The heirs of Neri failed to answer the
complaint and thus were declared in default
2. The Escrittura Transaccion indicated that
Neri Sr was merely a trustee and should have
returned said property long ago.
The Heirs of Neri didnt take the loss well and
appealed to the CA. The CA examined the
records and found that the RTC erred because
in an action to recover, the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant. It is well accepted
that the possessor of the property has the
presumption of title in his favor; therefore any
person who claims he has a better right to
property must prove he has better title than the
defendant and he must properly prove the
identity of the property. Apparently the RTC
based its decision on the Escrittura
Transaction, but the original records of such
document were never found or located!
Worse, it was never presented to the RTC!
Plaintiff Heirs of Fabella relied on the Escrittura
as the primary claim to lot 868. For all we
know, it could have been a figment of their
imagination.
The lack of evidence compelled the CA to
reverse the RTC decision and restore the
contested property to Neri.
The Heirs of Fabella contested the CA reversal
and raised the issue to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Heirs of Fabela provided
substantial evidence of ownership over the
contested property.
HELD:
No. Despite the default of the Heirs of Neri, the
allegations of the Heirs of Fabella rested on
shaky ground. The latter failed to establish
their case on preponderance of evidence.
In an action for recovery of ownership, the
person who claims he has a better right to
property must prove not only his ownership of
property, but also the identity of the land by
describing the location,a area, and boundaries
thereof. In the case at hand, petitioners based
their claim of ownership on the 1924 Escritura
de Transaccion, the original copy of which was
never presented in the trial court. That was the
only piece of evidence that could establish
petitioners ownership and the identity of the
subject lot.
The RTC committed travesty by guessing the
appropriate boundaries of the lot that came
under litigation.
Ultimately the SC affirmed the reversal of the
CA on the reason that the Heirs of Fabela
failed to substantiate their claim on the merits
of his title.
Republic vs. Carrasco
GR 143491
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision[1] dated June 14, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
59566, affirming in toto an earlier decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong,
Rizal, Branch 80, which ordered the
registration in the name of herein respondent
Efren C. Carrasco of a parcel of land situated
at Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
The factual antecedents:
On October 1, 1996, in the RTC of Morong,
Rizal, respondent Efren M. Carrasco filed an
application for registration of title over a
17,637-square meter land situated at Sitio
Ulang Tubig, Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc,
Tanay, Province of Rizal.
In his application, docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 215-T and raffled
to Branch 80 of the court, respondent alleged
that he is the owner in fee simple of the land
sought to be registered; that said land is
alienable and disposable and not within any
military or whatever kind of reservation; that to
the best of his knowledge, the land has never
been mortgaged or encumbered or that any
person has any interest thereon, legal or
equitable; and that the subject land is declared
for taxation purposes in his name. Among the
documents attached to the application were
the individual plan and technical description of
the land; Diazo polyester film (SEPIA) of the
original survey subdivision plan SGS-No.
04-000518-D of which the subject land is a
part; respondents Affidavit of Ownership dated
August 22, 1996, therein stating that he took
possession of the land in 1990 from his
predecessor, Norberto Mingao, who has
occupied the land for the last 25 years; the
latters Deed of Waiver dated December 16,
1991, thereunder waiving his claim over the
land in favor of the respondent; a Certification
from the Land Registration Authority as to the
status of the land; Tax Declaration No.
017-4224 for the year 1996 in respondents
name; and an official receipt dated September
13, 1996 of realty tax payment.
1996 marked Exhibit J; that the boundary
Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed an opposition to
the application. There being no private
oppositor, the trial court issued an order of
general default on November 10, 1997 and
proceeded on the same day with the markings
of the respondents documents and the
reception ex parte of his evidence.
possession of the same in the concept of an
Thereafter, or on November 26, 1997, the
respondent testified in support of his
application. He likewise adduced the testimony
of one Teosito Avesado. Hereunder is the trial
courts summation of respondents testimonial
evidence:
matter of the case is not within a military or
Petitioner Efren Carrasco testified on
November 26, 1997 that he is single, 24 years
of age, a farmer and residing at Tanay, Rizal, a
Filipino; that he owned a parcel of land located
at Sitio Ulang Tubig, Barangay Tandang Kutyo,
Tanay, Rizal with an area of 17,637 sq. meters;
that the said land has not been the subject of
Original Registration of Title as amended by
PD 1529; that he acquired the said land from
Norberto Mingao as his compensation for
having worked with him and his acquisition as
evidenced by a Waiver executed by Norberto
Mingao in favor of petitioner on December 16,
1991 which he caused to be marked Exhibit E;
that he also produced and showed to the
Court as proof of his ownership to the land an
original survey subdivision plan No.
SGS-04-000518-0, which he caused to be
marked Exhibit F and the particular Lot No. 16
on the map as Exhibit F-1; that he caused the
survey of the property by a duly licensed
Geodetic Engineer in the person of Engineer
Modesto Allado who prepared the technical
descriptions of the property now marked
Exhibit G and issued a surveyors certificate
which was marked Exhibit H; that the land
sought to be registered was declared for
taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration
No. 017-4224 in the name of Efren Carrasco
which was marked Exhibit I; that the taxes for
the said property was paid under Official
Receipt No. 215109 dated September 13,
owners of his property sought to be registered
are: on the East, Miguel Taclas, on the North,
Maximo Mondragon, on the South, Allan
Alcantara and on the West, Jesus Consulta;
that he has been in continuously, openly,
adversely in possession of the said property in
t h e c o n c e p t o f a n o w n e r, w h i l e h i s
predecessors-in-interest has likewise been in
owner continuously, openly, and adversely for
more than 25 years; that there are no other
persons claiming possession over the
property; that the same property has not been
mortgaged or encumbered to any other
persons or entities; that the property subject
naval reservation.
On cross-examination, he testified and clarified
that he was employed in the land of Norberto
Mingao, clearing and planting on the vast
property he owns; that his father also had
worked for Norberto Mingao for a very long
time and for the services that he and his father
rendered, he was given by Mingao about
17,637 square meters of the more or less
600,000 square meters of land he owns; that
in 1950 his father took over the possession of
the land, cultivated the same and planted fruit
trees and growing crops; the said land was
given by Mr. Mingao to his father because of
the services he rendered to Mingao by
clearing, planting and cultivating his vast track
of lands; that it was in 1990 that he occupied
the possession of his father by virtue of the
Deed of Waiver executed by Mingao in his
favor.
registration is not alienable public agricultural
The second witness of petitioner is Teosito
Avesado, 69 years old, a businessman and a
resident of B.F. Homes Phase 3, Paraaque,
Metro Manila; that he personally knows the
applicant in this case as he is one of the
workers of Norberto Mingao, that he knew the
land sought to be registered because he used
to visit Mingao in that area as they happened
to be the President and Vice President of the
Magellan Agricultural Corporation respectively;
that he is interested in the petition so that
people working with Mingao should be given
the rightful ownership and title to the land they
hold; that Mr. Mingao had started to occupy a
vast tract of land during the early 1940s and
because of his appreciation to the services of
his workers who worked for him in the land for
a very long time, he gave a portion of his land
to applicant.[3]
appealed decision of the trial court, to wit:
In a decision[4] dated February 4, 1998, the
trial court, upon a finding that the respondent
has sufficiently established his ownership of
the land in question, ordered the registration
thereof in his name, thus:
Wherefore, it is hereby decreed that the
property described as Lot 16, SGS-000518-D
located at Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay,
Rizal with an area of 17,637 square meters
may now be registered and confirmed in the
name of Efren N. Carrasco pursuant to the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, and
the corresponding title to the property be
issued in his name after payment of the
required fees.
affirmative having found the evidence sufficient
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Solicitor General, the Land Registration
Authority, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Provincial Government
of Rizal, the Office of the District Engineer of
Rizal, the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal and the
parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Insisting that (1) the land being applied for
land; and (2) respondent is not qualified to
register the same under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529,[5] the Republic, through the
OSG, appealed to the CA whereat its appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
59566.
During the pendency of the appeal, the
respondent filed a motion with the appellate
court praying for the admission of additional
evidence, which additional evidence included
an Affidavit of Ownership dated June 1, 1998
of Norberto Mingao. In its resolution of
February 9, 1999, however, the CA merely
noted the motion.
Eventually, in the herein assailed decision
dated June 14, 2000, the CA dismissed the
Republics appeal and affirmed in toto the
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
In its decision, the CA held that the subject
land is alienable in view of the certification from
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that the land was verified to
be within the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain and outside of any civil or
military reservation. On the issue of whether
the respondent was qualified to have the land
registered in his name, the CA ruled in the
to establish respondents and Mingaos
ownership and possession of the land in
accordance with the rule laid down in Republic While the rule is well-settled that findings of
v. Court of Appeals[6] that occupation and fact of appellate courts are conclusive upon
cultivation for more than 30 years by an this Court, there are, however, recognized
applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest exceptions thereto, among which is where the
title on such applicant so as to segregate the findings of fact are not supported by the
land from the mass of the public domain. record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion.[9]
Unable to accept the judgment, the Republic is Such exceptions obtain in this case.
now with this Court via the present petition on
the following grounds: Basically, the pivotal issue is whether the
respondent was able to sufficiently prove his
I possession, in the concept of an owner, of the
land sought to be registered for the period
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS required by law so as to entitle him to the
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS registration thereof in his name.
RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS QUALIFIED
TO APPLY FOR THE REGISTRATION OF We resolve the issue in the negative.
TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND UNDER P.D. NO. 1529. Before one can register his title over a parcel of
land, he must show that: (1) he, by himself or
II through his predecessors-in-interest, has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
A S S U M I N G A R G U E N D O T H AT possession and occupation thereof under a
RESPONDENT IS QUALIFIED TO APPLY FOR bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
REGISTRATION OF THE QUESTIONED LOT, 1945 or earlier; and (2) the land subject of the
STILL THE HONORABLE COURT OF application is alienable and disposable land of
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT BASED the public domain.[10]
ON JURISPRUDENCE, REPUBLIC V. COURT
OF APPEALS, 235 SCRA 567 (1994),
RESPONDENT HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION For sure, Section 14, paragraph (1), of the
THEREOF WITHIN THE PERIOD Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529)
PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE SAME TO explicitly states:
BE ACQUIRED THROUGH JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE.[7]
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following
In his Comment,[8] respondent maintains that persons may file in the proper Court of First
he is entitled to apply for registration of title Instance [now the Regional Trial Court] an
over the subject property because his open, application for registration of title to land,
adverse and continuous possession thereof for whether personally or through their duly
more than 30 years has ripened into authorized representatives:
ownership. In any event, respondent argues
that the CA has found his evidence sufficient (1) Those who by themselves or
to establish his and his predecessor-in- through their predecessors-in-interest have
interests ownership and possession of the been in open, continuous, exclusive and
land, which factual finding is conclusive on this notorious possession and occupation of
Court. alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
The petition is impressed with merit. since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

We have no disagreement with the finding of
the CA that the subject property is part of the
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, having been classified as
such by the DENR, an appropriate government
agency for the purpose. We part ways,
however, with the CA in its conclusion that the
respondent has established his ownership of
the land in question for the period of
possession required by law.
Respondent anchors his claim of ownership on
his allegation of continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner by
himself and through his predecessor-in-
interest, Norberto Mingao, for more than 30
years.[11] Bearing in mind the rule that a
person who seeks registration of title to a
piece of land must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence,[12] we find respondents
evidence in this respect insufficient.
To begin with, the respondent failed to prove
that Norberto Mingao from whom he allegedly
derived his title, was the owner of the subject
land and hence can transmit rights over the
same in his favor.
In his Deed of Waiver dated December 16,
1991, Mingao merely claimed ownership of the
land and that he is waiving his right and
interest thereon in favor of the respondent.
Significantly, the same Waiver did not even
specifically state when his (Mingaos)
possession started. While, as rightly found by
the CA, Mingao has been in possession of the
land since 1950 based on Mingaos Affidavit of
Ownership dated June 1, 1998 which was
presented while the case was pending appeal
with the CA, nonetheless, without more, said
affidavit is not adequate to prove the fact of
possession beginning that date. Indeed, it may
not be amiss to point out that Mingao did not
even testify in this case.
The Court cannot give full credence to
respondents Affidavit of Ownership dated
August 22, 1996 for he simply alleged therein
that Mingao had occupied the land for the last
25 years. Likewise, respondents testimony
regarding Mingaos possession and ownership,
aside from being self-serving, consists merely
of general statements with no specifics even
as to when his predecessor began occupying
the land. Indeed, such is hardly the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence required in cases of
this nature. Respondent must present proof of
specific acts of ownership to substantiate his
claim and cannot just offer general statements
which are mere conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession.
In the same vein, Teosito Avesados testimony
cannot be relied upon to corroborate
respondents claim as to Mingaos possession
as owner of the land, more so, when we are
not sufficiently convinced as to said witness
personal acquaintance with Mingao or
knowledge regarding the latters intention to
give the subject land to the respondent.
Furthermore, there is no proof that Mingao
declared the land in his name for taxation
purposes or paid taxes due thereon. True, a
tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to
prove ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.[13] As
we held in Republic v. Alconaba:[14]
While tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute, at the least, proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes not only manifests ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but also announces an adverse claim
against the State and all other interested
parties with an intention to contribute needed
revenues to the government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership.
Hence, since Mingaos possession and
ownership of the subject land were not
sufficiently proven, Mingao himself cannot
validly transmit his rights over the land in
respondents favor. At any rate, the mode by
which respondent alleged to have taken
possession and ownership of the land is not
one of those provided for under Article 712 of
the Civil Code. [15]
No. 141, the pertinent provision of which is
To show how he acquired possession of the
subject land from Mingao, respondent
presented his Affidavit of Ownership dated
August 22, 1996 and Mingaos Deed of Waiver
dated December 16, 1991. But said
documents cannot show that there was a valid
transmission of rights. As it were, respondents
Affidavit of Ownership merely stated that he
has taken possession of the subject land in
1990 from Mingao. On the other hand,
Mingaos Deed of Waiver is not, as aforestated,
a mode of acquiring ownership.
The waiver cannot even be considered a
donation because it does not comply with the
formalities required in order for a donation of
an immovable to be valid pursuant to Article
749 of the Civil Code[16] because
respondents acceptance thereof is lacking.
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
Also, prescription cannot be availed of to
acquire ownership not only because the
respondents possession was not in the
concept of an owner, but also because he
failed to comply with the required period.
Respondent cannot tack his possession to
that of Mingaos since there is no privity
between them, the transmission of rights not
having been proven. Thus, respondents
possession must be reckoned only from the
time of his actual possession which, as
admitted by him, commenced in 1990.
Appeals[17] where we ruled that occupation
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that
respondent may validly derive his right of
possession from Mingao, still, he may not
rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the
land in question. For, as the CA correctly
found, and which the respondent does not
dispute, Mingaos possession started only in
1950 which is 5 years later than the reckoning
point of June 12, 1945 under the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529). It is thus
clear that respondent failed to comply with the
period of possession and occupation not only
as required by Section 14(1), supra, of the
Property Registration Decree but also by the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
Section 48(b):
Section 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of first Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefore, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Clearly then, the reliance placed by the
appellate court in Republic v. Court of
and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public land, is
erroneous. Said ruling has been effectively
superseded by subsequent legislations which
amended Section 48(b) the Public Land Act.
The case of Republic v. Doldol,[18] cited in
Igtiben v. Republic,[19] provides a summary of
these amendments, to wit:

The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942
which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended
Section 48(b) now reads:
215-T of the RTC of Morong, Rizal, Branch 80,
Section 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of first Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefore, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx x
second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)
Someime later, Susana sold the land to
As presently phrased, the law requires that
possession of lands of the public domain must
be from June 12, 1945 or earlier for the land to
be acquired through judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title.
In sum, the respondent could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the land in
question because he has not proved
possession openly, continuously and adversely
in the concept of an owner since June 12,
1945, the period of possession required by
law. At best, he can only prove possession
since 1990, the date which he admitted to
have taken possession of the subject parcel of
land from Mingao.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed decision dated June
14, 2000 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 59566
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and LRC No.
is ordered DISMISSED.
Ramos-Balalio vs. Ramos
GR 168464
Facts:
Petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander
(now deceased) are the children of spouses
Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The
spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in
1938. Abundio died in 1944, Susana met her
in 1946, with whom she had five children, one
of whom is respondent Rolando.
In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana
discovered that Felimon Domingo applied for a
sale patent over the subject parcel of land
which she opposed. The Bureau of Lands
resolved the dispute.
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied
her husband Eusebio, a soldier, wherever he
was assigned, Susanas father, George Bueno,
and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the
cultivation and possession of the subject land.
petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it among
herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent
Rolando and his siblings. The partition was not
registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in
favor of Rolando and Alexander.
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share;
however, it came to her knowledge that
respondents Rolando and Eusebio had
usurped her share and deprived the
mortgages of possession over the land. After
settling the mortgage, petitioner filed a case for
recovery of inheritance, possession and
damages with a petition for preliminary
mandatory injunction.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff
Zeinada Ramos. The CA found that neither
Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the
homestead application requirements in order
to acquire superior vested right. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
WON Zenaida, as an applicant for public land,
may be considered as having any right to the
land occupied.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to
acquire title to public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes.
A careful examination of the records shows
that petitioner has not satisfactorily established
that a valid application for homestead patent
was filed by her parents. The decision of the
Bueau of Lands in 1958 only addressed
Zenaidas familys right of preference over th
land, in view of their possession and cultivation
of the land.
The purported sale between petitioner and her
mother cannot be given effect, nor can it be a
source of right for Zenaida, because Susana
did not have the authority to sell what did not
belong to her.
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor
Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as
heirs of Susana.
We find that Zenaida has proven prior
possession antedates the filing of the
homestead application.
Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations
both in her name and that of her predecessor-
in-interest covering the property. Time and
again, we have held that although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indication of
possession in the concept of ownership.
Republic vs. Enriquez
GR 160990
For resolution by the Court is a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
filed by the Republic of the Philippines
questioning the Decision[1] dated November
28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68973. The assailed
Decision affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Branch 39, granting the application for
registration of title of land filed by respondents.
Respondents filed their verified petition for
confirmation and registration of title to two
parcels of land located in Gahonon, Daet,
Camarines Norte on January 16, 1997.[2] One
parcel, Lot 1711, Pls-488-D, consists of 455
square meters. The other parcel (hereafter
referred to as Parcel 2), described in
Psu-05-006497-D, contains 297 square
meters.
Petitioner, through the Director of Lands, filed
an Opposition on the grounds that
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest
have not been in continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that
respondents evidence is not competent or
sufficient to establish their claim; and that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of the
public domain.[3]
On September 28, 1998, the RTC rendered its THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Decision with the following dispositive portion: AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
WHEREFORE, title of the applicants to the LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE THE FAILURE
455-square meter parcel of land described on OF RESPONDENTS TO PROVE THAT THEY
Plan-051603-0022344 (Exh. M) and the 297- AND THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
square meter parcel of land described on plan HAD BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
Psu-05-006497-D (Exh. M-1) is hereby EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
confirmed and the same is ordered registered OF THE SUBJECT LOTS IN THE CONCEPT
in the name of spouses Ricardo B. Enriquez OF OWNERS FOR AT LEAST THIRTY YEARS.
and Eliza M. Enriquez, both of legal age, [6]
Filipino citizens and residents of Batobalani,
Paracale, Camarines Norte. These issues, notably, are questions of fact
that petitioner had already previously raised in
Once this decision shall have become final, let its appeal before the CA. The general rule is
an order for the issuance of decree be issued. that questions of fact are beyond the province
of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[7] Said rule,
SO ORDERED.[4] however, admits of certain exceptions, to wit:

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA on (1) when the factual findings of the Court of
grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
respondents failure to present the original
tracing cloth plan of the subject lots, and (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on
respondents failure to prove open, continuous, speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
exclusive, and adverse possession for more
than 30 years. Finding no error, the CA denied (3) when the inference made by the Court of
the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision in Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
the assailed Decision dated November 28, mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
2003.[5]
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in
Hence, herein petition based on the following the appreciation of facts;
grounds:
(5) when the appellate court, in making its
I findings, goes beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN admissions of both appellant and appellee;
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH GRANTED THE (6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT
HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION TO (7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice
PROCEED WITH THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF certain relevant facts which, if properly
RESPONDENTS TO PRESENT THE considered, will justify a different conclusion;
ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN OR THE
DIAZO POLYESTER FILM. (8) when the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting;
II

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
sufficient identification to identify a piece of
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by
the evidence on record. [8] (Emphasis
supplied)
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
After going over the evidence extant in the
record of this case, the Court finds that the CA
failed to notice a relevant fact which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion,
thus necessitating a review of the case.
Particularly, the Court is referring to the fact
that there exists a material discrepancy in the
technical description of Parcel 2 applied for as
will be discussed forthwith.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of
land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and
(b) the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.[9]
the Property has not been forfeited for non-
One of the mandatory requirements in
applications of original registration of land is
the submission in evidence of the original
tracing cloth plan or the sepia copy (Diazo
Polyester Film), duly approved by the Bureau
of Lands. This is to establish the true identity of
the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land or a portion thereof already
covered by a previous land registration, and to
forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped
by a subsequent registration of any adjoining
land. Failure to comply with this requirement is
fatal to petitioners application for registration.
[10]
before the trial court.
Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court
allowed substantial compliance with this rule.
In Recto v. Republic of the Philippines,[11] this
Court held that blueprint copies of the original
tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands
and other evidence could also provide
land for registration purposes, as the property
was sufficiently identified by: 1) the blueprint
copy of the plan and technical description
which were both approved by the Land
Management Services of the Department of
and 2) the report of the Land Management
Sector stating that the subject property is not a
portion of, nor identical to any previously
approved isolated survey. The applicants in the
Recto case also submitted a certified true
copy of the original tracing cloth plan to the CA
as well as a certification from the Land
Registration Authority attesting that the original
plan in diazo polyester film was on file.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla,[12] the
Court also deemed as substantial compliance
the submission of the following in lieu of the
original tracing cloth plan, to wit: 1) a blueprint
copy of the subdivision plan approved by the
Director of Lands; 2) a technical description
approved by the Land Management Bureau of
the DENR; 3) a certification from the DENR
C o m m u n i t y E n v i ro n m e n t a n d N a t u r a l
Resources Office (CENRO) which states that
payment of real estate taxes, is entirely within
the alienable and disposable zone as of
December 31, 1925, has not been previously
titled and is not covered by any previous public
land application; and 4) a report of the Land
Management Bureau stating that the Property
is not recorded in their lot and plan index cards
as being subject of a previous public land
application. The applicants also filed a motion
to admit original tracing cloth plan with the
Court of Appeals during the pendency of the
appeal and attached thereto the original plan,
which the Court noted as the same as the
blueprint subdivision plan offered as evidence
In the present case, there is no question that
respondents did not submit the original of the
tracing cloth plan of Lots 1711, Pls-488-D and Southwest: National road
Psu-05-006497-D. Applying the exception, the
CA ruled that the same may be dispensed with Meanwhile, in the 1996 blue print copy of the
as there are on record the blueprint copies of survey plan[17] and the technical description
the properties and other evidences, which issued by the Lands Management Services,
sufficiently establish the nature, identity, [18] Parcel 2 already contained an area of 297
location and extent of the subject properties. square meters, and bounded as follows:
The CA also ruled that the case of Director of
Lands v. Tesalona,[13] cited by petitioner, does Southwest: National Road
not apply in this case since there is no Northwest: property of Samuel Magana
discrepancy in the area of the land as stated in Northeast: Lot 1711, Pls 488-D
the application and in the blue print. Southeast property of Emeteria Abodago

Petitioner, however, insists that there exists a Moreover, the Court notes that in a
material discrepancy in the area of Parcel 2. Certification dated October 15, 1992, issued
by the Office of the CENRO, Daet, Camarines
The Court went over the records of this case Norte, there already exists a previous survey
and indeed, as borne by respondents own plan over the same property but which
evidence, there exists a significant discrepancy measures 250 square meters. It was stated
in the area of Lot Psu-05-006497-D creating a therein: THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records
doubt as to the actual area, such that the filed in this Office, shows that the parcel of
exception to the rule on the presentation of the land with an area of 250 square meters as
original tracing cloth plan cannot be applied. surveyed by Engr. Virgilio F. Jimenez for Tomas
Cootauco, located at Gahonon, Daet,
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December Camarines Norte x x x.[19]
2, 1994 between Rosalinda Oloya and
respondents, Parcel 2 was described as Respondents failed to satisfactorily explain the
follows: reason for the difference in the area. What
respondent Ricardo Enriquez merely said on
Parcel 2 A parcel of land situated at Gahonon, this score was: When the relocation survey
Daet, Camarines Norte, Philippines. Bounded was conducted and the exact boundaries
on the north by irrigation canal; on the South were determined, it was found out that the
lot owned by Mrs. of Tomas Cootauco; on the area is actually 297 and not 250.[20] Such
West lot No. 1710 -____ and on the East lo bare testimony does not suffice to clarify the
[sic] No. 1710 ____. Declared under Tax Decl. difference in the area, as shown in the
No. 018-0991 containing an area of 250 Sq. m pertinent documents on record. Respondent
more or less.[14] Enriquez did not conduct the survey, and it
does not appear that he has technical know-
This is confirmed in the Provincial Assessors how in this regard. It could have been different
Property Field Appraisal & Assessment Sheet had the original tracing cloth plan been
for the years 1993[15] and 1994,[16] and the submitted in evidence, since it is the best
Declaration of Real Property in the names of evidence to identify a piece of land for
Rosalinda Oloya and Tomas Cootauco, registration purposes,[21] or at the very least,
although the boundaries set therein were as the geodetic engineer who surveyed the
follows: property should have testified with regard to
the increase in the area.
Northeast: Lot 1711
Northwest: Road lot It should be stressed that a person who seeks
Southeast: Road lot registration of title to a piece of land must
prove the claim by clear and convincing Actual possession of a land consists in the
evidence, and is duty bound to identify manifestation of acts of dominion of such a
sufficiently and satisfactorily the property. nature as a party would naturally exercise over
Otherwise stated, all facts must indicate that her own property. A mere casual cultivation of
no other person, including the government, will portions of land by the claimant does not
be prejudiced by the adjudication of the land to constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
the applicant.[22] ownership. Such possession is not exclusive
and notorious as it gives rise to a presumptive
Given respondents failure to identify with grant from the State. The applicant is
certainty the area of Parcel 2 as described in burdened to offer proof of specific acts of
Lot Psu-05-006497-D, the RTC should have ownership to substantiate the claim over the
therefore denied the application for registration land. The good faith of the person consists in
of title over said property. the reasonable belief that the person from
whom she received the property was the
The foregoing conclusion, however, does not owner thereof and could transfer ownership.
hold true with regard to Lot 1711, Pls-488-D.
All the evidence on record sufficiently identified Records bear out that Lot 1711, Pls-488-D
the property as the one applied for by was originally part of a 707-square meter
respondents, and containing the property owned by Concepcion Pabico. In an
corresponding metes and bounds as well as Escritura de Compra Venta dated April 23,
area. Consequently, the original tracing cloth 1941, the property was sold to Tomas
plan need not be presented in evidence, Cootauco.[26] After the death of Cootauco, his
applying the exception set forth in the heirs sold the property, which was already
Hubilla[23] and Recto[24] cases. partitioned into to two portions, Parcel 1
consisting of 455 square meters and Parcel 2
On the issue of open, continuous, exclusive consisting of 250 square meters, to Rosalinda
and notorious possession of the subject lots, Buag Oloya by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
the Court will settle the issue only vis--vis Lot Sale dated October 22, 1992.[27] The sale
1711, Pls-488-D, since as earlier stated, the was confirmed in an Extra-Judicial Settlement
application for the registration of title over of Estate with Confirmation of Sale executed
Parcel 2 should be denied. on October 22, 1992.[28] Oloya, in turn, sold
these two parcels of land to respondents in a
In Republic v. Jacob,[25] the Court explained Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2,
the concept of possession and occupation 1994.[29]
referred to in cases of registration of title, viz.:
Records also show that as early as 1963,
Indeed, the law speaks of possession and Cootauco has already declared Lot 1711,
occupation. Possession is broader than Pls-488-D for taxation purposes,[30] and realty
occupation because it includes constructive taxes have been paid thereon since 1964.[31]
possession. Unless, therefore, the law adds It has been ruled that while tax declarations
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all- and realty tax payment of property are not
e n c o m p a s s i n g e ff e c t o f c o n s t r u c t i v e conclusive evidence of ownership,
possession. Taken together with the words nevertheless, they are good indicia of the
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word possession in the concept of owner for no one
occupation seems to highlight the facts that for in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
an applicant to qualify, her possession of the property that is not in his actual or at least
property must not be a mere fiction. constructive possession. They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of
a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[32]
owners and declared the same for taxation the
Given the sufficiency of proof of respondents
compliance with the legal requirements, in that
Lot 1711, Pls-488-D has been identified with
certainty, and that respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same since
1963, or for 34 years, the application for the
registration of title of Lot 1711, Pls-488-D was
therefore correctly granted by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.
because he failed to file an Answer. The
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68973 affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION to the effect that the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court dated September
28, 1998 is MODIFIED whereby the application
for original registration of the 297-square meter
parcel of land described in plan
Psu-05-006497-D is DENIED.
taxes due thereon and explained that after the
SO ORDERED.
Rumarete vs. Spouses Hernandez
GR. No. 168222
Facts:
The Instant Case revolves around a
dispute over the ownership of Lot No. 379 with
an area of 187,765 square meters and located
in Barrio Catimo, Municipality of Guinayangan,
Province of Quezon.
The petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance of real property and/or quieting
of title with damages against respondent heirs
of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta averring that his godfather
Santiago who previously possessed and
cultivated the lot before he orally bequeathed
the said property toTeudolo and transferred
residence. From 1929, Teodulo and later, his
wife and 11 children possessed the land as
earliest being in 1961.
Respondents on the other hand
claimed that the land in question was sold to
them by Santiago on November 11, 1964 to
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
The CFI of Tayabas rendered a Decision
written in Spanish, declaring Lot No. 379 as a
public land and recognizing Santiago as
claimant thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No.
12. However, no title was issued to Santiago
spouses petitioned the court to re-open
Cadastral Proceeding No. 12 having
succeeded the rights of Santiago, alleging that
though no title was issued in the name of
Santiago, the same decision is, nevertheless,
proof that Santiago was in possession of the
said land.
Further, respondent Joaquin testified
that from 1966 up to the time he testified, his
family declared the lot for taxation and paid the
death of his father in 1970 he no longer visited
the land and it was only when the complaint
was filed against them when he learned that
petitioners are in actual possession of the
property.
On March 31, 1997, the RTC rendered
a decision in favor of the petitioners holding
that the latter possessed the land in the
concept of an owner since 1929 becoming its
owner by acquisitive prescription. Thus, when
Santiago sold the lot to the respondents
parents the former no longerhad the right over
the property.
The respondents appealed to the CA
which reversed and set aside the decision of
the trial court ruling that Teodulo did not
acquire title over Lot No. 379, that his bare
allegation that Santiago orally bequeathed to
him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove
transfer of ownership.
Issue:
WON Teudolo has the right of
ownership over Lot No. 379.
SC Held:
Yes. The Court finds that Teodulos
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in
the concept of an owner for more than 30
years vested him and his heirs title over the
said lot. The decision the court stated that the
law applicable in the Instant Case is Sec. 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public
Land Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942, effective June 22, 1957 which
provides that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act (now Property
Registration Decree), to wit:
x xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been, in
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force
majeure.Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
The court states that when the
conditions specified in the said law are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being
issued, and the land ceases to be part of the
public domain.
Moreover, after reviewing the facts of
the case, the court finds that Teodulos
unchallenged and continuous occupation of
the said lot proved that Teodulo possessed
and cultivated the land as owner thereof since
1929.
Likewise, the court found Santiago
never challenged Teodulos possession of Lot
No. 379 nor demanded or received the
produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago
never exercised any act of ownership over Lot
No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is
no longer interested in asserting any right over
the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a
quitclaim.
On the other hand, spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be
considered as purchasers in good faith
because they had knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry.The Court
notes that Santiago was not residing in Lot No.
379 at the time of the sale.He was already 81
years old, too old to cultivate and maintain an
18-hectare land. These circumstances should
have prompted the spouses to further inquire
who was actually tilling the land. Had they
done so, they would have found that Teodulo
and his family are the ones possessing and
cultivating the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be
considered as third persons or purchasers in
good faith and for value or those who buy the
property and pay a full and fair price for the
samebecause they merely inherited Lot No.
379 from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta.
Fule vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-17951
February 28, 1963
Facts:
The Instant Case reviews the decision
of the Court of Appeals regarding the land
owned by Emilia E. de Legare, which was sold
by her step-son to the petitioner spouses.
In evidence it appears, that Emilia E. de
Legare (Plaintiff), owned a house and lot at
San Juan, Rizal, ownership of such property
was evidenced by TCT No. 21253, issued by
the office of the Register of Deeds of the
province of Rizal. That on Sept. 26, 1951,the
plaintiff constituted on the property a first class
mortgage in favour of defendant Tomas Q.
Soriano to guarantee the payment of a loan.
On March 29, 1953, an intruder broke
in to the property of the plaintiff, pressed a
knife on her side and demanded that she give
him Php 10,000 and threatened to kill her if
she failed to raise the said amount the
following morning.
Issue:
WON the herein petitioner purchasers
in good faith and for value of the properties
here contested?
SC Held:
Yes. The court hold that the herein
petitioners are innocent purchasers and
adjudged them as the lawful owners of the
said property.
In their promulgation the court stated
that Good faith consists in an honest intention
to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another.
In the instant case the court finds the
following facts uncontroverted. That the
negation and transaction from the respondent
to the petitioners were conducted by a real
estate broker, John did not act suspicious, he
was the adopted son of the respondent and
he had not been known to commit crime or
dishonesty.
Likewise, it should be noted that the
deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no
one would have questioned its authenticity
since it was duly acknowledged before a
notary public. Moreover, the document bares
the genuine signature of the respondent.
Furthermore, the court states that the
demeanour of the petitioner satisfies the
measure of good faith contemplated by law
asthe they observed due diligence and
precaution in the course of the transaction by
not rely solely on the documents exhibited to
them by John Legare but on the registerability
of those documents.
In the same vein, when the Register of
Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name
of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered
the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third
parties were concerned, acquired a valid title
to the house and lot here disputed. When,
therefore, he transferred this title to the herein
petitioners, third persons, the entire
transaction fell within the purview of Article
1434 of the Civil Code which provides that:
When a person who is not the owner of a thing
sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the
seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or
grantee.
Philippine Columbian Association vs..Panis
G.R. No. L-106528
December 21, 1993
Facts:
Herein petitioner, Philippine Columbian
Association owns two parcels of land which
are adjacently situated, the first part is where
its office stands and the parcel is a 4,842.90
s q u a re m e t e r l a n d o c c u p i e d b y t h e
respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and
KarloButiong, duely elected councillors of the
City of Manila.
Petitioner in the Instant case instituted
an ejectment proceeding against herein private
responders before the MeTC of Manila.
Judgment was rendered against the said
occupants, the said judgement was affirmed
by the RTC,CA and subsequently by the SC in
G.R. No. 85262. Its motion to execute
judgement was then granted by the MeTC on
April 9,1990.
On June 8,1990, private respondents
filed with the RTC a petition for preliminary
injunction and restraining order to enjoin their
ejectment from and the demolition of their
houses on the said land. On June 28,1990 the
City of Manila file a complaint for the
expropriation of the 4,842 sq. m. lot subject of
the ejectment proceeding. Petitioner, in turn
filed a motion to dimiss the complaint, alleging,
inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power
to expropriate private land; that the
expropriation is not for public use and welfare;
that the expropriation is politically motivated
and that the 2 million deposit representing the
value of the land, was insufficient and was
made under P.D. 1533, a law declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
On September 14, 1990, the RTC
denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and
entered an order of condemnation declaring
the regularity of the expropriating proceeding.
T h e p e t i t i o n e r fi l e d a m o t i o n f o r
reconsideration, but it was also denied by the
RTC. Petitioner appealed to the CA assailing
the order of the RTC, However, it the CA also
denied the said petition.
Issue:
WON the City of Manila has the power to
initiate an expropriation proceeding against a
private property.
WON the petitioners were afforded due
process of law
SC Held:
Yes. The revised charter of the City of
Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes it to
condemn private property for public use and
to acquire private land and subdivide the
same into home lots for sale on easy terms to
city resident. The revised charter expressly
grants the City general powers over its
territorial jurisdiction, including the power of
eminent domain.
The City of Manila, acting through its
legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide
these lands into home lots for sale to bona
fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to
laborers and low-salaried employees of the
city. That only a few could actually benefit from
the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character.
Yes. Due process was afforded to
petitioner when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order,
denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in determining whether
grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent courts, passed upon the very
same issues raised by petitioner in its motion
to dismiss, which findings we uphold.
Petitioner therefore cannot argue that it was
denied its day in court.
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47553
January 31, 1981
Facts:
T h e c a s e re v o l v e s a ro u n d t h e
expropriation of Block 10 and 19 and the
determination of the value of the just
compensation of the same. Herein petitioner
pray that the decision of the CA with regard
the compensation of the said property at
P0.07 per sq. m. be reversed and that the
decision of CFI Pampanga setting the value of
compensation at P15.00 be upheld; that the
private respondent be adjudged to pay rentals
for the use of Block 19 at the rate of P2.00 per
sq.m per annum from June 30,1954 until the
same is vacated by it.
On August 8, 1969, NPC filed a
complaint for eminent domain with the CFI of
Pampanga, praying that it be allowed to
acquire right of way easement over the
property of petitioners consisting of two
adjoining parcels of land (Lot 633 and 634)
alleging that the proposed right-of-way is
needed to construct the 69 KV power line
encompassing 2,835 square meters of
petitioners property; that on March 2, 1970
the defendants, petitioners herein, filed an
answer asking that the complaint for
expropriation be dismissed and on the first and
second counter-claims prayed; That plaintiff be
made to pay rentals of P2.00 per annum from
year 1957 and for as long as it uses and
occupies the same and back rentals with 12%
interest per annum; that in the event that the
expropriation be granted, plaintiff to pay as
compensation for the total encompassed in
Block 10 at the price of 20.00 per sq. m, with
12% annual interest computed from the date
of possession, until paid.
The decision of the RTC was modified
by the CA upon appeal of the plaintiff giving
smaller valuation of the said property.
Issue:
WON the valuation of Block 19 as modified by
the Court of Appeals was just.
SC Held:
No. In its ruling the court states that
the reasons relied upon by the RTC which
appear just, equitable, and in consonance with
established jurisprudence are:
The defendants clearly showed that the
properties herein involved have been
converted into a subdivision in 1962.
Moreover, the court is guided by the
Commissioners Report and Findings of the
ocular inspection in determining the nature of
the properties involved. In effect, therefore, the
court is of the opinion that the evidence
presented by the defendant outweigh the
evidence presented for the plaintiff by
preponderance.
Furthermore, it was established that
the properties, being converted into a
subdivision sell at P15.00 to P20.00 per
square meter and there are many willing
buyers at this price range. It has also been
established by evidence on record and
confirmed by the report of the Commissioner,
that the Conching Subdivision, where the
subject properties form parts, are located
along the national highway; that it is near the
town proper of Mexico, Pampanga where the
school and church sites are situated.
In the same vein, the court held that in
giving valuation to properties, factors such as
its relation or distance towards the national
highway, to the town proper, and to other
commercial sites such as schools and
churches, must be given consideration.
The Manila Railroad Company vs. Romana
Velasquez et, al.
G.R. No. L-10278
November 23, 1915
Facts:
This action was instituted by the Manila
Railroad Company for the purpose of
expropriating twelve small parcels of land for a
railroad station site at Lucena, Province of
Tayabas.
The commissioner fixed the value of
the twelve parcels at P81,412.75 and awarded
P600 to Simeon Perez as damages for
removal of an uncompleted camarin. Upon
hearing, the commissioners report was
approved and the plaintiff directed to pay to
the Tayabas Land Company the total amount
awarded, with interest and costs. The plaintiff
company alleges that the awarded value was
grossly excessive, pointing out that the land
has never been used except for rice culture.
Issue:
WON the Courts have the power to review and
modify the findings of the commissioner
WON the appraised value of the land was just
in accordance with law
Held:
Yes. In its decision the court stated that under
Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure
that the report of the commissioners on the
value of the condemned land is not final and
that the judgement of the court is necessary to
give effect to their estimated valuation.
The Court held that in order to give the
quotation from 246 its proper meaning, it is
obvious that the court may, in its discretion
correct the commissioner report in any
manner deemed suitable to the occasion so
that final judgment may be rendered and thus
end the litigation. Moreover, section 496
provides that the SC may, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, affirm, reverse, or modify
any final judgement, ordered, or decree of the
Court of First Instance and Sec. 297 as
amended by Act. No. 1596 provides that xxx
the Supreme court may review the evidence
and make such findings upon the facts by a
preponderance of the evidence and render
such final judgment as justice and equity may
require.
No. In its decision the court states that there is
no question but that the compensation to
which a defendant owner is entitled is the
market value of the condemned property, to
which, of course, must be added his
consequential damages if any, or from which
must be deducted his consequential benefits,
if any.
In estimating its value all the capabilities of the
property, and all the uses to which it may be
applied or for which it is adapted are to be
considered, and not merely the condition it is
in at the time and the use to which it is then
applied by the owner.
Furthermore, the court opines that either as a
residential site or as a railroad station site, its
value should be principally regulated by the
value of other agricultural land on the outskirts
of the town. Thus the court fixed its price at
P6,500 and affirmed the amount for
consequential damages at P600 set by the
lower court.