Ortigas vs Feati The validity of the resolution was never questioned before
94 SCRA 533 the court. And the validity of the resolution was admitted at
Facts:
Plaintiff Ortigas & Co, vendor, entered into separate
agreements with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles on a sale on installments over two parcels of land
known as Lots No. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills
Subdivision, situated in Mandaluyong, Rizal.
The Angeles transferred their rights and interests over the
aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. When the
payment was given for the purchased price over the lots,
Ortigas & Co executed the corresponding deed of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez. The said agreement of the sale on
statements as well as the deeds of sale contained
restrictions:
1. The parcel of land subject of the sale shall be used
exclusively for residential purposes, and shall not be entitled
to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other
lots belonging to the seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements except the fence
which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be,
(a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided
with modern sanitary installations connected either to the
public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not
be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its
boundary lines.
Eventually Feati Bank acquired the said lots. The said lots
were later on declared as commercial and industrial zone as
per resolution NO. 27 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
Feati bank constructed buildings devoted to banking
purposes, but which it also claimed that could also be
devoted to, and used exclusively for residential purposes.
Ortigas and Co upon knowing of such fact demanded Feati
to stop the construction of the commercial building. The
latter refused stating that the said buidling was constructed
in accordance with the zoning regulations.
Hence a civil case was filed seeking for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
RTC dismissed the complaint. It went up to the SC.
Issues:
1. whether resolution no. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of
police power;
2. whether the said resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
i. whether resolution no. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise
of police power;
Without Merit.
1
least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts of the case. But
assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for
Ortigas & Co to raise said issue, it is still unsustainable.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act, "empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of
the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that
Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the
word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact
the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law which
prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that
the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally
construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted
in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to
exist." The same section further mandates that the general
welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as
to give more power to local governments in promoting the
economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of
the people in the community. The only exceptions under
Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a
third party on the other," in which case the original terms
and provisions of the contract should govern. The
exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
ii. whether the said resolution can nullify or supersede
the contractual obligations assumed by
defendant-appellee.
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of
highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short)
from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power
to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality,
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in
the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The
lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place.
EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities
and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly
granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong,
through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the
subject resolution.
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building
restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as
vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of
sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613
and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot
prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power
through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building
restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential,
cannot be enforced.
Balacuit v CFI
GR No. L-38429
June 30, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City
of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to
of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old.
There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month
imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then
issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The
respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and
an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that
Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal
Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic
Act No. 523 where it states that the Municipal board can
only fix license fees for theatres and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the
ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied
in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere
in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of
exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant
of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by
the City?
Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus
unconstitutional. Petition granted.
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was
interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to
restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate
places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of
the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as
to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
2
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of
theatres, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council
in the exercise of delegated police power by the local
government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila
prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets
beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional
for being a valid exercise of police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no
authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power
to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the
police power as delegated to it under the general welfare
clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it
appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is
a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due
process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive,
unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade,
and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts,
considering that the theatre owners are bound under a
contract with the film owners for just admission prices for
general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is
necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due
to the prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agrees with petitioners that the ordinance is not
justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the
burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out
the same amount of money for the admission of their
children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the
price of admission would mean corresponding savings for
the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to
bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only
make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it
likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty
in its implementation because as already experienced by
petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children
over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12
years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The
ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this
undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of
Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by
movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is,
however, not at all practicable. We can see that the
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive
upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no
discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general
welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price,
the children are being exploited by movie house operators.
We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the
full price of admission. They are treated with the same
quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie
house and theater operators will be discouraged from
exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much
less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the
ordinance and still earn profits for themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere
license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater
or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter
the theater and observe the performance on condition that
he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a
right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according
to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is
clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that
right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the
owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the
contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the
clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and
at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The
State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to
interfere with the admission prices to these performances.
This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions
are not affected with public interest even to a certain
degree. Motion pictures have been considered important
both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and
expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the
perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or
public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are
considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may
not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control
and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
3
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their
property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at
which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
protection of the due process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself
or is established by proper evidence
LUCENA GRAND TERMINAL, INC v. JAC LINER, INC
GR No. 148339
23 February 2005
Facts:
Respondent JAC Liner, a common carrier operating buses
which ply various routes to and from Lucena City assailed
City Ordinances Nos. 1631 and 1778 of Lucena City as
unconstitutional on the grounds that the same constituted
an invalid exercise of police power and an undue taking of
private property.
Ordinance 1631 grants the petitioner a franchise to
construct, operate and maintain a common bus-jeepney
terminal facility in Lucena City. Sec 4 (c) of said Ordinance
provides that during the City of Lucena shall not grant any
third party any privilege to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or
jeepney terminal. Ordinance 1778, on the other hand,
regulates the entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses,
mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys. Under said
ordinance, all temporary terminals are hereby declared
inoperable starting from the efffectivity of this ordinance;
and that no other terminals shall be situated inside or within
the City of Lucena.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city,
was one of those affected by the ordinances. The RTC of
Lucena rendered judgment, declaring City Ordinance 1631
as valid, having been issued in the exercise of police power,
but declared its Sec. 4 (c) as illegal and ultra vires. It also
declared City Ordinance 1778 as null and void, for being an
invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of police
power.
Issue: Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its
police power when it enacted the subject ordinances?
Held: NO. That traffic congestion is a public concern cannot
be gainsaid. The questioned ordinances having been
enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in
the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting
the interference of the State. The first requisite for the
proper exercise of police power, which is lawful subject, is
thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of
whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably
necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in
the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit
the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within
Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the
operation of only one common terminal, the franchise for
which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying
routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close
down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
petitioner. These ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal
operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to
fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help
impede the flow of traffic. Neither are terminals public
nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a
legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances
due to their alleged I ndirect effects upon the flow of traffic,
at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a
thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated via an
ordinance, without judicial proceedings. In the subject
ordinances, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from
whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness,
not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality.
If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective. The weight of
popular opinion must be balanced with that of an individuals
rights.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel v City Mayor of Manila
GR No. L-24693
July 31, 1967
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and
one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the
prohibition of Ordinance 4670 to be applicable in the city of
Manila.They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the
powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact
that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying
their personal information.There was also a provision that
the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city authorites.
They claimed this to be violative of due process for being
vague.The law also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in
first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
4
room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also
invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary. It
was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours.There was also a
prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.The challenged
ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.The lower
court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.Hence, this
appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Ordinance is a valid exercise
of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process
for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its
face. Thus it would be unreasonable to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely for the well-being of the people,
especially if there is no factual foundation being laid to prove
its alleged violation of due process and offset the ordinances
presumed validity.
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio
GR No. 118127
April 12, 2005
Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which
was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an
ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day
clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three months to wind
up business operations or transfer to any place outside
Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds
allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that
in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTDC filed a Petition with the lower court,
praying that the Ordinancebe declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional?
HELD: YES
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
A. The Ordinance contravenesthe Constitution
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass
muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should
be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of
the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must
not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. The Ordinance was passed by the City
Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of
the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated
police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause. The enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
A.1 It infringes the due process clause
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate
limits on government, usually called procedural due process
and substantive due process.Procedural due processrefers to
the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property while
substantive due processasks whether the government has
an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty,
or property.It looks to whether there is a sufficient
justification for the governments action.
The police power granted to local government units must
always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property
A.1.aRequisites for the valid exercise of Police Power
are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not only
must it appear that
(1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive.
It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
5
arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due
process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion
and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Councils police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.The worthy aim of fostering public morals and
the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved
through means less restrictive of private rights;. The closing
down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.
A.1.b Means employed are constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance
halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section
3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of
approval of the Ordinance within which to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-
Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. Further, it states in
Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the
provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the
Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to
liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare. In accordance with this
case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation
are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty
A.1.c Modality employed is unlawful taking
The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it
substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of
its property. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the
running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate
area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind
up business operations or to transfer outside the area or
convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An
ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be
identified. A possessory taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
regulatory taking occurs when the governments
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
the property. What is crucial in judicial consideration of
regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property
in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for
use. A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land will require compensation under the
takings clause.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the
prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval
within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to
any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts
to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation
of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business
will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers
it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire
establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the
substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices
which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a
period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of
private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as
a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property
to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for
noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation.
Distinction should be made between destruction from
necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that
the property taken in the exercise of police power is
destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose while the property taken under the power of
eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and
is therefore wholesome. If it be of public benefit that a
wholesome property remain unused or relegated to a
particular purpose, then certainly the public should bear the
cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of
private property for public use
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide
or limit the petitioners actions. Ordinances placing
restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to
be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions
6
to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of
the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of
unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions
A.2. The Ordinance violates EqualProtection Clause
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions
between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for
prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot see the
logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in
the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.
A.3. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is
ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as
the latter merely empowers local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the
power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover
under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies
to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It cannot be
said that motels are injurious to the rights of property,
health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate
business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is
not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement
without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise
runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly
argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds
of commercial establishments except warehouse or open
storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid
and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the
powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in
conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
GR No. 122846
January 20, 2009
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor
Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as
"An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time
admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in
hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and
void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities, among other local
government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports.
Ruling:
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the
Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for
more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who
wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate
purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed
any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable
private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other
than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look
to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of
7
the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
Abraham Rimando Vs. Naguilian Emission Testing
Center, Inc.
GR No. 198860
July 23, 2012
Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from a petition for
mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian
Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President,
Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P.
Rimando, mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.
The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor
of the respondent.
In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its
business is being conducted on a parcel of land which
formerly belonged to the national government but later on
certified by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The petitioner refused to issue a business
permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract
of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The parties did
not reach a common ground hence, the petition for
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may
be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the
respondents business permit?
Held:
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a
business permit since the exercise of the same is a
delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. Local government units exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the
Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised,
the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but
certainly, not of mandamus.
Fernando vs St. Scholasticas College
GR No. 161107
March 12, 2013

FACTS:
Respondents St. Scholasticas College (SSC) and St.
Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are
educational institutions organized under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and
business addresses at Malate, Manila, and at Marikina
Heights, Marikina City, respectively.Respondent SSC is the
owner of four (4) parcels of land located in Marikina Heights.
Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence
of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house
of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly
sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter
fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence
along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other
improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of
Marikina. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City
enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Marikina." Subsequently, Ordinance Nos. 217 and 200were
enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance
No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE No. 192
Series of 1994
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES
AND WALLS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative
body of the municipality to "x xx Prescribe reasonable limits
and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction
of the municipality, x xx";
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known
as the National Building Code of the Philippines, does not
adequately provide technical guidelines for the construction
of fences, in terms of design, construction, and criteria;
WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall
provide more efficient and effective enforcement of laws on
public safety and security; XXX
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the
construction of all fences, walls and gates on lots classified
or used for residential, commercial, industrial, or special
purposes.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed
under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1)
meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be
of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-
thru; XXX
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within
the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of commercial
and industrial establishments and educational and religious
institutions.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose
existing fences and walls do not conform to the
specifications herein are allowed adequate period of time
from the passage of this Ordinance within which to conform,
as follows:
(1) Residential houses eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments five (5) years
(3) Industrial establishments three (3) years
8
(4) Educational institutions five (5) years (public and
privately owned)
Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the
provisions of this Ordinance shall be demolished by the
municipal government at the expense of the owner of the lot
or structure.
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the
fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru,
and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters
to provide parking space for vehicles to park.The
respondents requested for an extension of time to comply
with the directive. In response, the petitioners, through then
City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement
of the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for
prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina.
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in
excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192,
asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. That demolishing their fence and
constructing it six (6) meters back would result in the loss of
at least 1,808.34 square meters along West Drive, and at
least 1,954.02 square metersalong East Drive. It would also
result in the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk,
electric house, storage house, comfort rooms, guards room,
guards post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for
students, Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-
purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their
beneficial use. The respondents, thus, asserted that the
implementation of the ordinance on their property would be
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due
process of law; and that the petitioners could only
appropriate a portion of their property through eminent
domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the
provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not
exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as
sufficient protection for many years.
The petitioners countered that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power, by virtue of which, they could
restrain property rights for the protection of public safety,
health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and
general prosperity.
On the merits, the RTC rendered a decisiongranting the
petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition
commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from
enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the
respondents property. It ruled that the assailed ordinance
was neither remedial nor curative in nature, considering that
at the time the respondents perimeter wall was built, the
same was valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to
any previous legislation that it sought to correct.
The CA dismissed the petitioners appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision.
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the
assailed ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter setback
requirement is, as held by the lower courts,
invalid. Nonetheless, the petitioners argue that such
invalidity was subsequently cured by Zoning Ordinance No.
303, series of 2000. They also contend that Section 3,
relating to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, must be
complied with, as it remains to be valid.
ISSUE:
Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government of
Marikina
RULING:
No. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC
in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must
permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the
assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina
City.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people."The State, through the legislature,
has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation
of police power is embodied in Section 16of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the
General Welfare Clause,which has two branches. "The first,
known as the general legislative power, authorizes the
municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
the municipal council by law. The second, known as the
police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health
and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and
for the protection of their property."
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,25 discusses the test
of a valid ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.26
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of
Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police power. To
successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests
have been used by the Court the rational relationship test
and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is
on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
9
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test,
Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for
not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys
purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass
the following requisites as discussed in Social Justice Society
(SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method. Otherwise, the police power measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and
a violation of the due process clause.
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to
the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed
under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1)
meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be
an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
x xx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within
the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of commercial
and industrial establishments and educational and religious
institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners
from requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete
wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must
be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters
back in order to provide a parking area.
Setback Requirement
The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the
parking area to be created would remain with the
respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its
students and faculty, and that its use by the public on non-
school days would only be incidental.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the
setback requirement was to make the parking space free for
use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for
the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be
available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain,
provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that
the ownership of the property will continue to remain with
the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the
acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is
essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the
title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be
made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The
Court is of the view that the implementation of the setback
requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of
3,762.36 square meters of the respondents private property
for public use without just compensation, in contravention to
the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of
unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that
providing for a parking area has no logical connection to,
and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of
these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback
requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.The
Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of
the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is
invalid.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences
to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to
be at least 80% see-thru, should remain valid and
enforceable against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the
petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage,
suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or
unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly
the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security.
The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this
purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The
petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not
appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence
would provide better protection and a higher level of
security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent,
than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that
such exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be
criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would
be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears that the
respondents concrete wall has served as more than
sufficient protection over the last 40 years. `
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in
accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their
property.
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in
an undue interference with the respondents rights to
property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is,
10
thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents.
Legaspi v City of Cebu
G.R. No. 159110
December 10, 2013
FACTS:
1. On Jan 27 1997 the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu
passed Ordinance 1664 which authorized the traffic
enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). Pertinent
provisions of the said ordinance are as follows:
Section 1. POLICY It is the policy of the government of the
City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any
provision of any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or
Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise
known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as amended, in
order to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the
streets in the City of Cebu at all times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES Any vehicle
found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the
City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the
parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire
of the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to
immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any
traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu
City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby
authorized to immobilize any violating vehicle as
hereinabove provided.
Section 3. PENALTIES Any motor vehicle, owner or driver
violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations
and/or restrictions, as may be provided under Ordinance No.
801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall be
penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the
ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle immobilizer
may not be removed or released without its owner or driver
paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu City through the
Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties
for all prior traffic law violations that remain unpaid or
unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said vehicle,
and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned
personnel of the bureau responsible for the release of the
immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by
any of the following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcia
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an
immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the
denver boot vehicle immobilizer or other such special
gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be
prosecuted for such loss or destruction under pain or
penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing
ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition
to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; Provided that any such act may not be
compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and
constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a
hazard thereof shall be towed to the city government
impounding area for safekeeping and may be released only
after the provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully
complied with.
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance
shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or
of a fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
nor more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), or both
such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.[2]
2. On July 29, 1997, two lawyers filed a suit seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for
being in violation of due process and for being contrary to
law, and damages. One of the lawyers, Jaban Sr parked
his car in a paying parking area but his car was immobilized
after 10 mins; the car was impounded for 3 days and he had
to pay 4.2k fine without court hearing or due process of
reason why the car was immobilized. A similar thing
happened to the author lawyer Jaban Jr who parked his
car in a secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting
parking, he had to pay pay 1.4k.
3. On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi sued in RTC
Cebu to demand the delivery of personal property,
declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and
damages. He left his car outside the gate of his house,
occupying part of the road and the sidewalk to make way for
the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be
allowed to unload his materials and equipment with the
assurance that the unloading would not take too long. While
waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the
phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him
to go into the house to answer the call; that after a short
while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons
had clamped the front wheel of his car.
4. The City Attorney of Cebu, as a defense, said that the
officers only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the
plaintiffs. They added that the said ordinance enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality and validity.
5. On Jan 22 1999 RTC declared Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void for violating due process - In both procedural
and substantive due process, a hearing is always a pre-
requisite; depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole
determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP
personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel.
It was indicated that the owner of the immobilized vehicle
shall have to undergo all these ordeals at the mercy of the
Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question
mandates, is the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and
collector.
6. CA reversed RTC, declared Ord 1664 valid. The CA
stated that Ordinance 1664 is a legitimate exercise of police
power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu.
ISSUES
11
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within
the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of
Cebu - YES
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
requirements for validity and constitutionality,
particularly the limitations set by the Constitution
and the relevant statutes - YES
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petitions for their lack of
merit. The decision of the CA was affirmed.
Citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. the court restated the
tests for a valid ordinance:
1. must be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact
2. must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law,
3. must also conform to the following substantive
requirements
a. must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
b. must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
f. must not be unreasonable
In compliance with the formal requirements:
The enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 was within the
corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu. No issues
were raised against the formalities of the enactment of the
ordinance, so compliance is presumed. Congress enacted the
LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the
various LGUs of the States great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of
taxation, but with parameters and limitations. It bears
stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the
City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules
and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of
the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare
Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.24Section 458of
the LGC relevantly states: Section 458. Powers, Duties,
Functions and Composition. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section
22 of this Code, and shall:
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and
effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as
provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition
to said services and facilities, shall:
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places
and approve the construction, improvement repair
and maintenance of the same; establish bus and
vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of
the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve
the public; regulate garages and operation of
conveyances for hire;designate stands to be
occupied by public vehicles when not in use;
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts,
awnings and awning posts on the streets; and
provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of
streets and public places;(vi) Regulate traffic on all
streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or
obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the
interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places.
The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to
leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the
problem of traffic congestions associated with development
and progress because they were directly familiar with the
situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs
would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes
because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to
their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard
allowed to the LGUs of the cities ,their traffic regulations
must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the
constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.
In compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the
substantive requirements:
The Court discussed the 2 aspects of the guaranty of due
process:
1. procedural due process - procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property (i.e. notices and
hearings)
2. substantive due process - adequate reason for
taking away a persons life, liberty, or property. In
other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is sufficient justification for the
governments action.
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under
the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy. The terms encroachment and obstacles
used in Section 458 of the LGC were broad enough to
include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed
the streets, alleys and sidewalks
Petitioners say that they were not accorded the opportunity
to protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the
vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior
to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that the
ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that reason. Any
vehicle owner may protest such action of a traffic enforcer
or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. the ordinance
permits the release of a vehicle upon a protest directly made
to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the
Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu;
12
or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belcia, even without
payment of the fine. None of the petitioners resorted to this.
Such did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the
escape clause written in the ordinance. The immobilization
of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not
necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the
time of the apprehension. In that situation, the enforcer
would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or
issue a traffic citation. The towing away of the immobilized
vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but
designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from
obstructing traffic.
As to the compliance with the procedural due
process:
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of
procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under
our laws in which the absence of one or both of such
requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due
process. These are: cancellation of the passport of a person
being sought for the commission of a crime, preventive
suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges,
the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies,
the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of
theaters showing obscene movies, and the abatement of
nuisance per se, arrest of a person in flagrante delicto. The
same applies to the clamping of the tires of the vehicles of
the petitioners.
The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping
the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not
around at the time of apprehension. The lack of a hearing
does not constitute a breach of procedural due process, for
giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the
apprehensions through a timely protest. Such clamping of
the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way
to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors;
otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply
driving away.
Legaspi refers to a different ruling in the Astillero case but
SC says this is an irrelevant ruling - it should be the RTC that
had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case
despite the appeals in these cases being already pending in
the CA.
- the same RTC should have exercised a becoming
modesty on the issue of the constitutionality of the same
ordinance that the Constitution required the majority vote of
the Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine.
Social Justice Society vs Atienza
GR No. 156052
March 7, 2007
FACTS:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor
approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became
effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the
police power delegated to local government units, a principle
described as the power inherent in a government to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.
This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general
welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as
its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land
bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track
in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR
Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L.
Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana
bounded by the Pasig River, MarcelinoObrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other
businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted
under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6)
months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within
which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called " Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that " the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable option." The
Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No.
97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that
the MOU was effective only for a period of six months
starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the
Sanggunianadopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity
of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance. Meanwhile, petitioners filed
this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUE:
WON the City Mayor has the mandatory legal duty to
enforce the said ordinance.
RULING:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an
extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is
13
already imposed on the respondent and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must
be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act
required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel
compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which
a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ
of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of
the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which
is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal
right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS
states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila.
The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly
residents of Manila. We need not belabor this point. We
have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest.
Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct
interest in the enforcement of the city's ordinances.
Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to
institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes
upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city."
One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive
of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondent's duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful,
unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second
issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and
Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the
Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of
the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City
of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally
hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,
along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists
why such a protective measure should be delayed.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. LIM
GR Nos. 187836 & 187916
November 25, 2014
FACTS:
This is a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor
Atienza, Jr. Petitioners challenge the validity of Ordinance
No. 8187 entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE
NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MANILA
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING
ORDINANCE OF 2006, BY CREATING A MEDIUM
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL
ZONE (1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS
ENFORCEMENT" enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Manila (Sangguniang Panlungsod) on 14 May 2009.
Creating a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial
zone (1-3) effectively lifted the prohibition against owners
and operators of businesses. Such ordinance contains
provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No.
8027.
In G.R. 1878836, they contended the Ordinance not a valid
exercise of police power because the measures provided
therein do not promote the general welfare of the people
within the contemplation of the following provisions of law:
a) Article III, Section 18 (kk) of Republic Act No. 409
otherwise known as the "Revised Charter of the City of
Manila," which provides that the Municipal Board shall
have the legislative power to enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper;
b) Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the
Local Government Code, which defines the scope of the
general welfare clause;
In G.R. No. 187916, alleges violation of the right to health of
the people and the right to a healthful and balanced
environment under Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Respondent contends that it is the function of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning ordinances, for
which reason, it may proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8119 without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed under
Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning
and Development Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81
(Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance No.
8119, especially when the action actually originated from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod itself.
14
That the assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; that it is consistent with the general welfare clause
and public policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not
run contrary to the Constitution, municipal laws, and
international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed
ordinance.
ISSUE:
Is the Ordinance a valid exercise of Police Power under the
General Welfare Clause?
RULING:
NO. The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides
that the SangguniangPanlungsod is vested with the power to
"reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city "subject to
the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an
ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance. These have been properly applied in G.R. No.
156052, where the Court upheld the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the
Ordinance, and declared that the mayor has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been
repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise
annulled by the courts.
In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the
SanguniangPanlungsod is in the best position to determine
the needs of its Constituents that the removal of the oil
depots from the Pandacan area is necessary "to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of
a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had
already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of
the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of
the previous members were no longer re-elected, but with
the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the
conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots
existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do
not substantially differ to this day, as would later be
discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on
the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
"general welfare" of the city does not after all gear towards
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to
which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city
councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the
citys economic related benefits, through the continued stay
of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and
safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to
make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the
table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of Manila
should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history
reveals that there is truly no such thing as "the will of
Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the people is
concerned.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a guarantee for the
protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents
of Manila. There, the Court said that the enactment of the
said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the
concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject "to
safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila;"and a lawful method the enactment
of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from
industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the
continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan.
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil
companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal has never
been one of the targets of terrorist attacks; that the
petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures; and that the possibility that it would be picked
by the terrorists is unlikely given the security measures
installed thereat.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a
likely target of terrorist attacks has already been passed
upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the
Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila and the then position of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that
the threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were
correct, the very nature of the depots where millions of liters
of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless
of whether or not the composition may cause explosions,
has no place in a densely populated area. Surely, any
untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism
of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not
only destruction to properties within and among the
neighboring communities but certainly mass deaths and
injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the
Pandacan Terminals, which the oil companies continue to
insist to have been validated and recognized by the MOU,
the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already put this issue to
rest. It specifically declared that even assuming that the
terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were
inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the MOU gave it full
force and effect only until 30 April 2003.
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain
insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers posed by
the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area
have already been completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike
at one point or another, no matter how remote it is as
perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to life
to be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics
and theories of probability have no place in situations where
15
the very life of not just an individual but of residents of big
neighborhoods is at stake.
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are
no impediments to its enforcement and
implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who
have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and
control their own destiny and preserve their lives and
safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors
warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
The same best interest of the public guides the present
decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target
even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of
any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer
put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that
Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is
invalid and unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No.
8187 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID
with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil
Terminals.
DOCTRINE:As a result of the zoning, the continued
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their
present location will no longer be permitted. The power to
establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit
of the residents of a locality The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, asa representation of western interests,
which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is
such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not
safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these
terminals to dissipate the threat. The peoples Right to life
prevails over petroleum companies Right to Property.(copied
from DBL Pre-bar Notes)
Valentino Legaspi v. City of Cebu; Jaban v. CA
GR No. 159110; GR No. 159692
December 10, 2013
Facts:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the
traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). Petitioners
Jaban and Legaspi questioned the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 1644 for being in violation of due process and
for being contrary to law. Their separate complaint alleged
that they had properly parked their car and that upon
return, had found their car being immobilized by a steel
clamp; that their car was impounded for and was informed
at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay a fine to
the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car; well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and corporations or local government units. Once
without due process of law delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co national lawmaking body.
defendants, the City Attorney of Cebu presented similar
defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the
only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules
plaintiffs; and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of
presumption of constitutionality and validity. The cases were the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare
consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.
rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision declaring .
Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu and
its codefendants appealed to the CA which overturned the Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states:
RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid. Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Composition. (a) The sangguniang
Issues panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was city, shall enact ordinances, approve
enacted within the ambit of the resolutions and appropriate funds for the
legislative powers of the City of general welfare of the city and its
Cebu; and inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 Code and in the proper exercise of the
complied with the requirements for corporate powers of the city as provided for
validity and constitutionality, under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
particularly the limitations set by xxx
the Constitution and the relevant (5) Approve ordinances which shall
statutes. ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and
Ruling facilities as provided for under Section
17 of this Code, and in addition to said
A. Tests for a valid ordinance services and facilities, shall:
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,18 the Court restates the tests xxx
of a valid ordinance: It must not only be within the corporate (v) Regulate the use of
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be streets, avenues, alleys,
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law sidewalks, bridges, parks
(FORMAL), it must also conform to the following and other public places
SUBSTANTIVE requirements: (1) must not contravene the and approve the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or construction,
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) improvement repair and
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be maintenance of the
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not same; establish bus and
be unreasonable. vehicle stops and
terminals or regulate the
B. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal use of the same by
requirements privatelyowned vehicles
which serve the public;
With no issues being hereby raised against the formalities regulate garages and
attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we operation of
presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. conveyances for hire;
Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the designate stands to be
delegation to the various LGUs of the States great powers, occupied by public
namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and vehicles when not in use;
the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate regulate the putting up
the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with of signs, signposts,
by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with awnings and awning
the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision posts on the streets; and
of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory provide for the lighting,
limitations. cleaning and sprinkling
of streets and public
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. BelAir places;
Village Association, Inc., the Court cogently observed: It (vi) Regulate traffic on all
bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the streets and bridges;
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or prohibit encroachments
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The or obstacles thereon and,
National Legislature, however, may delegate this when necessary in the
power to the President and administrative boards as interest of public

16
 welfare, authorize the
removal of
encroachments and
illegal constructions in
public places;
The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to
leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the
problem of traffic congestions associated with development
and progress because they were directly familiar with the
situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs
would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes
because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to
their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard
allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations
must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the
constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.
C. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the
substantive requirements
Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met
the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its
conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding
the growth and progress in the population and economic
centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No.
1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the
general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was,
therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government
purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic
congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing
the streets of the City of Cebu.
The clamping of the petitioners vehicles pursuant to
Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly
situated) is of the same character as the established
exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already
said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors
were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous.
Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc.
GR No. 189185
August 16, 2016
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with
various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao
City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose
a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by
all agricultural entities within Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.
et al., filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance
of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged
that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of
17
police power; violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property without due
process of law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section
511 6 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
The residents living within and adjacent to the
bananaplantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda,
joined by other residents of Davao City, (Mosqueda, et al.)
submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene and
Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. The
RTC granted their motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional
ondue process and equal protection grounds for being
unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of
police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition period to shift to other
modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in
requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone
under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao
City.
Ruling:
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process
Clause
The SC said, Davao City "must notact arbitrarily, whimsically
or despotically regardless of the ordinance's salutary
purpose."
On Section 5, the SC said 3 months
would be inadequate time for the city to
shift fromaerial to truck-mounted boom
spraying, effectively depriving the city
an efficient meansto combat disease.
But the SC disagreed with PBGEA that
the buffer zone required by the
ordinanceis in violation of due process
since the purpose is to minimize the
effects of aerialspraying.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection
Clause
The SC said equal protection wasviolated since the
ordinance made no substantial distinctions when it
prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of the substance
or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied,
and when it imposed the 30-meter buffer zone in all
agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the size of
landholdings.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
According to the SC, the City disregarded regulations
implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA),
including its identification and classification of safe pesticides
and other agricultural chemicals.
Regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals, the SC said, is a function lodged with the FPA and
not with local government units.
Thus, when Davao City enacted the ordinance "without
inherent and explicit authority to do so" the SC said the local
government performed an ultra vires act.

Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo vs. Municipal Mayor
of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya
GR No. 188448
January 11, 2017
Facts: In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang sent two letter-
complaintsto then Municipal Mayor Santiago O. Dickson and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing
them of the illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners
Laygo over Public Market Stalls which petitioners leased
from the Municipal Government.
The Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang to
Mayor Dickson for appropriate action.
The Sangguniang informed Mayor Dickson that the matter
falls under the jurisdiction of his office since the
Sangguniang has already passed and approved Resolution
No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor Dickson to enforce
the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public
market.
Mayor Dickson informed the Sangguniang that the stalls
were constructed under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
scheme, which meant that the petitioners had the right to
keep their stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied.
Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter praying for the
cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality
and petitioners for violating the provision on subleasing.
Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter. Thus,
Bandrang filed a Petition for Mandamus against him and
alleged that despite already being aware of the violations of
the lease contracts of petitioners, Mayor Dickson still refused
to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against
subleasing. Bandrang concluded that Mayor Dickson's
inaction can only be construed as an unlawful neglect in the
performance and enforcement of his public duty as the Chief
Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
The RTC held petitioners clearly violated the terms and
conditions of the lease contract. Since Mayor Dickson failed
in his duty to enforce the resolution and delayed its
implementation without valid reason, mandamus is a proper
remedy.The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC.
* In the case at bar, the Sangguniang delegated to Mayor
Dickson and subsequently to incumbent Mayor Dacayo, the
power to cancel the lease contracts of those market
stallholders who violated their contracts with the
Municipality. Inferred from this power is the power of the
Mayor to determine who among the market stallholders
violated their lease contracts with the Municipality. Such
power connotes an exercise of discretion.
Issue:
Should the petition for Mandamus prosper for the refusal of
the mayor to perform a discretionary act?
Ruling:
18
No. The Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts
sought to be done are discretionary in nature. The petition
sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease
contract of petitioners with the Municipal Government and to
lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. In an
earlier decided case, we held that the privilege of operating
a market stall under license is always subject to the police
power of the city government and may be refused or
granted for reasons of public policy and sound public
administration. Being a delegated police power falling under
the general welfare clause of Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is,
therefore, discretionary in nature.
While Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act on the
directive, he may not be compelled to do so in a certain
way, as what was prayed for by Bandrang in seeking the
cancellation of the contract and to re-lease the vacated
market stalls to interested persons. It was enough that
Mayor Dickson be reminded of his authority to cancel the
contract under Item No. 11, but whether or not his decision
would be for or against Bandrang would be for Mayor
Dickson alone to decide. Not even the Court can substitute
its own judgment over what he had chosen.
As it was, Mayor Dickson did act on the matter before him.
He exercised his discretion by choosing not to cancel the
contract on the ground of pari delicto, explaining that
Bandrang, as the sub-lessee herself, was in violation of the
same policy on subleasing. The complaint does not allege
that in deciding this way, Mayor Dickson committed grave
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority. Neither did Bandrang present proof that Mayor
Dickson acted arbitrarily, wantonly, fraudulently, and against
the interest of the public when he chose not to cancel the
lease contract of petitioners.
Suguitan vs City of Mandaluyong,
GR No. 135087
March 14, 2000
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued
Resolution No. 396, S-1994authorizing then Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the
property of Alberto Sugui located at Boni Avenue and Sto.
Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of the
Mandaluyong Medical Center.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter
offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to
sell. Consequently, the city of Mandaluyong filed a
complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
based on the following grounds -(1) the power of eminent
domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2)
there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of
subject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to
expropriate the said property without payment of just
compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget
and appropriation for the payment of the property being
expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property is
but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for
his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and
opposition to the motion.
Acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court
issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take
immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the
deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market
value of the subject property based upon the current tax
declaration of such property. Subsequently, Mandaluyong
assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a
writ of possession issued by the trial court.
Petitioner assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only
exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of
an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7160, and not by means of a mere
resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly
and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that
pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient
antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with
the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a
resolution is necessary upon the initiation of expropriation
proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order
to appropriate the funds for the payment of just
compensation.
ISSUE:
Is an ordinance necessary for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by an LGU?
RULING:
Yes. The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative
in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may
be validly delegated to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities, although the scope of this
delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that
of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in
strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by local government units is section 19 of RA 7160 which
provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That
the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated; Provided,
finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
19
Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine
whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegating law. In fact, the courts have
adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by
local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly
exercised by the national legislature.
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the
following requisites have been complied with by the local
government unit concerned:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property .calr
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit
of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to
exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners'
property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the
first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from
ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not
a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an
ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court
has determined the amount of just compensation. An
examination of the applicable law will show that an
ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint
with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the
power of eminent domain is already being exercised.
It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will
not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting the
necessary ordinance and thereafter reinstituting
expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied
with all other legal requirements.
Municipality Of Paranaque vs V.M Realty Corporation
292 SCRA 676
FACTS:
The Municipality of Paranaque pursuant to a Sanguniang
Resolution filed a complaint for expropriation against V.M
reality over two parcels of land with a combined area of
10,000 sqm, said lots would serve the purpose of alleviating
the living conditions by providing socialized housing for the
homeless. The municipality previously made an offer to
enter into negotiated sale where V.M did not accept.
Finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance the
RTC gave it due course and authorized the municipality to
take possession upon deposit of the amount equivalent to 15
percent of its fair market value based on its current tax
declaration. VM answered, alleging that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action because under the LGC, an
ordinance is required and not just a resolution and that the
cause of action was barred prior judgment. RTC dismissed
the case, Municipality appealed. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the
municipal council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a
valid cause of action.
2. Whether or not res judicata is a valid ground for dismissal
of case.
HELD:
1. An ordinance is required to validly exercise such power.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch which may be delegated the exercise to LGU. An LGY
may therefore exercise the power to expropriate rivate
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latters control and restrains, imposed through law, in
this case LGC, specifically section 19 which requires that
such power must be exercised pursuant to an ordinance.
The term resolution and ordinance are not synonymous. An
ordinance is law but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body. The former
possesses a general and permanent character, while the
latter is temporary in nature. The two are also enacted
differently. One requires third reading, while a resolution
does not unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
sanggunian members.
2. Eminent Domain not Barred by Res Judicata. While all the
requisites of res judicata are present in this case, the court
holds that such principle which finds application in generally
all cases and proceedings cannot bar the right of the state or
its agent to expropriate private property. The scope of
eminent domain is plenary and like police power, can reach
every form of property which the state might need for public
use.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the
right of the state to exercise eminent domain, it does apply
to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example a
final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the
ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue, it cannot however bar the state from
thereafter complying with this requirement and subsequently
exercising the power over the same property.
17. Gocuan
Province of Camarines Sur vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 103125
May 17, 1993
Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
Provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
20
Complaint for expropriation was then filed against the
private respondents (San Joaquins). The San Joaquins
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The Trial
Court ruled in favour of the province. The San Joaquins went
to the Court of appeals and the latter ruled in their favour.
The Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue:
Is the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government
units subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the
Agrarian Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural
to non-agricultural use?
Ruling:
NO. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least
that local government, units must first secure the approval
of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they
can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings.
Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units
to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite
to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian
Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the
use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
City Of Cebu vs Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo
GR No. 142971
May 7, 2002
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a
complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses
Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged that they
needed the parcels of land owned by the respondents for
public purpose because they are planning to construct a
public road which will serve as an access or relief road of
Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilom Avenue
and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu
City.
The trial court appointed Palermo M. Lugo, Alfredo Cisneros
and Herbert E. Buot to be the commissioners to determine
the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated.
The commissioners report contained that the plaintiff is
directed to pay a just compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to
the respondents.
The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They
asserted that just compensation should be determined on
September 17, 1993, as of the date of the filing of the
complaint and not at the time the property was actually
taken in 1994.
ISSUE:
Whether just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint
HELD:
No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Governments right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose.[9] However, the
Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation
as consideration therefor.
In this case, the applicable law as to the point of
determining the just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall
be determined as of the time of actual taking. The SC
justifies that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property
as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits
of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the
report of the commission so they need to comply on the
agreement in good faith. Also, the petitioner was too late to
question the valuation without violating the principle of
equitable estoppel. And lastly, Section 4, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a
substantive law.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
Jesus is Lord Christian School Inc. vs Municipality of
Pasig
GR No. 152230
August 9, 2005
Facts:
The municipality of Pasig passed an ordinance for the
expropriation of a private property for the building of an
access road from the public market to a certain barangay in
Pasig. The municipality notified the owners by sending a
letter manifesting its intention to construct an access road.
Petitioners contention is that there was no valid and definite
offer, as required by Sec. 19 of the LGC, before a
municipality can exercise the power of expropriation.
21
Respondent argued that there was substantial compliance to
the prior valid and definite offer.
Issue:
Whether or not the there was a prior valid and definite offer
Held:
The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor
of the owner and against the condemnor. The respondent
was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a
valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before
filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer
to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements
and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public
purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court
action. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely
perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a
reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A
single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will
suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its
definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property.
However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the
certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated.
Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered
owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that
persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on its face.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that
before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and
valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an
access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent
to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local
Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly
bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the
co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners,
the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a
specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is
merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the
price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
Masikip vs City of Pasig
GR No. 136349
January 23, 2006
FACTS:
Then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, notified
Masikip of its intention to expropriate a portion of her
property to be used for the sports and recreational activities
of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. A second letter was
sent, stating that the property was allegedly for the purpose
of provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of
our community. Masikip refused. When Pasig filed an action
for expropriation, Masikip filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that there was no genuine necessity for the taking.
According to petitioner, there is already an established
sports development and recreational activity center at
Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being
utilized by its residents.
ISSUES:
Was there a genuine necessity for the expropriation of
Masikips property?
RULING:
No. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of
a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the
land. The records show that the Certificationissued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of the
Ordinance authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members
of the said Association are desirous of having their own
private playground and recreational facility. Masikips lot is
the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity
has not been shown, especially considering that there exists
an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available
to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Francia vs Municipality of Meycauayan
GR No. 170432
March 24, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a
complaint for expropriation against petitioners Francia
because respondent needed petitioners' property at the
junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camalig
main road artery and the MacArthur Highway to establish a
common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles
with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. petitioners denied
that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It
was in fact developed and there were plans for further
development. For this reason, respondents offer price
of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square meter) was too low.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a
public purpose. The construction of a common terminal for
all public utility conveyances (serving as a two-way loading
and unloading point for commuters and goods) would
improve the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours.
Moreover, the property was the best site for the proposed
terminal because of its accessibility. petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) claimed
that the trial court issued the orders without conducting a
hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose.
Issue:
22
If prior determination of the existence of a public purpose
was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession
Ruling:
Before a local government unit may enter into the
possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it
must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the
said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value
based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make
the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent
to the issuance of a writ of possession.
Republic vs Vicente Lim
GR No. 161656
June 29, 2005
Facts:
Republic insituted a special civil action for expropriation with
CFI of Cebu, involving Banilad Friar land Estate, Lahug, Cebu
City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for
the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of
GAERVASIA Denzon, while Lot 939 was in the name if Eulalia
Denzon. After depositing P9,500 with PNP, pursuant to the
Order of the CFI dated 1938, the Republic took posession of
the lots. Thereafter, on May14, 1930, the CFI ordered the
republic to pay the Dezons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation. For the time being, the lots were transferred
to Valdehueza and Penerio, which was subsequently owned
by Vicente Lim pursuant to loan agreement that resulted to
being foreclosed. On May 4, 2001, pursuant to a petition for
quiting of title, RTC declared Vicente Lim as the absolute
and exclusive owner of the lot 932.
Issue:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932
despite its failure to pay the just compension therefore
pursuant to the judgement of the CFI rendered as early as
May14, 1940.
Ruling:
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."
The length of time and the manner with which it evaded
payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and
confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation
proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5,
1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this
day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-
handed.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic's
delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as "just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered 'just.'" In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an
entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is
not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio.
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of
power. This limiting function is in keeping with the
philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise
of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual's
rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be
strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government,
and liberally in favor of the property owner.
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in other
democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,thus:
"Title to property which is the subject of
condemnation proceedings does not vestthe
condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid,but the
condemnor's title relates back to the date on
which the petition under theEminent Domain Act,
or the commissioner's report under the Local
Improvement Act, is filed.
. . . Although the right to appropriate and use land
taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner
until payment is actually made.
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can
be no transfer of title from the landowner to the
expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic's acquisition of
ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just
compensation within a reasonable time.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza,
respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932
but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of
course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of
just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of
the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases
of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,and
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. However, the facts of
the present case do not justify its application. It bears
stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation
proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57)
years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the
Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate
refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of
possession is in order.
MCIAA vs Lozada, Sr.
GR No. 176625
February 25, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada were the registered
owners of Lot No. 88 which the Republic sought to acquire
by expropriation through then Civil Aeronautics
23
Administration (CAA) for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
A decision was rendered by the CFI in favor of the
Government and Bernardo Lozada, Sr. as landowner
appealed therefrom. During the pendency of the appeal, the
parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect
that the subject property would be resold to the original
owner at the same price when it was expropriated in the
event that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport.
Title to Lot No. 88 was subsequently transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines. However, the projected
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport did not
materialize. Since the public purpose for the expropriation no
longer exists, the Lozadas sought to repurchase their
property.
Issue:
Can the respondents recover the property?
Held:
Yes. It is well settled that the taking of private property by
the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to
mandatory requirement that it is for a particular public
purpose which partakes of the nature of implied condition
that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to
keep the property expropriated. The expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated
in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should
file another petition for the new purpose. If this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to
the return of the amount of just compensation received.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic
flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely,
the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate
the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be
enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the
property held by the government in favor of the former. In
constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and
passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the title
and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary.
To summarize, respondents must return to petitioners the
just compensation they received for the expropriation and to
pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in
maintaining Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their
services to the extent that respondents were benefited
thereby. Petitioners are entitled to keep whatever fruits and
income they may have obtained from Lot No. 88 and
respondents are also entitled to keep whatever interests the
amounts they received as just compensation may have
earned in the meantime, as well as the appreciation in value
of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence of nature and
time.
Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano vs Republic; MCIAA vs
Inocian
GR No. 168770; GR No. 168812
February 9, 2011
FACTS:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs
predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the
Lahug Airport in Cebu City. As a sweetener, the government
negotiating team assured the landowners that they could
repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport
expansion project not push through or once the Lahug
Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu
Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and
executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase while
others refused to sell because the price offered was way
below market. The Republic, represented by then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of
the NAC, filed a complaint for expropriation for the
remaining lots. The CFI (Civil Case No. R-1881) rendered
judgment for the Republic allowing the exercise of the right
of eminent domain. In view of the buy-back assurance by
the government, the owners of the lots no longer appealed
and the certificates of title for the covered parcels of land
were issued in the name of the Republic which, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6958, were subsequently transferred to
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the
aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased
operations as Mactan Airport has opened to accommodate
incoming and outgoing commercial flights. This prompted
the former lot owners to formally demand from the
government that they be allowed to exercise their promised
right to repurchase on the ground that the expropriated lots
were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no
expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. As their
demand was unheeded, the civil suits followed, hence these
two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition) is a complaint for
reconveyance filed by Ricardo L. Inocian and others wherein
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, directed MCIAA to reconvey
the lands to the plaintiffs after they have paid for the sums
indicated in the previous expropriation case. G.R No. 168770
(Ouano Petition) is also a complaint for reconveyance filed
by the Ouanos wherein the RTC initially ruled in their favor
but reversed its earlier decision upon motion for
reconsideration by the Republic. The Court of appeals
affirmed the RTCs decision denying the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff lot owners (Ouanos, Inocians,
and others) are entitled to recover their property
RULING: Yes.
MCIAA argues that the judgment of condemnation in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was
unconditional as there is nothing in the fallo of the courts
decision indicating that that the government undertook to
reconvey the covered lands in case the Lahug airport
expansion project is aborted. MCIAA further argues that the
claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged
verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can
reacquire their landholdings is barred by the Statute of
Frauds. As ruled by the Supreme Court, the statute applies
only to executory and not to completed, executed, or
partially consummated contracts as in this case.
Furthermore, the objection on the admissibility of evidence
on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not
timely raised (and MCIAA did not timely object).
24
On eminent domain:
The notion, therefore, that the government, via
expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership
over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer
tenable. The Court in this case reiterated the case of MCIAA
vs. Lozada, Sr. which abandoned the previous case of Fery
vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan (the case which MCIAA
constantly invoked) which ruled that the former owner is not
entitled to reversion of the property even if the public
purpose was not pursued and was abandoned.
The Court ruled that Fery was not decided pursuant to our
now sacredly held constitutional right that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake of the nature
of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable
the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Take note: Expropriated lands should be differentiated
from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely
transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale
contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play.
There is really no occasion to apply the fee simple concept if
the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on
its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a
necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so
desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the
return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.
Public use, expanded concept: Public use, as an eminent
domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of usefulness, utility, or advantage, or
what is productive of general benefit of the public. If the
genuine public necessity- the very reason or condition as it
were- allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a
private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more
cogent point for the governments retention of the
expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if
the government devotes the property to another public use
very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has
been said that the direct use by the state of its power to
oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession
to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use,
the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator
to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter
desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power
of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for
which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the
judgment would violate the property owners right to justice,
fairness, and equity. The government cannot plausibly keep
the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in
the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is
not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand
the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question
to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and
fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocians return to
MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest
to be computed from default, which in this case should run
from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance
obligation. They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary
expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their
respective lots and the monetary value of its services in
managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as
private owners, were benefited thereby.
Spouses Yusay vs Court Of Appeals
GR No. 156684
April 6, 2011
FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044
square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street
and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong
City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the
rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the
land was their only property and only source of income.
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted
Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City
Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal
steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for
the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less
privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552
HELD:
No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary
nature while an ordinance is a law that is permanent in
character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred
from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of
what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant
circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely
a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a
third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members. In simply expressing its sentiment or
opinion through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all
gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
25
Henry Sy vs Quezon City
GR No. 202690
June 5, 2013
Facts:
November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael
Mathay, filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC in
order to acquire a 1,000 sqm parcel of land, owned and
registered under the name of Henry Sy, which was intended
to be used as a site for several government activities.
March 18, 1997, pursuant to Sec. 19 of the LGC, the City
deposited the amount of Php 241, 090 with the Office of the
Clerk of Court, representing the 15% fair market value of
the subject property based on its tax declaration. Sy did not
question the right to expropriate the property but only the
amount of just compensation. The RTC tasked 3
commissioners to determine the proper amount of just
compensation. It was decided by 2 of them that it should be
at Php 5,500 per sqm to be computed from the date of the
filing of the expropriation complaint. On the other hand, 1
said that the amount should be Php 13,500 per sqm.
The RTC ruled that just compensation should be Php 5,500
per sqm. It also didnt award damages and back rentals in
favor of Sy. For equity considerations, 6% legal interest was
awarded and computed from the date of the filing of the
expropriation until full payment of just compensation. The
CA affirmed the RTCs ruling with the modification that the
City should pay Sy the amount of Php 200,000 as exemplary
damages (because the City took the property without even
initiating expropriation proceedings) and attorneys fees
equivalent to 1% of the total amount due. Sy was denied
payment for back rentals and damages for shelved plans of
utilization.
Both Sy and the Citys motion for reconsiderations were
denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Did the CA err in upholding the amount of just
compensation, the grant of 6% legal interest and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees?
Ruling:
The petition was partly granted.
The correct legal interest is 12% owing to the nature of the
Citys obligation as an effective forbearance. It was held in
Republic v. CA that the debt incurred by the government on
account of the taking of the property subject of an
expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance which
therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal
interest. Also, legal interest should accrued from the time of
the taking of the property in 1986 (when the property was
already used as a Brgy. Day Care and Office? And not from
the filing of the complaint for expropriation on November 7,
1996. The lack of proper authorization, i.e. resolution to
effect the expropriation, did not affect the character of the
Citys taking of the subject property back in 1986. There is
taking when the owner is actually deprived of the use of
his property thus, the legal character of the Citys action as
one of taking did not change.
Because of such irregularity in the actual taking and filing
of the expropriation proceedings, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees should be awarded to the landowner for
equity purposes. MIAA v. Rodriguez states that these are
wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed
and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages and
attorneys fees is in order.
With regard to the amount of just compensation, the Php
5,500 per sqm cannot be sustained. This was derived from
the documents that were issued in 1996. Valuation should
be based as of the time of taking which was in 1986. Thus,
the case should be remanded to the RTC for proper
assessment.
Mangune vs Ermita
GR No. 182604
September 27, 2016
Facts:
R.A. No. 7842 was enacted establishing the Taguig-Pateros
District Hospital (TPDH), under the administration and
supervision of the DOH.
President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the
City of Taguig. E.O. No. 567 provided that it was issued
pursuant to R.A. No. 7160 /Local Government Code of 1991
and the President's continuing authority to reorganize the
offices under the executive department.
Thus, the City of Taguig, through its Mayor Tinga, issued
E.O. No. 053 formalizing the plan for the City of Taguig's
take-over of the operations of TPDH. The City of Taguig and
the DOH subsequently entered into a MOA providing the
details of the transition and turn-over of the hospital's
operations from the DOH to the City of Taguig.
Petitioners aver that E.O. No. 567 contradicts the
constitutional principle of separation of powers as: (1) it
amends the Local Government Code, particularly its Section
17(e), which limits devolution of basic services and facilities
to LGUs to only 6 months after the effectivity of the law; and
(2) it violates the DOH-issued IRR of the LGC which provides
that district health offices in the NCR, including its district
hospitals, are exempt from devolution. Petitioners also argue
that E.O. No. 567 violates R.A. No. 7305 because the former
did not include provisions for the expenses relative to
petitioners' transfer and reassignment.
Respondents counter that the issuance of E.O. No. 567 is
within the President's constitutional power of control over
government entities in the executive department, her
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President and her constitutional
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Consequently, the MOA between the City of Taguig and DOH
as well as the subsequent executive orders of then Mayor
Tinga are valid.
Issue:
WON E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
26
Held: E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. Thus, to be valid, an administrative issuance,
such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority
given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the above requisites.
First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and
constitutional basis.
E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the LGC
expressly devolving to the local government units the
delivery of basic services and facilities, including health
services.
It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization. Thus, E.O.
No. 567 merely implements and puts into operation the
policy and directive set forth in the Local Government Code.
Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of
the President to issue. The President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the executive department. This is
sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
The transfer of the administration and supervision of TPDH
from the DOH to the City of Taguig is a result of the
President's exercise of her power of control over the
executive department, including the DOH. In issuing E.O.
No. 567, the President was actually carrying out the
provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government
Code. She was performing her duty to ensure the faithful
execution of the laws.
As regards the second requisite, that the order must be
issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, petitioners do not question the procedure by
which E.O. No. 567 was issued. In the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the
government are presumed to be valid, and there being no
objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the
promulgation of E.O. No. 567, the presumption is that the
executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and
limitations imposed by law.
The third requisite provides that an administrative
issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the
Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for
such is the sole function of the legislature which the other
branches of the government cannot usurp.
In assailing E.O. No. 567, petitioners argue that it violates
Section 17(e) of the Local Government Code. For petitioners,
the provision limits the devolution of services to a period of
only six (6) months from the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Any devolution after the expiration of
such period can only be done through a statutory act. Thus,
the issuance of E.O. No. 567, which was well-beyond such
period, is a clear usurpation of legislative functions.
There is no question that the law favors devolution. In fact,
as mentioned earlier, Section 5(a) of the Local Government
Code explicitly states that in case of doubt, any question on
any provision on a power of a local government shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the LGU.
The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period
is that the framers of the law provided for the period to
prompt the national government to speedily devolve the
existing services to the LGUs. However, it was not intended
as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely prohibit the
national government from devolving services beyond the
period. Most especially so in this case because the TPDH
was created long after the lapse of the six-month period,
thus making its devolution within such period impossible.
Petitioners also posit that E.O. No. 567 violates the IRR
promulgated by the DOH pursuant to Article 25 of the IRR of
the Local Government Code as it excludes district health
offices and hospitals in the NCR, including TPDLI, from
devolution.
We emphasize that under the Local Government Code, it is
the Oversight Committee, composed of representatives from
both the executive and the legislative branches of
government, which was tasked to formulate the
implementing rules and regulations of the law. The Local
Government Code did not delegate to any other entity the
formulation of its implementing rules and regulations.
The Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any
provision directing the DOH to promulgate implementing
rules and regulations on the devolution of health services.
Article 25 of the IRR of the LGC mandates that the health
services to be provided by the LGUs must comply with the
standards and criteria given by the DOH. It does not direct
the DOH to create rules on how devolution of health services
must be implemented.
We emphasize that the DOH is subject to the power of
control of the President. Therefore, E.O. No. 567 issued by
the President shall prevail over any issuance made by the
DOH and not the other way around.
The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an
administrative issuance. It is an axiom in administrative law
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and
fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be
invalid.65 Specific to a reorganization, it is regarded as valid
provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer
of the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH
to the City of Taguig aims to provide the City of Taguig the
genuine and meaningful autonomy which would make it an
effective and efficient partner in the attainment of national
goals and providing basic health services and facilities to the
community. It implements and breathes life to the provisions
of the Constitution and the Local Government Code on
creating a more responsive and accountable local
27
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.
The petition is DENIED.
Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 104786
January 27, 1994
(229 SCRA 554)
TOPIC: Reclassification of Lands
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 (Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City), Section 8 of which required that
funeral parlors shall be established not less than 50 meters
from any residential structures, churches and other
institutional buildings.
Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance,
Patalinghug was issued a building permit for the construction
of a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan
Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.
Thereafter, Patalinghug commenced the construction of his
funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay
Agdao, Davao City that the construction of Patalinghugs
funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was
allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia
ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and
found that the nearest residential structure, owned by
Wilfred Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. But,
Patalinghug continued to construct his funeral parlor.
Consequently, private respondents filed a case for the
declaration of nullity of a building permit with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order with the trial court.
RTC: dismissed. After conducting its own ocular inspection,
it found that:
1. the residential building of Cribillo and Iglesia ni
Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95 meters
away, respectively, from the funeral parlor.
2. although the residential building owned by Mr.
Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor (separated
only by a concrete fence), said residential building
is being rented by Mr. Asiaten, who actually
devotes it to his laundry business with machinery
thereon.
CA: reversed and annulled Patalinghugs building permit on
the ground that the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter
radius from Mr. Tepoot's building. Although Mr. Teepots
building was used by his lessee for laundry business, it was
a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration, thus
paving Ordinance No. 363 applies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral home
constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone
in Davao City.

RULING:
YES. Petitioner did not violate Section 8 of Ordinance No.
363. The question on whether or not Mr. Teepots building is
residential or not was already resolved by the lower court
and said resolution is considered binding. The testimony of
City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was
used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place
where a laundry business was conducted. But while its
commercial aspect has been established by the presence of
machineries and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a
residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes
as such, was not fully substantiated.
A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the
property for zoning purposes. A property may have been
declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation
purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A
discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the
nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis
the determination of a property for zoning purposes. A tax
declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same
for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not
bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real
Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the
actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or
taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a
taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a
taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or
city assessor as commercial because its actual use is
commercial.
The finding that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial is
strengthened by the Sangguniang Panlungsods declaration
of the questioned area as commercial or C-2 under the same
ordinance. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was
declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local
government has reclassified an area as commercial, that
determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the
commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been
declared thru the ordinance, private respondents failed to
substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the
funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes
a "commercial purpose".
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a
municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote
the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to
this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which
regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted
comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of
the area covered thereunder.
CA decision is reversed. RTC decision is reinstated.
30. Quinanola
Nicolas Laynesa vs Uy
GR No. 149553
28
February 29, 2008
Facts:
In 1938, Robert Morley was the owner of a 4-hectare parcel
of land in Barrio Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
Santos Laynesa was his tenant over 2 1/5 hectares of the
land. In 1947, Morley sold the 4 has. toSixto Cuba, Sr. He
maintained Santos as the tenant over the 2-hectare portion
while instituting petitioner Nicolas Laynesa, son of Santos, as
his tenant over the remainder of the property.
On January 13, 1993, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land, transferring the property to
respondent PacitaUy, married to respondent PaquitoUy, in
consideration of PhP 80,000. Cuba, Jr. was named owner of
the land. Notably, the Deed was not registered with the
Register of Deeds. Later, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of
Assignment or Transfer of Rights of the undelivered owners
share of the produce in favor of Pacita.
On July 13, 1993, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate
the land. She claimed that she had purchased the land. The
Laynesas asked for proof of Pacitas acquisition, but she
could not produce any.
Subsequently, Pacita returned and again demanded that the
Laynesas vacate the property, this time exhibiting the Deed
of Absolute Sale of Unregistrered Land signed by Cuba, Jr.
Consequently, the Laynesas filed on October 13, 1993 a
petition against Pacita with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), for Legal Redemption
entitled. The Laynesas primarily sought that they be allowed
to redeem the land from Pacita.Thereafter, on November 25,
1993, Pacita filed a complaint docketed for Collection of
Rentals and Ejectment against the Laynesas with the
DARAB.
Meanwhile, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal
Agricultural Office (MAO) that the property was not prime
agricultural property, and from the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) that TCT No. 23276 was not covered
by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or by Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 27. The certifications were sought so the land
could be reclassified as industrial land.
On May 29, 1995, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili,
Camarines Sur approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied
Ordinance No. 28 and reclassified the land from agricultural
to industrial. Hence, the CA ruled DARAB without
jurisdiction. According to the CA, the evidence on record
shows that when the Laynesas filed their action with the
DARAB, the property was no longer agricultural but had
been reclassified.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the reclassification of a lot by a
municipal ordinance, without the Department of
Agrarian Reforms (DARs) approval, suffices to oust
the jurisdiction of the DARAB over a petition for
legal redemption filed by the tenants.
2. Whether or not there was a valid reclassification.
Ruling:
1. No, this position is incorrect.
Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-
agricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of
RA 7160, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint
filed by a tenant of the land in question for threatened
ejectment and redemption for the following reasons:
(1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. Likewise settled is
the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. DARAB Case
No.V-RC-028 was filed by the tenants of an agricultural land
for threatened ejectment and its redemption from
respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments of
the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter
and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws.
Such being the case, the complaint falls within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on the
quasi-judicial powers of the DAR. It bears stressing that the
DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Primary jurisdiction means in case of seeming conflict
between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts,
preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise
and experience in agrarian reform matters. Sec. 50 is also
explicit that except for the DA and DENR, all agrarian reform
matters are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
DAR.
(2) Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said
section shall be construed as repealing, amending or
modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657. As
such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on quasi-judicial powers of the
DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160.
In view of the foregoing reasons, we rule that the DARAB
retains jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian
reform matters even though the landowner or respondent
interposes the defense of reclassification of the subject lot
from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
2. On the issue of whether there has been a valid
reclassification of the subject lot to industrial land, we rule
that respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to
buttress their assertion that all the conditions and
requirements set by RA 7160 and MC 54 have been satisfied.
Respondent Pacita only procured a MAO certification that the
property was not prime agricultural property. The MARO
certified that the land was not covered by the OLT under PD
27. These two certifications will not suffice for the following
reasons:
(1) Sec. 20 of RA 7160 requires submission of the
recommendation or certification from the DA that the land
ceases to be economically feasible or sound for agricultural
purposes. In this case, the MAO certification attests only that
the lot is no longer prime agricultural property.
(2) Sec. 20 requires a certification from the DAR that the
land has not yet been distributed to beneficiaries under RA
6657 which took effect on June 15, 1988 nor covered by a
notice of coverage. In the case at bar, the MARO
certification which pertains only to PD 27 does not suffice.
29
(3) Respondents have not shown any compliance with Sec. 2
of MC 54 on the additional requirements and procedures for
reclassification such as the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Boards report and recommendation, the requisite
public hearings, and the DAs report and recommendation.
Based on the foregoing reasons, respondents have failed to
satisfy the requirements prescribed in Sec. 20 of RA 7160
and MC 54 and, hence, relief must be granted to petitioners.
Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local
Government Code, granted local government units the
power to reclassify agricultural land, the stringent
requirements set forth in Sec. 30 of said Code must be
strictly complied with. Such adherence to the legal
prescriptions is found wanting in the case at bar.
Ayala Land, Inc. vs Castillo, et. al.
GR NO. 178110
June 15, 2011
Reclassification of Lands
FACTS:
CCFI owned 2 parcels of land mortgaged in favor of MBC.
The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property
under compulsory acquisition under the CARL of 1988. MBC
foreclosed on the lien and the land was awarded to it in an
auction sale. Subsequently, the SC in G.R. No. 85960
ordered MBCs partial liquidation and allowed the sale of the
banks assets including the subject landholding. CCFI was
authorized to partially redeem the subject land and sell them
to a third party,Ayala Land Inc.
Prompted by the numerous proceedings for compulsory
acquisition initiated by the DAR against MBC, Governor
Reyes requested DAR Sec.to issue an order exempting the
landholdings of MBC from CARL and to declare a moratorium
on the compulsory acquisition, but thiswas denied. Upon
petition, the OP remanded the case to the DAR.
DARSecretary then issued a Resolution granting MBCs
"Request for Clearance to Sell," with the sale to be
undertaken by CCFI.He also issued Conversion Order
approving the conversion and/or exemption based on the
findings of the DARs CLUPPI and of the MARO that the land
was beyond 18 degrees in slope. CCFI submitted the
following:
(1)Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution
approving the conversion/ reclassification of the
said parcels of land from agricultural to residential,
commercial, and industrial uses; (2)Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution recommending conversion based
on the favorable findings by the Committee on
Housing and Land Use;
(3) Statement of Justification; and
(4) proof of settlement of claims.
Almost 3 years after the Conversion Order had been in force
and effect, the farmers tilling the subject land filed a Petition
for Revocation of Conversion Order alleging: (1) that the
sale by CCFI to ALI was invalid as it was done prior to the
lands conversion and was concealed in the application;and
(2) that CCFI and ALI were guilty of misrepresentation in
claiming that the property had been reclassified through a
mere Resolution when the law required an ordinance of the
Sanggunian.
The DAR Sec. denied the petition. This was affirmed by the
Office of the President which found the subject property to
have been legally converted into non-agricultural land, citing
the findings of the local agencies that it was beyond 18
degrees in slope, remained undeveloped, was not irrigated,
and was without any other source of irrigation in the area.
The CA reversed the findings of the OP and the DAR. Even if
the issue was only raised for the first time on appeal, the CA
ruled that the subject land could no longer be subject to
conversion because a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of
Acquisition had already been issued over the properties.
ISSUES:
1. Does a notice of acquisition ban conversion of land?
2. Is the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution sufficient
compliance with the requirement of the Conversion Order?
3. Was the subject property legally converted into non-
agricultural land?
RULING:
1. NO. A notice of acquisition is not an absolute, perpetual
ban on conversion. AO 12-94par. E, disallows applications
for conversion of lands for which the DAR has issued a
notice of acquisition. But this falls under heading VI,
"Policies and Guiding Principles."The law grants the DAR
Sec. the sole power to make this policy judgment, despite
the "guiding principle."Upon applicants compliance with the
application requirements, the DAR is rightly authorized to
determine the propriety of conversion. Ithas the sole
prerogative to make technical determinations on changes in
land use and to decide whether a parcel of agricultural land
has indeed been converted to non-agricultural use.
2. YES. While the LGCrequires that an ordinance must be
enacted for a valid reclassification,Conversion and
Reclassification are separate procedures. The 2 Resolutions
were submitted to the DAR only as supporting documents in
their application for Conversion. Par. B (3) Part VI of DAR
AO 12-94 allows conversion when the land will have greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes "as certified by the LGU." The 2 Resolutions, while
not strictly for purposes of reclassification, are sufficient
compliance with the requirement of the Conversion Order.
Par. E and B (3) were thus set merely as guidelines in issues
of conversion. CARL is to be solely implemented by the DAR,
taking into account current land use as governed by the
needs and political will of the local government and its
people.
3. YES. Land use conversion may be allowed when it is by
reason of changes in the predominant use brought about by
urban development. Par. B (3) Part VI of DAR AO 12-94
states that if at the time of the application, the land still falls
within the agricultural zone, conversion shall be allowed only
on the following instances: a) When the land has ceased to
be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes,
as certified by the Reg. Dir. of DA or b) When the locality
has become highly urbanized and the land will have a
greater economic value for residential, commercial and
industrial purposes, as certified by the LGU. The thrust of
this provision is that even if the land has not yet been
reclassified, if its use has changed towards the
modernization of the community, conversion is still allowed.
30
The Conversion Order has long attained finality and may no
longer be questioned.
Macasiano vs Diokno
212 SCRA 464
Facts:
Municplaity of Paraaque passed Ordinance no. 86 which
authorized the closure of Gabriele, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and theestablishment of a flea
market thereon. This was pursuant to MCC Ordinance No. 2,
approved by the Municipal council, authorizing andregulating
the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and
open spaceswithin Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea
market and/or vending areas.
Upon authority given by the Municipal Council, it entered
into an agreement with Palanyag whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain andmanage the flea market in the
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues
tothe treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.
Market stalls werethen put up by Palanyag on the said
streets.
Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of the
stalls but were later returned to Palanyag. Notice was given
to remove it within 10 otherwise they will be dismantled.
Respondents petitioned the court and Macasiano was
enjoined from enforcing the order of destroying and
confiscating the market stalls.
Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that
municipal roads are used forpublic service and are therefore
public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject
toprivate appropriation or private contract by any person,
even by the respondent Municipality of Paraaque. Petitioner
submits that a property already dedicated to publicuse
cannot be used for another public purpose and that absent a
clear showing that the Municipality of Paraaque has been
granted by the legislature a specific authority toconvert a
property already in public use to another public use,
respondent municipality is,therefore, bereft of any authority
to close municipal roads for the establishment of a
fleamarket.
Issue:
Is the ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal
council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of the
public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market vaild?
Ruling:
NO. J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension
and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and
are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government which are
devoted to public service are deemed public and are under
the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments
have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use
of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon
them by Congress.
Authority to local government units to close roads and other
similar public places should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law.
These basic principles have the effect of limiting such
authority of the province, city or municipality to close a
public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code
lays down the basic principle that properties of public
dominion devoted to public use and made available to the
public in general areoutside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government
unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a
road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole
purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property
from public use when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or necessary for public useor
public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use,
the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned. It is only then that the
respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in
accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II
of Blg. 333, known as Local Government Code.
The general public have a legal right to demandthe
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads
and streets and the officials of respondent municipality have
the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the
city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent
municipality has the authority to passthe disputed ordinance,
the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot
be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority
due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the
conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the
ordinance.
Cabrera vs Court of Appeals
195 SCRA 314
FACTS:
On September 19, 1969, the Provincial
Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158 resolving
to close the old road leading to the new Capitol
Building of the province to traffic effective October 31, 1969,
and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the
new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District
Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the
respective remaining portion of their properties.
Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed on
December 29, 1978, a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road
and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions
and Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land
fronting his house was a public road owned by the
Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and
therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contended that
31
Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid,
as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said
road.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the board has authority to close the road.
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to damages.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
The authority of the provincial board to close that road and
use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the
following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to
Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides,
R.A. No. 5185, Section 11 (II) (a):
II. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal
councils, as provided for in the pertinent sections of the
Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the
need of approval or direction from any official of the national
government: Provided, That such actions shall be subject to
approval or direction by the Provincial Board:
(a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. With the
prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal
council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or
square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part
thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person
prejudiced thereby. L
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used
or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or
conveyed.
Finally, the construction of the new road was undertaken
under the general welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience
the petitioner has suffered pales in significance compared
to the greater convenience the new road, which is wide and
concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to the
pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the
new road adds beauty and color not only to the
town of Virac but also to the whole
province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those
benefits, every individual in the province, including the
petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs Hon. Pascual A.
Bercilles
GR No. L-40474
August 29, 1975
Facts:
The terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City
was declared in a Resolution as an abandoned road, the
same not being included in the City Development Plan. Later
it was also sold in a public bidding by the Acting Cebu City
Mayor as authorized by a Resolution to petitioner, Cebu
Oxygen & Acetylene Co.
When petitioner sought to register such lot, the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the property being a public
road intended for public use is considered part of the public
domain and therefore outside the commerce of man.
Issue:
Is the local government empowered to close a public road or
street?
Held:
Yes. Section 31, paragraph 34 of the City Charter of Cebu
City (Republic Act No. 3857) gives the City of Cebu the valid
right to declare a road as abandoned. Since that portion of
the city street subject of petitioner's application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows
that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Favis vs City of Baguio
G.R. No. L-29910
April 25, 1969
(29 SCRA 456)
Facts:
Antonio Favis bought a parcel of land from the Assumption
Convent, Inc. Said lot is bounded on the southwest
(proposed road), owned by Assumption Convent, Inc. and
part of subdivision plan.
Simultaneous with the sale, Assumption donated to the City
"for road purposes" the lot indicated in its subdivision
plan as the proposed road. This donated road is used by
Favis as his means of egress and ingress from his residence
to a public street called Lapu-Lapu Street.
Lapu-Lapu Street is actually a portion of a big tract of land
registered in the name of the City, known as Baguio Market
Subdivision, for all of which the City holds Transfer
Certificate of Title. It branches out to various parts of the
market subdivision. Ocular inspection conducted by the trial
court disclosed that at the exact connecting point of Lapu-
Lapu Street and the donated road (which leads to appellant's
land), the road opening is only 2.5 meters wide.
Lot 25 of the Baguio Market Subdivision is northernmost in
said subdivision and contains an area of approximately 400
square meters. As far back as June, 1947, the City, leased
this Lot 25 to Shell for a ten-year period renewable for
another ten years. Shell constructed thereon a service
station of about 335 square meters.
In 1961, the City Council of Baguio passed a Resolution
authorizing the City thru its Mayor to lease to Shell two
parcels of land.
Lot 25 (Lot A), it is to be noted, is the same lot leased to
Shell way back in June, 1947 and the lease of Lot B is
merely an addition thereto. This additional area taken from
Lapu-Lapu Street is five (5) meters wide and twenty (20)
meters long and abuts Lot 25.
32
Antonio C. Favis lodged a letter- protest against the
additional lease made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it
would diminish the width of Lapu-Lapu Street to five meters
only; that it would destroy the symmetry of the said street
thus making it look very ugly; and that the City was bereft of
authority to lease any portion of its public streets in favor of
anyone.
Issue:
Does the city council have the power to close city streets like
Lapu-LapuStreet? Favis asserts that since municipal bodies
have no inherent power to vacate or withdraw a street from
public use, there must be a specific grant by the legislative
body to the city or municipality concerned
Ruling:
Undoubtedly, the City is explicitly empowered to close a city
street.
We may drive home the point by presenting here the
converse of the rule as set forth in Unson vs. Lacson, supra.
There, as here, the municipal board passed an ordinance
(No. 3470) withdrawing the northern portion of Callejondel
Carmen from public use, declaring it patrimonial property of
the City of Manila and authorizing its lease to Genato
Commercial Corporation. Unson had a lot bordering
Callejondel Carmen on which several buildings stood. One of
such buildings was known as "Commerce Building." Prior to
the construction of Genato's building on the leased premises,
Unson's lot had on its southern boundary two exits on
Callejondel Carmen which had to be closed upon the
construction of said building. Unson went to court alleging
that the ordinance and the contract of lease with Genato
were illegal. The trial court upheld the city's authority to
withdraw such alley for public use and to convert it into
patrimonial property. But, on appeal, we held:
"In this connection, respondents have been unable to cite
any legal provision specifically vesting in the City of Manila
the power to close Callejondel Carmen. Indeed, Section
18(x) of Republic Act No. 409 upon which appellees rely
authorizes the Municipal Board of Manila 'subject to the
provisions of existing laws, to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement . . . of streets, avenues,
alleys . . . and other public places,' but it says nothing about
the closing of any such places. The significance of this
silence becomes apparent when contrasted with Section
2246 of the Revised Administrative Code, explicitly vesting in
municipal councils of regularly organized municipalities the
power to close any municipal road, street, alley, park or
square, provided that persons prejudiced thereby are duly
indemnified, and that the previous approval of the
Department Head shall have been secured. The express
grant of such power to the aforementioned municipalities
and the absence of said grant to the City of Manila lead to
no other conclusion than that the power was intended to be
withheld from the latter."
The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain property is
still necessary for public use.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And
the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered
with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.
So the fact that some private interests may be served
incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.
Deemed as material factors which a municipality must
consider in deliberating upon the advisability of closing a
street are: "the topography of the property surrounding the
street in the light of ingress and egress to other streets; the
relationship of the street in the road system throughout the
subdivision; the problem posed by the 'dead end' of the
street; and width of the street; the cost of rebuilding and
maintaining the street as contrasted to its ultimate value to
all of the property in the vicinity; the inconvenience of those
visiting the subdivision; and whether the closing of the street
would cut off any property owners from access to a street."
Given the precept that the discretion of a municipal
corporation is broad in scope and should thus be accorded
great deference in the spirit of the Local Autonomy Law
(R.A. 2264), and absent a clear abuse of discretion, we hold
that the withdrawal for lease of the disputed portion of
Lapu-Lapu Street and the conversion of the remainder of the
dead-end part thereof into an alley, does not call for, and is
beyond the reach of, judicial interference.
Sangalang vs Immediate Appellate Court
176 SCRA 719
FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association
(BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public.
BAVA claim that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and
Jupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of property without
due process of law or expropriation without just
compensation.
ISSUE:
Is the act of the Mayor valid?
HELD:
YES, the opening of the streets was warranted by the
demands of the common good, in terms of traffic
decongestion and public convenience.
There is no merit in BAVA's claims as there is no taking of
property involved here. The act of the Mayor, now
challenged, is in the concept of Police power. Police power is
the states authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. It consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good.
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.The
Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and liberties. It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the
greater number. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. v. Drilon)
BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street
was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The
fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is
no argument against the Municipality's effort to ease
vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local
executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number,
in many cases, at the expense of the minority.
33
Pilapil vs Court of Appeals
216 SCRA 33
[Closure and Opening of Roads, Article 43-45, IRR of LGC,
Permanent, grounds and conditions]
Facts:
The petitioners-spouses (hereinafter, Pilapils) own a parcel
of land situated in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu, which
formerly belonged to Marcelo Pilapils grandfather.
Meanwhile, private respondents (hereinafter, Colomidas),
who are residents of Mandaue City, purchased on 4 June
1981 from Esteria vda. de Ceniza and the heirs of Leoncio
Ceniza a parcel of land, also located at Bahak, Poblacion,
Liloan, Cebu.
The Colomidas claim that they had acquired from Sesenando
Longkit a road right of way which leads towards the National
Road; this road right of way, however, ends at that portion
of the property of the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists
all the way to the said National Road. However, the Pilapils
specifically deny the existence of such camino vecinal.
The Colomidas presented witnesses testifying that the
camino vecinal traverses the property of the Pilapils. On the
other hand, the Pilapils presented Engineer Epifanio Jordan,
the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the
Municipality of Liloan to testify that on Liloan's Urban Land
Use Plan or zoning map which he prepared upon the
instruction of then Municipal Mayor Cesar Butai and which
was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan,
the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak does not traverse, but runs
along the side of the Pilapil property.
Both the trial court and Court of Appeals gave credence to
the testimonies of Colomidas witnesses and ruled in favor of
them.
Issue:
Does the camino vecinal traverses Pilapils property?
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the issue of the witnesses
credibility has been rendered moot by the unrebutted
evidence which shows that the Municipality of Liloan,
through its Sangguniang Bayan, had approved a zoning
plan, otherwise called an Urban Land Use Plan. This plan
indicates the relative location of the camino vecinal in sitio
Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu.
It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or
abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative
of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere
with such a right. Under the applicable law in this case,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code),
more specifically Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I
thereof provides:
A local government unit may likewise, through
its head acting pursuant to a resolution of
its Sangguniang and in accordance with existing law
and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay,
municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or
square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall
be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced
 thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the local unit
concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed.
A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for
public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a
local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan had the
unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use
map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may
consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be
constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close
any municipal road.
In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the
Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban Land Use Plan; this
plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor. By doing so,
the said legislative body determined, among others, the
location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak.
As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino
vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of Socrates
Pilapil. This is the proposed road leading to the national
highway." The Colomidas presented no rebuttal witness to
show that by the approval of the zoning map by the
Sangguniang Bayan, they were effectively deprived of access
to the national highway from their property.
Alolino v. Flores
GR No. 198774,
April 4, 2016
FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels
of land where he initially constructed a bungalow-type
house. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He
also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his
property. There are terraces on both floors. There are also
six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the
ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia
(Marie) Flores constructed their house/ sari-sari store on the
vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear
perimeter wall of Alolino's house. Since they were
constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not
secure a building permit. The structure is only about two (2)
to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house,
covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents'
construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he
had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress
to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the spouses remove their structure
but the latter refused. Thus, he complained about the illegal
construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of
Taguig. Sometime 2001 or 2002, respondents began
constructing a second floor to their structure, again without
securing a building permit. This floor was to serve as
residence for their daughter, Maria Teresa Sison. The
construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with
the Building Official of Taguig.
34
On May 17, 2002, the Office of the Barangay Council of
Tuktukan issued a certification that no settlement was
reached between the parties relative to Alolino's 1994
complaint. The respondents did not comply with the
directive from the building official, prompting Alolino to send
them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the
removal of their illegally constructed structure.
Respondents refused to comply. Thus, on February 14,
2003, Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with
the RTC.
RTC: Alolino had already previously acquired an easement of
light and view and that the respondents subsequently
blocked this easement with their construction. Respondents'
illegal construction was a private nuisance with respect to
Alolino because it prevented him from using the back portion
of his property and obstructed his free passage to
the barrio/municipal road. Moreover, respondents' house
was a public nuisance, having been illegally constructed on
a barrio road - a government property - without a building
permit.
CA: RTC decision is reversed and complaint is dismissed. (1)
Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view
because he never gave a formal prohibition against the
respondents; (2) Alolino was also at fault, having built his
house up to the edge of the property line in violation of the
National Building Code; (3) Alolino had not acquired an
easement of right of way to the barrio Road; and (4) that
the respondents' house was not a public nuisance because it
did not endanger the safety of its immediate surroundings.
The Government had already abandoned the barrio road
pursuant to the 2004 Sanggunian resolution.
ISSUE:
Was respondents property, where the house/sari-sari store
was built, validly reclassified from a municipal/barrio road to
a residential lot by the Sanggunian?
HELD: No.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari
sari store on government property. Properties of LGUs are
classified as either property for public use or patrimonial
property.
From the distinction provided in Article 424 NCC,
the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of
public dominion devoted to public use.
We find no merit in the respondents' contention that the
Local Government of Taguig had already withdrawn the
subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a
residential lot. To convert a barrio road into patrimonial
property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance,
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian
members, permanently closing the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but
merely passed a resolution. The difference between an
ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an
ordinance is a law but a resolution is only a declaration of
sentiment or opinion of the legislative body.
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute
control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate
the use of these properties unless specifically authorized by
Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC. In
exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with the
conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by
Congress. The Sanggunian's failure to comply with Section
21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the barrio road.
As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the
benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce
of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or
disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a
Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4) it
cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a
contract; (5) it is not subject to attachment and
execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easements.
Agreeably, Alolino does not have an easement of light and
view or an easement of right of way over the respondents'
property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not mean,
however, that the respondents are entitled to continue
occupying the barrio road and blocking the rear of Alolino's
house. Every building is subject to the easement which
prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing
nuisance.
Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents' house
is evidently a nuisance. A barrio road is designated for the
use of the general public who are entitled to free and
unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on
these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed
house, are injurious to public welfare and convenience. The
occupation and use of private individuals of public places
devoted to public use constitute public and private nuisances
and nuisance per se. Evidently, the respondents have no
right to maintain their occupation and permanent
obstruction of the barrio road. The interests of the few do
not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public
safety, good order, and general welfare.
City Council of Cebu vs Cuizon
47 SCRA 325
FACTS:
Respondents Mayor Cuizon and Tropical Commercial Co.
entered into a contract involving the purchase of road
construction equipment for $520,912.00 cash from Tropical.
The City Council of Cebu filed with the CFI a complaint to
nullify said contract as having been executed without prior
authority from it. Complaint was dismissed for lack of legal
capacity.
The lower court held that there is no provision of law
authorizing the city council to sue in behalf of the city and
that the authorized representative under the LGC is the city
mayor for that purpose. Hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the city councilors have the legal capacity to
question the validity of the contract entered into by the
mayor.
RULING:
35
Yes. Plaintiffs' right and legal interest as city councilors to
file the suit below and to prevent what they believe to be
unlawful disbursements of city funds by virtue of the
questioned contracts and commitments entered into by the
defendant city mayor notwithstanding the city council's
revocation of his authority with due notice thereof to
defendant bank must likewise be recognized.
The lower court's narrow construction of the city charter,
Republic Act No. 3857, that under section 20 (c) thereof, it is
only the city mayor who is empowered "to cause to be
instituted judicial proceedings to recover properties and
funds of the city wherever found and cause to be defended
all suits against the city," and that plaintiffs' suit must
therefore fail since "there is no provision in the said charter
which authorizes expressly or impliedly the city council or its
members to bring an action in behalf of the city" cannot
receive the Court's sanction.
The case at bar shows the manifest untenability of such a
narrow construction. Here where the defendant city mayor's
acts and contracts purportedly entered into on behalf of the
city are precisely questioned as unlawful, ultra vires and
beyond the scope of his authority, and the city should
therefore not be bound thereby nor incur any liability on
account thereof, the city mayor would be the last person to
file such a suit on behalf of the city, since he precisely
maintains the contrary position that his acts have been
lawful and duly bind the city.
To adhere to the lower court's narrow and unrealistic
interpretation would mean that no action against a city
mayor's actuations and contract in the name and on behalf
of the city could ever be questioned in court and subjected
to judicial action for a declaration of nullity and invalidity,
since no city mayor would file such an action on behalf of
the city to question, much less nullify, contracts executed by
him on behalf of the city and which he naturally believes to
be valid and within his authority.
Ramos, et. al. vs Court of Appeals
GR. No. 99425
March 3, 1997
(269 SCRA 34)
FACTS:
Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C.
Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc.
filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal
Ordinances No. 91 and No. 7 and the contract of lease over
a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of
Baliuag, Bulacan. The provincial Fiscal and the Provincial
Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer in behalf of
respondent municipality.At the pre-trial conference, Atty.
Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was
counsel for respondent municipality. Provincial Attorney
Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of
Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was
Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioners'
Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It
was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal
offer of evidence for respondent municipality.
During the hearing, petitioners questioned the personality of
Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of the respondent
municipality, and moved to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from
appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to
declare null and void the proceedings participated in and
undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos
and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion stating, among
others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for
respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his
collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is
adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken
by Atty. Romanillos. Respondent Judge issued an Order
which denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty.
Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to
declare null and void the proceeding participated in by Atty.
Romanillos; and on the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's
motion "to formally adopt the entire proceedings including
the formal offer of evidence". In support of his foregoing
action, respondent Judge reasoned:
"Petitioners" motion for the disqualification of Atty.
Romanillos as respondent municipality's counsel is
deemed moot and academic in view of his
withdrawal as counsel of said municipality.
The opposing counsel has never questioned his
appearance until after he made a formal offer of
evidence for the respondents. The acquiescence of
petitioners' counsel of his appearance is
tantamount to a waiver and petitioners are,
therefore, estopped to question the same.
ISSUES
1. Who is authorized to represent a municipality in a
civil suit against it?
2. What is the effect on the proceedings when a
private counsel represents a municipality? Elsewise
stated, may be the proceedings be validated by a
provincial attorney's adoption of the actions made
by a private counsel?
RULING:
As to the First Issue: Who is Authorized to Represent
a Municipality in its Lawsuits?
In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who
may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against
it, thus: . . . The matter of representation of a municipality
by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where we ruled that
private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality
in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal
district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic)
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in
cases where the municipality or municipal district in question
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality or municipal district in the same province.
When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal
shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal
is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
36
subdivision of a province a special attorney may be
employed by its council.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3,
Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.For the
aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the
provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's
case must appear on record.In the instant case, there is
nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on
appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is
without authority of law.The provincial fiscal's functions as
legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a province and
corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were subsequently
transferred to the provincial attorney.
The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that
only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal
attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only
in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a
municipality to represent it in lawsuits. These exceptions are
enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental, to wit:
When the municipality is an adverse party in a
case involving the provincial government or
another municipality or city within the province.
Where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to
serve and represent it.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent in court a particular municipality such
as:
o when original jurisdiction of case
involving the municipality is vested in
the Supreme Court,
o when the municipality is a party adverse
to the provincial government or to some
other municipality in the same province,
and
o when, in a case involving the
municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is
pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee,
creditor or otherwise.
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. It
may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondent
municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi
Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in
this same case. The order of the trial court stated that Atty.
Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating counsel
of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial attorney."
This collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not
have been recognized as legal. It has already been ruled in
this wise:The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal
are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not
legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of
Hagonoy. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal
cases, an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil
cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff.
As already stated, private lawyers may not represent
municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in
collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is
anchored on the principle that only accountable public
officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that
public funds should not be expanded to hire private
lawyers.Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for
questioning the legality of the appearance of Atty.
Romanillos, notwithstanding that they questioned the
witnesses of respondent municipality during the hearing of
its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality
of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals held that the legality of
the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings.
As to the Second Issue: Effect on Proceedings by
Adoptionof Unauthorized Representation
We agree with public respondent that such adoption
produces validity. This Court believes that conferring
legitimacy to the appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not
cause substantial prejudice on petitioners. Requiring new
trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality was
not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not
serve the interest of justice. After all, this Court does not see
any injustice committed against petitioners by the adoptions
of the work of private counsel nor any interest of justice
being served by requiring retrial of the case by the duly
authorized legal representative of the town.
In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private
lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of
substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may
adopt the work already performed in good faith by such
private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided
that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party and
(2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is
paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.
Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work
cannot bind the municipality.
People v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 162748-50
March 28, 2006
Facts:
Calamba Mayor Lajara and his fellow local publics officials,
members of the Sangguniang Bayan, and the President of
the Australian Professional Realty Inc. were charged before
the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sections 3, (g) and (j)
of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It
was alleged that said officials gave APRI unwarranted
privilege of constructing a shopping center in Calamba
despite knowledge that the said construction firm was not
qualified by the PCAB. There were other anomalies alleged
such as the terms and conditions of the MOA entered into
was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Municipality such that the actual operation and management
of the said shopping center and the income derived
therefrom for a period of 25 years will be directly under the
control and supervision of the APRI. It was also alleged that
no pre-qualification, bidding and awarding of the project was
conducted, thus, causing undue injury to the Government
and that the MOA was still under the study of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. It was argued that
the Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan, which authorized
the entering into the MOA, was not valid for the reason that
37
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna disapproved or did
not ratify the same.
Issue:
Can a Municipal Ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Bayan be declared invalid for its lack of approval or
ratification from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
Held:No.
Under Section 22 (d) of the Local Government Code, Local
government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of
their proprietary functions in the managements of their
economic enterprises As held in the case of Mendoza v.
Leon, the establishment, construction and maintenance of
municipal markets are undoubtedly pure proprietary function
of any municipality.
It is the opinion of this Court that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan may not restrict or frustrate the exercise of the
proprietary function of the municipality because the power
to review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is limited only to
a finding that an ordinance or resolution is beyond the
power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Pangbayan (Sec. 56 (c) Local Government Code).
OSG vs. Court of Appeals and the Municipal
Government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur
GR No. 199027
June 9, 2014
Facts:
Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a
petition for mandamus filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur
by the former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Saguiran for the payment of their unpaid terminal leave
benefits.
RTC dismissed the petition. On appeal, the CA issued a
notice requiring the OSG to file a memorandum for the
Municipality of Saguiran. Instead of filing the required
memorandum, OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion
requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum on
the ground that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be
represented by its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI (3)(i)
of the LGC which bar local government units from obtaining
the services of a lawyer other than their designated legal
officers. OSG contended that it has no legal authority to
represent the Municipality of Saguiran as its mandate is
limited to the representation of the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its official
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
Issue:
May the OSG be compelled to represent the Municipality of
Saguiran in its lawsuit?
Ruling: No.
LGC vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be
counsels of local government units.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the OSGs powers
and functions are as follows:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.
The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head
of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or
controlled corporations. The Office
of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the
services of a lawyer. It shall have
the following specific powers and
functions:
(1) Represent the Government in
the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party;
However, on the matter of counsels representation for the
government, the Administrative Code is not the only law that
delves on the issue. The Local Government Code limits the
lawyers who are authorized to represent the local
government units in court actions. Under Book III, Title V,
Article XI, Sec. 481 of LGC, it is provided that the legal
officer shall represent the local government unit in all civil
actions and special proceedings wherein the local
government unit or any official thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party. This provision of the LGC restricts the
lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its
counsel in court proceedings.
Being a special law on the issue of representation in court
that is exclusively made applicable to local government
units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the
Administrative Code, which is classified only as a general law
on the subject matter.
A general law and a special law on the same subject are
statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving
effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one
of which is special and particular and the other general
which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and
thus conflict with the special act, the special law must
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must not be taken as
intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions
38
of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to
construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs Zamboanga City
22 SCRA 1334
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the
Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province.
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga
City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that Buildings
and properties which the provinceshall abandon upon the
transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by
the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred toconsisted of 50 lots
and some buildingsconstructed thereon, located in the City o
f Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates
of title in the name of Zamboanga Province.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing
the province of Zamboanga into two (2):
Zamboanga del Norte andZamboanga del Sur.
Properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga
shall be divided equitably between the Province
of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga
del Sur by the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Auditor General. However,
on June 17, 1961, Republic Act
3039was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act
39 by providing thatall
buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of
charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961,
ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from
effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to
return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from
it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del
Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of
Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has
already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to
file on March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory
Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction"
Issue:
Whether or not Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its
private properties without due process and just
compensation
Ruling:
The matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property
is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without
due process and payment of just compensation||.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid
insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high
school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these
were held by the former Zamboanga province in its
governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive
Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of
the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental
purposes.|||
The fact that the 26 lots are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the
other hand, that the 24 lots used for
governmental purposes are also registered
is of no significance since
registration cannot convert public property to private.
Applying, Art. 424 of NCC, all the properties in question,
except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as
patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province.
Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and
the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are
not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public
works for public service"
Rabuco vs Villegas
55 SCRA656
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic
Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the
subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in
the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of
the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis
to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and
disposition does not constitute infringements of the due
process clause or the eminent domain provisions of
the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of
the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State
property.
Facts:
The City officials of the City of Manila questioned the
constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby congress
converted the lot in question together with another lot in
San Andres, Malate from "reserved as communal property"
39
and into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for
sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof.
It is argued invalid and unconstitutional for constituting
deprivation the City of Manila of the lots in question without
due process of law and without just compensation as
contended by the city officials.
Issue:
Whether or not the the lots in dispute maybe disposed
without paying just compensation to the city of Manila.
Held:
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be
stricken down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of
Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in
subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants
without payment of just compensation is untenable and
without basis, since the, lots in question are manifestly
owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity
and are therefore public property over which Congress had
absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property
owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it
could not be deprived without due process and without just
compensation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the
properties were "reserved as communal property" and
ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands
of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants
thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying
State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary
legislative power which will not be interfered with by the
courts.|||
The Court holds that the Act in question (Republic Act
3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the
social justice policy of the Constitution and the government
program of land for the landless and that they
were not "intended to expropriate the property involved but
merely to confirm its character as communal land of the
State and to make it available for disposition by the National
Government: . . . The subdivision of the land and
conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants
by Congressional authorization does not operate as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain without just
compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2),
Article III of the Constitution, but simply as
a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state
property."
Villanueva vs Castaneda
154 SCRA 142
Facts:
On 7 November 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando
(Pampanga) adopted Resolution 218 authorizing some 24
members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association (FUMTA) to construct permanent stalls and sell
along Mercado street, on a strip of land measuring 12 by 77
meters (talipapa). The action was protested on 10 November
1961 by Felicidad Villanueva, et. al. (claiming that they were
granted previous authorization by the municipal government
to conduct business therein), in Civil Case 2040, where the
Court of First Instance (CFI) Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a
writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the FUMTA
members from constructing the said stalls until final
resolution of the controversy.
On 18 January 1964, while the case was pending, the
municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution 29,
which declared the subject area as the parking place and as
the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly
revoking Resolution 218 (series of 1961).
On 2 November 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the
aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by
Villanueva, et. al., being public in nature, was beyond the
commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of
private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was
made permanent.
The decision was not enforced as the petitioners were not
evicted from the place. The number of vendors in the area
(talipapa) ballooned to 200. The area deteriorated
increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in
general, as the makeshift stalls render the area as virtual fire
trap.
On 12 January 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens
and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the
immediate implementation of Resolution 29, to restore the
property to its original and customary use as a public plaza.
Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the
municipal attorney, OIC (Office of the Mayor) Vicente
Macalino issued on 14 June 1982 a resolution requiring the
municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish
the stalls beginning 1 July 1982.
The Villanueva, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with the
CFI Pampanga (Civil Case 6470) on 26 June 1982.
Issue:
Did the mayor act whimsically in exercising his authority only
after the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation
to look into the complaint filed by the Association of
Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando?
Held:
The Court observes that even without such investigation and
recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in
ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its status
as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative
authorities. In calling first for the investigation (which the
petitioner saw fit to boycott), he was just scrupulously
paying deference to the requirements of due process, to
remove an taint of arbitrariness in the action he was caged
upon to take.
Since the occupation of the place in question in 1961 by the
original 24 stallholders (whose number later ballooned to
almost 200), it has deteriorated increasingly to the great
prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of
stags therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable
materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap, which,
added to the fact that it obstructs access to and from the
public market itself, has seriously endangered public safety.
The filthy condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet
items are sold, has aggravated health and sanitation
problems, besides pervading the place with a foul odor that
has spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is
unsightly, to the dismay and embarrassment of the
inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the
40
town of which they can all be proud. The vendors in the
talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the
flow of traffic, thereby impairing the convenience of
motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in
the public market, who pay substantial rentals to the
municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business
from prospective customers who are intercepted by the
talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper.
On top of all these, the people are denied the proper use of
the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their
leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic
and other communal activities of the town can be held.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the
petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to
the municipality under the general welfare clause. This
authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein. This authority was validly exercised in this case
through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964,
by the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the
resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement
for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered
or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In
fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation
of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an
act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Dacanay vs Asistio
GR No. 93654
May 6, 1992
Facts:
On January 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by
the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city
and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for
flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City mayor
opened up 7 flea markets in that city. One of those streets
was the Heroes del 96 Street where the petitioner lives.
Upon application of vendors, respondents City Mayor and
City Engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending
activities on said street.
In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC City Mayor of Caloocan
City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes
del 96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets.
As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del 96
Street, through the tolerance of public respondents, and in
clear violation of the decision in Civil Case No. C-12921,
Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus, praying
that public respondents be ordered to enforce the final
decision in Civil Case No. C-12921 which upheld the City
Mayors authority to order the demolition of market stalls on
V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del 96 streets and to
enforce PD No. 772 and other pertinent laws.
Issue:
Whether or not public streets or thoroughfares can be leased
or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city
ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Commission?
Held: NO
The petition for mandamus is meritorious. There is no doubt
that the disputed areas from which the private respondents
market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as
found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public
street is property for public use, hence outside the
commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424 NCC). Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the
right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of
the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void
for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the
city streets may not be bargained away through a contract.
The executive order issued by the Acting Mayor authorizing
the use of Heroes del 96 Street as a vending area for
stallholders who were granted licenses by the city
government contravenes the general law that reserves city
streets and roads for public use.
City of Angeles v Court of Appeals
261 SCRA 90
Facts:
In a Deed of Donation, respondent donated to the City of
Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in Barrio Pampanga, City
of Angeles (50,676 sq m). The amended deed provides that:
The properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely
for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Any change or
modification in the basic design or concept of said Sports
Center must have the prior written consent of the DONOR.
The properties donated are devoted and described as open
spaces of the DONORs subdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases the
DONOR and/or assumes any and all obligations and liabilities
appertaining to the properties donated.
On 1988, petitioners started the construction of a drug
rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon
learning thereof, private respondent protested such action
for being violative of the terms and conditions and also
offered another site for the rehabilitation center. Private
respondent filed a complaint for breach of the conditions
imposed in the amended deed of donation and seeking the
revocation of the donation. Petitioners admitted the
commencement of the construction but alleged that the
conditions imposed in the amended deed were contrary to
Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise known
as the Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality of Angeles.
Issue:
41
Whether a subdivision owner/developer is legally bound
under Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate to the city or
municipality the open space allocated exclusively for parks,
playground and recreational use.
Ruling:
PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines open space as an area
reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational
uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health
centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and
amenities. These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and
non-buildable. No portion of the parks and playgrounds
donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose
or purposes. Upon their completion x xx, the roads, alleys,
sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or
developer to the city or municipality and it shall be
mandatory for the local government to accept; provided,
however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to
the Homeowners Association of the project with the consent
of the city or municipality concerned. x xx. (amended sec.
31, PD 957)
It is clear from the aforequoted amendment that it is no
longer optional on the part of the subdivision
owner/developer to donate the open space for parks and
playgrounds; rather there is now a legal obligation to donate
the same. Although there is a proviso that the donation of
the parks and playgrounds may be made to the homeowners
association of the project with the consent of the city of
municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is
still obligated under the law to donate. Such option does not
change the mandatory character of the provision. The
donation has to be made regardless of which donee is
picked by the owner/developer. We hold that any condition
may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation
should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no
basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation of
the open space for parks and playgrounds should be
unconditional.
Chavez vs Public Estate Authority
GR No. 133250
November 11, 2003
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila
Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the
Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into
a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between
AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of
submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred
to AMARI.
By 1973, the government signed a contract with CDCP to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
and to construct Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road.
By 1977, Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA which
tasked the latter "to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x xx
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands and Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in
the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
By 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum
directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll
future works in MCCRRP x xx shall be funded and owned by
PEA.
By 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) .
By April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the
Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI
entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA,
in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5 On June 8,
1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto
Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
2.
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." And
as a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation.
By 1997, Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No.
365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No.
560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA,
contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.
ISSUE:
WHETHER or NOT AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire
and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay?NO
HELD:
1. The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands
and waters of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It
declares that all natural resources are owned by
the State and except for alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain, natural resources
cannot be alienated. The Amended JVA covers a
reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project
have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are
42
still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Further, it is provided that AMARI will
reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the
areas of land and it will shoulder the other
reclamation costs to be incurred. The foreshore
and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of
the lands of the public domain, waters and other
natural resources and consequently owned by the
State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas
shall not be alienable unless they are classified
as agricultural lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by
PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain
to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. Absent two official acts
a classification that these lands are
alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these
lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable
lands of the public domain. Only such an
official classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title
II3 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws
There is no express authority under either PD No.
1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA
"to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds
of lands x xx owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government."87 (Emphasis
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private
parties its patrimonial properties in accordance
with the PEA charter free from constitutional
limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's
patrimonial lands.PEA may also sell its alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative
authority, there is no longer any statutory
prohibition against such sales and the
constitutional ban does not apply to individuals.
PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales.
The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain
barred from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain, including
government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions
of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA
 to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis the contractor or developer is an individual,
supplied) would not apply to private corporations portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12
but only to individuals because of the hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD conveyed to him in ownership in view of the
No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 legislative authority allowing such conveyance.
Constitutions. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT
Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a
3. Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the
as alienable or disposable lands open to 1987 Constitution.
disposition, and further declared no longer needed
for public service, PEA would have to conduct a
public bidding in selling or leasing these lands.
PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63
Philippine Fisheries Development Authorities vs CA
and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in
GR No. 169836
the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding
July 31, 2007
a public auction. Moreover, under Section 79 of PD
No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code, the government is required to sell
Facts:
valuable government property through public
The Ministry of Public Works and Highways reclaimed from
bidding. It is only when the public auction fails
the sea a 21-hectare parcel of land in Barangay Tanza, Iloilo
that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case
City, and constructed thereon the IFPC, consisting of
the Commission on Audit must approve the selling
breakwater, a landing quay, a refrigeration building, a
price. The Commission on Audit implements
market hall, a municipal shed, an administration building, a
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
water and fuel oil supply system and other port related
through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27,
facilities and machineries. Upon its completion, the Ministry
1989. This circular emphasizes that government
of Public Works and Highways turned over IFPC to the
assets must be disposed of only through public
Authority, pursuant to Section 11 of PD 977, which places
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to
fishing port complexes and related facilities under the
only in case of "failure of public auction." At the
governance and operation of the Authority. Notwithstanding
public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are
said turn over, title to the land and buildings of the IFPC
qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and
remained with the Republic. The Authority thereafter leased
submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
portions of IFPC to private firms and individuals engaged in
Private corporations are barred from bidding at
fishing related businesses.
the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. The failure of public bidding on
Sometime in May 1988, the City of Iloilo assessed
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
the entire IFPC for real property taxes. The assessment
hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a
remained unpaid until the alleged total tax delinquency of
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the
the Authority for the fiscal years 1988 and 1989 amounted
area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of
to P5,057,349.67, inclusive of penalties and interests. To
public bidding happened on December 10, 1991,
satisfy the tax delinquency, the City of Iloilos cheduled
more than three years before the signing of the
on August 30, 1990, the sale at public auction of the IFPC.
original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic
situation in the country had greatly improved
Issue:
during the intervening period.
1) whether the Authority is a government owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC) or an instrumentality of the
4. The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article
national government;
XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear:
2) whether the IFPC is a property of public dominion.
"Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, x xx." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Ruling:
Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as For an entity to be considered as a GOCC, it must either be
legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Two
private parties, recognizes the constitutional requisites must concur before one may be classified as a
ban. private corporation, even one that stock corporation, namely: (1) that it has capital stock
undertakes the physical reclamation of a divided into shares, and (2) that it is authorized to distribute
government BOT project, cannot acquire dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to its
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in
stockholders. If only one requisite is present, it cannot be
view of the constitutional ban. Although Section
properly classified as a stock corporation. As for non-stock
302 of the Local Government Code does not
contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, corporations, they must have members and must not
the constitutional restrictions on land ownership distribute any part of their income to said members.
automatically apply even though not expressly
mentioned in the Local Government Code.Thus, The Authority is actually a national government
under either the BOT Law or the Local instrumentality which is defined as an agency of the national
Government Code, the contractor or developer, if government, not integrated within the department
a corporate entity, can only be paid with framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If

43
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.[13] When the law vests
in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the
government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers.
Thus, the Authority which is tasked with the special public
function to carry out the governments policy to promote the
development of the countrys fishing industry and improve
the efficiency in handling, preserving, marketing, and
distribution of fish and other aquatic products, exercises the
governmental powers of eminent domain,[14] and the power
to levy fees and charges.[15] At the same time, the Authority
exercises the general corporate powers conferred by laws
upon private and government-owned or controlled
corporations.[16]
By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local
governments cannot impose any kind of tax on national
government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local
governments are devoid of power to tax the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities. The
taxing powers of local governments do not extend to the
national government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code as stated in the
saving clause of Section 133.
The Iloilo fishing port which was constructed by the State for
public use and/or public service falls within the term port in
the aforecited provision. Being a property of public dominion
the same cannot be subject to execution or foreclosure
sale.[22] In like manner, the reclaimed land on which the
IFPC is built cannot be the object of a private or public sale
without Congressional authorization. Whether there are
improvements in the fishing port complex that should not
be construed to be embraced within the term port, involves
evidentiary matters that cannot be addressed in the present
case. As for now, considering that the Authority is a national
government instrumentality, any doubt on whether the
entire IFPC may be levied upon to satisfy the tax
delinquency should be resolved against the City of Iloilo.
In sum, the Court finds that the Authority is an
instrumentality of the national government, hence, it is liable
to pay real property taxes assessed by the City of Iloilo on
the IFPC only with respect to those portions which are
leased to private entities. Notwithstanding said tax
delinquency on the leased portions of the IFPC, the latter or
any part thereof, being a property of public domain, cannot
be sold at public auction. This means that the City
of Iloilo has to satisfy the tax delinquency through means
other than the sale at public auction of the IFPC.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority vs CA
GR No. 150301
October 2, 2007
44
Facts:
The controversy arose when
respondent Municipality of Navotas assessed the real estate
taxes allegedly due from petitioner Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981-1990 on
properties under its jurisdiction, management and operation
located inside the Navotas Fishing Port Complex (NFPC).
The assessed taxes had remained unpaid despite the
demands made by the municipality which prompted it,
through Municipal Treasurer Florante M. Barredo, to give
notice to petitioner on October 29, 1990 that the NFPC will
be sold at public auction on November 30, 1990 in order
that the municipality will be able to collect on petitioners
delinquent realty taxes which, as of June 30, 1990,
amounted to P23,128,304.51, inclusive of penalties.
Petitioner asked the RTC to enjoin the auction of the NFPC
on the ground that the properties comprising the NFPC are
owned by the Republic of the Philippines and are, thus,
exempt from taxation.According to petitioner, only a small
portion of NFPC which had been leased to private parties
may be subjected to real property tax which should be paid
by the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the PFDA should be liable for taxes
Held:
As a reclaimed land, the port complex should be considered
a reserved land. In NDC v. Cebu City, the Supreme Court
held that a reserved land is a public land that has been
withheld or kept back from sale or disposition. The land
remains an absolute property of the government. As its title
remains with the State, the reserved land is tax exempt.
In Government v. Cabangis and Lampria v. Director of
Lands, this Court declared that the land reclaimed from the
sea, as a result of the construction by the government of a
breakwater fronting the place where it is situated, belongs to
the State in accordance with Article 5 of the Law of Waters
of 1866.
The NFPC property is intended for public use and public
service. As such, it is owned by the State, hence, exempt
from real property tax.Nonetheless, the above exemption
does not apply when the beneficial use of the government
property has been granted to a taxable person. Section 234
(a) of the Code states that real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
is exempted from payment of the real property tax except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
As a rule, petitioner PFDA, being an instrumentality of the
national government, is exempt from real property tax but
the exemption does not extend to the portions of the NFPC
that were leased to taxable or private persons and entities
for their beneficial use.
Similarly, for the same reason, the NFPC cannot be sold at
public auction in satisfaction of the tax delinquency
assessments made by the Municipalityof Navotas on the
entire complex. Petitioner is only liable to pay the
amount of P62,841,947.79 representing the total taxes due
as of December 31, 2001 from PFDA-owned properties that
were leased, as shown in the Summary of Realty Taxes Due
Properties Owned and/or Managed by PFDA as per Realty
Tax Order of Payment dated September 16, 2002.
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan vs Hon. Dumdum
GR No. 168289
March 22, 2010
FACTS:
A Complaint was filed by herein private respondent Emily
Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against herein petitioners, the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive,
Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money and
damages. It was alleged that respondent, doing business as
KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling
surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts
and related supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople.
Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner
municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles,
which were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in the municipality. That because of Oples
earnest representation that funds had already been allocated
for the project, she agreed to deliver from her principal place
of business in Cebu City twenty-one motor vehicles whose
value totaled P5,820,000.00. She attached to the complaint
copies of the bills of lading showing that the items were
consigned, delivered to and received by petitioner
municipality on different dates.However, Ople allegedly did
not heed respondents claim for payment. That the total
obligation of petitioner had already totaled P10,026,060.13
exclusive of penalties and damages. Thus, respondent
prayed for full payment of the said amount, with interest at
not less than 2% per month, plus damages for business
losses, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and the costs of
the suit.
The trial court issued an Ordergranting respondents prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment conditioned upon the
posting of a bond, the trial court then issued the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff to attach the
estate, real and personal properties of petitioners.
Instead of addressing private respondents allegations,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismisson the ground that the
claim on which the action had been brought was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, that there was no
written contract or document that would evince the
supposed agreement they entered into with
respondent. They averred that contracts of this nature,
before being undertaken by the municipality, would
ordinarily be subject to several preconditions such as a
public bidding and prior approval of the municipal council
which, in this case, did not obtain. Petitioners also filed a
Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment Already Issued, invoking immunity of the state
from suit, unenforceability of the contract, and failure to
substantiate the allegation of fraud.
The trial court issued an Order denying the two
motions. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but they
were denied.
The Court of Appeals, finding no merit in the petition, upheld
private respondents claim and affirmed the trial courts
order.
45
ISSUE:
I. Whether the contract is unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds as there was no written contract or document that
would evince the supposed agreement
II. Whether there is a valid reason to deny petitioners
motion to discharge the writ of preliminary attachment.
RULING:
I.
NO. the contract is enforceable. Statute of Frauds found in
paragraph (2), Article 1403 of the Civil Code, requires for
enforceability certain contracts enumerated therein to be
evidenced by some note or memorandum. The term Statute
of Frauds is descriptive of statutes that require certain
classes of contracts to be in writing; and that do not deprive
the parties of the right to contract with respect to the
matters therein involved, but merely regulate the formalities
of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.
Thus, the Statute of Frauds only lays down the method by
which the enumerated contracts may be proved. But it does
not declare them invalid because they are not reduced to
writing inasmuch as, by law, contracts are obligatory in
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided
all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The
object is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of
obligations depending, for evidence thereof, on the
unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain
enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a
writing signed by the party to be charged. The effect of
noncompliance with this requirement is simply that no action
can be enforced under the given contracts. If an action is
nevertheless filed in court, it shall warrant a dismissal
under Section 1(i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, unless
there has been, among others, total or partial performance
of the obligation on the part of either party.
Since there exists an indication by way of allegation that
there has been performance of the obligation on the part of
respondent, the case is excluded from the coverage of the
rule on dismissals based on unenforceability under the
statute of frauds, and either party may then enforce its
claims against the other.
II.
NO. there is no valid reason to deny petitioners motion to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment. The general
rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is
that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued
without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit
but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when
the government enters into a business contract, as it then
descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it
may be embodied in a general or special law such as that
found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which vests local government
units with certain corporate powers one of them is the
power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and
liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where the
suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is
ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for
itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may
not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving
non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to
satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes
only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize
such judgment as final and make provisions for its full
satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by
general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only
to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the
judgment.
Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, citing Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,
There, the Court highlighted the reason for the rule, to wit:
The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimants
action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based
on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriations as
required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects. x
xx
With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of
preliminary attachment must be dissolved and, indeed, it
must not have been issued in the very first place. While
there is merit in private respondents position that she, by
affidavit, was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud in
the same way that the fraud attributable to petitioners was
sufficiently alleged in the complaint and, hence, the issuance
of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of
attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and
unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the
municipality may not, in the event that respondents claim is
validated, be subjected to writs of execution and
garnishment unless, of course, there has been a
corresponding appropriation provided by law.
Viuda de Tantoco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
49 Phil 52
Facts:
Municipality of Iloilo appropriated 2 strips of land owned by
petitioner for widening of a street. - Petitioner files case in
Court of First Instance to recover the purchase price for the
said lots. The CFI of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to
pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was
unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a
writ of execution issue against the property of the said
municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto
trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo
and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and
Mandurriao.
46
The Municipality files a motion to dissolve the attachment
and declare such as null and void for being illegal. This was
granted by the CFI.
Issue:
Can the properties mentioned be attached by a judgment-
debtor of a municipality?
Ruling:
Citing Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of
Guinobatan (32 Phil., 654), the SC ruled that the movable
and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for
governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the
payment of a judgment against the municipality. The
supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public
use to which such kind of property is devoted.
The Court further added that even the municipal income, is
exempt from levy and execution. SC cited volume 1, page
467, Municipal Corporations by Dillon stating the following:
The revenue of the public corporation is the
essential means by which it is enabled to perform
its appointed work. Deprived of its regular and
adequate supply of revenue, such a corporation is
practically destroyed and the ends of its erection
thwarted. Based upon considerations of this
character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that
not only the public property but also the taxes and
public revenues of such corporations cannot be
seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments
rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such
judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are
not subject to execution unless so declared by
statute. The doctrine of the inviolability of the
public revenues by the creditor is maintained,
although the corporation is in debt, and has no
means of payment but the taxes which it is
authorized to collect.
The following rules can therefore be culled from this case:
1. Properties held for public uses - and generally
everything held for governmental purposes - are not subject
to levy and sale under execution against such corporation.
The same rule applies to funds in the hands of a public
officer and taxes due to a municipal corporation.
2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its
proprietary capacity, as distinguished from its public or
governmental capacity, property not used or used for a
public purpose but for quasi-private purposes, it is the
general rule that such property may be seized and sold
under execution against the corporation.
3. Property held for public purposes is not subject
to execution merely because it is temporarily used for
private purposes. If the public use is wholly abandoned,
such property becomes subject to execution.
Baldivia vs Lota
107 Phil 1099
FACTS:
The petitioners Jose Baldivia, Marcelo Capuno, Carlito
Catapang, Eliseo Dimaculangan and Ricardo Bathan were
former members of the police force of the municipality of
Taal, province of Batangas. Shortly after the last election
held in November 1955, the petitioners resigned from their
positions. They have brought this instant action to compel
the respondent Flaviano Lota in his capacity as municipal
mayor of Taal, Batangas, to approve the vouchers submitted
by the petitioners for the payment of the leave pay which
they had in their favor at the time of their separation from
the service.
The evidence of the petitioners show that the petitioners
resigned because they belong to a different political faction
from that of the Respondent. In connection with their claim
for their leave pay, they had gone to the Office of the
President in Malacaang, and were able to secure a note
from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique c. Quema,
addressed to the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas,
requesting the latter to help the petitioners in securing the
payment of their accumulated vacation and sick leave.
Acting on the said note of Mr.Quema, the Provincial
Treasurer wrote separate letters to the respondent municipal
mayor and to the municipal treasurer of Taal, Batangas,
interceding in behalf of the petitioners and suggesting a
manner by which their claim may be paid.
The petitioner Jose Baldivia was actually able to receive one
month leave pay on two separate occasions, on December 1,
1955, and February 10, 1956, respectively. The other
petitioners were likewise able to receive one month leave
pay each on February 10, 1956. The petitioners claim,
however, that there is a balance remaining in their favor of
unpaid vacation leave in the amount of three and one-half (3
1/2) months in the case of Jose Baldivia, and four months
each in the case of the rest of the petitioners, all at the rate
of P35.00 a month. The municipal treasurer prepared the
corresponding vouchers for the payment of another one
month vacation leave to each of the petitioner and
submitted them to the respondent mayor for approval. The
respondent, however, refused to approve the same.
In justification for his act, respondent alleged that there is
no appropriation for the amount covered by said vouchers;
that petitioners held their positions illegally, they having
served beyond the time limit prescribed by law for the
effectivity of their appointments as temporary employees;
and that said appointments were illegal, the same having
been made without the consent of the municipal council,
which is required in sections 2199 and 2200 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may compel compel
respondent, FlavianoLota, as Mayor of Taal, Batangas, to
approve certain vouchers
RULING:
Yes, the mayor may be compelled through mandamus. While
the Court feels itself powerless to grant the relief prayed for
by the petitioners, it could not help but express its sympathy
with their situation, and its displeasure with the manner by
which they had been deprived of a claim which appeared to
be valid and meritorious. This case is another manifestation
of that unfortunate phenomenon in local politics in this
country wherein considerations of public interest have been
set aside for the satisfaction of petty factional jealousies and
sacrificed on the altar of political rivalries. The instant
petitioners are claiming only what is due them nothing more,
47
nothing less. The payment of leave pay to an employee who
has been separated from the service and who generally
depends for his continued sustenance on such amounts as
may be collected by him by reason of his past services, is
not only an expression of simple justice on the part of the
government, but is also designed for the maintenance of the
loftier ideal of morale in the public service. The respondent
in this case has shown unusual interest not for the purpose
of affording the petitioners the justice that is due them, but
in his attempt to find ways and means of defeating the
petitioners claim. The respondent has admitted that he had
spent over a thousand pesos in going to different
government offices and in making several trips to Manila to
consult with legal luminaries to research and find reasons
to justify his refusal to pay the petitioners. It is ironic indeed
that in so doing, he actually spent more than what the
petitioners are claiming to be the balance of their unpaid
leave. It may well be said that had the respondent instead
spent his money, time and effort to look for means by which
he could pay the petitioners, he would have dedicated
himself to a worthier cause and with decidedly lesser effort
and expense.
Indeed, respondent could have, and should have, either
included the claim of petitioners herein in the general budget
he is bound to submit, pursuant to section 2295 of the
Revised Administrative Code, or prepared a special budget
for said claim, and urged the municipal council to
appropriate the sum necessary therefor. In any event, if the
municipal mayor fails or refuses to make the necessary
appropriation, petitioners may bring an action against the
municipality for the recovery of what is due them and after
securing a judgment therefor, seek a writ of mandamus
against the municipal council and the municipal mayor to
compel the enactment and approval of the appropriation
ordinance necessary therefor.
Yuviengco vs Gonzales
108 Phil 247
DOCTRINE: In an order brought against a province for the
recovery of an amount representing the unpaid balance of
cost of construction of school projects, the Provincial
Treasurer and the Assistant Provincial Treasurer are parties,
because they are the legal custodians of the public funds of
the province and are in charge of the disbursement thereof.
Hence, if they willfully disobey and defy the court's order to
deposit the amount needed to settle the claim, which has
been found to be valid and demandable, the said officials
may be ordered arrested
FACTS:
On November 13, 1956, Geronimo V. Maluto, filed against
the Province of Cavite and Vicente Francisco, as District
Engineer of Cavite, a complaint for the recovery representing
the unpaid balance of costs of the construction of two school
projects, with legal interest.
Respondent court found that the evidence and the law
supported the validity of the said plaintiff's claim and thus
ordered the payment of the amounts prayed for. The said
judgment became final and executory.
On September 20, 1954, however, it adopted a resolution
authorizing payment of the said obligation subject to the
condition of availability of funds. On October 29, 1958,
respondent court ordered the Provincial Treasurer of Cavite
to deposit the moneywith the court with the warning that he
shall be ordered arrested upon failure to comply with said
order.
Compliance with the aforecited order was not made hence
the said court on October 30, 1958 ordered the arrest of
said Provincial Treasurer.
On November 3, 1958, respondent court issued another
order upon the plaintiff's urgent motion for compliance
showing that non-compliance, with the first order was
caused by the Provincial Treasurer's alleged sickness and
absence from office. The latter order commanded the
Assistant Provincial Treasurer of Cavite to act in place of the
Provincial Treasurer and deposit with the court.The said
order also contained a warning that said officer would be
held in contempt of court in case of non-compliance.
The petitioners assailed the orders contending that it is
arbitrary and capricious and that they (the Provincial
Treasurer and the Assistant Provincial Treasurer) are not
parties to the case (the proper party against whom
execution should have been made being allegedly the
Province of Cavite.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners considered parties to the case?
RULING:
It is illogical for petitioners to contend that the Provincial
Treasurer and the Assistant Provincial Treasurer are not
parties to the case. For, in a very real sense, indeed they
are, because they are the legitimate custodians of the public
funds of said province, the very officials in charge of the
disbursement of all provincial funds.
Petitioners' willful disobedience and defiance to respondent
court's order is irreverence of the court's dignity. In the
maintenance of the respect due to it, respondent court was
correct in the imposition of the orders of arrest.
Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois
GR No L-3485
June 30, 1950
Facts
Manaois obtained a judgment against the municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte and Judge De Guzman of said province
issued a writ of execution against the defendant
municipality. In compliance with said writ the Provincial
Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached the amount
of One thousand seven hundred twelve pesos and one
centavo (P1,712.01) in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay,
Ilocos Norte, representing the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio
Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendant
municipality and about forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five
different persons by the Municipality.
The Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte in representation of the
municipality of Paoay, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan asking for the dissolution of that
48
attachment of levy of the properties above-mentioned
which was denied. Instead of appealing from that order the
municipality of Paoay has filed the present petition for
certiorari with the writ of preliminary injunction, asking that
the order of respondent Judge dated October 6, 1946, be
reversed and that the attachment of the properties of the
municipality already mentioned be dissolved.
Issue:
Whether the properties attached by the sheriff for purposes
of execution are subject to levy.
Ruling:
No. The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay,
Ilocos Norte, which had been parceled out or divided into
lots and later let out to private persons for fishing purposes
at an annual rental are clearly not subject to execution. In
the first place, they do not belong to the municipality. They
may well be regarded as property of State. What the
municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be
considered the usufruct or the right to use said municipal
waters, granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised
Administrative Code which reads as follows:
1. SEC. 2321. Grant of fishery. A municipal
council shall have authority, for purposes of profit,
to grant the exclusive privileges of fishery or right
to conduct a fish-breeding ground within any
definite portion, or area, of the municipal waters.
"Municipal waters", as herein used, include not
only streams, lakes, and tidal waters, include
within the municipality, not being the subject of
private ownership, but also marine waters include
between two lines drawn perpendicular to the
general coast line from points where the
boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea
at high tide, and third line parallel with the
general coast line and distant from it three marine
leagues.
Where two municipalities are so situated on
opposite shores that there is less than six marine
leagues of marine waters between them the third
line shall be a line equally distant from the
opposite shores of the respective municipalities.
The municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or
right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to
enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away
from it as its property through execution.
The fishery lots numbering about forty in the municipality of
Paoay are not subject to execution. However, the amount of
P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of Paoay representing
the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out by
the municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and
the attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is valid. We
may add that other amounts coming or due from lessees of
the forty odd fishery lots leased by the municipality to
different persons may also be attached or garnished to
satisfy the judgment against the municipality of Paoay.
Municipality of Makati v. CA
GR Nos. 89898-99
October 1, 1990
Facts:
An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to
petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account
(Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with
the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing
the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of
Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing, respondent RTC
judge rendered a fixing the appraised value of the property
at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was
earlier released to private respondent.
Pending, petitioner filed a "Manifestation"informing the court
that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful
owner of the subject property because a new title over the
property had been registered in the name of Philippine
Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB). PSB filed a manifestation
informing the court that it had consolidated its ownership
over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. After several conferences, PSB and private
respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby
they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation
due from the expropriation proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order
whichordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to
PSB the sum of P4, 953,506.45 which corresponds to the
balance of the appraised value of the subject property from
the garnished account of petitioner. However, petitioner
contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so
would result in the disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation.
Respondent trial judge issued an order denying
petitioner'smotion for reconsideration on the ground that the
doctrine did not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically
opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject
property.
Petitioner in its petition before the Court of Appeals,alleges
for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the
PNB Buendia Branch, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3
exclusively for the expropriation of
thesubject property, with an outstanding
balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7
for statutory obligations and other
purposesof the municipal government,
with a balance of P170,098,421.72.
xxxxxxxxx
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was
specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had
initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no
objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of
the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94.
However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as
the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the
net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public
funds earmarked for the municipal government's other
49
statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without
the proper appropriation required under the law.
Issue:
Are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's
other statutory obligations exempted from execution without
the proper appropriation required under the law?
Ruling:
Yes. Public funds earmarked for the municipal government's
other statutory obligations exempted from execution without
the proper appropriation required under the law.
In this jurisdiction, well-settledis the rule that public funds
are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary
for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale
to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market
fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for
the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
The foregoing rule finds application in thecase at bar. Absent
a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed
anordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balancedue under the RTC decision,
less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A
265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly
effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and
PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality
fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment
of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel
the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor.
City of Quezon vs Lexber, Inc.
GR No. 141616
March 15, 2001
Facts:
On August 27, 1990, a Tri-Partite Memorandum of
Agreementwas drawn between petitioner City of Quezon,
represented by its then Mayor Brigido R. Simon, Jr.,
respondent Lexber, Inc. and the then Municipality of
Antipolo, whereby a 26,010 square meter parcel of land
located in Antipolowas to be used as a garbage dumping site
by petitioner and other Metro Manila cities or municipalities
authorized by the latter, for a 5-year period commencing in
January 1991 to December 1995. Part of the agreement was
that the landowner, represented by Lexber, shall be hired as
the exclusive supplier of manpower, heavy equipment and
engineering services for the dumpsite and shall also have
the right of first refusal for contracting such services.
This led to the drawing of first negotiated contractbetween
petitioner, represented by Mayor Simon, and Lexber
whereby the latter was engaged to construct the necessary
infrastructure at the dumpsite. Construction of said
infrastructure was completed and the contract price agreed
upon was accordingly paid to it by petitioner.Meanwhile, a
second negotiated contractwas entered into by Lexber with
petitioner. Lexber alleged that petitioner immediately
commenced dumping garbage on the landfill site
continuously from December 1991 until May
1992. Thereafter, petitioner ceased to dump garbage on the
said site for reasons not made known to
Lexber. Consequently, even while the dumpsite remained
unused, Lexber claimed it was entitled to payment for its
services as stipulated in the second negotiated
contract.Respondents counsel sent a demand letter to
petitioner demanding the payment of at least 50% of its
service fee under the said contract.
Petitioner, represented by Mayor Mathay,denied any liability
under the contract on the ground that the same was invalid
and unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the subject
contract was signed only then Mayor Simon and had neither
the approval nor ratification of the City Council, and it lacked
the required budget appropriation.
Thus, a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance or Rescission of Contract and Damages was
filed by Lexber against petitioner. Lexber averred that
because petitioner stopped dumping garbage on the
dumpsite after May 1992, Lexbers equipment and personnel
were idle to its damage and prejudice. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of respondent ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the said Judgment was affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Is a contract entered into by the city mayor involving the
expenditure of public funds by the local government without
prior appropriation by the city council valid and binding?
Ruling:
Petitioner insists that the answer is in the negative, arguing
that there is no escaping the stringent and mandatory
requirement of a prior appropriation, as well as a
certification that funds are available therefor.
There is no denying that Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445
(Auditing Code of the Philippines) provide that contracts
involving expenditure of public funds:
a. can be entered into only when there is an
appropriation therefor; an
b. must be certified by the proper accounting
official/agency that funds have been duly
appropriated for the purpose, which certification
shall be attached to and become an integral part
of the proposed contact.
However, the very same Presidential Decree No. 1445 does
not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso
facto makes a contract entered into by a local government
unit null and void.Consequently, public funds may be
disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law, but also
in pursuance of other specific statutory authority, i.e.,
Section 84 of PD 1445.
Furthermore, then Mayor Simon, Jr. did not enter into the
subject contract without legal authority. The Local
Government Code of 1983, or B.P. Blg. 337, which was
then in force, specifically and exclusively empowered the
50
city mayor to represent the city in its business transactions,
and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury and all
bonds, contracts and obligations of the city.Such power
granted to the city mayor by B.P. Blg. 337 was not qualified
nor restricted by any prior action or authority of the city
council.
Under B.P. Blg. 337, while the city mayor has no power to
appropriate funds to support the contracts, neither does said
law prohibit him from entering into contracts unless and until
funds are appropriated therefor. In fact, it is his bounden
duty to so represent the city in all its business
transactions. On the other hand, the city council must
provide for the depositing, leaving or throwing of
garbage and to appropriate funds for such expenses.It
cannot refuse to so provide and appropriate public funds for
such services which are very vital to the maintenance of
cleanliness of the city and the good health of its inhabitants.
There is no provision in B.P. Blg. 337, however, that
prohibits the city mayor from entering into contracts for the
public welfare, unless and until there is prior authority from
the city council. This requirement was imposed much later
by R.A. No. 7160, long after the contracts had already been
executed and implemented.
The trial court ruled that while there may not have been
prior authority or appropriation to enter into and implement
the second negotiated contract, the project denominated as
Quezon City Landfill Disposal System was duly supported by
a Certificate of Availability of Funds.
It must be noted that the Negotiated Contract dated
November 8, 1990 is not ipso facto absolutely null and
void. The subject thereof is perfectly within the authority of
the city government. It is pursuant to the Tripartite
Agreement entered into between the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the Municipality of Antipolo. The plaintiff was
given the exclusive right to exercise acts stated in the two
negotiated contracts, which are entered into to further carry
out and implement the provisions of the Tripartite
Agreement.
It is of no moment that the certificate referred to by the trial
court did not state that the amount necessary to cover the
proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for
expenditure on account thereof.The Certificate of Availability
of Fundsmerely showed that funds for the Landfill Disposal
System was available. The funds to cover the 1992 fiscal
year could have been made available and appropriated
therefor at the beginning of said year. That the Quezon City
government later refused to appropriate and approve
payments to Lexber under the contract despite its use of the
facilities for several months in 1992, is not respondents
fault, and being the aggrieved party, it cannot be made to
suffer the damage wrought by the petitioners failure or
refusal to abide by the contract.
When appellant City government, after the construction by
the appellee of the dumpsite structure in accordance with
the contract plans and specifications, started to dump
garbage collected in the City and consequently paid the
appellee for the services rendered, such acts produce and
constitute a ratification and approval of the negotiated
contract and necessarily should imply its waiver of the right
to assail the contracts enforceability.
 Manantan vs Municipality of Luna
82 Phil 844
FACTS:
The municipal council of Luna, Province of La Union, passed
its Resolution No. 32, series of 1945, the purpose of offering
at public auction on a lease of the privilege to catch
"bagus" fry within certain section of the municipal waters.
Acting on the authority granted in said resolution the
municipal treasurer issued the necessary notices for the
auction wherein it was stated, among other things that the
fishing privilege in question would be leased to the highest
bidder ranging from P1,000 and up together with a deposit
of 10 per cent of the amount so offered for the period of one
year from January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946. With the
further statement that bids for more than one year but not
more than four years can be offered.
In official confirmation, the municipal council passed
Resolution No. 37, series of 1946, granting to Julian
Segundo Manantan and his associates the fishing privilege in
question and authorizing the municipal mayor to execute the
corresponding contract of lease. The lease was to be four
years (from 1946 to 1949, inclusive) at the agreed price of
P1,000 for the first year payable immediately, and P2,400
for the succeeding three years, payable in a lump sum at the
beginning of 1947 or in installments at the discretion of the
municipal council.
After paying the P1,000 corresponding to the first year of
the lease, the lessees began catching "bangus" fry within the
fishery zone in question. But the municipal council, now
composed of a new set councilors headed by a new mayor,
passed, a two new resolution: one annulling the fishing
privilege granted to Julian Segundo Manantan and his
partners and another setting date for auction of the fishing
privilege. Subsequently, Manantan and his associates
commenced the present suit in the Court of First Instance of
La Union to have said resolution declared void and the
municipal council enjoined from carrying out the auction.
The municipal council, however, went ahead with the
auction and awarded the lease for the fishing privileges in
question to Timoteo Santaromana, whose bid was declared
to be the better of the two that were submitted.
Petitioners contends that the lower court erred in holding
Resolution No. 37 to be null and void, and in not declaring
Resolution No. 23 null and void as violative of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the passage of any law
impairing the obligation of contracts. It is obvious that the
case hinges on the validity of Resolution No. 37 granting the
fishing privileges to the petitioners. The learned trial judge
rightly held that Resolution No. 32 (the one authorizing the
first auction) was not invalidated by the fact that it was
disapproved by the provincial board, since "they only ground
upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal
resolution . . . invalid is when such resolution . . . is beyond
the powers conferred upon the council . . . making the
same" and there is no question that Resolution No. 32 is
within the powers granted to municipal councils by the
Fishery Law. His Honor, however, was in error in taking the
view that Resolution No. 37 and the lease contract granted
under it were null and void on the ground that when the
municipal council by said resolution "accepted the four-year
if proposal of petitioners and declared them to be the best
51
and highest bidders for the 1946-1947-1948-1949 fishing
privilege, the municipal council in effect awarded to the
petitioners the four fishing privilege without the intended
benefits of public auction, in violation of section 69 of Act
No. 4003, the Fishery Law, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 471." The trial judge thus proceeds on the
assumptions that Resolution No. 32, which authorized the
first auction, did not authorize a lease for more than one
year, so that the notice of public auction calling for bids for a
longer period was unauthorized and therefore void.
ISSUE:
Is Resolution 37, granting petitioners the 4-year fishing
privilege, valid?
RULING: YES.
It is true that the resolution fixes the minimum price for the
lease at P1, 000 for one year "beginning January 1, 1946, up
to and including December 31, 1949." But nowhere does it
say that the lease was to be for one year only. On the
contrary, it expressly provides that the lease "can be
extended for a period of from one to four years," thus
indicating an intention not to limit the duration of the lease
to one year. In accord with that intention, the municipal
treasurer, in announcing the public auction, inserted in the
notice a provision that "bids for more than one year but not
more than four years can be offered," and the same
municipal council which passed the resolution (No. 32)
confirmed that intention by entertaining and accepting in its
Resolution No. 37 the petitioners' bid for four years. It is a
rule repeatedly followed by this Court that "the construction
place upon a law at the time by the official in charge of
enforcing it should be respected."
As that part of the notice issued by the municipal treasurer
which calls for bids for a longer period than one year but not
more than four years is in accord with the real intent of
Resolution No. 32, as that intention was subsequently
confirmed in Resolution No. 37 of the same municipal
council, the said notice cannot be deemed to be
unauthorized and void, so that it is erro[neous] to hold that
he grant of the fishing privilege to the petitioners was null
and void for lack of a valid notice of the public auction.
It results that the contract of lease entered into under the
authority of Resolution No. 37 between the petitioners and
the municipal government of Luna is a valid and binding
contract and as such it is protected by the Constitution and
cannot, therefore, be impaired by a subsequent resolution
which sets in it aside and grants the fishing privilege to
another party.
Sangalang vs IAC
176 SCRA 759
FACTS:
Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of
Jupiter Street, Makati Metro Manila. Sangalang and the other
petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter Street initially
filed a case against Ayala to enforce by specific performance
restrictive easement upon property pursuant to stipulations
embodied in the deeds of sale cornering the subdivision, and
for damages,they want their property to remain residential
as agreed. The other petitions were also for the enforcement
of the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale
executed by the Ayala corporation.
The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all
sold by Makati Development Corporation MDC (which will
later merged with ayala, the company owned and operated
Bell-Air village) and also the owners of subject to certain
conditions and easements contained in the Deed Restrictions
which formed a part of each deed of sale. When MDC sold
the above-mentioned lots to appellees predecessor in
interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block between
Buendia Avenue and Jupiter street, from Reposo street in
the west to Zodiac Street in the east was still undeveloped.
Although it was not part of the original plan, MDC
constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along
jupiter.
In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its
ordinance no 81, providing for the zonification of Makati.
Under this ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class
A residential zone, with its boundary in the south extending
the center line of jupiter street. Under the zoning
classification, Jupiter street, therfore is a common boundary
of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone.
Gates have been installed by BAVA (Bell Air Village
Association) with its employ its security guards in strategic
locations across Jupiter Street to maintained, supervise and
enforce traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the
village. Then, on January 17, 1977 the Mayor of Makati
directed that in the interest of Public welfare and for the
purpose of easing traffic congestion, the streets of in Bel-Air
village should be opened for public use. The other streets in
Bel-Air were voluntarily opened except Jupiter street. The
Municipal engineer of Makati then wrote a letter addressed
to BAVA to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the
entire portion of Jupiter street from Makati Avenue to
Reposo Street. Finally, the municipal officials of makati
allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates
constructed/located at the corner of Reposo street and
Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences at Jupiter street
and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire
length of Jupiter to public traffic.
Petitioners brought the present action for damages against
the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation on the ground of
breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict. The area
ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was
brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged
breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status
of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective
cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners
and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street
for public use and Whether or not the exercise of police
power is valid.
HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence
nothing was violated. Petitioners cannot successfully rely on
the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence
along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as
evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain
a wall between the residential and commercial sections. It is
52
our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere
boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of Makati
and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the
records themselves reveals, by the petitioners themselves,
as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association
itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was
intended for the use by both -the commercial and residential
blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for the
exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-
Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished
from the general public.
Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still
overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which
represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The
petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed non-impairment
guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. While non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, I.e the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. Invariably described as the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government the
exercise of such power maybe judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is a capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having bee a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or
arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the
judgments so appealed.
61. Gocuan
Quisumbing vs Gov. Garcia
GR No. 175527
December 8, 2008
Facts:
COA conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu. It
found out that several contracts in the total amount of P102,
092, 841.47 were not
supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution
authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract,
as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160. In her
defense, Governor Garcia argued that there was already an
authority from the Sanggunian by virtue of appropriation
ordinance. However, this appropriation ordinance was only a
re-enacted budget of the previous year (2003).
Issue:
Is the re-enacted appropriation ordinance the same as prior
authorization by the Sanggunian as stated in Sec 22(c) of
the LGC?
Ruling:
No. The fact that the Province of Cebu operated under a
reenacted budget in 2004 lent a complexion to this case
which the trial court did not apprehend. Sec. 323 of R.A. No.
7160 provides that in case of a reenacted budget, only the
annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existing
positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and
essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and
supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be
deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in
accordance therewith.
It should be observed that, as indicated by the word only
preceding the above enumeration in Sec. 323, the items for
which disbursements may be made under a reenacted
budget are exclusive. Clearly, contractual obligations which
were not included in the previous years annual and
supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the local
government unit. It follows, too, that new contracts entered
into by the local chief executive require the prior approval of
the sanggunian.
The question of whether a sanggunian authorization
separate from the appropriation ordinance is required should
be resolved depending on the particular circumstances of
the case. Resort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary
in order to determine if there is a provision therein which
specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract
to be entered into. Should the appropriation ordinance, for
instance, already contain in sufficient detail the project and
cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief
executive needs to do after undergoing the requisite public
bidding is to execute the contract, no further authorization is
required, the appropriation ordinance already being
sufficient.
On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance
describe the projects in generic terms such as infrastructure
projects, inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and
sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems projects,
reclamation projects or roads and bridges, there is an
obvious need for a covering contract for every specific
project that in turn requires approval by
the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian approval may also be
required for the purchase of goods and services which are
neither specified in the appropriation ordinance nor
encompassed within the regular personal services and
maintenance operating expenses.
Vergara vs The Hon. Ombudsman
GR No. 174567
March 12, 2009
FACTS:
1. The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where
petitioner was a member, issued Resolution No. 115, Series
of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with
landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang,
and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing,
the choice for the new city hall site was limited to properties
owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.
2. The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series
of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots
owned by Pamana with a total area of 55,190 square meters
for the price of P129,017,600. Mayor Lajara was also
authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required
documents.
53
3. The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through
Mayor Lajara, entered into the following agreements: MOA,
Deed of Sale, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of
Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).
4. The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the
City Council. Petitioner, however, alleged that all these
documents were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly
noted by the Commission on Audit.
5. The respondents justified the absence of ratification by
the City Council of the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of
Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior
authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that
petitioner did not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given
prior authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts.
In fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact
Resolution No. 280.
6. The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City
Council was not a condition sine qua non for the local chief
executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The
law requires prior authorization from the City Council and in
this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City
Councils stamps of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara
to purchase the subject lots.
7. Aggrieved by the Ombudmans findings, petitioner
elevated the case before this Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the
lots should bear the ratification by the City Council of
Calamba
RULING:
Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the
Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Sale, Deed of
Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, do not bear the
ratification by the City Council.
In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
pointed out that the ratification by the City Council is not a
condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter
into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior
authorization from the City Council and in this case,
Resolution No. 280 is the City Councils stamp of approval
and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, provides:
Section 22.Corporate Powers. - x xx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization
by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy
of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous
place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal
or barangay hall. (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers,
duties, and compensation of the Chief Executive.
Specifically, it states that :
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and
Compensation. - x xx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:
x xx
(vi) Represent the city in all its business
transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds,
contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the
sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law
or ordinance; (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the
City Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara
to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the
SangguniangPanlungsod, it cannot be said that there was
evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of
ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the
properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to Pamana
or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to
Calamba City.
Another principle not discussed: A Resolution is enough to
authorize the local chief executive.
Verceles vs COA
September 13, 2016
Facts:
The Provincial Government of Catanduanes through
Governor Verceles, engaged the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to carry out the province's
tree seedlings production project (the project).The province
and PENRO entered into several Memoranda of Agreement
(MOA) to implement the project.obleslaw
On June 11, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP),
through Resolution No. 067-2001, gave blanket authority to
the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the
province.
The cost of the project was allegedly paid out of the
Economic Development Fund (EDF) allocation in the
provincial budget for calendar years (CY) 2001 and 2002.The
EDF is the 20% portion of the province's internal revenue
allotment (IRA) required by law to be spent on development
projects.
On October 12, 2001, the SP issued Resolution No. 104-A-
2001,12 which effectively revoked the blanket authority given
to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the
Province.
On February 4, 2003, the COA Audit Team Leader issued
an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM), finding that
Verceles should have sought prior authority from the SP
pursuant to Sections 22 (c)and 465 (b) (1) (vi) of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) before
54
executing any MOA after the issuance of Resolution No. 104-
A-2001.
According to Verceles, while prior authorization to enter into
a contract is the general rule, the LGC identifies an
exception, i.e., when the contract entered into is pursuant to
a law or ordinance. He points out that the funding for
the first and third MOAs were approved and included in the
budget of the province for CYs 2001 and 2002.chanrobleslaw
Verceles posits that even granting that Resolution No. 104-
A-2001 had revoked the governor's blanket authority to
enter into contracts on behalf of the province, the MOAs
merely implemented the items already identified in the
appropriation ordinances for CYs 2001 and 2002. Thus, he
could (as he did) enter into the MOAs to implement the
approved items in the budget.
Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were covered
by appropriations under the EDF of the Province's CY 2001
and CY 2002
The second, fourth and fifth MOAs, on the other hand, were
funded from augmentation of funds from savings, which
augmentations were ratified in the CY 2003 appropriation
ordinance. Augmentation is allowed under Section 336 of the
LGC and Article 454 (b) of the LGC implementing rules and
regulations.44 Verceles underscores that the appropriation
ordinance for CY 200345 ratified the second, fourth, and fifth
MOAs.
The COA refutes this claim on the grounds that: (1) the
ordinances did not specifically authorize Verceles to execute
the MOAs with the PENRO; and (2) the CY 2003
appropriation ordinance, which supposedly ratified the
augmentations made by Verceles in 2001 and 2002, could
not have retroactive application.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the governor was authorized by the SP to
enter into contracts in behalf of the province
2. Whether or not the governors power to augment was
validly exercised
Held:
1. Partly Yes. Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs
were funded by the EDF allocation of the province in CYs
2001 and 2002. We agree but only with respect to the third
MOA.
The prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter
into contracts on behalf of the local government unit may be
in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the
year which specifically covers the project, cost, or contract
to be entered into by the local government unit.56
chanrobleslaw
the LGC requires the local chief executive to secure prior
authorization from the sanggunian before he can enter into
contracts on behalf of the LGU.63 A separate prior
authorization is no longer required if the specific projects are
covered by appropriations64 in the annual budget65 of the
LGU. The appropriation ordinance passed by
the sanggunian is the local chief executive's authority to
enter into a contract implementing the project.
As required in Quisumbing v. Garcia, the local chief
executive must inquire if the provisions in the appropriation
ordinance specifically cover the expense to be incurred or
the contract to be entered into.
If the project or program is identified in the appropriation
ordinance in sufficient detail, then there is no more need to
obtain a separate or additional authority from
the sanggunian. In such case, the project and the cost are
already identified and approved by the sanggunian through
the appropriation ordinance.
On the other hand, the need for a covering contract arises
when the project is identified in generic terms. The covering
contract must also be approved by the sanggunian.
Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were funded by
the EDF allocation of the province in CYs 2001 and 2002. We
agree but only with respect to the third MOA. ( <-- 3M was
specifically allocated for seedling production project)
2. No. Under Section 336, the general rule is that funds shall
be available exclusively for the specific purpose for which
they have been appropriated. The exception is when the
local chief executive is authorized by ordinance to augment
any item in the approved annual budget from savings in
other items within the same expense class.
Article 45477 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC78 states that augmentation implies the existence in the
budget of an item, project, activity, or purpose with an
appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent
evaluation of needed resources is determined to be
deficient.
The question is whether the grant of authority to the local
chief executive to augment items in the annual budget can
be belatedly granted. To answer this, we review the case
of Araullo v. Sec. Aquino III.79
chanrobleslaw
Construing Section 25(5),80 Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the Court laid down the requisites for a valid
transfer of appropriated funds at the national level, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from
the appropriations for their respective offices;
and cralawlawlibrary
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective
offices.81chanrobleslaw
The crucial requisite as far as the fourth and fifth MOAs are
concerned is the first requisite, i.e., the existence of a law
(in this case, ordinance) authorizing the governor to
augment items in approved budget. As to the second MOA,
the crucial requisite is the third requisite, i.e., the existence
of an actual item to be augmented.
Second MOA (2001 EDF)
55
There was no valid augmentation made in CY 2001 that
could have covered the cost of the second MOA.
As discussed above, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance
did not identify the specific projects or items82 to be funded
by the EDF. How could Verceles transfer savings from
nonexistent items (in the EDF) to augment the tree
seedlings propagation project? The project that was
supposed to be augmented was also not identified in the CY
2001 appropriation ordinance.
The augmentation was legally impossible as there were no
items from which savings could have been generated from
and there was no item to which such savings could have
been transferred.83 The second MOA was thus correctly
disallowed.
Fourth and Fifth MOAs (2002 EDF)
Still in Araullo, we ruled that Section 25(5) Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, not being a self-executing provision of the
Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be
operative. That law, generally, is the general appropriation
act (GAA) of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first
requisite, the GAA should expressly authorize the transfer of
funds.84chanrobleslaw
Araullo suggests that for augmentations to be valid, the GAA
of a given fiscal year must expressly authorize the transfer
of funds in the same year. At the very least, a law must first
be passed authorizing the transfer of savings in the year that
realignments are to be made.
On the local level, Section 336 of the LGC requires an
implementing ordinance so that the local chief executive can
augment items in the annual budget of the LGU.
Applying Araullo, the appropriation ordinance of a given
fiscal year must expressly authorize the local chief executive
before he can make augmentations in that particular year, or
at the very least, he must be authorized by ordinance before
he can make augmentations.
Exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far as
their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved
in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception.
Consistent with the strict construction approach, we rule that
the requisite "authorized by ordinance" does not necessarily
and automatically include "ratified by ordinance."
The exception clause of Section 336 states: "the local chief
executive . . . may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment
any item in the approved annual budget . . . ."88 The key
phrase is "by ordinance, be authorized to augment." We
must therefore interpret this phrase in a manner that does
not easily erode the basic principle that funds shall be
available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they
have been appropriated.
To "authorize" means "to empower; to give a right or
authority to act." It means "to endow with authority or
effective legal power, warrant or right; to permit a thing to
be done in the future."89
chanrobleslaw
Thus, strictly speaking, the governor must be duly
authorized before he can make augmentations. We highlight
the words "to augment" suggesting that what is being
authorized is an act that has yet to happen.
Sison vs. People
GR Nos. 170339,170398-403
March 9, 2010
FACTS:
A state auditor conducted a post-audit investigation which
revealed that during the incumbency of petitioner Rolando E.
Sison, then municipal mayor of a fourth-class municipality,
no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of certain
equipment and supplies. During trial before the
Sandiganbayan, Sison himself testified that he made a
personal canvass, and indeed, no public bidding was
conducted, reasoning that since all suppliers were based in
Manila, nobody would bid anyway. The Sandiganbayan
convicted him of seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (RA) 3019. Sison appealed, invoking reasonable
doubt.
ISSUES:
Was there a failure to comply with the requirements of the
law on procurement of supplies?
Is Sison guilty of violating Sec. 3(e), RA 3019?
RULING:
RA 7160 explicitly provides that, as a rule, acquisitions of
supplies by local government units shall be through
competitive bidding.By way of exception, no bidding is
required in the following instances:
(1) personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) emergency purchase;
(3) negotiated purchase;
(4) direct purchase from manufacturers or
exclusive distributors; and
(5) purchase from other government entities.
Sison availed of personal canvass which is an exception to
the rule requiring public bidding. However, the law provides
limitations on such exception, to wit:
Sec. 367. Upon approval by the Committee on
Awards, procurement of supplies may be affected
after personal canvass of at least three (3)
responsible suppliers in the locality by a
committee of three (3) composed of the local
general services officer or the municipal or
barangay treasurer, as the case may be, the local
accountant, and the head of office or department
for whose use the supplies are being procured.
The award shall be decided by the Committee on
Awards.
Purchases under this Section shall not exceed the
amounts specified hereunder for all items in any
one (1) month for each local government unit:
xxxxxx
Fourth Class and Below Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00)
The use of the word shall indicates the mandatory nature
of the above provision which Sison violated. Moreover,
seeing as the equipment and supplies procured included one
56
Toyota Land Cruiser and 119 bags of cement, the maximum
of P20,000 was clearly exceeded.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid
down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how strict
they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. These requirements
are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure
transparency in the acquisition of government supplies,
especially since no public bidding is involved in personal
canvass.
Ong vs People
GR No. 176546
September 25, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was accused of malversation of public funds and
property in connection with several alleged irregularities
committed during her term as Mayor of Angadanan,
including the purchase of the dump truck for being grossly
overpriced. Upon finding of probable cause, she was indicted
or violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, as amended, with
respect to the acquisition of the dump truck. Sangguniang
Bayan members and complainants Ruben P. Lappay and
Mirasol P. Lappay both testified that the dump truck was
bought without conducting a public bidding or a resolution
by the Sangguniang Bayan; that the truck was merely
reconditioned and not brand new as can be seen from its
deplorable condition, worn tires and old battery; and that a
subsequent canvass of other suppliers showed that better
quality dump trucks cost no more than P500,000.00.
In her defense, petitioner testified that in 1996, the
municipality appropriated the amount of P1,000,000.00 for
the purchase of a dump truck;that pursuant to said
appropriation, the subject vehicle was purchased on August
12, 1996 for P750,000.00 through a negotiated purchase
from Josephine Ching of J.C. Trucking; that the public
bidding and prior Sangguniang Bayan resolution were
dispensed with pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA)
Resolution Nos. 95-244 and 95-244-A which do not require
the conduct of a public bidding on any negotiated purchase
in amounts not exceeding P10,000,000.00; that the truck
was not in disrepair as the same was inspected by the
Regional Engineer from COA who declared it fit and in good
running condition; and that the purchase was allowed by
COA because it did not issue a notice of disallowance
The Sandiganbayan found her guilty hence she appealed
denying causing injury or giving anybody any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of her
official or administrative functions, or that she is guilty of
any manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
negligence.
Issue:
If the acquisition is valid pursuant to a COA resolution
stating that there is no necessity of prescribing the limit of
purchases not subject to public bidding since Executive
Order No. 301 authorizes the heads of an agency with the
approval of the Department Heads to enter into a negotiated
purchase as long as the same is advantageous to the
government.
Ruling:
The contention that the acquisition through a negotiated
purchase was valid the same being pursuant to COA
Resolution Nos. 95-244 and 95-244-A, is untenable.
Petitioners reliance on said COA Resolutions is
misplaced. The resolutions are implementing guidelines
which must be read and applied in conjunction with Title
VI,23 Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 356 thereof
states the general rule that the acquisition of supplies by the
local government units shall be through competitive bidding.
a local chief executive could only resort to a negotiated
purchase under Section 366 of RA No. 7160 and COA
Resolution Nos. 95-244 and 95-244-A, if the following two
requisites are present: (1) public biddings have failed for at
least two consecutive times and; (2) no suppliers have
qualified to participate or win in the biddings.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that by procuring the
subject truck through a negotiated purchase without public
bidding, petitioner failed to comply with the above stated
procedure. Indeed, as the local chief executive, petitioner is
not only expected to know the proper procedure in the
procurement of supplies, she is also duty bound to follow
the same and her failure to discharge this duty constitutes
gross and inexcusable negligence.
Price quotations obtained from several suppliers24 as well as
the testimonies of Ramon de Guzman Sevilla, Ruben Lappay
and Mirasol Lappay proved that the dump truck purchased
by petitioner was over-priced. Hence, had petitioner
observed the proper procurement procedure, the
municipality of Angadanan could have acquired a dump
truck similar to, if not better than the one originally bought,
at a much lower price of not more than P500,000.00.
Without doubt, petitioners negligence caused undue injury
to the government while at the same time gave unwarranted
benefits to Josephine Ching.
City of Manila vs Genaro N. Teotico and CA
GR No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
Facts:
On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down
from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a
few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch
basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall,
Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla
complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On
appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila have control or supervision
over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages
suffered by Teotico
Ruling:
Decision affirmed. In its answer to the complaint, the City,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have
been constantly kept in good conditionand manholes
57
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's
"control or supervision."
Bernardino Jimenez vs City of Manila and
Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 71049
May 29, 1987
Facts:
Jimenez went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at
a time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep
rainwater. On his way home, he stepped on an uncovered
opening which could not be seen because of the dirty
rainwater, causing a rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside the
uncovered opening, to pierce his left leg. His left leg swelled
and he had to be confined for 20 days in the hospital.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the
Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration
the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a
Management and Operating Contract.
Respondent City maintains that it cannot be held liable for
the injuries because under the Management and Operating
Contract, Asiatic assumed all responsibility for damages
which may be suffered by third persons for any cause
attributable to it. Also, that under Article 1, Section 4 of RA
No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila): the City
shall not be liable for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the negligence or failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter.
Issue:
Is the City of Manila liable for damages?
Held: Yes
SC clarified that RA No. 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city
officers. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines provides specifically that: Provinces, cities
and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works under their control or supervision.
Therefore Art 2189 is decisive on this case.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability to attach, that the defective public works belong
to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility
is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over
the public building in question.
The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject
public market was admitted by: Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in
his letter to
Secretary of Finance; that the City of Manila employed a
market master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary
duty is to take direct supervision and control of that
particular market; and the provision under the LGC that the
treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision,
administration and control over public markets.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable.
Florentina A. Guilatco vs City of Dagupan and The
Honorable Court of Appeals
171 SCRA 382
FACTS:
While petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, a court Interpreter,
was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control
and supervision of the City of Dagupan), she accidentally fell
into a manhole located on said sidewalk. As a result, she had
to be hospitalized for 16 days because of her fractured right
leg and severe pain on all parts of her body. Despite her
discharge, she had difficulty in locomotion which prevented
her from reporting for duty as a court interpreter thereby
losing her income. Furthermore, she has lost several pounds
as a result of the accident and is no longer her former jovial
self, and has been unable to perform her religious, social,
and other activities which she used to do prior to the
incident.
Petitioner filed a civil action for recovery of damages against
respondent City of Dagupan. The city contended that Perez
Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a
national road that is not under the control or supervision of
the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the
city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public
Highways that has control or supervision through the
Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held
concurrently by the same person who is also the City
Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road
by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to
answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the
Civil Code
RULING: Yes.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from
injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition
of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.
58
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to
attach. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer whose duty includes the care and custody of the
public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of
water supply, and the control, maintenance and regulation
of the use of the same. The same charter of Dagupan also
provides that the laying out, construction and improvement
of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation
of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board.
Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has
supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.
Petitioner is entitled to actual damages in the amount of
P15,924; P20,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as
exemplary damages.
Municipality of San Juan vs CA
GR No. 121920
August 9, 2005
FACTS:
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
entered into a contract for water service connections with KC
Waterworks Service Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC
was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS
to conduct and effect excavationsat the corner of M. Paterno
and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road,
for the laying of water pipesand tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.
Only of the job was finished in view of the fact that the
workers were still required to re-excavate that particular
portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to
the concessionaires. Between 10:00 and 11:00 in the
evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her
Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of
thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan
Road towards thedirection of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro
Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The
road wasflooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the
left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the
workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa
wasfractured.Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-
awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro
Manila acomplaint for damages against MWSS, the
Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan
municipal officials.After due proceedings, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS
and theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to
her. CA affirmed RTC with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Juan can be held
liable
HELD:
Yes. Jurisprudenceteaches that for liability to arise under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads,streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a
province,city or municipality has control or supervision
thereof.At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is
not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
thatthe defective roads or streetsbelong to the province, city
or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
Whatsaid article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section
149, of the Local Government Code, the phrasesregulate
the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of
gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, and adoptmeasures to
ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live
wires and other similar hazards to life andproperty, are not
modified by the term municipal road. And neither can itbe
fairly inferred from the same provisionof Section 149 that
petitioners power of regulationvis--visthe activities therein
mentioned applies only in caseswhere such activities are to
be performed in municipalroads. To our mind, the
municipalitys liability for injuriescaused by its failure to
regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches
regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a
national or municipal road, for as long asthe same is within
its territorial jurisdiction. Neither is the petitioner relieved of
liability based on its purported lack of knowledge of the
excavation and thecondition of the road during the period
from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988 when the accident
occurred. It mustbe borne in mind that the obligation of the
petitioner to maintain the safe condition of the road within
its territory is acontinuing one which is not suspended while
a street is being repaired.
Nor can petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of Ordinance
82-01 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.Concededly,
Section 8 of the Ordinance makes the permittee/excavator
liable for death, injury and/or damages caused by the non-
completion of works and/or failure of the one undertaking
the works to adopt the required precautionary measures for
the protection of the general public. Significantly, however,
nowhere can it be found in said Ordinance any provision
exempting municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities
caused by their own negligent acts. Afortiori, nothing
prevents this Court from applying other relevant laws
concerning petitioners liability for the injuries sustained by
Biglang-awa on that fateful rainy evening of 31 May 1988.
Municipality of Pasay vs Manaois
86 Phil 629
Facts:
Municipality of Paoay has been leasing fishery lots on
municipal waters. It entered into a contract with Duque for
the lease of 3 fishery lots. Later on, the municipal council
confiscated the leased property for non-payment. Manaois
was the highest bidder for the lease of the property and paid
the rentals thereon. However, he was denied entry into the
area as Duque claims to be the rightful lessee. Manaois then
59
brought an action against the municipality to recover the
sum paid and damages.
Respondent obtained a judgment against the Municipality of
Paoay of a writ of execution against the defendant
municipality. In compliance with the said writ, the Sheriff
levied upon and attached the following properties:
"(1) The amount of One thousand seven
hundred twelve pesos and one centavo
(P1,712.01) in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay,
Ilocos Norte, representing the rental paid by Mr.
Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the
defendant municipality;"(2) About forty fishery
lots leased to thirty-five different persons by
the Municipality."
The Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, representing the
Municipality of Paoay, filed a petition asking for the
dissolution of the attachment or levy. After it was denied,
the petitioner now files a petition for certiorari with writ of
preliminary injunction to have the order of the RTC Judge
reversed. Allegedly, the properties attached are not subject
to levy because they are properties for public use.
Issue:
Are the properties exempt from attachment or levy? Are the
funds from the rent of these properties subject to levy or
attachment?
Ruling:
The property itself may not be levied or attached but the
funds coming therefrom may be.
There is no question that properties for public use held by
municipal corporations are not subject to levy and execution.
Even public revenues of municipal corporations destined for
the expenses of the municipality are also exempt from
execution. The reason is that they are held in trust for the
people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the
purposes for which municipal corporations are created.
Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by
a municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by great
weight of authority as the private asset of the town and may
be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The
same rule applies to municipal funds derived from
patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that
shares of stock held by a municipal corporation are subject
to execution.
The municipality does not own the water it leases, what it
only holds is usufruct in the issuance of licences. Even so,
the Municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right
of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner as it is merely
granted to them by the Legislature through Secc. 2321 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the
renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to
execution. In other words, to many municipalities
engaged in this business of letting out municipal waters
for fishing purposes, it is a sort of sideline, so that even
without it the municipality may still continue functioning
and perform its essential duties as such municipal
corporations.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal
waters for fishing purposes as a business.
Merritt vs Government of the Philippines Islands
34 Phil 311
Facts:
The plaintiff, Merritt who was a constructor, riding on a
motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle
Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof, upon
crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof,
so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act,
turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching
the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue,
without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post placed there.
Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was
severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he
could never perform his job the way he used to and that he
cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue
the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the
government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature
(An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The
lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.
Issue:
WON the government is liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance.
Held:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom
that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals
in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents.
The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent
(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office
60
if he is a special official) so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special
agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent
hence, there can be no liability from the government. The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.
Municipality of San Fernando (La Union) vs Firme
GR No. L-52179
April 8, 1991
(195 SCRA 692)
FACTS:
At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
(owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and
sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of
physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo
Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner raised as one of its defenses the non-suability of
the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is immune
from suit
RULING: YES.
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable
for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability
of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver,
acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance
of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox,
et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and
the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and
the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."
We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be
held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee,
who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and
deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality
no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Discussion on Non-suability of the State and the Dual
Capacity of LGUs:
Non-suability of the State
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly
provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent. Consent
takes the form of express or implied consent. Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
Consent is implied when the government enters into
business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the
other contracting party, and also when the State files a
complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and
cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject
to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself
to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if
it can, that the defendant is liable.
Dual Capacity of LGUs
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In one, they exercise the right
springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of
the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity,
though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless
public functionaries performing a public service, and as such
they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the
other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as
legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and
agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of
the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity,
and not for the state or sovereign power.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations
are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be
61
held answerable only if it can be shown that they
were acting in a proprietary capacity.
74. Quinanola
Mendoza vs De Leon
33 Phil 508
Facts:
An action for damages was filed against the individual
members of the municipal council of the municipality of
Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an
exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under
the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission.
After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was
forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted
by the herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same
ferry to another person.
Issue:
Are the members of the municipal council personally liable?
Ruling: Yes
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the
Municipal Code have both governmental and corporate or
business functions. Act No. 1643 provides that the use of
each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and
slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township
shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer
period not exceeding five years as may have been previously
approved by the provincial board of the province in which
the municipality or township is located. The leasing of a
municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of
time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a
lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with
the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect.
A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary or business
functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it
is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far
as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is
concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be
enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts
of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment
in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as
those of private corporations or individuals. As to such
matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is
for these purposes that the municipality is made liable to
suits in the courts. Municipal corporations are subject to be
sued upon contracts and in tort.
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or
employer must answer civilly of the negligence or want of
skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another, who is free from
contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations, under
the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this
rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for
damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist. To
create such liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the
act done which is injurious to others must be within the
scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by charter or
positive enactment (the extent of which powers all persons
are bound, at their peril, know); in other words, it must not
be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or
authority of the corporation to act in reference to it under
any circumstances.
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634,
the plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of
the ferry in question for the period of his lease. Were the
municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a
judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the
contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual
method of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex
delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of
municipalities. In administering the patrimonial property of
municipalities, the municipal council occupies, for most
purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private
corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the
term may be used, such as the fishing and ferry rights, etc.,
they must exercise considerable judgment. It required some
considerable amount of business acumen to compel
performance on the part of lessees of these privileges in
accordance with the terms of their leases and in a manner
which will not cause the property to deteriorate. Questions
must continually arise which are not expressly provided for
in contracts and which must be settled, if possible, in a
manner that will preserve the just claims of the municipality.
The rule of personal liability should be with municipal
councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or
managers of an ordinary private corporation. The defendants
are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the
ferry privilege in question.
Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Torio, et. al. vs Fontanilla
GR No. L-29993
October 23, 1978
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui passed 2 resolutions
providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration
and the creation of the town fiesta executive committee. The
council appropriated funds for the construction of 2 stages.
The stage collapsed while the troupe was performing the
zarzuela and its member, was pinned underneath and died
the following day.
The heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint to recover damages
against the Mun. ofMalasiqui, the Mun. Council and its
members. The municipality answered that no liability can
arise as the holding of a town fiesta is an exercise of
governmental functions.
ISSUES:
62
1. Is the holding of the town fiesta an exercise of a
governmental function?
2. Is the municipality liable for damages for the death of
Fontanilla?
RULING:
1. NO. Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the state and
promoting the public welfare. The holding of the town fiesta
by the municipality was an exercise of a proprietary function.
According to Article 2282 of the Revised Administrative
Code, municipalities are authorized to hold fiesta, but it is
not their duty to conduct such.It is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general
welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of
the state.
The distinction of powers is important in determining the
liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which
result in an injury to third persons.If the injury is caused in
the course of the performance of a governmental function,
no recovery can be had from the municipality nor from its
officers. On the other hand,with respect to proprietary
functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contract or ex delicto.
2. YES. Since the holding of a town fiesta is an exercise of a
proprietary function, the Municipality is liable for any injury
sustained on the occasion thereof. Under the doctrine of
respondent superior, the municipality is to be held liable for
the death of Fontanilla if that was attributable to the
negligence of the its officers, employees, or agents. In this
case, negligence was found in the failure of the Municipality
through the Committee on Entertainment and Stage to build
a stage strong enough to sustain the weight of the
performance and to take the necessary measure to insure
the personal safety of the participants.
However, the councilors are not liable as there was no
showing of bad faith or gross negligence on their part;they
were not participants in the wrongful act.
City of Manila vs IAC
179 SCRA 428
Facts:
Vivencio, husband of Irene Sto. Domingo,was buried in a
certain lot of the North Cemetery which was leased by the
City to wife for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021
as evidenced only by a receipt. The said term of duration
was not even recorded in the burial record of the Manila
North Cemetery.
Believing in good faith, in accordance to an administrative
order prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the
processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots and plots within the North
Cemetery, the lot was leased only for five years and was
ready for exhumation. The cemetery authorities then
exhumed and removed the remains of the late Vivencio from
the burial site and placed the bones and skull in a bag or
sack and kept the same in the depository orbodega of the
cemetery.
The same lot in question was rented out toanother so that
when Irene and her children went to visit on All Souls Dayin
their shock, consternation and dismayit was someone elses
tomb already. The authorities explained to Irene and was
informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased
husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the
exhumed remainsfrom the different burial lots of the North
Cemetery are being kept until they areretrieved by
interested parties. To her, the advice given was simply
unacceptable. She was too aggrieved that she came to court
for relief even before she could formally present her claims
and demands to the city government and tothe other
defendants named in the present complaint.
Petitioners contention: (1) North Cemetery is exclusively
devoted forpublic use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the
Compilation of the Ordinances of theCity of Manila and since
it is a political subdivision in theperformance of its
governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which
may becaused by its public officers and subordinate
employees; (2) Section 4, Article I of theRevised Charter of
Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries
topersons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any othercity officer, to enforce the
provision of its charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or
fromnegligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other
officers while enforcing orattempting to enforce said
provisions. - Revised Charter of Manila beinga special law
cannot be defeated by the Human Relations provisions of
the Civil Codebeing a general law.
Respondents maintained that the City of Manila entered into
acontract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary
functions with privaterespondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The
city and its officers therefore can be sued for anyviolation of
the contract of lease
Issue:
Is the operations and functions of a public cemetery a
proprietary function of the City of Manila hence making it
liable for damages?
Ruling:
YES. Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political
body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its
city government in conformity with law, and in its proper
corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and
be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-
public, governmental or political on the one hand, and
corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
In Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with
respect to proprietaryfunctions the settled rule is that a
municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex
contractu.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a
special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of
the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the
Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904.
The administration and government of the cemetery are
under the City Health Officer the order and police of the
cemetery, the opening of graves, inches, or tombs, the
exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are
under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of
the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the
63
procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of
burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through
Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975.With the acts of
dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of
Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was
leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence,
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision
entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for
such breach is prescribed in the contract.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, City of Manila is
liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed
to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The
contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6,
1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning
from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot
was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation,
the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force
and effect.
Quezon City vs Lexber Inc.
GR No. 141616
March 15, 2001
FACTS:
LEXBER INC. owned a parcel of land in Antipolo which was
contracted to be used as a garbage dumping site by Quezon
City and other Metro Manila Cities or municipalities
authorized by the latter for 5 years from Jan.1991 to Dec.
1995.
On August 27, 1990, a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn among
Quezon City, represented by Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.,
Lexber Inc. and Mun. of Antipolo. Part of the Agreement
was that Lexber Inc. shall be hired as the exclusive supplier
of manpower, heavy equipment and engineering services for
the dumpsite and shall also have the right of first refusal for
contracting such services.
On September 10, 1990, comes the first negotiated contract
between Quezon City represented by Mayor Simon and
Lexber Inc. for Lexber to construct the necessary
infrastructure at the dumpsite, designated as the Q.C.
Sanitary Landfill which was completed on November 25,
1991 and the contract price was paid by Q.C.
On November 8, 1990, second negotiated contract was
entered into between Lexber and Q.C. where it was agreed
that Lexber shall provided maintenance services in the form
of manpower, equipment and engineering operations for the
dumpsite. It was also agreed that Q.C. shall pay Lexter a
reduced fee of 50% of the monthly contract price if Q,C.
fails to dump the agreed volume of garbage for any given
month.
On December 11, 1991, Lexber was notified to commence
maintenance and dumping operations at the site starting on
Dec. 15, 1991 by Q.C. thru the City Engineer Alfredo
Macapugay, Proj. Manager Rene Lazaro, and Mayor Simon.
Q.C. immediately commenced dumping garbage on the
landfill site continuously from December 1991 until May
1992. Thereafter, it ceased to dump garbage on the site
without notice to Lexber who then claimed that even if the
dumpsite remains unused, it was entitled to payment for its
services as stipulated in the second negotiated contract.
Q.C. who is now acting thru Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. who
succeeded Mayor Simon in the interim, denied any liability
under the contract on the ground that it was invalid and
unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the contract was
signed only by Mayor Simon and was not approved nor
ratified by the City Council and it lacked the required budget
appropriation.
ISSUES:
1. Was the second negotiated contract null and void ab
initio because its execution was done in violation of
existing laws, more particularly Sections 85, 86 and 87
of P.D. 1445 and Section 177(b) of B.P. 337?
2. Do subsequent acts of Q.C. petitioner constituted a
ratification of the subject negotiated contract
notwithstanding the lack of appropriation?
RULING:
1. No, the second negotiated contract was entered in to
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. pursuant to law or specific statutory
authority as required by P.D. No. 1445. It is also evident
that even as early as April 4, 1991, funds which were
certified to as available had been allocated for use in the
first few months operation of the sanitary landfill.
P.D. 1445 does not provide that the absence of an
appropriation law ipso facto makes a contract entered into
by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of the
statute specifically provides: Revenue funds shall not be paid
out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance
of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only
pursuant to an appropriation law, but also in pursuance of
other specific authority, i.e., section 84 of PD 1445. Thus,
when a contract is entered into by a city mayor pursuant to
specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the
disbursement of funds from any public treasury or
depository therefor.
As such, an appropriation law is not the only authority upon
which public funds shall be disbursed. Furthermore, then
Mayor Simon did not enter into the subject contract without
legal authority. He was so authorized under BP 337, the
Local Government Code of 1993. We note that while the
subsequent Local government Code of 1991, which took
effect after the execution of the subject contract, provides
that the mayors representation must be upon authority of
the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or
ordinance, there was no such qualification under the old
code.
2. Yes, there was constructive ratification on the part of
petitioner. When appellant City government after the
construction by the appellee of the dumpsite structure in
accordance with the contract plans and specifications started
to dump garbage collected in the City and consequently paid
the appellee for the services rendered, such acts produce
64
and constitute a ratification and approval of the negotiated
contract and necessarily should imply its waiver of the right
to assail the contracts enforceability.
City of Manila vs IAC
GR No. 71159
November 15, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Irene Sto. Domingo leased a burial ground for the
remains of her late husband from the North Cemetery as
operated by the City Government of Manila for a period of
25 years from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The full
payment of Php50.00 is evidenced by a receipt. No other
document was executed as in fact, the burial record for the
lot does not reflect the duration of the lease.
Believing in good faith that the lease was only for 5 years in
accordance with an Administrative Order released in 1975
prescribing the procedure for the use and disposition of
burial lots, the subject lot was certified as ready for
exhumation.
When Irene Sto. Domingo went to visit her deceased loved
one on All Souls Day, she was shocked and dismayed to find
another stone marker on her husbands burial lot. When she
inquired from the office, she was told that the remains of
her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in
question which was given to another lessee.
And that she can look for the bones of her deceased
husband in the warehouse of the cemetery.
THUS, petitioner with her children, sued the City of Manila,
its officers from the City Health and North Cemetery for tort
and damages from breach of contract.
Issue:
Can the City of Manila be held liable for the violation of the
lease contract?
Ruling:
Yes. The City of Manila can be held liable to petitioners for
the breach of contractual obligations.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body
corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its
city government in conformity with law, and in its proper
corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and
be contracted with.
The North Cemetery is within the class of property, which
the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial
lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence,
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them.
 Province of Cebu vs IAC
GR No. 72841
January 29, 1987
(147 SCRA 447)
Facts:
On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent Governor Rene
Espina was on official business in Manila, the Vice-Governor,
Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the
Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the
City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all located in the City
of Cebuand authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed
of donation on behalf of the province. The deed of donation
was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu
by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the
City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. The document of
donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer.
The donation was later approved by the Office of the
President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.
According to the questioned deed of donation the lots
donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds
that would be used to finance its public improvement
projects. The City of Cebu was given a period of one (1)
year from August 15, 1964 within which to dispose of the
donated lots.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as
illegal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating
practically all the patrimonial property of the province of
Cebu, considering that the latter's income was less than one-
fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.
Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. announced
that he would borrow funds from the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and would use the donated lots as collaterals. In
July, 1965, the City of Cebu advertised the sale of all the lots
remaining unsold. Thereupon, Governor Espina,
apprehensive that the lots would be irretrievably lost by the
Province of Cebu, decided to go to court. He engaged the
services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the
case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu.
The Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the
Provincial Attorney, Baguia, to enter his appearance for the
Province of Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-
Governor and members of the Provincial Board in this case.
A compromise agreement was reached between the
province of Cebu and the city of Cebu.
For services rendered Atty. Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's
Lien, praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in
said case be entered upon the records. To said notice,
petitioner Province of Cebuopposed: the payment of
attorney's fees are not allowed by law.
Issue:
Can the governor validly engage the services of a private
lawyer and can the province be held liable to pay the fees?
Ruling:
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private
attorney has been settled in Ramos v. Court of Appeals (108
SCRA 728).
65
Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the
municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:
"Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality, or
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases
whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court
or in cases where the municipality, or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or
to some other municipality, or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and
of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. LLpr
"When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council."
The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the
Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it as when he
represents the province against a municipality.
The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should
be represented in its court cases by a government lawyer,
like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal, intended
that the local government should not be burdened with the
expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker also
assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation
would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its
litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney
and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the
corporation's interests, and that, as civil service employees,
they could be held accountable for any misconduct or
dereliction of duty
However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid
generaliterconceditur; inesthaecexceptio, si non aliquid sit
contra jus fasque (Where anything is granted generally, this
exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law
and right). Indeed, equity, as well as the exceptional
situation facing us in the case at bar, require a departure
from the established rule.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a
municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract
to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or
appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to
contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been
said to apply to all cases where money or other property of
a party is received under such circumstances that the
general law, independent of express contract implies an
obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to
the same." (38 Am. Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):
"The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine
of an implied contract does not connote an enforceable
obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which
equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the claim.
The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the
obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the
unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it.
The measure of recovery is the benefit received by the
municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of
the property or services, or the compensation specified in
the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the
invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and reasonable
not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to
the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true measure
of recovery."
The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract was
ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having
regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some
benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for
the purposes of denying answerability.
San Diego vs Municipality Of Naujan
107 Phil 118
FACTS:
Following a public bidding, a contract was entered into
between highest bidder San Diego and Municipality of
Naujan for the exclusive privilege of use the Butas River and
the Naujan Lake. San Diegos petition for extension for
another five years was approved and confirmed by the
municipal council of Naujan whose term was then about to
expire. Under a new set of municipal council members, the
resolution for the approval of San Diegos petition, was
revoked, for the reason that the extension was illegal, it
having been granted without competitive public bidding.
ISSUE:
Is the Resolution revoking the extension valid/ is the
municipality estopped from assailing the validity of the
contract?
HELD: YES, the municipal council was correct in revoking
the resolution.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a
municipal corporation to validate a contract which it has no
power to make, or which it is authorized to make only under
prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a
prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has
accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully
performed his part of the agreement, or has expanded large
sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently
assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel
against a municipality in such case would be to enable it to
do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, where a
contract is violative of public policy, the municipality
executing it cannot be estopped to essert the invalidity on
this ground; nor can it be estopped to assert the invalidity of
a contract which has ceded away, controlled, or
embarrassed its legislative or government powers.
There is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case
was awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the
rental and the extension of the term of the lease appear to
have been granted without previous public bidding.
66
It has been ruled that statutes requiring public bidding apply
to amendments of any contract already executed in
compliance with the law where such amendments alter the
original contract in some vital and essential particular.
Inasmuch as the period in a lease is a vital and essential
particular to the contract, we believe that the extension of
the lease period in this case, which was granted without the
essential requisite of public bidding, is not in accordance
with law.
Municipality of Jasaan v. Gentallan
GR No. 154961
May 09, 2005
Facts:
On December 14, 1994, then Mayor Jose Salcedo appointed
Jocelyn Gentallan as local civil registrar of the Municipality of
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. This was later confirmed by the
Civil Service Commission and because of the incaction of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jasaan, such appointment was
deemed approved. However, Rosalina Asis, a research aide
of in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, filed a protest but
was later dismissed by the CSC.
Nonetheless, the CSC reviewed the appointment and found
that Gentallan was not qualified for the position. Pursuant to
the CSC resolution to this effect, Gentallan was ordered by
the Mayor to vacate her position and resume her former
position as Assistant Registration Officer.
Gentallan appealed the resolution and the Court of Appeals
found that she was qualified to the position. However, the
mayor did not implement the courts decision to reinstate
respondent. Respondent, through her counsel, wrote the
CSCRO-10 requesting for an order directing the municipality
to reinstate her and pay her backwages. Despite the
favourable orders granted to Gentallan, the municipality did
not reinstate her and paid her back salaries.
The municipality claimed that Gentallan was not entitled to
back salaries because she was not illegally dismissed from
service and that it was merely following the previous orders
of the CSC when it ordered respondent to vacate the
position in issue.
This prompted respondent to appeal her case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is Gentallan entitled to payment of back salaries, RATA and
bonuses?
Ruling: Yes.
Firstly, the Supreme Court found that respondent was
qualified and eligible for the position of local civil registrar,
and there was no factual nor legal basis for her removal
from said position. The CA order to reinstate her had
become final and executory. The CA decision ought to be
upheld.
As a permanent appointee to the position, respondent
enjoys security of tenure. She is likewise entitled to all
benefits, rights and privileges attached to the position. She
cannot be removed or dismissed from the service without
just cause and without observing the requirements of due
process.
An illegally dismissed government employee who is later
ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other
monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to
her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an
employee who is reinstated after having been illegally
dismissed is considered as not having left her office and
should be given the corresponding compensation at the time
of her reinstatement.
In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that
malice or bad faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal
to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers. Thus, they
cannot be held personally accountable for her back salaries.
The municipal government, therefore, should disburse funds
to answer for her claims resulting from dismissal.
Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte vs Manaois
GR No. L-3485
June 30, 1950
FACTS:
The municipality of Paoay is and for many years have been
leasing fishery lots on municipal waters. These waters have
been parceled out in lots, either singly or in groups and let
out or rented after public bidding to the highest bidders,
ordinarily, for a year, but sometimes, for a longer period of
time.
On April 4, 1937, the municipality of Paoay entered into a
contract with one Francisco V. Duque for the lease of fishery
lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 at a rental of P1,218.79 per annum,
for a period of four years from January 1, 1937 to December
31, 1940.
In 1938, the municipal council of Paoay approved a
resolution confiscating said six fishery lots on the ground
that Duque had failed to comply with the terms of the lease
contract. Thereafter, the lease of fishery lots were
advertised for public bidding, including the lots above
mentioned. Teodoro Manaois, being the highest bidder for
lots 3 to 8, was awarded the lease as per resolution of the
municipal council of December 1, 1938.
On January 1, 1939, Manaois paid P2,025 as rental for the
year 1939. However, when Manaois and his men tried to
enter the property in order to exercise his right as lessee
and to catch fish, he found Duque and his men who claimed
that he (Duque) was still the lessee, and despite appeal of
Manaois to the Municipality to put him in possession and the
efforts of the municipality to oust Duque, the latter
succeeded in continuing in his possession and keeping
Manaois and his men out.
Manaois brought an action against the Municipality of Paoay
to recover not only the sum paid by him for the lease of the
fishery lots but also damages.
He obtained judgment in his favor in June, 1940, which
decision has long become final. Judge De Guzman of said
province issued a writ of execution against the defendant
67
municipality where the Provincial Sheriff levied upon and
attached the following properties: (1) P1,712.01 in the
Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing the
rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging
to the defendant municipality; and (2) About forty fishery
lots leased to thirty-five different persons by the
Municipality."
Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, representing Paoay, filed a
petition for the dissolution of that attachment or levy.
Denied, the municipality subsequently filed the present
petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction,
asking that the order be reversed and that the attachment
be dissolved contending that the properties attached by the
sheriff for purposes of execution are not subject to levy
because they are properties for public use.
ISSUE:
Were the (1) fishery lots and (2) rental payments for its
lease subject to levy and attachment?
HELD: (1) No. There can be no question that properties for
public use held by municipal corporations are not subject to
levy and execution.
This court has held that properties for public use like trucks
used for sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons, police
stations, public markets, together with the land on which
they stand are exempt from execution. Even public revenues
of municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the
municipality are also exempt from execution. The reason
behind this exemption extended to properties for public use,
and public municipal revenues is that they are held in trust
for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of
the purposes for which municipal corporations are created,
and that to subject said properties and public funds to
execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some
instances, destroy said purpose.
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte are clearly not subject to execution. In the first place,
they do not belong to the municipality. They may well be
regarded as property of the State. What the municipality of
Paoay hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct
or the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by
section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay
over its municipal waters, subject to execution to enforce a
judgment against the town? We are not prepared to answer
this question in the affirmative because there are powerful
reasons against its propriety and legality. In the first place, it
is not a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent right
of the town. It is based merely on a grant, more or less
temporary, made by the Legislature. All this only goes to
prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this
usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute
manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be
taken away from it as its property through execution.
Second, if this were to be allowed and this right sold on
execution, the buyer would immediately step into the shoes
of the judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer presumably
buys only the rights of the municipality. He does not buy the
fishery itself nor the municipal waters because that belongs
to the State. All that the buyer might do would be to let out
or rent to private individuals the fishery rights over the lots
into which the municipal waters had been parceled out or
divided, and that is, after public bidding. Then, we shall have
a situation rather anomalous to be sure, of a private
individual conducting public bidding, renting to the highest
bidders fishery lots over municipal waters which are property
of the State, and appropriating the rentals to his own private
use. The impropriety, if not illegality, of such a contingency
is readily apparent.
The situation imagined implies the deprivation of the
municipal corporation of a source of a substantial income,
expressly provided by law. Because of all this, we hold that
the right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal
waters, particularly, the forty odd fishery lots included in the
attachment by the Sheriff, is not subject to execution.
(2) Yes. The revenue or income coming from the renting of
these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution.
It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish this kind
of revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses
and market fees are provided for and imposed by the law,
they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose
of financing the governmental activities and functions of
municipal corporations. These revenues are fixed and
definite, so much so that the annual appropriations for the
expenses of the municipalities are based on these revenues.
Not so with the income derived from fisheries. In the first
place, the usufruct over municipal waters was granted by
the Legislature merely to help or bolster up the economy of
municipal government. Secondly, the amount of this income
is far from definite or fixed. It depends upon the amounts
which prospective bidders or lessees are willing to pay. In
other words, to many municipalities engaged in this business
of letting out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a
sort of sideline, so that even without it the municipality may
still continue functioning and perform its essential duties as
such municipal corporations.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal
waters for fishing purposes as a business for the reason that
the law itself allowed said municipalities to engage in it for
profit. And it is but just that a town so engaged should pay
and liquidate obligations contracted in connection with said
fishing business, with the income derived therefrom.
Therefore, the fishery lots in the municipality of Paoay are
not subject to execution. The levy and attachment made is
void. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal
treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by Demetrio
Tabije on fishery lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a
proper subject of levy, and the attachment made thereon by
the Sheriff is valid. We may add that other amounts coming
or due from lessees of the forty odd fishery lots leased by
the municipality to different persons may also be attached or
garnished to satisfy the judgment against the municipality of
Paoay.
Municipality of Makati vs CA
GR Nos. 89898-99
October 1, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of
land owned by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors
68
Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised
value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered
petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment
of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of
execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds
of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at
the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of
public funds without the proper appropriation required under
the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence,
petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public
funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the
properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which
are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses
and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of
Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public
funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under
the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly
effected on the public funds of petitioner.
2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent
and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against
it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in
order to compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and
use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable
failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession
of the property since the same has been the site of Makati
West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This
Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its
legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had
in fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should
be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Laganapan vs Asedillo
GR No. L-28353
September 30, 1987
FACTS:
On 4 January 1960,The petitioner Solano Laganapan was
appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan,
Laguna by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. His salary was of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies No.
increased and he was extended an appointment which was 2. Whether or not Solano Laganapan was illegally
approved as provisional by the Commissioner of Civil dismissed Yes.
Service. The petitioner was given another increase in salary 3. Whether or not the Municipality may be held
and a corresponding appointment was made which the equally liable with Mayor Asedillo Yes.
Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of
RULING:
Republic Act No. 2260, to continue until replaced by an
While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant
eligible but not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of
can bring a matter to court, it is necessary that he first
certification of eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of
exhaust all the remedies in the administrative branch of the
Laguna." For the third time, he was again given salary
government, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
increases, and new appointments were extended to him,
remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly
which appointments were also approved by the
held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of
Commissioner of Civil Service. However, on 16 February
administrative remedies is not applicable where the question
1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his
in dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act
position by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground
is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil
excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department
service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his
secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear
firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal
the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there
Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
petitioner's dismissal on the same day. Respondent Epifanio
intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter
Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan,
disregard of due process. The rule does not also apply
Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner.
where insistence on its observance would result in
Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna
nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule
abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
police of Kalayaan, Laguna. In view thereof, the petitioner
complained to the Police Commission which advised him to
In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the
file an injunction suit against Mayor Asedillo.
services of the appellee, the appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo
acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or
The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto
even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due
with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents
process. No charges were filed; nor was a hearing
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna,
conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity to
and Epifanio Ragotero, seeking his reinstatement to the
defend himself, despite the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic
position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back
Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966,
salaries and damages. In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio
which took effect on 8 September 1966, that "Members of
Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment
the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed
of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and
except upon written complaint filed under oath with the
the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services
Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or
could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure
incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government,
of the appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to
serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and
exhaust all administrative remedies. The respondent
violation of law." Following the rule, there was no need for
Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its part, alleged that
exhaustion of administrative remedies before appellee could
the petitioner has no cause of action against it; and that, if
come to court for the protection of his rights.
the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the
said mayor should be held solely liable therefor.
Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed
and the appellee was immediately removed from office and
The appellants contend that the appellee should have first
replaced by the appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same
exhausted all administrative remedies before he reported to
day, so that appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service,
the courts. They suggested that the appellee should have
even if available to the appellee, was not an adequate
appealed the order of dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Furthermore, appeal
Service in view of the provisions of Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16 of
to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not a pre-requisite to,
Republic Act No. 2260 which grant the Commissioner of Civil
nor a bar to the institution of quo warranto proceedings, so
Service the final authority to pass upon the removal,
that, as pointed out by the trial court, to require the appellee
separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this
employees in the competitive or classified service; and to
action, could easily result in a grave injustice of barring him
hear and determine appeals instituted by any person
forever from bringing the matter to the courts of justice for
believing himself to be aggrieved by an action or
judicial determination. We also find no merit in the
determination of any appointing authority contrary to the
appellants' contention that, since the appointments extended
provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules.
to the appellee as chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna were
all provisional in nature, and not permanent, his services
could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure
ISSUE:
of the appointing officer. While it may be true that the
1. Whether or not Laganapan violated the Doctrine

69
appellee was holding a provisional appointment at the time
of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could
be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could
only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the
appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service
Commission. Here, no such certification was received by
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal
of the appellee.
We, likewise, find no merit in the contention of the
respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna that Mayor
Elpidio Asedillo alone should be held liable for the back
salaries of the petitioner, because the records show that the
action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally,
but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna,
and he appeared and defended the action in such capacity.
Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary
dismissal of the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo, the
Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least
protesting the petitioner's summary dismissal from his
position, even abolished the appropriation for the salary of
the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider this act
of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or
confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily
dismissing the petitioner, as to make said municipality
equally liable, as held by the trial court, as respondent
Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner and for the
payment of his back salaries. The trial court, therefore,
did not commit error in finding that the summary
dismissal of the petitioner was illegal and in ordering
the respondent Mayor and respondent Municipality to
reinstate him with back salaries from the time of his
dismissal
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 91391
January 24, 1991
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, with the
assistance of Solicitor General Chavez filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint against Cojuangco, Jr. and
Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and
accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of
Enriles motion to dismiss, he filed an answer with
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
Enrile requested for leave of court to implead Chavez and
the PCGG officials as additional party defendant therein for
lodging an alleged harassment suit. The motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan.
Chavez argued that since he was simply the lawyer in the
case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the
Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases
pursuant to Section 1, EO No. 14, he cannot be sued in a
counterclaim in the same case.
Issue:
Is it proper to implead Solicitor General Chavez as additional
party defendant in the counterclaim filed by Enrile in the
same civil case?
70
Held: No
The charges pressed by Enrile for damages under Article 32
of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his
rights, Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action
for damages against the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
Chavez argued that he was covered by the immunity proviso
provided for under Section 4(a) or EO 1, however, such
argument was not well taken. A mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges
being automatically dropped. Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor
grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of
the Republic.
Where Chavez exceeds his authority as Solicitor General,
acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the Enrile, "maliciously
conspires with the PCGGcommissioners in persecuting
respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidentlybaseless
suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and
liberties, there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him.Highposition in
government does not confer a license to persecute or
recklessly injure another.The actions governed by Articles
19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relationsmay
be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The
issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for
damages. He has the right. The issue is whether ornot that
action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the
case filed against him.
When a lawyer acts in the name of a client, he should not be
sued on acounterclaim in the very same case he has filed
only as counsel and not as a party. Anyclaim for alleged
damages or other causes of action should be filed in an
entirely separateand distinct civil action.
Rama vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. L-44484
March 16, 1987
Facts:
During the incumbency of Espina as Provincial Governor of
Cebu, Rama as Vice-Governor, and Garcia, Mendiola and
Carillo as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Resolution No. 990 was adopted where the Provincial
Government of Cebu, under the aforementioned officials,
declared its policy to mechanize the maintenance and repair
of all roads and bridges of the province, to economize in the
expenditure of its Road and Bridge Fund for the
maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges
receiving national aid JJ and to adopt a more
comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and orderly
operation and maintenance of the Office of the Provincial
Engineer." To implement said policy, the Provincial Board
resolved to abolish thirty positions (around 200 employees of
the province were eased out of their respective jobs).
However, contrary to its declared policy to economize the
provincial administration, it later on hired around one
thousand new employees, renovated the Office of the
Provincial Engineer and provided the latter with a Mercedes-
Benz car.
The displaced employees filed an action for the annulment
of Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement, and recovery of
damages against the aforementioned provincial officials who
were sued both in their official and personal capacities as a
result of their alleged unjust, oppressive, illegal, and
malicious acts.
Issue:
May Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola, and Carillo be held
personally liable for damages for adopting Resolution No.
990 which abolished positions to the detriment of the
occupants thereof?
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioners are personally liable for damages
because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees
through an ostensibly legal means.
In the case, it was found by the CA that the provincial
employees concerned were eased out because of their party
affiliation. Such act of the petitioners reflected their
malicious intent to do away with the followers of the rival
political party so as to accommodate their own protgs.
Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act
maliciously or wantonly and if the work which they perform
is done to injure an individual rather than to discharge a
public duty.
It was held in a case that a public officer who commits a tort
or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of
his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable
therefor like any private individual. A public officer is civilly
liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the
performance of their duties as public officers, or for wilfully
or negligently causing damage to another, or for wilfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs and/or public policy.
Ramas protestations that when he eventually became the
Governor of Cebu he reinstated most of the dismissed
employees cannot erase the fact that he had a hand in the
adoption of Resolution No. 990. His subsequent benevolent
act cannot sufficiently make up for the damage suffered by
the dismissed employees during their period of
unemployment.
Correa vs CFI Bulacan
GR No.L-46096
July 30, 1979
Facts:
On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered
judgment in Civil Case No. 3621-M in favor of therein
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) and adversely against
therein defendants Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein).
The pertinent portions of the decision read as follows:
71
"This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T.
Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor
and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan
respectively, should be ordered personally to pay
the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to receive by
reason of their illegal removal from office until
they are actually reinstated.
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
on March 22, 1976, and the motion for reconsideration of
the Appellate Court's decision was denied on May 11, 1976.
On August 24, 1976, the decision of the Court of Appeals
became final and executory. It is in connection with the
efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of execution issued
to enforce the aforestated final judgment that the present
proceedings arose.
Bulacan. Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment
is rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation
who is sued in his official capacity for the payment of back
salaries of officers illegally removed, the judgment is binding
upon the corporation, whether or not the same is included
as party to the action. Petitioner contends that it is the
municipality of Norzagaray that is liable.
Issue:
The issue is whether or not respondent Court in denying the
Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution acted with grave
abuse of discretion or with lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Held:
In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers,
except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have
acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the
requirements thereof." A public officer who commits a tort or
other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of
his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable
therefor like any private individual. This principle of personal
liability has been applied to cases where a public officer
removes another officer or discharges an employee
wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-
compliance with the requirements of law in respect to
removal from office, the officials were acting outside their
official authority.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of
execution. The writ was strictly in accordance with the terms
of the judgment.
Pedro Gallego vs Vicente Verra
73 Phil 453
Synopsis: A case on petition for certiorari to review the
decision of the CA which declared illegal the Gallegos
election to the office of Municipal Mayor of Abuyog Leyte, in
the general elections of December, 1940 on the ground that
he did not have the residence qualification.
Facts:
Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After studying in the
Catarman Agricultural School in the province of Samar, he
was employed as a school teacher in the Municipality of
Catarman as well as in the Municipalities of Brawn, Dulag,
and Abuyog, province of Leyte.
He ran for Mayor of his home town, but was defeated.
Finding himself in debt and unemployed, he went to
Mindanao to search for a job. He went to Misaims Oriental,
but he wasnt able to find a job so he went to the Sitio of
Kaato-an, Malaybalay, Bukidnon where he arrived and
immediately found employment as nurseryman in the chitin
plantation of the Bureau of Forestry.
He returned to Abuyog on July 30 after arriving on June 20
to SitioKaato-an. He was offered employment as teacher in
the public school of the array of Union, Municipality of Sogod
Leyte. He did not accept the offer however He went back to
Kaato-an that August 23 to resume his work. He stayed in
the Chichona plantation until he resigned in September
1940. During the period of his stay, his wife and children
stayed in Abuyog Leyte.
He registered himself as an elector in percent no. 14 of
Lantapan, municipality of MalaybalayBukidnon, and voted
tehere in the election for assemblymen held in December
1938. He did not fill the blank space corresponding to the
length of time he had resided in Bukidnon in his voters
affidavit, the trial court noted.
On January 20, 1940, he obtained and paid for his residence
certificate form the municipal treasurer of Malayalam, in
which certificate it was stated that he had resided in said
municipality for one year and a half.
Based on the said facts, the CA held that Pedro Gallego
acquired a residence or domicile of origin in the municipality
of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and had lost his domicile of original
in the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte, at the he was elected
mayor of the latter municipality, and that therefore his
election was void.
Issues:
Whether or not Pedro Gallego had been a resident of
Abuyog for at least one year prior to December 10, 1940
Held:
Question may be approached from either two angles: Did he
lose his domicile in Abuyog by the mere fact that he worked
in Malaybalay as government employee? registered himself
as a voted and voted there in the election for assemblymen
in December 1938, and secured his residence certificate
there for the year 1940.
Had he reacquired his domicile of origin at least one year
prior to his election as mayor of Abuyog?
Petitioner did not lose his residence of domicile in abuyog.
He did not reside in Malaybalay with the intention of
remaining there indefinitely and of not returning to abuyog.
The court explained the term residence:
The term residence as used in the election law is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In
order to acquire a domicile by choice there must concur:
1. residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
72
2. an intention to remain there,
3. intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words there must be an animus non reverted and
an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time.
The acts of the person must confirm with his purpose. The
change of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the
place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact
of residence there must be added the animus manendi.
The court cites Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36).
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter from an elective office to
serve that community; and when the evidence on the
alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or conclusive
and it clearly appears, as in the entrant case, tat the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the
right to the ice, the will of the electorate should be
respected.
Pamil vs Teleron
86 SCRA 413
November 20, 1978
FACTS:
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election
for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was
later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival
candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga
questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as
provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code:
in no case shall there be elected or appointed to
a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers
in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge
Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is
repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows
ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ecclesiastic is eligible to an elective
municipal position
RULING:
The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935
Constitution, No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. If the the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section
2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for
elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided
the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority
vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code to be
unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be
granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set
aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the
mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out that how can one who swore to
serve the Churchs interest above all be in duty to enforce
state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets.
This is in violation of the separation of the church and state.
The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is
no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active
service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to
run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the
Election Code of 1971 every person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces shall ipso facto cease in their office or
position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy.
This implies that they are no longer disqualified from
running for an elective office. The Comelec further ruled
that as to the two remaining categories formerly banned
under the Revised Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and
contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed
to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim,
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, they being not included
in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New
Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the
necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified
by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.
Faypon vs Quirino
96 Phil. 294
Facts:
Respondent was proclaimed by the provincial board of
canvassers elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Sur. He was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur in 1895;
came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to the US for the
same purpose; returned to the Philippines in 1923; lectured
in UP; and engaged in newspaper work in Manila, Iloilo and
later on again in Manila. The crucial and pivotal point upon
which the eligibility of respondent to office is assailed, is his
registration as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
Held:
Mere absence from ones residence of origin - domicile - to
pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his vocation,
is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. The determination of a persons legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon intention which may be
inferred from his acts, activities or utterances. The party
who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin must show and prove preponderantly
such abandonment or loss. A previous registration as voter
in a municipality other than that in which he is elected is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his residence
of origin.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener
pastures to improve his lot, which includes study in other
places, practice his vocation or engage in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to
73
cast his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or
for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the
place of his profession or business activities; so there he
registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and
is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the
officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections.
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin, has not
forsaken him. This is the reason why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to the place of his birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the place of oness birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
GR No. 120295
June 28 1996
(257 SCRA 727)
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the
Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking
or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet
being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be canceled.
Frivaldo filed with the Comeleca petition, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more
legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor.
Issue:
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that his repatriation was valid and
legal and because of the curative nature
of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to
the date of the filing of his application to run for governor.
The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation
under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing
the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking
of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is
only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If
the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the
date of the filing of the application, then it should not have
explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be
proclaimed Governor of Sorsogon.
Torayno vs. Comelec
337 SCRA 574
Facts:
Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental
for three terms until 1995 election and his certificate of
candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he
executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City
which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming
20 years of residence. By 1998, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his
residence for the preceding two years and five months was
in the same city. Petitioners then filed a petition for
disqualification of Emano for failing to meet the one year-
residency requirement. Prior to the resolution of their
petition, Emano won the mayoral post and was proclaimed
winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of Emano.
COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency
requirement?
HELD:
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period
of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected,
the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility
of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with
the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that
community Emano was the overwhelming choice of the
people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate
the principle that the manifest will of the people as
expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect. In
case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate. Furthermore, during the
three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis
Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of
the provincial government was located. Based on our ruling
in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente
Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period
of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office
therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on
the part of Emano in his choice of residence. Petitioners put
much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a
highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the
provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting
restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in
representation. The classification of an area as a highly
urbanized or independent component city, for that matter,
does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce
and other businesses from the entire province -- and vice
versa -- especially when the city is located at the very heart
of the province itself, as in this case.Undeniably, Cagayan de
Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and
remains a geographical part of the province.
74
Coquilla vs Comelec
GR No. 151914
July 31, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino
parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He
was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States, the last of which
took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5,
2000.[4] Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 8171[5] to the Special Committee on
Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7,
2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as
a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was
approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12,
2001.[6] On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the
incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for
reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate
of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case
before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner
was voted for and received the highest number of votes
(6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin
of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed
mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.[8] He
subsequently took his oath of office.
Issue:
Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May
14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ruling:
First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160)
provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation,[21] but
rather to domicile or legal residence,[22] that is, the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi).[23] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person
at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).[24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in
Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000,
when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an
alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as
our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a
visitor or as a resident alien.
Mitra vs Comelec
GR No. 191938
July 2, 2010
Facts:
In the present case, the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy
(COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly
misrepresenting that he is a resident of
the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he
ran for the position of Governor. When his COC for the
position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled,
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second
District of Palawan. This district then included, among other
territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.
On March 26, 2007, Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as
a highly urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component
city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal
consequence of this new status was the ineligibility
of Puerto PrincesaCity residents from voting for candidates
for elective provincial officials.On March 20, 2009, with the
intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record
from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta.
Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy.
Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of
Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Respondents filed a petition to deny due course or to
cancel Mitras COC. They essentially argued that Mitra
remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet
established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not
qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner is liable for material
misrepresentation under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code? Whether or not the Petitioner was able to establish
his residence in the Municipality of Aborlan, enabling him to
run for the position of Governor?
Held:
We find that Mitra did not commit any deliberate
material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the
75
evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident
of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically
consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him
ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
Mitras domicile of origin is
undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as
Governor in light of the relatively recent change of status of
Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly
urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for
provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin
and acquire a new one within the local government unit
where he intended to run; this would be his domicile of
choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which
the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
We cannot but conclude that the COMELECs approach i.e.,
the application of subjective non-legal standards and the
gross misappreciation of the evidence is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, as the COMELEC used wrong
considerations and grossly misread the evidence in arriving
at its conclusion. In using subjective standards, the
COMELEC committed an act not otherwise within the
contemplation of law on an evidentiary point that served as
a major basis for its conclusion in the case.
The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC
is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed
to consider as it focused mainly on the character of
Mitrasfeedmill residence. For this reason, the COMELEC was
led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of
judgment. By failing to take into account whether there had
been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the
COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming
that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity
in a material representation. In this case, it doubly erred
because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered
evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence
within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.
Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation
and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of
residence, specifically, his expressed intentto transfer to a
residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him
eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory
moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a
leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent
home; and the construction of a house in this lot that,
parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased
pending the completion of his house.
Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before
elections, will be construed as directory after the elections,
to give effect to the will of the people.
Handrieder vs De Rivera
AM Case No. P-05-2026
 August 2, 2007
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Celia
A. de Rivera, Interpreter of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 100, for Serious Misconduct, Willful
Refusal to Pay Just Debt, and Conviction for an Offense
Involving Moral Turpitude, relative to Criminal Cases Nos.
043676 to 043690 for fifteen (15) counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Celia De Rivera."
In a Complaint-Affidavit dated 31 August 2004, complainant
Virginia Hanrieder alleged that in a decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 in
the criminal cases, respondent had been found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of fourteen (14) counts of B.P. 22 violation
and adjudged civilly liable for the fifteen (15) checks subject
of the charges.
A fine had also been imposed on respondent without any
provision for subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Despite the finality of the decision, according to complainant
she had not been able to collect any amount from
respondent, except the cash bail bond in the amount of
P10,000.00. In addition, respondent did not pay the fine and
even opposed the release of the cash bond into
complainant's custody as partial satisfaction of the adjudged
civil liability. Complainant further alleged that the writ of
execution issued by the trial court could not be enforced as
the sheriff could not levy upon any cash or property of
respondent. Consequently, the sheriff had made an
arrangement with respondent for the latter to pay the
amount of P500.00 monthly. Notwithstanding, this
respondent failed to comply.
Complainant thus prayed that respondent be dismissed from
service and that all of her retirement, termination, and
unused leave benefits in the amount sufficient to repay her
debts plus interest be released to complainant.
Respondent asserted that her failure to pay her civil
obligation was not prompted by bad faith or willful intention
to evade a responsibility. In addition, she asserted that her
conviction for violation of B.P. 22 cannot be characterized as
misconduct so gross in character as to render her morally
unfit to hold her position since the same was not committed
in her professional capacity.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) evaluated the
Complaint-Affidavit and found it meritorious. Accordingly,
the OCA recommended that respondent be suspended for
thirty (30) days for her willful failure to pay her just
debts. The OCA however did not consider respondent's
conviction for B.P. 22 as a conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the OCAs recommendation, that respondent be
suspended for thirty days for her willful failure to pay her
just debts, is in accord with law and jurisprudence.
II. Whether the respondents conviction for B.P. 22, a crime
involving moral turpitude, warrants dismissal of the
respondent.
RULING:
I.
76
The Court finds the OCA's recommendation not in accord
with law and jurisprudence.
It appears that the OCA failed to take into account
respondent's having been adjudged guilty of several counts
of B.P. 22 violation when it recommended that she be
merely suspended. It might seem that the issuance of the
bouncing checks is but a component of respondent's general
failure to pay her just debts to complainant. But since
issuing a bouncing check for whatever purpose is in itself a
criminal offense, such act should be considered and
appreciated separately from the failure to pay just debts.
We first consider the charge of failure to pay just debts.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which is
applicable since respondent is an employee in the civil
service, provides:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. (a) No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary
action:
xxx xxx xxx
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful
failure to pay taxes due to the government;
xxx xxx xxx
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service defines "just debts" as those (1) claims adjudicated
by a court of law, or (2) claims the existence and justness of
which are admitted by the debtor. Under the same Rule,
willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense
with the corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first
offense, suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) days for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.
In the case at bar, respondent does not deny her
indebtedness and the same had been adjudicated by a court
of law. Thus, her liability under the law is undisputed. While
the Court is sympathetic to respondent's financial condition,
she has a moral and legal duty to pay her obligations when
due despite her financial difficulties. Her failure to do so
warrants disciplinary action. Since she committed the
offense for the first time, the appropriate penalty is
reprimand.
Apropos complainant's request for the Court's intercession to
collect the amount owed her, it should be stressed that the
Court is not a collection agency. Thus, the Court cannot
grant her plea. The Court, however, is duty bound to correct
whatever it perceives as an improper conduct among court
employees by ordering them to do what is proper in the
premises. In the instant case, the Court directs respondent
to pay her indebtedness to complainant, within a reasonable
time from the receipt of this Resolution. A violation of this
order could be the basis of another administrative charge for
a second offense of "willful failure to pay just debts"
punishable by suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days,
among other serious charges arising from a willful violation
of a lawful order of this Court.
II.
YES. For having been found guilty with finality of a crime
involving moral turpitude, respondent Celia
A. de Rivera should be dismissed from service.
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that conviction for
a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disciplinary
action. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service states that conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a grave offense and upon the first
offense, the penalty of dismissal must be meted out. In the
case of Re: Conviction of Imelda B. Fortus, Clerk III, RTC Br.
40, Calapan City for the Crime of Violation of B.P. 22, the
Court characterized the violation of B.P. 22 as a crime
involving moral turpitude. It is clear therefore that
respondent should be dismissed from service for having
been convicted by final judgment of B.P. 22 violations. As in
the previously cited case, however, respondent may reenter
the government service if she can prove that she is fit to
serve once again.
Indeed, it is worthy of note that respondent violated B.P.
22 not once or twice, but at least 14 times. The individual
amount for each check may have been relatively small,
ranging from P833.00 to P4,400.00, yet the sheer number of
instances that respondent violated B.P. 22 cannot simply be
ignored, especially considering the moral turpitude
dimension of her acts.
WHEREFORE, respondent Celia A. de Rivera, Interpreter,
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 100, is REPRIMANDED for her
willful failure to pay just debts, whi\ch amounts to conduct
unbecoming a court employee. Furthermore, for having been
found guilty with finality of a crime involving moral
turpitude, respondent Celia A. de Rivera is hereby
DISMISSED from the service. Respondent, however, may be
allowed to reenter government service if she can prove that
she is fit to serve once again.
Edgar Y. Teves vs Comelec
GR No. 180363
April 28, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative
of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the
May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent
Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was
convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which
is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of
P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is
disqualified from running for public office because he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified
petitioner from running for the position of member of House
of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his
Certificate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that
[petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional
elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental
thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration
moot and academic. .
77
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have
merit.
Issue:
Did petitioners violation of Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019 involve moral turpitude?
Ruling:
No. The crime for which petitioner was convicted in
Sandiganbayan in 2005 did not involve moral turpitude. The
Court discussed Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
regarding disqualifications of a candidate.
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months,
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall
be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years
from his service of sentence, unless within the same period
he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted,
reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are
as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a
direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has
a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of
R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution
or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a)
It shall be unlawful for any local government official or
employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games
licensed by a local government unit.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not
automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude.
A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the
violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral
turpitude does not include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his
influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or
financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally
hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the
management thereof to his wife considering that the said
transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest.
Grego vs COMELEC
June 19, 1997
274 SCRA 481
FACTS:
Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government
Code) which took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a
person for any elective position on the ground that had
been removed from office as a result of an administrative
case.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position
as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged
by a certain Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a
candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of
Manila during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won
and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992
synchronized national elections. Again, he succeeded in his
bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors.
However, his victory this time did not remain
unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he
found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the
polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
One such case was a petition for quo warrantofiled before
the COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo, another candidate for
councilor in the same district, who alleged Bascos ineligibility
to be elected councilor on the basis of
the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more
78
cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the
Office of the Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior
and Local Government. All these challenges were, however,
dismissed, thus, paving the way for Bascos continued stay in
office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained
undaunted and ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995,
local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he
beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor
seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again
contested.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondents
disqualification, pursuant to the above provision, contending
that as long as a candidate was once removed from office
due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took
place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
disqualification applies.
.
Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to
said relief because Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be
validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its
effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of
attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested
rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160
applies retroactively to those removed from office before it
took effect on January 1, 1992
RULING:
Sec. 40(b) of the LGC has no retroactive effect and
therefore, disqualifies only those administratively removed
from office after Jan. 1, 1991 when the LGC took effect. It is
a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160
does not have any retroactive effect. Laws operate only
prospectively and not retroactively.
In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code
took effect only on January 1, 1992. Section 40(b) must
nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to
Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is
stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not
mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of
the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to
attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as
long as a candidate was removed from office due to an
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place
during or prior to the effectivity of the code, the
disqualification applies. To him, this interpretation is made
more evident by the manner in which the provisions of
Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense is used in
enumerating the grounds for disqualification, petitioner
strongly contends that the provision must have also referred
to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the
Code. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view.
Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of
Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exists no
compelling reason for us to depart therefrom.
A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be
so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which
transpired before its passage: Lexprospicit, non
respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.
 Salalima vs Guigona
257 SCRA 55
FACTS:
Petitioner was held administratively liable and suspended in
connection with the negotiated contract entered into on 6
March 1992 with RYU Construction for additional
rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Marketinstead
through a bidding and for entering into a retainer agreement
with private lawyers in November 1989 despite of the
availability of a Provincial Legal Officer.
Petitioner argued that he cannot be held liable because
public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner be held liable for acts committed during a
prior term?
RULING:
NO. Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term
are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this
is especially true where the constitution provides that the
penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from holding
office for the term for which the officer was elected or
appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregard or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains
that Aguinaldo does not apply because the case against the
official therein was already pending when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid. It is of the
view that an official's reelection renders moot and academic
an administrative complaint against him for acts done during
his previous term only if the complaint was filed before his
reelection. The fine distinction does not impress us.
The rule makes no distinction. As a matter of fact,
in Pascual the administrative complaint against Pascual for
acts committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, was filed only a year after he was reelected.
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as
criminal cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule
is not only founded on the theory that an official's reelection
expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or
condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during his
previous term.
79
We may add that sound public policy dictates it. To rule
otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating
endless partisan contests between the reelected official and
his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former
during his new term with administrative cases for act,
alleged to have been committed during his previous term.
His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself
in the said cases to the detriment of public service. This
doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however,
apply to criminal acts which the reelected official may have
committed during his previous term.
Osorio vs COMELEC
GR No. 162892 (RESOLUTION)
May 6, 2004
Facts
Petitioner and private respondents were both candidates for
the position of Barangay Chairman in the 2002 barangay
elections. Private respondent filed a disqualification case
against petitioner on the ground that the latter was found
guilty of dishonesty by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
while holding public office. Said CSC decision was final and
executory.
Petitioner won the barangay election by 21 votes. However,
on August 23, 2002, the COMELEC First Division released its
resolution declaring petitioner disqualified to run for any
public elective position since the penalty imposed upon
herein Respondent include[d] dismissal from service as a
result of that administrative Case, Petitioner insists that the
word "office" in Section 40(b) of the 1991 Local Government
Code refers exclusively to an elective office.
Issue:
Disqualification of petitioner
Ruling:
It is proper. Petitioner's cause for disqualification is provided
in Section 3(b) of COMELEC resolution 4801 promulgated on
May 23, 2002:
Section 3. Disqualifications. - The following are
disqualified from running for any elective barangay
and sangguniang kabataan positions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
xxx xxx xxx
in relation to Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code:
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
xxx xxx xxx
The above-stated provisions state "removed from office"
without any qualification. It is a cardinal rule in statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
must not distinguish, in accordance with the maxim ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
 Marquez vs COMELEC
GR No. 112889
April 18, 1995
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective
position of Governor filed this petition for certiorari praying
for the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC which
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning
candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for
being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for
ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his
arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that
country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for
cancellation ofrespondent's certificate of candidacy, on the
ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section
40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner
with the COMELEC. The COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings
against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02
February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, denied a
reconsideration of the resolution.
Issue:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of
his certificate ofcandidacy (and to date), is said to be facing
a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from
justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a
candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to,
anelective local office.
Ruling:
Yes. Private respondent is a fugitive from justice and is
disqualified from being a candidate and is ineligible from
holding an elective local office.
The law needs no further interpretation and construction.
Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear and it
disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local office.
The Solicitor General, expresses a like opinion and concludes
that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
In the present case, at the time private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy,a criminal charge against him for ten
(10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
80
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his
arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that
country.
Rodriguez vs Comelec
GR No. 120099
July 24, 1996
Facts:
Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O.
Marquez, Jr. were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of
Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won
and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo
warranto before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed that
Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on
November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the
Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims,
grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal
property.Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice"
which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility. The
COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal before this
Court.
Issue:
Is Rodriguez a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code based on the
alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him?
Ruling:
The Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC" promulgated on
April 18, 1995, hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ
Decision, declared that: xxx, fugitive from justice includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence (x xx), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term."
Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under
the definition thus given was not passed upon by the
Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon
remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed
therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ
Decision.
The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Courta
report wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties'
evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from
justice". Intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case
because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in
the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal
charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November
12, 1985).

The objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice
are: (a) a person committed a 'crime' or has been charged
for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the
jurisdiction of the court where said crime was committed or
his usual place of abode.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to
evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge
by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or
of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground
for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to
run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:"A
'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be
established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the
time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this
definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.
Mercado vs Manzano
307 SCRA 630
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent
was then declared the winning candidate; however its
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of
the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and,
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code provides that
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner
with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is
a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of
a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14,
1955, and is considered an American citizen under US
Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these
81
facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US
citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public
elective office in the Philippines
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution
provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization
takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes
his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law
lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of
respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance
to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill
his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Cordora vs Comelec
GR No. 176947
February 10, 2009
Facts:
Cordora filed a complaint in the COMELEC accusing
Tambunting of making false assertions in his Certificate of
Candidacy specifically on the qualification of residency and
being a natural born citizen. Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated
that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an
American. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship
through naturalization in Honolulu. In short, Cordora argues
that statements made by Tambunting in the Bureau of
immigration is contrary to what is stated in his Certificate of
Candidacy.
To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-
born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied
that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The
certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government
after Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form
I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntings
citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings
possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an
oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Issue:
Whether Tambunting knowingly made untruthful statements
In his COC
82
HELD: NO
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-
130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained
two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other trips
where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly,
Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of
his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The
fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify
him from running for public office.
Dual Citizenship is not a ground to disqualify from running in
any elective local position. Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. What is referred to in R.A 7160 as dual
citizenship must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance and it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained
therein.
On residency, Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to
meet the residency requirement because of Tambuntings
naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American.
Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws,
includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed
place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is
not dependent upon citizenship.
105. Gocuan
Moreno vs Comelec
GR No. 168550
August 10, 2006
Facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno
from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the
latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two
(2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no
cause of action because he was already granted probation.
The case went all up to the Supreme Court. In
SC, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local
Government Code applies only to those who have served
their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence.
Issue:
Is Moreno disqualified to run for public office considering
that he was convicted by final judgment of a crime with a
penalty of more than 1 year imprisonment but was later on
granted pardon without him having served the sentence?

Ruling:
No, he is not disqualified. Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code appears innocuous enough at first
glance. The phrase service of sentence, understood in
its general and commonsense, means the confinement of a
convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged
by the court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is
rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation
cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides
that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
Pamil vsTeleron
GR No. L-34854
November 20, 1978
Facts
Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the
position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.
Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto
was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the
office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative
Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in
active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public
works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper,
respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to
the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory
ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of
1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by
petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied
repeal.
Issue
Whether or not the disqualification of the respondent based
on Administrative Code provision Constitutional
Ruling
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a
lengthy and protracted deliberation, the Court is divided on
the issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that
the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision
is no longer operative either because it was superseded by
the 1935 Constitution or repealed.
The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court
constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven
83
does not suffice to render the challenged provision
ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be
accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its
application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. They
have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower
court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father
Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor.
Nonetheless, the above view failed to obtain the necessary
eight votes needed to give it binding force. The attack on
the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it
must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and
application.
In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under the present
Charter, it is explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights." The
challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar
as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or
appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the
religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so
exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an
ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices
to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an
incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision
relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional
mandate.
Talaga vs Comelec
GR No. 196804
October 9, 2012
Facts: Ramon Talaga already served 3 consecutive terms as
mayor in Lucena city. He filed his COC for mayor despite his
service of 3 consecutive terms; a petition cancellation of
COC was filed against him. On April 19, 2010 , the COMELEC
(division) DISQUALIFIED Ramon. Ramon filed a motion for
reconsideration. He withdrew his motion for reconsideration
on May 4, 2010; on the same day his wife Barbara Ruby
filed her own COC, as substitute of Ramon. On May 5, 2010
COMELEC en banc declared the Resolution of COMELEC
division as final and executory. On election day on May 10,
2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots
but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of
Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in
Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as
against Castillos 39,615 votes.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a valid substitution?
2. Who among the parties should assume the contested
position?
Held:
1. No. Existence of a valid CoC is a conditionsine qua non
for a valid substitution.There are two remedies available to
prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is
through a petition for disqualification and the other through
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in
Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other
hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can
only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of
candidates, and the fact of a candidates permanent
residency in another country when that fact affects the
residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and
distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying
due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya32 that
the following circumstances may result from the granting of
the petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but
may have filed a valid CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time
may not have filed a valid CoC; and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied
due course or cancelled.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid
candidacy,33 there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a
valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not
at all a candidate.34
The Declaration of Ramons disqualification rendered his CoC
invalid; hence, he was nota valid candidate to be properly
substituted.
2. Elected Vice Mayor must succeedand assume the
position of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in the
office.
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of
Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the
rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him because
Ramons disqualification became final prior to the
elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on
Elections,53 where the Court said:
x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification
before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases
because the judgment declaring the candidates
disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become
final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other
cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer have one common essential condition the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final before
84
the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the
present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labos disqualification became final only on
14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections.
On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In
the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment
23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day,
Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short,
Cayats candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally
non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by
final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory
provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two
situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes
final before the elections, which is the situation covered in
the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is
the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of
the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before
an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004
elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor
are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was
the sole and only candidate, second to none.54
Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that
he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena
City for having obtained the highest number of votes among
the remaining qualified candidates.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified
through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of
which Ramon received on the same date.56 Ramon filed a
motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 but withdrew
the motion on May 4, 2010,59ostensibly to allow his
substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not
file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances
indicated that there was no more pending matter that could
have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due
course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be
said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days
from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This
happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality,
the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by
Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5,
2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division final and executory.
Yet, we cannot agree with Castillos assertion that with
Ramons disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his
favor. Barbara Rubys filing of her CoC in substitution of
Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual
circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat,
the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004,
and his disqualification became final before the May 10,
2004 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat
was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the
only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet.
In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May
10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the
electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the
electorate, she became a contender for the same position
vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing
as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos
claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes, and of being consequently entitled to
assume the office of Mayor.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the
place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two
requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the
electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that
candidates disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the
plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.64Under this sole exception, the electorate may be
said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the
second highest number of votes may be deemed
elected.65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo
simply because the second element was absent. The
electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the
fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec
GR No. 205033
June 18, 2013
FACTS:
The Comelec en banc issued a resolution which denied due
course to petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos Certificate of
Candidacy for mayor, since he was convicted by final
judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6)
counts of acts of lasciviousness, with the principal penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count
and carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification pursuant to Article 41, RPC. After serving his
sentence, Jalosjos filed his COC for mayor and meanwhile
filed a petition for inclusion in the list of voters which was
denied.
Jalosjos imputed lack of jurisdiction to the Comelec en banc.
He also argued that Art. 41 of the RPC imposing the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification was
already removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160.
85
Hence, he argues that he is already qualified to run for
public office.
ISSUES:
Was Art. 41 of the RPC amended by Section 40(a) of RA
7160, such that a person previously disqualified to run for
public office may already do so after the lapse of two (2)
years after the service of his sentence?
RULING:
There is no such amendment.
Section 40(a) of the LGC provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
The above provision does not cover cases wherein the law
imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which
has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective
office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC:
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal Their accessory penalties. - The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a
penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly
and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he
remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him
to run as mayor.
Chua vs Comelec
GR No. 216607
April 5, 2016
Facts:
Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila
during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. After
the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest
number of votes. She was proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers on May 15, 2013.On the date of Chuas
proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) filed a
Petition captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a
nuisance candidate" and "to deny due course and/or cancel
[Chuas] Certificate of Candidacy." Fragata was allegedly a
registered voter in the Fourth District who claimed that
Chua was unqualified to run for Councilor on two grounds:
Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and she was a permanent
resident of the United States of America. The Comelec
treated the petition as one for disqualification. The Comelec
found that Chua was a dual citizen when she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy. Although she reacquired her Filipino
citizenship in 2011 by taking an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner failed to take a sworn
and personal renunciation of her American citizenship
required under Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission held
that Chua was disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Consequently,
Chuas Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio, and all
votes casted for her were stray. Chuas proclamation was
likewise voided.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner disqualified to run for public office?
Ruling:
Petitioner claims that when she took the Oath of Allegiance
to reacquire her Filipino citizenship, it amounted to
renounciation of her American citizenship. Petitioner cannot
claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by
taking the Oath of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the
sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are
separate requirements, the latter being
an additional requirement for qualification to run for public
office. In Jacot v. Dal
[T]he oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize
that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for
all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.100
With petitioners failure to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, petitioner was a
dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy
on October 3, 2012. Under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, she was disqualified to run for Councilor
in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and
Local Elections.
Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
GR No. 212615 / GR No. 212989
July 19, 2016
Facts:
In a Petition for Disqualification dated May 8, 2013 filed
before the COMELEC, Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. (Ludovico)
86
sought the disqualification of Labao, Jr. as candidate3 for
Mayor of the Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz in the May 13,
2013 elections, on the ground that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive
from justice. Ludovico essentially averred that there was an
outstanding warrant for Labao, Jr.'s arrest in connection with
the filing of an Information for Murder against him and four
other persons; and that he had eluded arrest, thus, was at
large.
The Information for murder stemmed from the assassination
of Vice-Mayor Abel P. Martinez (Vice-Mayor Martinez) in
front of his residence on May 4, 2012. The assailants of
Vice-Mayor Martinez were not immediately known. But on
December 20, 2012, one Roger D. Loredo (Loredo) executed
an extrajudicial confession admitting his participation in the
killing of Vice Mayor Martinez, and implicating Labao, Jr. as
the mastermind thereof. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
found probable cause to indict Labao, Jr.
Ludovico filed the said petition for disqualification against
Labao, Jr. He argued that Labao, Jr. qualified as a fugitive
from justice as he went into hiding after he was charged in
court to avoid criminal prosecution. 6 It is for such reason
that Labao, Jr. is considered a fugitive from justice and,
thus, disqualified from running as mayor. Labao, Jr. denied
the assertion that he was a fugitive from justice. He
countered that there was no charge against him when he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC); and that he was
only implicated in the crime when Loredo filed his
extrajudicial confession on December 20, 2012.Finally,
Labao, Jr. puts emphasis on the fact that he had already
been proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Mambusao, Capiz on May 14, 2013
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified as municipal mayor
on the premise that he is a fugitive from justice
notwithstanding that there is no more warrant of arrest
against him and the criminal charge against him had already
been dismissed
Ruling: No
The petition against Labao, Jr. was for disqualification and
not a pre ... proclamation controversy. Labao, Jr. was not a
fugitive from justice at the time that he was a candidate for
Mayor of Mamhusao, Capiz during the May 13, 2013
Elections. The COMELEC anchored its finding that Labao, Jr.
was a fugitive from justice from the fact that he was missed
at the hospital when the warrant for his arrest was being
served. No other substantial evidence was presented to
prove that Labao, Jr, tried to hide from the authorities or
that he left Mambusao, Capiz to avoid being arrested and
prosecuted.
The Court finds that the pieces of evidence on record do not
sufficiently establish Labao, Jr.' s intention to evade being
prosecuted for a criminal charge that will warrant a
sweeping conclusion that Labao, Jr., at the time, was
evading prosecution so as to disqualify him as a fugitive
from justice from running for public office.
Abella vs Comelec
GR No. 100710
September 3, 1991
(201 SCRA 253)

Facts
Adelina Larrazabal obtained the highest number of votes in
the local elections of February 1, 1988 and was proclaimed
as the duly elected governor the province of Leyte but was
later declared by the COMELEC "... to lack both residence
and registration qualifications for the position of Governor of
Leyte as provided by Art. X, Section 12, Philippine
Constitution in relation to Title II,
Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 137 and Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179
and is hereby disqualified as such Governor. Benjamin
Abella, the who obtained the second highest number of
votes for the position of governor was not allowed by the
COMELEC to be proclaimed as governor after the
disqualification of Larrazabal.
Issues:
a) Does the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters'
electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a
prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as
provincial officials?
b) Can Abella as the one who obtained the second highest
number of votes for the position of governor be proclaimed
as governor?
Held
a) Yes. Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179 connotes two prohibitions
one, from running for and the second, from voting for any
provincial elective official.
b) No. While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a
petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of
Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections,
Larrazabal was considered as a bonafide candidate. The
voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that
she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor.
Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that Abella lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. What matters
is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who
is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at
the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes for the
same position cannot assume the vacated position.
*During the pendency of the case, a TRO was issued
ordering incumbent Vice-Governor of Leyte Hon. Leopoldo E.
Petilla to desist from assuming the office of the Governor
and from discharging the duties and functions since he took
his oath as Provincial
Governor of Leyte and assumed the governorship, but this
TRO was subsequently lifted.
CENIZA, et al. vs. COMELEC, COA, and NATIONAL
TREASURER
95 SCRA 763
FACTS:
Pursuant to Batas Blg. 51 enacted by the Interim Batasang
Pambasa on Dec. 22, 1979, COMELEC adopted Resolution
87
No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities
(unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly
urbanized cities (those earning above P40M), and
component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting
in provincial elections. The City of Cebu is classified as a
highly urbanized city since it has an income of P51,
603,147.64, thus its voters cannot take part in the election
of provincial elections of the province of Cebu. On the other
hand, the City of Mandaue is classified as a component city
but its registered voters cannot vote for the provincial
elective officials because its Charter expressly so provides.
Since Cebu and Mandaue City were added to a list by
COMELEC in Resolution No. 1421 as two of the cities not
entitled to participate in the election of provincial officials,
Ceniza et al., in behalf of the other members of D-O-E-R-S
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed), a civic and
non-partisan group, filed a suit as taxpayers and registered
voters of such cities assailing BP. 51 which uses the annual
income of a given city as the basis for classification of
whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial
officials of the province where the city is geographically
located; and Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 as well as Republic
Act No. 5519 (Charter of Mandaue City) which went into
effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of
Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum.
The petitioners further contend that:
1. section 3 of Batas Blg. 885, insofar as it classifies
cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as
the only basis for not allowing its electorate to
vote for the provincial officials is inherently and
palpably unconstitutional in that such classification
is not based on substantial distinctions germane to
the purpose of the law which in effect provides for
and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage,
and therefore such unreasonable classification
amounts to a denial of equal protection;
2. the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
protection of the law since the voters in other
component cities are allowed to vote for provincial
officials;
3. political and gerrymandering motives were behind
the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the
Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the
Province of Cebu is politically and historically
known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total
952,716 registered voters in the province, 234,582
are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from
Mandaue City, so that 278,940 electors, or close
to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu
would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection
clause.
RULING: No.
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest
autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The state shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government
units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities." Art. XI, Section
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities
outside the supervisory power of the province where they
are geographically located. This is as it should be because of
the complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city
due to a bigger population and greater economic activity
which require greater autonomy. Corollary to independence
however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in
provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective
provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased
to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority over
said city.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and
component cities on the basis of their regular annual income
is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city
would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic,
and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued
support of the provincial government thus justifying the
continued participation of the voters in the election of
provincial officials in some instances.
As to petitioners second contention, the Supreme Court
found that the practice of allowing voters in one component
city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same
privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of
legislative discretion which violates neither the
Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage.
As to petitioners third contention, the Court has ruled that
such charge has no factual and legal basis.
"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to
give an unfair advantage to the party in power.
As to the argument that the Charter of Mandaue went into
effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of
Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum, the Court held that
the Constitutional requirement that the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a
province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to
the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore
cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which
came into existence on June 21, 1969.
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
GR No. 196271
October 18, 2011
On June 30, 2011, RA 10153,(An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes) was enacted. The law
reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to
the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national
and local elections. The law as well granted the President
the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office
of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and
the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall
88
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No.
10153 already spawned petitions against their validity;
House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were
challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act
(RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter
and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the
Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections including the ARMM elections?
HELD:
Yes, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators
of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992
and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional
elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording
and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987
Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.
SC dismissed the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of
RA 10153 in toto.
Borja v. COMELEC
GR No. 133495
September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter,
Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms,
from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was
also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification
on the ground that Capco would have already served as
Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he
would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second
Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared
Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently
voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of
mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
term is considered to have served a term in that office for
the purpose of the three-term limit
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again
as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to
the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the
full term because he only continued the service, interrupted
by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayors
assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service
in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X,
8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art.
X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so
on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving
by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the
first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time
89
for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to
unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
GR No. 135150
July 28, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995
elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. On February 27, 1998, or
about three months before the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC
order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez,
Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of
the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his
certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for
disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already
served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May
13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. The
COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC
resolution maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for
only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office
in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioners
assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service
of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor
for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few
months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners assumption of office from May
1995 to March 1, 1998 is considered full term of office for
the purpose of three-term rule
Held:
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule
are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision
of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final
judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner
was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all[5] and
while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the
strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he
is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to
the final outcome of the election protest.[6] Petitioner
Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not
duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality
that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have
served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served
the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support
it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of
the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term
limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same
time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not
by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and
that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot
be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three
term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him
disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral
elections should therefore be set aside.
Adormeo vs. COMELEC
GR No. 147927
February 4, 2002
FACTS:
90
Petitioner (Raymundo Adormeo) and private respondent
incumbent Mayor (Ramon Talaga, Jr.) were the only
candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy (COC) for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.
Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where
he served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in May
1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall
election of May 2000, he again won and served only the
unexpired term of Bernard Tagarao after having lost to the
latter in the 1998 election.
Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or
disqualification of the respondent on the ground that the
latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3
consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired
term of office is considered as one (1) term.
Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor
of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-
election in 1998 and during Tagaraos incumbency, he was a
private citizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3
consecutive terms.
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the term of office of elective officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years
and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides
that no local elective official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent had already served three
(3) consecutive terms as mayor of Lucena City, thereby
disqualifying him to run in the May 14, 2001 elections
RULING: NO.
Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms.
For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity
of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998
elections.
Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be
deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida
vs. COMELEC, we said:
The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he
was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
 renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3-
consecutive term limit.
118. Quinanola
Latasa v. COMELEC
GR No. 154829
December 10, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that
he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had
already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections,
filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's
candidacy since the latter had already been elected and
served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that
this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of
candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first
time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was not
acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and
he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did
the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him
disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and
ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was
converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos.
So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it
should not be construed as vying for the same local
government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the
position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Ruling: No
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should
be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this
rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
91
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does
not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As
stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos
is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the
city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms
as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent
of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding
office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction
and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Ong vs. Alegre and COMELEC
GR No. 163295
January 23, 2006
FACTS:
Francis Ong was the mayor of the Municipality of San
Vicente from 1995-1998. Francis was again proclaimed
winner by COMELEC in the 1998 mayoralty election. Alegre
filed an election protest but the decision declaring Alegre as
the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty contest came
out only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and has started to serve the 2001-2004 term
as mayor.
In the 2004 elections, Francis and Alegre filed COC for
mayor of the same municipality. Upon Alegres Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel COC,COMELEC
declaredFrancisdisqualified to run for mayor and his name
was ordered deleted from the official list of candidates.This
was predicated on the 3-consecutive term rule, Francis
having assumed as mayor and discharged the duties thereof
for 3 consecutive full terms in 1995-2008, 1998-2001, and
2001-2004.
Rommel Ong filed his own COC for the position of mayor, as
substitute candidate for his brother Francis.However,
COMELEC denied due course to Rommels COC.
ISSUES:
1. Should Franciss assumption of office as mayor for the
term 1998-2001 be considered as full service for the purpose
of the 3-term limit rule?
2. Was COMELECs action to deny due course to Rommels
COC as substitute for Francis proper?
RULING:
1. YES.
The 3-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in
both the Constitution and the LGC. For it to apply, the
official should (1) be elected for 3 consecutive terms in the
same post and (2) and have fully served 3 consecutive
terms.These disqualifying requisites are present, barring
Francis from running for mayor in 2004.
While the RTC ruled that Alegre was the legally elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty elections, this was without
practical and legal use and value having been promulgated
after the term of the contested office has expired. The
contention that Francis was only a presumptive winner in
said election did not make him less than a duly elected
mayor. His proclamation by the MBC as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term is
considered as service for a full term. There was no
interruption of the continuity of service as Francis was never
unseated during the term in question. A contrary view would
be an outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally
disqualified and repudiated loser with a crown of victory.
2. YES. An existing COMELEC policy provides for the non-
inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the certified
list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Moreover, a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has
been cancelled or not given due course cannot be
substituted. A person with a cancelled certificate is no
candidate at all.
Atty. Rivera v COMELEC
GR No. 167591
May 9, 2007
Facts:
There are 2 cases involving same facts and issues. (1) A
petition for cancellation filed by Atty. Rivera and Normandick
De Guzman; (2) a petition for quo warranto by Antony dee,
a Mayoralty candidate of Pampanga. These were filed
against Mario Boking Morales, running also for mayor in
Mabalacat, Pampanga, on the ground that he was elected
and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor
of the place thus ineligible to run for another term or fourth
term.
Morales admitted that he was electedmayor of Mabalacat for
the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
92
(firstterm) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term),
but he served the secondterm from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or asa "de facto
officer" because (1) he was not validly elected since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC which
decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001, and
(2) he was preventively suspended by the suspended by the
Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to
July 15, 1999
COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision in EPC
No.98-131 of the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared
respondent Morales'proclamation void, his discharge of the
duties in the Office of the Mayor inMabalacat is that of a de
facto officer or a de facto mayor. Therefore, hiscontinuous
service for three consecutive terms has been severed.
Hence, filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Morales assumption, from July 1, 1995
to June 30, 2001 (2nd term), may be considered as one
full term service in the context of the consecutive
three-term limit rule.
(2) Whether the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who will
serve the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.
Ruling:
1. YES. For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that
he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July
1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for
the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as
held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been
mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break
since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30,
2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years.
Morales maintains that he served his second term
(1998 to 2001) only as a "caretaker of the office" or as
a "de facto officer." Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when
an official serves in the same position for three
consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de
facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay
on indefinitely"
2. The vice-mayor shall server the remaining duration of
term. Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as mayorof Mabalacat, the instant petition for
quo warranto has become moot.
In Labo v. Comelec, 8 this Court has ruled that a
second place candidate cannotbe proclaimed as a
substitute winner. The rule, therefore, is: the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majorityvotes does
 not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highestnumber of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidatecannot be deemed
elected to the office.
As a consequence of petitioner's ineligibility, a
permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government
Code
Dizon vs. Comelec and Morales
GR No. 182088
January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga filed a
case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the
incumbent mayor of Mabalacat because under the LGC, no
local elective official is allowed to serve for more than 3
consecutive terms for the same position. Dizon alleged that
Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004.
Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position
and same municipality.
Morales asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as
mayor because he was not elected for the said position in
the 1998 elections. He avers that the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Dee as the duly
elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Morales
also alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or
when he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat. Respondent
further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second
term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the LGC is
not applicable to him.
According to COMELEC, Respondent was elected mayor of
Mabalacat in 1995, 1998, and 2001. When he ran in 2004,
the Supreme Court ruled in May 2007 (3 years later) that
respondent has violated the three-term limit and thus was
not considered a candidate in the 2004 elections. The vice-
mayor assumed office as mayor from May 2007-June 2007.
Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap
and allows him to run again for the same position in the
2007 elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales, in running for mayor in the 2007
elections, has violated the three-term limit rule
HELD:
No. The petition has no merit.
Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term
in office. However, according to the SC, it unseated Morales
in its May 2007 decision by canceling his Certificate of
Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004
elections.
We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of
Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June
93
1998; 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001; 1 July 2001 to 30 June
2004; and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of the LGC state that the term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years,
and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the
application of the disqualification: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not
the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term and did not
hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.
Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of
2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. Thus, the period from 17
May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap. As a result, the
present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively
Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Bolos vs Comelec
GR No. 184082
March 17, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Nicasio Bolos, Jr. was elected for three terms as
Punong Barangay of Brgy. Biking, Dauis Bohol. Durigng his
last term, he ran as Sanguniang Bayan Member and
subsequently left his post as Punong Barangay to serve his
full term asSanguninag Bayan until 2007.
In 2007, Bolos ran for Punong Barangay and Respondent
Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay
filed a petition in the COMELEC for the disqualification
alleging Bolos is
no longer allowed to run for the same position in accordance
with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43
(b) of R.A. No. 7160 as he has served three terms.
Bolos argued that he has not violated the three-term limit as
his election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan
member was by operation of law hence, it must be
considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
his last term of service.
Issue:
Is Bolos disqualified to run on the ground of violation of the
three-term limit rule?
Ruling:
Yes. Bolos is disqualified as he violated the three-term limit
rule. Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides
that barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit,
while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office of
barangay officials shall be five (5) years.
The rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts:
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining
the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does
not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together
to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
The Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
Petitioner clearly satisfies the first condition. As to the
second condition, there is a voluntary renunciation as he
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay and assumed
office as Sangguniang Bayan member thus he is deemed to
have fully served three consecutive terms.
Aldovino v. Comelec
GR No. 184836
December 23, 2009
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-
term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or
the Local Government Code)?
Facts:
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected
councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively.
In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days
in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan's
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy
for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)
sought to deny due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy
or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term
therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Issues:
1. Is the preventive suspension of an elected local official an
interruption of the three-term limit rule; and
2. Is the preventive suspension considered involuntary
renunciation as contemplated in Section 43 (b) of RA 7160?
Ruling:
Nature of Preventive Suspension
94
Preventive suspension whether under the Local
Government Code, 17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, or the Ombudsman Act is an interim remedial
measure to address the situation of an official who have
been charged administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential
for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local
Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is strong and
given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information
(that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in
court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when,
in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is
strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended
official is barred from performing the functions of his office
and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not
vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of
guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates
under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to
the protection of the service rather than to the interests of
the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the
service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the
exercise of the functions of the official's office; the official is
reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary
incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is
vacated when a public official is preventively suspended.
This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
1. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-
Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule
demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official's
stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one
since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for
a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this
reality and to allow a constitutional violation through
sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge
the functions of office with the interruption of term that the
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many
reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them
personal and some of them by operation of law that may
temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising
the functions of his office in the way that preventive
suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability
through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension
as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may
prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his
office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive
suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery
of service for a time within a term. Adopting such
interruption of actual service as the standard to determine
effective interruption of term under the three-term rule
raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing
this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual
service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of
office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the
three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-
sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
2. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of
law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the
suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may
have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of
the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive
suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that
voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the
element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely
involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that
an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive
suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and
involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to
the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by
nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective
natures is the more important consideration of how they
affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the
total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the
Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-
term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an
effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be
a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider
it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a
preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of
office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this
sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more
potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
expressly disallows as an interruption.
Mendoza vs Familara
GR No. 191017
November 15, 2011
FACTS:
95
Mendoza, a candidate for Barangay Captain, questioned the
retroactive application of the three-consecutive term limit
imposed on barangay elective officials beginning from the
1994 barangay elections
ISSUE:
Is the retroactive application constitutional?
HELD:
The law is CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is settled in the case of COMELEC vs Cruz, no retroactive
application was made because the three-term limit has
been there all along as early as the
second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the
[Local Government Code] and can still be found in
the current law.
Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials are provisions that
are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless
the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is
provided with respect to the length of the term of office
under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective
officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length
of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast
to this clear case of an exception to a general rule,
the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain
any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who
must perforce include barangay officials.
This leads to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has
been there all along and does not simply retroact the
application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections
of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory
changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the
challenged proviso.
Abundo, Sr. v. COMELEC
GR No. 201716
January 8, 2013
Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo
vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged
and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the
2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the
office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of
the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of
the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to
this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the
formers disqualification to run predicated on the three-
consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC
First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in
the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was
accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga,
Catanduanes.
The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal
mayor and the COMELEC has resolved the case in the same
wise. By virtue of such, It is upon the foregoing backdrop of
events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as
incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
Issue:
Is Abundo eligible to run and be elected as the rightful
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes?
Ruling: Yes.
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been
Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due
proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local
office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only
to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and
prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest
in their position" but also to "enhance the peoples freedom
of choice." In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
"while people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken
that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."
In the present case, the Court finds Abundos case
meritorious and declares that the two-year period during
which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption, which effectively removed
Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the
term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly
elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his
election protest against Torres and his consequent
proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first
requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based
on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is
satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not
Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the
phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local
elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of
whether or not there was an effective involuntary
96
interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in
the disruption of the continuity of Abundos mayoralty.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in
a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the
law describes that an officer may hold an office." It also
means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another." It is the
period of time during which a duly elected official has title to
and can serve the functions of an elective office.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten
months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo
cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could
hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he
assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said
elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title
to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume
the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually
held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only
upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest,
as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for
only a little over one year and one month. Consequently,
since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo
fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground
is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which
Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundos
continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term,
cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-
term threshold.
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is
related to the concepts of interruption of service and
voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption
means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. To
interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the
reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the
service by the concerned elected official by effectively
cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the
occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the
word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or
abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the
office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up
or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service
of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost
his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought
entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest
case. And respondent-appellants victory in the said case is a
final confirmation that he was validly elected for the
mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007.
Note:
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence
on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position
and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the
rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot
be treated as one full term as contemplated under the
subject constitutional and statutory provision that service
cannot be counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he
held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his
succession to said position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive
terms and who did not seek the elective position for what
could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election,
had an interruption in the continuity of the officials service.
For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo
and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the
conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself,
work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of
service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as
the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the
office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his
office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption
need not be for a full term of three years or for the major
part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of
time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break
the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and
said decision becomes final after said official had served the
full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest
does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to
serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite
the defeat, should be counted in the application of term
limits because the nullification of his proclamation came
after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
Sambarani v. COMELEC and Maulay
GR No. 160427
September 15, 2004
FACTS:
In the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Sambarani, Miraato,
Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ran for re-election
97
as punong barangay in their respective barangays, all in
Tamparan, Lanao del Sur.
Due to a failure of elections in eleven barangays in Lanao del
Sur, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5479 setting special
elections on 13 August 2002 in the affected barangays in
Lanao del Sur including the five barangays. On 14 August
2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael Maulay issued a
certification that there were no special elections held on 13
August 2002.
Consequently, Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and
Dayondong (joint-petitioners) filed a Joint Petition seeking to
declare a failure of elections in the five barangays and the
holding of another special election. The Joint Petition
attributed the failure of the special elections to EO Maulays
non-compliance with COMELEC Commissioner Sadains
directive. Commissioner Sadain had directed EO Maulay to
use the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
2001 computerized Voters List and the Voters Registration
Records of the Provincial Election Officer during the
December 2001 registration of new voters.
Since EO Maulay failed to file a written explanation,
COMELEC moved for the resolution of the case. It directed
the DILG to appoint Brgy Captains and Brgy Kagawads in the
five barangays pursuant to LGC. Petitioners filed the instant
petition to hold another special election which the COMELEC
subsequently denied on the ground that the 30-day period
had already lapsed.
Petitioners argue that as the incumbent elective punong
barangays, they should remain in office in a hold-over-
capacity until their successors have been elected and
qualified pursuant to LGC.
ISSUE:
May the DILG, in the interim, appoint the Brgy and SK
officials?
HELD:
No, the DILG cannot appoint pending the election of new
officials.
RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and
SK elections, prescribes the term of office of barangay and
SK officials, and provides for the qualifications of candidates
and voters for the SK elections.
As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA
9164 is clear. Since there was a failure of elections in the 15
July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August 2002
special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as
barangay chairmen of their respective barangays in a hold-
over capacity. They shall continue to discharge their powers
and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and
privileges pertaining to the office.
True, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the
term of elective barangay officials to three years. However,
Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent
barangay officials may continue in office in a hold over
capacity until their successors are elected and qualified.
Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which
provides that: All incumbent barangay officials xxx shall
remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for
cause xxx until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified. Section 8 of the same RA 6679 also states that
incumbent elective barangay officials running for the same
office shall continue to hold office until their successors shall
have been elected and qualified.
The application of the hold-over principle preserves
continuity in the transaction of official business and prevents
a hiatus in government pending the assumption of a
successor into office. As held in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,
cases of extreme necessity justify the application of the
hold-over principle.
Victoria vs Comelec
229 SCRA 269
January 10, 1994
FACTS:
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the
Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically
assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving
vacant his post as vice-governor. The Comelec certified
Jesus James Calisin of District 1 as first ranking member
with Juan Victoria of District 2 as second ranking
member based on the number of votes obtained by the
Sanggunian members in relation to the number
of registered voters in the district. Pursuant to the Comelec
resolution, DILG Secretary Alunan designated Calisin as
acting Vice-Governor.
Victoria claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members
should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in
relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on
the number of voters in the district who actually
voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a
large number of registered voters but only a few actually
voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a
low percentage of the number of votes obtained.
Conversely, a district may have a smaller number
of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in
which case the winning candidate would get a higher
percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, Victoria would
come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
ISSUE:
How shall the ranking in the Sanggunian be determined for
purposes of succession?
RULING:
Section 44 of the Local Government Code provides that if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice-governor,
the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian
member, shall become vice-governor. "For purposes of
succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in
each district in the immediately preceding local election."
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number
of registered voters in each district. In such a case, the
98
Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words.
Victoria's contention must very well be addressed to
the legislative branch and not to the Court which has
no power to change the law.
Recabo vs Comelec
GR No. 134293
June 21, 1999
FACTS:
On March 27, 1998, petitioner Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed
his certificate of candidacy (as official candidate)for vice-
mayor of the municipality of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte of the
political party LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. His nomination by said
political party is evidence by the certificate of nomination
and acceptance dated March 27, 1998 signed by Fidel V.
Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and
Secretary General, respectively, of said political party.
However, on April 2, 1998, another person, respondent
Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claiming to be the official candidate of
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP as vice-mayor of the municipality of
Mainit, Surigao del Norte also filed his certificate of
candidacy. Petitioner submitted to this Commission a copy of
the certificate of nomination and acceptance in favor of
Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., dated March 30, 1998 signed only by
one representative of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Francisco T.
Matugas. The space of the other representative Robert
Barbers is blank.
Petitioners Arguments: That the respondent KAISER B.
RECABO, JR., is a SUBSTITUTE candidate for the office of
VICE-MAYOR of the Municipality of Mainit, Surigao del Norte.
He filed his Certificate of Candidacy on April 02, 1998. He
claims to be a substitute of MRS. CANDELARIA B. RECABO
who filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
VICE-MAYOR of Mainit, Surigao del Norte on March 25,
1998.Petitioner submits the theory that since the certificate
of nomination and acceptance in favor of Candelaria B.
Recabo is not signed by Robert Barbers, there is no valid
nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP in favor of Candelaria
Recabo. Therefore, Candelaria B. Recabo not having been
validly nominated, should be deemed an independent
candidate only. And since Candelaria B. Recabo is an
independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted
because under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977
promulgated on January 15, 1998, "no substitution shall be
allowed for an independent candidate."
Private Respondents Arguments: that the certificate of
nomination and acceptance signed only by representative
Matugas (and without the joint signature of representative
Barbers) substantially complied with the party requirements
and are, therefore, valid as far as the party is concerned.
Respondent maintains that his nomination is valid.
Respondent further argues that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to rule on who between petitioner and
respondent has a valid certificate of candidacy.Respondent
likewise claims that the certificate of nomination in favor
petitioner is falsified because it was notarized in Mainit,
Surigao del Norte at a time when the signatories therein
(Fidel Ramos and Jose de Venecia, Jr.,) were not in said
place. Respondent however has not presented any evidence
to this effect.
Based on the foregoing, the respondent Commission
cancelled the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Kaiser B.
Recabo, Jr. Petitioner Recabo, Jr., filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplement thereto. Francisco R.
Reyes, Jr. filed his opposition. On July 1, 1998, the
Commission en banc issued a resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners certificate of nomination by
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP is valid?
2. Whether or not a certificate of votes is sufficient to
establish the results of the election.
3. Should Reyes be proclaimed winner and assume the
position of vice-mayor being the second highest
winning candidate?
4. How then the vacancy should be filled up?
RULING:
1. NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under
Section 5 thereof: The certificate of nomination by
registered political parties of their official candidates
shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later
than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
as specified in Section 4 hereof, duly signed and
attested under oath by the party president, chairman,
secretary-general or any other party officer duly
authorized in writing to do so. Pursuant to said
resolution, the political party of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP
issued an `Authorization designating two (2) Party
officers to nominate, sign, attest under oath and issue
the Official Certificates of Nomination, namely,
Francisco T. Matugas and Robert Ace S. Barbers.
Consistent with the foregoing, the certificate of
nomination and acceptance, as pointed out by the
Comelec, requires the joint signing of the two party
officers.
The certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as
his mother did not comply with the requirements of
being official candidates of LAKAS Party. The certificate
of nomination was invalid because it was signed only by
one authorized party officer as compared to Reyes
which was signed by the National Chairman and
Secretary General, respectively, of said political party.
Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for
the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy
to curb the evil that the Comelec sought to abate
pursuant to its mandate to hold free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. As the respondent
Commission stated, to allow respondent to run under
the circumstances adverted to herein would put the
election process in mockery and disrepute for we would
in effect be allowing an anomalous situation where a
single political party may field-in multiple candidates for
a single election position. It will be recalled that the
mother of herein petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy on March 25, 1998 and later withdrew the
same on March 31, 1998. In the meantime, Reyes, Jr.
filed his certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998.
Thereafter, Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy
on April 2, 1998, in substitution of his mother who had
withdrawn earlier.
99
Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the
same political party, at the time petitioner Recabo, Jr.
filed his certificate of candidacy there was no more void
to fill in as respondent Reyes, Jr. had already filed his
certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP. Verily, there was no more vacancy to be
substituted for. Disunity and discord amongst
members of a political party should not be allowed to
create a mockery of our electoral process, which
envisions one candidate from a political party for each
position.
2. To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall
resolve the second issue first that the electorate has
spoken loud and clear in favor of petitioner by giving
him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the
votes cast for both of them. Petitioner, in effect,
argues that the popular will as clearly expressed in
votes cast and counted should prevail, such that the
election of a candidate cannot be annulled because of
formal defects in his certificate Recabo submitted a
Certified List of Candidates with their Votes Obtained
and an undated `Certified List of Winning Candidates
both signed by the Acting Election Officer and Election
Officer-OIC, respectively.
In Garay vs. Commission on Elections, we had occasion
to rule that: xxx. According to Section 17, a certificate
of votes can only be evidence to prove tampering,
alteration, falsification or any other anomaly committed
in the election returns concerned, when duly
authenticated x xx. A certificate of votes does not
constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine
results of the election; only election returns are.
In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning
candidates sufficient evidence of the real results of the
election. Moreover, the certificate of votes submitted
does not conform with Section 16 of R.A. 6646. It does
not state the number of votes obtained in words; it
does not state the number of the precinct, the total
number of voters who voted in the precinct and the
time issued. Most importantly, it was merely certified
true and correct by a certain Lydia P. Mahinay as acting
election officer. As aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A.
6646 requires that the certificate of votes be signed
and thumbmarked by each member of the board of
election inspectors. Thus, the doctrine that a mere
technicality cannot be used to frustrate the peoples will
finds no application in the case at bar considering that
the results of the election have not been duly
established.
3. No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish
the true and genuine results of the election. A
certificate of canvass issued on the basis of the election
returns is required to proclaim the elected candidate. It
is settled that the disqualification or non-qualification of
the winner in a vice mayoralty race does not justify the
proclamation of the defeated candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes. To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a
second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters.
 He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
4. The vacancy due to the ineligibility of herein petitioner
should be filled up in accordance with Section 44 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that
the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become
the vice-mayor.
Farias v. Barba
GR No. 116763
April 19, 1996
Facts:
Domingo, who did not belong to any political party, was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas,
IlocosNorte. During his term, he resigned after going without
leave to the US. To fill the vacancy created by his
resignation, the mayor, Barba, recommended to the
Governor of IlocosNorte, Farias, the appointment of
Palafox. A similar recommendation, contained in a
resolution, for the appointment of Palafox was made by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas to Mayor Barba. The
resolution was submitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan of
IlocosNorte. The latter disapproved the same for the reason
that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan
members are lodged in the Governor. The
SangguniangPanlalawigan recommended to Governor
Farias the appointment of Nacino.
On June 8, 1994, Gov. Farias appointed Nacino and swore
him to office. On the same day, Mayor Barba appointed
Palafox to the same position. The latter took his oath the
day thereafter. Palafox and Nacino filed with the RTC a
petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
Issue:
In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan
caused by the cessation from office of a member who does
not belong to any political party, who can appoint the
replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
Held:
The person who has the power to appoint under such
circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of
the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
Section 45(c) of the LGC states, In case the permanent
vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall,
upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint
a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
The appointing authority is not bound to appoint
anyonerecommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned.
The power of appointment is adiscretionary power. On the
other hand, neither is the appointing power vested with
solarge a discretion that he can disregard the
100
recommendation of the Sanggunianconcerned. Since the
recommendation takes the place of nomination by political
party, therecommendation must likewise be considered a
condition sine qua non for the validity ofthe appointment, by
analogy to the provision of Sec. 45(b).
Since neither Nacino nor Palfox was appointed in the manner
indicated by law, neither is entitled to the seat in the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, IlocosNorte, which was
vacated by member Domingo. For while Nacino was
appointed by the provincial governor, he was not
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On
the other hand, Palafox was recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the
provincial governor whoappointed him.
Purto Navarro and Tamayo vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 141307
March 28, 2001
Facts:
In May 11, 1997 local elections, Calimlim and Aquino, both
from Lakas NUCD-KAMPI, were elected as mayor and vice-
mayor, respectively. However, on March 25, 1999, Mayor
Calimlim died so a vacancy was thus created in the Office of
the Mayor by operation of law. Pursuant to the LGC, then
Vice-Mayor Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly, Tamayo
who belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party,the
highest-ranking member (the one who garnered the highest
number of votes) of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to
the position of the Vice-Mayor.
Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the
elevation of Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor,
Governor Agbayani appointed Navarro as Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to the same political
party as that of Tamayo.
Private respondents filed a civil case to nullify the
appointment of Navarro, arguing that it was the former vice-
mayor Aquino, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who
created the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan
because under the law he was also a member of the
Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from Lakas
NUCD-KAMPI. On the other hand, petitioners contended that
it was the elevation of Tamayo to the office of Vice-Mayor
which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian
Bayan. Hence, the appointment extended by Gov. Agbayani
to Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the
REFORMA-LM, is valid.
Issue:
Is the appointment of Navarro as Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan proper?
Ruling: Yes.
Under Section 44 of LGC, a permanent vacancy arises when
an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. Sec. 45
of LGC provides among others that xxx only the nominee of
the political party under which the Sanggunian member
concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the
Sangunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove
provided. The appointee shall come from the political party
as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy
xxx.
With the elevation of Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-
LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the
Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who
should belong to the political party of Tamayo. Otherwise,
REFORMA-LMs representation in the Sanggunian would be
diminished. The reason behind the right given to a political
party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party
representation as willed by the people in the election.
The last vacancy in the Sanggunian refers to that created
by the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next
higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant.
Damasen vs Tumamao
GR No. 173165
February 17, 2010
Facts:
A permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the Vice
Mayor of San Isidro, Isabella when incumbent Vice-Mayor
NeliaTumamao died.. Pursuant to Sec. 44 of RA 7160, Ligaya
Alonzo, the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang
Bayan was elevated to the position.
To fill the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguinang Bayan, Mayor
Lim recommended to Governor Padaca the appointment of
Oscar Tumamao, also a member of LDP. Tumamao was
appointed, took his oath and attended sessions.
On May 2005, Atty. Lucky Damasen, became a member of
LDP and got hold of a letter of nomination to the
Sanggunian Bayan from provincial chairman of LDP Balauag
addressed to Governor Padaca. He was appointed to SB and
took his oath. Damasen attended sessions but he was not
recognized.
He filed a petition for quo warranto with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against Tumamao with the RTC,
seeking to be declared the rightful member of the SB.
As part of his defense, Tumamao presentedAtty. Ernest
Soberano who identified a letter dated June 14, 2005,
signed by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, which states
that the latter was revoking her nomination of Damasen,
and that she was confirming Tumamaos nomination made
by Mayor Lim. Later, Tumamao presented Provincial
Chairman Balauag who affirmed the contents of her letter
revoking the nomination of Damasen.
RTC ruled in favor of Damasen.
Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. The CA held that Damasen was not entitled to
assume the vacant position in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Issue:
Who, between Damasen and Tumamao, is entitled to the
contested position?
Held:
101
Tumamao is entitled to the contested position.
It is undisputed that the law applicable to herein petition is
Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160, which provides for the rule on
succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the
Sanggunian. As can be gleaned from Sec. 45, the law
provides for conditions for the rule of succession to apply:
First, the appointee shall come from the same political party
as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy.
Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a
Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the
political party concerned. The reason behind the right given
to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain
the party representation as willed by the people in the
election.
Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred
because of the elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-
mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her should also
belong to the LDP so as to preserve party representation.
Thus, this Court cannot countenance Damasens insistence
in clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not a bona
fide member of the LDP. While the revocation of the
nomination given to Damasen came after the fact of his
appointment, this Court cannot rule in his favor, because the
very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee
must come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian
member who caused the vacancy. To stress, Damasen is not
a bona fide member of the LDP.
In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of
the electorate. He himself admits that he was previously a
member of the Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position
of Mayor under the said party on the May 2004 Elections.
Likewise, he did not resign from the said party when he
joined the LDP, and even admitted that his joining the LDP
was not because of party ideals, but because he just wanted
to. How can the will of the electorate be best served, given
the foregoing admissions of Damasen? If this Court were to
grant herein petition, it would effectively diminish the party
representation of the LDP in the Sanggunian, as Damasen
would still be considered a member of the Lakas-CMD, not
having resigned therefrom, a scenario that defeats the
purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs contrary the
ratio of Navarro.
What is damning to the cause of Damasen, is the letter of
Demaree J.B. Raval, the Deputy Secretary Counsel of the
LDP, addressed to Governor Padaca wherein it is
categorically stated that Damasen is not a bona fide member
of the LDP.
This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the letter
coming from the LDP leadership. Quite clearly, from the
tenor of the letter, it appears that the membership of
Damasen still had to be approved by the LDP National
Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasens procurement of a
Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman
Balauag, to this Courts mind, the same merely started the
process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean
automatic membership thereto. While it may be argued that
Damasen was already a member upon receipt of a
Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman
Balauag, this Court cannot impose such view on the LDP. If
the LDP leadership says that the membership of Damasen
still had to be endorsed to the National Council for approval,
then this Court cannot question such requirement in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. It is well settled that
the discretion of accepting members to a political party is a
right and a privilege, a purely internal matter, which this
Court cannot meddle in.
Jalosjos vs Comelec
GR No. 205033
June 18, 2013
Facts:
On November 16, 2001, petitioner Jalosjos was convicted by
final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six
(6) counts of acts of lasciviousness in People of the
Philippines v. Jalosjos in G.R. Nos. 132875-76. He was
sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count,
respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification under Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, his sentence was
commuted by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to 16
years, 3months and 3 days. After serving the same, he was
issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison on March 18,
2009.On April 12, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a
voter in Zamboanga City. Because of his previous conviction,
hisapplication was denied, prompting him to file a petition
for inclusion in the permanent list of voters. Pending the
resolution of his petition, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012,
seeking to run as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13,
2013 elections. In his CoC, petitioner stated that he is a
registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.On
October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for
Inclusionon account of his perpetual absolute disqualification
which ineffect deprived him of the right to vote in any
election. Such denial was affirmed by the RTC of Zamboanga
City, Branch 14 inits October 31, 2012 Order, which is final
and executory under the Omnibus Election Code. Five (5)
petitions were lodged before the COMELECs first and second
divisions seeking the denial and/or cancellation of
petitioners CoC due to his perpetual absolute disqualification
as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement. The COMELEC En Banc relied on the Courts
pronouncement in the consolidated cases of Dominador
Jalosjos Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC
and in its Resolution No. 9613 motu propio denied due
course and/or cancelled petitioners CoC. Petitioner then filed
this petition against COMELEC Resolution No. 9613.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification?
RULING:
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited,
provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted
felon of the privilege to run for elective office. To note, this
penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based
on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous
by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of
moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,30 as the same
partakes of a privilege which the State grants only to such
classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the
common good.
102
Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in
relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more direct and specific in
nature insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for
elective office due to his conviction as compared to Section
40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of offenses involving
moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment without any consideration of certain
disqualifying effects to ones right to suffrage. Accordingly,
Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of
general application and therefore, must yield to the more
definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex
specialis derogat generali general legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed therefor should
prevail.
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried
with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the
RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed,
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a
penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly
and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he
remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him
to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who
is previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said
accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. In this case, the same accessory penalty had not
been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by
any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioners
disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to
subsist.
Further, it is well to note that the use of the word
"perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty
connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not
depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as
its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Courts
ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, where the court explained the
meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office:
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification
disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to
vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the
sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired
on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to
or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the
term of the sentence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more
recent cases of Aratea, Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino,held:
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the
right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction
becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does
not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last
sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
[perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any
public office that the convict may be holding at the time of
his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment,
and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective
public office perpetually.
Chua vs. COMELEC
GR No. 216607
April 5, 2016
Facts:
On October 3, 2012, Arlene LlenaEmpaynado Chua filed her
certificate of candidacy for councilor for the fourth district of
Manila during the May 13, 2013 National and Local elections.
After the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth
highest number of votes. She was proclaimed by the Board
of Canvassers on May 15, 2013 as the sixth councilor for the
fourth district of Manila (there are only 6 seats available).
However, when she was proclaimed,Emelda Frigate filed a
petition to declare as a nuisance candidate and to deny due
course and/or cancel Chuas certificate of candidacy. Frigate
was allegedly a registered voter in the fourth district who
proclaimed that Chua was unqualified to run for councilor on
two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen and she was a
permanent resident of the United States in America.
Chua contended that she was a natural born filipino, born to
Filipino parents in Cabanatuan city, Nueva ecija. With
respect to her residency, she said that she had been residing
in Sampaloc Manila since 2008 and had more than compiled
with the one year period required to run for councilor.
On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a motion to intervene with
manifestation and motion to annul proclamation. She alleged
that she also ran for councilor in the fourth district of Manila,
and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh
among all the candidates, next to Chua. She said that if
Chua be disqualified, she should be proclaimed councilor the
following this courts ruling in Maquiling v COMELEC.
Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen was
unqualified to run for councilor. Based on an order of the
Bureau of Immigration, Chua was allegedly naturalized as an
American citizen on December 7, 1977. She was issued an
American passport.
103
As a consequence, the COMELEC annulled proclamation of
respondent Chua as councilor for the 4th district of Manila,
and to direct the board of canvassers of the city of Manila to
convene and proclaim intervenorBacani as the duly councilor
of the fourth district of the City of Manila.
Chua then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issue:
Whether the rule on succession under section 45 of the local
government applies to this case
Held:
The rule on succession under section 45 applies in this case.
Permanent Vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those
arising when an elective official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitates to discharge the functions of his office.
In these situations, the vacancies were caused by those
whose certificates of candidacy were valid at the time of the
filing, but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that
took effect after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner Arlene Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified
from running for the position of Councilor in the fourth
district of Manila during the 2013 National and Local
elections. With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy, her certificate of
candidacy was void ab innate. She was correctly considered
a non-candidate. All votes caster for her were stray, and the
person legally entitled to the position is private respondent
Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes
among the eligible candidates.
People vs Bustamante
105 Phil. 64
Facts:
Defendant-appellant Bustamante was married to one Maria
Perez on August 9, 1954 before the Justice of the Peace of
Binalonan, Pangasinan. A little over a year later, he
contracted a second marriage with DemetriaTibayan,
solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco Nato of Mapandan,
Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said
municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting.
Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a
month, after which time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan
to live with the first wife, Maria Perez. In the course of her
search for him, Demetria discovered from the Binalonan
municipal authorities the previous marriage of defendant
Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the
duly elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of the
municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of
1951. On September 16, 1955, Aquino went on leave of
absence for one month. In view of this, the vice-mayor was
designated by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal
government during his absence; and Nato was acting in this
capacity when he performed the second marriage of
Bustamante with DemetriaTibayan.
Apellant, relying upon Article 56 of the Civil Code contends
that thre could not have been a second marriage to speak
of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated
the same, hence, without autnority of law to do so.
Issue:
Did the Vice-Mayor have the authority to solemnize the
second marriage?
Held:
The vice-mayor of a municipality acting as Acting Mayor has
the authority to solemnize marriages, because if the vice-
mayor assumes the powers and duties of the office of the
mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it is because
the latter is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as mayor, for
in both instances, he discharges all the duties and wields the
powers appurtenant to said office.
Garcia v Mojica
GR No. 139043
September 10, 1992
Facts:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City
mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of
asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-
2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon
F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news
reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase
of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by
petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution
officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to
conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After
investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be
upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against
petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent
Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
approved this recommendation.
Issues:
Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable
Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by
virtue of the Local Government Code
Held:
1. The Supreme Court said, No. As previously held, a re-
elected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term
of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him
back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects
him, then such is considered a condonation of his past
misdeeds.
104
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the
contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was
signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was
not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate
could not be said to have voted for petitioner with
knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an
act done during his previous term. While petitioner can no
longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract
with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any
case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The
ruling does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners
wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in
signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the
question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our
considered view that he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month
suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively
suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to
the Deputy Ombudsman.
Alejandro vs Office of the Ombudsman
GR No. 173121
April 3, 2013
Facts:
During an anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG
discovered that MICOs car-wash boys had been illegally
getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG
arrested the car-wash boys and confiscated the containers
used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredos
father and the Barangay Chairman or punong barangay of
Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with the
PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the
confiscated containers. This intervention caused further
commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended
car-wash boys to escape. The Ombudsman then after its
initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against the
petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint
legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted
intervention, where he was found guilty and was ordered to
be dismissed from service.
Issue and Ruling:
1. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRES A
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43
REVIEW?
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for
another appeal from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply
requires that a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for certiorari may be filed in all other
 cases where the penalty imposed is not one
involving public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one (1) month, or a fine
equivalent to one (1) month salary. This post-
judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the Office of
the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain cases.
To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all
administrative remedies when he filed his motion
for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman. There is no further need to
review the case at the administrative level
4.
since the Deputy Ombudsman has already
acted on the case and he was acting for and
in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman
2. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS?
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the
Local Government Code both provide for the
procedure to discipline elective officials, the
seeming conflicts between the two laws have been
resolved in cases decided by this Court where it
held that the two statutes on the specific matter in
question are not so inconsistent x x x as to compel
us to only uphold one and strike down the other."
The two laws may be reconciled by understanding
the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate any act or omission of a public officer
or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. In administrative cases involving
the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body where the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take
cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.In this case, the petitioner is a
Barangay Chairman, occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade 14.2Since the
complaint against the petitioner was initially
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose
exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN HAS THE
POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE?
Section 15 of RA 6770 reveals the manifest intent
of the lawmakers to give the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. These powers unmistakably grant the
Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly
impose administrative sanctions; its power is not
merely recommendatory. We held in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Apolonio29 that:It is likewise
apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers
intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman
with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can
effectively carry out its mandate as protector of
the people against inept and corrupt government
officers and employees. The Office was granted
105
the power to punish for contempt in accordance
with the Rules of Court. It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies (with the exception only of impeachable
officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary).
Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under
its authority pending an investigation when the
case so warrants.
Whether or not Alejandro is liable for misconduct
in the performance of his duties?
YES. At the outset, we point out that the
maintenance of peace and order is a function of
both the police and the Barangay Chairman, but
crime prevention is largely a police matter. At the
time when the police officers were hauling the
confiscated equipment, they were creating a
commotion. As Barangay Chairman, the petitioner
was clearly in the performance of his official duty
when he interfered. Under Section 389(b)(3) of RA
7160, the law provides that a punong barangay
must "maintain public order in the barangay and,
in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal
mayor and the sanggunian members in the
performance of their duties and functions."Yet,
instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually
ordered several bystanders to defy the PNP-
CIDGs whole operation. The petitioners act
stirred further commotion that unfortunately led to
the escape of the apprehended car-wash boys
While the petitioner has general charge of the
affairs in the barangay, the maintenance of peace
and order is largely a police matter, with police
authority being predominant especially when the
police has began to act on an enforcement
matter.Police authority is superior to the punong
barangays authority in a situation where the
maintenance of peace and order has
metamorphosed into crime prevention and the
arrest of criminal offenders.In this case, a criminal
act was actually taking place and the situation was
already beyond the general maintenance of peace
and order. The police was, at that point, under the
obligation to prevent the commission of a crime
and to effect the arrest, as it actually did, of
criminal offenders.From another perspective, the
peace and order function of the punong barangay
must also be related to his function of assisting
local executive officials (i.e., the city mayor),
under Section 389(b), Chapter III of the Local
Government Code. Local executive officials have
the power to employ and deploy police for the
maintenance of peace and order, the prevention
of crimes and the arrest of criminal offenders.
Accordingly, in the maintenance of peace and
order, the petitioner is bound, at the very least, to
respect the PNP-CIDGs authority even if he is not
in the direct position to give aid. By interfering
with a legitimate police operation, he effectively
interfered with this hierarchy of authority.
 5. Whether or not there is justification to impose a
higher penalty against the petitioner?
Yes. His open interference in a legitimate police
activity. and defiance of the police's authority only
show his clear i1itent to violate the law; in fact, he
reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot
official tasked at the first level with the
enforcement of the law. The photographs, taken
together with the investigation report of the Police
Superintendent and the testimonies of the
witnesses, even lead to conclusions beyond
interference and defiance; the petitioner himself
could have been involved in corrupt activities,
although we cannot make this conclusive finding
at this point. We make this observation though as
his son owns MICO whose car-wash boys were
engaged in water pilferage. What we can
conclusively confirm is that the petitioner violated
the law by directly interfering with a legitimate
police activity where his own son appeared to be
involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as
grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides that the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service.
Pablico vs Villapando
GR. No. 147870
July 31, 2002
Facts:
An administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse
of authority and culpable violation of the
Constitution.[3] Complainants alleged that respondent, on
behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy
agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty
candidate in the May 1998 elections. They argue that the
consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period
under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the
President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal
from service on erring elective local officials?
Ruling:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local
official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from
office on any of the following grounds:
xxx x xx x xx
An elective local official may be removed from office
on the grounds enumerated above by order of the
proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision
that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring
elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law.
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds
that (b) An elective local official may be removed from office
106
on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article
[The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government
Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the
disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The
disciplining authority referred to pertains to
the SangguniangPanlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the
Office of the President.
This grant to the disciplining authority of the power to
remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority
of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or
contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government
Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with
the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates
to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring
elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with
the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to
remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for
being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or
removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of
suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost
good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public
official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of
their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be
put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove.
Bunye vs Escareal
GR No. 110216
September 10, 1993
Facts:
The petition seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on
May 11, 1993 by the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspending them from office pending their trial
for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Actunder an information alleging that:
accused, while in the performance of their official
functions, in conspiracy with one another and taking
advantage of their official positions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enact Kapasiyahan Bilang
45 on August 1, 1988, and on the basis thereof, forcibly took
possession of the new Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, and thereafter took over the operation and
management of the aforesaid public market starting August
19, 1988, despite the fact that, there was a valid and
subsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for
a term of 25 years, between the Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod and
mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.,
which forcible take-over had caused undue injury to the
aforesaid Cooperative members, and gave the Municipal
Government, and in effect, the herein accused themselves,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of their official functions.
On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, and over the
opposition of the accused, the Sandiganbayan issued on May
11, 1993 a resolution suspending them pendente lite from
public office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension on
the petitioners is valid?
Held:
There is no merit in the petitioners' argument that because
they have repeatedly admitted that they had committed the
acts constituting the offense charged against them, there is
no cause for apprehension that they might tamper with the
records in the offices under their control, or intimidate
prospective witnesses against them. The Solicitor General
correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that
their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution
will need to hold up its case against them. "The prosecution
must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the
facts for trial under conditions which would ensure
nonintervention and noninterference for ninety (90) straight
days from petitioners' camp.
The fear of the petitioners that the municipal government of
Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for ninety (90) days when they
(petitioners) are preventively suspended, is remote. There
will still remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the
Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government, will surely know
how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily
vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor and six councilors in
accordance with the provisions of the Local Government
Code, R.A. No. 7160
Garcia vs Mojica
314 SCRA 207
September 10, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a
contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the
city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period
was to commence on September 1998 when the first
delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding
the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City,
through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry
into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution
officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to
conduct the inquiry, After his investigation, he recommended
that the said inquiry be upgraded
to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and
the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica,
107
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation.
Respondent Allan Francisco S. Garciano, the graft
investigating officer to whom the case was raffled for
investigation, recommended the preventive suspension of
petitioner and the others. Two days later the affidavit-
complaint against petitioner was filed. The following day the
Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive
suspension order. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order which motion was denied.
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of
the said order. He pleads for immediate relief through the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUES:
I. What is the extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to
conduct administrative investigation?
II. Given the purpose of preventive suspension and the
circumstances of this case, did respondent Deputy
Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of discretion when he
set the period of preventive suspension at six months?
III. Assuming that the Ombudsman properly took cognizance
of the case, what law should apply to the investigation being
conducted by him, the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160)
or the Ombudsman Law (R.A. 6770)? Was the procedure in
the law properly observed?
IV. What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the
investigation of acts done before his reelection?
RULING:
I.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations is mandated by no less than the
Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13[1], the
Ombudsman has the power to:
investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of
the Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct
administrative investigations. Thus, Section 19 of said law
provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall
act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or
omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys
functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority:
SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. That the Office of the
Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investigation
into the acts complained of, appears clear from the
foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770.
However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman
may conduct an investigation over a particular act or
omission, is different from the question of whether or not
petitioner, after investigation, may be held administratively
liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in mind, even
as we must also take note that the power to investigate is
distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring
public officer.
Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the
Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its
administrative investigation is provided by specific provision
of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
We have previously interpreted the phrase under his
authority to mean that the Ombudsman can preventively
suspend all officials under investigation by his office,
regardless of the branch of government in which they are
employed, excepting of course those removable by
impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.
The power to preventively suspend is available not only to
the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. This is
the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 above cited.
There can be no question in this case as to the power and
authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an
order of preventive suspension against an official like the
petitioner, to prevent that official from using his office to
intimidate or influence witnessesor to tamper with records
that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against
him.
108
II.
YES, respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse
of discretion when he set the period of preventive
suspension at six months.
Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, to repeat,
may be imposed when, among other factors, the evidence of
guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be
preventively suspended must not exceed six months. In this
case, petitioner was preventively suspended and ordered to
cease and desist from holding office for the entire period of
six months, which is the maximum provided by law.
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension.
xxx
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong as to warrant preventive suspension rests with the
Ombudsman. The discretion as regards the period of such
suspension also necessarily belongs to the Ombudsman,
except that he cannot extend the period of suspension
beyond that provided by law.But, in our view, both the
strength of the evidence to warrant said suspension and the
propriety of the length or period of suspension imposed on
petitioner are properly raised in This petition
for certiorari and prohibition. It is pertinent to note here that
the inquiry that preceded the filing of an administrative case
against petitioner was prompted by newspaper reports
regarding the allegedly anomalous contract entered into by
petitioner, on behalf of Cebu City, with F.E. Zuellig. In the
memorandum to respondent Mojica,respondent Garciano
recommended that petitioner be preventively suspended,
based on an initial investigation purportedly showing: (1) the
contract for supply of asphalt to Cebu City was designed to
favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount quoted in the contract was
too expensive compared to the amount for which asphalt
may be bought from local suppliers such as Shell and
Petron, particularly considering that the amount was fixed in
dollars and was payable in pesos, thus exposing the city
government to the risks attendant to a fluctuating exchange
rate, and (3) the interest of the city under the contract is not
protected by adequate security. These findings were based
on the contract itself and on letters from Bitumex and Credit
Lyonnais. There were also letters from Shell and Petron that
were replies to the Office of the Ombudsmans (Visayas)
inquiry on whether or not they could supply Cebu City with
asphalt and on what terms.
Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no
evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of
preventive suspension against petitioner. But considering its
purpose and the circumstances in the case brought before
us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum
period of six months is unwarranted.
On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during
his oral argument at the hearing that the documents
mentioned in respondents comment, documents that show
petitioners guilt, were obtained after petitioner had been
suspended. Even if an afterthought, he claimed
they strengthen the evidence of respondents against
petitioner. If the purpose of the preventive suspension was
to enable the investigating authority to gather documents
without intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents
submission, we can only conclude that this purpose was
already achieved, during the nearly month-long suspension
of petitioner from June 25 to July 19, 1999. Granting that
now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even
without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us
that the maximum six-month period is excessive and
definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to
make its legitimate case against petitioner. We must
conclude that the period during which petitioner was already
preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the lawful
purpose of preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying
needed documents, or harassing and preventing witnesses
who wish to appear against him.
III.
The Ombudsman Law or RA 6770 should apply to the
investigation conducted by it and the procedures in the law
were properly observed since as previously held there could
be preventive suspension even before the charges against
the official are heard, or before the official is given an
opportunity to prove his innocence.
True, under the Local Government Code, preventive
suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined,
and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here,
petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to
refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum
period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But
as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced
under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated
under the Local Government Code.
Respondents base their argument on the deliberations of the
Senate on Senate Bill No. 155, which became the Local
Government Code. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
commenting on the preservation in the proposed Code of
the power of the Office of the President to suspend local
officials, said:
Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the
Senate Committee is ready to adopt a more stringent rule
regarding the power of removal and suspension by the
Office of the President over local government officials, Mr.
President. We would only wish to point out that in a
subsequent section, we have provided for the power of
suspension of local government officials to be limited only to
60 days and not more than 90 days in any one year,
regardless of the number of administrative charges that may
be filed against a local government official. We, in fact, had
in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo where the
Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the filing of
charges against him so that he can be continuously
suspended when one case is filed right after the other, Mr.
President.
Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for
the shorter period of preventive suspension imposable under
the Local Government Code. Political color could taint the
exercise of the power to suspend local officials by the
mayor, governor, or Presidents office. In contrast the
Ombudsman, considering the constitutional origin of his
Office, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries of
politics, as respondents would have us believe.
109
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,on the matter of whether or not
the Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to
investigate local elective officials by virtue of the Local
Government Code, we said:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to
indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly,
the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other.
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive
suspension under the Ombudsman Law is much too
repugnant to the 60-day period that may be imposed under
the Local Government Code.But per J. Vitug, the two
provisions govern differently.
We have held in other cases that there could be preventive
suspension even before the charges against the official are
heard, or before the official is given an opportunity to prove
his innocence. Preventive suspension is merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation and is not in any way
the final determination of the guilt of the official concerned.
Petitioner also avers that the suspension order against him
was issued in violation of Section 26(2) of the Ombudsman
Law, which provides:
SEC. 26. Inquiries. xxx
(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints
from any source in whatever form concerning an official act
or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if
it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same
and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the
reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to
investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public
officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and
require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two
hours from receipt thereof
Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted
into a full-blown administrative investigation, the official
concerned must be given 72 hours to answer the charges
against him. In his case, petitioner says the inquiry was
converted into an administrative investigation without him
being given the required number of hours to answer.
Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the
requisite 72 hours to submit a written answer to the
complaint against him. This, however, does not make invalid
the preventive suspension order issued against him. As we
have earlier stated, a preventive suspension order may be
issued even before the charges against the official
concerned is heard.
Moreover, respondents state that petitioner was given 10
days to submit his counter-affidavit to the complaint filed by
respondent Tagaan. We find this 10-day period is in keeping
with Section 5(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman,[23] which provides:
Sec. 5. Administrative adjudication; How conducted.
(a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, the
respondent shall be furnished with copy of the affidavits and
other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be
ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other evidences in
support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the
complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10)
days from receipt of the counter-affidavits of the
respondent.
IV.
The ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot
anymore be held administratively liable for an act done
during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract
with F.E. Zuellig.
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a
reelected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term
of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the
electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did
so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his
past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still
reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds.
That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his
character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to
determine, in factual terms, the extent of this
knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be
impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the
precise timing or period when the misconduct was
committed, reckoned from the date of the officials
reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.
As held in Salalima,
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as
criminal cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule
is not only founded on the theory that an officials reelection
expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or
condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during his
previous term. We may add that sound policy dictates it. To
rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating
endless partisan contests between the reelected official and
his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former
during his new term with administrative cases for acts
alleged to have been committed during his previous
term. His second term may thus be devoted to defending
himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service...
However, respondents argue that the contract, although
signed on May 7, 1998, during petitioners prior term, is to
be made effective only during his present term.
We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in
the result. The agreement between petitioner (representing
Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the
contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that
moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the
contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial
to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may
have in signing the contract already became extant on the
day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the
deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been
made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable
for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this
should not prejudice the filing of any case other than
administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may
110
not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for
whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in
signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the
question of whether or not he may be
held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered
view that he may not.
Hon. Tomas N. Joson III v. CA
G.R. 160652
February 13, 2006
Facts:
1. The Sangguniang bayan filed an administrative complaint
against incumbent Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Elizabeth R.
Vargas for dishonesty, misconduct in office, and abuse of
authority. It was alleged that Mayor Vargas submitted to the
Provincial Budget Officer two falsified documents, namely,
Appropriation Ordinance No. 1 and Resolution No. 2,
approving the enactment of Appropriation Ordinance No. 1.
2. Mayor Vargas filed a complaint for annulment of falsified
minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with
damages against the SB members before the RTC of
Cabanatuan City.
3. Mayor Vargas filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
a motion to suspend proceedings and/or motion to dismiss
due to the pendency of a prejudicial question in the Civil
Case she filed, specifically questioning the genuineness of
the documents she allegedly falsified. Without resolving the
said motion, the SP recommended to Gov. Joson the
preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas for sixty days.
4. Governor Joson issued an order of preventive suspension
against Mayor Vargas. Mayor Vargas filed before the Office
of the President a very urgent petition to set aside the
suspension order. This was granted but the preventive
suspension was reinstated when Gov. Joson filed a motion
for reconsideration with the Office of the President.
5. Mayor Vargas moved for reconsideration of the Resolution
reinstating the order of preventive suspension. She also filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, with Urgent Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78247.
6. The CA resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
to further enjoin and restrain Governor Joson from imposing
the order of preventive suspension and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from conducting proceedings in the
administrative case against Mayor Vargas.
Issue:
1. Did the CA act with manifest partiality, arbitrarily and in
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order
because:
a. Respondent Vargas availed the wrong remedy when she
filed CA-G.R. SP No. 78247;
b. Respondent Cargas clearly failed to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief;
c. The preventive suspension order was legally and validly
issued.
2. Did the CA act arbitrarily and in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing
petitioners to cease and desist from conducting proceedings
in the administrative case?
Ruling:
1. No.
a. The assailed resolution having being issued by the Office
of the President, through the Executive Secretary, it would
seem that the proper remedy is an appeal via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A
perusal of the instant petition for certiorari would, however,
reveal that petitioner is alleging that the challenged
resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and
beyond respondents jurisdiction, hence, the appropriate
remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 as correctly availed by
Mayor Vargas.
b. Citing Paat v. CA, the Court held that it recognizes some
exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. They are the following:
(1) when there is a violation of due
process, (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel
on the part of the administrative agency
concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9)
when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings, (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention.
The requirement of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies may likewise be
dispensed with in the following
instances: (1) when the claim involved
is small; (2) when strong public interest
is involved; and (3) in quo warranto
proceedings.
c. Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code,
preventive suspension may be imposed (a) after the issues
are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability
that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. Issues are
considered joined when the complaint has been answered
and there are no longer any substantial preliminary issues
that remain to be threshed out.
In the administrative case, it appears that petitioner did not
file, so far, an answer to the complaint thus the issues could
not have been considered joined. What she did was to file a
Motion To Suspend Proceedings And/Or Motion To Dismiss
which was treated by the sanggunian as her answer.
111
However, nothing in the records can be inferred that the
petitioner intended the said motion to be her answer.
Also, the assailed preventive suspension are general
statements, mere verbatim reproduction of the provision of
law, unsupported by any factual and substantial evidence.
There is no showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, with
both parties charging each other with falsification of
documents.
2. No. Petitioner's contention that there is only one issue
presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 78247, that is, the validity of
the reinstatement of the preventive suspension order thus it
was an abuse of discretion on the part of CA when it
directed the SP to cease and desist from conducting the
admin case, is of no merit.
Two of the issues raised by Mayor Vargas in her petition to
the Court of Appeals pertain to the proceedings in
Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003, to wit: (1) whether the
civil case filed by Mayor Vargas before the Cabanatuan RTC
for annulment of falsified minutes of session and
appropriation ordinance with damages is a prejudicial
question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings
in the administrative case, and (2) whether the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has jurisdiction to hear the administrative case
filed against Mayor Vargas, when the relief sought is her
removal from office.
It is apparent that Mayor Vargas questioned the jurisdiction
of SP in the admin case since under Sec. 60 of the LGC, only
the proper court may order the dismissal from public office
of an elective official. She was therefore questioning the
propriety of the proceedings in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan despite the alleged prejudicial question in the
civil case.
CA therefore did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the said resolution.
Mendoza vs Laxina Sr.
GR No. 146875
July 14, 2003
FACTS:
On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter
assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay
captain of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997
Barangay Elections. Meanwhile, RoqueFermo, his rival
candidate, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. On January 18, 1999,
Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay
Elections. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the
COMELEC while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending
appeal.
On January 20, 1999, an order was issued by the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending appeal. Hence,
respondent vacated the position and relinquished the same
to Fermo. Thereafter, respondent filed a petition with the
COMELEC questioning the January 20, 1999 order of the trial
court. On September 16, 1999, the COMELEC issued a
resolutionannulling the order which granted the execution of
the decision pending appeal on the ground that there
existed no good reasons to justify execution.
On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of
execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Batasan Hills. On October 28, 1999,
Fermo was served a copy of the writ of execution but
refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. He also refused to
vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan Hills.
This did not, however, prevent respondent and his staff from
discharging their functions and from holding office at the SK-
Hall of Batasan Hills. On the same date, respondent
appointed Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretaryand on
November 8, 1999, he appointed Rodel G. Liquido as
Barangay Treasurer.
On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of
execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Batasan Hills. On October 28, 1999,
Fermo was served a copy of the writ of execution but
refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. He also refused to
vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan
Hills. This did not, however, prevent respondent and his staff
from discharging their functions and from holding office at
the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills. On the same date, respondent
appointed Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary and
on November 8, 1999, he appointed Rodel G. Liquido as
Barangay Treasurer.
Petitioner Mendoza and other Kagawads questioned the
validity of the official acts discharged by respondent, which
includes appropriation of salaries, immediately after re-
assumption but prior to re-taking of his oath of office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of an oath of office anew by a
duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective
official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-
assumption in office where the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) orders the relinquishment of the contested
position.
RULING:
No, it is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-
assumption in office. To be sure, an oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to
the full investiture with the office. It is only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to
enter into the position becomes plenary and
complete. However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in
office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to
exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election
protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming
office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is
annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid
execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is
issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the
duties of the office to which he has been elected.
In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner
in the 1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills, Quezon City;
he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed
office. He is therefore vested with all the rights to discharge
the functions of his office.
112
The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999
was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on May
27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights
of the office. Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as
Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in
office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
Aguinaldo vs Santos
212 SCRA 768
NOTE: AGUINALDO DOCTRINE (already abandoned)
FACTS:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of
Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup dtat was crushed,
DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor
Aguinaldo requiring him toshow cause why he should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the
Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of
several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts
committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to
the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to
the cause of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60
days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision
finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal
from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor.
Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order
with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary
of Local Government. Petitioner argued that:
(1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government officialunder Section 60, Chapter
IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution;
(2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to
suspend or remove petitioner, the former could
not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and
(3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner
should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and
not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an
act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed
against him on the ground that he had been removed from
office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed
on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet
attained finality and is still pending review with the Court.
As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the
resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor
of Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and
academic
2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove
local government officials as alter ego of the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before
petitioner could be removed from office.
HELD:
1. YES. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor
of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending
moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among
the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is
that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner
for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
2. YES. The power of the Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the Constitution
and a statutory grant from the legislativebranch. The
constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4)
of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President
the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general
supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional
doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337
was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the
legislature the power and authority to enact a local
government code, which provides for the manner of removal
of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al.
vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the occasion to state
that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of
the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed
Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of
the DILG secretary to remove local elective government
officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally,
but administratively where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence.
Garcia vs Mojica
GR No. 139043
September 10, 1999
Facts:
Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight other city officials
was placed under preventive suspension without pay for the
maximum period of six months and told to cease and desist
from holding office immediately for an alleged anomalous
purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract
signed by petitioner.
113
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of
the said order. He pleads for immediate relief through the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issues
What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the
investigation of acts done before his reelection? Did the
Ombudsman for the Visayas gravely abuse his discretion in
conducting the investigation of petitioner and ordering
his preventive suspension?
Ruling
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as
criminal cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule
is not only founded on the theory that an officials reelection
expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or
condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during his
previous term. We may add that sound policy dictates it. To
rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating
endless partisan contests between the reelected official and
his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former
during his new term with administrative cases for acts
alleged to have been committed during his previous term.
His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself
in the said cases to the detriment of public service...
Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for
an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of
the contract with F.E. Zuellig.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable
for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this
should not prejudice the filing of any case other than
administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may
not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for
whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in
signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the
question of whether or not he may be held administratively
liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may
not.
Valencia vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 141336
June 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, et al were charged with
Violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 23624.A"Motion to Quash"
was filed by petitioner Valencia.
In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the
administrative case against them docketed as OMB-ADM-1-
96-0316, which involved the same subject matter as the
criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint
against them after finding that the contract of loan was
entered into in pursuance of the police power of the local
chief executive. Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed
with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Resolve Motion to
Quash Information. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in not
dismissing the information or in not granting the Motion to
Quash information despite the fact that respondent
Ombudsman had already dismissed the administrativecase
against the petitioners regarding the same subject matter of
the criminal case against the petitioners
Ruling:
No. There is no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the
Information againstpetitioners on the basis solely of the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against them.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of
the administrative case againstthem based on the same
subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case
because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases
is only substantial evidence. While that may be true, it
should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative
liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of
administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public
service, based on the time-honored principle that a public
office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of
the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.
Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the
administrative case againstpetitioners is the fact that they
were reelected to office. Indeed, a reelected local official
may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for
this holding is that when the electorate put him back into
office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed
with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such
reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only
the administrative, but not thecriminal, liability incurred by
him during his previous term of office.
There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash
the Information againstpetitioners on the basis solely of the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against them.
People vs Hon. Rodolfo Toledano and Rolando Bunao
GR No. 110220
May 18, 2000
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, Rolando Bunao, while allegedly a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, Zambales and its
Committee on Bids and Awards, entered into a lease
contract with said municipality covering 2 public market
stalls. As a consequence, 2 administrative charges were filed
against him with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon.Both cases were eventually dismissed by the Office of
the Ombudsman.
114
On December 7, 1992 an information for violation of Section
41(1) in relation to Section 221 of BP 337 was filed against
private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales. Before arraignment, private respondent moved to
dismiss the information on the ground that the charge had
already become moot and academic and that any criminal
liability he may have incurred has been extinguished. The
respondent court dismissed the information.This petition
for certiorari and mandamus was filed questioning the
Orders issued by the respondent court dismissing the
information.
Respondent judge dismissed the information on the ground
that the administrative case filed against private respondent
Bunao with the Office of the Ombudsman had been
dismissed. In the memorandum filed by the Solicitor
General, said order of dismissal on the ground of extinction
of criminal liability is assailed for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
on the part of respondent judge, thus: "The respondent
court anchored its disposition in Criminal Case RTC No.
1274-I on dismissal of administrative case against private
respondent Rolando Bunao. But Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code enumerates the grounds for extinction of
criminal liability; and, dismissal of an administrative charge
against accused is not one of them.
Issue:
Was the dismissal of the criminal case proper by reason of
the dismissal of the administrative case?
Ruling: No.
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law
that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission.The
reliance made by respondent judge on the re-election of
private respondent as Kagawad in the May 1992 election so
as to warrant the dismissal of the information filed against
him, citing Aguinaldo vs. Santosis misplaced. The ruling in
said case which forbids the removal from office of a public
official for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, finds no application to criminal cases, pending
against said public officer.
Morales vs CA and Binay
GR Nos. 217126-27
November 10, 2015
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Binay and other
public officers of the City Government of Makati
charging them with administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
criminal cases for violation of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of
Public Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to be
involved in anomalous activities attending the
procurement and construction phases of the
Makati Parking Building project, committed during
his previous and present terms as City Mayor of
Makati.
The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension
order, placing Binay Jr., et al., under preventive
 suspension for not more than six (6) months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order.
The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
notwithstanding Pea, Jr.'s assumption of duties
as Acting Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia, Jr. v.CA,
it found that it was more prudent on its part to
issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised,
considering that if it were established that the acts
subject of the administrative cases against Binay,
Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then,
applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.
Binays contention:
Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term
and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for
a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him
moot and academic.
In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the
lack of evidence to sustain the charges against
him, his suspension from office would
undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously
chosen and voted into office.
The Ombudmans contentions:
The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders.
Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter
of defense, which should have been raised by
before it during the administrative proceedings.
There is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint
after his re-election in 2013.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and the WPI enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based
on the condonation doctrine.
Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is
abandoned, but the abandonment is prospective in
effect.
A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order was correctly issued.
1. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the
assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases
enunciating the condonation doctrine. By merely
following settled precedents on the condonation
doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained
"good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on
its legal attribution above.
B. The Condonation Doctrine
115
1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or
implied forgiveness of an offense, especially by
treating the offender as if there had been no
offense."
2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,
a. First, the penalty of removal may not be
extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct.
b. Second, an elective official's re-election
serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to
remove him therefor.
c. Third, courts may not deprive the
electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers.
3. It is not based on statutory law but a
jurisprudential creation.
a. It originated from the 1959 case of
Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija. In which case, as there was no
legal precedent on the issue at that time,
the Court, resorted to American
authorities and found that the weight of
authorities seems to incline toward the
rule denying the right to remove one
from office because of misconduct during
a prior term.
4. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a
criminal case. Also, it would not apply to
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no
sovereign will to disenfranchise.
C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
legal bases.
1. There is really no established weight of authority
in theUS favoring the doctrine of condonation.
2. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer
impact of the condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-
examination.
a. Pascual was decided within the context of
the 1935 Constitution which was silent
with respect to public accountability, or of
the nature of public office being a public
trust.
3. The concept of public office, under the 1987
Constitution, AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the
corollary requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY
TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is PLAINLY
INCONSISTENT with the idea that an
elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during
a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post.
4. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense.
5. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to
support the notion. In fact the Local Government
Code and the RRACCS precludes condonation
 since in the first place, an elective local official
who is meted with the penalty of removal could
not be re-elected to an elective local position due
to a direct disqualification from running for such
post.
6. If condonation of an elective official's
administrative liability would perhaps, be
allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same
should have been provided by law under our
governing legal mechanisms.
7. The proposition that the electorate, when re-
electing a local official, are assumed to have done
so with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any, is infirm.
No such presumption exists in any statute or
procedural rule.
a. Most corrupt acts by public officers are
shrouded in secrecy, and concealed
from the public. At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what
is to be condoned. Thus, there could be
no condonation of an act that is
unknown.
8. Liability arising from administrative offenses may
only be condoned by the President in light of
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application. It
should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected.
Disclaimer: digest not mine. This is from Roloma for
our admin class during 2nd year.
Giron vs Ochoa (Condonation)
GR No. 218463
March 1,2017
Facts:
Giron filed a case in the ombudsman agains barangay
Chairman for illegally using electricity in his computer shop.
The case was referred then to the Special Investigation
Committee on Administrative cases agains elective barangay
official in the city Council, the investigation was however
suspended due to the up and coming Barangay Elections,
Cando ran in this election as Kagawad and won. He assumed
office on December 1, 2013. The city council then adopted
the resolution of the committee recommending dismissal of
the case for being moot and academic. Citing the Pascual
case, as reiterated in Aguinaldo where the court stated that
a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor.
116
Giron argued that the doctrine of condonation was only
applicable when the re-election of the public official was to
the same position.
Issue:
Whether or not the Pascual/Aguinaldo doctrine is still
applicable
Whether the doctrine applies to re-election to a different
position
Held:
The condonation doctrine has been abandoned by Carpio-
Morales, as it is unconstitutional but should only apply
prospectively. On this matter, cando is deemed condoned
without prejudice to filing of criminal case for theft of
electricity.
On this issue of re-election to a different position,
considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the
Court agrees with the interpretation of the administrative
tribunals below that the condonation doctrine applies to a
public official elected to another office. The underlying
theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus,
in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the
following: first, the penalty of removal may not be extended
beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for
each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective
official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate,
who are assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a
given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another
office, was the same.
149. Gocuan
Malinao vs Reyes
GR No. 117618
March 29, 1996
255 SCRA 616
Facts:
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III
of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Respondent Mayor filed a case
against her in the Office of the Ombudsman for gross
neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence. While the
case was pending, he appointed a replacement for
petitioner.
On February 24, 1994 petitioner filed an administrative case,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 93-03, against
respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial
of due process.
On August 12, 1994, the case was taken up in executive
session of the Sanggunian. The transcript of stenographic
notes of the session[1] shows that the Sanggunian, by the
vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found respondent Mayor
guilty of the charge and imposed on him the penalty of one-
month suspension,
The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in a
Decision dated September 5, 1994,[2] signed by only one
member of the Sanggunian, Rodrigo V. Sotto, who did so as
Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Copies of the Decision were served on
respondent Mayor Red as well as on respondent Governor
Luisito Reyes on September 12, 1994.
On October 21, 1994,[7] the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2,
acquitted respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The
vote was embodied in a Decision of the same date, which
was signed by all members who had thus voted.
Petitioner went to the SC by way of a Petition for Certiorari
and mandamus basically contending that inasmuch as the
Decision of September 5, 1994 had become final and
executory, for failure of respondent Mayor to appeal, it was
beyond the power of the Sanggunian to render another
decision on October 21, 1994 which in effect reversed the
first decision.
Issue:
1. Did the Sanggunian render a decision on August 12,
1994?
2. Is the remedy of petition for certiorari and mandamus
proper? Is the decision of the Sanggunian appealable to the
Office of the President?
3. Is the case moot and academic considering that the
Mayor was reelected?
Ruling:
1. No. Contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only
show is that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a
vote on the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not
that it then rendered a decision as required by 66(a) of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
In order to render a decision in administrative cases
involving elective local officials, the decision of the
Sanggunian must thus be in writing stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. What
the Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12, 1994 was not
to render a decision.
Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian
Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded
as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures
of the requisite majority. Like the procedure in the Supreme
Court, the voting following the deliberation of the members
of the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their
decision unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by
one of them and concurred in by the others, in the same
way that the voting following the deliberation on a case in
the Supreme Court becomes its decision only after the
opinion prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others
composing the majority. Until they have signed the opinion
and the decision is promulgated, the Justices are free to
change their votes.
Now, as already stated, the Sanggunian, at its session
on October 21, 1994, took another vote and, 7 to 2, decided
to dismiss the case against respondent Mayor. This time its
decision was made in writing, stating the facts and the law
on which it was based, and it was signed by the members
taking part in the decision. This, and not the so-called
decision of September 5, 1994, is the decision of the
Sanggunian.
117
2. No, petition for certiorari is not proper; Yes, the decision
of the Sanggunian is appealable to the OP. Petitioner
brought this case by way of Petition for certiorari and
mandamus. A prime specification of the writ of certiorari,
however, is that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available
to petitioner. But, in the case at bar, petitioner could have
appealed the decision of the Sanggunian to the Office of the
President as provided in 67(b) of the Local Government
Code.
3. Yes. At all events, this case is now moot and academic as
a result of the expiration of respondents term during which
the act complained of was allegedly committed, and further
proceedings against respondent Mayor are barred by his
reelection on May 8, 1995.
Pursuant to 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension
cannot exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a
period of six (6) months for every administrative offense. On
the other hand, any administrative disciplinary proceeding
against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is
reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of
whatever misconduct he might have committed during his
previous term.
Salalima v. Guingona
GR No. 117589-92
May 22 1996
FACTS:
NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning
the validity of the auction sale, which the Province
conducted because of NPCs failure to pay real property
taxes assessed. The Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
through a resolution, authorized respondent Governor
Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm
(Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC.
Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty.
Cornago.
On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Province. The latter then paid the lawyers amounting to
around 7 million. However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial
Auditor informed the Province that COA had disallowed the
payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor
General and a written concurrence of COA. An administrative
complaint was later on filed against the petitioners with the
Office of the President.
The Office of the President found that the petitioners
incurred administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to
defend it in the NPC case.
1. Section 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer
of the province has the duty to represent the LGU
in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein
the LGU or any official thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party.
2. In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the
Supreme Court ruled that the LGU cannot be
represented by private lawyers and it is solely the
Provincial legal officer or provincial fiscal who can
represent it. A private lawyer has no standing in
such a case.
Because of these findings, the OP imposed the penalty of
suspension for 6 months against Gov. Salalima and Vice
governor Azana, while the members of the SP were
suspended for 4 months. The petitioners appealed the case
to the SC. In the meantime, the 1992 elections took place
wherein the petitioners were reelected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be held administratively
liable, despite re-election
HELD: NO.
Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer
be held to answer for these in view of the fact that they
have already been reelected. Their reelection operates as
condonation of any misconduct committed in their prior
term.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled that offenses committed
or acts done in a previous term are generally held not to
furnish a cause for removal in the current term of office.
This is because each term is separate from other terms and
that the reelection operates as a condonation of the officers
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefore. Such a rule is founded on the theory
that an officials reelection expresses the sovereign will of
the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission
constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was
committed during the previous term. Also, sound policy
dictates such a rule. A contrary rule would open the
floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests
between reelected officials and their political enemies who
may not stop to hound the former during his new term with
administrative cases for acts alleged to have been
committed during his previous term.
This Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly
stated therein:
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Dagadag vs Tongnawa
GR Nos. 161166-67
February 3, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Dagadag was formerly the mayor of the
municipality of Tanudan, Province of Kalinga. Michael
Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the
municipal engineer and municipal planning and development
coordinator, respectively, of the said municipality. Petitioner
issued an order dropping them from the roll of employees by
reason of their unauthorized absences. Respondents then
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC
issued Resolution No. 991136 affirming petitioners
order dropping respondents from the roll. Respondents filed
with the Court of Appeals which reversed and ordered their
reinstatement and payment of backwages. Petitioner
118
appealed to the SC. Respondents aver that petitioner has no
legal personality to file the instant petition because he had
ceased to be the municipal mayor of Tanudan
Issue:
Who may appeal from the Decision of the CA?
Held: The current Mayor and the CSC
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one
entitled to the avails of the suit.We hold that the CSC and
the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest in this case
and, therefore, can contest the assailed joint Decision of the
Court of Appeals before us.
The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals because it has been
mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the
integrity of our civil service system.[7] Thus, any
transgression by herein respondents of the CSC rules and
regulations will adversely affect its integrity. Significantly, it
has not challenged the assailed Decision.
As regards the mayor of Tanudan, there are two (2) reasons
why he may interpose such appeal. The first is rooted in
his power to appoint officials and employees of his
municipality.Being chief executive of the municipality, he
possesses this disciplinary power over appointive municipal
officials and employees. To be sure, whenever his order
imposing administrative sanctions upon erring municipal
personnel is challenged, he should be allowed to defend his
action considering that he is the appointing authority.
The second reason why the municipal mayor of Tanudan has
legal personality to challengeddecision is because the
salaries of the respondents, being municipal officials, are
drawn from the municipal funds.
Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with this
Court the instant petition assailing the Appellate Court
Decision, was no longer the mayor of Tanudan.
Where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor,
the appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and
maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do
so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or
action, the same should be dismissed.
Petition denied.
Flores vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga
GR No. 159022
February 23, 2005
FACTS:
Several municipal councilors filed an administrative
complaint with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for dishonesty
and gross misconduct against then Mayor Edgardo G. Flores,
alleging that he executed Purchase Request No. 1 for
communication equipment worth P293,000 without any
resolution or ordinance from the Sangguniang Bayan, and
that such amount was overpriced by 100%.
Respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an Order
recommending to Governor Lapid of Pampangathat Flores be
preventively suspended from office for a period of sixty (60)
days.
Without seeking reconsideration of the Order of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Flores sent a letter dated
September 12, 2002 to respondent Governor Lapid
requesting him to veto the same.
Also, without waiting for respondent Governor Lapids action
on his letter, Flores filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for issuing the Order. The Court
of Appeals denied his petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Was there a failure to exhaust administrative remedies such
that it warrants dismissal of the certiorari petition?
HELD:
Yes. It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the
petitioner has available remedies within the administrative
machinery against the action of an administrative board,
body, or officer, the intervention of the courts can be
resorted to by him only after having exhausted all such
remedies. The rationale of this rule rests upon the
presumption that the administrative body, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its
decision on a given matter and decide it properly.
A motion for reconsideration of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigans Order is a condition sine qua non before filing
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of the same
Rule requires that petitioner must not only show that
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the
questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, but that there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.We have held that the plain and adequate
remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration.
Moreover, petitioner has not shown any valid and compelling
reason why, without waiting for the Governors action on the
matter, he immediately filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari. By doing so, petitioner effectively
deprived the Governor of his duty to take appropriate action
on the controversy.
Buencamino vs CA
GR No. 175895
April 17,2007
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, an administrative complaint against petitioner
for grave misconduct, abuse of authority, acts unbecoming
of a public officer, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). In his
complaint, private respondent alleged, among others, that
the act of petitioner in demanding payment (without official
receipt) of a pass way fee or a regulatory fee of P1,000.00
for every delivery truck that passes the territorial jurisdiction
119
of San Miguel, Bulacan is illegal. The Office of the
Ombudsman declared petitioner administratively liable for
abuse of authority and suspended him from office for a
period of six (6) months without pay. Petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals, petition for review with application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner prayed that the
Office of the Ombudsman be enjoined from implementing its
Decision during the pendency of his appeal, petitioners
application for preliminary injunction was denied. Petitioner
filed for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, alleging that in denying his
application for a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion; that pursuant to Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, the Decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman suspending him from office is not
immediately executory; and that in enforcing its Decision
suspending him from the service during the pendency of his
appeal, the Office of the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and the rulings of
this Court in Lapid v. Court of Appeals; Lopez v. Court of
Appeals, and Ombudsman v. Laja stating that only orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and
unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than
public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases,
the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory
only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said
order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution
shall perforce issue as a matter of right. In its comment,
the Office of the Ombudsman countered that the Court of
Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolutions; and that the cases cited by petitioner
are not applicable to this case, the same having been
overturned by the ruling of this Court in In the Matter to
Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPW and that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, thus:
x x x this Honorable Court emphatically
declared that Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman was already amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the
pertinent provision on the execution of
the Ombudsmans decision pending
appeal is now similar to Section 47 of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service that
is, decisions of the Ombudsman are
immediately executory even pending
appeal.
ISSUE:
Are decisions of the Ombudsman immediately
executory even pending appeal?
RULING:
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, thus:

Sec. 7. Finality and
execution of decision. - Where the
respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be
final, executory and unappealabe. In all
other cases, the decision may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case
the penalty is suspension or removal
and the respondent wins such appeal,
he shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension and shall
be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall ensure that the decision shall be
strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by
any officer without just cause to comply
with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against
said officer.
Clearly, considering that an appeal under Administrative
Order No. 17, the amendatory rule, shall not stop the
Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being
executory, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application
for injunctive relief.
Sangguniang Barangay of Don Marcos vs Punong
Barangay Martinez
GR No. 170626
March 3, 2008
Facts:
December 2004 Severino Martinez, Punong Barangay of
Barangay Don Mariano Marcos (Bayombong, Nueva
Vizacaya) was administratively charged with Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Practices Act by petitioner (Sanggunian Barangay) through
the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang
Bayan. Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC, the SB is the
disciplining authority over elective barangay officials.
120
Charges, among others (6 in all) were for failure to submit
and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of
their solid waste management project particularly the
sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials derived from
composting and garbage collection. There was also a charge
for failure to liquidate his travelling expenses for the 2003
Lakbay-aral.
July 2005 - the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision
which imposed the penalty of removal from office. The
Decision was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor (Severino
Bagasao) for its implementation. Mayor issued a
Memorandum, stating that SB is not empowered to order
Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision
remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove
Martinez, an elective local official, from office
NO. SC affirmed RTC
During the deliberations of the Senate on the LGC, the
legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the
Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over
cases involving the removal of elective local officials was
evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically
ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials. Court invalidated Article 125, Rule
XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (which provides that An elective
local official may be removed from office by order of the
proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code
provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative
case against an erring elective barangay official before the
SP or SB. However, the Sangguniang cannot order the
removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local Government
Code.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by
the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if
found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal
from office, the case should be filed with the regional
trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently
apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal
from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most
extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems
that the removal of the official from service is
warranted, then it can resolve that the proper
charges be filed in court.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official
are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the
penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with
the regional trial court. The most extreme penalty that the
Sanggunian may impose is suspension.

Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., and Glenda Araa vs
Office of The Ombudsman
GR No. 180917
April 23, 2010
Facts:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal
Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer,
respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. Towards the end of
2001, Mayor Vicente Salumbides III (the mayor) saw the
urgent need to construct a two-classroom building with
fence (the projects) for the Tagkawayan Municipal High
School (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion area
would no longer admit high school freshmen starting school
year 2002-2003. On how to solve the classroom shortage,
the mayor consulted Salumbides who suggested that the
construction be charged to the account of the Maintenance
and Other Operating Expenses/ Repair and Maintenance of
Facilities (MOOE/RMF) but Glenda advised Salumbides that
there were no more available funds that could be taken from
the MOOE/RMF. The savings of the municipal government,
however, were adequate to fund the projects but the
approval by the Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed
supplemental budget must be secured.
The members of the Sangguniang Bayan have already gone
on recess for the Christmas holidays, so Glenda and
Salumbides advised the mayor to source the funds from the
P1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved Municipal
Annual Budget for 2002. The mayor thus ordered to proceed
with the construction and only after were the projects
included in the list of local government projects scheduled
for bidding. Thus, the construction of the projects
commenced without any approved appropriation and ahead
of the public bidding.
A complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioners for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty. Petitioners were found guilty of Simple
Neglect of Duty, for which they were meted the penalty of
suspension from office for a maximum period of six months
with a stern warning against a similar repetition.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of
condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who
were administratively charged along with the reelected
official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly
committed during their preceding term.
Issue:
Can the petitioners be absolved of the administrative
charge?
Held: No
The Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of
an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his
immediately preceding term of office because each term is
separate from other terms, and the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. But this does not apply to appointive officials
and the non-application of the condonation doctrine to
appointive officials does not violate the right to equal
121
protection of the laws. Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
As to the charge:
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give
proper attention to a task expected from an employee
resulting from either carelessness or indifference. In the
present case, petitioners fell short of the reasonable
diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care
and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and
fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their
imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.
As municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to
uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and
support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic
services and provisions of adequate facilities when he
advised the mayor to proceed with the construction of the
subject projects without prior competitive bidding.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the improper use of
government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior
advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of
liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her
written objection as municipal budget officer.
Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense
punishable by suspension without pay for one month and
one day to six months. Finding no alleged or established
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum
penalty of six months, the Court finds the imposition of
suspension without pay for three months justified.
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series
of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, on September 20, 1993 a
complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation
over two parcels of land with a combined area of about
10,000 sqm. located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to
its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,
previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of
the property with private respondent, which the latter did
not accept.
In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court
authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15% of its fair market value based on its
current tax declaration. Private respondent filed its answer
alleging that (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not
to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code;
and (2) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. [The second argument was raised
because on Sept. 29, 2987, the Municipality also filed a
complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of
land against Limpan Investment Corporation, the
predecessor-in-interest of V.M Realty Corporation. The case
was dismissed with prejudice by the RTC and was not
appealed, hence the same became final.]
The trial court then nullified its February 4, 1994 order and
dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's resolution.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Municpality of Paraaque can
exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.
(2) Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable
to the present case.
RULING:
(1) No. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case "substantially complies with the
requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and
"resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing
authority on the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain."
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of government which may
delegate the exercise thereof to local government units,
other public entities and public utilities. A local government
unit may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latter's control and restraints, imposed through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
As provided for under Section 19 of RA 7160, the following
essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit
of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
122
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise
by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. If Congress
intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through
a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. The absence of an ordinance authorizing
the complaint for expropriation is equivalent to lack of cause
of action.
(2) No. Although all the requisites for the application of res
judicata are present in this case, the Court holds that the
principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally
all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State
or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature
of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State,
dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. That
petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from
reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and all others are properly complied with.
Magtajas vs Pryce Properties
GR No. 111097
July 20, 1994
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the
opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The trouble
arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. The reaction of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile.
On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353. On
January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-
93. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of
Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed to prohibit
their enforcement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 are valid
HELD:
No. In the Local Government Code, local government units
are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which
are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The
rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these
ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Tatel vs Municipality of Virac
Facts:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta.
Elena,Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners
warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the
matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the
petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the
people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then
passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as
a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New
Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials,
petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in
the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid
loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other
hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal
protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for
not having been passed in accordance with law.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the respondent.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance
within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the
Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
Held:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is
anuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil
Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by
the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. Municipal Corporations are agencies of the State for
the promotion and maintenance of local self-government an
as such are endowed with the police powers in order to
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.
It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be
partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with
public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable.
Basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials
are stored. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the
loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not
err in its decision.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
123
Young vs. City of Manila,
73 Phil 537
(1941)
Facts:
The plaintiff is the owner of the Antipolo Subdivision situated
near the northern boundary of the city of Manila, of which
the various lots involved in this litigation form part. Five of
said lots are known as street areas, that is to say, they are
named and indicated as streets on the subdivision plan; and
fifteen of said lots scattered in eight different blocks are
residential lots. All of said lots were declared a nuisance and
a menace to public health, by the Director of Health,
because they were so low or excavated as to admit and
cause the formation of stagnant and foul water and that
they should be filled to at least fifteen centimeters above
street grade in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
3352. Accordingly, the City Engineer notified and required
the plaintiff to fill said lots within ninety days, with a warning
that should he fail to do so, the City Engineer would cause
the said lots to be filled, subject to the provisions of said Act.
The plaintiff did not dispute the decision of the Director of
Health and the requirement of the City Engineer for the
filling of said lots, but he declined to undertake the filling
and notified, the City Engineer that, as the cost of filling said
lots would be more than the assessed valuation of the
property, he exercised the option granted him in section 3 of
Act No. 3352 to sell the land to the City for its market value.
The City Engineer thereafter undertook the work of filling
portions of the lots in question by contract which was
awarded to the lowest and best bidder. For that work the
city of Manila paid the total sum of P24,164.06 out of the
special revolving fund created by section 5 of Act No. 3352
The plaintiff refused to reimburse to the City the amount
spent by the latter for the filling of the lots in question and
insisted on his option to sell said lots to the City at the
current market value, under section 3 of Act No. 3352.
Contending that it was not under obligation to buy said lots,
and invoking section 5 of Act No. 3352 in relation to section
2498 of the Revised Administrative Code, the City advertised
said lots for sale at public auction on September 29, 1937, in
order to satisfy the expenses of filling them; and, because of
the absence of bidders at such sale, the said lots were
forfeited to the city of Manila under the provisions 2501 of
the Revised Administrative Code, subject to plaintiff's right of
redemption. The plaintiff having failed to redeem said lots,
the City Treasurer, on January 9, 1939, declared the
forfeiture absolute and conveyed said lots to the city of
Manila.
The plaintiff commenced the present action against the city
of Manila to recover from the latter the payment for the
lands plus legal interest thereon and for refund of additional
taxes paid under protest by the plaintiff to the defendant city
of Manila subsequent to the filing of the original complaint
herein.
The plaintiff assails the judgment of the lower court insofar
as it fails to determine the price that the defendant city of
Manila should pay to the plaintiff for the lots in question and
dismisses his claim for the refund of the taxes; and the
defendant city of Manila on its part contends that it is not
obligated to buy said lots because the plaintiff is solvent and
not unable to pay the cost of filing.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant city of Manila is under
obligation to purchase the said lots from the plaintiff
Held:
The case hinges on the construction of section 3 of Act No.
3352, which reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Owner may sell land to city. Should
the cost of filing belonging to a private owner
exceed one-half of the assessed value thereof, the
owner shall have the option to either sell the
property to the city at current market value or
reimburse the amount expended for filing in
twenty equal annual installments as provided in
section five of its Act. In the case the owner
decides to sell his property for inability to pay the
cost of filing, the city shall purchase it and the
cost thereof shall be charged to the special fund
herein created: Provided, however, That the city
shall dispose of the land by public auction to the
highest and best bidder, but no award shall be
made unless the amount of the offer is at least
equal to the cost of land, including the cost of
filling and incidental expenses. The proceeds of
such sale be resorted to said special fund.
In applying this statutory provision to the present case, it is
important to bear in mind that the land involved herein
consists of street and building lots. Street areas are marked
and set apart for the use of the public in general and the
buyers of the building lots in particular. The owner of a
subdivision cannot sell the residential lots unless he provides
streets therefor. He adds the cost of the street areas to the
price he charges for the residential lots. The segregation of
the street from the building lots as shown on the subdivision
plan and in the technical description of each of said lots
constitutes a representation and promise by the owner of
the subdivision to every buyer of the building lots that he
(the owner) has set aside and appropriated the said areas
for street purposes; or, in other words, that he has
withdrawn them from the commerce of men. That promise
forms part of the consideration of every contract of sale
which he makes of the residential lots. He cannot sell the
streets nor use them for any other purpose without violating
his contract with the buyers of the building lots. Indeed,
after adding the cost of the streets to the price of the
building lots, the owner of the subdivision has no legal nor
moral right to sell those street areas.
Section 3 above quoted refers to land that is subject to the
commerce of men. Thus, it provides "that the city shall
dispose of the land by public auction to the highest and best
bidder, but no award shall be made unless the amount of
the offer is at least equal to the cost of the land, including
the cost of filling and incidental expenses." Since the City
cannot sell the streets, it is obvious that it is not under any
obligation to purchase the street areas in question.
We are therefore of the opinion and so hold that the plaintiff
cannot compel the defendant city of Manila to purchase from
him the street areas described in his complaint. Neither can
he compelled to donate said land and transfer his title to the
City so that the latter may build and maintain the streets.
But as long as the plaintiff retains the title and ownership of
said street areas, he is under obligation to pay to the land
124
taxes thereon as well as to reimburse to the City the
expenses of filing the same.
As to residential lots in question, we are of the opinion that
the defendant city of Manila is under obligation to purchase
them from the plaintiff at the market price in view of the
option exercised by him under section 3 of Act No. 3352.
The contention of the City Fiscal that in order to exercise
such option the plaintiff must show himself to be insolvent
and unable to pay the cost of filling, is untenable. The law
expressly provides that, should the cost of filling any lot
exceed one-half of the assessed value thereof, the owner
shall have the option to either sell the property to the City at
current market value or reimburse the amount expended for
filling it. It also provides that "in case the owner decides to
sell his property for inability to pay the cost of filling, the city
shall purchase it and the cost thereof shall be charged to the
special fund herein created." But the phrase "inability to
pay" cannot be interpreted to mean that the owner must be
insolvent in order to entitle him to exercise the option to sell.
It is presumed that the legislature to make the law operate
equally on all private owners regardless of their financial
condition.
With reference to plaintiff's claim for the refund of the land
taxes paid under protest, we find that he is not entitled
thereto for the reason that his offer to sell the land in
question did not relieve him of the obligation to pay taxes
thereon.
Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works,
GR No. L-10405,
December 29, 1960
(110 Phil. 331)
FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law
appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig
feeder road terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of
Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use
for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the
Antonio Subdivision. The said subdivision is owned by
Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same
Senate that passed and approved the same law. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact
that he owns those terminals and that his property would be
unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the
said law would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained
from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other
hand, donated the said property to the City of Pasig five (5)
months after the effectivity of the tax law.
The trial court dismissed the on the ground that the
appropriation was validated by the donation of the property
to the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent donation of the property to
the government rendered the tax law valid
RULING:
No, the court stressed that the validity of a statute depends
upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or
approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed,
subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective
operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said
statute.
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected
feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon
whether said roads were public or private property when the
bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed
by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the
President and the disbursement of said sum became
effective, or on June 20, 1953.
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads
were to be constructed belonged then to respondent
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and hence, was null and void.
The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after
the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to
the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of
legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not
cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a
judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the
declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use
of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote
the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public.
162. Quinanola
Atienza v. Villarosa
GR No. 161081
May 10, 2005
Facts:
Mindoro Occidental Governor Villarosa issued
memorandum requiring that all purchase orders for supplies,
equipment, etc. for the upkeep of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan be signed by him. Vice-Governor
Atienza replied that such authority was vested in him by the
LGC. In response, Villarosa ordered the dismissal of almost
60 of Atienzas appointees in the provincial government.
Atienza asked Villarosa to reconsider both of his actions but
the latter refused. Thus, Atienza filed a prohibition suit in the
CA assailing as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion the respondent Governors Memoranda. The
petitioner Vice-Governor claimed that these memoranda
excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in
violation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.
7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991, and its
implementing rules and regulations. It was prayed that the
respondent Governor be enjoined from implementing the
assailed memoranda.
CA dismissed the case and upheld Villarosas power to sign
the purchase orders. Citing Section 344 of Rep. Act No.
7160, the CA upheld the authority of the respondent
Governor to issue the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 as
it recognized his authority to approve the purchase orders.
The said provision provides in part that approval of the
disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself
shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.Atienza
appealed to the SC, which ruled in his favor. The CA ruled
that the issue on whether it could be enjoined had already
been rendered moot and academic. The CA pointed out that
the subject of the said memorandum could no longer be
enjoined or restrained as the termination of the employees
had already been effected. It opined that where the act
sought to be enjoined in the prohibition proceedings had
already been performed and there is nothing more to
restrain, the case is already moot and academic.
Issues:
1. Who between the petitioner and the respondent is
authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection
with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment,
including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan?
2. Does respondent Villarosa, as local chief executive, have
the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of
casual/job order employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan
Members and the Office of the Vice-Governor?
Ruling:
1. We hold that it is the Vice-Governor who has such
authority.
Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the
province is exercised by the SangguniangPanlalawigan and
the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer. Being vested with
legislative powers, the SangguniangPanlalawigan enacts
ordinances, resolutions and appropriates funds for the
general welfare of the province in accordance with the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. The same statute vests
upon the Vice-Governor the power to:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the SangguniangPanlalawigan
and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan.
a
Further, Section 344 provides:
Sec. 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers. No
money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer
certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been
legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has
obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies
to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and
payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the
department or office who has administrative control of the
fund concerned, as to validity, propriety and legality of the
claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving
regularly recurring administrative expenses such as payrolls
for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light,
water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances to
government creditor agencies such as the GSIS, SSS, LBP,
DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the
DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by
the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever
local funds are disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be
approved by the administrator of the fund.
125

In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the
department head or chief of office, the officer next-in-rank
shall automatically perform his function and he shall be fully
responsible therefor.
Reliance by the CA on the clause approval of the
disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself
shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed of the
above section (Section 344) to rule that it is the Governor
who has the authority to approve purchase orders for the
supplies, materials or equipment for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan is misplaced. This clause cannot
prevail over the more specific clause of the same provision
which provides that vouchers and payrolls shall be certified
to and approved by the head of the department or office
who has administrative control of the fund concerned. The
Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, has administrative control of the
funds of the said body. Accordingly, it is the Vice-Governor
who has the authority to approve disbursement vouchers for
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan.
On this point, Section 39 of the Manual on the New
Government Accounting System for Local Government Units,
prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), is instructive:
Sec. 39. Approval of Disbursements. Approval of
disbursements by the Local Chief Executive (LCE) himself
shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed, except
for regularly recurring administrative expenses such as:
payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for
light, water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances
to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, BIR,
PHILHEALTH, LBP, DBP, NPO, PS of the DBM and others,
where the authority to approve may be delegated.
Disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for
the operation of the Sanggunian shall be approved by the
provincial Vice Governor, the city Vice-Mayor or the
municipal Vice-Mayor, as the case may be.
While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the
authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants
drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes
the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same
applying the doctrine of necessary implication. This doctrine
is explained, thus:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The
doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as
may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which
it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
126
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of
power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit,
simper inest et minus.
Warrants are order[s] directing the treasurer of the
municipality to pay money out of funds in city treasury which
are or may become available for purpose specified to
designated person[s]. Warrants of a municipal corporation
are generally orders payable when funds are found. They
are issued for the payment of general municipal debts and
expenses subject to the rule that they shall be paid in the
order of presentation.
The ordinary meaning of voucher is a document which
shows that services have been performed or expenses
incurred. It covers any acquittance or receipt discharging the
person or evidencing payment by him. When used in
connection with disbursement of money, it implies some
instrument that shows on what account or by what authority
a particular payment has been made, or that services have
been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued
to payment.
Purchase order, on the other hand, is an authorization by
the issuing party for the recipient to provide materials or
services for which issuing party agrees to pay; it is an offer
to buy which becomes binding when those things ordered
have been provided.
When an authorized person approves a disbursement
voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the entries
therein, among others: that the expenses incurred were
necessary and lawful, the supporting documents are
complete and the availability of cash therefor. Further, the
person who performed the services or delivered the supplies,
materials or equipment is entitled to payment. On the other
hand, the terms and conditions for the procurement of
supplies, materials or equipment, in particular, are contained
in a purchase order. The tenor of a purchase order basically
directs the supplier to deliver the articles enumerated and
subject to the terms and conditions specified therein. Hence,
the express authority to approve disbursement vouchers
and, in effect, authorize the payment of money claims for
supplies, materials or equipment, necessarily includes the
authority to approve purchase orders to cause the delivery
of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement
vouchers and approves the payment for the procurement of
the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the
operation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, then he also has
the authority to approve the purchase orders to cause the
delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign
all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater and
includes the authority to approve purchase orders for the
procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment
necessary for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan.
2. We hold that the Governor, with respect to the
appointment of the officials and employees of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, has no such authority.
Among the powers granted to the Governor under Section
465 of Rep. Act No. 7160 are:
Sec. 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions
and Compensation. (a) The provincial governor, as the chief
executive of the provincial government, shall exercise such
powers and perform such duties and functions as provided
by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
provincial governor shall:
(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and
wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this
Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to
appoint.
On the other hand, Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor
the power to, among others:
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint
all officials and employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan,
except those whose manner of appointment is specifically
provided in this Code.
Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint
officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of the
provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan because such
authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same
manner, the authority to appoint casual and job order
employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan belongs to the
Vice-Governor.
The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials
and employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan is anchored
on the fact that the salaries of these employees are derived
from the appropriation specifically for the said local
legislative body. Indeed, the budget source of their salaries
is what sets the employees and officials of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan apart from the other employees
and officials of the province. Accordingly, the appointing
power of the Vice-Governor is limited to those employees of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan, as well as those of the Office
of the Vice-Governor, whose salaries are paid out of the
funds appropriated for the SangguniangPanlalawigan. As a
corollary, if the salary of an employee or official is charged
against the provincial funds, even if this employee reports to
the Vice-Governor or is assigned to his office, the Governor
retains the authority to appoint the said employee pursuant
to Section 465(b)(v) of Rep. Act No. 7160.
However, in this case, it does not appear whether the
contractual/job order employees, whose appointments were
terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1,
2002 issued by the respondent Governor, were paid out of
the provincial funds or the funds of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the
said memorandum cannot be upheld because it absolutely
prohibited the respondent Vice-Governor from exercising his
127
authority to appoint the employees, whether regular or
contractual/job order, of the SangguniangPanlalawigan and
restricted such authority to one of recommendatory nature
only. This clearly constituted an encroachment on the
appointment power of the respondent Vice- Governor under
Section 466(a)(2) of Rep. Act No. 7160.
Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta
GR No. 134213
July 20, 1999
FACTS:
The Governor of Negros Occ. designated Vice-Governor
Gamboa as Acting Governor for the duration of his official
trip abroad until his return. When the
SangguniangPanlalawigan held its regular session, the
members thereof questioned the authority of Gamboa to
preside therein in view of his designation as Acting
Governor. Herefused when asked to vacate the Chair. A
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was filed and
the trial court declared Gamboa temporarily legally
incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during
the period that he is the Acting Governor.
ISSUE:
May an incumbent Vice-Governor while concurrently the
Acting Governorcontinue to preside over the sessions of the
SP?
RULING: NO
The LGC provides that the Vice-Gov. shall be the presiding
officer of the SP. In addition, when there is temporary
vacancy in the office of the Governor, the Vice-Gov. shall
automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties of
the Governor.
A Vice-Gov. who is concurrently an Acting Governor is a
quasi-Governor so that for purposes of exercising his
legislative powers, he is deemed a non-member of the SP
for the time being. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Gov.
cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the
latter office which includes being the presiding officer of the
SP. First, the nature and duties of the Governor call for a
full-time occupant to discharge them. Second, under the
LGC the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over
the SP and no longer a member thereof.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the
Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the
office of the Vice-Gov. whenever the latter acts as Governor
by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This constitutes an
inability on the part of the regular presiding officer to
preside during the SP sessions. Under Sec. 49(b) of the LGC,
in the event of such inability, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.
Malonzo vs Zamora
323 SCRA 875
January 28, 2000
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General questioning the decision of the Supreme
Court dated July 27, 1999 wherein the Court annulled and
set aside the Office of the President's decision wherein
Mayor Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Malapitan and several Councilors
were adjudged guilty of misconduct and each were meted
the penalty of suspension from office for a period of 3
months. The OP found petitioners guilty of misconduct on
the ground that . . .
". . . the P39,352,047.75
appropriated in Ordinance 0254 to
fund theexpropriation of Lot 26 of
the Maysilo Estate was merely a
portion of theP50 million included
and appropriated in the 1998
Annual Budget forexpropriation
purpose and . . . the judicial action
for expropriation . . . is
stillpending with the court. This
being so, the amount allocated for
theexpropriation cannot be
reverted to or be deemed as
savings to serve asfunds actually
available for the supplemental
budget. . .
(a supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon
three readings held on the same day of a proposed budget.
Hence they were charged of misconduct)
Solicitor General contended that the Office ofthe President
did not err in suspending herein petitioner Mayor for
misconduct forrealigning the P50 million appropriation and
maintains that:
Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was enacted
withoutsufficient compliance with the requirement
of Section 50 of the Local Government
Coderequiring that house rules be adopted or
updated.
Assuming that the Sanggunian can legally take up
matters pertaining to the supplemental budget
even before the adoption or updating of its
existing rules of procedure, the circumstances that
preceded the enactment of the supplemental
budget were irregular since there was undue haste
in conducting the three readings of Ordinance No.
0254, Series of 1998, in one session day.
Issues:
(1) Does the law require the completion of the
updating or adoption of the internal rules of
procedure before the Sangguniang Panlungsod
could act any other matter like the enactment of
an ordinance?
(2) Can the three reading of a proposed ordinance be
held on the same day?
Ruling:
(1) NO. The records satisfactorily show, however, that
the Sanggunian took up the matter of adopting a
set of house rules in its general meeting entitled,
"Katitikan ng Karaniwang Pulong ng Sangguniang
Panlungsod na ginanap noong ika-2 ng Hulyo
1998 sa Bagong Gusali ng Pamahalaang Lungsod
ng Caloocan." During said meeting, the
Sanggunian created an Ad Hoc Committee
composed of seven (7) members to study the
existing house rules. Thereafter, it enacted
128
Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. As we have
held in our Decision dated July 27, 1999, such
succession of events is legally permissible. The law
does not require the completion of the updating or
adoption of the internal rules of procedure before
the Sanggunian could act on any other matter like
the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires
that the matter of adopting or updating the
internal rules of procedure be taken up during the
firsst day of session. It would be inequitable to
read something more into the requirement of the
law and use it as a basis for finding petitioners
guilty of misconduct, especially when the charge is
serious enough to warrant a penalty of suspension
from office for three (3) months without pay.
(2) YES. There is nothing in the law, however, which
prohibits that the three readings of a proposed
ordinance be held in just one session day.
Respondents themselves are aware of this. And it
certainly is not the function of this Court to
speculate that the councilors were not givenample
time for reflection and circumspection before the
passage of the proposed ordinance by conducting
the three readings in just one day considering that
it was a certain Eduardo Tibor, by himself as
taxpayer, and not the councilors themselves, who
raised such complaint. It might not be amiss to
point out that the salaries of the city employees
were to be funded by the said ordinance which
embodied the supplemental budget for 1998,
hence, the urgency for its passage. Even the five
(5) councilors 11 who abstained from voting for
the passage of Ordinance 0254, Series of 1998
took advantage of its benets by submitting to
the office of petitioner Malonzo the names of the
employees assigned to their respective offices for
salary and accounting purposes
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative Inc. vs
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
155 SCRA 421
FACTS:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete
sought to conduct an investigation in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio
Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and
Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged
that the power to investigate, and to order the
improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to
standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter
of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power.
The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions
performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to
punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt
HELD:
No. There is no express provision either in the 1973
Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative
bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional
or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only
possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for
the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior
would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a
judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of
the performance of legislative functions. To allow local
legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being
no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the
power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is
devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac
for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body
has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these
powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc
Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the
order complained of, such issuances would still be void for
being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena
power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where
the subject matter of the investigation is within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body.
Santiago vs Guingona
GR No. 134577
November 18, 1998
Facts:
During the election of the officers of the Senate, both Sen.
Fernan and Sen. Tatad were nominated as Senate President.
By vote of 20-2, Sen. Fernan was declared the Senate
President. Sen. Tatad then manifested that with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assumming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who voted for
Fernan belong to the majority and those who voted for him
as the losing nominee belongs to the minority. However,
those 7 members belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD party, thus
still a minority voted for Sen. Guingona, Jr. as the minority
leader. After three sessions, the issue was still unresolved.
Thereafter, Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Thus, Sen.
Santiago and Sen. Tatad filed a quo warranto proceeding
alleging a violation of the Constitution by virtue of
Guingonas declaration and sought his ouster.
Issue:
Was there a violation of the Constitution by virtue of the
declaration of Sen. Guigona as the minority leader?
Ruling:
129
No, there is no violation of the Constitution with regards to
the manner of the election of Sen. Guigona as Minority
Leader.
The term majority when referring to a certain number out of
a total or aggregate, simply means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total.While the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority,
who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
Majority sometimes referred to as plurality, may also refer to
the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,
not necessarily more than one half. In contrast, minority is a
group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority. Minority is a group, party, or
faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising
a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be
the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not
as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the
leader representing all the minorities.
No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of
the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly
within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.
Zamora v. Caballero
GR No. 147767
January 14, 2004
(464 Phil 471)
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the
Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and
resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held
on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
It appears that on February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor
Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice of a special session
on February 7, 2001. Upon the request of Governor Jose R.
Caballero, however, the scheduled special session was reset
to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a written notice.
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special
session to, among other things, allow the Governor to
deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven
members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present,
no resolution was considered.
On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular
session during which it issued Resolution No. 05 declaring
the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of
calamity and Resolution No. 07 authorizing the Governor to,
on behalf of the province, enter into a construction contract
(Contract) with Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the
Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the
construction of the capitol building. During the same session,
the Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation
submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto.
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present
at the commencement of the session on February 26, 2001,
the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos.
05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended
it.
Petitioner thus filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) against the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of
the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging
that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the
presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless
"conducted official business without a quorum" as only
seven of its fourteen members were actually present when
the irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto
was noted, and the motions to declare the entire province of
Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and to authorize
the Governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado
Company were approved.
Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special
session of February 8, 2001 for lack of quorum, there being
only seven members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and
for lack of written notice sent to all members at least 24
hours before the holding of the special session in accordance
with Section 52 (d) 17 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC).
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board
Member Sotto was in the United States at the time the
questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the
actual number of Board Members then in the country was
thirteen which should be the basis of the determination of a
quorum.
Issue:
Was there a compliance by the Sanggunian with the
requirements prescribed under the LGC before it may grant
the Governor authority to enter into the Contract?
Ruling:
The present caseinvolves a local legislative body, the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province,
and the applicable rule respecting quorum is found in
Section 53(a) of the LGC which provides:
Section 53. Quorum.
(a) A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have
been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to
transact official business. Should a question of quorum be
raised during a session, the presiding officer shall
immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and
thereafter announce the results.
"Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body
which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will
enable the body to transact its proper business or that
number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to
pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. "Majority,"
when required to constitute a quorum, means the number
130
greater than half or more than half of any total. In fine, the
entire membership must be taken into account in computing
the quorum of the sangguniangpanlalawigan, for while the
constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is more
exacting as it requires that the "majority of all members of
the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a
quorum.
The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the
LGC is not merely "a matter of style and writing" as
respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of
"meaning and intention." The qualification in the LGC that
the majority be based on those "elected and qualified" was
meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all
members thereof have been proclaimed. And, while the
intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum
requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even
when not all members thereof have been proclaimed and
have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when,
after all the members of the sanggunian have assumed
office, one or some of its members file for leave. What
should be important then is the concurrence of election to
and qualification for the office. And election to, and
qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not
altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the
principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the
participation of all its members so that they may not only
represent the interests of their respective constituents but
also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every
question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the
Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal
provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly
questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And
all such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for
they are considered unofficial acts done during an
unauthorized session.
Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because
there was no quorum when her letter of irrevocable
resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same
reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect.
The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the
construction contract is also deemed not approved in
accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative
votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the
defect in the seventh vote. For as priorly stated, as the
Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the
affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding
officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and
thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting
authority to the Governor.
This Court is faced with an act clearly intended to
circumvent an express prohibition under the law a
situation that will not be condoned. The LGC clearly limits
the power of presiding officers to vote only in case of a tie,
to wit:
Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall
be the presiding officer of the sangguniangpanlalawigan . . .
. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of inability of the regular presiding officer to
preside at a sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer. . . .
While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may
not, at the same time, be allowed to exercise the rights of a
regular board member including that of voting even when
there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who
merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not
have greater power than that possessed by the latter who
can vote only in case of a tie.
Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into
a construction contract to be valid, the vote of the majority
of all members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those
present during the session, is required in accordance with
Section 468 54 of the LGC in relation to Article 107 55 of its
Implementing Rules.
Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was
then the Acting Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still
invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of
its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in
the Sanggunian, the approval of eight members is required
to authorize the governor to enter into the Contract with the
Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for
payment on the part of the local government unit.
La Carlota City, Negros Occidental vs Atty. Rex Rojo
GR No. 181367
April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Rojo tendered his resignation as Sangguniang
Panlungsod member preceding his appointment as
Sangunniang Panlungsod Secretary. Due to infirmities in his
appointment, his resignation was considered withdrawn.
ISSUE:
Is the resignation as Sangguniang Panlungsod member not
deemed acceptedwhen it was presented on during the
scheduled regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
for lack of quorum?
HELD: It was validly accepted.
RA 7160 clearly states that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed of the
city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the
regular sanggunian members, the president of the city
chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of
thepanlungsodnapederasyonngmgasangguniangkabataan,
and the sectoral representatives, as members. Blacks Law
Dictionary defines composed of as formed of or consisting
of. As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to
break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it
matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes.
Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is
mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a
tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and
absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to
break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a
member of the Sanggunian.
131
Thusly, a quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be
computed based on the total composition of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In this case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is composed of the presiding officer, ten (10)
regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total
of thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13 members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7)
members, is needed to constitute a quorum to transact
official business. Since seven (7) members (including the
presiding officer) were present on the regular session of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum
such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was
validly accepted.
De los Reyes vs Sandiganbayan
281 SCRA 631
Facts:
Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the
crime of falsification of a public document, specifically
Resolution No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal
Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint alleged that the
resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the
payment of the terminal leave of two municipal employees,
was anomalous for not having been approved by the said
Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made no
reference to the supposed approval thereof. It contended
that its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in
connivance with Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Member Jesse
Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.
In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner
argues that the deliberations undertaken and the
consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative
in nature. He adds that as local chief executive, he has
neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare said
resolution; hence, he could not have taken advantage of his
official position in committing the crime of falsification as
defined and punished under Article 171[6] of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court
that the final step in the approval of an ordinance or
resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his
signature, is purely a ministerial act.
Issues:
(1) Is the affixing of signature or approval of an ordinance
by the local chief executive merely a ministerial act?
(2) Can the minutes taken during the session of a local
legislative assembly be sufficient evidence to prove that the
same assembly made no reference to the passage of the
resolution in question?
Ruling:
(1) No.
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power
confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of
signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its
enforceability.Such power accords the local chief executive
the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first
instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the
Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the
same. The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override
the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members
thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all
legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the
concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an
ordinance or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the
pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence as well.
(2) Yes.
In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that
petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan
on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner
approved the subject resolution knowing fully well that the
subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and
discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan
during the legislative session.
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as
the official repository of what actually transpires in every
proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be
corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus
giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight
for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely
to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the
conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court,
without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in
resolving the dispute at hand.
Acaac vs Hon. Azcuna, Jr.
GR No. 187378
September 30, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Peoples Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation,
Inc. (PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded
by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the
protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. In line with its
objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous
materials on Capayas Island in 1995 as well as a seminar
cottage in 2001 which it rented out to the public and
became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, among
whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April and May 2002, however, respondents Mayor
Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. and Building Official Marietes B.
Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction
against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit
prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the
Philippines), and ordered PETAL to stop all illegal building
activities on Capayas Island.
On July 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 which
prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the
sanctuaries; and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if
authorized by the local government.
Azcuna approved the subject ordinance, which was
thereafter submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Misamis Occidental that conducted a joint hearing on the
matter. Notices were posted at the designated areas,
including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
132
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress
thereto.
Petitioners filed an action for the issuance of a TRO,
injunction and damages against respondents before the RTC
alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with
whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the
operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and
recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject
ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were
deprived of their livelihood.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject
ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted
without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province as required
by LGC; and (c) it was not approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of
action against them since they are not the lawful owners or
lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as
timberland and property belonging to the public domain.
Moreover, they have complied with all the publication and
hearing requirements for the passage of the ordinance,
which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to take any positive action
thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and
enforceable.
ISSUE:
Is the subject ordinance valid and enforceable against
petitioners?
HELD:
Yes. Section 56 (d), LGC provides that if no action has been
taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30)
days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the
same shall be presumed consistent with the law and
therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance
cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of
time considering that the same is still pending with the
Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It, however, bears to note that
more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the
said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the
Sangguniang Bayan; hence, it should be deemed approved
and valid.
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners
contentions that the subject ordinance was not published
nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the
LGC. Petitioners own evidence reveals that a public
hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the
ordinance. Other than their bare allegations, petitioners
failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast,
Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the
publication and posting requirements.
While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other
evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption
of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or
legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting
evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the
burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however,
failed to do.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that
which the law requires them to do, in the absence of
positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative
allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it,
she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut
the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances
and to discharge the burden of proving that no public
hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we
are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.
Robert Tayaban vs People
GR NO. 150194
March 6, 2007
FACTS:
In 1988, Roberto Tayaban was the mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao.
He made a project proposal with the Governor for a public
market to be erected. The same was approved and it was
funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). The project
bidding was subsequently won by Lopez Pugong. Pugong
began erecting the market but in 1989, Tayaban and Tinocs
councilors enforced a resolution to demolish the structure
being built on the ground that the structure is not being
erected in the proper area as specified by Tayaban and that
the structure is a public nuisance and by virtue of police
power to protect general welfare.
Tayaban and some councilors then went to the site and
demolished the structure. Pugong sued Tayaban et al for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti
Graft Act). Pugong also averred that the resolution reviewing
the said local public development project (market) that the
council passed in 1989 was not posted in a conspicuous
place as required by Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC
(R.A. No. 7160). Tayaban lost and he appealed contending
that he demolished the structure by virtue of PD 1096
(National Building Code) and LOI 19 (removal of illegal
structures).
ISSUE:
Is the resolution a valid legislation?
RULING:
A careful reading of Resolution No. 20 reveals that
petitioners only basis in deciding to carry out the demolition
was because the supposed public market was being erected
in a place other than that identified by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tinoc. There was no mention whatsoever in the
said Resolution that the private contractor failed to secure
the requisite building permit. Neither was there any mention
that the demolition was being conducted pursuant to the
power vested upon the Mayor by the provisions of LOI No.
19. Even the letter sent by petitioner Tayaban to the head
laborer of Pugong dated July 31, 1989, the letter to the
Station Commander of the INP, Tinoc of even date, and the
133
memorandum sent to the laborers of Pugong dated August
3, 1989 uniformly state that the only reason why petitioners
wanted to stop the construction was because the supposed
public market was being erected in the wrong place. Hence,
petitioners reliance on the provisions of P.D. No. 1096 and
LOI No. 19 was merely an afterthought and as a means of
justification for their acts which, in the first place, were done
in bad faith.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners
contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of
police power. The exercise of police power by the local
government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental
law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the
present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as
a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per
se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. Petitioners claim that the public
market would pose danger to the safety and health of
schoolchildren if it were built on the place being
contested. However, petitioners never made known their
supposed concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB.
Instead, they took the law into their own hands and
precipitately demolished the subject structures that were
built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with
the proper authority, which in this case is the CEB.
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. vs Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr
GR No. 156052
March 7, 2007
FACTS:
The SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 8027.Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on
November 28, 2001. It became effective on December 28,
2001, after its publication.Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted
pursuant to the police power delegated to local government
units. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they
agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
was the most viable and practicable option." Under the
MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals
which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28)
tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of
works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones
surrounding the Pandacan Terminals; establish joint
operations and management, including the operation of
common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with
international and domestic technical, safety, environmental
and economic considerations and standards.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand,
committed to do the following:endorse to the City Council
this MOU for its appropriate action; enable the OIL
COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal
requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint
operations and the scale down program; monitor the OIL
COMPANIES compliance with the provisions of this MOU and
protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all
efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into
these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized
parties. The SangguniangPanlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30,
2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending
the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called
for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action
mandamus praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate
removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of
the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
RULING:
1.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory
legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to
stay. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027
has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.
However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance
and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that
the latter has not amended the former. He insists that
the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect
and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from
enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the
MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its
full implementation.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to
compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable
or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal
function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to
expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is
neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a
legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear
legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance,
petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered
with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in
Manila. It claims to have many members who are
residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and
Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.We need
not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases
that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public
right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws
are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest.Besides, as
residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in
the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent
never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this
proceeding.On the other hand, the Local Government
Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor,
to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
for duty to do so.
2. The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to
the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether
the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s.
2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the
terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force
and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at
present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,
along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a
terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason
exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
134

Ongsuco vs Malones
GR No. 182065
October 27, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market.
After a meeting with the stall holders, Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin approvedMunicipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled
"The Municipal Revised Revenue Code."The Code contained
a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the
imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of P20,000.00
andP15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second
floors of the municipal public market, respectively. The same
Code authorizedrespondent to enter into lease contracts
over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard
contract of lease for the stall holders at themunicipal public
market.Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution
No. 68, series of 1998, moving to have the meeting declared
inoperative as a publichearing, because majority of the
persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed
to agree to the said measure. However,Resolution No. 68,
series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was
vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998.
Respondentwrote a letter to petitioners informing them that
they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal
public market without anylease contract, as a consequence
of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for
qualified and interested applicants.Petitioners filed a Petition
for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, against respondent. The RTC found that
petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of
mandamus or prohibition. Because they failed to show a
clear legal right to the use of the market stalls without
paying the goodwill fees and also on theground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Is there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative
remedies?
Is the imposition of the goodwill fees is valid? NO, it is
defective due to lack of public hearings
Held:
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the
authority to resolve acontroversy, the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Thus, a case where theissue raised is a purely
legal question, well within the competence; and the
jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative
agency,would clearly constitute an exception.There is no
dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other
stall holders at the municipal public market were sent
out,informing them of the supposed "public hearing" to be
held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners
received their notice, the"public hearing" was already
scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later.This
contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code which
requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten
days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or
published. When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought
135
to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No. 68,
series of 1998 vetoed thesaid resolution. Although the
Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override
respondent's veto, it no longer did so.The defect in the
enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured
when another public hearing was held on 22 January
1999,after the questioned ordinance was passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17
August 1998. Section 186 of theLocal Government Code
prescribes that the public hearing be held prior to the
enactment by a local government unit of an
ordinancelevying taxes, fees, and charges.Since no public
hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void
andcannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and
ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon
respondent the jurisdiction toorder petitioners' stalls at the
municipal public market vacant.
Garcia, et al. Comelec
GR No. 111230
September 30, 1994
Facts:
In its PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993, the
Sanggunian Bayan ngMorong agreed to the inclusion of the
Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
Zone.
Petitioners filed a petition to annul the said
PambayangKapasyahan. However, the Municipality of
Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30
days after its submission. So, petitioners resorted to their
power of initiative under the LGC. They started to solicit the
required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said
resolution. COMELEC en banc denied the petition for local
initiative on the ground that its subject is merely a
resolution and not an ordinance. Under section 120,
Chapter 2, Title IX, Book 1 of LGC, local initiative is defined
as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.
Petitioners argued that a Sangguniang Bayan resolution
being an act of the local legislative assembly is undoubtedly
a proper subject of initiative. It also contended that
Comelecs authority in the matter of local initiative is merely
ministerial; and it is duty-bound to supervise the gathering
of signatures in support of the petition and to set the date of
the initiative once the required number of signatures are
obtained.
Issue:
Is PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993 a proper
subject of an initiative?
Ruling:Yes.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but
resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The
Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes
a resolution. Moreover, Sec. 3(a0, RA No. 6735 (An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum)
expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on
local legislations.
LGC did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to
ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I
merely defines the concept of local initiative. It does not deal
with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local
initiative. It is section 124 which deals with such. It states:
Sec. 124. Limitations on
Local Initiatives. (a)
The power of local
initiative shall not be
exercised more than
once a year.
(b) Initiative shall
extend only to subjects
or matters which are
within the legal powers
of the Sanggunians to
enact.
Generally, resolutions are not normally subject to
referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to
the successful administration of the business affairs of a city.
However, in this case, it cannot be argued that the subject
matter of the resolution of the Municipality of Morong merely
temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a
permanent rule of conduct or government.The inclusion of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far
reaching implications in the governance of its
people.Considering the lasting changes that will be brought
in the social, political, and economic existence of the people
of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic
Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on
the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the
decision of the municipality of Morong for the
inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what
matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the
people of Morong.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs Comelec
GR No. 125416
September 26, 1996
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy
of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over
the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation
of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
136
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted
such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annulPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join
provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang BayanngMorong acted upon the
petition by promulgating
PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend
certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power
initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local
initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was
merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued
Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the
former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued
Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendumand
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the
conduct of the referendum
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for
certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848
alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding
with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a
national law
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the
conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject
within the powers of the people of Morong to enact;
i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a
national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an
INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for
a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the
footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least
27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum
returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers"
and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative"
used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this
exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose

bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls
independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or
reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without
action on the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises

administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to
its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-
making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the

municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and
not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is

not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then
there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is
only when the people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it
is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue
upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not
hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has

authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to
the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality"
or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections
itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the
issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply
included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution
No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made
by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could
take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the
exercise of its review powers.

137