G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 and given five (5) days to answer the charges.
e (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar,
instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief
sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the
review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of
justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise,
where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court
or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may
the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for
the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence
taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed
in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases
recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances
that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally
staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes
as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited
no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering
in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers
joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D.
807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario
Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate
answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when
their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the
Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration
orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their
counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario
dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as
the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked
CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari,
in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the
striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R.
No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court
. . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf
of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members
so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements
dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of
their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the
. . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers
CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a
"dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario
requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he
(Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin
and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants'
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended
without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
1
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The
Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the
following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be
accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the
matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now
suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very
badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent
of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to
bring with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this
matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on
the basis of complainants' evidence.
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was
submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education
Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in
G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without
prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the
matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it
was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-
work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those
charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit
their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process
of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from
those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being
unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor
General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel
bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has
also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide
or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause
exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize,"
justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine
with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been
passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject
to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil
Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
2
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent
office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence
is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise
that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.
It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether
3
or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order
to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules
and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done
by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed
for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted
to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have
been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission;
and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based
on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or
defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not
the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the
Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things.
It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same
ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining
teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education
Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would
be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve
no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the
Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the
appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil
Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights
and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the
case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest
the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass
actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education
served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For
failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the
suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a
case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in
the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-
work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
4
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in
cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate vs. Adjudicate These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether
or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order
to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules
and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done
by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed
for said acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based
on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or
defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not
the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the
Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
5
 G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS
JOHN DOES, respondents.
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights
("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit
public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-
1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by
Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of
the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the
City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In
said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12
July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1Prior
to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by
petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's
Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a
letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter
to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along
North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23
July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners
to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31
July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered
the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of
the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction.
The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the
(petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement
whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the
moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants
are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land,
particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon
City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and
exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within
the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if
already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and
ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the
courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that
"the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that
the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on
each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its
constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations
of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss
should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission
to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but
6
it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and
violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little
regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and
children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were
witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which
we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and
DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected
by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused
from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court
also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo,
who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring
such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of
her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence
is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed
that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way
be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
7
 . . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way
of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other
kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that
any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that
has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The
participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following
varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue
of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world,
whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union,
the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty,
and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process
of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials,
to be elected to public office, and to form political associations
and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an
education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual
person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they
are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can
only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he
is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights
can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and
in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value
to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may
have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law.
Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of
the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled
"Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in
their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the
International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon
the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972.
Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were
detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-
Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress
of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law
brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
judges lost independence and security of tenure, except
members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit
letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance
thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as
declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and
the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can
see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made
clear in view of the importance of human rights and also
because civil and political rights have been determined by many
8
international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of
Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such
a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the
precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be
curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that
the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and
political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights
covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual
involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw
the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been
made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well
as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right
against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on.
These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in
many international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what
we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and
political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right
against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights
that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass
social and economic rights, and there are other violations of
rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts
and authorities.
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define
its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps
heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the
ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we
would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and
political rights as covered by the international standards
governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular
political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political
detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have
experienced during martial law which we would now like to
safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had.
Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the
proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human
rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of
Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the
rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political
rights.
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of
human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime,
everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos
regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they
had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to
political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to
confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to
repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human
Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political
detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5)
salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner
Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed
Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible,
without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
9
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was
actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made
without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was
qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner
Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right
with other human rights specified in other convention which I do
not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the
Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner
mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which
we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I
have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here,
I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite
possible that there are rights specified in that other convention
which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it
would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general
terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained
in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments,
could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will
fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the
purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article,
but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights
would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the
need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the
question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to
marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil
right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various
specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned
initially by this provision freedom from political detention and
arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well
as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and
collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes
precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group
of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of
the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the
Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the
Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political
rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international
instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and
every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the
civil and politically related, as we understand it in this
Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to
the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the
International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights
of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et
cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the
sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has
specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims
of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay
and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so,
they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason
is, the cases involved are very delicate torture, salvaging,
picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the
persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like
politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this
Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this
commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual
who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we
10
 should concentrate only on civil and political violations because
if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place
to go again and we will not receive any response. . .
. 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on
its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise
defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue
of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also
refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for
debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights
of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting,
and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has
not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any
event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have
thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA
of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated
is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within
its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in
direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power
to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of
its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the
like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay
for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the
Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services"
mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the
CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which
the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only
in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection
of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way
of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue
11
in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case
No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting
final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing
of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been
intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission
on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No.
90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's
jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990
stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights
allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege
to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and
supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing
and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power
of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and
power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of
the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human
rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative
power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR
to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of
injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for
a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in
which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
12

G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE :PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-appellant.
DECISION
"Chicks mo dong?"1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities,
the fate of many desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This
case resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully,
there will be more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is
committed even though the minor knew about or consented to the act of trafficking.
This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."3
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated
May 5, 2008, states:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 oclock A.M., in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or
recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for money,
profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec.
6, Par. (a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), 5 a nongovernmental
organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in
human trafficking in Cebu City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1
Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police
operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending
to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with
marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter. 9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms
were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while
Room 25 was for the rest of the police team.10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan, Cebu Citys red light district. Accused noticed them and called their
attention by saying "Chicks mo dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?).11
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with
accused went as follows:
Accused: Chicks mo dong?(Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa
motel. (Are they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the
motel.)
Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and Ill get them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a
prospective subject.13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in
this case.14
Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in
sex?)15 Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo
inquired how much their services would cost. Accused replied, "Tag kinientos"
(P500.00).16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to
Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding toRoom 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked
money to accused.17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This
was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24,
arrested accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police
confiscated the marked money from accused. 18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB "were
brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the representatives from the IJM
and the DSWD."19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement
was supported by a copy of her certificate of live birth. 20
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In
March 2008 she stopped working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City.
She stayed with her cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It
was there where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in
a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was no longer a virgin, she offered
AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the money in order to helpher father.
AAA recalled that she had sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 and
given an additional P500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided
customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to Barangay Kamagayan,
telling her that there were more customers in that area.21
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see
her pimping girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified
13
that on May 2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a customer. That was the
first time that she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a
certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed inthe taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24.
It was in Room 24 where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and
toldAAA and BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she was
rescued and not arrested.25
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along
with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received P400.00 for every customer
who selected her.26
The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan,
SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the
missed call to PSI Ylanan, they "rushed to Room 24 and arrested the
accused."27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from
accuseds right hand "and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the
same at the police blotter prior operation. . . ." 28
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM "in conducting
the operation against the accused."29
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified thatshe worked as a laundry woman. On the evening
of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by
two men on board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone named
Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men
informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper
witha number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions. When
accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come
because allegedly, she would be given money by the two males. 30 Ruling of the
trial court
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and held31 that:
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under
paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in
prostitution asdefined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of "sexual
intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e. the
solicitation for sex and the handing over of the "bust money" of Php1,000.00
already consummated the said act.
....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as
qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION
(Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine
and awarded moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision 33 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000
and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals
noted and gavedue course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. The case
records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17,
2014.37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This
court also required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to
confirm the confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General 41 filed their
respective manifestations, stating that they would no longer file supplemental
briefs considering that all issues had been discussed in the appellants brief and
appellees brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter 42 dated June
17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed accuseds confinement at
the Correctional Institution for Women since October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused iswhether the prosecution was able to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accuseds brief, the sole issue may
be dissected into the following:
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid,
considering that there was no prior surveillance and the police did not
know the subject of the operation;43
(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accuseds guilt beyond
reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence presented to show
that accused has a history of engaging in human trafficking; 44 and
(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons,
considering that AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.45
14
 Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated
into committing the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did
not evenknow who their subject was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of
the alleged victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted
because the prosecution did notpresent evidence that would prove she had a
history of engaging in human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a
pimp and asserted that she was a laundry woman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that
she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to display herself to solicit
customers.49
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in convicting accused because
witnesses positively identified her as the person who solicited customers and
received money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have
been recognized by courts.51Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is
valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused had "fully
consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . ."53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casios conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
CTOC) was "adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession" 54 on
November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations "Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children" (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on
September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocols entry into force was on
December 25, 2003.58
In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:
Article 3 Use of terms For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant
where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in
persons" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the "Anti-
Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of the countrys commitment to [the]
protocol."59
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described
trafficking in persons as follows:
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is
tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most
flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this
insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape,
physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and
indentured servitude.
....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of
the Child; the United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and
their Families; and the United Nations Resolution on Trafficking in Women and
Girls, among others.
Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations Convention
Against Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.
At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that
shall squarely address human trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill
No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-
trafficking law when other laws exist that cover trafficking.61
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised
Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino
Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No.
8239 or the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal
recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public documents and the mail-order bride
scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or
15
transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like
practices. They only address to one or some elements of trafficking independent
of their results or consequence.62(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of
human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and
approved on May 26, 2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons
The elements of trafficking inpersons can be derived from its definition under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The actof "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation
or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." 63
On January 28, 2013,Republic Act No. 10364 64 was approved, otherwise known
as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012." Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208 was amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
"(a) Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,
offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child
for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as trafficking in
persons even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person"
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs" (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found thatAAA and BBB were recruited by accused when
their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. 65 AAA was a child
at the time that accused peddled her services. 66 AAA also stated that she agreed
to work as a prostitute because she needed money.67 Accused took advantage of
AAAs vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses.68
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No.
9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2,
2008. She concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with "customers"
for money.69 For liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined
under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still
becommitted even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of
threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes ata minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if
16
it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)
The victims consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. 71 Even without
the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minors consent is not given
outof his or her own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in
persons. Accused was charged under Section 4(a), which states:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural
or judicial, to commit any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by
any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or
overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of
trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
a. When the trafficked person is a child;
b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043,
otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said
adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group
of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a
person who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the
offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with
any member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement
agencies; and
g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the
offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines "child" as:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
....
b. Child- refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over
eighteen (18) but isunable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of
trafficking in persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of
the offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was also
qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers
waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old
when accused peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence
to show that she was born on January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused
committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the
victims was a child. As held by the trial court:
[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere
"transaction" i.e. that solicitation for sex and the handing over of the "bust money"
of Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test
to determine whether there was a valid entrapment operation:
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or
"origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether
entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents. All relevant facts such as the
accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness
in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of
mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's
propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects
an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for
the unwary criminal." If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to
commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail
even if a police agent usedan unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court
considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police
conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents,
on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the
crime.For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. The test of
17
entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to
induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to
commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding
person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by
the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) 77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test
in determining the whether there was an entrapment operation or an
instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test should not preclude courts from
also applying the subjective test. She pointed out that:
Applying the "subjective"test it is worth invoking that accusedappellant procures
income from being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof
evidencing accused-appellants history in human trafficking or engagement in any
offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending
human traffickers for quite some time.79 (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance
before the entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and
instigation. In Chang v. People,80this court explained that:
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is
instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
reaoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of
the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the
police to commit the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned
her living as a laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of the
Court of Appeals:
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo
and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that
evening, and when the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told
them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal. 82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she
initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused
called out their attention by saying "Chicks mo dong?" If accused had no
predisposition to commit the offense, then she most likely would not have asked
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely
proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who
asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part
of the police for the accused to commit the crime.
When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights. 83 The
marked money retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the
entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence. 84
On accuseds alibi thatshe was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court
of Appeals noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi
was unsubstantiated and cannot be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for
an entrapment operations validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored
the value of flexibility in police operations:
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-
bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is
a trait of good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations,
for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the
courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time
is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. 88 (Citations
omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The
urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate
action on the part of the law enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of 2,000,000.00. Section 10
(b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides that:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. The following penalties and sanctions are
hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
....
c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages
from P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also award exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance with the ruling in
People v. Lalli90 where this court held that:
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
18
 (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.
....
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to
the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is
worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually
violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious.
There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of
Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award
of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91

Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its
accompanying desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It
reflects the weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly
thrive in such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our world,
where our choices of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last resort
taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest
relationships. It serves as a foundation for two human beings to face lifes joys and
challenges while continually growing together with many shared experiences. The
quality of our human relationships defines the world that we create also for others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm
the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding
their character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other
human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of
accused in this case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the
hope that our people and our government unite against everything inhuman. We
contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.
There are more AAA's and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued.
They, too, need to be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still
much good in our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall not
be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in
accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:

(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

19
 People of the Philippines vs Shirley Casio Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014 Persons. The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental
organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in
human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino
Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as
decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM
provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter. The
team went to Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24
was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police
team. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan, Cebu Citys red light district where the accused noticed them and
called their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the signal, the accused was
arrested and the two minors were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons
have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;
1. When the trafficked person is a child;
2. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise
known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 and said adoption is
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking
is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group;
4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person
who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is
committed by a public officer or employee;
5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any
member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
6. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement
agencies; and

(2) The means used include by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of 7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs

The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when
their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at
the time that accused peddled her services.66 to work as a prostitute because she
needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of
AAAs vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child

for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as trafficking in
persons even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.

20
 G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world
behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of
their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its
protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first
petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and
set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief
of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein
petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders,
and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) 3 of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons
acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from
causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition,
to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be
granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed
for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing,
render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just
and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as
a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents
requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written
return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND
the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on
November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days
from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment
of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five
days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports,
records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and
oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the
latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the
sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by
herein respondents:
21
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before
February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the
CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San
Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not
informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed
by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts,
fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked
him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond,
not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the
stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to
the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to
the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but
three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de
la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted
as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also
saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo
Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded.
Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in
his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van
was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of
age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was
"Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors
was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and
made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he
recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van
stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo
were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open,
Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the
head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes.
After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his
(Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he
was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was
hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how
many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each
time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the
soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with
respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw
their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that
the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One
of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead
of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents'
abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the
guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond
was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was
sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his
stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol,
punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood.
When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they
stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room.
Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the
next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to
get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still
awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand
from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains.
After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo
church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he
was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. 19 He
reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The
soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place
near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly,
kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then
a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see
Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was
returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. 20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds
were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed,
particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a
room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring
1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels,
bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort
Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One
room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad
and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also
sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU." 24
22
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body
and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were
feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were
aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white
arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including
orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of
respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were
sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti.
Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a
soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take
care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with
Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in
Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks
in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there,
Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside
the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang,
Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball
court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already
waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began
by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the
affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He
then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan.
Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen.
Palparan was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba
natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na
mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa
magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at
sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat
sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre
na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not
do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men -
the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house.
Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because
he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond
relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,
Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they
continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again.
The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He
was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and
Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big
white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to
gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and
Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would
make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of
the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. 31 During his
testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen.
Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one
capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
"Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking
up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at
Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce
himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan.
While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his
house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. 34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under
the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white
vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute
ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the
barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean
outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also
ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the
Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had
been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go
home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she
was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his
arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and
Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as
Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24 th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
23
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the
daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. 37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue
along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to
November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar"
and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the
24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There
were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some
soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with
their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They
were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. 39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some
other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers
of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he
witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA
members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond
was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they
arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him
and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes. 41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred
to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed
with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp.
Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami.
Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser.
Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang
nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga
bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo.
May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita.
Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog.
Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit
hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita
malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo.
Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay
sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at
napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain
ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas
sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil
kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang
suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol
ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga
3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay
dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami
kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw
naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama
na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong
buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami
kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan,
ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also
farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family.
They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell
their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the
names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves
as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
24
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where
they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00
or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00
each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted
to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to
him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had
saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed
in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted
respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have
electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the
evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At
about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the
guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the
highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a
bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. 45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit
insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that
when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of
his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers
he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and
told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With
a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he
could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang,
Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario.
He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He
was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military
trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in
his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan
and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to
Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these
trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in
Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of
their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo
saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected
with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights
violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an
NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He
first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination.
His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their
account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted
on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof
were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified
that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In
compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return
of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement
therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time
arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared
or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in
the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen.
Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General
of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz,
Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza.
The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006,
the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes
C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding
General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence
was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the
Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing
his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo
brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally
detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. 48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein
petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office
only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged
abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military
directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of
the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable
Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to
institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of
the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in
a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a
25
 policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should
adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may
aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death
or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may
have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in
the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached
to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did
the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the
AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the
result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct
of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching
Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding
General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24
IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this
Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to
be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished
Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative
to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the
instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before
the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest
efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances
of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the
commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted
by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado,
INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court,
involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the
24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went
to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward
incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the
24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries
with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged
detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their
good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire
into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a
detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel
Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse
was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men
to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the
affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured
in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. 52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col.
Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based
in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this
Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry
Division.54
26
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of
the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of
Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU
auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz,
aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA
Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was
directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. 57 Jimenez testified that this
particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction
of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was
happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them
execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The
investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the
evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the
individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other
sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other
witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to
him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. 63 The six persons
were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them. 64 During
the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the
Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. 65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their
statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure.
Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006. 66 When the Sworn
Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation
report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June
1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006
for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February
2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case
for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church
located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He
claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy.
Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the
suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a
CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo
brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently
denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29
May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at
Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in
their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2)
brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that
on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete
chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he
just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when
he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA
vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that
they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006
in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active
supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder
brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy.
Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned
only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims
further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact
that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father
and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject
CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo
brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in
(Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
27
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them
since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He
claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he
was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only
reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those
people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo
who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA
BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident.
Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of
the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at
Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims
further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he
vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two
(2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached
him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated
because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006
in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20)
years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers
of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the
construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only
about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan
informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent
of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he
considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains
loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular
case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and
disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14
February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that
incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged
in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the
past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @
KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact
that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As
it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the
Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would
not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance
with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's,
they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention
by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the
activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection
with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged
charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has
not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict
them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is
therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela
Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and
Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment
of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the
following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND
OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.
28
 II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A)
FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B)
CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL
ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND
DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND
CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE
MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL
PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM
FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July
16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based
perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system" 72 participated in
mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." 73 It was an exercise
for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. 74 As
the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
"killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in
Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in
Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in
the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the
exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the
Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments,
limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation,
making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that
motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right
of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors,
to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner
to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles
of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power
characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to
enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. 82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually
evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It
became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one
piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage
that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history
conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public
authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:
(1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to
the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection
of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process. 85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted
an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights,
including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany
and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only
to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. 87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the
writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our
charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or
29
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The
Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the
Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo
libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions
of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law
tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through
remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a
petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate
to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a
writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides
rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that
it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the
goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights
on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also
sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on
October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition
as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo
brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners'
first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and
giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted,
and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of
herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of
petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-
strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of
action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court
of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were
continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent
Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with
countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will
to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few
examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa
istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." 97 "May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko
iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit
30
ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." 99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay
kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang
babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent
Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently
identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel
and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who
barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on
their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries,
namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula
de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the
abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements
of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the
suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the
NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who
turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction
were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall
of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the
CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact
that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from
outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily
investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At
the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of
men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer
tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen.
Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them
what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen.
Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been
shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during
their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command
bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged
and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of
law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth
Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and
Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the
abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be
then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario
drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following
the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-
300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on
February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in
subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which
was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo
and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong
materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren)
brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an
unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept
for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where
the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren
also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the
petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents
to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On
that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see
their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights
violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four
Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with
whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan
required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo,
p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario
had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and
forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The
participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and
Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally
involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their
participation is overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements
were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit
of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by
forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
31
injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity
with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony
and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," 104 firms up
respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in
finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents
of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and
tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly
based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister
Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition
of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.107 She was also examined by a medical
doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her
back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning
and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated
on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of
their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or
oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes
as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo.
There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are
physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" 109 as
their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named
in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at
large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position
to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis
supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this
right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights
based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment."
Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the
1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and
from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the
general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They
submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security
of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which
enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation
of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v.
Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no
undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty" 114 such as a
requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a
deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance." 116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their
right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed
been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to
security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the
extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v.
CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person
and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers
of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is
an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace
and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons
and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security.
Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right
to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the
right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The
32
life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived
with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will
protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's
existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a
person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment
of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of
those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas"
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration
of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that
"freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the
word "security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to
security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right
and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong.
Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear
caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as
people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another
with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or
past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct
to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in
this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of
the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life
itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When
employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or
fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of
free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes
bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will
- although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-
discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons
under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced
disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be
protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against
torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent
case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained,
alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby
violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3,
on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on
the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily
on the concept of security in holding, viz:
33
 ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic
authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected
to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the
circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply
with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also
made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be
related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights
and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built
into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat
and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in
the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal
duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without
an effective search for the truth by the government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government
protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights
Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right
to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9,
the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily
be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.
In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion
teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed
from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its
location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to
security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed
focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the
right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person.
These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the
Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right
of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence
that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security
only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time,
States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in
the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States
can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their
jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise
detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable
and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of
article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the
personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction
would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the
Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political
activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and
restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of
cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v.
Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the
abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform
in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner
and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation
of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt
on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right
to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but
imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to
liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1)
of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had
been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's
requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile.
34
The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of
person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but
must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over
that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk
of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation
into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody
and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar,
we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to
security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to
respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their
families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured
and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before
he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed
has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not
because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their
abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in
June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan,
respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they
should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga
3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay
dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they
were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent,
moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military
not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons
known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and
Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment
and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and
security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements
or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the
perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt
acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty
and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government.
Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by
themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably
failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt.
Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and
one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first
time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking
the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the
veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses
to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors
of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a
Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in
the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members
of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the
aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of
witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. 150 Petitioner
AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the
above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on
this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the
AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to
provide results of the investigations to respondents. 151 To this day, however,
almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of
National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the
results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a
writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion
that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection
by the government.
35
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is
violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated
by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners
question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of
the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production
order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant.
Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be
complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application
must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable
cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 152 In the case at bar, however,
petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations
made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit,
the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by
name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the
documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present
case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under
the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand
of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge,
under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.)
Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it
violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and
held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or
confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to
provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the
disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is
irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition
for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize
the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly
and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction.
Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served
with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for
violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant
in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make
appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent
guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
36
 Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo
FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men
belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters
of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing petition as amparo petition.
of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
states that upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of
any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, October 7, 2008)

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, confirm the present places of
official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports
and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing
violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been
violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public
officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably,
since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again
be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to
their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,
the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a
search warrant.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused
with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution. It said that the production order should be likened to the production

37
 G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO,
SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf
and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United
States District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives
in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely:
Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Respondents.
DECISION
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish
weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and the fundamental
structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a
significant number, the changes, however, have not sufficiently healed the colossal
damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law period. The
cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse
outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the
appropriate relief due them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim
that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely
personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to
involve the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations 1 who,
deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man who once held absolute
rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly
representative, his estate. The clash has been for now interrupted by a trial court
ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a
whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them
by a foreign court. There is an understandable temptation to cast the struggle
within the simplistic confines of a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive
at what might seem the desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort to the equity
principle all too often leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally
wrong.
Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case will comfort
those who maintain that our substantive and procedural laws, for all their perceived
ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just.
The relief sought by the petitioners is expressly mandated by our laws and
conforms to established legal principles. The granting of this petition for certiorari
is warranted in order to correct the legally infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of
the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed
with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against
the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate).
The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens 2 who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the
hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. 3 The Alien Tort Act
was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as
it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law. 4 These
plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the
Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were
tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military
or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately
ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was
impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B)
of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked
by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class
action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary execution and
disappearance victims.5Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict
and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff
class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel
L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a
total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was
eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision
rendered on 17 December 1996.6
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor
the US District Court awarded damages.7 They argued that since the Marcos
Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the
US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be
recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court then in force.8
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among
others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had
only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees,
notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of
damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25
Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the
proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners
claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of
pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.9
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada10 of the Makati
RTC issued the subject Orderdismissing the complaint without prejudice.
38
Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject
matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved
a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of
money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On
that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find
application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was
approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not
been paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge
Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial, petitioners filed
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent
judge.11 They prayed for the annulment of the questioned orders, and an order
directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of
appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the
subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an
action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also
point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two
Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the
liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule
1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every
action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution,
which provides that "Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty,"
a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing fee. The
adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was characterized
as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this
case.12 It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the
enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with
Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati
RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a
new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between
the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be
relitigated again in another country.13 The CHR likewise invokes the principle of
comity, and of vested rights.
The Court's disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential
guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing foreign judgments,
particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for the issuance a
limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special circumstances of the petitioners as
victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged allegation of human rights
abuses.
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the
respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded that the
filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of the
property in litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141
as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million. The provision
states:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money
claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or
a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the
same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the
started value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but less than P 200,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than P 250,000.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than P 300,00.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00
(Emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions,
permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-in-
interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not based
on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the present petition is
whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money claim against an estate
not based on judgment."
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly
based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision
does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment,
and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
39
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing
fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of
the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. 14 In
special proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the
filing fee is again based on the value of the property. 15The aforecited rules
evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where the value
of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads in full:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(b) For filing
1. Actions where the value
of the subject matter
cannot be estimated --- P 600.00
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the
filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a),
as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment.
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action
to enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and
effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. 17 This principle was prominently
affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot18 and expressly
recognized in our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen &
Co.19 The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in
turn, was derived from the California Act of March 11, 1872. 20 Remarkably, the
procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48
states:

2. Special civil actions except

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judicial foreclosure which judgment is as follows:

shall be governed by (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
paragraph (a) above --- P 600.00
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
3. All other actions not presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title;
involving property --- P 600.00
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
mistake of law or fact.
estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and
one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive
It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed
upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is
value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the claimant and shall
presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their
be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the
successors in interest by a subsequent title.21 However, in both cases, the foreign
case at bar. A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want
property or an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
of jurisdiction or notice to the party,22 collusion, fraud,23 or clear mistake of law or
property.16 Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US
fact.24 Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend
District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.
against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that
there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. 25

40
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce
a foreign judgment26, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case
of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine
its efficacy.27Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of its validity. 28
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to
enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing
of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is
one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right,29 and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a
vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or
the "presumptive evidence of a right."30 Absent perhaps a statutory grant of
jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be
brought before the regular courts.31
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action
arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts
or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same
set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that
are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a
tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of the right of the
complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in
a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the
same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of
action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign
judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the
complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission
committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual
allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus
conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are
assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter
left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to
a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion,
fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a
strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims
and issues.32 Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by
never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote
what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest
and quietness."33 If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. 34
Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition
that the subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a foreign
judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it
applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all
practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary
estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailed Order, the respondent judge
pounced upon this point without equivocation:
The Rules use the term "where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated." The subject matter of the present case is the judgment
rendered by the foreign court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite
sums of money, as and for compensatory damages. The Court finds that
the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated; indeed, it can even
be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish between the
enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment, and
separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees.
Similarly, a plaintiff suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be
allowed to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that the
subject matter of his suit is not the P1 million, but the enforcement of the
promissory note, and that the value of such "enforcement" cannot be
estimated.35
The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is
capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos Estate
cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion
of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v.
Scandia,36 from which the rule in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but
which incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:
xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the
defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
41
 where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. 37
Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized as being
incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality of conveyances and money
deposits,38 validity of a mortgage,39 the right to support,40validity of
documents,41 rescission of contracts,42 specific performance,43 and validity or
annulment of judgments.44It is urged that an action for enforcement of a foreign
judgment belongs to the same class.
This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject
matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the
effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money.
Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for "the enforcement of the foreign
judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is
no denying that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in
the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of reckoning, we
must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the point that a
declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of
pecuniary estimation might lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as
the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But
under the statute defining the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts
are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign
judgments.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must
be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. 45
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject
matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property or a sum of
money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a
foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of action arising from
the adjudication of such judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for
enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would
fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of
the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision indicates that it can be
relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for enforcement of foreign
judgments, provided that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such
complaint:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce
the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the
same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing
it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the
proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and
other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),
involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it
was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount
required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the
correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent
judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the
complaint.
42
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which
should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision is grounded
solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the the
internationally recognized policy of preclusion,46 as well as the principles of comity,
utility and convenience of nations47 as the basis for the evolution of the rule calling
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The US Supreme Court
in Hilton v. Guyot48 relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially derived
from the landmark treatise of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws of 1834.49 Yet the notion of "comity" has since been criticized as one "of dim
contours"50 or suffering from a number of fallacies.51 Other conceptual bases for
the recognition of foreign judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory
or the modern doctrine of obligation.52
There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the
standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but these
have not borne fruition. The members of the European Common Market accede to
the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as to participating
countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and rvision au
fond.53 The most ambitious of these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared
in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law.54 While it has not received
the ratifications needed to have it take effect, 55 it is recognized as representing
current scholarly thought on the topic.56 Neither the Philippines nor the United
States are signatories to the Convention.
Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory
force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is
essential. Steiner and Vagts note:
. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private
international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one
conducive to the growth of a transnational community encouraging travel
and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary resurgence
of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values that systems of
public and private international law seek to further a community interest
in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal
systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important role
in both fields.57
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points
out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments,
there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable
expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have
submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one state, and
proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of
the judgment issued by the court.58
There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment
and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, the
exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the
time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The
requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of
generally accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The Restatement,
Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation
after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States,"
and on its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions as valid
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.59Similarly, the notion that fraud or
collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation
with foreign jurisprudence and commentators,60 as well as the doctrine that the
foreign judgment must not constitute "a clear mistake of law or fact." 61 And finally,
it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of
judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice
which may lead to a denial of recognition.62
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign
judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction.63 This defense allows for the
application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when
such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the
judgment is against a person.64 The defense is also recognized within the
international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy
exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the
light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to
the case.65 The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to
the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim
is noxious to our constitutional values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law,
by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. 66 The classical formulation
in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice
on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.67
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert
with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted
principles of international law.68 As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread
practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and
enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is
no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules
governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.
43
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or
jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is
evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed
in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has
long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may
be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state,69 but they all
prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for,
however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The
bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international
practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules
of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court,70 and could very well be
abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as
are all State components, to obey the laws of the land, including generally
accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those
ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 71
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it
emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and
affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country
merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally
accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave
concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the
value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will
almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the
applicable laws and standards of the forum. 72 The vagaries of inflation, as well as
the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into
an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the
docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the
award sought to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the
Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award
involving real property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia
where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that
the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined
by the standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as
it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign
judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that
resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the
complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Court's Final
Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under the
governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule
141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only
the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.
Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which
states that "[F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." Since the
provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives
rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the
parameters of this constitutional right. Given our preceding discussion, it is not
necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the
petitioners. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by
the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds 73 or unless the
resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.74
One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that
the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of
the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not
precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is
on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the
enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented
before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but
within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On
the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged,
and contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby
issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
44
 G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself
and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the
teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as
their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed
to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that,
for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed
by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's
groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect
on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law
provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities
of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as
being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-797)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on
the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann
J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private
respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J.
Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-
Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from
his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately
isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and
prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he
would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager
of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons.
Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said
bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using
the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent
physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed
private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully
on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and
whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped
her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat
her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-
year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink
of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by
cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply
fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was
hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to
visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12
45
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she
intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's
mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just
accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has
not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that
he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner
had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would
not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep
wells. He is the President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he and private
respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner
over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary
of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid
for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid
by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC
Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the
filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions
of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against
the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued
a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted
hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal
dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by
police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings
Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to
allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal
dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or
anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-
entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and
finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily
residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate
with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or
contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor
send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the
children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the
Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender
any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children,
including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical
expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other
cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31
March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his
Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court
by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the
month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support
pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent
and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo,
the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in
the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
46
 On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court
issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included
the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued
use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in
Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the
house in Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila,
whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace,
in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum
of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until
the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the
TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and
(2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1)
removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the
amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level
at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO
to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only
to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other
personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos,
co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment
in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have
left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove
things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household
furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall
be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for
rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms
to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the
children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to
faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her
and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc.,
of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of
recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the
children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six
or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie
Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men
allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in
his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed
their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported
to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father
for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the
housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal
detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent,
armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings.
Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids'
room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which
reads as follows:
47
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either
directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype,
cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's
other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily
residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm
and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month
and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September
6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total
amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No.
FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide
the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise
dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of
Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of
gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest
in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets
or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie
J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes
"I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325
and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona
shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and
are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of
these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without
the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of
petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted
TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within
which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified.
Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of
private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued
renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30)
days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications
as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO
arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case
for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
48
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE
THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING
THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A
BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No.
9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by
the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698)
filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in
the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC
of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family
Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. 42 In accordance
with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A.
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the
latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and
their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all
kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:
49
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.
9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction
to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and
Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file
an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the
opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending
party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending
party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's
claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of
a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited
from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a
quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely
on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for
the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not
have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question
relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be
supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among
others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for
further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked
and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall
be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a
hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if
a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or
renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment
is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection
order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R.
CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that
if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief.
However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in
this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
50
orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from
taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection
shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only
for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of
itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the
Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter
of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the
community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts.
The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and,
hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary
powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection
orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose
of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation
to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter
of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's
plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize
spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband
or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the
remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which
became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito
(better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a
"synthesized measure"62 an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-
Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships
Act"63 providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but
at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of
violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the
deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some
women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that
if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other
members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this
would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims
or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners
in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include
men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women.
I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties
therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men,
children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to
limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The
understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than
just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the
interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not
get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights
especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not
had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after
years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even
the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then
it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
51
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their
lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an
unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women
are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment
where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior
to the Filipino woman.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with
this bill because the family members have been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims
of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason
incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost
always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly children who are
excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses
the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection
orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection
to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against
women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures
and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot
just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect
the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power
relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation
to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate
family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen.
Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept
the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to
accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to
the amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree.
Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong
mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree
that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a
matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-
year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these
things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular
measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the
men in the bill but not the children.
52
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and
wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and
abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said
grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and
it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived
as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative
that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none
was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which
it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did
not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for
Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women
and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and
traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and
supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men
gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue,
passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against
Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women,
which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and
to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of
gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his
remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing
Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
53
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women.
The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the
family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they
were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill,
his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and
other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and
wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and
through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands
to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which
allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise
wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the
English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first
appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her
hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to
the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized.
The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They
considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering
holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to
vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the
roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to
the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public
concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women
are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women
reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from
reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who
do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or
hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on
family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double
the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families
where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the
most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because
they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no
other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent
Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide
victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women
Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful.
The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed
the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the
landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on
the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City,
Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the
Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these
women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has
ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
54
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and
for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence
against women and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002
representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of
2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent
54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances
served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the
year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of
5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471
cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90%
of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-
in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics
on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of
2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and
violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively
low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation.
In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic
violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller
number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women
constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a
man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44
percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to
live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman
against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated
against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-
drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted
or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets,
plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty
of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of
vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there
may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their
number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of
the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing,
crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other
crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now
Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in
defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority
under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization"
first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill
No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a
private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the
complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our
women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J.
Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent
language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A.
9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist"
and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a
"prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by
biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate
55
against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory
and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself
to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing
the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out
in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines
ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW
was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention
mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of
equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to
all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when
it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and
security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against
a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a
woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in
any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause
mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness
abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from
engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;
56
 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and
the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are
attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery.
The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that
the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent
action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not
guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that
phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make
every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in
its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband
or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed
"against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had
a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs,
of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he:
"On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and
ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court
to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence,
to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified
by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after
raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is
in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary
to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an
ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the
petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the
right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences
in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, 103among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
57
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to
file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order
that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the
notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary
or permanent protection order should not be issued. 106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection
order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days
earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for
the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the
trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within
which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he
chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in
futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only
for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do
so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process
of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the
VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the
residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as
her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended
party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose
of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are
violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the
court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort
him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's
residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property
rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property
and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of
encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed
policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or
any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained
by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family
Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the
issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of
protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate
equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
58
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power
which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other
lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of
power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The pertinent provision
reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1wphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date
of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall
be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a
Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately
after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct
any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely
orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or
her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into
the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine
what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary
inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur
that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to
victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated,
assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law
by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's
movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles
was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not
again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be,
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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 JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against
private respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a
bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household
help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her
with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter,
Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the
hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for
seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept
his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was
afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo
from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of
violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary
Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all
his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to
wives/women and not to husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by
men against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and
other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal
violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an
abused wife, theequal protection guarantee is violated.
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women
International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human
rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
4. Convention Against Torture, and the
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion
of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the
standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.
Declaration of Policy in RA 9262
enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by
providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological,
and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the
victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate
to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination
that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of
equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines
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 compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination
against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate
means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and
most comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The
CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive
discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
2. Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and
advancement for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well
as de facto equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of
discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination
against women, with the emphasis that women have suffered and are continuing
to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms, which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as
mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made
in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are
victims of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by
strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or
had a sexual or dating relationship.
3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the
Achievement of Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on,
the subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal
Code: all "assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming
from the view of male superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological
assumption that: husband and wife were one body before God; thus "they were
one person under the law, and that one person was the husband," a concept that
evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment
of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are
expected to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family.
This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women power,
which must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is
one of the ways men control women to retain such power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even
kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal
family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law
developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a
rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases
involving violence committed against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of
15,969 cases involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different
categories of violence committed against women. The number of reported cases
showed an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that
women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and
therefore need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of
empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from
violence perpetuated by women.
4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and
cultural differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between
women and men prescribe that they be treated differently under particular
conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the
disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a man requires the special
protection of the law, as gleaned from the following recommendations of
the CEDAWCommittee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not
enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between
women and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-
identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such
differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective
strategy aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a redistribution
of resources and power between men and women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality.
These results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women
enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the
same income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and
women enjoying freedom from violence.
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 The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres
of her life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation
of ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that
the violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the
government, which is committed to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being,
then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be empowered.
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively
undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and
inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision
provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such discrimination.
Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would
address the evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply
embedded in the societys subconscious, on Filipino women and children and
elevate their status as human beings on the same level as the father or the
husband.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination
against women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse
discrimination" against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception to equality, but
an expression and attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and substantive
equality which the Filipino people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987
Constitution." Ameliorative measures are necessary as a redistributive mechanism
in an unequal society to achieve substantive equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that
they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It
is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men.
Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences
between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in
order to address such differences.
Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same.
But this model does not take into account biological and socially constructed
differences between women and men. By failing to take into account these
differences, a formal equality approach may in fact perpetuate discrimination and
disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model this recognizes differences between women and men
but considerswomens weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This
approach reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the issue
of discrimination of women on account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by
nature, but suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed
disadvantages were eliminated, there was no further need for protection." Thus,
the substantive equality model gives prime importance to womens contexts,
realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and measures
directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the disadvantages they
experience as women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause (application of the substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men
under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to
the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of
the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children,
who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important
governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives
the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based
classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause
embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal
protection simply requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same
way. It does not connote identity of rights among individuals, nor does it require
that every person is treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a safeguard
to ensure that State-drawn distinctions among persons are based on reasonable
classifications and made pursuant to a proper governmental purpose. In short,
statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and
made pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found
that domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute
to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the States
mandate to actively promote the familys total development. Congress also found,
as a reality, that women and children are more susceptible to domestic and
other forms of violence due to, among others, the pervasive bias and prejudice
against women and the stereotyping of roles within the family environment that
traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary
to recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one
hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally,
is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on persons and family under the
Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between men and
women in the context of the family.
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Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate
relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a
power issue.

By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative

constitutional requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can
become descriptive reality. The socially constructed distinctions between women
and men that have afflicted us and spawned discrimination and violence should be
eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-exist.

The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from
the helter skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the
special other who we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible,
then for such time as will be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last
for eternity.

I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.

Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to
be freed from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded,
to hit their wives or partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt
community response to this violent behavior through barangay officials who can
command the man to immediately desist from harming his home partner and their
children. It also establishes domestic violence as a crime, not only against its
victims but against society as well. No longer is domestic violence lightly dismissed
as a case of marital dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.

Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no
longer be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive
equality. "It ought to be construed in consonance with social justice as the heart
particularly of the 1987 Constitutiona transformative covenant in which the
Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged
groups and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy." This means that the weak,
including women in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they
may cease to be weak.

Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored
on the human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of
discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine society, each person
may be restored to his or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status."

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