USON v.

DEL ROSARIO
GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson,
the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a
defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the
latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and
are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article
287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD:
No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at
the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article
657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in
view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire
and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given
retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared
for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.
As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized
by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESPERANZA, M. PO, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS:
Leonard and Catalina were husband and wife.
June 6, 1946: Leonard died as his heirs his surviving spouse and some minor children.
Leonard left a parcel of land which is a conjugal property.
April 15, 1946: Surviving spouse Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to the Spouses Canoy,
needing it for the support of her children
May 24, 1947: Spouses Canoy sold the same land to PF Bienvenido
The 2 deeds of Sale have never been registered

January 17, 1948: SS Catalina sold of the same land to DF Esperanza, which portion belongs
to their children, after her appointment as guardian of her children

ISSUE 1: W/N the 1st sale to Spouses Canoy was valid - NO

ISSUE 2: W/N the 2nd sale to DF Esperanza of of the land was valid YES

RULING:

Sale to Spouses Canoy

Article 657 of the Old CC [now Art. 777 NCC] provides:
The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death
When Catalina sold the entire parcel to the Spouses Canoy, of it already belonged to
Catalinas [sellers] children.
No formal or judicial declaration is being needed to confirm the childrens title.
Thus, the first sale was null and void because it included the childrens share.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent.
It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death of the
predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is
always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death.

Sale to Defendant Esperanza

The sale to the DF having been made by authority of the competent court was legal and
effective.
No registration is needed. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not
avail the PF because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.
Spouses Canoy has the right to bring an action against Catalina as may be appropriate for such
damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale.

SYLLABUS
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; TRANSMISSION TO HEIRS, FROM MOMENT OF
DEATH; SALE MADE BY WIDOW OF DECEDENTS PROPERTY.
The moment of death is the determining factor when the children of a decedent acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent.
No formal or judicial declaration is needed to confirm the childrens title. Sale made by the
widow of the decedents property after his death is null and void so far as it included the
childrens share.
2. ID.; SALE OF DECEDENTS PROPERTY, WITH COURTS AUTHORITY; NECESSITY
OF REGISTRATION OF SALE.
Sale made of decedents property with authority of the competent court is legal and effective
even if not registered.
FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who
later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment
as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion
now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?
HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition
Balus v. Balus
Petitioner Celestino and respondents Saturnino and Leonarda are the children of the spouses
Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on 6 September 1978. In 1979, Rufo mortgaged a
parcel of land as security for a loan obtained from a bank. When Rufo failed to pay the loan, the
property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public
auction held for that purpose. The same was not redeemed within the period allowed by law.
Hence, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Rufo died on 6 July 1984. On 10 October,
1989, petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to
each of the a specific one-third portion of the subject property. Three years thereafter,
respondents bought the subject property from the Bank and a new title was issued in their name.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. The respondents thus filed a
complaint for recovery of possession. However, petitioner alleged that respondents act of
buying back the property without notifying him inures to his benefit as co-owner and that he is
entitled to a one-third share of the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property forms part of the estate of petitioner and
respondents father

No. The court ruled that the subject property does not form part of the estate of Rufo considering
that ownership over the same was transferred to the bank prior to the death of Rufo. Inheritance
consists of existing property, as well as accrued property, and transmissible rights and
obligations at the time of death of the decedent. Thus, since Rufo lost ownership over the subject
property during his lifetime, the same no longer forms part of his estate to which his heirs may
lay claim at the time of his death. Consequently, his children never inherited the property. The
Court further ruled that petitioner and respondents are not co-owners of the subject property and
there is no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their
deceased father.
Union Bank vs Santibanez
Facts:
Efraim Santibanez and his son Edmund entered into 2 loan agreements with First
Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC). February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness
of their late father to FCCC. On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
the FCCC as the assignor, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank. USMB then made demand letters to Edmund and Florence for their debts with FCCC.
Edmund was nowhere to be found (he went to the US) so all demands went to Florence. USMB
stated that since she and Edmund executed a joint agreement for the partition of the estate, she is
liable for the debts. Florence said alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was
not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund
was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the
petitioner under the joint agreement. The TC denies the claim of USMB for lack of merit.
Issue:
Can USMB file a claim against Florence and the estate since the estate was already partitioned
between Edmund and her?
Ruling:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of
the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being
so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially
so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of
the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability
incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes
and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty.
Vitug v. CA
FACTS:
Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitugs (deceased) estate.
Rowena Corona was the executrix. Romarico, the deceaseds husband, filed a motion with the
probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to
the estate to cover alleged advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. The
advances were used to pay estate taxes.
Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a savings account which
formed part of the conjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no
ground for reimbursement. Romarico claims that the funds are his exclusive property, having
been acquired through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.
The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account shall
belong to and be the sole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor.
ISSUE:

W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.

HELD:

YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a
personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property
and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. The bequest or
devise must pertain to the testator.

In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not
shown that the funds belonged exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.

It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is
also not a donation between spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own
properties to the other.

It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceaseds assets because it
is the separate property of Romarico.
Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.

A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his
his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.

0Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not
be violative of the law (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property
in fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).
The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the motion to sell. CA reversed
stating that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a donation inter vivos, it is a
prohibited donation (donation between spouses).

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship agreement
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate

No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causa nor a
donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of an aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall
give or do upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is
uncertain, such as death. The Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not
contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may be violative of a law such as in
the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is
used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a
compulsory heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently,
the Court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As
such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the amounts under the
savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the
survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are not conjugal partnership
properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?

HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be
embodied in a will. A will has been defined as a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death. In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of
conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims
that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one partys separate properties in favor of the
other, but simply, their joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was
to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses
because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by mere stipulation and that it is no cloak to
circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by
law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly
denominated in banking parlance as an and/or account. In the case at bar, when the spouses
Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them
in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have
arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
Torres vs Lopez
-the decedent was judicially declared unable to take care of himself
-he does not have any children but he has two brothers who survived him
-he made a will stating that : all his property will be given to his guardian (kato brother nga nag
take care niya ug kato anak sa iya brother)
-the other brother questioned the intrinsic validity of the will because it was made by person with
a senile dementia
Issue:
Whether or not the will made by the decedent is valid?
Ruling:
Yes. Even if he has a senile dementia he can still make a valid will. What is important is he can
be considered as he has a sound mind capable of making a will. If a person possesses a sufficient
testamentary capacity. It was also declared by doctors who are examined him that he is of
sound mind.
Mercado vs Santos
-Mercado was arrested four times
-charge against him: falsification of a document
-the charge was made the executor
-executor: fake na will ang gi submit ni Mercado sa court for probate
-third arrst : approved na ang probate
-sa fourth case: gi deny sa court kay na probate na ang will
Ruling:
Once the will has been probated,if mo lapse na ang six months dili na ma question ang
-the will is already conclusive, it cannot be disturbed
Dorotheo vs CA
-namatay ang wife
-namatay ang husband
-gibilin sa husband ang tanang property tanan sa iyang kabit
-nag pa probate ang kabit
Court :
Dili pwede, because one cannot dispose what one does not have. Na apil man niyag hatag
legitime sa iyang mga anak
Extrinsically valid but intrinsically void because the kabit is not the rightful heir.