The Irish MUST Be Allowed A Referendum On Final Brexit Deal

The Irish MUST be allowed a
referendum on final Brexit deal,

politician demands
IRISH people must be given a final vote on whether to accept the terms of the final
Brexit deal between the UK and the European Union (EU), a politician has
demanded.
By Joey Millar
PUBLISHED: 10:45, Sat, May 27, 2017
GETTY
Michael Fitzmaurice has called for an Irish referendum on the UK's Brexit deal
The terms of the exit deal, which will be negotiated over the next two years, cannot be agreed unless
they are ratified by an Irish referendum, Michael Fitzmaurice has claimed. This is necessary due to the
extent to which Ireland will be effected by Britain leaving the bloc, said independent member of
parliament for Roscommon-South Leitrim.
Mr Fitzmaurice said: The implications of a bad deal or no deal at all for Ireland on the Brexit
negotiations are huge and any agreement reached between the EU and the UK should be voted on by
the Irish people.
We do a huge amount of business with the UK, especially in the agri sector, and any deal reached on
the Berxit negotiations will have fundamental effects on our farming and food industry.
"Ireland must be front and centre at those talks and not watching on from the sidelines.
READ MORE: What will happen to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales after Brexit?
Michael Fitzmaurice said Irish people needed a vote on the final deal
He said Irish people needed a veto vote not simply to ensure relations with Britain remained strong but
also to re-assert the island as a major player at the EU.
Mr Fitzmaurice said: Ireland used to have a veto on important matters at EU level but thats now
gone. We see the UK and the EU playing hardball in recent weeks, and while they can fight if they
wish we must get in there are make sure we get a good deal on behalf of the Irish people.
GETTY
Ireland will suffer when the UK leaves the EU

I am firmly of the opinion that whatever deal emerges from the negotiations should be voted on by the
Irish people and we should show the EU and we are prepared to stand up and fight for our interests on
this vital issue.
This is not the first time Mr Fitzmaurice has spoken in favour of an Irish referendum on accepting the
terms of the Brexit deal.
Last month he said the risk of things going pear-shaped made a vote a necessity.
He said: Our Taoiseach should go out there and announce it to them, put them out of joint if they have
to, and say we are going to hold a referendum on this decision.
If democracy is anything that we all believe in, the Irish people, in one of the most important of their
lives, should deserve a referendum on this.
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/809820/brexit-ireland-referendum-michael-fitzmaurice-
european-union-deal
Could an Irish referendum delay or

even derail Brexit?
Unavoidable that talks on article 50 will trigger a referendum here, seminar
hears
Thu, Jan 26, 2017, 01:00 Updated: Thu, Jan 26, 2017, 13:14
Ruadhn Mac Cormaic Foreign Affairs Correspondent

A think-tank founder has said talks on article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty the provision that allows for a
member state to leave the bloc would lead to a referendum here. Image: iStock

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Could Irish voters block a future deal to withdraw Britain from the EU by rejecting it in a referendum?
With the clock counting down to the formal commencement of the two-year Brexit negotiation process,
some EU specialists are debating whether the project could be delayed, or even derailed, by a vote of
the Irish people.
The prospect is sure to intrigue EU lawyers, preoccupy Government negotiators and cause heads to
explode in the editorial offices of the London tabloids.
At a seminar hosted last week by the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), a Dublin-
based think-tank, founder Brendan Halligan said he had long been of the view that talks on article 50 of
the Lisbon Treaty the provision that allows for a member state to leave the bloc would lead to a
referendum here.
I think its unavoidable, Mr Halligan said, echoing a hypothesis recently put forward by Peter
Brennan, formerly Europe director for business lobby group Ibec.
In a briefing paper published earlier this month, Mr Brennan argued that, taking account of previous
Supreme Court decisions, a working assumption must be that whatever legal agreements (note the
plural) result from the Brexit talks will be put to referendums in the State. The outcome would hardly
be a foregone conclusion.
If this treaty results in a major disruption to the Irish economy, a deterioration of the exchequers
position, and the introduction of UK tariffs on some sensitive Irish agri-food products, will the Irish
electorate vote Yes? Unlikely, he wrote.
Really conceivable?
Speaking from the floor at the IIEA event, former minister for finance Alan Dukes spelled out the
implications. Is it really conceivable that we would face a referendum, one of the outcomes of which
might be that we would say no, the UK cannot leave?
A definitive answer must await the conclusion of the talks, most likely in autumn 2018. In principle,
however, we know the Brexit deal would trigger a referendum here if it goes beyond the scope or
objectives of existing EU law, or violates the sovereignty clause in the Constitution by imposing new
restrictions on the Government.
Given that the agreement will have to be ratified by all member states, a rejection by Irish voters would
have unknown consequences.
Catherine Day, former director general of the European Commission, said it was her understanding that
the article 50 deal would not require a change to the EU treaty and would therefore not automatically
trigger a referendum in the Republic.
Gavin Barrett of the School of Law at UCD and an expert on EU law, said the deal appears unlikely to
force Ireland to do anything that its not already doing in the EU. He points out that neither German
reunification, which radically altered the power balance within the European Union, nor the post-
2004 enlargement rounds necessitated plebiscites here.
So, in principle, I dont see any particular reason why a shrinkage of the European Union should
trigger a referendum either, Prof Barrett said.
That position could shift, however, if the Brexit deal was to involve the creation of a new institution
one to regulate the new relationship between the EU and UK, or Dublin and London, for example.
If institutions like that involved giving away power or committing to undefined policies, then it might
theoretically be possible that a referendum might be necessitated, said Prof Barrett, though he think it
is a remote possibility.
Thats the legal principle. But referendums are not only about the law; theyre also about politics. You
can never get away from the fact that even if you dont have to have a referendum, sometimes people
propose them, said Ms Day.
New type of plebiscite
The current environment may make such demands more likely. Up until now, every EU referendum
here has been held because the Government believed the Constitution required it. But the fact that
serious discussion is taking place about a referendum on public ownership of the water infrastructure
suggests that a new type of plebiscite could be around the corner.
Moreover, deciding whether a referendum must be held is not an exact science. At least some Irish
negotiators involved in drafting the EU fiscal treaty, an agreement that tightened budgetary rules
during the financial crisis, believed they had done enough to ensure a referendum was not required.
The Attorney General advised differently, and the treaty was approved by public vote in May 2012.
Given the high political cost that any government would incur by deciding against a referendum, only
to be ordered to hold one by the judiciary, any cabinet faced with having to weigh two reasonably
strong arguments for and against will err on the side of caution.
The consequences of getting that decision wrong are very severe, said Prof Barrett. If there is even a
strong possibility that a referendum is needed, then you have to have a referendum.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/could-an-irish-referendum-delay-or-even-derail-
brexit-1.2951162
Just what is going in Dublin? asks DUP
of Irish statements on Brexit
Nigel Dodds criticises Taoiseachs and Simon Coveneys recent harder line on
Brexit
July 31, 17
Harry McGee, Amanda Ferguson

Jeffrey Donaldson, Nigel Dodds and Emma Pengelly of the DUP walking out of 10 Downing Street in
June. Photograph: Daniel Leal-Olivas/AFP/Getty Images
The DUP has accused the Irish Government of going backwards and politicking over Brexit in
preparation for a general election.
On Sunday DUP deputy leader Nigel Dodds suggested since Enda Kenny was replaced as Taoiseach
by Leo Varadkar and Simon Coveney took over from Charlie Flanagan as Minister for Foreign Affairs,
confusion seems to be the order of the day.
Just what is going in Dublin? he asked.
The North Belfast MP said there had been a series of inconsistent and incoherent statements from
both men and accused Mr Varadkar of having an intemperate outburst after the Taoiseach said the
State would not design a border for Brexiteers.
This came after Mr Coveney denied a newspaper report suggesting the Government preferred the idea
of a sea border after Brexit.
A spokesman for the Taoiseach said yesterday that Mr Varadkar had already outlined his views on a
number of issues relating to Brexit, including the Border, and had nothing to add.
Mr Varadkar, who is due to make his first visit as Taoiseach to the North in the coming days, had said
the Government did not want to see any economic border on the island after Brexit and that he hoped
unionists would not respond angrily to his position.
Mr Dodds dismissed Mr Varadkars position as total nonsense and reiterated his party and British
government commitment to no internal UK borders.
There already is an economic border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, he said. For
instance, does he not realise that every time you cross the Border you need to change currency? Or that
each jurisdiction is subject to entirely different taxation and financial regimes?
It is good that the UK government swiftly and forcefully debunked any notion of internal borders
within the UK.
Thats in line with previous commitments given to us by the prime minister, and its something that is
non-negotiable. Sensible work to achieve practical and mutually beneficial arrangements for the
Border after Brexit have been stopped on Varadkars orders.
Mr Dodds spoke of Mr Coveney adopting the language of Sinn Fin when the latter spoke about
special status for the North in the European Union after Brexit.
Beyond preposterous
Fianna Fil spokesman on Brexit, Stephen Donnelly, said the arguments being put forward by Mr
Dodds were beyond preposterous.
My main response to the statement is that it is a masterclass in irony. Its very hard to take talk of
common sense co-operation seriously from a Brexiteer. The very act that has taken us backwards is
Brexit.
Mr Donnelly said Fianna Fil recognised the diplomatic efforts of the Government and the suggestion
of having the Border in the Irish Sea was one of the options put forward by his own party in the event
of Brexit occurring.
Sinn Fin spokesman David Cullinane said the only people who had been inconsistent and incoherent
when it came to Brexit were the British government.
The DUP strategy is to give a blank cheque to the British government. Nigel Dodds would be better
served dealing with the negative consequence of a hard Brexit rather than throwing his rattle out of he
pram, he said.
Earlier on Sunday, the DUPs Lagan Valley MP, Jeffrey Donaldson, faced criticism from Twitter users
after he was critical of the Dublin administration.
He wrote on Twitter: A country that uses electronic toll tag systems on 11 of its main roads cant
claim there isnt a technological solution to a Brexit border.
Several Twitter users pointed out there is a huge difference between paying toll charges and
immigration and customs checks.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/brexit/just-what-is-going-in-dublin-asks-dup-of-irish-
statements-on-brexit-1.3171756
Unregulated free movement would not
keep faith with Brexit
Comments by Britains international trade secretary seem to contradict
chancellor
July 31, 17

Britains international trade secretary Liam Fox: Control of our own borders was one of the elements
we wanted in the referendum. Photograph: Reuters


Unregulated free movement of labour after Brexit would not keep faith with the EU referendum
result, Britains international trade secretary Liam Fox has said.
Dr Fox insisted the British cabinet has not agreed a deal on immigration after withdrawal from the EU.
The remarks came as British chancellor Philip Hammond signalled there was broad acceptance in
cabinet of a wide-ranging post-Brexit transitional period lasting up to three years.
Dr Fox told the Sunday Times: We made it clear that control of our own borders was one of the
elements we wanted in the referendum, and unregulated free movement would seem to me not to keep
faith with that decision.
Dr said he had not been involved in any cabinet talks on extending free movement for up to three years
after Brexit, stating: If there have been discussions on that I have not been party to them. I have not
been involved in any discussions on that, nor have I signified my agreement to anything like that.
In remarks that are likely to be seen as directed at the chancellor, Dr Fox said: I am very happy to
discuss whatever transitional arrangements and whatever implementation agreement we might want,
but that has to be an agreement by the cabinet.
It cant just be made by an individual or any group within the cabinet.
Registration system
Mr Hammond said on Friday the transitional period up to 2022 would mean many arrangements
remaining very similar to how they were the day before we exited the European Union.
The chancellor said there would be a registration system in place for people coming to work in the UK
after Brexit, during the transitional period.
If they come here to work after we leave the European Union, during that transitional period, the
sensible approach will be to seek to register people so that we know whos coming and whos going,
he said.
A British government source told the Press Association that freedom of movement will end when
Brexit occurs in March 2019, and a time-limited implementation period would then follow.
The source said that the idea of mass, uncontrolled migration is not a vision of Brexit that we will
undertake.
However, the EU has made it clear continued access to the single market is dependent on free
movement of labour.
Cabinet civil war
Conservative party tensions were also on show as former Brexit minister David Jones branded Mr
Hammonds transition initiative deeply dangerous as he accused the chancellor of going on
manoeuvres while the British prime minister Theresa May was abroad on holiday.
All this agitation by the chancellor and his allies is hugely discourteous to her and undermines her
authority, Mr Jones said in the Mail On Sunday.
The war of words came as an ally foreign secretary Boris Johnson also criticised Mr Hammonds plans.
Gerard Lyons, who was an economic adviser to Mr Johnson when he was London mayor, said a two-
year transition period would work better.
Writing in the Sunday Telegraph, he said: Many of the risks being highlighted about Brexit are
perceived risks, not real risks. And a two-year transition would alleviate many concerns.
Mr Johnson has not yet commented publicly on Mr Hammonds transition plans.
Liberal Democrat leader Sir Vince Cable said Dr Foxs remarks point to a cabinet civil war.
He said: Dr Foxs comments, directly contradicting the chancellor over a transitional agreement on
Brexit, show all the signs of a cabinet in a state of civil war.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/brexit/unregulated-free-movement-would-not-keep-
faith-with-brexit-1.3171635
Varadkars comments on Brexit are a
sharp message to London
Analysis: Taoiseachs extraordinary outburst signifies a distinct change of
mood
Sat, Jul 29, 2017,
Pat Leahy, Mary Minihan

Asked about a newspaper story that reported tensions between the British and Irish governments,
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar let rip. Photograph: Collins


The Twitter bio of Taoiseach Leo Varadkar says, among other things, that he has been known to talk
too much.
Its one of the reasons why he has been popular with reporters as he rose through the political ranks.
He was certainly talking freely on Friday during his first round-table interview with political
correspondents at Government Buildings.
Before taking questions from reporters, he delivered a brief speech outlining his views on the
relationship between journalists and politicians, by its very nature both symbiotic and oppositional,
but hopefully not unhealthy, insidious or destructive in the way it is in some other countries.
We are all patriots and I think its better for our country and better for our politics if we each have the
opportunity to do our jobs as best we can, and to feed off each other rather than feed on each other, he
said.
The first question on Brexit prompted a response that demonstrated a clear change of tone from the
softly softly diplomatic approach adopted by his predecessor, and reminded the reporters of
Varadkars previous habit of making headlines with forthright statements.
Asked about a London Times story that reported tensions between the British and Irish governments
and a proposal from Dublin that the Border should effectively run down the Irish Sea, Varadkar let rip.
There hasnt been an economic Border since 1992, he said.
As far as this Government is concerned there shouldnt be an economic Border. We dont want one.
Its the United Kingdom, its Britain that has decided to leave and if they want to put forward smart
solutions, technological solutions for Borders of the future and all of that thats up to them.
Were not going to be doing that work for them because we dont think there should be an economic
Border at all. That is our position, Varadkar continued.
So we do not think it is in the interests of our country. We do not think its in the interests of Northern
Ireland or the United Kingdom that there should be an economic Border between our two countries or
on our island and were not going to be helping them to design some sort of Border that we dont
believe should exist in the first place.
Severe impact
So let them put forward their proposals as to how they think a Border should operate and then well
ask them if they really think this is such a good idea because I think it will have a very severe impact
on their economy if they decide to go down that route.
Varadkars rocket is the most forthright statement of the Irish Governments position since the Brexit
vote. It also marks a significant shift away from the essentially collaborative stance adopted by the
Irish towards the British since the referendum. It will give relations between Dublin and London a jolt
of the type not seen for many years.
But Varadkars intervention is only a public outburst of a private frustration with the British that has
been growing in Irish Government circles since last year.
Lack of clarity
A combination of Westminsters lack of clarity about what the UK wants from Brexit, as well as a
growing trepidation in Dublin about the consequences of the hardening British stance on Brexit has led
to the first cooling of relations between the two governments in decades.
And while relations between the two governments, both institutionally and personally, remain
comparatively good, there is a growing chasm on Brexit.
Most people in the Irish Government believe that Ireland, North and South, is just not a priority for the
UK. Looking at the behaviour of the British government since the referendum, its difficult to quibble
with that judgment.
That, more than anything, is what Varadkars extraordinary intervention on Friday was about.
Senior officials denied that Varadkars comments represented a change of policy by the Government.
But they conceded it signifies a change of mood. And there is no question that on Brexit, the mood has
darkened.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/brexit/varadkar-s-comments-on-brexit-are-a-sharp-
message-to-london-1.3170367
British government rules out moving
Border to Irish Sea after Brexit
Moving controls to ports and airports in North not an option, British
authorities say
Sat, Jul 29, 2017, 05:27
Denis Staunton London Editor

UK chancellor of the exchequer Philip Hammond said on Friday that Britain would seek a transition
arrangement lasting up to three years after Brexit. Photograph: Tolga Akmen/Reuters


The British government has ruled out moving the Border to the Irish Sea after Brexit by imposing
customs checks between Northern Ireland and Britain. The department for exiting the European Union
said that, although finding a solution for the Border was a top priority, moving controls to ports and
airports in the North was out of the question.
As we have always been clear, our guiding principle will be to ensure that as we leave the EU no
new barriers to living and doing business within the UK are created. Therefore we cannot create a
Border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, a spokesperson said.
We aim to have as frictionless and seamless a Border as possible between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland and we welcome the European Councils recognition that flexible and creative
solutions will be required. It is our priority to deliver a practical solution that recognises the unique
social, political and economic circumstances of the Border.
The future of the Border has emerged as the point of strongest disagreement between the British and
Irish governments over Brexit, with Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney expressing scepticism
about the capacity of technology to ensure that customs controls would be frictionless. Mr Coveney
met Brexit secretary David Davis in London earlier this month and the two men had an exchange
which was described as blunt and frank.
A few days later, Mr Davis told the House of Lords EU committee that the change of personnel at the
top of the Irish Government had slightly stymied technical work that had started on making customs
controls on the Border as unobtrusive as possible.
I saw Mr Coveney, the new foreign secretary, the other day, and we started that discussion again, as it
were, from scratch, he said.
Favoured option
EU diplomatic sources told The Irish Times on Friday that the Government did not explicitly propose
moving the Border to the Irish Sea at a recent EU summit. British officials are aware, however, that the
Governments favoured option is to extend the EU customs union to include Northern Ireland,
effectively moving the Border to the Irish Sea.
The proposal is unacceptable to the DUP, on whose 10 votes at Westminster the Conservative
government depends for its survival. The DUPs leader in the Commons, Nigel Dodds, on Friday
described the idea as untimely and unhelpful and made clear that his party would block it.
The DUP will not tolerate a Border on the Irish Sea after Brexit that makes it more difficult to live,
work and travel between different parts of the United Kingdom. The prime minister has already
reiterated this. At Westminster we will continue to use the influence of our 10 MPs to ensure that
respect for the integrity of the UK remains at the core of the negotiations process, he said.
The chancellor of the exchequer Philip Hammond said on Friday that Britain would seek a transition
arrangement lasting up to three years after Brexit, during which its relationship with the EU would
appear almost unchanged. Mr Hammond said a consensus was emerging in the cabinet in support of an
arrangement under which Britain would continue to have full access to the single market but would
also continue to allow free movement of people from the EU.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/brexit/british-government-rules-out-moving-border-to-
irish-sea-after-brexit-1.3170348
The Brexit vote changed everything. Ireland's future -

North and South - is as yet unwritten, but it will not be like
the past. Here, The Irish Times looks at the possibilities
and the challenges. Will the UK's departure from the EU
accelerate the demand for a united Ireland? Or will it drive
both parts of the island apart?
Coveney says there is no
proposal for Irish Sea
border
Government says onus on Britain to come up with border
solution
Fri, Jul 28, 2017, 11:56 Updated: Fri, Jul 28, 2017, 12:53
Mary Minihan, Vivienne Clarke
Simon Coveney as he recently announced that over 500,000 passports have

already been issued this year so far
There is no proposal for a post-Brexit border in the Irish
Sea, Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney has aid.
There is no proposal for a post-Brexit border in the Irish Sea, Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon
Coveney has aid.
Mr Coveney was being questioned about a report this morning that an Irish Se border was being sought
by Dublin as the preferred outcome in the Brexit talks between the UK and the European Union.
The report in the London Times and its Ireland edition suggested that rather than a hard border between
Northern Ireland and the Republic a border could exist in the Irish Sea and free movement would be
allowed on the island of Ireland. The Department of Foreign Affairs insisted the Governments
approach to the border in Brexit negotiations has been consistent.
There is no proposal that the border would be in the Irish Sea, told RTs News at One. What we
are saying is there is an onus on the UK to come up with imaginative solutions.
He also responded to comments by DUP MP Jeffrey Donaldson who said a border at sea plan was
utter madness. It was reported in the London Times and its Ireland edition on Friday morning.
A senior political source said earlier that the notion of a border at sea has been around for some time
and has been articulated in public on several occasions. A spokesman for the Department of Foreign
Affairs, said: The Government has consistently said that the border issue is a political not a technical
matter and it will require flexible and imaginative solutions.
The risks of a hard border are not solely economic or trade related. It is also about communities and
society and there are many factors that will have to be considered.
Home Offices lack of action on post-Brexit Border is shocking

Brexit: more than 100,000 from North, Britain seek Irish passport
EU and UK singing off same hymn sheet on Northern Ireland
He said Irelands unique concerns and priorities for the Brexit negotiations have been strongly
acknowledged by both the UK and Irelands EU partners.
The objectives of protecting the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts and the gains of the peace
process including avoiding a hard border are shared by all sides.
Mr Coveney told RTs later he didnt agree with Mr Donaldson and denied that his efforts were
damaging the relationship between Ireland and the UK. I am a friend of Britain. I went to university
there. I have friends there. We have to be honest with each other. Enda Kenny said this is a political
matter not a technical matter.
Mr Coveney said that Britain had made its democratic choice to leave and the onus is now on them
to ensure that they dont do any damage to Ireland.
He dismissed Mr Donaldsons assertion that a technological solution was possible in relation to the
border. The border is 500k long with 400 crossing points. It wont be possible to put cameras on all of
them. I dont think thats the approach to take.
We need imaginative solutions, incisive political solutions.
Mr Coveney said he was not looking to damage the relationship between Ireland and the UK or
Northern Ireland and the UK. He said he could not stand over any solution that threatens the peace
process and was trying to find a political solution.
Any solution should not compromise the Good Friday Agreement.
This requires a political solution between Ireland, the UK, the EU and Northern Ireland. We need to
try to work out a unique political solution to allow us to continue to operate as today.
It is not an easy process. Ireland has real vulnerabilities.
He denied that he and the Taoiseach Leo Varadkar were throwing their weight around in the Brexit
talks because of their new positions. This is the Irish Governments position. It is not changing its
position. It is going to become very difficult.
Mr Donaldson earlier accused Mr Coveney of jumping the gun after this mornings story . The story
reported British officials were taken aback at what they interpreted as a change in tone taken by Ireland
as negotiations on the United Kingdom leaving the European Union continue.
The DUP, which is propping up the Conservative Government in Britain, reacted angrily to the story.
Sir Jeffrey said modern technology could come up with a frictionless border. He told RTs Morning
Ireland: I believe it is possible to arrive at this outcome. Modern technology is a wonderful thing.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/coveney-says-there-is-no-proposal-for-irish-sea-
border-1.3169885
Brexit raises questions about

the future of EU aviation
Air transport contributes 4.1bn directly to Irelands GDP
with Open Skies under threat
Tue, Jul 25, 2017, 01:00
Paddy Smyth
It is widely recognised that for the full benefits of the liberalisation of air
transport to be realised, the system of allocating airport runway slots at EU
airports will have to be revised. Photograph: Getty Images
A family trip from Milan to Paris in 1992 would have cost
25 times more than it does today, with the minimum price
for a ticket on the route dropping from more than 400 to
about 15 today.
http://www.mineralsireland.ie/NR/rdonlyres/9FCF4046-1788-482E-ADBA-
06C9CA6D8F9E/0/IAEG_Annual_Review_Article1.pdf
IrishTimes: Bertie, chlorine-washed chicken and the Brexit
border
July 28, 2017
bertie brexit,border brexit,ahern bertie,border irish,bertie border,border

tensions,brexit tensions,border its,brexit its,bertie its,bertie tensions,its
tensions
Its rare enough that a story involves Bertie Ahern, the Irish Border and chlorine-washed chicken, but
some key developments this week highlight precisely the economic problem with the Border after
Brexit. There are, of course, key political issues here too, but the crux of the dilemma relates to the
economy and to trade. And this will be a tricky one to solve.
The key issue is that as things stand Britain has said it will leave the EU single market after Brexit and,
crucially, that it will also leave the customs union. The customs union is the agreement which allows
goods to move freely across EU borders.
A vital part of the customs union is that there in place what is called a common external tariff. In other
words whenever goods from outside the EU enter the union, they are subject to the same controls and
the same tariffs, or import duties, no matter where they enter. In this way, once goods have entered into
the customs union from a third country at one point, they can then circulate freely across the union.
Now lets introduce the chlorine washed chicken. There was a bit of a row in the UK this week over
proposals for a post-Brexit free trade deal with the US and suggestions that this would allow chlorine
washed chicken from the US into the UK. In the US, chicken is regularly washed - or rinsed - with
chlorine after slaughtering. This is banned in the EU, not because it is unsafe as such, but because the
EU says it wants to ensure high standards right through the slaughtering process.
Now it is unclear how this would be dealt with in any US/UK deal, but thats not the point. If it isnt
chlorine washed chicken it could be Argentinian beef, butter from New Zealand or an engineering
product from the Far East. After Brexit , a border is needed somewhere between Britain and the EU to
control the movement of such products, make sure appropriate tariffs are applied on goods entering the
customs union and that complex regulations on where products come from and their safety are met.
Frontline economy
Ireland, as the only country with a land Border to the UK, is in the frontline. The two most obvious
solutions are to have the Border on the island of Ireland - and have the controls there - or to have it at
ports and airports leaving and coming in to Ireland. The latter solution would be better for the
Government, but it would be far from ideal, imposing new requirements and barriers on trade with
Britain. But this would probably be preferable to the erection of new Border controls on the island,
with all the political implications that would bring.
For the North, meanwhile, as well as the political sensitivities, there are economic issues. The Republic
is a significant trading partner, but of course companies in the North sell as lot more to Britain. For this
reason the idea of new controls at Larne and other ports on goods moving to the UK will not go down
well.
This has all been obvious since the Brexit vote. So former taoiseach Bertie Ahern is correct when he
says that a year has been wasted in terms of looking for a solution, though the Irish Government
probably had little option with first the UK general election and then chaos in Westminster over the
UK stance. How do you negotiate with that?
The public stance of the Government is that Britain has created this problem and it is up to it to solve it.
The ideal solution would be if Britain stayed in the customs union, greatly reducing the Border
problem.
Right now there are soundings that Britain might seek to remain in the union for a transition period of
some years after Brexit. But once it leaves the union, the problem immediately appears - how do you
control goods entering the EU customs union? Technology might make a Border, wherever it is, less
intrusive. But it will not remove it
There are a range of other possible solutions which have been touted, such as the North remaining in
the customs union, or having some other type of special status. But none of these solutions are perfect.
When it comes to the Border after Brexit we are, unfortunately, talking about damage limitation.
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/bertie-chlorine-washed-chicken-and-the-brexit-border-
1.3170243?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-
origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fbertie-chlorine-washed-
chicken-and-the-brexit-border-1.3170243
Irish government will not design

'Brexiteer border', says Varadkar
28 July 2017
Media captionLeo Varadkar will not design 'border for Brexiteers'
The Irish government will not design a border for Brexiteers, Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) Leo
Varadkar has said.
He said his government did not want to see any kind of economic border on the island of Ireland when
the UK leaves the European Union.
Mr Varadkar said he hoped unionists in Northern Ireland would not respond angrily to his position.
He is due to visit Northern Ireland next week.
"It is the British and the Brexiteers who are leaving, so if anyone should be angry it's us quite frankly,"
he added.
"But we are not going to get angry.
"We are going to try and find solutions or at least minimise the damage to relations between Britain
and Ireland, to the peace process and to trading links."
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Finding a solution to the Irish
border issue is one of the main challenges of Brexit
Earlier, Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney denied a newspaper report that suggested the Irish
government preferred a sea border.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/dplc/dv/finalreport/finalreporten.pdf
'Madness'
The Times report suggested Mr Varadkar wanted customs and immigration checks at ports, rather than
any checks along the land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
Sources told the paper that Mr Varadkar believes a land border would jeopardise the peace process.
Media captionFergal Keane speaks to people on both sides of the border about
Brexit
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) described the suggestion as "madness".
DUP MP Sir Jeffrey Donaldson told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "That's just not going to
happen.
"There is no way that the DUP would go for an option that put a border between one part of the UK
and another.
Media captionFollow the road that cuts across the Irish border four times inside
six miles
"That would be a bit like saying we're going to create a border between California and the rest of the
USA.
"I think what Dublin needs to think about is innovative ways in which it can move its market closer to
the UK."
Sir Jeffrey claimed that 64% of goods exported by the Republic of Ireland go to the UK.
But that figure is incorrect - exports to the UK amounted to 12.8% of trade in 2016, according to the
Irish government.
Media captionSir Jeffrey Donaldson tells Today idea of a sea border between
Ireland and UK is "absurd"
Ulster Unionist Party leader Robin Swann said Mr Varadkar's comments were "totally irresponsible".
"If the taoiseach thinks he is going to use the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland to make a name for himself he should think again," he added.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22645.pdf
'Imaginative'

However, Mr Coveney told Irish national broadcaster RT: "There is no proposal that is suggesting
that there be a border in the Irish Sea."
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Unionists have said that any
movement of the border between the UK and Ireland will not happen
The Irish foreign minister said the onus was on the UK to "come up with imaginative and if necessary
unique solutions" to avoiding a so-called hard border.
The Irish border is one of the key issues that needs to be resolved by the UK and the EU before talks
begin on a new trade deal.
Mr Coveney said a political solution was required, rather than a technical fix, which has been
suggested by Brexit Secretary David Davis.
Mr Davis has proposed using measures like surveillance cameras to allow free movement between the
north and south of the island.
Mr Coveney insisted his government colleagues will not support proposals that result in checkpoints
along the Irish border.
http://www.ajhtl.com/uploads/7/1/6/3/7163688/article_17_vol._3_1.pdf
The United States Urges Establishment

of a Power-Sharing Government in
Northern Ireland
Press Statement by Heather Nauert
U.S. Department of State Spokesperson
Washington, DC
05 July 2017
The United States regrets that the political parties in Northern Ireland have not yet reached an
agreement to establish a power-sharing regional government following elections in March.
We urge the regions two largest parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, to continue
their discussions with the aim of forming an effective, responsive, and representative government as
soon as possible. All of Northern Irelands political leaders share a collective responsibility to build on
the political and economic progress made since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and to construct a
better, shared future for all of Northern Irelands citizens.
The United States will continue to work with all parties in Northern Ireland as well as the UK and Irish
governments to help facilitate the restoration of Northern Irelands regional government.
2017
05 July 2017 The United States Urges Establishment of a Power-Sharing Government in Northern
Ireland The United States regrets that the political parties in Northern Ireland have not yet reached an
agreement to establish a power-sharing regional government following elections in March.
We urge the regions two largest parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, to continue
their discussions with the aim of forming an effective, responsive, and representative government as
soon as possible. All of Northern Irelands political leaders share a collective responsibility to build on
the political and economic progress made since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and to construct a
better, shared future for all of Northern Irelands citizens.
27 April 2017 United States Urges Establishment of a Power-Sharing Government in Northern

Ireland Todays pause in talks to form a government in Northern Ireland allows time for planning a
constructive, cooperative way forward. The United States urges all political parties in the region to
establish a power-sharing government soon after talks resume in June.
21 March 2017 State Department on the Passing of Northern Irelands Martin McGuiness First, we
were saddened to learn of the passing of Martin McGuiness. As deputy first minister of Northern
Ireland, McGuiness worked to make the power sharing in government a cornerstone of consolidating
peace and building prosperity in the region. In making difficult decisions to move away from
militancy, McGuiness worked to end violence and promote cross-community reconciliation.
15 March 2017 Remarks by Vice President Pence to the American Ireland Fund National Gala So
heres to Ireland. Heres to the United States of America. Heres to our shared heritage, and heres to
the confident, confident hope that the ties between our people and the Irish people will only grow and
expand as the years go on to the betterment of our people and the world.
17 January 2017 U.S. Government Statement on Northern Ireland The United States remains
committed to supporting a more peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland. To this end, we urge all
political parties to focus on quickly finding a way forward to the resumption of stable devolved
governance. We also encourage civil society leaders to continue their vital work building a better,
shared future.
2016
05 July 2016 Personal Representative Gary Hart Travel to Belfast Former Senator Gary Hart, will
travel to Belfast, U.K., July 6-7, to encourage continued and full implementation of the December 2014
Stormont House and November 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
24 June 2016 Statement by President Obama on the UK Referendum The people of the United
Kingdom have spoken, and we respect their decision. The special relationship between the United
States and the United Kingdom is enduring, and the United Kingdoms membership in NATO remains
a vital cornerstone of U.S. foreign, security, and economic policy.
13 April 2016 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Secretary Kerry submitted the
2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (commonly known as the Human Rights Reports) to
the U.S. Congress. The reports, now in their 40th year, document the status of human rights conditions
in 199 countries and territories around the world.
The 2015 Reports highlight the intensified global crackdown by an increasing number of states on
members of civil society. Government efforts to stifle civil society were achieved through overt or
direct means including through harassment, intimidation, detention, and restrictions on their ability to
operate; through the implementation of overly broad counterterrorism or national security laws to
control the freedom to assemble and to suppress dissent; and through more nuanced yet burdensome
bureaucratic procedures such as the passage of NGO legislation that restricts the operating space for
human rights organizations. The collective result of these measures has led to the silencing of
independent voices, a growing impoverishment of political discourse, and diminishing avenues for
peaceful expression and change.
The 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are available at

State.gov/humanrightsreports
Preface to 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Kingdom
Kerry on Release of the 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
Briefing on the 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
16 March 2106 Readout of the President and Vice Presidents Meeting with the Leaders of Northern
Ireland President Obama dropped by a meeting yesterday between Vice President Biden and the
leaders of Northern Ireland, First Minister Arlene Foster and deputy First Minister Martin
McGuinness. The President and Vice President congratulated the First Minister on her election to
office in January, and commended both leaders for the progress being made in the Northern Ireland
peace process, specifically the successful conclusion of the Stormont House Agreement in December
2014 and the Fresh Start Agreement in November 2015.
11 March 2016 Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. A new initiative launched by United States
Customs and Border Protection will allow pre-approved, U.K. passport holders to gain expedited
clearance upon arrival in the United States. Speaking about the initiative, Consul General Daniel
Lawton said: The United States is a popular destination for Northern Ireland business and vacation
travelers. This program can facilitate and boost travel between our two countries. Currently
available at 46 U.S. airports and 13 preclearance locations, streamlines the screening process for
trusted travelers. As an added benefit, Global Entry members are also eligible to participate in the TSA
Pre expedited screening program.
25 February 2016 Special Representative OBrien Travel to Northern Ireland U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerrys Special Representative for Global Partnerships Andrew OBrien will lead a delegation of
U.S. investors, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and representatives from academia to Belfast and
Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland from February 29 March 4, 2016. The purpose of the
delegation will be to bring together representatives in Northern Ireland and members of the U.S.
private sector to seek out potential projects, partnerships and business opportunities.
21 January 2015 United States Begins Implementation of Changes to the Visa Waiver Program The
United States today began implementing changes under the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and
Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (the Act). Under the Act, travelers in [certain] categories are
no longer eligible to travel or be admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program.
Special Representative OBrien Travel
to Northern Ireland
Home / News & Events / Special Representative OBrien Travel to Northern Ireland
Special Presidential Envoy Andrew OBrien (State Dept)
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerrys Special Representative for Global Partnerships Andrew OBrien,
in collaboration with Invest Northern Ireland, will lead a delegation of U.S. investors, entrepreneurs,
philanthropists, and representatives from academia to Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland
from February 29 March 4, 2016. The purpose of the delegation will be to bring together
representatives in Northern Ireland and members of the U.S. private sector to seek out potential
projects, partnerships and business opportunities.
On February 29 and March 1, Special Representative OBrien and the delegation will be in Belfast to
meet with government officials and private sector representatives on economic climate and investment
opportunities. The delegation will also make stops at local businesses and Queens University.
On March 2, Special Representative OBrien and the delegation will travel to Derry/Londonderry to
meet with government representatives and gain a deeper understanding of the regions economic
landscape. Later, they will engage with government and private sector leaders regarding partnership
opportunities aimed at increasing economic growth. The group will also visit several businesses and
the Magee College campus of Ulster University.
On March 3, the group will attend breakfast with Derry/Londonderry business and community leaders,
and then will return to Belfast where they will engage in wrap-up meetings in preparation for a larger
investment delegation to take place in the future.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights

and Labor
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015
United Kingdom
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253127.pdf
Varadkar's Brexit
border comments
extraordinary
Updated / Monday, 31 Jul 2017
Leo Varadkar said last week that the Government would not
design a border for Brexiteers
A former special adviser to DUP leader Arlene Foster

has described as "extraordinary" comments made by
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar in relation to a border
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
post-Brexit.
Speaking on RT's Morning Ireland, Richard Bullick
said, that traditionally, Taoisigh have dealt with such
issues with a measure of moderation and
responsibility.
Mr Bullick said that private views are normally kept
private, adding that it may be an issue of "somebody
relatively recently into office that led them to say what
they thought out loud, which isn't always the most
desirable stance in politics."
He said both sides needed to work together and that
this kind of language was not helpful.
Last week, Mr Varadkar said the Government does
not want any sort of economic border on the island of
Ireland after Brexit.
Mr Varadkar said if Britain wants to put forward
technological solutions that is up to them, but the
Government would not do that work for them.
In what was the most hard-hitting response yet from
the Taoiseach on the issue of the border, he said the
Government was not going to design a border for the
Brexiteers.
"So let them forward their proposals as to how they
think a border should operate and we'll ask them if
they really think this is such a good idea," he said.
He warned that it would have a very severe impact
on the British economy "if they go down that route".
Mr Bullick said whether we liked it or not, the issue of
the UK leaving the EU was settled last June and in
his view the common interest should be in getting the
best deal for all of the people of Ireland.
He said since 1921 there had been a border on the

island of Ireland and that cannot be wished away.
Mr Bullick said the desire of most people in Northern
Ireland was to have a border that does not impede
economic activity.
In relation to achieving a frictionless border, he said it
would be challenging and would require a lot of
thought and imagination, but that it was possible to
get pretty close to that goal so long as everyone was
pushing in the same direction.
https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0731/894137-vardkar-brexit-border/
Govt will not design

border for Brexiteers,
says Varadkar
Updated / Saturday, 29 Jul 2017
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar said the Government does not want any
economic border after Brexit
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has said the Government

does not want any sort of economic border on the
island of Ireland after Brexit.
Mr Varadkar said if Britain wants to put forward
technological solutions that is up to them, but the
Government would not do that work for them.
In what is the most hard-hitting response yet from the
Taoiseach on the issue of the border, he said the
Government was not going to design a border for the
Brexiteers.
"So let them forward their proposals as to how they
think a border should operate and we'll ask them if
they really think this is such a good idea," he said.
He warned that it would have a very severe impact
on the British economy "if they go down that route".
The Taoiseach said he hoped there would not be an

angry response from unionists to the Government's
position.
"It is the British and the Brexiteers who are leaving,
so if anyone should be angry it's us quite frankly.
"But we are not going to get angry. We are going to
try and find solutions or at least minimise the damage
to relations between Britain and Ireland, to the peace
process and to trading links," he said.
He said both he and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Simon Coveney are in agreement on the issue.
Brexit border issue requires 'imaginative

solutions'
Earlier, Mr Coveney said Ireland cannot support
proposals resulting in border checkpoints between
Northern Ireland and the Republic.
The Department of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the
Government's position on the issue of the border in
Brexit negotiations is a political not a technical
matter.
In a statement, it said avoiding a hard border after
Brexit will require "flexible and imaginative solutions".
The statement followed a report in the Times
newspaper that the Government is pushing for the
Irish Sea to become the post Brexit border with the
UK.
The newspaper reported that the
Taoiseach was unconvinced by the UK's plans to
introduce a hi-tech land border between Northern
Ireland and the Republic after Brexit.
The border between Northern Ireland and the
Republic is one of the key issues that needs to be
resolved by the UK and the EU before talks begin on
a new trade deal.
British ministers had proposed using measures such
as surveillance cameras to allow free movement
between the north and south.
However, sources told The Times that Mr Varadkar
thinks these plans could jeopardise the peace
process and restrict movement between the two
countries.
Speaking on RT's News at One, Minister Coveney
said Britain has chosen to leave the EU and there is
an onus on it to make sure the consequences of that
decision do not harm Ireland.
He said: "We have a border that is 500km long.
There are 400 road crossings along that border.
"Anybody who suggests to me that we can solve this
problem by putting cameras on this border ... I don't
think that is the approach we can take."
The DUP, needed by British Prime Minister Theresa
May to prop up her minority administration in the
House of Commons, has ruled out the suggestion of
a sea border post Brexit.
DUP chief whip Jeffrey Donaldson said: "There is no
way that the DUP would go for an option that creates
a border between one part of the United Kingdom
and the other."
He told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "Dublin
really needs to understand that that proposition is
absurd and unconstitutional."
DUP MP Ian Paisley said the reported position of the
Irish Government appeared to leave two alternatives
- a "very hard border" or that "Ireland will wise up and
leave the EU" itself.
Meanwhile, a post-Brexit transitional period is
expected to be completed within three years of the
UK leaving the European Union, the British
Chancellor has said.
Philip Hammond said there was a "broad consensus"
that the "treaty-based arrangements" with the EU
would be in force by the next scheduled general
election in June 2022.
But Mr Hammond said on the first day after leaving
the bloc in March 2019 "many things will look similar".
Ulster Unionist Party leader Robin Swann described
the Taoiseach's language over the border issue as
totally irresponsible.
Mr Swann said if the Taoiseach thinks he is going to
use the border to make a name for himself, he should
think again.
He said if the Government continues to harden its
language in relation the border then it is showing total
disrespect to the people of Northern Ireland and their
right to self determination.
https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0728/893599-brexit/
SEEMS LEO CAN'T PUT A FOOT RIGHT ...
"Mr Bullick said that private views are normally kept private, adding that it may be an issue of
"somebody relatively recently into office that led them to say what they thought out loud,
which isn't always
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYShare
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the UK) is a constitutional monarchy with
a multiparty, parliamentary form of government. Citizens elect representatives to the House of
Commons, the lower chamber of the bicameral Parliament. They last did so in free and fair elections on
May 7. Members of the upper chamber, the House of Lords, occupy appointed or hereditary seats.
Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Bermuda each have elected legislative bodies and devolved
administrations, with varying degrees of legislative and executive powers. The UK has 14 overseas
territories, including Bermuda. Each of the overseas territories has its own constitution, while the UK
government is responsible for external affairs, security, and defense. Civilian authorities throughout the
UK and its territories maintained effective control over the security forces.
During the year the most serious human rights problems were continuing stop and search practices in
Scotland, female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C), and in Bermuda the incremental introduction
of the Disclosure and Criminal Reform Act 2015, which makes possible double jeopardy and removes
some protections against self-incrimination.
Other problems included the erroneous refoulement of Eritrean asylum seekers to their homeland, the
extended detention of unofficial and failed asylum seekers, violence against women and children,
sexual abuse of children, anti-Semitic vandalism and violence, trafficking in persons, ethnic hate
crimes, anti-Muslim hate crimes, and discrimination against women in employment.
The government investigated, prosecuted, and punished allegations of official abuse, including by
police, with no reported cases of impunity.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of

the Person, Including Freedom
from:Share
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
During the year there were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful
killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The law prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards. Following a visit to
Northern Irelands Maghaberry high security prison, the chief inspector of prisons in England and
Wales deemed it the most dangerous prison ever inspected and claimed it was unsafe and unstable for
prisoners and staff.
Physical Conditions: In March 2014 a Council of Europe committee criticized the conditions of a
number of jails in Scotland. After visiting prisons across Scotland, inspectors from the Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) stated many
prisoners were held in cupboard-like boxes, and dont feel safe. In response the Scottish Prison
Service noted the findings of the report and stated the safety of prisoners was paramount.
In Northern Ireland women did not have a separate facility from juveniles. In April the Hydebank
prison was redesignated a college in a new approach to dealing with young offenders.
Another report by the CPT on detention facilities in Gibraltar noted a lack of access to natural light in
the cells, no privacy from the in-cell video-surveillance, and no access to meaningful outside exercise
for persons held longer than 24 hours.
The Official Annual Report of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales for the
period 2014-15 stated there were 250 deaths in 2014-15, an increase of 5 percent from the preceding
year. There were seven deaths in halfway houses, a decrease from 11 in 2014. There was one suicide
and one death from natural causes in the immigration removal facility. There were 155 deaths from
natural causes and 76 suicides. The prison service noted four as apparent homicides; a further seven
deaths were classified as other non-natural and eight awaited classification. Scottish Prison Service
figures showed 19 deaths in prisons in Scotland in the first 11 months of the year compared with 24 in
2014. Of those 19, 18 were still to be determined following the conclusion of Fatal Accident Inquiries.
The other death was a result of natural causes.
According to the Prisoner Ombudsman for Northern Irelands annual report for 2014-2015, the
ombudsman began investigations into three deaths (one fewer than in 2014). One of the deaths
appeared to be self-inflicted, and the other deaths remain undetermined pending postmortem results.
There was one death--a suicide--in the Bermuda prison system in 2014.
Administration: The prisons and probation ombudsman for England and Wales investigated complaints
from prisoners and deaths in custody. Separate ombudsmen performed similar duties in Scotland,
Northern Ireland, and Bermuda. Authorities investigated credible allegations of questionable
conditions.
In August 2014 data obtained by BBC Scotland via a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request showed
that prisoners in Scotland submitted almost 9,000 complaints to Scottish Prison Service between
January 2013 and July 2014. The most common complaints were about food, prison staff, and bullying.
In response the Scottish Government stated it would evaluate the independent review process for these
grievances.
Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental
observers. Every prison, immigration removal center, and some short-term holding facilities at airports
have an independent monitoring board (IMB). IMB members are independent, and their role is to
monitor day-to-day life in their local facility and to ensure that proper standards of care and decency
are maintained. Members have unrestricted access to their local prison or immigration detention center
at any time and can talk to any prisoner or detainee they wish, out of sight and hearing of staff, if
necessary.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government observed these prohibitions.
The Scottish police force, Police Scotland, was criticized after a BBC Scotland investigation in
February revealed that consensual stop-searches of children were taking place in Scotland, despite
senior officers advising members of the Scottish Parliament in June 2014 that the practice would be
abolished. In September, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon requested an investigation into the
policy.
In Bermuda the number of stop-and-search actions in anticipation of violence numbered

approximately 250 in the third quarter of the year. This was a significant decrease from a high of
approximately 6,500 in the second quarter of 2011, when gang violence was at its height. Civil rights
groups stated the law unfairly targeted blacks.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
Except in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the national police maintained internal security and reported
to the Home Office. The army, under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for
external security and supports police in extreme cases. The National Crime Agency (NCA) investigates
many serious crimes in England, Scotland, and Wales and has a mandate to deal with organized,
economic, and cybercrimes as well as border policing and child protection. In May the Northern
Ireland Assembly extended the NCAs powers to Northern Ireland. The NCA director general has
independent operational direction and control over the NCAs activities and is accountable to the home
secretary.
By law authorities must refer all deaths and serious injuries during or following police contact--
including road traffic fatalities involving police, fatal police shootings, deaths in or following police
custody, apparent suicides following police custody, and other deaths where the actions or inaction of
police may have contributed--to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). The IPCC
managed an investigation into allegations against a member of Humberside Police staff who in January
was found guilty of witness intimidation, aggravated stalking, harassment, and assault. He was jailed
for 12 months.
Scotlands judicial, legal, and law enforcement system is fully separate from that of the rest of the UK.
Police Scotland reports to the Scottish justice minister and the state prosecutor. Police Scotland reports
cross-border crime and threat information to the national UK police and responds to UK police needs
in Scotland upon request.
Police Scotland was criticized for arming officers on routine patrol and for its policy on stopping and
searching juveniles (see section 1.d.).
Northern Ireland also maintains a separate police force, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).
The PSNI reports to the Northern Ireland Policing Board, a nondepartmental public body composed of
members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and independent members of the community. Northern
Irelands minister of justice appoints the board.
In Bermuda the Bermuda Police Service (BPS) is responsible for internal security. The BPS reports to
the governor appointed by the UK but is funded by the elected government of Bermuda.
Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces, and the government has
effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of
impunity involving the security forces during the year.
Coroners inquests investigated deaths related to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The Historical
Enquiries Team was closed and replaced by the Legacy Investigations Branch located in the PSNI.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Police in the UK must have a warrant issued by a magistrate or a judge to arrest a person. Police must
inform detainees promptly of charges against them, and this right was respected. A senior police
official must authorize detention without charges for more than 24 hours, and a magistrate must
authorize detention for more than 36 hours up to a maximum 96 hours. Police may detain terrorism
suspects without charge for up to 14 days.
There is a functioning bail system, and defendants awaiting trial have the right to bail, except for those
judged to be flight risks, likely to commit another offense, suspected terrorists, or in other limited
circumstances.
If questioned at a police station, all suspects have the right to legal representation, including counsel
provided by the government if they are indigent. Police may not question suspects who request legal
advice until a lawyer is present. Detainees may make telephone calls. The maximum length of pretrial
detention is 182 days. The court may extend the detention in exceptional cases. Suspects were not held
incommunicado or under house arrest. Authorities generally respected these rights.
In Gibraltar the CPT found that, while the right of access to a lawyer is adequately enshrined in law in
Gibraltar, a lawyer was only accessible at the detainees own expense.
In Scotland police may detain a subject for no more than 24 hours. After an initial detention period of
12 hours, a police custody officer may authorize further detention for an additional 12 hours without
authorization from the court, if the officer believes it necessary. Only a judge can issue a warrant for
arrest if he or she believes there is enough evidence against a suspect. A detainee must immediately be
informed of allegations against him or her and be advised promptly of the charges against him or her if
there is sufficient evidence to proceed. Police may not detain a person more than once for the same
offense. Depending on the nature of the crime, a suspect should be released from custody if he or she is
deemed not to present a risk. If police think it is important that the case is heard at court quickly, the
suspect may be released on an undertaking--a promise to attend court when told to. Suspects
perceived to be a risk to the public can be held in custody until the next court day. There is a
functioning bail system.
In Bermuda a person must usually be arrested with a warrant issued by a court. The law permits arrests
without warrant in certain conditions. No arrests or detentions can be made arbitrarily or secretly. The
detainee must be told the reason for his arrest immediately upon being arrested. Detainees may be held
for 42 hours for investigation, but detention should be reviewed at specified intervals of initially six
hours, then every 12 hours, until 42 hours are reached. For serious crimes, a senior police officer may
authorize additional detention of up to 72 hours before charges are filed. Crimes with firearms
automatically allow detention up to 72 hours and have special provisions under the law to detain
without charge for two weeks, followed by an additional two-week period with the approval of the
Supreme Court.
There is a functioning system of bail. A detainee has the immediate right of access to a lawyer, either
through a personal meeting or by telephone. Free legal advice is provided for detainees. A detainee
who wishes to have another lawyer can have one at his own expense. Police can interview without a
lawyer in exceptional circumstances which must be authorized, such as to save life or to find
kidnapping victim. Police must inform the arrestee of his rights to communication with friend, family
member, or other person identified by the detainee. The police superintendent can authorize
incommunicado detention for serious crimes such as terrorism. House arrest does not legally exist but
may be a condition of bail.
Formal complaints about arrests can be made to an independent criminal compensation board, the
police complaints authority, the Human Rights Commission, or a court.
Protracted Detention of Rejected Asylum Seekers or Stateless Persons: See section 2.d.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government respected judicial independence.
Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent judiciary routinely enforced this right.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, and the right to be promptly and in detail informed of
the charges, with free interpretation as necessary. Criminal proceedings must be held without undue
delay and be open to the public except for cases in juvenile court or those involving public decency or
security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may order the court closed, but sentencing
must be public.
The law in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland allows for jury trials with some exceptions. The law
provides for judge-only trials when there is a real and present danger that jury tampering would take
place. In Scotland a judge hears summary procedures without a jury. The maximum prison and
financial penalties for summary procedures are 12 months imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 pounds
($15,020). Cases involving greater penalties require a jury. Bermudian law provides for jury trials in
criminal cases and for trial by judge in civil cases.
Defendants have the right to communicate with an attorney of choice, or to have one provided at public
expense, except in cases before employment tribunals that may unintentionally overlap with
undiscovered discrimination cases. Defendants and their lawyers have adequate time and facilities to
prepare a defense and have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases, with some
exceptions, such as instances in which information pertaining to a suspect relates to national security.
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them, present witnesses and evidence, and not
to be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants have the right to appeal adverse verdicts.
In Bermuda, Parliament enacted the Disclosure and Criminal Reform Act 2015 and the Criminal
Jurisdiction and Procedure Act 2015 to modernize the criminal justice system. Provisions include the
right to appeal an acquittal on a technicality and to reopen an acquittal in serious cases when new,
compelling evidence becomes available. Rights groups criticized a provision requiring a defendant to
make a statement to the prosecutor and the court within 28 days of his arraignment if he is going to
give evidence at his trial, failing which the court may direct the jury to draw inferences in deciding
whether the accused is guilty of the offense charged. There were no prosecutions under any part of the
new legislation by years end.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
In the UK individuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and groups of individuals may seek
civil remedies for human rights violations and have the right to appeal to the European Court for
Human Rights decisions involving alleged violations by the government of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
In Bermuda the Human Rights Tribunal adjudicates complaints.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these
prohibitions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties,

Including:Share
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The law provides for freedom of speech and press, and the government routinely respected these rights.
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined
to promote freedom of speech and press.
Freedom of Speech and Expression: The law prohibits expressions of hatred toward persons on account
of their color, race, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origin, religion, or sexual
orientation as well as any communication that is threatening or abusive and is intended to harass,
alarm, or bring distress to a person. The penalties for such expressions include fines, imprisonment, or
both.
Press and Media Freedoms: The laws restrictions on expressions of hatred apply to the print and
broadcast media. In Bermuda the law prohibits publishing written words that are threatening, abusive,
or insulting, but it applies only on racial grounds; on other grounds, including sexual orientation, the
law only prohibits discriminatory notices, signs, symbols, emblems or other representations.
Internet Freedom
The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, and there
were no credible reports that the government monitored private online communications without
appropriate legal authority.
The government on occasion blocked websites, for example, Bit Torrent file-sharing sites such as
Pirate Bay, primarily for hate speech and violations of intellectual property rights. Viewing or posting
the following categories of activity on the internet is subject to criminal prosecution: child sexual abuse
images hosted anywhere in the world, criminally obscene adult content hosted in the UK, incitement to
racial hatred content hosted in the UK, and nonphotographic child sexual abuse images, such as
drawings, hosted in the UK.
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 91.6 percent of adults (44.7 million individuals)
in the UK used the internet January-March.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
There were no government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The law provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government routinely
respected these rights.
c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of States International Religious Freedom Report at

www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of

Refugees, and Stateless Persons
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and
the government routinely respected these rights. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and
assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.
In-country Movement: The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act enacted on February 12 lowered the
threshold at which the home secretary can impose terrorism prevention and investigation measures
(TPIMs) from a reasonable belief to a balance of probabilities. TPIMs include electronic tagging,
reporting regularly to the police, and facing tightly defined exclusion from particular places and the
prevention of travel overseas. A suspect must live at home and stay there overnight, possibly for up to
10 hours. The suspect may apply to the courts to stay elsewhere. The suspect is allowed to use a mobile
phone and the internet, to work and study, subject to conditions. Fewer than 15 individuals were
subject to TPIMs.
Emigration and Repatriation: The new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act introduced Temporary
Exclusion Orders (TEOs), which permit the home secretary administratively to impose on a returning
British citizen, or others with a right to live in the UK, certain obligations once back in the UK, such as
reporting to a police station. A TEO requires a court order and is subject to judicial oversight; an
individual has the right to appeal. A TEO may be imposed if the home secretary reasonably suspects
the individual in question is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity and reasonably
considers it necessary to protect people in the UK from a risk of terrorism. There have been no known
impositions of TEOs since the introduction of this new power.
Protection of Refugees
Access to Asylum: In England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the law provides for the
granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing
protection to refugees. Bermudas constitution and laws do not provide for granting asylum or refugee
status, and the government does not have an established a system for providing protection to refugees.
In September, Scottish First Minister Sturgeon criticized the UK government for its response to the
Syrian refugee crisis. Sturgeon called on the UK government to increase the number of refugees
allowed into the country to 10,000, with Scotland taking at least 1,000 based on its population share.
On September 7, Prime Minister David Cameron promised that the UK would accept up to 20,000
Syrian refugees by 2020 from camps and elsewhere in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. During the year
the government accepted 1,000 individuals.
Safe Country of Origin/Transit: The UK is subject to the EUs Dublin III regulation and considers all
other EU member states, except Greece, to be countries of safe origin or transit. The regulation permits
authorities to remove an asylum applicant to another country responsible for adjudicating an
applicants claim. The government places the burden of proof on asylum seekers who arrive from safe
countries of origin, who pass through a country where they are not considered to be at risk, or who
remain in the country for a period of time before seeking asylum.
Refoulement: On July 2, Human Rights Watch alleged UK authorities were returning Eritreans to their
country in the mistaken belief they would not be persecuted for evading the draft or leaving Eritrea
illegally. Between January 1 and the end of March, a record number of 3,552 Eritreans sought asylum
in the UK, according to the Home Office.
Refugee Abuse: Home Office officials have the power to detain asylum seekers and unauthorized
migrants who do not enter the asylum system. Immigration detention was used to establish a persons
identity or basis of claim, to remove a person from the UK, or to avoid a persons noncompliance with
any conditions attached to a grant of temporary admission/release. Although Home Office policy states
that detention should be used sparingly, and for the shortest period necessary, there is neither a
maximum time limit for the use of immigration detention in the UK nor automatic judicial oversight of
decisions to detain. In response to calls from NGOs and the CPT to introduce a maximum time limit
and to enhance existing mechanisms for independent oversight, the Home Office began to review its
use of immigration detention and the length of time individuals can spend in detention.
In July the Home Office announced that more than 100 asylum seekers held in immigration detention
centers would be released because of the immediate suspension of the Home Offices fast-track
detention system after a court ruled the system unlawful. Their cases were among 800 others under
urgent review.
Employment: The government did not allow asylum seekers to work. They received government
support at 30 percent below the normal rate for the duration of their asylum application. The
government granted an asylum seeker with an upheld claim refugee status and the benefits enjoyed
by citizens, including employment opportunities.
Durable Solutions: The government granted varying levels of assistance to refused asylum seekers,
including return flights and financial assistance.
Temporary Protection: The government may provide temporary protection to individuals who may not
qualify as refugees under the categories of humanitarian protection and discretionary leave. In 2014 it
granted humanitarian protection to 1,015 persons and subsidiary protection to 105 others.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the

Political ProcessShare
The law provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections
based on universal and equal suffrage, and citizens exercised that ability.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: The UK held national parliamentary elections on May 7, while Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland elected their own parliaments in 2011. Bermuda last held elections in 2012.
International standards were respected during these elections. There were no reports of abuses or
irregularities.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of

Transparency in GovernmentShare
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government implemented the
law effectively. In the UK there were no reports of government corruption during the year.
Corruption: In July documents from the Bermuda Supreme Court leaked to online radio station
MAGIC included an affidavit filed on July 2 by Allied Trust and Allied Development Partners Ltd. on
behalf of would-be waterfront developer Michael MacLean. MacLean alleged that former premier
Member of Parliament (MP) Craig Cannonier, former attorney general MP Mark Pettingill, and
Minister of Home Affairs Senator Michael Fahy offered to endorse his lease plans in exchange for
bribes for 1 million-5 million Bermudian dollars (BD$), equivalent to $1 million -5 million, each.
Premier Dunkley and the accused vehemently denied the allegations. The BPS investigated, but there
were no charges at the end of the year.
Financial Disclosure: All MPs are required to disclose their financial interests. The Register of
Members Interests is available online and updated regularly. These public disclosures include paid
employment, property ownership, shareholdings in public or private companies, and other interests that
might reasonably be thought to influence the member in any way. The Scottish Parliament, the
National Assembly for Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the Bermudian Parliament have
similar codes of conduct for members. Under the ministerial code issued by the Prime Ministers
Office, ministers must follow standards of conduct, including the disclosure of gifts and travel. The UK
publishes the names, grades, job titles, and annual pay rates for most civil servants with salaries greater
than 150,000 pounds ($225,000). Government departments publish the business expenses of and
hospitality received by their most senior officials.
Public Access to Information: The law provides for public access to information, and authorities
routinely granted access to citizens and noncitizens, including foreign media. Authorities implemented
the law effectively.
In Scotland the law gives everyone the right to ask for any information held by a Scottish public
authority. The Scottish Information Commissioner is responsible for enforcing and promoting this
legislation and implemented the law effectively. The commissioner sometimes responded to requests
late.
Bermuda began implementing public access to information legislation on April 1. The government
responded to, or was in the process of responding to, 75 requests as of the middle of December.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude

Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of
Alleged Violations of Human
RightsShare
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings of human rights cases. Government officials
were routinely cooperative and responsive to their views.
Government Human Rights Bodies: Parliament has a Joint Committee on Human Rights composed of
12 members selected from the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The committee investigates
human rights matters in the country and scrutinizes legislation affecting human rights. It may call for
testimony from government officials, who routinely comply.
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) is an independent, nondepartmental public body
that promotes and monitors human rights and protects, enforces, and promotes equality across nine
protected grounds: age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief, pregnancy and maternity,
marriage and civil partnership, sexual orientation, and gender reassignment. The sponsoring
department is the Government Equalities Office. The commission was well funded and was considered
effective.
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, sponsored by the Northern Ireland Office, and the
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, sponsored by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister, monitored human rights in that province. These entities were adequately funded and
considered to be effective.
In Bermuda the Human Rights Commission administers the law regarding human rights. In Bermuda
the Human Rights Commission is an independent body that effectively administers the law regarding
human rights by the investigation and resolution of complaints lodged to it; its funding is adequate.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal

Abuses, and Trafficking in
PersonsShare
UK law prohibits discrimination based on age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil
partnership, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, disability, language, sexual orientation, or
social status, and the government routinely enforced the law effectively.
Bermudian law protects against discrimination because of race, place of origin, color, or ethnic or
national origins, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, disability, family status, religion or beliefs,
political opinion, and, except where the nature of the an offense justifies different treatment, criminal
record. Elderly persons are also a protected class in the areas of goods, facilities, services, and
accommodations but not in employment. The law does not protect against discrimination of persons
with mental, learning, and cognitive disabilities.
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape, spousal rape, and domestic violence. The
maximum legal penalty for rape is life imprisonment. The law also provides for injunctive relief,
personal protection orders, and protective exclusion orders (similar to restraining orders) for female
victims of violence. The government enforced the law effectively in reported cases. Courts in some
cases imposed the maximum punishment for rape. According to the ONS, in 2014 police recorded
58,954 sexual offenses, of which 29,265 were for rape, a 37 percent increase over the previous year
and the highest level since the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard in 2002/03.
Improvements in recording and a greater willingness of victims to come forward to report such crimes
were thought to be the main causes for the higher numbers. The government provided shelters,
counseling, and other assistance for survivors of rape or violence in the UK and Northern Ireland. It
offered free legal aid to battered women who were economically dependent on their abusers.
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law prohibits FGM/C in the UK. It is also illegal to
take abroad a British national or permanent resident for FGM/C, or to help someone trying to do this.
The penalty is up to 14 years in prison. The Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 was amended during
the year to include FGM Protection Orders. An FGM Protection Order is a civil measure that can be
applied for through a family court. It offers the means of protecting actual or potential victims from
FGM/C under the civil law. Breach of an FGM Protection Order is a criminal offense carrying a
sentence of up to five years in prison.
Since September 2014, hospital providers have been obligated to collect data on all incidents of
FGM/C for the Female Genital Mutilation Prevalence Dataset, including those already being treated
and new cases. Since October general practice doctors must also report suspected cases. For the period
of September 2014 to March 2015, 3,963 newly identified cases of FGM/C were reported, 60 newly
identified cases were under the age of 18. According to the government, the UK communities most at
risk included the Kenyan, Somali, Sudanese, Sierra Leonean, Egyptian, Nigerian, and Eritrean. Non-
African communities that practiced FGM/C included the Yemeni, Afghani, Kurdish, Indonesian, and
Pakistani. Official reports stated that it was difficult to tell when or where FGM/C occurred.
Sexual Harassment: The law criminalizes sexual harassment. No further information was available.
Reproductive Rights: Couples and individuals have the right to decide the number, spacing, and timing
of their children; to manage their reproductive health; and to have access to the information and means
to do so, free from discrimination, coercion, or violence.
Discrimination: The law provides the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including
under family, labor, property, nationality, and inheritance laws. Women were subject to some
discrimination in employment (see section 7.d.).
Children
Birth Registration: A child born in the UK receives the countrys citizenship at birth if one of the
parents is a UK citizen or a legally settled resident. Children born in Northern Ireland may opt for UK,
Irish, or dual citizenship. A child born in an overseas territory is a UK overseas territories citizen if at
least one of the childs parents has citizenship. There are special provisions for granting citizenship to
persons who might otherwise be stateless. All births must be registered within 42 days in the district
where the baby was born, and unregistered births were uncommon.
Child Abuse: According to the charitable NGO National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children (NSPCC), more than 30,000 allegations of sexual offenses against children, including rape,
assault and grooming offenses, were made to police forces in England and Wales in 2014/15.
In Scotland there were 3,742 recorded sexual offenses against children in 2013/14. This was a rate of
3.4 sexual offenses per 1,000 children under age 16.
The PSNI recorded 1,575 cases of abuse against a person under the age of 18 in Northern Ireland in
2014-15. As of June, 141 children were on the child protection register in Northern Ireland because of
sexual abuse. The Historic Institutional Abuse Inquiry continued to investigate 524 reports from
victims of child abuse in 16 religious and government-run care homes and reformatory institutions in
Northern Ireland from 1922 to 1995.
Social service departments in each local authority area in the country maintained confidential child
protection registers containing details of children at risk of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or
neglect. The registers also included child protection plans for each child. According to the NSPCC, at
the end of March 2014 there were 56,231 children on child protection registers or subject to child
protection plans in the UK. In Scotland as of July 2014, there were 2,882 children on child protection
registers. In Northern Ireland as of June 2015, there were 2,010 children on child protection registers.
In January the Foreign and Commonwealth Office reported widespread sexual abuse of children on the
island of St. Helena. Its report had found a culture of acceptance of child abuse and alleged a number
of serial child sex offenders and serial victims lived on the island. Sexual maturity, rather than age of
consent, was the de facto basis in determining what was acceptable for sexual relations on the island.
Early and Forced Marriage: The minimum legal age for marriage in the UK is 16. In England and
Wales, persons under 18 and not previously married require the written consent of the parents or
guardians, and the underage person must present a birth certificate. During the year forcing a UK
citizen into marriage anywhere in the world became a criminal offense in England and Wales. The new
law provides for a maximum prison sentence of seven years. In Scotland persons between 16 and 18 do
not need parental consent to be married. In Northern Ireland persons under 18 need parental consent
or if appropriate an order of a court dispensing with consent. In Bermuda the minimum age for
marriage is 18.
The governments Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) operated a helpline providing confidential support and
advice to victims and professionals and conducted a nationwide outreach program with schools, social
services, and police. In 2014 the FMU gave advice or support to 1,267 cases, 79 percent of which
involved female victims. More than 10 percent involved victims with disabilities and 11 percent of
cases involved victims under the age of 16.
In June a man was sentenced to 16 years in prison for making a 25-year-old woman marry him under
duress, the first ever to be jailed under the forced marriage laws introduced in 2014. The same month,
Respond, a UK-based charity supporting persons with learning disabilities affected by trauma and
abuse, launched My Life, My Marriage, a project aimed at challenging the practice of forcing marriage
on persons with learning disabilities.
In Scotland the law provides for protection against forced marriage without free and full consent and
for protecting persons who have been forced into marriage without such consent. The legal minimum
age to enter into a marriage in Scotland is 16 and does not require parental consent.
The minimum age for marriage in Bermuda is 16 for both girls and boys.
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): See information for girls under 18 in womens section
above.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The penalties for sexual offenses against children and the commercial
sexual exploitation of children range up to life imprisonment. Released persons convicted of sexual
offenses must register with police and notify police any time they change their name or address, or
travel outside the UK.
Authorities identified 2,340 potential trafficking victims from 96 countries in 2014 compared with
1,746 potential victims in 2013. Of these, 29 percent were children.
The minimum age of consensual sex in the UK is 16. In Bermuda the legal minimum age for
consensual sex is 16 for heterosexuals and lesbians and 18 for gay men.
International Child Abductions: The UK including Bermuda is party to the 1980 Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Due to its distinct and separate legal system,
Scotland has an independent body for handling Hague Convention cases and communicates directly
with Hague Convention authorities. For information see the Department of States report on
compliance at travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/legal/compliance.html and country-specific
information at travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/country/united-kingdom.html.
Anti-Semitism
The 2011 census recorded the Jewish population of the UK as 263,346.
The NGO Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 473 anti-Semitic incidents across the UK in the
first six months of the year, a 53-percent increase over the first six months of 2014. The increase was
most pronounced during the first three months of the year and may have reflected an increase in the
reporting of anti-Semitic incidents due to raised communal concern about anti-Semitism following the
attacks in Paris and Copenhagen, rather than a significant increase in incidents. The CST recorded 88
anti-Semitic incidents on social media, comprising 19 percent of the total. The CST recorded 44 violent
anti-Semitic assaults, double the 22 incidents of this type recorded during the comparable period in
2014. These incidents, two of which were categorized as extreme violence, made up 9 percent of the
total.
On January 26, Baroness Jenny Tonge tabled a written question in the House of Lords asking whether
the government would plan to encourage Jewish faith leaders in the United Kingdom publicly to
condemn settlement building by Israel and to make clear their support for universal human rights. She
said British Jews must condemn Israel if they want to avoid increased expressions of anti-Semitism.
Tonge sits in the House of Lords as an independent peer after the Liberal Democrats expelled her from
the party in 2013 for commenting that, Israel would not be there forever, and then refusing to
apologize. In 2010 she received criticism for comments that invoked blood libels.
On March 23, a mob broke into the Ahavas Torah synagogue in London, where worshippers were
marking the end of the Sabbath, shouting Kill the Jews, assaulting at least one man, smashing
windows, and vandalizing the building. Scotland Yard arrested six individuals in connection with the
attack.
On July 4, a Jewish teenager was seriously injured in an attack at a tram stop in northern Manchester.
Police believed comments made during the attack were anti-Semitic and were investigating it as a hate
crime.
Trafficking in Persons
In July the Modern Day Slavery Bill became law. The new law introduces trafficking reparation orders
to encourage the courts to use seized assets to compensate victims and prevention orders to restrict the
activities of potential slave masters. Since October thousands of the UKs biggest firms must reveal
whether they have taken action to ensure they do not use child or slave labor (see section 7.b.).
See the Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
Persons with Disabilities
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental
disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to health care, or the
provision of other government services. The government effectively enforced the law.
In 2014 the NGO National Autism Society reported that, of 800 respondents in its survey, 81 percent
had experienced verbal abuse and 47 percent had been the victim of physical assaults (see also section
6, Early and Forced Marriage).
In May official government figures released under a FOIA request showed that 4,748 adults with
disabilities reported being sexually abused in the last two years--two-thirds of the total sexual abuse
cases reported.
Bermudian law protects the rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace. The law does not
include any protection from discrimination on the grounds of mental health.
From March 2014 through March 2015, in Scotland there were 177 recorded crimes connected to
disability, an increase of 20 percent from the previous year. The PSNI recorded 78 hate crimes
connected to disability from July 2014 through June 2015, an increase of 12 crimes from the previous
year. The mandate of the EHRC includes work on behalf of persons with disabilities to stop
discrimination and promote equality of opportunity. The EHRC provided legal advice and support to
individuals, a hotline for persons with disabilities and employers, and policy advice to the government.
It may also conduct formal investigations, arrange conciliation, require persons or organizations to
adopt action plans to ensure compliance with the law, and apply for injunctions to prevent acts of
unlawful discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The law prohibits racial and ethnic discrimination, but Travellers, Roma, and persons of African, Afro-
Caribbean, South Asian, and Middle Eastern origin at times reported mistreatment on racial or ethnic
grounds. In January the High Court ruled the government had illegally discriminated against Travellers
by unlawfully subjecting planning applications from Roma and Travellers to special scrutiny.
In England and Wales, police recorded 52,528 hate crimes in 2014-15, an increase of 18 percent
compared with the previous year. Of these, 37,484 (84 percent) were race hate crimes. In 2013-14
Scottish police recorded 3,785 race crimes, a 9 percent decrease from the previous year and the lowest
number recorded since 2003-04. In October a University of Strathclyde study found that one in three of
the 500 black and minority ethnic Scots surveyed had experienced discrimination. In Northern Ireland
from July 2014 to June 2015, the PSNI recorded 884 hate crimes connected to racism, an increase of 82
crimes from the previous year.
In Bermuda arrests of black persons were disproportionately high. In 2014, 87 percent (2,144) of 2,456
persons arrested were black (excluding mixed race). According to the 2010 census, 54 percent of all
residents described themselves as black. Among the Bermudian population, excluding foreign
residents, 63 percent were black.
Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual

Orientation and Gender Identity
In Bermuda the legal minimum age for consensual sex is 16 for lesbians and 18 for gay men. On
August 28, the Bermuda Human Rights Tribunal found that it could not deliver a just verdict in a
2014 case where a man posted derogatory comments (I hate your kind.) on Facebook about a
transvestite bus driver. The Tribunal stated that the Human Rights Act (HRA) applies only on racial
grounds. On other grounds, the law only prohibits discriminatory notices, signs, symbols, emblems or
other representations. The Human Rights Commission also recommended that Parliament amend the
HRA to provide a broader definition or section on gender that would include a range of transgender
classifications. It pointed out that the question of whether there is protection against the discrimination
of transsexual, transgender, or other persons who do not fit the traditional classification of male or
female has not yet been tested in Bermuda.
In Bermuda during September, a number of well attended public meetings discussed same-sex
marriage, which is prohibited in Bermuda. One foreign speaker made derogatory remarks about
lesbian, gay, transgender, and intersex persons and same-sex marriage, and the government
subsequently prohibited that person from traveling to Bermuda in the future.
The law in England and Wales prohibits discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation,
although individuals reported sporadic incidents of homophobic violence. It encourages judges to
impose a greater sentence in assault cases where the victims sexual orientation was a motive for the
hostility, and many local police forces demonstrated an increasing awareness of the problem and
trained officers to identify and moderate these attacks. From 2014 to 2015, police in England and
Wales recorded 5,597 hate crimes related to sexual orientation and 605 transgender hate crimes.
In Scotland racial, sexual, or other discriminatory motivation may be an aggravating factor in crimes.
Scottish law also criminalizes behavior that is threatening, hateful, or otherwise offensive at a regulated
soccer match and penalizes any threat of serious violence and threats to incite religious hatred through
the mail or the internet. Crime aggravated by sexual orientation was the second most common type of
hate crime, with 841 charges reported in 2014-15 a decrease from 890 in 2013-14. Between March
2014 and March 2015, 21 charges were reported in Scotland with an aggravation of prejudice relating
to transgender identity.
The PSNI recorded 196 hate crimes related to homophobia and 10 transphobic crimes in Northern
Ireland from July 2014 to June 2015. In April, Health Minister Jim Wells stepped down following
homophobic statements. In October a court convicted an Ashers bakery of discrimination for refusing
an order from a gay customer and was ordered to pay 500 pounds ($750) in damages to the individual.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination
Offenses linked to victims religion increased by 43 percent from 2013-14 to 3,254. Of the 5,591 hate
crimes Police Scotland recorded in 2014-15, there were 569 charges with a religious aggravation. The
PSNI recorded 30 hate crimes motivated by religion from July 2014 to June 2015, an increase of 20
crimes from the previous year. During the same period, the PSNI recorded 1,080 sectarian crimes in
Northern Ireland, an increase of 49. The number of sectarian incidents rose to 1,547, an increase of 171
incidents.
In October the prime minister announced that he would require police forces in England and Wales to
record anti-Muslim hate crimes and to treat them as seriously as anti-Semitic attacks. At present the
NGO Tell Mama project, which works closely with the CST, is the main unofficial source of
statistics on anti-Muslim hate crime.
Section 7. Worker RightsShare

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively,
and conduct legal strikes. The government generally respected these rights. The law prohibits antiunion
discrimination but does not require reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.
The law does not cover workers in the armed forces, public-sector security services, police forces, and
freelance or temporary work. The law excludes workers serving in the police, the prison service, and
the armed forces from the right to strike. According to the International Trade Union Confederation
(ITUC), the right to strike in the UK is limited due to prohibitions against political and solidarity
strikes, lengthy procedures for calling strikes, and the ability of employers to seek injunctions against
unions before a strike has begun if the union does not observe all proper steps in organizing the strike.
The government enforced applicable laws. Remedies were limited in situations where workers faced
reprisal for union activity, and the ITUC stated that the law does not provide adequate means of
protection against antiunion discrimination, and noted that legal protections against unfair labor
practices only exist within the framework of organizing a recognition ballot. Penalties range from
employers paying compensation to reinstatement and were sufficient to deter violations.
The government and employers generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining. Unions and management typically negotiated collective agreements, which were less
formal and not legally enforceable. The terms of the agreement could, however, then be incorporated
into an individual work contract with legal standing.
The law does not allow independent trade unions to apply for derecognition of in-house company
unions or to protect individual workers seeking to do so. Labor-market surveys suggested that
employers expanded the practice of zero-hour contracts in which workers are required to be available
but are not guaranteed any minimum work hours, which potentially eroded independent trade union
membership and further limited worker rights.
Various labor NGOs advocated for workers rights freely within the UK and acted independently from
trade unions, although often advocacy problems overlapped. NGOs advocated for improvements in
paid family leave, a minimum/living wage, and worker safety among other problems.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, but such practices occurred. The Modern Day Slavery
Law, enacted in March, introduces trafficking reparation orders to encourage the courts to use seized
assets to compensate victims and prevention orders to restrict the activities of potential slave masters.
From October, thousands of Britains biggest firms must now reveal whether they have taken action to
ensure they do not use child or slave labor (see section 6, Trafficking in Persons). More than 12,000
firms with a turnover of 36 million pounds ($54 million) are required to publish an annual statement
setting out what steps they are taking to ensure that slave labor is not being used.
The government generally enforced these laws effectively. Resources and inspections were generally
adequate and were sufficiently stringent compared with other sentences for serious crimes.
Victims of forced labor included men, women, and children. Migrant workers were subject to forced
labor in agriculture, construction, food processing, and service industries (especially nail salons), and
on fishing boats. Women employed as domestic workers were particularly vulnerable to forced labor.
NGOs noted that the UKs work visa system ties the employee to the employer even when they are
subject to abuse, making victims of exploitation potentially reluctant to come forward.
In Bermuda the Department of Immigration and the Director of Public Prosecutions confirmed there
were no cases of forced labor during the year, although historically there were some cases of forced
labor, mostly involving migrants, among men in the construction sector and women in domestic
service. The media did not report any cases of forced labor or worker exploitation in 2014 or the first
half of the year. The law requires employers to repatriate work-permit holders. Failure to do so had
been a migrant complaint. The cases of worker exploitation largely consisted of employers requiring
workers to work longer hours or to perform work outside the scope of their work permit. The
Department of Immigration imposed civil penalties in approximately eight such cases. The penalties
for employing someone outside the scope of their work permit are BD$5,000 ($5,000) for the first
offense and BD$10,000 ($10,000) for the second or subsequent offenses.
Also see the Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
UK law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 13 with exceptions for sports, modeling,
and paid performances. The law prohibits those under 16 from working in an industrial enterprise,
including transportation or street trading. Childrens work hours are strictly limited and may not
interfere with school attendance. Different legislation governs the employment of persons under 16,
and, while some laws are common across the UK, local bylaws vary. Children between the ages of 13
and 16 must apply for a work permit from a local authority, if local bylaws require, and the local
authoritys education and welfare services have primary responsibility for oversight and enforcement
of the permits. The authorities effectively enforced applicable laws.
The departments of health, trade, industry, education, and skills have regulatory responsibilities related
to child labor.
In Bermuda children under the age of 13 may perform light work of an agricultural, horticultural, or
domestic character if the parent or guardian is the employer. Schoolchildren may not work during
school hours or more than two hours on school days. No child under 15 may work in any industrial
undertaking, other than light work, or on any vessel, other than a vessel where only family members
work. Children under 18 may not work at night, except that those ages 16 to 18 may work until
midnight; employers must arrange for safe conduct home for women between ages 16 and 18 working
until midnight. Penalties for violations of the law begin at BD$350 ($350) for the first offense and
BD$720 ($720) for the second and subsequent offenses. The BPS reported no cases of child labor or
exploitation of children during the year. The penalty for willfully abusing, mistreating, neglecting,
deserting, or abandoning a child is a fine not exceeding BD$3,000 ($3,000) or imprisonment for a term
not exceeding six months.
Labor laws do not set a minimum age for work in the territories of St. Helena-Ascension-Tristan da
Cunha. The government of the British Virgin Islands has not developed a list of hazardous occupations
prohibited by children, and it is unclear whether a comprehensive list of hazardous occupations exists
for children in St. Helena-Ascension-Tristan da Cunha and Monserrat.
There are legislative gaps in the prohibition of trafficking in children for labor exploitation and the use
of children for commercial sexual exploitation in St. Helena-Ascension-Tristan da Cunha. While
criminal laws prohibit trafficking in children for sexual exploitation, they do not address trafficking in
children for labor exploitation.
It is unclear whether the laws in Monserrat prohibit the use of children in illicit activities such as drug
trafficking, begging, theft, or burglary.
Traffickers subjected children to commercial sexual exploitation in Anguilla and Turks and Caicos.
Also see the Department of Labors Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at
www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/ for information on UK territories.
d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation
The law prohibits discrimination in employment or occupation regarding race, sex, gender, disability,
sexual orientation, and gender identity. The government effectively enforced these laws and
regulations. Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to race, gender, and
sexual orientation and gender identity (see section 6).
The law requires equal pay for equal work. Its stated aims are to improve equality and reduce
discrimination and disadvantage for all, at work, in public and political life, and in a persons life
opportunities. A study by the Chartered Management Institute (CMI) found that Britains gender pay
gap is widest at the top of the corporate ladder, where female directors earn one-tenth less on average
than their male counterparts. Further down the pay scale, the gaps were smaller. Among professional
level employees, the gender pay gap was between 2 and 3.5 percent. This finding was similar to the
Office for National Statistics annual estimate of the average gender pay gap, which was a record low
of 19.1 percent in 2014, down from 27.5 percent in 1997. Both the ONS and the CMI data suggested
the pay gap was far smaller among younger workers. Women in the CMI survey ages 26-35 were paid
6 percent less than their male colleagues, rising to a fifth for women ages 36-45. The gap increased to
more than a third for women ages 46-60, and to 38 percent for workers in their 60s.
In September an employment tribunal found that Surrey and Sussex Police department unlawfully
discriminated against police marksman Bruce Shields on disability grounds when it removed the
officer from his firearm duties for failing a newly introduced hearing test. The court stated that
throughout his 16-year career, Shields was repeatedly assessed very positively and that there was no
evidence that the officers partial hearing loss had caused any operational difficulty or issue.
In September a woman was awarded nearly 184,000 pounds ($276,000) compensation in one of the
UKs first claims of caste discrimination. Permila Tirkey was recruited from India, based on her low
caste in Hindu society, and kept in domestic servitude by her employers in Milton Keynes. Tirkey
alleged that her employers forced her to work 18 hours per day, seven days a week for 11 pence
($0.17) per hour. The Legal Aid Agency initially refused to fund her representation for 17 months on
the grounds that her case was not of sufficient importance or seriousness and that it was only a
claim for money.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
On October 1, the minimum wage increased from 6.50 pounds ($9.75) to 6.70 pounds ($10.05) for
individuals 21 and over, from 5.13 pounds ($7.70) to 5.30 pounds ($7.95) for individuals between 18
and 20, from 3.79 pounds ($5.70) to 3.87 pounds ($5.80) for individuals under 18, and from 2.73
pounds ($4.10) to 3.30 pounds ($4.95) for an apprentice.
The government measures the poverty level as income less than 60 percent of the median household
income, thus the poverty line moves with the median income year to year. In 2010-11, the most recent
period for which data was available, the poverty level for households was an income of 215 pounds
($323) per week. Tax authorities may issue compliance orders against employers who are not paying
the minimum wage, but employment tribunals handle disputes. The government monitored employers
compliance with minimum wage law.
The law limits the workweek to 48 hours when averaged over a 17- to 26-week period. The law
provides for one day of rest per week, 11 hours of daily rest, and a 20-minute rest break when the
working day exceeds six hours. The law also mandates a minimum of four weeks of paid annual leave,
including eight national holidays. As part of collective agreements, however, almost all workers are
legally entitled to 5.6 weeks paid holiday per year, while an employer can choose to include bank
holidays as part of a workers statutory annual leave. An individual employee may agree by contract to
work overtime for premium pay. The law does not prohibit compulsory overtime, but it limits overtime
to the 48-hour workweek restriction. The law stipulates that employers may not place the health and
safety of employees at risk. The 48-hour workweek regulations do not apply to senior managers and
others who can exercise control over their own hours of work. There are also exceptions for the armed
forces, emergency services, police, domestic workers, sea and air transportation workers, and
fishermen. The law allows workers to opt out of the 48-hour limit. There are exceptions for airline
staff, delivery drivers, security guards, and workers on ships or boats. The government set appropriate
occupational safety and health standards.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE), an arm of the Department of Work and Pensions, effectively
enforced occupational health and safety laws. It conducted workplace inspections and may initiate
criminal proceedings. HSE inspectors enforced health and safety standards by giving advice on how to
comply with the law. Employers may also be ordered to make improvements, either through an
improvement notice, which allows time for the recipient to comply, or a prohibition notice, which
prohibits an activity until remedial action has been taken. The HSE issued notices to companies and
individuals for breaches of health and safety law. The notice may involve one or more instances when
the recipient has failed to comply with health and safety law, each of which was called a breach. The
HSE prosecuted recipients for noncompliance with a notice. In 2014 the HSE prosecuted 582 cases in
England and Wales; local authorities in England and Wales prosecuted 92 cases, while the procurator
fiscal in Scotland prosecuted 35 cases. In Northern Ireland from April 2014 to March 2015, there were
seven successful prosecutions with fines totaling slightly more than 129,500 pounds ($194,500). The
HSENI (Northern Ireland) also made 5,993 inspections and served more than 177 formal enforcement
notices.
According to the HSEs annual report for 2014-15, the provisional estimate of workers fatally injured
in the UK was 142, more than the 133 fatalities reported for the same period in the previous year.
There were 78,000 reported nonfatal injuries to employees. Workers can remove themselves from
situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment and authorities
effectively protected employees in this situation. There is an HSENI specifically for Northern Ireland.
It reported that during April 2014 to March 2015 there were 23 fatalities, compared with eight in the
previous year. Reportable injuries were 2,263, a 1-percent increase from the previous year.
Bermudas law does not provide for a minimum wage, but the Department of Labor and Training
enforces any contractually agreed wage. The law requires that work in excess of 40 hours per week be
paid at the overtime rate or with compensatory time off; employees may waive rights to overtime pay.
The law also requires that employees have a rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours per week. It
provides for paid public holidays and two weeks paid annual leave. Regulations enforced by the
Department of Labor and Training extensively cover the safety of the work environment. Between
January and September, one industrial injury was reported.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers immigration benefits and
naturalization on behalf of the United States Government, and establishes related policies and
priorities. USCIS seeks to secure Americas promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate
and useful information to our customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an
awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration system.
https://uk.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2016/08/USCIS_Instructions_Collection-of-
reentry-permit.pdf
ProudOverseasVoter Final
Opportunities to Return Voted Ballots
Dont wait, return your voted ballot right away!
Remember U.S. embassies and consulates are not polling places; same-day in-person voting is not
available outside the United States. The majority of states require voted ballots to reach local election
officials by the close of polls on Tuesday, November 8. U.S. citizens who want to participate in the
2016 U.S. elections should already have returned their absentee ballots to their local election officials.
Never received your ballot?
If you registered to vote and requested an absentee ballot prior to your states registration deadline, but
have not yet received your ballot, complete and return a Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot to ensure
your vote reaches election officials by your states deadline. If your regular ballot arrives later,
complete and return it as well. Your Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot will only be counted if your
regular ballot does not reach local election officials by your states deadline. Your vote will not be
counted twice.
Returning your ballot
You may drop off your ballot at the U.S. Embassy in London and U.S. Consulates in Belfast and
Edinburgh. Make sure to place it in either a postage-paid envelope or envelope bearing domestic U.S.
postage addressed to your local election officials. To ensure your ballot is delivered on time to local
election officials,it must be received no later than the following dates and times:
U.S. Embassy London: Wednesday, October 12 at 8:00 a.m.
U.S. Consulate Belfast: Monday, October 10 at 12:00 p.m.
U.S. Consulate Edinburgh: Thursday, October 6 at 8:00 a.m.
Missed the U.S. embassy/consulate shipment deadline?
Consider returning your ballot to the United States via Royal Mail, an express courier service such as
FedEx, UPS, or DHL or electronically if allowed by your state. If you are using Royal Mail or an
express delivery company, be sure to affix sufficient international postage, and allow adequate time for
international mail delivery prior to your states voting deadline. Check your states voting procedures
at www.FVAP.gov for guidance.
Returning your Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot by email or fax.
If you have previously registered to vote and requested an absentee ballot but it has not yet arrived the
following states allow voters to use email or fax to send signed, voted Federal Write-in Absentee
Ballots to local election officials: Alaska (fax only), Arizona (contact election official first), Arkansas
(fax only), Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida (fax only), Hawaii (fax only), Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana (fax only), Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska (fax only
paper copy must also be mailed), Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma (fax
only), Oregon (paper copy must also be mailed), Rhode Island (fax only), South Carolina, Utah,
Washington, and West Virginia. Review your states voting procedures at www.FVAP.gov carefully
for guidance.
Help spread the word about overseas voting.
Please help spread the word to your friends, family, and colleagues that now is the time to start
thinking about overseas voting. Consider posting to your Twitter, Instagram, Facebook or other social
media account that you are an active voter and will be dropping off or mailing your Federal Post Card
Application or completed ballot. Use #ProudOverseasVoter to help get the word out about voting.
Have Questions?
You can contact Embassy Londons Voting Assistance Officer at LondonVote@state.gov. For U.S.
citizens in Northern Ireland, contact ACSBelfast@state.gov. U.S. citizens in Scotland can contact
Edinburgh-Info@state.gov. You can also contact the Federal Voting Assistance Program directly if
you encounter issues with local election officials by emailing Vote@FVAP.gov or toll free by phone
from many countries around the world.
Confirm your registration and ballot delivery online.
Learn more at the Federal Voting Assistance Programs (FVAP) website at www.FVAP.gov.
U. S. Embassy London
Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Incident in Westminster
22 March 2017
The U.S. Embassy in London informs U.S. citizens that there has been a security incident on
Westminster Bridge near Parliament. U.S. citizens should heed guidance from local authorities and
maintain security awareness. View updates from the Metropolitan Police at news.met.police.uk/ or
follow at @metpoliceuk.
Please monitor media and local information sources and factor updated information into personal travel
plans and activities.
We strongly encourage U.S. citizens in the United Kingdom to directly contact concerned family
members in the United States to advise them ofyour safety.
See the State Departments travel website for the Worldwide Caution,
Travel Warnings, Travel Alerts, and United Kingdom Country Specific
Information.
Enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive
security messages and make it easier to locate you in an emergency.
Contact the U.S. Embassy in London at 44 (0) 20 7894 0551, 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday.
Call 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the United States and Canada or 1-202-
501-4444 from other countries from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).
Follow us on Twitter and Facebook.
Facebook Safety Check: The Attack in Westminster
You can check on friends in the affected area or mark yourself safe using Safety Check.
More Information
Please follow directions of the local authorities and monitor local news. Useful sources of updates
include:
London Metropolitan Police Service @MetPoliceUK

The Metropolitan Police on protests & special events in
London @MetPoliceEvents
Transport for London (TFL) @TFL
London Fire Brigade @LondonFire
City of London Police UK @CityPolice
British Transport Police @BTP
https://uk.usembassy.gov/incident-near-westminster-london-uk/
Service Area
The London Field Office has jurisdiction over U.S. immigration matters in the United Kingdom, the
Republic of Ireland, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
First Time Users/Frequently Asked Questions
If you are a first-time user or have general questions please see our Frequently Asked Questions.
Immigrant Visa Case Number
If your Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) has been approved by the USCIS London Field Office,
or you have already received your immigrant visa case number (LND + four digit year YYYY + 6
digits, for example LND2016 000 000) and you have a question about the process, please check our
Immigrant Visas: FAQ section.
https://uk.usembassy.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/2017/07/USCIS_London_Permits_Received_24july2017.pdf
Visas
For in-depth information about visas, please check the Visas section of the U.S. Embassy London
website.
https://uk.usembassy.gov/united-states-urges-establishment-power-sharing-government-northern-
ireland-2/
Image copyright Reuters Image caption The onus is on the UK to come up with a
solution for the Irish border, said Simon Coveney
Addressing reporters on Friday afternoon, the taoiseach said both he and Mr Coveney were on the
same page on the issue.
But Mr Varadkar added that if the UK government wants technological solutions to the border that was
up to them.
He said the Irish government would not do that work for them.
Sinn Fin leader Gerry Adams supported Mr Varadkar's remarks and said he should support a
campaign for Northern Ireland to be granted special status within the EU.
"The taoiseach should should tell both the British government and the EU negotiating team that this is
the best solution to the economic, political and social challenges that Ireland faces from Brexit," Mr
Adams added.
In the 2016 referendum, the UK as a whole voted to leave the EU but in Northern Ireland, 56% of the
electorate voted to remain.
Corrects Coveney to foreign minister, paragrapch 3)
* Ireland (Other OTC: IRLD - news) says opposed to checks on Irish land border
* DUP says border between Northern Ireland and Britain absurd
* Ex NI First Minister says spat 'enormously damaging'
By Padraic Halpin and Conor Humphries
DUBLIN, July 28 (Reuters) - Northern Irish protestant politicians who are propping up British Prime
Minister Theresa May's minority government reacted with fury on Friday to a report that Ireland wants
the Irish Sea to be its effective border with Britain after Brexit.
Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar on Friday confirmed his government would oppose any customs
posts or immigration checks on the land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland,
but he did not say where they should be placed instead.
His foreign minister, Simon Coveney, said there was no sea border proposal. But he did not say where
he wanted to locate the customs and immigration checks that will be inevitable if Britain leaves the
European Union's single market and customs union.
The issue of how the Republic and Northern Ireland will fare after Britain leaves the EU is particularly
sensitive given the decades of violence in the province over whether it should be part of Britain or
Ireland. Around 3,600 people were killed before the 1998 peace agreement.
The Times newspaper sparked the row with a report that the Irish government's preferred option was
for customs and immigration checks to be located away from the land border and at ports and airports,
effectively drawing a new border in the Irish Sea.
Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - the Protestant party propping up British Prime
Minister Theresa May's minority government angrily rejected the idea.
"There is no way that the DUP would go for an option that creates a border between one part of the
United Kingdom and the other. Dublin really needs to understand that the proposition is absurd, it's
unconstitutional," DUP MP Jeffrey Donaldson told BBC Radio.
Ian Paisley Jr, one of the 10 DUP members of the British parliament allowing May's government to
stay in power said on twitter that the Irish government's opposition to high-tech border posts was for "a
very hard border" returning to Ireland.
Former Northern Ireland First Minister David Trimble said in an interview with Sky News that Ireland
was risking doing "enormous damage" to relations between Dublin and Belfast, .
In a ratcheting up of Irish rhetoric around Brexit, Varadkar said it was the Ireland rather than unionists
that should be angry at British plans to reimpose an "economic border" across the island of Ireland for
the first time in 25 years.
"As far as this government is concerned there shouldn't be an economic border. We don't want one,"
Varadkar told reporters at a briefing in Dublin.
Politicians in London, Dublin, Belfast and Brussels have all said they want to avoid the return of a
"hard border" on the divided island, although no progress has yet been made.
The current border between the Irish Republic, a member of the European Union, and the British
province of Northern Ireland would become the only land frontier between the U.K. and the EU once
Britain left the bloc in early 2019.
There have been no customs or immigration checks on the 500-kilometer border since the European
single market came into effect in 1993 and about 30,000 people cross every day without any border
checks.
The Irish government has pointed out that any hindrance to cross-border trade would hit Northern
Ireland harder with the Republic accounting for 25 percent of Northern Irish exports outside the UK,
compared with just 1.4 percent going the other direction.
Overall, 52 percent of voters in the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the EU in last year's
referendum, but 56 percent of those voting in Northern Ireland supported remaining in the bloc.
(Reporting by Padraic Halpin Additional reporting by Cassandra Garrison in London; Editing by
Jeremy Gaunt)
EU Breaches Treaty Obligations to Uk and Ireland Yet Again ...
EU Breaches Treaty Obligations to Uk and ... much about Europe people actually were voting
against the ... The Lisbon Treaty Referendum ...
https://www.scribd.com/document/338493445/EU-Breaches-Treaty-Obligations-to-Uk-and-
Ireland-Yet-Again-More-Treason
The Irish Free State passportand the question of citizenship,

1921-4 by Joseph P. O'Grady
The issue of citizenship played a major role in the negotiations that led tothe Anglo-Irish
treaty of 1921; but that point was overshadowed by the tendency of those who negotiated the
treaty (and the authors who have written about it) to see the issue of 'common citizenship' as
only one point under
the heading of allegiance to the crown and membership of the British Empire.
That it was a central issue is clear, however, for at one point in the 1921 negotiations Lloyd
George asked, 'to put it bluntiy will you be British subjects or foreigners? You must be either
one or the other.' Arthur Griffith, the leader of the Irish delegation, answered: 'in our proposal
we have agreed to "reciprocity of civic rights" . We should be Irish and you would be British
and each would have equal rights as citizens in the country of the other.' That exchange
caused the British to ask the Irish for a direct answer to the question, would they
'acknowledge this common citizenship?' . The Irish, however, only responded with the words,
'Ireland would undertake such obligations as are compatible with the status of a free partner'
in 'the community of nations known as the BritishCommonwealth' . Those words did not
satisfy the English negotiators, but in the end the Irish accepted an agreement in which the
words
'common citizenship' appeared in the oath to the king which all members ofDail Eireann
would have to take. That satisfied the British demands on allegianceto the crown
That acceptance, however, did not end the story. When the treaty was ratified by the Ddil in
January and a provisional government formed, the Irish had to frame a constitution. This was
completed in May 1922 and submitted to the British cabinet at the end of the month. The
cabinet's evaluation of the document made Lloyd George seek from Arthur Griffith on 1 June
1922 specific answers to six questions.
The first was 'is it intended by the Irish representatives
that the I.F.S. shall be within the empire on the basis of common citizenship, or merely
associated with it?'
Next day Griffith answered, 'it is intended
that the Irish Free State shall be not merely associated with, but a member of and within the
community of nations known as, the British Empire and on the basis of common citizenship
as explicitiy provided by the treaty' .That agreement meant that the words 'common
citizenship' would again appear in
article 17 of the Irish Free State constitution as part of the oath of allegiance.
Because the term 'common citizenship' appeared in both the treaty and the constitution, in
theory the citizens of the Irish Free State remained British subjects until 1935 when the Irish
passed the Irish Nationality Act;5 but in practice the change came much earlier, in April 1924,
when the Irish government
rejected the British demand that the description 'British subject' be printed on each Irish
passport. The question of how the passport issue generated a debate over the meaning of
'common citizenship' has not gained much attention among
historians. D. W. Harkness in his The restless dominion: the Irish Free State and the British
Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31 (London, 1969) devotes only half a page to it, whde
neither W. K. Hancock, in his Survey of British
Commonwealth affairs, volume i: problems of nationality, 1918-1936 (Oxford, 1937), nor
Nicholas Mansergh, in his Britain and Ireland (London, 1942), mentions the issue. Mansergh
does comment on the passport dispute in his
later The Commonwealth and the nations (London 1948), but only as a passing point. Ronald
Hyam and Ged Martin, in their Reappraisals in British imperial history (London, 1975),
mention the passport question on page 205; but they
list it only as a precedent toward full independence from Britain which the Irish established,
but no one else in the Commonwealth of Nations wanted to follow. It is clear from the present
account, however, that the Irish did not see their position on passports as a precedent
towards full
independence. It was merely the outgrowth of their inability to describe Irish citizens as
'British subjects' on an official government document.
In December 1922, when the Irish Free State came into being, the minister for external
affairs, Desmond FitzGerald, took immediate steps to issue Irish passports. In this he
followed the practice of the other self-governing dominions which had been issuing their own
passports for some time. Since the treaty had given the new Irish government the same
constitutional status as Canada, he used the Canadian passport as the model for his first
suggestion. He submitted
this to the executive council for consideration on 23 January 1923. Someone at the
discussion questioned the proposed wording:
'Passports are granted
(1) to natural-born British subjects,
(2) to persons naturalized in the Irish Free State, in the United Kingdom, in other British
colonies, or in India' . As a result, a third category was added and placed at the head of the
list: 'citizens of the Irish Free State'
Illegal Passports are granted to natural-born British subjects,

to persons naturalized in the Irish Free State, in the United Kingdom under eu law is
unconstitutional and treason pdf doc
with the exception of the Irish Free State (see Irish nationality law), ... Children
born in the United Kingdom, British ... History of British nationality law ...
The Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland provided that
children born on the island of Ireland to parents who were both foreign nationals
would no longer have a constitutional right to citizenship of the Republic of
Ireland.[2] It was effected by the Twenty-seventh Amendment of the
Constitution Act, 2004, which was approved by referendum on 11 June 2004
and signed into law on 24 June of the same year.[3] It partially reversed changes
made to the Constitution by the Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
Ireland which was passed as part of the Good Friday Agreement
Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the

Constitution Act, 2004
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2004/ca/27/enacted/en/pdf
Twenty-seventh Amendment
Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland referendum[1]
Date 11 June 2004
Results
Votes %
Yes 1,427,520 79.17%
No 375,695 20.83%
Valid votes 1,803,215 98.89%
Invalid or blank votes 20,219 1.11%
Total votes 1,823,434 100.00%
Registered voters/turnout 3,041,688 59.95%
We Voted No on This referendum but still they Illegally passed This

with the exception of the Irish Free State (see Irish nationality law), ...
Children born in the United Kingdom, British ... History of British
nationality law ...
The Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland
http://wikivisually.com/wiki/Twenty-
seventh_Amendment_of_the_Constitution_of_Ireland
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (Irish: An tAire Gntha
Eachtracha agus Trdla) is the senior minister at the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade in the Government of Ireland. The Minister's office is
located at Iveagh House, on St Stephen's Green in Dublin; "Iveagh House"
is often used as a metonym for the department as a whole. From 1922 until
1971 the title of the office was "Minister for External Affairs".
The current office holder is Simon Coveney, TD. He is assisted by:
Joe McHugh, TD Minister of State for the Diaspora and Overseas
Development Aid
Helen McEntee, TD Minister of State for European Affairs, Data
Protection and the EU Single Digital Market
Simon Coveney, Minister of Defence (cropped).jpg

Incumbent
Simon Coveney
since 14 June 2017
Appointer President of Ireland on the nomination of the Taoiseach
Inaugural holder George Noble Plunkett
Formation 22 January 1919
Website www.dfa.ie
Overview
The department has the following divisions:
Finance Unit oversees the financial control of the department.
Anglo-Irish Division deals with Anglo-Irish relations and Northern
Ireland.
Cultural Division administers the state's Cultural Relations Programme.
European Union Division coordinates the state's approach within the
European Union (EU).
Development Cooperation Division responsible for the Irish Aid
programme and for Irish international development policy.
Passport and Consular Division is responsible for the issuing of passports
to Irish citizens.
Political Division is responsible for international political issues and
manages the state's participation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security
Policy.
Protocol Division is responsible for the organisation and management of
visits of VIPs to the state and of visits abroad by the President of Ireland.
The Minister has responsibility for the relations between Ireland and foreign
states. The department defines its role as: "The Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade advises the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, the
Ministers of State and the Government on all aspects of foreign policy and
coordinates Ireland's response to international developments. It also
provides advice and support on all issues relevant to the pursuit of peace,
partnership and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, and between North and
South of the island, and to deepening Ireland's relationship with Britain
http://wikivisually.com/wiki/Minister_for_Foreign_Affairs_and_Trade
IrelandUnited Kingdom relations, also referred to as BritishIrish relations,
are the relations between the states of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The
three devolved administrations of the United Kingdom, in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland, and the three dependencies of the British Crown,[1]
the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey, also participate in multilateral bodies
created between the two states.[2]
Since at least the 1600s, all of these areas have been connected politically,
reaching a height in 1801 with the creation of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland. About five-sixths of the island of Ireland seceded from
the United Kingdom in 1921 as the Irish Free State. Historically, relations
between the two states have been influenced heavily by issues arising from
their shared (and frequently troubled) history, the independence of the Irish
Free State and the governance of Northern Ireland. These include the
partition of Ireland and the terms of Ireland's secession, its constitutional
relationship with and obligations to the UK after independence, and the
outbreak of political violence in Northern Ireland. Additionally, the high
level of trade between the two states, their proximate geographic location,
their common status as islands in the European Union, common language
and close cultural and personal links mean political developments in both
states often closely follow each other.
Today, Irish and British citizens are accorded equivalent reciprocal rights
and entitlements (with a small number of minor exceptions) and a Common
Travel Area exists between Ireland, United Kingdom, and the Crown
Dependencies. The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference acts as an
official forum for co-operation between the Government of Ireland and the
Government of the United Kingdom on matters of mutual interest generally,
and with respect to Northern Ireland in particular. Two other bodies, the
BritishIrish Council and the BritishIrish Parliamentary Assembly act as a
forum for discussion between the executives and assemblies, respectively,
of the region, including the devolved regions in the UK and the three Crown
dependencies. Co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland, including the execution of common policies in certain areas, occurs
through the North/South Ministerial Council. In 2014, the UK Prime
Minister David Cameron, and the Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny described the
relationship between the two countries as being at 'an all time high'.[3]
Both Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Union (then the
European Communities) in 1973. However, the three Crown dependencies
remain outside of the EU. In June 2016, the United Kingdom held a
referendum in which most voted to leave the European Union; but most
voters in Northern Ireland voted that the UK should remain in the EU.
http://wikivisually.com/wiki/Anglo-Irish_relations
Brexit briefing: impact on Common

Travel Area and the Irish
The implications of UK withdrawal for immigration policy and nationality
law: Irish aspects
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/brexit-briefing-impact-on-common-travel-
area-and-the-irish/

By Bernard Ryan, Professor of Law, University of Leicester, 18 May 2016
The Immigration Law Practitioners Association has commissioned a series of

briefings on key aspects of the Brexit debate by some of the UKs top lawyers and
academics specialising in EU free movement and migration law. The purpose of the
briefings is to inform interested members of the public, charities and organisations.
They are available to be used as a resource and for any further information or help
please contact Nicole Francis, Chief Executive at ILPA.
Introduction
This paper addresses the Irish dimensions to a UK decision to withdraw from the EU, in the
immigration and nationality policy spheres. It addresses the implications of withdrawal for common
travel area arrangements with the Republic of Ireland (section 1) and for the special status of Irish
citizens in the UK (section 2).
In the paper, it is assumed that the Republic of Ireland would continue as a Member State of the EU.
That has been the position of the Irish Government since the referendum was announced, and there is
no evidence of significant support in the Republic of Ireland for a membership referendum, or for
withdrawal from the EU.
It is also assumed that Northern Ireland would remain within the UK. Opinion poll evidence in 2014
showed a clear majority (60-40) in favour of Northern Irelands remaining within the UK, rather than
unification with the Republic of Ireland.[i] After a UK decision to withdraw, it must be considered
unlikely that there would be an increase in those supporting a change in Northern Irelands
constitutional position
The common travel area

Overview
In this context, the term common travel area refers to administrative arrangements providing a special
immigration control regime as between the UK and the Republic of Ireland.[ii] Arrangements of this
kind have been in place for the most of the period since the Irish Free State was established in
1922.[iii] In practice, the aims of these arrangements have been to ensure relative freedom of
movement between the two states, and to establish forms of co-operation between the two states
immigration authorities.
The primary explanation for the durability of these arrangements has been the assumption of the UK
authorities that it is impractical for the Irish border to be an immigration frontier.[iv] One result has
been support by Northern Irish unionists for the common travel area, in order to avoid immigration
control on journeys between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.[v]
The many social and economic connections between the Republic of Ireland and all parts of the UK are
a second factor pointing towards relative freedom of movement between the two states. This aspect of
the common travel area is generally favoured by the Irish Government. It also appeals to nationalist
opinion in Northern Ireland, which supports any lessening of the de facto consequences of the partition
of the island of Ireland.
A third factor underlying common travel area arrangements is that these favour the free movement of
labour. For most of the period since 1922, that meant movement of Irish workers to Great Britain. With
greater economic development in the Republic of Ireland since the mid-1990s, the pattern has been
more varied, with movement in both directions.
Current arrangements
The legal framework relating to the common travel area is quite different in the two states.
In UK law, by virtue of section 1(3) of the Immigration Act 1971, immigration control does not apply
to persons arriving from the Republic of Ireland. Persons arriving from the Republic of Ireland have
leave to enter automatically, subject to the provisions of the Immigration (Control of Entry through
Republic of Ireland) Order 1972. Article 3 of the 1972 Order excludes several categories of person
from the benefit of section 1(3), including visa nationals not in possession of a visa. Article 4 of the
Order deems certain other persons to have leave only for three months, including persons whose
nationality means that they do not require visas.
Of particular significance is an exemption within Article 4 to these deemed leave arrangements. In its
original version, Article 4 of the 1972 Order exempted Irish citizens alone. That provision was
however replaced in 2014 by an exemption for EEA/ Swiss nationals and their family members who
have a right to enter deriving from EU free movement law.
Under Irish immigration law, everyone who is not an Irish or a British citizen is classed as a non-
national.[vi] Under the Immigration Act 2004, immigration controls apply automatically to all non-
nationals who arrive from the UK by air or sea, and may be imposed upon non-nationals who arrive
by land from Northern Ireland. Individuals who arrive by land must obtain immigration permission to
be in the state within one month. This framework is however to be read with the EU free movement of
persons rules, which confer rights of entry and residence upon EEA/Swiss nationals and family
members.
The two states authorities have long co-operated in immigration control in practice. One area where
extensive co-operation is evident concerns the list of states whose nationals require a visa to enter:
currently, 103 states are subject to visa requirements in both states, seven in the UK alone, and seven in
the Republic of Ireland alone. A more recent development saw the launching in October 2014 of a joint
British-Irish visa, which allows nationals of China and India to visit both states for up to three months,
on the basis of a visa issued by either state. There is also co-operation to ensure that individuals cannot
use one state as a back door to the other. That is linked in turn to provision in the immigration law of
each state for entry to be denied to a person who intends to travel to the other, but who would not be
admitted there.
At the EU level, these arrangements between the UK and Republic of Ireland are reflected in three
Protocols annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Protocol 19, which is concerned with
the Schengen open borders zone, provides that the Republic of Ireland and the UK are not
automatically covered by Schengen rules, or by proposals to develop them. Protocol 20 allows the UK
and Republic of Ireland to continue to make arrangements between themselves relating to the
movement of persons between their territories (the Common Travel Area). Protocol 21 provides that
each of the UK and the Republic of Ireland may unilaterally choose to opt in to immigration or asylum
legislation other than Schengen rules, or to discussion of proposals relating to such legislation.
Implications of withdrawal
In the event of UK decision to withdraw, it is to be presumed that the underlying reasons for the
common travel area would continue to apply. The political consensus in support of the common travel
area in Northern Ireland would probably be an especially significant factor.[vii]
Continuing with common travel area arrangements also appears to be compatible with EU law. There is
no obvious legal reason why the Republic of Ireland should not retain the benefit of Protocols 19 and
20 after UK exit, allowing it to maintain special co-operation arrangements with the UK outside the
Schengen zone.
After a UK decision to withdraw, reform of common travel arrangements might nevertheless be

considered. In the words of the Governments March 2016 document Alternatives to Membership It is
not clear that the Common Travel Area could continue to operate with the UK outside the EU, and
Ireland inside, in the same way that it did before both countries joined the EU in 1973.[viii]
One contextual factor would be the possible emergence of customs checks on goods moving between
the two states. In the event of a UK withdrawal, much would depend on the terms of its subsequent
relationship to the EU. To the extent that customs checks applied to goods moving across the border on
the island of Ireland, or to traffic between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain, there would be
pressure for controls on the movement of persons as well.
Three specific factors in the immigration policy field that point towards reform of common travel area
arrangements may also be suggested.
The need to amend UK legislation in any event. If the UK left the EU, an amendment to Article 4 of the
1972 Order (above) would be required in any event. The 1972 Order currently contains an exemption
for all those with rights deriving from EU free movement law in the UK, something which would make
no sense in the event of withdrawal. Would an exemption for Irish citizens alone be restored? For
reasons explained in section 2 (below), that question would probably be linked to a wider set of issues
about the status of Irish citizens in UK immigration law.
EU free movement rights in Ireland. If the UK withdrew from the EU, and did not agree to the free
movement of persons within a post-exit arrangement, the implications of EU free movement rights in
the Republic of Ireland would need to be addressed. The issue would be that EEA and Swiss nationals
and their family members could be present or resident lawfully in the Republic of Ireland, but free in
practice to enter the UK without permission to do so.
A pragmatic response to this scenario appears the most likely. One solution would be for all or most
EEA/Swiss nationalities to be exempted from overall UK visa requirements. Alternatively, persons
with those nationalities, and potentially their family members, with residence documents issued in the
Republic of Ireland, might be permitted to enter the UK without a visa, even if they would otherwise be
visa nationals.
Dublin transfers. At present, the UK and Ireland are among the 32 states covered by the Dublin III
Regulation. That legislation permits applicants for international protection to be transferred to another
participating state inter alia where that was the participating state they first entered, or that was where
they first applied for protection. Eurostat data shows that, between 2008 and early 2014, the UK made
1334 Dublin requests to the Republic of Ireland, and received 815 requests from it. In the same period,
the UK actually transferred 753 persons to the Republic of Ireland, and received 357 transfers from it.
Both states might therefore find it attractive to have a post-withdrawal arrangement concerning the
transfer of applicants for international protection. This could in theory happen under the Dublin
Regulationassuming it survives in something like its present formif the UK continued to
participate. Alternatively, it could be achieved through a modification of historic common travel area
arrangements.
Given these reasons to consider adjustments to the common travel area arrangements, wider changes
cannot be ruled out. One possibility is that the UK might adopt the Irish approach of applying
immigration control to entry by air and sea only. Another possible incremental change would address
rights of travel between the two states for residence permit and visa holders.
There would also be scope for a more comprehensive arrangement or international agreement between
the two states to emerge. That would potentially address the following points:
the extent of immigration control on travel by air and sea, and by land
rights of entry and residence for British and Irish citizens
rights of travel for those with a residence permit or visas issued by one of
the states
responsibility for international protection applications, and
the procedures by which visa policy and operational co-ordination would
be arranged.
The status of Irish citizens in the UK

Overview
Irish citizens are not considered foreign in Britain, something which is linked to various rights and
arrangements that directly or indirect favour them. In the event of a decision to withdraw, with the
Republic of Ireland remaining inside the EU, the appropriateness of that special status might well be
re-examined, either generally or in relation to specific rights.
Current arrangements
The fundamental provision concerning the status of Irish citizens in Britain is the Ireland Act 1949,
which was passed when the Irish state withdrew definitively from the Commonwealth. Section 2(1) of
the 1949 Act declares that notwithstanding that the Republic of Ireland is not part of [Her] Majestys
dominions, the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force in any
part of the UK. It goes on to provide that references in any Act of Parliament, other enactment or
instrument whatsoever to foreigners, aliens [etc..] shall be construed accordingly.
In practice, the main rights which are currently associated with the non-foreign status of Irish citizens
are the following.
As explained above, Irish and other EEA/ Swiss citizens travelling directly from the Republic of
Ireland are not subject to a requirement to obtain leave to enter the UK.
The position of Irish citizens in UK immigration law is anomalous. Irish citizens became subject to
immigration control under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, but that legislation was not used
to prevent entry and residence by them, other than in the event of an exclusion or deportation order.
Since 1 January 1973, Irish citizens have also in principle been subject to the control under the
Immigration Act 1971. However, from that date, Irish citizens entering from the Republic of Ireland
benefitted from the exemption in the 1972 Order discussed above. In addition, progressively from that
date, entry and residence by all Irish citizens including those who enter the UK from elsewhere, or
who were born there has been protected by EU law.
The position of Irish citizens within nationality law is also anomalous. Irish citizens are treated as
settled in the United Kingdom from the date they take up ordinary residence.[ix] This permits Irish
citizens to naturalise after five years continuous residence, and enables their children born in the
United Kingdom to acquire British citizenship from the date of residence. This is a more generous
regime than that applicable to other EEA and Swiss citizens and their family members, who typically
require five years residence in order to become settled, and a further years residence to naturalise.
The precise rationale for this generous regime is uncertain, however, with neither the common travel
area nor the Ireland Act 1949 appearing sufficient as an explanation.
Together with Commonwealth citizens, resident Irish citizens have full political rights in the UK, i.e.
the rights to vote in all elections, to stand for election to the House of Commons, and to be members of
the House of Lords.
Residence elsewhere in the common travel area, including in Ireland, counts towards the habitual
residence test of eligibility for non-contributory benefits in the UK.[x] This is of particular relevance
to Irish citizens moving from Ireland, and also protects other EEA and Swiss nationals moving from
there.
There is an additional Northern Ireland dimension to consider. The 1998 Belfast Agreement recognised
the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or
British, or both, as they may so choose, and that such persons had the right to hold both British and
Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments. Taken together, these two statements permit a
person from Northern Ireland to rely upon their Irish citizenship alone, even if they legally hold British
citizenship as well.
Implications of withdrawal
After a decision to withdraw, the following questions concerning the legal position of Irish national
appear the most likely to arise.
The Ireland Act 1949. In the event of the Republic of Ireland remaining within the EU, with the UK
outside, questions might be posed as to whether it remains appropriate to classify it, and its citizens, as
non-foreign. If changes were made, they would potentially affect all of the entitlements referred to
above.
Position in immigration law. If the UK decided to withdraw from the EU, it would be necessary to
resolve the question of the position of Irish citizens in immigration law.
If there was continued support for the common travel area principle, the most likely outcome is a
general exemption from immigration control, in line with the position of British citizens in Irish law
(above), so as to permit both entry and residence by Irish citizens. An exception could be made for
exclusion and deportation cases.
The alternative would be a form of visa waiver for Irish citizens, regardless of where they enter from.
This would permit entry and short-term stay, but not residence. The limited nature of this solution
would also be difficult to reconcile with continued support for a common travel area between the two
states.
Position in nationality law. A resolution of the position of Irish citizens within immigration law would
permit clarification of their position in nationality law. At what point would they become settled so as
to permit them to acquire British citizenship by naturalisation, and their children to acquire it by virtue
of birth in the UK?
Political rights. The political rights of Irish citizens in the UK have previously been questioned. In his
review of citizenship law for the Government in 2008, Lord Goldsmith disagreed with the right of Irish
and Commonwealth citizens to vote in parliamentary elections.[xi] Were that suggestion acted upon, it
would probably have implications for membership of the House of Commons and Lords as well.
The Belfast Agreement is a significant constraint in this area. In 2008, Lord Goldsmiths solution was
to preserve the right to vote for Irish citizens from Northern Ireland alone.
It is possible that these questions would re-emerge in the event of withdrawal from the EU by the UK.
It is not however possible to predict the likely outcome at this stage.
Conclusions
Based on the analysis here, the following conclusions may be suggested as to the likely implications of
a UK decision to withdraw upon the relationship with the Republic of Ireland, in relation to
immigration and nationality law and policy:
The overall common travel area principle would probably continue to be

supported by the two states.
It would probably be thought necessary to make specific adjustments to
common travel area arrangements, e.g. to take account of persons with EU
free movement rights in the Republic of Ireland, or to cater for
international protection applicants
There could be pressure for wider changes to common travel area
arrangements, such as the application of immigration control to air and
sea travel from the Republic of Ireland to the UK, or rights of travel. These
might lead on to consideration of a more comprehensive agreement
between the two states.
It would be necessary to resolve the position of Irish citizens within UK
immigration law and nationality law.
A wider questioning of the special status of Irish citizens in the UK,
including their political rights, is also a possibility.

References
[i] Northern Ireland says yes to a border poll but a firm no to united Ireland, Belfast Telegraph,
29 September 2014.
[ii] Separate arrangements between the UK and the Channel Islands and Isle of Man are not addressed
here.
[iii] See generally Bernard Ryan, The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland (2001) 64
Modern Law Review 855-874.
[iv] Recent support for this assessment of the Irish border may be found in HM Government, Scotland
Analysis: Borders and Citizenship (January 2014), p. 49.
[v] The exception is a period during and after world war two (1939-1952), when immigration control
applied to those arriving in Great Britain from either jurisdiction in the island of Ireland.
[vi] Immigration Act 1999, section 1(1), read together with Aliens (Exemption) Order 1999.
[vii] This consensus is emphasised by Christine Bell in Brexit, Northern Ireland and UK-Irish
Relations, Centre on Constitutional Change, 26 March 2016.
[viii] HM Government, Alternatives to membership: Possible models for the UK outside the EU
(March 2016), p. 12.
[ix] This position is set out in published guidance: see Home Office, European Economic Area (EEA)
and Swiss nationals: Free movement rights, (12 November 2015), p. 24.
[x] See for example, Universal Credit Regulations 2012 (SI 2013 No. 376), Regulation 9.
[xi] Citizenship: Our Common Bond (2008), p 75. He proposed preserving the position of existing
residents.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/617755/EEA-Free-movement-rights-
guidance.pdf.pdf
Brexit, Northern Ireland and UK-Irish

Relations
Amid pronouncements about the UK as an island nation, scant media or political
attention has been paid to its only land border with the EU - between Northern
Ireland and the Republic. However, says Professor Christine Bell in this extended
analysis, the impact of Brexit on the institutions built up as part of the Peace
Process would be considerable.

The EU referendum and the possibility of Brexit raise distinct questions for
Northern Ireland as a devolved region within the UK as part of the peace process.
In the referendum debate, more attention needs to be given in the rest of the UK
to Northern Ireland, the one part of the UK which has a land border with another
EU country.

Political Divisions and the EU Referendum Campaign
The first key question as regards the EU referendums impact in Northern
Ireland relates to the distinctiveness of its political settlement: how will the
Brexit campaign affect political relationships ever fragile within Northern
Ireland?

The Northern Irish government is a power-sharing government: it involves a
compulsory coalition in which the two biggest parties, the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP) and Sinn Fin, essentially share the first ministership. The First
Minister is the DUPs leader Arlene Foster and the Deputy First Minister is Sinn
Fins Martin McGuiness, but this nomenclature is slightly misleading as in fact
both have equal powers and can only act together as the Office of the First
Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM).

The DUP has come out in favour of leaving the EU while Sinn Fin has come out
in favour of remaining. So the first key question is: How does a schizophrenic
OFMDFM work in practice, and to what extent does navigating the referendum
campaign risk further destabilising the power-sharing government? One can see
the impact of division on a single party government at the level of the UK and the
lifting of collective responsibility, but that is a context of a party that had a single
manifesto and ideology at the outset.

As regards this question, however, there are some grounds for cautious
optimism. Both Sinn Fins and the DUPs positions were predictable and neither
was in reaction to the other. Moreover, neither party is unequivocally confident
in its position.

While, in the words of Foster, the DUP has always been Eurosceptic in its outlook,
the party has a core rural constituency (to which Foster herself belongs) made
up largely of farmers. This community is deeply worried about the uncertainty of
Brexit. Farmers depend on a whole range of EU grants and schemes to which
their entire financial outlook is currently tied. They are also physically and
economically connected to the Republic of Ireland. It is unclear how either the
UK government or devolved government would step in to replace current
funding, how long it would take, and what would happen in the meantime.
Moreover, while agriculture is devolved, that devolution is constrained and
mediated (as in all devolved regions) by EU law. Shifting policy areas like this
into a less constrained devolved setting could open up new issues to cross-
community contestation in unpredictable ways.

For all of these reasons perhaps, the DUP position has been nuanced. To quote
Foster again:

'At every stage in this European negotiation process we had hoped to see a
fundamental change to our relationship with Europe. In our view, we see nothing in
this deal that changes that outlook. Therefore we will on balance recommend a
vote to leave the EU.'

That on balance is important for the DUP, it is extremely nuanced.
Interestingly, since that statement even a nuanced leave position has become
somewhat isolated within Unionism: the once-dominant and fast-resurrecting
Ulster Unionist Party has come out in favour of remaining. The influential and
historically unionist Ulster Farmers Union has also said that there is no
compelling case for Brexit, citing concern about subsidies, lack of alternative
funds and the importance of the EU export market.

A similarly nuanced position in favour of remain has been taken by Sinn Fin
again under pressure of contradictory impulses. For their part, Sinn Fin may be
great Europeanists now, but their record on Europe has not always been so
enthusiastic. Notably, they opposed the Lisbon Treaty campaigning for a no in
the first Irish referendum a position that was successful. Admittedly, this
campaign is not about whether to give more powers to Europe rather it is
about staying or leaving altogether. However, Sinn Fins previous opposition to
Europe was driven both by an Irelands interests argument and a leftist tinge
rooted in the view of Europe as a negative capitalist club of elites. Neither of
these impulses are irrelevant to this debate and neither has entirely gone away.

Added to this, Sinn Fin is an abstentionist party in the UK Parliament on the
grounds that, as Britain should not interfere in Ireland, so they will not interfere
in British political decisions. It is therefore potentially problematic internally for
them to campaign in a fundamentally British decision.

Their move to actively campaign against Brexit in this referendum has resulted
mainly from their electoral ambitions in the Republic of Ireland. As these have
grown over time, the party has firmly realised that being Eurosceptic in Ireland
is hugely unpopular a little like opposing the NHS in the UK. Moreover, as
discussed further below, the European context was vital to the Northern Ireland
peace process, on which their success in the North also depends. These factors
have pushed them to overcome their commitment to abstentionism and non-
interference in British affairs.

Implications of EU Exit for Northern Ireland
While both parties have jumped, predictably, in different directions, they do so
with an amount of internal disquiet. As a result, they have nuanced their
positions fairly carefully to take account of internal dissent in ways that may lead
to a nuanced response to each others campaign tactics. There are reasons to
hope, therefore, that the very fact of a Brexit campaign will not become overly
divisive in an already divided society, despite the opposing positions of the two
main parties of government.

However, the second key question for Northern Ireland is how a leave vote
might impact on Northern Ireland and the wider British-Irish relationship that
underpins the political settlement. Here, there is much less reason to be
optimistic about the consequences of a leave vote. As with Scotland, polls
suggest that Northern Ireland will vote decisively to remain within the EU. There
are four key serious concerns about the effect of a leave vote on Northern
Ireland.

Removal of an Enabling Factor for Peace

First, joint membership of the EU and commitment to European values, such as
those of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), were a vital part of
the context of the Northern Irish peace process. While the peace process was
sold to Nationalists and Republicans as transformation of the Northern Irish
State, the context of devolution and the close binding of the devolution
framework to EU and ECHR law enabled Unionists to accept the project as one of
modernisation in line with the changes that were happening across the UK.

Human rights and anti-discrimination law transformative for Nationalists in
ensuring that the new arrangements would not replicate the discriminatory
devolution of the past could be accepted by Unionists as a normal part of the
British (in Europe) context. Pulling the European platform from under the peace
process fundamentally changes the political context in which people found
themselves able to agree on contentious matters. Perhaps the political
institutions can now weather this, but they are still far from any steady state of
normal operation.

Reinstatement of a Now-Invisible Border
Second, while the border was a major issue during the conflict, since the 1998
peace agreement this has been the dog which has not barked. The Republic of
Irelands claim to the territory of Northern Ireland found in Articles 2 and 3 of its
constitution was amended, and the UK implemented reciprocal commitments,
such as incorporating the ECHR into UK law. The physical border was dismantled
and freedom of movement, underpinned by a Common Travel Area (a sort of
mini-Schengen between the UK and Ireland), has continued throughout. Cross-
border movement, cooperation and trade have all been embraced by both
Unionists and Nationalists and the removal of the border from the arena of
Unionist/Nationalist contention is a remarkable peace process achievement and
was hard-won.

This is the UKs only land border with another country. If the UK were to leave
the EU it would be difficult to see how the border could remain as open as it is
today. Preventing immigration to the UK of EU-nationals who would have
freedom of movement to Ireland, would only be possible by introducing strict
border controls between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (or even
more contentious, but not without precedent controls for entry to the rest of
UK from Northern Ireland).

The consequences of increased border controls and the re-erection of a
dismantled physical border between the North and South would be disastrous
politically and practically. For example, the second city in Northern Ireland the
majority nationalist Derry/Londonderry essentially now has suburbs that
sprawl over the border. People live and work on either side, crossing daily while
working in essentially the same communal space carrying both euros and
pounds and paying in either currency interchangeably on either side (the ATMs
in Derry even dispense currency in euros if one wants). These cross-border
hinterlands are replicated in dozens of rural farming communities along the
border, which post-Brexit could find themselves with new physical barriers to
circumvent, and under quite different trade regimes with other countries,
depending what side of the road their cows graze on, where their house is, and
where they got their passport from.

Impact on Trade
Third, tied up with the border is the question of trade between UK and Ireland.
According to a recent UK government report, Ireland is the UKs fifth largest
export market and imports more from the UK than any other country. The UK
accounts for 30 per cent of imports into Ireland. In 2014, exports of goods and
services from the UK to Ireland totalled 27.86 billion.

If one counts trade moving both directions, cross-border trade is worth an
estimated 65 billion annually. Whatever favourable relationships would be
maintained, it is difficult to imagine Brexit and its consequences having
absolutely no negative effect on this trade. A reduction of even a couple of per
cent is a fairly devastating figure, and the upper-end figure of negative impact on
trade is 20 per cent.

EU Funding for Peace

Finally, the EU has been central in funding the Northern Irish peace process. EU
funding has arguably been a major key to the success of the implementation of
the peace agreement. Since 1995, there have been three PEACE programmes,
with a financial contribution of 1.3 billion. A fourth is in progress and will
contribute 270 million. These have funded infrastructure, business, political
reconciliation and civil society projects, all of which have striven to address the
legacy of the conflict and create momentum for the peace process, with
considerable success.

As stated on its website, the PEACE programme has been implemented as a
cross-border cooperation programme (in the context of European territorial
cooperation) and has two main aims:
cohesion between communities involved in the conflict in Northern

Ireland and the border counties of Ireland; and
economic and social stability.
The programme addresses the specific problems caused by the conflict with the
aim of creating a peaceful and stable society. To this end, it builds upon two main
priorities (reconciling communities and contributing to peace) and the new
programme will have four main objectives:
shared education;
helping children and young people;
creating shared spaces and services;
building positive relations at a local level.
It is of course possible as with so many things that the money the UK pays
into the EU could be spent directly on these matters. But how likely is this in the
UK now?

Moreover, EU funding has been about more than just money EU money has
been perceived as neutral in ways UK government money was not. EU funds
have also been smart in their modalities. They have involved very innovative
delivery mechanisms that forced collaboration across peace walls, business and
civil society, and political divides in what is perhaps the major unsung
implementation clever tool story of any peace process in the world.

Remembering that Northern Ireland has had a peace process claiming to have
ended the violence almost every decade from 1920 until the Agreement in 1998,
one has to take seriously everything that was done differently this time round. It
also helped build British-Irish relations. It seems a more than a pity to undo the
very cross-border cooperation that this programme has paid so much money for.

Kicking Sleeping Dogs
All of these issues concern not just the peace process, but British-Irish
relationships more generally which perhaps can be said to be currently at their
all-time high of any point in history. But the issues are fundamental to the peace
process and for many the daily context of their lived lives. Brexit would be a
massive kick to sleeping dogs that have been lying happily asleep for many years
now. These dogs may of course yawn and lie down again, but that is quite a
gamble and not usually what kicking sleeping dogs achieves.

And the kick may perhaps happen without the consent of the people of the island
of Ireland, North and South, whose consent to any change in their political
settlement was so carefully negotiated and voted on across the island, with
unquantifiable benefits to the whole of the UK.

No one in Northern Ireland kids themselves: none of these issues will drive or be
decisive in the debate across the UK. In fact, they may be lucky to get a mention
in the mainstream national media. But perhaps the fact that the UK has a
sensitive land border with another European country, and that the common
context of EU membership underpins the end to a violent conflict, should be
taken a little more seriously beyond Northern Ireland or even at least noticed.

This article was informed in part by a joint meeting on EU and British-Irish
relations held by the Royal Irish Academy and British Academy on 1 March 2016.
Views and opinions remain the authors own.
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/brexit-
northern-ireland-and-uk-irish-relations
Aliens (Exemption) Order, 1999.

http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1999/si/97/made/en/print
April 2017 immigration update podcast

https://www.freemovement.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/FM-podcast-April-2017.mp3
Citizenship Matters: Lessons from the Irish Citizenship Referendum

Constitution of the Irish Free State, the Irish Nationality and ... to the Irish-
born children of noncitizens ... British law in the ...
In 2004, by constitutional referendum, Ireland revoked the automatic right to
citizenship by territorial birth (jus soli). This event is of great significance in
Europe, where consequently there is no longer a single nation that grants
unrestricted territorial birthright citizenship to people born within its borders,
and also represents a trend toward the revocation of jus soli within nations
governed by the common law tradition. But the Irish Citizenship Referendum
also invites comparative analysis with the United States, where jus soli is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, due both to the historical and
contemporary links between the two nations and the presence of contemporary
pressures to undermine jus soli in the United States that are similar to those that
resulted in the Irish Citizenship Referendum. In this article, we discuss both the
importance of U.S. practice for the normative discussions surrounding the
removal of jus soli as an automatic qualification for citizenship in Ireland, and
the importance of the Irish debates as an example for the historical and
normative investigation of the foundations of citizenship in the United States,
especially in the field of American studies. In particular, we propose that the
Irish Citizenship Referendum illuminates the need to reconsider the relationship
between restrictionism in immigration and in citizenship, often cast in American
Studies as a direct relationship. The Irish case shows that a successful campaign
for limits on access to citizenship was made in the absence of policies limiting
immigration. One of the purposes and effects of citizenship restriction in a
context of increased immigration, we propose, is the creation of a dual and
unequal workforce. For this reason, we argue that the elimination of jus soli as a
basis for citizenship was unjustified in the Irish case, despite the popular
pressures on Irish politicians, and that the pressure being placed on U.S.
politicians to undermine jus soli should be consciously resisted.

Article 2 and Article 3 of the Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hireann)
were adopted with the constitution as a whole on 29 December 1937, but
completely revised by means of the Nineteenth Amendment which took effect on
2 December 1999.[1] As amended they grant the right to be "part of the Irish
Nation" to all of those born on the island of Ireland and express a desire for the
peaceful political unification of the island subject to the consent of the people of
Northern Ireland. Before 1999, Articles 2 and 3 made the claim that the whole
island formed one "national territory".
Current version
The Irish Government was bound by the terms of the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement to submit
Articles 2 and 3 to amendment by referendum. To this end, the Nineteenth Amendment of the
Constitution was adopted in June of the same year. The new wording describes the Irish nation as a
community of individuals with a common identity rather than as a territory, and is intended to reassure
unionists that a united Ireland will not come about without a majority of the Northern Ireland electorate
declaring in favour of such a move.
Full text
Article 2
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its
islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise
qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its
special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.
Article 3
1. It is the firm will of the Irish Nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite
all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the
diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united
Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of
a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in
the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by
this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the
laws enacted by the Parliament[2] that existed immediately before the
coming into operation of this Constitution.
2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared between
those jurisdictions may be established by their respective responsible
authorities for stated purposes and may exercise powers and functions in
respect of all or any part of the island.
Article 2
As amended, Article 2 provides that everyone born on the island of Ireland has the right to be a part of
the Irish nation. The intention is partly to allow the people of Northern Ireland, if they wish, to feel
included in the 'nation' without making what might be perceived as an extraterritorial claim. This is a
reflection of the provision in the Belfast Agreement recognising
the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or
British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British
and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change
in the status of Northern Ireland.
The new wording of Article 2 also had the legal effect of granting to everyone born on the island the
right to Irish Citizenship. However this right has since been qualified by the Twenty-seventh
Amendment. Adopted in 2004, this amendment did not alter the wording of Articles 2 and 3 but
nonetheless limited the constitutional right to citizenship to those born on the island to at least one Irish
parent. Article 2 further recognises the "special affinity" between the people of Ireland and the Irish
diaspora.
Article 3
As amended, Article 3, Section 1 expresses the "firm will" of the Irish nation to create a united Irish
people, though not, explicitly, a united country. It stresses, however, that a united Ireland should
respect the distinct cultural identity of Unionists and that it should only come about with the separate
"democratically expressed" consent of the peoples of both parts of the island. This provision was
intended to diminish the concerns of Unionists, that their rights would be ignored in a united Ireland,
should that happen. Under the Good Friday Agreement the people of Northern Ireland's
"democratically expressed" consent must be secured in a referendum. Interestingly for a provision that
speaks of the "Irish Nation"'s desire for unity, it adds an additional legal requirement for a referendum
to be held not only in Northern Ireland but also in Ireland before a united Ireland could be brought
about. Section 2 allows Ireland to participate in the cross-border 'implementation' bodies established
under the Agreement.

The Good Friday Agreement radically transforms the institutional and
constitutional arrangements the UK and Irish governments have with Northern
Ireland. Under the terms of the Agreement both governments made
constitutional and legislative changes to alter their expressions of sovereignty
over Northern Ireland. In exchange for the Republic's agreement to amend
Articles 2 & 3, the British government repealed the Government of Ireland Act
1920. This took effect when the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which
implemented the Agreement, became law on 19 November 1998.
The Agreement mandated new institutional arrangements to reflect the British
and Irish governments' altered expressions of sovereignty over Northern
Ireland. These were: the North-South Ministerial Council; the implementation
bodies; the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental
Conference. The Minister for Foreign Affairs David Andrews and the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Dr Mo Mowlam signed the treaties
regulating these bodies in Dublin on 8 March 1999.
The treaties, however, could only take effect once an Executive had been
established in Northern Ireland. At midnight on 1 December 1999 twenty-
seven years of direct rule came to an end when power was formally devolved
to the new Northern Ireland Assembly. The following day power was devolved
to the North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council when the
Irish Foreign Minister David Andrews and the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland Peter Mandelson signed commencement orders for the new British-
Irish Agreement in Iveagh House, Dublin. An hour later Taoiseach Bertie
Ahern signed a declaration formally amending Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish
Constitution that had claimed sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Later the
same day Northern Ireland's power-sharing Executive met for the first time.
At the heart of the Agreement is the recognition by both governments that
Northern Ireland remains part of the UK until a majority of its people decide
otherwise. Moreover, the UK and the Republic agreed "that it is for the people
of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts
respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, north
and south, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that
this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement
and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland."
That consent is to be tested in a border poll at intervals of no less than seven
years to ascertain whether Northern Ireland wants to remain part of the UK or
be absorbed into the Republic. The seven yearly interval is only triggered
when the first such poll is held. The decision to hold the first poll in 2005 will
be taken by the Secretary of State. Should a majority favour union with the
Republic, the UK government is committed to implement the necessary
legislative change.
Peace agreements and human rights by Christine Bell
Oxford University Press 2000
Chapter 6: But what was the question? Evaluating Self-determination
Northern Ireland extract.
B. Northern Ireland
The situation in Northern Ireland throws up the classic minority/territorial

integrity conundrum of international self-determination law. While a black-
letter international law position would define (Catholic) Nationalists within
Northern Ireland as a minority group within a unit commanding territorial
integrity, the international community also showed concern over the legitimacy
of Northern Ireland given continuing denial of rights and equality to (Catholic)
Nationalists. The Belfast Agreement attempts to find a way out of self-
determination conundrums, drawing on current trends towards an expanded
notion of internal self-determination.i It is of great significance for international
lawyers as it both complied with the legal requirements of international law
while creatively transcending their paradoxes. Moreover, international law was
self-consciously used in this process.
Self-determination is dealt with in the Belfast Agreement ostensibly by using

the imprecise language of international law. This is then coupled with
institutional mechanisms which move away from absolute notions of
statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity through devices of
consociational government, cultural provision, human rights protections, and
cross-border connections. First, effective participation of all groups in decision
making is guaranteed by a consociational arrangement (with proportionality,
power-sharing and mutual vetoes). Second, human rights are guaranteed to
all groups equally, regardless of where borders are or how they might change
in the future, taking the 'sting' out of whichever Constitutional arrangement
might prevail. Third, the entire Agreement is copperfastened through 'regional'
mechanisms which reassure competing nationalisms, and potentially offer
new ways of thinking about sovereignty and indeed, new ways of 'getting
government done.'
These structures, with their many symbolic and practical possibilities, tap into
the 'new trends currently emerging in the world community' of greater political
and economic integration at the 'supranational' level coupled with growing
emphasis on the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of groups, at the
'intrastate' level.ii Together the combination of supra-state structures and local
consociational structures mark a move away from traditional notions of
democracy and sovereignty. The Belfast Agreement illustrates how this move
can enable self-determination solutions which begin to transcend the
sovereignty/territorial integrity versus minority rights divide. Northern Ireland
retains its territorial integrity in what Unionists claim is an 'internal' solution,
but British sovereignty and the nature of the state is also changed through the
cross-border bodies.
The compatibility of Agreement with international law developments was not a

coincidental convergence of political pragmatism with international law
standards.iii This was not just as a result of the intangible guidance of the
parameters set by international law during the conflict. It is clear from analysis
of contributing paragraphs, phrases and ideas to the Agreement, that
international law formed an important backdrop to negotiations. At key
moments parties felt they had to address international law, and on other
occasions, it gave parties new ways of relating to the conflict.
For Republicans agreement could only have been reached when their self-
determination claims were addressed. The history of the self-determination
paragraph is beyond the scope of this book, save to say that the formulation
as first accepted by the British Government in the Downing Street Declaration
was vital to reaching the first IRA cease-fire.iv As pointed out in Chapter Five,
John Hume also saw the value of making non-violent method itself a self-
determination issue. This answered the Provisional IRA's national liberation
agenda which drew support from international standards and conflicts
elsewhere.

Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson and Irish Foreign Affairs Minister David Andrews signing the new British-Irish
Treaty in Dublin, 2 December 1999
THE BELFAST AGREEMENT OF 1998: from ethnic democracy to
a multicultural consociational settlement?
Paul Bew
From: A farewell to arms? From 'long war' to long peace in Northern Ireland
edited by Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen
Manchester University Press 2000
What is the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998, which was supported by 71

per cent of those voting in the referendum in Northern Ireland on 22 May
1998, and how did it come about ?(1)
One recent interpretation by Professor Brendan O'Leary stresses that the

Agreement is in conformity with the essential principles of Arend Lijphart's
concept of consociationalism: it also draws attention to the long-term
academic interest of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Dr Mo
Mowlam, in such a theory, as well as the fact, as well as the fact that 'at least
one of her advisors has had an abiding interest in the subject. (2) The same
article concedes, however, that politicians under the pressure of events are
capable of coming up with similar arrangements without any necessary
recourse to an elaborate theoretical backdrop. The analysis of the Agreement
presented here will follow this latter approach; not least because earlier
research has demonstrated that the conceptualisation of a previous attempt at
a settlement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, as 'coercive
consociationalism' was
flawed.(3) This has also been the approach of writers advocating the type of
settlement actually attempted in 1998.(4)
The top line of 'Heads of Agreement' of January 1998 which heralded the
Stormont Agreement document was 'balanced constitutional change'.(5) Now
that the Belfast Agreement is completed we can see exactly what was meant
by that phrase. There will be, it is clear, significant changes to both to British
legislation and to the Irish Constitution of 1937. The British government has
decided to repeal the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. Some republicans
profess to think this is very significant in a positive way, while some unionists
are alarmed by the suggestion that in some way Northern Ireland's position
within the UK is being weakened.
The nature of the constitutional deal
The Government of Ireland Act has been seen as Britain making a one-sided
claim to supremacy over Northern Ireland regardless of the views of the
people living there. It sits uneasily with later solemn declarations by Britain
that the union is dependent upon, and arises solely from, majority support in
the province - declarations given by the British government at the time of the
Sunningdale Agreement in December 1973 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of
November 1985 and the Joint Declaration of December 1993.(6) In other
words, one might say that the Government of Ireland Act represented an old-
fashioned imperialist mindset and should be got rid of.
But there is another side to this matter. As David Trimble pointed out in an
article in 1994, the controversial part of the Government of Ireland Act
(section 75) is merely a 'saving clause' designed to assert Westminster's
residual authority over a devolved Belfast
parliament.(7) The purpose is not to make an imperialist British claim over

Northern Ireland against the wish of a majority of its citizens. The key
legislation establishing the union is anyway the Act of Union of 1800: this Act,
as Trimble has stressed, remains in force.
The fact that David Trimble has long taken a relatively relaxed view of the
significance of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 has always carried with
it the implication that he might trade it as part of a deal bringing changes to
the Irish Constitution of 1937 - even though during the negotiation he often
took a publicly rigid strand as, for example, when he published in March 1999
(8) an article in the Sunday Independent apparently, but not actually,
exhibiting a reluctance to accept change in this area.
Catholics in the Protestant state
Catholics in Ulster 1603-1983: An Interpretative History by Oliver P Rafferty

(Gill & MacMillan, 1994)
Early alienation
In the initial stages, as we have seen, many northern Catholics supported the
treaty arrangements, not because they liked the idea of partition but because
they shared the optimistic view that the new Ùlster' could not long endure
and that soon the border would become but a figment of Protestant Unionist
imagination. This attitude did not prevent them from demanding at a quite
early stage the immediate inclusion of obviously nationalist areas such as
Derry city, Tyrone and Fermanagh in the Irish Free State. Their hostility and
indifference to the northern parliament grew out of hearty disdain for an
institution they regarded as ephemeral and irrelevant to postwar Ireland. It
seemed pointless for Ulster Catholics to engage with a new transitory political
arrangement clearly marked for an early demise.
The results of the civil war in the Irish Free State to some extent began a
sense of alienation and despair among northern Catholics in their dealings
with both parts of Ireland. While many northerners actually fought on the Free
State side, it quickly became clear that the Cosgrave government, despite the
presence in it of northerners such as Ernest Blythe, did not - understandably -
intend to give northern Catholic affairs a high priority in Free State policy.
Setting aside their hostility in principle to what was in effect a Protestant state,
the Catholic authorities quickly became immersed in dealings with the new
political order over the question of education. The issue here was one of
clerical control, coupled with a desire to secure as much money as possible
from the state to support the Catholic system. The Church favoured none of
the various schemes on offer to deal with educational provision. It spurned the
relatively liberal `four and two system', advanced in 1925, whereby in
voluntary schools four of the managers would be appointed by the Church
and two by the local authority, in exchange for substantial state financial
assistance. The idea that democratic control could have any place in Catholic
education was firmly repudiated by Cardinal O'Donnell: Ìt is a great fallacy to
suppose that election is the only way, or always the best way to find a
representative man. Among Catholics there is no more representative person
in the parish than the average parish priest....'
`Lord Londonderry's Education Act of 1923 aimed at providing a system of

integrated education at least at the primary level. Under its provisions Catholic
schools were to lose the grants they had under the national school
arrangements, which amounted to two-thirds of building and equipment costs.
Londonderry was determined to resist building the idea of religious instruction
in the new system, asserting: `Religion instruction in a denominational sense
during the hours of compulsory attendance there will not be'.2 He did not
reckon with the defiance this would meet from the Protestant clergy and the
Orange Order. By February 1925 Orange Lodge officials had formed an
alliance with the Ùnited Education Committee of the Protestant Churches', to
pressure the government into amending the 1923 act. In particular they
wanted the power to appoint only Protestant teachers to `state' schools , or at
last representation on appointments committees for Protestant clergy, and a
repeal of the provisions that forbade religious instruction. After some initial
resistance Londonderry, under pressure also from the prime minister Sir
James Craig, interpreted the amending bill of 1925 in the sense specified by
the Protestant-Orange alliance. He then offered his resignation.
By 1928-9 the Protestant Churches again agitated for further reforms of the
state system in a more specifically Protestant direction, covering much the
same ground as the previous demands. The 1930 act made more explicit
what had been simply tolerated under the 1925 act. The intention of the new
act was, in the words of the Prime Minister, to `make the provided and
transferred schools safe for Protestant children'.3 Given such clear
manipulation of the system by the majority population the Catholic hierarchy
acted decisively in its own self-interest. The bishops threatened that if the
grants to Catholic schools that had been abolished in 1923 were not restored
then they would take legal action to refer the 1930 measure to the judicial
committee of the privy council since it manifestly contravened the provision of
the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which had forbidden the endowment
of any Church. On the principle that two wrongs make a right, the government
offered the bishops 50 per cent grants for building and equipment costs in
Catholic schools - they already paid teachers' salaries in such schools.
Protestant teachers to teach Protestant children
A History of Ulster by Jonathan Bardon (The Blackstaff Press, 1992)

Charles S.H. Vane-Tempest-Stewart, the 7th Marquess of Londonderry, had
made considerable personal sacrifices by joining the Northern Ireland
government. One of the richest men in the kingdom at the dazzling centre of
London society, he turned down the offer to become a minister to join Craig
and his colleagues as minister of education. Back in Ulster he looked oddly
out of place and out of time, Lady Spender remarking that `he apes his
ancestor the great Lord Castlereagh, wears a high black stock over his collar
and a very tightly fitting frock coat, and doesn't look as if he belongs to this
century at all'. Determined to uphold the Union his forebear had forged, he
threw himself enthusiastically into the task, and won the devoted support of
his civil servants, in spite of his tendency to address them like domestics and
to emphasize points by striking his ministerial table with his riding crop.
`Religious instruction in a denominational sense during the hours of

compulsory attendance there will not be', Londonderry declared in 1923,
overruling one of the main recommendations of a committee had appointed
under the chairmanship of Robert Lynn. The marquess, like the architects of
the National Schools the previous century, set out create a system of
elementary schools drawing pupils from all parts of the community. He now
faced the intense hostility of both the Catholic and Protestant Churches. The
managers of Catholic schools had stated their opinion in 1921 that `the only
satisfactory system of education for Catholics is one wherein Catholic children
are taught in Catholic schools by Catholic teachers under Catholic auspices'.
Catholics refused to serve on the Lynn committee and Catholic teachers,
meeting at Strabane and Omagh in February 1922, pledged themselves not to
accept salaries from the Northern Ireland government and recognized only the
authority of the Department of Education in Dublin. Around one third of
Catholic schools refused co-operation and for several months the Provisional
Government paid the salaries of their teachers; as the civil war extended,,
however, the Cosgrave government stopped payments by October 1922 and
the campaign of non-cooperation ended soon after. By then the Catholic
Church had lost the opportunity to protect its interests.
Protestant opposition was slower in coming. In part this was due to the
complexity of the Education Bill, which Londonderry steered through
parliament in 1923 with remarkable ease considering the outcome. The act
incorporated most of the Lynn's committee's recommendations that the state
pay all teachers' salaries in elementary schools, which were to be in three
categories: `four-and-two' schools (where the management committee was
made up of four persons nominated by the managers or trustees, and two by
the local education authority) were eligible for capital grants and got half the
cost of repairs, equipment, heating, lighting and cleaning; but the voluntary
schools, the third category, got only a contribution towards heating, lighting
and cleaning. Londonderry spoke hopefully of having schools were children of
different faiths might study and play together, and allowed denominational
religious instruction only outside hours of compulsory attendance. He pointed
to Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act which made it illegal èither
directly or indirectly to establish or endow new religion'. Or to set religious
tests for teachers maintained out of public funds.
`Protestant teachers to teach Protestant children' was the watchword of clergy
who resented their control over teaching appointments and campaigned for
compulsory Bible instruction in the state schools. Alderman James Duff,
chairman of the Belfast Education Committee, countered that àny clergyman
who says that under the new education act the Bible is thrown out of the
schools is a man who has no right to wear the cloth'. The Ulster Teachers'
Union, composed of Protestants, carried a resolution denouncing these
`discontented divines who were misleading people', but lead by the Reverend
Dr William Corkey, manager of nine schools in the Shankill area, the
campaign gathered strength. The United Education Committee of the
Protestant Churches, founded in 1924, saw its opportunity as a general
election approached early in 1925: the committee met the Belfast Country
Grand Orange Lodge and leading politicians on 27 February; a provisional
conference was called for 5 March; and a stirring handbill was distributed.
With the title `PROTESTANTS AWAKE' in large red letters, the handbill
denounced the Londonderry act, arguing, for example, the `the door is
through open for a Bolshevist or an Atheist or a Roman Catholic to become a
teacher in a Protestant school'.
Promoting a culture of tolerance: education in Northern Ireland
by Fiona Stephen
From: A farewell to arms? From 'long war' to long peace in Northern Ireland
edited by Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen
Published by Manchester University Press, 2000
Integrated education
Planned integrated schoolsi in Northern Ireland are a relatively recent

phenomenon. The first twelve integrated schools all established during the
1980s were set up by parent groups and independently funded with
substantial help from major charitable foundations and trusts most notably the
Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Nuffield Foundation. In 1989, Brian
Mawhinney, then Minister for Education in Northern Ireland, included
provision for integrated education in the Education Reform legislation. This
was to be only where sufficient parent demand was shown to exist, but it
allowed the newly formed voluntary organisation the Northern Ireland Council
for Integrated Education (NICIE) to actively encourage and support parent
groups who wanted to establish integrated schools. The legislation also
permitted existing schools to opt for integrated status. Ministerial approval for
a change of status was subject to there being sufficient parental support as
indicated by a ballot, backed up by credible potential enrolments from both
sides of the community, substantial enough over a period of five years to
make the transformation to integrated status meaningful. The legislative basis
for an integrated school was loosely defined as one being likely to attract
'reasonable numbers' of both Catholics and Protestants which has
subsequently been defined by DENI as a 30% minimum enrolment from
whichever side of the community forms the minority within a particular school.
The integrated schools themselves adhere to a far more specific set of
principles, including a commitment to all ability schools at secondary level.ii
Since 1990 and the enabling legislation, the number of integrated schools has
rapidly increased, until at the time of writing there are 45 recognised
integrated schools, with more in the process of development. This rate of
development while impressive, represents provision for barely four per cent of
the total school population. It also represents a substantial investment of
resources during a period when stringent financial controls and cutbacks have
been the perceived norm. This has given rise to claims from opponents that
integrated schools have been treated more favourably, although the schools
have been rigorously monitored by Department of Education Northern Ireland
(DENI) and with much of the capital development being made possible by
bank loans and charitable support through the Integrated Education Fund
(IEF)iii. From the integrated schools' perspective the situation has appeared
very different, with the opening of each school representing a serious struggle
to provide suitable accommodationiv, in order to obtain both the necessary
initial funding and the vital imprimata of ministerial and DENI approval. The
integrated education movement as represented by NICIE and the IEF have
the stated goal of making integrated school provision available for ten per cent
of the N.I. school population by 2010. Both organisations believe this is the
minimum level necessary to make integrated schools at both primary and
secondary level available as a real option throughout Northern Ireland.
Recently several new integrated schools have been forced to open without
any government funding in the face of stringent DENI requirements. In 1994
the Integrated Education Fund in a review of the projected growth of
integrated schoolsv identified three potential models for development:
i. containment - allowing for minimum growth and restricting the opening of

integrated schools to 1 primary and 1 second level school per year for five
years;
ii. reactive - in which NICIE simply responded to parental demand known at

the time amounting to perhaps 6 primary and 7 second-level schools over a
five year period
iii. proactive - where NICIE would actively stimulate demand for new schools
amongst parent groups resulting in potential 22 primary and 13 second-level
schools over a five year period.
Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement both the British and Irish
governments made constitutional and legislative changes to their expressions
of sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The British government agreed to repeal
the Government of Ireland Act 1920. In a 1998 referendum the people of the
Irish Republic agreed to amend Articles 2 & 3 of their Constitution.
Hope and History': the US and peace in Northern Ireland by
John Dumbrell
"A Farewell to Arms? From "long war" to long peace in Northern Ireland"
Edited by Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen Published by
Manchester University Press, 2000
Clinton's activism: explanations and context
Various explanations for Clinton's activism spring to mind. The President had
a personal interest in the affairs of the province, stemming from student days
at Oxford. The abandonment of non-interventionism also had a strong
"bureaucratic politics" dimension. Clinton's Irish strategy involved a
bureaucratic victory for the White House European foreign policy staff over
the State Department. (Aside from State and the London Embassy, the
Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency were also opposed to
the granting of a visa to Adams in 1993-94.) At one level, Clinton was
responding to Congressional and Democratic Party pressure. Edward
Kennedy was an important influence. Clinton was also responsive to the new
alignment in elite Irish America represented by the Morrison-O'Dowd group.
The policy evolved alongside a reinterpretation of the "special relationship"
with London. Two clusters of explanatory context stand out: one involving the
Presidential relationship with Irish America; the other relating to the
development of American internationalism after the Cold War.
For The Nation columnist Eric Alterman, Clinton's Irish policy was "a stunning
success" for ethnic lobbying.26 Michael Mates, who had been sent by prime
minister John Major to Washington to protest Clinton's early interventions,
wrote in 1996 of "Clinton's cynical playing to the green Irish vote".27
Presidents, especially first term ones, are interested in votes and popularity.
Although criticised by Republicans for damaging US-UK relations, Clinton was
hardly likely to suffer much domestic damage in advancing his new activism.
Irish America - a vast constituency of around 40 million people, represented
by some powerful congressional figures - would probably like it. At worst, a
highly assimilated Irish America would be indifferent, though surely willing to
applaud any settlement. Irish-Americans were also widely thought to be
prominent in the ranks of "Reagan Democrats", who had defected to the
Republicans in the 1980s, and needed to be reclaimed. The new policy was
not entirely risk-free, even if we discount the impact on Anglo-American
relations. Nancy Soderberg later recalled the problems of heightening
expectations, about "the President pulling a rabbit out of the hat".28 The
policy clearly offended specialists at the State Department. However, it is
possible to concoct an argument to the effect that Clinton was primarily
concerned to please various sections of Irish America.
The problem with this type of analysis is that it is frequently pushed much too
far. Commentators understate the complexity and overstate the intensity of
political Irish America. David Trimble acknowledged, as the peace process
developed, that Irish America was "complex, politically".29 For one thing,
though arguably more assimilated than their Catholic counterparts, Protestant
Irish Americans represent a significant component in the ethnic mix.
Congressman Joseph Kennedy estimated in 1994 that around one-quarter of
Irish-Americans in his Massachusetts constituency were Protestant in
origin.30 Prominent Irish-Americans also often disagree about what is best for
Northern Ireland. In 1993-4, House of Representatives Speaker Tom Foley, a
highly influential Irish-American politician whom the Clinton Administration had
every reason to cultivate, opposed the granting of Adams' visa. There is no
cohesive "shamrock vote" in the US. In 1992, Clinton actually won reasonably
clearly in states with large Irish-American populations.31 Indulging in high-
profile and time-consuming policy departures in Northern Ireland was hardly a
rational way of electioneering. It is also worth recalling that Clinton (like
Senator Kennedy) has clashed with Irish Catholic lobbies over issues such as
abortion and the waning American enthusiasm for the McBride principles.32
Strong arguments can be mustered to link both the entire post-1992 peace
initiative, and Clinton's own part in it, to the global context - particularly to the
end of the Cold War. As Michael Cox has argued, "it was inevitable that, as
the tide of global radicalism began to retreat after 1989, this would feed into
republican thinking".33 With the Soviet threat removed, it indeed did appear
that London had neither selfish strategic nor economic interest in Ulster. The
Clinton-ANIA strategy was a coherent and successful attempt to reinforce
republican doubts about the rationale for the armed struggle and to talk up the
benefits of peace.
CONSOLIDATED TEXTS OF THE EU TREATIES AS AMENDED BY ... - gov.uk
CONTENTS Foreword by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1 1 Treaty on
European Union 3 2. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 36
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/228848/7310.pdf
Synopsis of the Agreement
http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/today/good_friday/
synopsis.html#ConstitutionalIssues
In the days following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and before the Referrendum, UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to reassure wavering people that it was safe to say 'Yes' to the
Agreement. People were afraid of letting terrorist prisoners out of gaol and of letting those who use
violence enter government. Mr Blair reinforced his reassurances by giving the people of Northern
Ireland 5 promises.
These 5 promises are as follows:
1. No change in the status of Northern Ireland without the express consent

of the people.
2. Power to make decisions returned to a Northern Ireland Assembly, with
accountable North-South co-operation.
3. Fairness and equality guaranteed for all.
4. Those who use or threaten violence excluded from the government of
Northern Ireland.
5. Prisoners kept in unless violence is given up for good.
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

https://rm.coe.int/1680695175

Brexit and the Irish question
13 June 2016
Fundamentally, Brexiters are asking the voters to take a monumental gamble, and they have failed to
persuade me.
I am one of the half-million or so Irish currently living in the United Kingdom. When I took up
residence some months ago I immediately registered to vote, and foremost in my mind was the June
referendum on UK membership of the European Union. The outcome of that referendum matters
greatly to Ireland, for few other EU member states are linked as intimately and in so many complex
ways as we are to the United Kingdom.
On her historic state visit to Ireland in 2011, Queen Elizabeth remarked on the ties between our
people, the shared values, and the economic, business and cultural links that make us so much more
than just neighbours, that make us firm friends and equal partners. The reference to firm friends and
equal partners is telling, because, as she diplomatically yet pointedly observed: Of course, the
relationship has not always been straightforward; nor has the record over the centuries been entirely
benign.
Today, the political relationships, solidarity and friendships that have grown between us since we
joined the European Union on the same day in 1973 have proved pivotal in building the peace in
Northern Ireland and the good-neighbourliness between the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The once fraught constitutional conflict concerning Northern Ireland is now governed by the terms of
the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Travel the road between Dublin and Belfast today and although
one transits from a euro to a sterling zone, and from Ireland to the United Kingdom, there are no border
controls, no visible customs barriers, and thankfully no security posts just an open road both ways.
When Brexit advocates tell me that if the United Kingdom leaves the EU, the open road will remain
open, I know they cannot guarantee that. Under Brexit, the border between Ireland and Northern
Ireland would become the sole land border and a crucial frontier post between the United Kingdom and
the European Union.
In addition to the half-million Irish-born people living in Great Britain, there are 300,000 British-born
people living in Ireland. The Treaty of Rome guarantees their freedom of movement. No one can say
for certain what rules would apply to the movement of peoples between our two islands after a Brexit.
Bilateral trade between Ireland and the UK is worth over 1bn every single week. Thirty per cent of
imports into Ireland come from the UK. We are the biggest single purchasers of British food and soft
drinks and the second-largest purchasers of British fashion and footwear. The vast bulk of our energy
requirements is purchased from the UK.
It is simply not possible to predict what model or models of trade relationships would emerge after a
Brexit, so when the Brexiters tell me that all those jobs and contracts are perfectly safe, I know it is a
prediction they are not in a position to make.
Is the European Union perfect? Not at all. Is it better than anything previously devised to secure peace,
partnership and prosperity? It most assuredly is. Has it structures ordered to its own reform and
development? Yes, it has. It has 28 guiding hands, among them the powerful and influential hand of the
United Kingdom.
The first half of the 20th century in Europe was littered with the bodies of the millions who died
because of the pull of militant politics. The second half was redeemed by the political imagination that
grew the idea of a Europe of nations working with one another and not against one another. We are still
in the opening chapters of the greatest adventure in collaborative democracy in world history. We have
absorbed 28 member states in a relatively short period of time, each very distinctive, each determined
to lose none of its essence and identity around the Union table, but each prepared to exercise (not
compromise) its sovereignty in a way that prepares a decent future for all of Europes children.
The UK is an important pillar of that future. It has strong views on Europe now and on what it could
become. It has an experienced and persuasive voice, powerful enough to make a visible impact on the
shape and trajectory of the Union in the century ahead. The Brexit alternative is for the UK to sit alone
on the sidelines, in a capricious world, trying to construct a riotous host of essential new trade and
political relationships while every one of its neighbours moves on in that same capricious world, but
within the established framework of the EU, thrashing out the issues that allow us to follow through on
the visionary purpose of securing peace and prosperity through partnership.
Fundamentally, Brexiters are asking the voters to take a monumental gamble. They have failed to
persuade me. I will be voting Remain to ensure the continuation of the contemporary, successful
relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom.
Mary McAleese was president of Ireland from 1997 to 2011

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/06/brexit-and-
irish-question
Her Majesty's Ambassador to Ireland

officially takes office
Mr. Robin Barnett CMG visited ras an Uachtarin yesterday to present his Letter of Credence to
President Michael D Higgins.
4 September 2016
British Ambassador to
Ireland H.E. Robin Barnett presented his Letter of Credence to President Higgins.
Ambassador Barnett said:
Yesterday I had the honour to bring greetings from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth and present my letter
of appointment to President Michael D Higgins. This is an important time for the UK, Ireland and
Europe, as we work to implement the result of the 23 June referendum.
I will be working hard to ensure friendship and warm relations between the peoples of these islands
continues to grow. I am looking forward to developing even stronger economic, people-to-people, and
cultural links. I am also looking forward to travelling the beautiful country of Ireland and to receiving
the cad mle filte for which it is known throughout the world.

The Irish MUST Be Allowed A Referendum On Final Brexit Deal

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The Irish MUST Be Allowed A Referendum On Final Brexit Deal

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The Irish MUST be allowed a

referendum on final Brexit deal,

Ireland will suffer when the UK leaves the EU

Could an Irish referendum delay or

Ruadhn Mac Cormaic Foreign Affairs Correspondent

New type of plebiscite

Just what is going in Dublin? he asked.

It cant just be made by an individual or any group within the cabinet.

Cabinet civil war

Mr Johnson has not yet commented publicly on Mr Hammonds transition plans.

There hasnt been an economic Border since 1992, he said.

The Brexit vote changed everything. Ireland's future -

Simon Coveney as he recently announced that over 500,000 passports have

Home Offices lack of action on post-Brexit Border is shocking

We need imaginative solutions, incisive political solutions.

Any solution should not compromise the Good Friday Agreement.

It is not an easy process. Ireland has real vulnerabilities.

Brexit raises questions about

bertie brexit,border brexit,ahern bertie,border irish,bertie border,border

Irish government will not design

Media captionLeo Varadkar will not design 'border for Brexiteers'

He is due to visit Northern Ireland next week.

"But we are not going to get angry.

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) described the suggestion as "madness".

The United States Urges Establishment

27 April 2017 United States Urges Establishment of a Power-Sharing Government in Northern

The 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are available at

Special Presidential Envoy Andrew OBrien (State Dept)

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights

A former special adviser to DUP leader Arlene Foster

He said since 1921 there had been a border on the

Govt will not design

Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has said the Government

The Taoiseach said he hoped there would not be an

He said both he and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Brexit border issue requires 'imaginative

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

In Bermuda the number of stop-and-search actions in anticipation of violence numbered

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

In Bermuda the Human Rights Tribunal adjudicates complaints.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties,

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

There were no government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

See the Department of States International Religious Freedom Report at

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the

Elections and Political Participation

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of

Section 5. Governmental Attitude

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal

The 2011 census recorded the Jewish population of the UK as 263,346.

See the Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

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