Risk Management

Risk Management of
Less Lethal Options

Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath,
and Forensics
R.T. Wyant Thomas Burns

Edited by John Allgire
Risk Management of
Less Lethal Options
and Forensics
Risk Management of
Less Lethal Options
and Forensics
R.T. Wyant
Thomas Burns
John Allgire
CRT Less Lethal, Inc.

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This text is dedicated to the men and women in the military,
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Contents
Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xi
About the Authors xiii
Introduction xxi
1 Police De-escalation Tactics: A Personal Account 1

TOM BURNS AND R. T. WYANT
2 Why We Use Less Lethal 27

R. T. WYANT AND TOM BURNS
3 Prevailing Less Lethal Options for Law

Enforcement 43
R. T. WYANT
4 RCAs: Chemical Irritants (OC, CS) and

Flammability Testing with Conducted-Energy
Weapons (Tasers) 79
R. T. WYANT
5 Less Lethal Impact Munitions: The Forensic

Testing Model 103
R. T. WYANT AND LUCIEN HAAG
6 Validating the LLIM Testing Model,

Documenting Wounds/Injuries 143
R. T. WYANT, C. WIGREN, AND T. HATCHER
7 Training for a Successful Less Lethal Program 171

vii
viii Contents
8 Arrest-Related Death, In-Custody Death, and

Excited Delirium Syndrome 201
R. T. WYANT
9 Forensics: Conducted Electrical Weapons (Taser) 221

R. T. WYANT
10 Aftermath: Post-Event Report Writing, Evidence

Collection, and Court Preparation 261
JOHN ALLGIRE, R. T. WYANT, TOM BURNS, AND
RON MCCARTHY
11 Risk Management for Law Enforcement in

Modern Society 283
R. T. WYANT AND JOHN ALLGIRE
Foreword
During the Edo period in feudal Japan, the infamous Shoguns ruled with
the iron-fisted loyalty of the warrior-class Samurai. The Samurai lived by the
Bushido code, which was shaped over thousands of years into a lifestyle com-
mitment to honor, obedience, duty, and self-sacrifice. The Samurai were the
military leaders and warriors, and as a result of their inaccurate but colorful
portrayal in modern media, they became known primarily for one thing
their skill with the sword (katana). The Samurai were in fact the warriors of
that era, but uncharacteristically, the Edo period was relatively calm. As a
result, the Samurai did not spend their time waging war, but keeping the peace.
The Samurais martial skills and commitment to honor, obedience, duty, and
self-sacrifice made them perfect for the role of the feudal police officer. All
aspects of Japanese society during this time were strictly regulated, and that
included the methods and implements of arrest (taiho-jutsu). Class distinction
in this era was significant, and serious injury to a prisonerespecially one of
social rank or statuscould result in significant chastisement for the officer
involved. Accordingly, the feudal police took extra precautions to capture law-
breakers alive and without injury, even though they (Samurai) lived by the
sword and often faced armed and violent subjects. This required the develop-
ment of specialized tools, tactics, and equipment to overcome resistance and
take suspects into custody with the least potential for causing death or serious
physical injury. The Samurai policing focus was not on their deadly force skill
or capability, but on their less lethal tools such as the sasumata (spear fork),
sodegarmi (sleeve entangler), and tsukubo (push pole). These devices enabled
officers to exert physical control from a safer-than-contact range, facilitated
the tasks of disarming and taking into custody, and reduced the potential for
injury to everyone involved. Welcome to contemporary policing in America.
President Lyndon Johnson faced massive civil unrest and protests in 1965,
and in response to calls for law and order took significant action to quell the
disturbances. The steps taken were perceived by many to be heavy-handed and
excessive, and resulted in the establishment of an attorney general commis-
sion focused on finding less deadly ways for police officers to interact with
the public. This effort bore significant fruit and resulted in the development
of the electronic control device (Taser), individual officer chemical munitions
(Mace), and extended-range impact devices (beanbag ammunition). As in the
era of the Samurai, contemporary police officers were skilled in the martial
ix
x Foreword
ways; committed to honor, obedience, duty, and self-sacrifice; and known for
their deadly-force capability. Likewise, the political, practical, and legal aspects
of policing in both eras made it abundantly clear that taking persons into cus-
tody with a reduced potential for causing death or serious injury was quite
often the appropriate path to take. In recognition of this, modern manufac-
turers produced hundreds of less lethal devices and offered training geared
toward their use, convincing law enforcement consumers that each was per-
fectly suited for meeting operational objectives in a safe and effective way. This
process resulted in both positive and negative outcomes, as some devices when
properly used have proven safe and effective, while others have proven the
exact opposite. Law enforcement has basically been left to procure the various
devices based on advertisement or endorsement, and thenwith limited in-
house testingtaking the tool to the street. This has often resulted in separa-
tion of the less lethal wheat from the chaff in similar fashion to walking a
tightrope without a net. If the agency crossed the chasm without anyone being
killed or seriously injured, then all was well. If someone fell, things were less
well or, in some cases, really bad. Enter CRT Less Lethal Inc. and their book,
Risk Management of Less Lethal Options: Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath,
and Forensics.
I have known Tom Burns for many years, and our association dates back to
early less-lethal-force programs in Seattle in the mid 1990s. Tom was a skilled
tactical officer conducting research on less lethal technology and training, and
I was the less-lethal-section chair and lead instructor for the National Tactical
Officers Association (NTOA) less-lethal-force train the trainer programs.
Tom was providing in-house training and putting agency tactics and technol-
ogy to the test in the field, and I was gathering lessons learned while con-
ducting research, teaching, and observing public disorder events in places like
Somalia, Haiti, Yemen, Northern Ireland, and East Timor. Our paths crossed
often, and we shared notes, experiences, and the realities of less lethal polic-
ing both here and abroad. Tom ultimately partnered with forensic scientist
Rick Wyant in 2003, and they created CRT Less Lethal Inc. Their organiza-
tion is focused on providing training, analysis, and independent testing of less
lethal weapons systems, and in my experience I have found that they do this
very well. This book provides an in-depth and practical analysis of the critical
issues involved with de-escalation and the less lethal process in policing today.
It offers objective and thought-provoking information that will assist policy
makers, prosecutors, trainers, and practitioners as they strive to understand
the most challenging of law enforcement dilemmasexerting physical control
over those who object to it, and doing so in a manner that balances the need to
overcome resistance with the acceptability of injury risk to all involved.
Steve Ijames
Acknowledgments
A special thanks to Sid Heal and Steve Ijames for believing in us enough
to share their extraordinary wisdom on less lethals.
Luke Haag has encouraged countless scientists to take the extra step
to help answer a question. He is a true inspiration. We would like to thank
the rest of those affiliated with the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark
Examiners (AFTE), particularly Glenn Davis, Kristen Drury, Kathy Geil,
and Brian Smelser for their passion, support, and inspiration to make a dif-
ference in our discipline.
What we can we say about John Allgire of the Whatcom County Sheriffs
Office? From the beginning, his insight, vision, intelligence, humor, and ded-
ication to the greater good has been pivotal in our success. Without him, this
book would not have been possible.
We are grateful to Chris Myers of the Seattle Police Department for his
assistance and ideas in the early days of our experiments, when he often said,
I dont know, lets try it and see what happens.
We thank the Washington State Patrol and the Seattle Police Department
for supporting our outside-the-box philosophy and many hours out of the office.
We also thank Defense Technologies (Safariland), Combined Systems,
CASE forensics, and Taser International for their support of our endeavors,
even though they might not have made sense at the time.
Lastly, thanks to our wives, Carol and Shan, for their love, understand-
ing, sacrifice, and extraordinary patience. We can finally answer the question
Is that damn book done yet? with a resounding Yes!
Rick and Tom
xi
About the Authors
R. T. Wyant received his masters

degree in 1994. Hehas been a foren-
sic scientist since 1995 and a reserve
deputy since 2000 for the Snohomish
County Sheriffs Office. He currently
supervises the forensic firearms
unit at the Washington State Patrol-
Seattle crime laboratory and is court
qualified in firearm/tool identifica-
tion, crime scene analysis, less lethal
devices, and trajectory reconstruc-
tion. Since 2001, Rick has developed
testing protocols that have been utilized by CEW (conducted electrical
weapon), OC-pepper spray, and less lethal impact munitions manufactur-
ers. His standard operating procedures for Taser evidence analysis have
been adopted by other crime laboratories. Wyant established foundational
criteria for the admissibility of forensic Taser evidence under the Frye
standard.
Rick has taught police agencies, scientists, students, and attorneys all
over the United States and abroad, including the United Kingdom, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Canada. He has published several scientific papers, and
in 2012 he assisted with theAtlas of Conducted Electrical Weapon Wounds
and Forensic Analysis, where he authored Chapter 10.
He is a distinguished member of the Association of Firearm and Tool
Mark Examiners, an associate member of the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences, a board member of the Scientific Working Group for Firearms and
Toolmarks (SWGGUN). He also sits on the NIJ Technology Working Group
(TWG) for less lethal weapons and the International Law Enforcement Forum
(ILEF). As a reserve deputy, he has performed solo patrol functions, bicycle
patrol, worked a search-and-rescue cadaver K9, and has deployed Tasers in the
field.
xiii
xiv About the Authors
Tom Burns has worked as an officer

with the Seattle Police Department
since 1989. During that time, Tom has
been assigned to patrol, anticrime team,
SWAT, and a proactive bicycle patrol
unit. During his tenure in SWAT, Tom
was a member of the chemical agent/less
lethal cadre and was cadre leader for two
years. He developed the concepts for the
chemical agent response teams (CART)
and was a lead instructor for the WTO
riots in Seattle in 1999.
Tom is a certified master instructor for specialty impact munitions,
chemical agents, NFDDs (noise/flash distraction devices), and Taser. Tom
was a lead instructor in rapid intervention tactics and has consulted with
the Department of Homeland Defense. He has taught crowd-control tactics
and the use of less lethal/chemical agents throughout the United States and
Canada. Tom spent seven weeks in Georgia training law enforcement and
military personnel for the 2004 G-8 conference. He was a lead instructor
working directly with numerous agencies in Denver and Minneapolis/St.
Paulin preparation for theDemocratic andRepublicanconventions in 2008.
Tom worked directly with the Vancouver Police Department in setting up
a less lethal program for the 2010 Winter Olympics. In 2012, Tom assisted
Chicago area police agencies in preparation for the G8 and NATO confer-
ences. He serves on the board of the National Institute of Justice Technical
Working Group for Less-Lethal Weapons (NIJ TWG-LL).
John Allgire received his BA in psy-

chology in 2001. That same year he
was hired by the Whatcom County,
Washington, Sheriffs Office. He was
assigned to patrol and worked as a
crime scene investigator (CSI) prior
to becoming a major crimes detective
with an ancillary duty in computer
forensics. Allgire is also a firearms
instructor for Whatcom County. He
is certified as a Tasermaster instruc-
tor and has always had an interest
in less lethal options and how they
can improve the outcomes of police
encounters. He has worked with CRT
Less Lethal since their first testing of
About the Authors xv
impact munitions and helped to evolve their scientific protocols. Allgire

also assisted in training Chicago-area police agencies in preparation for
the G8 conference in 2013.In his spare time, Allgire enjoys shooting sports
and reciting movie lines ad nauseam. One day he hopes to be very impor-
tant, have many leather-bound books, and an apartment that smells of rich
mahogany.
Charles Sid Heal retired as a com-

mander with the Los Angeles Sheriffs
Department after nearly 33 years in
law enforcement, more than half of
which was spent in units charged with
handling law enforcement special and
emergency operations. His experience
with riots and civil disorder situations,
including the employment of nonle-
thal options, includes serving as a pla-
toon and local incident commander for
the 1992 Los Angeles riots and as the
principal advisor and team leader of
the mobile training team for nonlethal
options during Operation United Shield
in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1995. He has served as a consultant on civil unrest
and nonlethal options for the California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training, the California Governors Office of Emergency
Services, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate
School, the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Department
of Defense Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate, and the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
As a collateral assignment, Sid was in charge of the Los Angeles Sheriffs
Departments internationally recognized technology exploration program.
This program seeks to identify, develop, exploit, and integrate new technolo-
gies for law enforcement. The focus of effort for this program is on inter-
vening with nonlethal options. Consequently, Sid has gained considerable
expertise and insight into the factors and influences involved in the devel-
opment and employment of nonlethal options and is a much-sought-after
speaker and trainer. He is the author of Sound Doctrine: A Tactical Primer
and Field Command, as well as more than 160 articles on law enforcement
issues. He holds a bachelors degree in police science from California State
University, Los Angeles; a masters degree in public administration from the
University of Southern California; and a masters degree in management
from California Polytechnic University, Pomona. He is also a graduate of the
FBIs National Academy and the California Command College.
xvi About the Authors
Steve Ijames has been a police officer for

over 30 years and retired asassistant chief
of police inSpringfield, Missouri.Ijames
is a graduate of the 186th FBI National
Academy and has a bachelors degree in
criminal justice and a masters degree in
public administration. During his full-
time law enforcement tenure, Ijames
served in, supervised, and commanded
a variety of assignments, including uni-
formed patrol, criminal investigations,
undercover narcotics, and special weap-
ons and tactics (SWAT). Ijames was the
founder of his agencys full-time tactical
team, and he participated in, supervised,
or commanded the service of approximately 3,000 search warrants as well as
the resolution of over 150 barricaded-subject incidents and seven hostage-
taking situations.
Ijames created the less lethal force(impact projectiles, chemical muni-
tions, and noise/flash diversionary devices) instructor/trainer programs for
the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) and the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),and is the author of the IACP model
policieson Taser, impact rounds, chemical agents, flash bangs, hostage res-
cue, and barricaded subjects. Ijames has provided use of force and SWAT/
command training on behalf of the IACP and the U.S. Department of State
across the United States, Canada, and in 33 countries, including such places
as Tanzania, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, El Salvador, Yemen, Pakistan, and East
Timor. Ijames has served on a variety of resistance-control investigative
commissions;has reviewed approximately 2,000 police use-of-force cases for
agencies across the United States, Canada, and abroad; andprovides police
litigation consulting in avariety of resistance-control and related areasfor
agenciesnationwide.
Lucien C. Luke Haag is a for-

mer criminalist and technical
director of the Phoenix Crime
Laboratory (196582) with more
than 47 years experience in the
field of criminalistics and foren-
sic firearm examinations. He is
presently an independent forensic
About the Authors xvii
consultant with his own company, Forensic Science Services, Inc., in Carefree,
Arizona. Haag has a bachelor of science degree in chemistry with minors in
math and physics from the University of California at Berkeley, with subsequent
forensic training at California State University at Long Beach, Indiana University,
Arizona State University, McCrone Research Institute, the FBI Laboratory, and
the FBI Forensic Training Facility at Quantico, Virginia. He is a distinguished
member and past president of the AFTE, a distinguished member of the
California Association of Criminalists, a member of the Southwest Association
of Forensic Scientists, a fellow in the American Academy of Forensic Sciences,
and a past board member of the International Wound Ballistics Association. He
has received the AFTE Key Member Award on three occasions during his many
years of participation in AFTE seminars. He has also authored and presented
more than 180 scientific papers, most of which have dealt with various exterior
and terminal ballistic properties, effects, and behaviors of projectiles. He is also
the author of Shooting Incident Reconstruction, available from Elsevier/Academic
Press (2006). He and his son, Mike, also teach a five-day shooting-scene recon-
struction course at the Gunsite Training Facility each fall in Arizona.
Ron McCarthy retired from the

Los Angeles Police Department
after 24 years of service. He was an
officer, supervisor, and assistant
commander of the LAPD SWAT
team and the LAPDs Emergency
Response Division, Metropolitan
Division. Upon his retirement he
became the chief of tactical opera-
tions for the U.S. Department of
Energy. From there he went on to
serve as the director of advanced
police studies for the International
Association of Chiefs of Police and
the National Institute of Justice
Deadly Force Training Program. In
1993 he started R. M. McCarthy & Associates, a training, consulting, and
logistics resource for law enforcement. He is also working as an account
manager for the Safariland Group, a police equipment manufacturer, and
is employed as an adjunct faculty member of Fullerton College, Police
Training Academy.
xviii About the Authors
Dr. Carl Wigren received his medical degree

from the University of Washington in 2001.
He completed specialty training in anatomic
pathology at the University of Washington and
two years of subspecialty training in foren-
sic pathology at the King County Medical
Examiners Office in Seattle, Washington,
and the Tarrant County Medical Examiners
Office in Fort Worth, Texas. He was an asso-
ciate medical examiner with the Snohomish
County Medical Examiners Office in Everett,
Washington, for two years before founding Wigren Forensic, PLLC, in 2009.
He currently provides medicolegal services to attorneys, coroners, and fami-
lies in Washington State. Dr. Wigren is a diplomate of the American Board
of Pathology and certified in anatomic pathology and forensic pathology. He
holds a faculty appointment at the Pacific Northwest University of Health
Sciences in Yakima, Washington, and a medical staff appointment at Skagit
Valley Hospital in Mount Vernon, Washington.
Darren Hall is a fifteen-year veteran of the

Vancouver Police Department (VPD) in British
Columbia. He has a passion for training, police
tactics, and officer safety. Eight years of opera-
tional experience includes policing the busy
entertainment district as well as the challeng-
ing Downtown East Side of Vancouver. Hall
has been dedicated to training for twelve years,
providing instruction in firearms, control tac-
tics, and less lethal weapons. For the last seven
years, he has been assigned to the Force Options
Training Unit, where he is the lead officer safety instructor at the Vancouver
Tactical Training Center. With the help of other dedicated trainers, Hall
has introduced science, physiology, human performance, and reality-based
training to the VPD. He is also a twelve-year member of the PSU (Public
Safety Unit) Tactical Support Unit and is responsible for all less-lethal-weap-
ons selection and instruction related to public order use. In addition to many
protests, He has been deployed as a tactical officer in every major public order
event, including the annual Celebration of Light Festival, the 2010 Winter
Olympics, and the most recent 2011 Stanley Cup riot.
About the Authors xix
Terry Hatcher has been a sonographer since 1981

and a professor since 1997. She has worked in radi-
ology performing X-rays; CT scans; diagnostic
ultrasound exams, including OB/GYN, abdomi-
nal, and small parts; vascular technology; and
nuclear medicine technology including fusion
imaging of PET scans and CT scans. Her latest
endeavors are using ultrasound to evaluate mus-
cle-skeletalrelated tissues. Terry has performed
research in the areas of Alzheimers progression
using PET/CT imaging, cardiac hibernation using
PET/CT imaging, and knowing the impact of
the Affordable Care Act on the training of future health care workers. She
teaches diagnostic ultrasound at Bellevue College in Bellevue, Washington,
and currently chairs that department.
Introduction
It all began with a Taser incident in 2001 that brought two cops, Chris
Myers and Tom Burns, and a forensic scientist, Rick Wyant, together to help
develop protocols to better investigate a class of weapons that were quickly
gaining momentum and popularity. As our partnership grew, we realized
that we all shared a similar desire to take a new approach to understand-
ing less lethal weapons. Tom wanted to test the ordnance used during the
WTO (World Trade Organization) riots in Seattle. Chris asked if we could
catch stuff on fire with pepper spray. John Allgire joined in to help with all
of the testing. After determining that our unique methodology for testing
products yielded some interesting and eye-opening data, we formed CRT
Less Lethal Inc. to help share our knowledge. Years later, when the CSI and
Mythbusters television shows copied one of our experiments, we knew we
were onto something special.
Rick, Tom, and John compiled this text as a culmination of that testing
and the lessons learned from investigating negative outcomes from all over
the United States and abroad. We realized that were people were being injured
or dying, as well as large settlements in court cases, based on inaccurate
knowledge or insufficient testing of less lethal options. We will not only dis-
cuss how these tools are deployed, but also outline ways a police department
can apply simple concepts and techniques to manage risk and limit liability.
These methods were developed over a decade of testing, training, evaluating,
deploying, analyzing, and testifying related to the use of these tools.
We were fortunate to have two icons in the less lethal realm to assist us
in this venture. Steve Ijames launches this text with a brilliant and percep-
tive foreword. Sid Heal keeps it going by sprinkling his wisdom and insight
throughout the books entirety. Others from many capacities generously
contributed material, including Luke Haag, Ron McCarthy, Darren Hall,
Dr. Carl Wigren, and Terry Hatcher, making this book a multidisciplinary
plethora of information.
We have been very lucky for the places we have been, the people we have
met, and the information we have gathered. It is high time we shared that
information in an attempt to make the world safer. Our hope is that the
information in this text will help prevent even one death, one unnecessary
lawsuit, or one wrongfully accused officer.
xxi
Police De-escalation
Tactics
A Personal Account
TOM BURNS AND R. T. WYANT
1
Contents
The Sword-Man: A Lesson in Less Lethal Options 4
Addressing the Threat 4
Less Lethal Deployment on Sword-Man 5
Training versus Reality 6
Adapting Tactics 6
Final Outcome and Lessons Learned 7
WTO: The Battle in SeattleA Less Lethal Success 7
Event Review 7
Pre-event Police Planning 8
Line Officer Training 9
Tactical CART Preplanning 9
Pre-event Protester Planning 10
Event Realities 10
Priorities: Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, Property Protection 13
CART Ran Out of Ordnance 14
Political Fallout 15
Lessons Learned 16
Seattle Mardi Gras Riots 2001: Celebration Took a Turn 17
Pre-Event Decisions 17
Lessons Learned after Mardi Gras 2001 18
Canadians Love Hockey: Stanley Cup Riots, Vancouver, BC 20
De-escalation and Less Lethal Options 24
References 25
The cost of doing business in law enforcement is an expensive undertaking

when one considers staffing, vehicles, uniforms, equipment, and training.
What can cripple a police department, or even a city, are payouts from use-
of-force complaints and workers compensation claims from injured officers.
Police chiefs from all over the world have struggled to manage the potential
1
2 Risk Management of Less Lethal Options: Evaluation, Deployment
risk and minimize negative outcomes of police encounters. Furthermore, the

political ramifications and shifting public opinion from high-profile inci-
dents such as in-custody deaths or videotaped use of force (Rodney King
beating) can affect police morale and even the safety of a jurisdiction (civil
disturbances that escalate into riots). When force is used, people can be sub-
jected to physical and/or emotional injury, which is usually associated with a
monetary payout. Incorporating additional de-escalation tactics and training
into police policy is a popular risk-management approach to mitigate these
bad outcomes and reduce liability related to the use of force by the police.
In reality, police officers have always applied de-escalation tactics, although
it is commonly believed that de-escalation only applies to verbal tactics in
calming a confrontational situation. Statistics have consistently demon-
strated that in the vast majority of incidents, the responding police officers
are able to control a situation with a number of tactics without resorting to
the use of physical force. Studies done in the late 1990s by the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) show that only 1.4%1.9% of the 40 million people who were contacted
by the police had reported force or the threat of force at least once during
the contact [1] (Figure 1.1). Other studies throughout the last decade have
mirrored this low figure. The BJS report also unfortunately states that media
depictions continue to create the perception that use or threat of force by the
Figure 1.1 Nearly all police contacts involve no use of physical force.
Police De-escalation Tactics 3
police is greater than it actually is. However, the outcry remains for officers
to attempt de-escalation techniques to reduce the perceived increase of force
used on the public.
THE WEBSTER DICTIONARYS

DEFINITION FOR DE-ESCALATE:
to decrease in extent, volume, or scope
It is important for all facets of the criminal justice system to understand

that de-escalation encompasses the entire range of force used by police [2].
Ironically, the mere presence of a patrol car or uniformed officer is a common
de-escalation technique. A patrol car rolling up on a street fight causing the
crowd to scatter is a prevalent example. An officer confronts a shooter in the
initial stages of a mass shooting, and the shooter commits suicide or surren-
ders upon seeing the officer. Most would describe that as a desirable outcome,
since the confrontation most certainly saved lives and the officer did not take
one. If an incident calls for action that prevents a higher level of force and/or
prevents the suspect from escalating his aggression, de-escalation is achieved.
It is often seen that police departments do not properly convey this message
when a positive outcome occurs, only when defending a negative one.
EXAMPLES OF DE-ESCALATION THAT MAY NOT FIT

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF THE DEFINITION:
An officer rams a fleeing car as it approaches a populated area.
An officer throws a rubber grenade near a gang fight in the street.
An officer deploys a Taser instead of going into physical bat-
tle with a suspect.
An officer shoots and kills a mass shooter in the initial stages
of the event.
An officer fires a beanbag into the thigh of a protestor inciting
a riot.
Lessons in de-escalation have been learned from the Tom Burns involve-
ment in several critical incidents in the Seattle area relating to unmanageable
individuals, civil disturbances, and the use of less lethal options and chemi-
cal irritants. Firsthand accounts will be highlighted in this chapter as they
pertain to preparation, initiation, and final outcomes of perilous and contro-
versial incidents. Ultimately, smart decision making before, during, and after
these stressful situations will make the difference between positive and nega-
tive results. One of the most important choices in managing risk and achiev-
ing a successful outcome of an incident includes the proper selection of less
lethal options and employing methods to maximize effectiveness, increase
safety, and limit liability.
The Sword-Man: A Lesson in Less Lethal Options
On April 3, 1997, Burns was assigned to the Seattle police SWAT team. It was
broadcast that patrol officers had contained a man with a Samurai sword
who was threatening passersby in a busy downtown corridor. Burns six-man
crisis team responded and was the first to arrive with tactical vests, helmets,
and specialty weapons.
The use of force is always accompanied by risknot just the risk of injury, but
the risk of ridicule. Assessing risk, then, becomes an important factor in con-
sidering what force options will reliably accomplish operational objectives.
Both the military and law enforcement communities are quite comfortable
with identifying the criteria that justify lethal force. After all, its a thresh-
old, and once crossed you can only be so dead. Nonlethal force, however, has
no such threshold. Instead, there is a huge gray area where legitimacy and
acceptability are blurry. For example, when considering how much injury is
acceptable, the question arises: Compared to what? Most of us would accept
substantially more injury if the alternative is death. Even so, we would likely
consider nonlethal options that blind, disfigure, or maim as excessive, even
when the only alternative is deadly force.
Sid Heal
Several marked patrol cars had formed a semicircle containing a man

wearing a black leather jacket, camouflage pants, boots, dark sunglasses, and
holding a large Samurai sword. The uniformed patrol officers who responded
first to this dangerous and tense situation had surrounded the troubled man
in an area near the Pike Street corridor, which is heavily traveled with pedes-
trian traffic leading from the famous Pike Place Market, known for the first
Starbucks coffee shop and fish throwers.
Addressing the Threat

Later to be identified as Tony Allison, he would forever be referred to in the
police department as Sword-man. Background checks would show that
he had been in Western State Mental Hospital in Washington for ten years
for pleading to second-degree assault with intent to rape. He was found not
guilty to more serious charges by reason of insanity. It was later relayed by

friends of Allison that he often carried the Samurai sword and spoke to
imaginary people in an effort to ward off demons. Initially unaware of Mr.
Allisons history at the time, it was difficult for the responding officers to
establish what his intentions were, and police options needed to be quickly
established. He would look to the sky and make unintelligible statements
holding the Samurai sword above his head, presenting it in an almost cer-
emonial manner. He was not responding to our attempts of communication
with the police, nor was he moving toward containment officers. Due to the
large number of onlookers and the threatening manner in which the Sword-
man was responding to simple negotiation, lethal force was appearing to be
the only viable option if public safety were further endangered.
Less Lethal Deployment on Sword-Man

In addition to the number of operators assigned to lethal cover, the Seattle
Police Department SWAT team did have a number of less lethal options
available at the scene. Allison continued to make threatening gestures with
the Samurai sword held in both hands, raising up the sword parallel to his
body from a crouched stance. As the threatening movements continued and
verbal de-escalation tactics were failing, the order was given to deploy less
lethal munitions. Burns was equipped with a Remington model 870 less
lethal shotgun loaded with five issued beanbag rounds (Chapter 3). In
an attempt to maximize effectiveness, the pelvic region was targeted due
to the thickness of his jacket. Other SWAT members fired a variety of less
lethal rounds, 40mm wood batons, 37mm ARWEN (Anti-Riot Weapon
ENfield), and other direct-impact chemical agent munitions (Chapter 3)
(see Figure1.2). Initial efforts to gain compliance with these weapons were
unsuccessful and instead met with a minimal physical response. It appeared
that none of the options used had any psychological or physiological effect.
The volley of less lethal rounds deployed at Allison did, however, seemingly
prevent his movement from the contained area, mitigating the potential
need for lethal force.
Many situations rapidly evolve from less dangerous circumstances before

requiring deadly force to resolve. An individual who is free to employ a variety
of options is more likely to be proactive, retain the initiative, and be quicker
to recognize situations requiring deadly force than one compelled to examine
a situation isolated by either/or parameters. Remember, the objective is to
win, not to fight!
Sid Heal
Figure 1.2 High-energy impact rounds (ARWEN) are often used against a single
aggressor (May Day 2013).
Training versus Reality

Often, police responses are identical for a mentally ill subject as they are for
a violently aggressive criminal. In department training and during less lethal
training courses, it is taught that the use of less lethal munitions will inca-
pacitate individuals. Promoting their products, manufacturers show videos
that make the products look effective and safe in the most ideal scenario.
Realistically, a truly focused, mentally ill, or drug-influenced individual can
overcome pain stimuli that would overwhelm a normal lucid person. Sword-
man withstood numerous rounds impacting all over his body, which not
only did not incapacitate him, but appeared to make him more focused and
ready to fight. Witnessing the situation unfold, Burns realized that a negative
outcome was appearing increasingly likely.
Adapting Tactics
After the volley of impact munitions that was fired at Sword-man appeared
to be ineffective, the order was given to attempt chemical irritants (Chapters
3, 4). Pepper spray (OC, i.e., oleoresin capsicum) from a riot-sized canister
(MK 46 size) and crowd-control blast-dispersion CS (tear gas) rounds were
used with no appreciable effect. The CS blast-dispersion round completely
enveloped his head in a white powder cloud. Allison responded by wiping
the CS away from his eyes and mouth, and then growling. Burns looked at
his partner and said, That is not a good sign.
Discussions with the team and command staff weighed options to create a
more favorable environment in which to take custody of Sword-man without
escalating force further. For Allisons safety, it became crucial that the situ-
ation be brought to a close, as all traditional methods to subdue him were
unsuccessful. With coordination from the fire department, he was sprayed
with water in an attempt to compel him with cold, which was unsuccessful.
The plan shifted to applying two high-pressure fire hoses to knock him off
his feet. The tactic was successful, and the team moved in and pinned him to
the ground with a ladder. The sword was removed from his hands with a long
pry tool, commonly used to rake windows. The plan worked seamlessly, and
Allison was finally taken into custody with no injuries to any officers.
Final Outcome and Lessons Learned

With minimal injury, Sword-man recovered from this incident and contin-
ued on a path driven by mental illness and uncontrolled drug use. Although
the end result was generally positive considering the difficulty of the situation,
people in law enforcement have a habit of Monday morning quarterbacking
each other without knowing the totality of the events. The department and
SWAT team received numerous suggestions on how this situation could have
been handled, from nets to tranquilizer darts. In the end, all involved were
commended for attempting and evaluating a number of options. This flex-
ibility in the approach to the incident was crucial to a nontraditional method
that ultimately solved the problem. By keeping options open, the situation
was successfully de-escalated, most importantly, without loss of life or harm
to officers or the public.
Looking back on that incident, it is clear that Tony Allison exhibited
many of the signs of excited delirium syndrome (ExDS, discussed in Chapter
8). He was delusional, stimulus focused, and exhibited an extremely high
pain threshold, all of which are indicators for this condition. Although this
knowledge may not have changed the outcome, it certainly could have helped
officers on the scene better understand what was occurring with this person.
WTO: The Battle in SeattleA Less Lethal Success
Event Review
In 1999, the city of Seattle was to host the WTO (World Trade Organization)
annual conference. Historically, past conferences brought mass protest and
violence to other host cities. The event would not only bring dignitaries from
around the world, but also 40,00060,000 protesters. Most of the protesters
would be peaceful, but a phenomenon called the contagion effect would
severely change the outcome of the Seattle event. Normally law-abiding peo-
ple would get caught in the moment and commit acts they would not do
under normal circumstances. The combination of circumstance and decision
making by the leadership led to three days of rioting and millions of dollars
in property damage in one of Americas major cities.
Contagion effect is a psychological observation that refers to the ten-

dency for people to be more susceptible to suggestion when in a group
than when by themselves. In riots or other civil disturbance situations,
this influence tends to be property destruction, violence toward others,
or other negative behavior.
Pre-event Police Planning

Assigned to SWAT and in charge of the less lethal/chemical irritant cadre,
Burns was initially informed that a $100,000 budget would be available to
assemble chemical irritant/less lethal teams (referred to as CART: Chemical
Agent Response Team). The primary assignment of CART was dignitary pro-
tection of the WTO delegates, with the majority of the team being tasked
specifically to delegate gathering venues. These teams would also be prepared
to respond to an incident if the event were to take a negative turn. As the
planning for the meeting progressed, some command staff minimized the
potential threat of conflict, and the CART budget was reduced to $25,000.
One difference between the military and law enforcement communities is that
the adversaries most likely to be encountered by a military force tend to be a
lot more similar to each other than those encountered in law enforcement.
With some exceptions, military adversaries are almost entirely male, of mili-
tary age, in good physical condition, and healthy. While some generalizations
can be made for adversaries in law enforcement environments, they dont tend
to be clumped so closely together. It is not at all unusual to find dangerous bel-
ligerents that are small, young, and female or, conversely, exceptionally large,
old, and male, often on the same shift. No single force option can safely and
effectively accommodate all these differences.
Sid Heal
Any response to a protest would have to consider the wide variety of peo-
ple who may attend or be in close proximity. Seattle has a relatively concen-
trated urban area due to geographic constraints, with businesses, shopping,
and hotels all located within a small area. Tactical plans had to consider busi-
ness owners, media, families, and children within any potential engagement
area.
Line Officer Training

Under normal police operations, officers are trained to think as individuals.
Acting as an individual in a civil disturbance scenario, an officer could be
perceived as rogue, resulting in scrutiny or, worse, attack. In a civil distur-
bance or crowd-control situation, officers must be trained to think, respond,
move, and react as a team to help prevent escalation of crowd hostility. In
watching footage of other protests, the crowd will immediately focus on the
one officer who looks out of place or takes an individual action. A coordi-
nated squad is perceived as a tactical movement, conveying a precise plan
to onlookers. All line officers were trained on the use and deployment of
40-inch ironwood batons and how to arrest or rescue individuals in a crowd.
With a majority of the line troops trained in line formations and baton usage,
the less lethal deployments would be designated to the four chemical agent/
less lethal CARTs.
Tactical CART Preplanning

The four CARTs were designed to have a multiresponse capability to address
low-level and high-level threats simultaneously, addressing individuals and
masses. Each team would have operators assigned with specific munitions and
deployment formats (single-shot 40mm and multishot 37mm ARWEN less
lethal launchers (Figure1.3). In addition, team members were equipped with
Figure 1.3 The primary less lethal projectile platforms used in WTO (40mm
single launcher and ARWEN).
large canisters of pepper spray/OC. Munitions ranged from .32- and .60-cali-
ber Stinger rounds (rubber buckshot) for low-level less lethal responses to
the hard plastic 37mm ARWEN and sponge-nose 40mm rounds for high-
level responses (Chapter 3). The additional munitions that the CARTs could
deploy included foam batons, rubber batons, wood batons, CS blast-disper-
sion rounds, a variety of CS grenades, and OC Stingball grenades (rubber
grenades with OC powder and rubber buckshot).
The expected physiological and psychological responses related to the
use of the less lethal options were discussed. All officers were evaluated with
practical exercises and written exams. It was imperative that all involved
with applying these options thoroughly understood both the capabilities and
the limitations of what they were deploying.
Pre-event Protester Planning

In the days prior to the WTO opening ceremonies, a few businesses in
downtown Seattle were fire-bombed with Molotov cocktails. False 911 calls
reporting people being shot were placed. Upon arrival, officers found no
sign of violence. Instead, a few onlookers with backpacks appeared to be
taking notes on how fast, how many, and from which direction officers
responded. Imposters dressed as uniformed personnel from a local power
company unsuccessfully attempted to gain entrance into the police commu-
nications center. Building security officers reported breaching of stairwells
for roof access. Banners were hung in places throughout the city with the
phrase TO SPD FOR WTO. In other areas near the conference hotel, items
such as rocks, bricks, and bottles were found in planter boxes and entrance
displays for businesses. It was evident that individuals had made a concerted
effort to organize, plan, and strategically place weapons in preparation to
riot.
Event Realities
It is well known that the police officer is the most visible form of govern-
ment and is often the target for any anger or displeasure an individual has.
Seattle had no previous experience in large-scale protests, and this would be
the first Internet protest, which allowed the collaboration and organization
of many people who shared the same ideology from all over the country and
abroad. In protests since 1999, the authors have seen a significant increase in
structure and organization of protesters, including teams designated as med-
ics supplied with pepper-spray countermeasures and gas masks (Figures1.4
and 1.5).
Figure 1.4 Protester with gas mask and medical kit with possible hostile intentions.
Figure 1.5 Organized protest groups train their own medical teams to counter-
act police weapons.
Figure 1.6 A majority of protesters are peaceful and nonviolent.
On the first day of the conference, temporary barriers to keep people

out of the streets were immediately pushed out of the way as demonstrators
assembled. Soon to follow were attacks on police vehicles and large drums
being rolled down the streets. Within hours of the initial confrontation, 30
tour buses filled with demonstrators had crossed the Canadian border and
were headed toward Seattle. As if from nowhere, tens of thousands of protest-
ers appeared and had flooded the primary retail streets in downtown Seattle
(Figure 1.6). The protesters had taken over the streets three to four blocks
wide, occupying the entire street and sidewalk area (Figure1.7). Police officers
were protecting hotels and meeting sites, but they were outnumbered several
hundred to one. The Battle in Seattle had begun, and it was quickly realized
that a major conflict was comingand police were the primary target.
Several protesters had come prepared with gas masks, homemade
shields, and costumes that seemed to serve two purposes: a banner for their
cause and a shield should the police deploy less lethal options. There were
people dressed as dolphins, butterflies, and turtles. (A fight between a turtle
and butterfly caught everyones attention, with the turtle beating the but-
terfly badly.) For hours, the mass of protesters was able to shut down vehicle
and foot traffic in the downtown corridor, clogging the streets and pre-
venting the delegates from reaching meeting venues. What was not widely
reported were the assaults on peaceful protesters by local gang members.
One of the demonstration rallying points was also a major drug trade area
in the city. The gangs took exception to their territory being invaded by
the colorfully dressed individuals beating drums and clogging their flow of
Figure 1.7 During civil disturbances, officers must anticipate being in proxi-
mity to mass numbers of people intermingled with media.
clients. Officers were forced to enter the crowd and save the protestors from
violent attack, but they were so outnumbered they were unable to safely
arrest the aggressors.
The area still contained thousands of gathered protesters, and the lack of
arrests emboldened the crowd. The contagion effect was evident. A large fire
had been started in an industrial-sized garbage dumpster, and the destructive
actions of a few were drawing thousands to witness and become influenced by
this behavior. No order was given to disperse the crowd. As the inaction of law
enforcement became more apparent, the violent protesters became empow-
ered and started throwing rocks, bottles, and other items toward the police
lines. The barrage of rocks and bottles was directed from deep in the mass of
people, which placed the officers, peaceful protesters, and the rest of the public
in danger of serious injury. The major shopping areas at the intersection of 4th
Avenue and Pike Street resembled a war zone, with debris from dumped news-
paper boxes and garbage cans covering the street. The majority of vehicles and
businesses on the block were spray-painted, with windows broken out.
Priorities: Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, Property Protection

With the protesters numbering more than 40,000, less lethal application
seemed to be the only option to de-escalate this rapidly devolving state. A
young captain assigned to the West Precinct, Jim Pugel, ordered the deploy-
ment of the impact munitions and chemical irritants to disperse the crowds
and target individual aggressors, something that had not been called for
in over 20 years in Seattle. Once the order was given, the CART response
teams coordinated to direct the protest groups out of the downtown cor-
ridor. As the crowd was forced to move for many blocks with a line of riot
police lobbing less lethal munitions their way, many protestors lost interest
and disengaged, leaving the motivated agitators behind. The deployment of
hundreds of Stingballs (rubber grenades; see Chapters 3 and 6) effectively
demonstrated how a tool that targets basic animal-instinct responses (fear
of lightning and thunder) could psychologically overwhelm and move large
masses with no reported injuries. The sponge-nose (Exact Impact) 40mm
rounds targeted specific individuals, inflicting pain and blunt trauma on
aggressors while minimizing the risk of potential injury to those near the
intended target. The decision from Captain Pugel to utilize the available
tools in this manner saved lives and minimized serious injury to the violent
protestors, the peaceful demonstrators, business owners, patrons, and the
police. The tactic of driving the crowd out of the downtown area with less
lethal options, and then following relentlessly until they dispersed, was so
successful that it is still in use in Seattle today as a response to major civil
disturbances.
ACTIONS OF WTO PROTESTERS BASED ON

THE OFFICIAL AFTER-ACTION REPORT:
Breaking windows with sledge hammers
Looting of businesses
Assaulting of WTO delegates, reporters, bystanders
Throwing police barricades through windows
Setting garbage dumpsters afire and pushing them into intersections
Stealing security fencing and placing these in intersections
Chaining themselves to various objects and to each other
Suspending themselves on large tripods in major intersections
Hitting and jumping on passing cars
Lying in the street to stop vehicular traffic
Assaulting police officers
CART Ran Out of Ordnance

Within hours after the first major application by CART, the deployment tac-
tics were working and the antagonists were losing zeal. However, the initial
budget cuts to this event ultimately affected the munitions supply, which
quickly dwindled. Due to the number of dignitaries attending the conference
and the enormity of the situation now on the worldwide stage, priorities were
Figure 1.8 Ensure you have an adequate less lethal supplies before major events.
shifted to ensure that the line officers received everything they needed. The
Washington State Patrol, the King County Sheriffs Office, and other sur-
rounding agencies stepped in with personnel and equipment to assist until
pallets of less lethal replacements arrived (Figure1.8).
Political Fallout
The use of chemical irritants, OC and CS, would create political difficulties
for the police administration, but ultimately saved the city tens of thousands
of dollars from claims of physical injury. Unfortunately, by the time force was
authorized, the situation was dire, requiring greater force and high numbers
of munitions. Although the use of less lethal options during WTO Seattle
clearly de-escalated the situation, to many their use was viewed as a failure
of police response and tactics. Imagine the outcome if the only options avail-
able were a line of officers swinging their 40-inch batons trying to subdue the
crowd. This has been the solution to violent protesting in countless locations
all over the globe, with serious injuries and even deaths to citizens and offi-
cers reported.
In total there were 93 minor injuries, one serious injury and no deaths
reported during the WTO conflict. Taking into account the vast numbers
of protesters and confrontations with line officers in the relatively small
geographic area, this is a truly remarkable statistic. There were a handful of
high-profile uses of less lethal force from individual officers caught on cam-
era. Although relatively minor given the totality of the violence levied against
police, these incidents received an intense amount of media attention and
were resolved with monetary payouts. Burns was sued federally 12 times as
the lead trainer. Although not directly involved with any of the individuals
claiming an injury, the officers deploying the force could not be identified;
therefore the trainer was held culpable. Ultimately, Burns was cleared of all
liability related to the WTO riots.
USE-OF-FORCE INCIDENTS DURING WTO

THAT RECEIVED SCRUTINY
An officer is caught on camera deploying a beanbag shotgun
round at point blank range into the groin area of a protester.
An officer is caught on camera asking two girls in a car to roll
their windows down and, upon compliance, subsequently
deploys pepper spray/OC into their vehicle.
Lessons Learned
After nearly three days of major conflict between law enforcement and pro-
test groups, it finally came to an end. In the aftermath, it was realized that
the destructive nature of anarchists and other groups was greatly underes-
timated. When not addressed in the early stages, these instigators can cre-
ate mayhem and influence others to do the same. Initially believed to be an
uncoordinated affiliation of like-minded people, WTO demonstrated that
protest groups have the desire and the ability to train, coordinate, commu-
nicate, and disrupt the workings of an entire city (Figure1.9). This should be
Figure 1.9 Often tension between protestors and police can predict conflict.
taken seriously by every police department anticipating a major gathering

and a lesson to invest resources, track discussions, and disrupt plans of pro-
test groups coming to their cities.
Seattle Mardi Gras Riots 2001: Celebration Took a Turn
Approximately one year after the WTO riots, the Seattle community would
again experience the shocking repercussions of a failure of police to respond
to the actions of a few individuals. During a Mardi Gras celebration on the
night of February 27, 2001, a gathering in Pioneer Square (historical district
in downtown Seattle) quickly devolved into racism-driven violence and a
considerable civil disturbance.
Pre-event Decisions
On Friday and Saturday nights prior to February 27, 2001 (Fat Tuesday), offi-
cers assigned to this event experienced hostile confrontations from the cel-
ebratory crowds. The responding officers in specialty units utilized less lethal
options to quickly de-escalate and stabilize the situation. Unfortunately,
these actions resulted in the business community complaining about the
officers heavy handed tactics on simple partiers. The hindrance of cel-
ebration was perceived by the community as an over-response and resulted
in a change in police response on Fat Tuesday. Officers in specialty units were
ordered to maintain a perimeter presence outside of public view so as not
to intimidate partygoers, which minimized the ability of police to address
unlawful behavior. This decision allowed a large group to gather with no
deterrence from the presence of law enforcement.
The violence of Mardi Gras 2001 was so fierce, so random, it left people
askingCan this be Seattle?It was Seattle.But even police commanders
seemed to be in denial, holding back squads of riot clad officers for hours
while the beatings continued. Sgt. Dan Beste, now retired, was at 1st and
Columbiapleading for permission to move inas victims staggered by.
They were crying and bleeding, clothes torn, asking us why didnt we
do something, and we were asking the same thing, Beste said.
Lynda Bryon, King 5 News, February 25, 2011 (from king5.com)
While the WTO demonstrators targeted police directly, the Fat Tuesday
celebration was just a party in the streets. During the WTO riots, masses
were estimated up to 40,000+, whereas this gathering was closer to 5,000.
Without the police presence, however, it was not long before pockets of fight-
ing broke out. Video of this event showed individuals randomly beating
Figure 1.10 Most animals are frightened by lightning and thunder. (Photo cour-
tesy of A. A. Ron Brudenell.)
partygoers with skateboards and brass knuckles. Innocent citizens could be

seen being attacked by several individuals at the same time. Several blatant
sexual assaults of females by groups of males were also captured on video.
Although the group was smaller, the magnitude of violence was magnified
by the lack of response by law enforcement. Before the order was given to
disperse the crowd with the less lethal tactics used during the WTO riots,
70 people were injured, 10 seriously, and one young partygoer, Khristopher
Kime, lost his life in the violence (Figures1.101.12).
Lessons Learned after Mardi Gras 2001

By responding to political pressure from the community, the police enabled
a small group of aggressors (most were gang members) to assault many
innocent citizens, including killing one of them. No one can be certain, but
Figure 1.11 Rubber grenades are the authors favorite crowd-management tools.
perhaps the mere presence of officers in the area could have prevented this
tragedy. In the aftermath, a task force was formed that identified and arrested
many of the offenders from that night, including the murderer of Mr. Kime.
As a result of the decision making from administrators that night, the City of
Seattle paid Mr. Kimes family $1.75 million.
Figure 1.12 Anatomy of a rubber grenade.

The lesson learned from the WTO and the Mardi Gras events is that you can
throw a little gas and make some loud noises to disperse a crowd quickly.
Some may be annoyed or inconvenienced, but everybody goes home OK.
Canadians Love Hockey: Stanley Cup Riots, Vancouver, BC
In 1994, and again in 2011, the city of Vancouver (located in British Columbia,
Canada) also experienced the contagion effect that can motivate normally
law-abiding individuals to act outside the boundaries of lawful behavior
(Figure1.13). In 1994, the Canucks lost to the Rangers in the Stanley Cup
Finals. The loss, which occurred in New York, led to unprecedented riot-
ing as approximately 70,000 sports fans gathered in the downtown corridor
of Vancouver. Sports fans, influenced by alcohol and driven by emotions,
turned their frustrations toward destruction of property. All major gather-
ings, whether contentious or celebratory in nature, have the potential to esca-
late based on the actions of a few (Figure1.14). In an effort to get medical
aid to an individual who had fallen into the crowd, paramedics were met
with uncooperative and confrontational behavior. As the police attempted to
assist the medic unit, they were confronted with escalating violence. Police
responded with a variety of chemical agents and less lethal options. The
crowd was now looting and causing extensive property damage.
During the attempt to subdue the crowd, a rioter was struck in the head
with a less lethal impact device fired by police. He was in a coma for four
weeks, resulting in permanent brain damage, which led to a civil suit in 1997,
100
WTO 1999
90
40,000+ protestors
80 Mardi Gras 2001
5,000+ protestors
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Injury Serious Injury Death
Figure 1.13 Comparison of injuries vs. crowd size in two of Seattles infamous
events.
Figure 1.14 Organized police presence is a powerful deterrent.
where the courts found he was 75% liable for his own injuries. In 1999, the
British Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, and in 2001 the Supreme Court
dismissed the case [4]. During these riots, approximately 200 people were
injured, and $1.1 million in property damage occurred.
In 2011, the Vancouver Canucks were again in the Stanley Cup Finals,
this time against the Boston Bruins. A large area downtown had been set up
with two large outdoor TV monitors to accommodate the 100,000 fans fol-
lowing the series. In a repeat performance, hooligans attended the event for
the sole purpose of creating a destructive and violent environment. In the
aftermath, at least 140 people were reported injured, one critically; at least
4 people were stabbed, and 9 officers were injured. Records showed that 101
people were arrested that night. Estimates suggested that property damage
exceeded $1.3 million [4].
The Vancouver Experience
by Darren Hall
I joined the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) in 1998 when less
lethal impact technology was exclusive to SWAT and the riot squad.
As less lethal options became more mainstream and available to patrol
officers, I was lucky enough to be selected as one of the first to deploy
with a beanbag shotgun and a Taser. Like most cops, I was involved in
many incidents where the risk was high and the need for distance was
required. Every time I had an operational deployment, I had the same

thought: Good thing we have these less lethal tools; sure made this a lot
safer.
During the riot of 1994, one of our SWAT guys deployed an ARWEN,
striking a man in the head. This was not his intended target, and the
deployment was deemed justified. But after seven plus years of court,
strife, and bad publicity, you can imagine the institutional reluctance to
ever go down that road again.
Vancouver was chosen to host the 2010 Winter Olympics, and we
needed to get our guys armed and trained as soon as possible. The VPD
had enjoyed so much success with the less lethal shotgun program it
seemed a natural solution to our PSU (Public Safety Unit) tactical needs.
I had two main concerns with that option: limited range and the poten-
tial for ammunition confusion between beanbags and lethal rounds such
as buckshot and slug ammunition.
Convincing an agencys administration to invest in a new weap-
ons program can be a real challenge. To get our guys the weapons they
needed, I asked those boys from CRT Less Lethal in Seattle to give a pre-
sentation, since these guys were actually doing proper scientific research
on less lethals. The science behind the research accompanied by an effec-
tive practical demonstration, followed up by a few lengthy draft docu-
ments up the chain got us the OK to buy 40mm launchers loaded with
Exact Impact (blue nose) rounds. Now we had the range we needed and
zero risk of lethal ammunition being introduced into the weapon system.
The real success story was the addition of blast balls to our scale of
issue. There was some trepidation at the command level because these
things look like hand grenades. Its not hard to imagine the media head-
lines if anything went wrong, but why make direct contact with a group
of angry people when you can get them moving from a distance? Anyone
who decided to remain would be easier to arrest and remove to a secure
area. With no increased risk to the officers on the line and very low injury
potential for the rioting civilians, they seemed to be the perfect addition.
By the time of the Stanley Cup riot of 2011, I was the departments use-
of-force instructor and in charge of the less lethal weapons program for
the Public Safety Unit. After the riot started, I saw several plumes of black
smoke rising between the buildings from seven blocks away and heard the
dull roar of the crowd; I knew we were in for a long night. When we got
there, it was a chaotic mess, with thousands of intoxicated young people.
Outnumbered and overwhelmed, we briefly retreated and regrouped.
In the short time it took for us to get geared up and return, the situ-
ation had changed dramatically. The crowd was huge, densely packed,
and occupied the entire expanse of Georgia Street. In the 30-meter gap
between the police and the crowd were several burning overturned cars
and smoldering trash blowing in the wind. Individual rioters were ran-
domly approaching the line to taunt the officers. When the police did
nothing to them, these individuals turned to the crowd raising their
hands, and the masses immediately recognized their efforts with trium-
phant cheers and encouragement.
Everything the police were doing was reactionary. The line stood still
and absorbed whatever was thrown at them. If anyone got close enough,
they were bumped by a shield or warned of an imminent baton strike.
We started moving forward as a line but the crowd remained still. The
gap narrowed to about 5 meters, and some people started to move, but
many would not move until they were physically contacted. This was very
risky for us, as we were significantly outnumbered and stretched very
thin across six lanes of a major street. This tactic was not working, and
things needed to change if we were going to take the city back.
Once the order was given, the first blast ball landed about 2 meters in
front of the crowd and got some people moving. As more dropped, the
crowd turned and ran, and we drove them to the end of the block. The
police line held at the intersection, which allowed negotiators to use the
public address system to warn the crowd and encourage them to leave. We
had pushed the crowd past all the burning cars on the block, and a large
number of the lesser influenced crowd had dispersed. What remained
on the street were the hardcore instigators and a few hundred enthusias-
tic participants. There were still thousands of spectator types, but only a
few took an active role against us. Because we were stationary again, we
became targets for bottles and other debris from all angles. Some of the
debris included the heavy metal connectors and base plates from the secu-
rity fencing on the ground, capable of inflicting serious injury.
It was time to put those 40mm launchers to use. Anybody who picked
up something to throw got shot in the leg or abdomen with the sponge
rounds. The rioter doubled over, then ran away into the crowd to not be
seen again. A small group of rioters picked up security fence pieces from
the ground and used them as shielding. My good friend Steve suggested
we use 40mm OC rounds, the idea being that they would burst on impact
and cover the guys holding it. When the fencing dropped, the line moved
forward. Add in some more blast balls and additional 40mm rounds, and
the crowd dispersed entirely. We never had to physically touch them,
making our job much safer and most certainly reducing the number of
injuries the crowd sustained. It was a night the good guys could really
look back on with pride. Great job by all who were there.
When all was said and done, there were zero reported injuries or com-
plaints related to the less lethal deployments from the PSU Tactical Team.
I believe this is largely due to proper selection of the right technology.
Whether it was horses, dogs, shields, or blast balls and 40mms, once
we started using our available options, everything came together. More

importantly, it was the members on the ground and the training of those
members that made the difference.
When I was issued that ARWEN years ago, I was trained how to take
it apart and fix itthats it. When I asked the boss, So when do you
want me to use this thing? and he didnt have an answer, I was a little
concerned. As a trainer, I made it my mission to make sure the guys had
that answer because they had lived it before in realistic scenario training.
They had to know why, when to start, when to stop, and what to do after
they use these weapons. Our guys became confident in their abilities as
marksmen, but also in their abilities to make good decisions. As a result,
they performed like calm professionals in the field and took decisive
action that contributed greatly to ending that riot.
De-escalation and Less Lethal Options
While just a few incidents have been highlighted that pertain to individual
and crowd-control situations, the common theme is that when applied timely
and efficiently, less lethal options are pivotal in de-escalating a situation.
Incidents similar to those described here still occur today, although agencies
are typically better prepared, arguably based on lessons learned from Seattle.
The nationwide Occupy movements in 2011 proved to all of us that orga-
nized civil disobedience toward government is alive and well.
In 2012 and again in 2013, Seattle police were again challenged by pro-
tests and subsequent civil disorder on May Day. The bulk of the protestors
were peaceful, but it was an opportunity for anarchists or other extremist
groups to act for the purposes of destruction and notoriety. After police
allowed a violent crowd to damage some businesses in 2012, the tactical plan
on how to manage the masses was modified, based on recommendations
from Tom Burns. Reverting to what was learned in 1999 during WTO, the
plan for the 2013 May Day protests was to drive and follow any aggressive
groups from the downtown area with rubber grenades and selected impact
munitions until they dispersed. The deployment of blast balls and other less
lethal tools was an impressive media spectacle and highly effective in dis-
persing the crowd. By reducing the contagion effect, the city was returned to
order after a few short hours with no significant injury and minimal damage
to property. The police emerged in favor of public opinion based on con-
cise decision making by field commanders, facilitating a rapid and effective
response by the line officers.
Although it is used only a small percentage of the time, training in less
lethal options must be a priority to begin the risk-management process.
The less lethal weapons highlighted in this chapter were utilized to man-
age crowds and address unruly individuals, yet their success is exclusive
to intelligent and judicious use. They can be fantastic tools to protect life,
effect an arrest, stabilize a situation, or protect property from destruction.
If used improperly or carelessly, they can spiral a situation out of control
and incur great scrutiny and financial liability. As subsequent chapters will
demonstrate, proper risk management is education and information sharing.
Although it is a concept lost on many municipalities, the cost of training the
end user in pre-event planning and post-event documentation is minuscule
compared to large monetary payouts from frivolous lawsuits founded on an
unfavorable outcome. Education prior to a controversial event that reaches
beyond the law enforcement community across many disciplines helps to
justify and explain the use of less lethal tools when deployed down the road
to de-escalate a situation.
References
1. Adams, K., Garner, J., and Langan, P. 1999. Use of force by police: Overview of
national and local data. NCJ 176330. Washington, DC: USDOJ, Office of Justice
Programs. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/176330-1.pdf.
2. Ijames, S. 1995. Less lethal force: Concepts and considerations in the de-escala-
tion philosophy. Tactical Edge, Summer: 5155.
3. Gillham, P. F. 2000. Complexity and irony in policing and protesting: The World
Trade Organization in Seattle. Social Justice 27 (2): 21236. http://depts.wash-
ington.edu/wtohist/documents/GillhamMarx.pdf.
4. CBCNews. 2011. A tale of two riots: Comparing the 1994 and 2011 Stanley Cup
riots in Vancouver. June 16. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ a-tale-of-two-
riots-1.1079520.
Why We Use
Less Lethal
2
Contents
Defining the Family 27
Law Enforcement Evolves 31
When We Were Square: It Started with the Beanbag 31
Risk of Serious Injury and Death 33
The Intent of Less Lethal 34
Physiological Responses 35
Life Safety 39
Safety of Crowds 40
Incident Stabilization and Property Protection 40
References 42
The development of less lethal options was originally driven by the fact that
law enforcement and military forces were limited in their response to unruly
individuals. Put simply, how do we fill the gap between ordering them to
comply and shooting them with bullets? Although their use is sometimes
controversial, Sid Heal cites six advantages of less lethal options over lethal
ones. They are more humane, provide an early control of a situation, offer
flexibility, help to de-escalate the incident, improve public perception of
trying to solve a conflict with minimal force, and force an adversary to
declare intentions. This last advantage affords the individual or crowd the
opportunity to retreat or continue to fight with hostile intent. An impor-
tant, but often overlooked, benefit of less lethal options is their use as a force
multiplier, allowing an engagement with combatants using fewer officers
(Figure2.1). Given all of the advantages that less lethal options present in
de-escalation, it is public pressure based on negative outcomes that drives
the necessity and subsequent evolution of these devices [1].
Defining the Family
What to call this family of weapons has been the subject of much discussion.
The military decided to coin the term nonlethal for this class of weapon, as
they are not intended to cause death [2].
27
Figure 2.1 Atypical less lethal options, bicycles, can be used as a force multi-
plier for outnumbered officers.
MILITARY DEFINITION OF NONLETHAL

Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed as to
incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, perma-
nent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the
environment.
This definition did not sit well with the law enforcement community, as
it is undisputed that these weapons can and will cause death despite their
intended purpose; so how can they be called nonlethal? As there is no reg-
ulating body for law enforcement definitions or protocols, artistic license
reigned free. Several alternative descriptions began to emerge, such as less-
than-lethal, antilethal, soft-lethal, low lethal, disabling tools, sublethal, min-
imal force options, compliance weapons, and less lethal. Then the debate
began on what to call them: weapons, tools, devices, or options? This text
will attempt to settle the debate by referring to this family of weapons as less
lethal options.
Why We Use Less Lethal 29
An irony is revealed in that while there is no common agreement of what to

call nonlethal options, there is nearly universal acceptance on their definition,
especially regarding the intent not to cause death or permanent injury. Every
definition in both the military and law enforcement communities and from
every country with a nonlethal capability has expressed that the intent of non-
lethal force is that it neither cause death or serious injury.
Sid Heal
With increased scrutiny placed on military conflicts, there has been a

greater demand for the development and use of less lethal options. As troops
move through impoverished areas, the rules of engagement do not generally
allow the use of lethal force for an individual stealing a rucksack hanging on
a tank. The military spends a tremendous amount of capital in an attempt to
develop the ideal less lethal tool. The goal is simple: thwart or stop an action
with little or no injury to the subject. The demands in law enforcement for
less lethal options arguably exceed the military in need, but law enforcement
typically relies on the military to develop and test these options in conflicts
before adopting them [2]. Most departments will not sacrifice their ever-
shrinking budgets to test a tool that is likely to be rarely utilized.
As the political and social arenas evolved in American culture, a need
to bridge the gap between lethal force and crowd control became appar-
ent (Figure 2.2). In the 1960s, law enforcement was challenged with the
Figure 2.2 Civil disobedience is not new.

Figure 2.3 Some less lethal options in use today.
civil rights movement and Vietnam War protests. In an effort to control

the crowds, water cannons and dogs and even lethal force were some of the
options used in lieu of baton strikes [2]. These alternatives were not well
received in the public eye. In May 1970, during a protest at Kent State in
Ohio, the National Guard was called in an attempt to quash a potential riot.
As the crowd grew, tear gas was deployed. As the tear gas supplies ran out,
the crowd grew more out of control. The troops were overwhelmed, which
resulted in the National Guard soldiers firing on American citizens, kill-
ing four. Many would argue that the mere presence of the National Guard
intensified the situation, but all would agree that there needed to be better
tactics on how protests and crowds are addressed [3]. Figure2.3 shows some
less lethal options in use today.
What with all the complexity and confusion, the more pragmatic among us
are asking, Why bother with nonlethal weapons at all? To be sure, human-
kind has been solving these same kinds of problems for thousands of years
without them. Nevertheless, when dealing with some situations, especially
riots and mobs, the ability to impose the will of the commander cannot be
achieved by mere force. If it were that simple, more force would automatically
equate with victory. What is more likely to lead to success in law enforcement
and peacekeeping operations is not the amount of force but rather the type
of force and how it is used. Without an ability to employ nonlethal force, the
answer is defaulted to lethal options. As the American psychologist, Abraham
Maslow, is reported to have said, If the only tool you have is a hammer, you
tend to think of every problem as a nail.
Contrary to the belief of some, a force that has a nonlethal capabil-
ity gains advantages over one that does not. When force is viewed (and
reviewed), as it always is nowadays, even a failure of a nonlethal option can
be a success in that it sends an implicit message of restraint. The fact that the
technology is still too primitive to provide the same effectiveness as lethal
force is not the fault of the user. The mere attempt becomes a noble effort.
Secondly, even when an adversary is killed after a failure, it is nearly impos-
sible for faultfinders and mudslingers to make a credible case for a rash or
impetuous act, or even a lack of patience or compassion. In all situations
where force is required, the pathway to the moral high ground is protected
by nonlethal options.
Sid Heal
Law Enforcement Evolves
With the civil disorders in the 60s, tear gas deployment was becoming politi-
cally unpopular. Batons were somewhat effective, but they required officers
to be in close proximity to the aggressor, hence making officers susceptible to
injury. As demonstrated in past events, an officer swinging a baton at some-
one with flowers in her hair is also not well received on the world stage. In
addition, people tend to move when you are swinging a stick at them, making
the impact site inherently unpredictable. Researchers from the U.S. Armys
Aberdeen Proving Ground and others released several publications related to
less lethal weapons research beginning in the early 1970s. This was the first
time that extensive studies occurred related to less lethal weapons, including
blunt-trauma injury and psychological effects of a variety of types [46]. Law
enforcement would follow and explored ways to utilize the armys research for
their applications. Luckily, the 1990s would bring some needed influx of rev-
enue and interest in less lethal weapons development for law enforcement [7].
When We Were Square: It Started with the Beanbag

Until the 1980s, the prevailing law enforcement tools included billy clubs,
saps, night-sticks, and the PR-24 baton. Alternatives to batons emerged,
including launched (extended range) projectiles, chemical agents, distraction
devices, and even the first generations of conducted-energy weapons (Tasers).
Figure 2.4 Original square-shaped 12-gauge beanbag.
One tool that emerged from that era is what is commonly referred to as
the beanbag. Originally, it consisted of a square-shaped cloth bag filled with
lead shotgun shot fired from a standard 12-gauge police shotgun (Figure2.4).
These less lethal impact munitions were marketed for years as an option for
police officers attempting to fill the gap between handheld batons and use
of a firearm (Figure2.5). Of course, the intent of the beanbag is to address
combative/high-risk subjects in critical incidents without the need of lethal
Figure 2.5 Possible impact of square beanbag (striking cardboard at 15 feet).

force. This projectile was fired out of a standard police shotgun and became
popular in many jurisdictions, including the Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Office and Springfield Missouri Police Department.
Around the late 1980s, a new extended-range impact munition, consist-

ing of about 40 grams of #9 lead shot sewn into a Cordura or ballistic nylon
pouch and launched from a 12-gauge shotgun with a cylinder choke, provided
American law enforcement a quick and inexpensive alternative to nightsticks
and pepper spray. While substantially more injurious than chemical sprays,
they provided a margin of safety because they could be employed against com-
batants at longer ranges. They quickly gained popularity in the American law
enforcement community and remain as one of the principal nonlethal weapons
in their arsenals.
Sid Heal
Risk of Serious Injury and Death

Contrary to public perception, deployments of these beanbags were not without
risk. A study of 967 beanbag deployments in 371 incidents revealed that seri-
ous injuries were indeed possible. Reported injuries included 43 lacerations, 27
fractures, and 14 penetrations (into chest cavity). Of these injuries, eight deaths
were attributed to injuries related to the chest impacts [8]. Analysis of the inju-
ries revealed a flaw in the square design of the projectile. Although designed to
inflict the same type of injury as a baton strike at a safe distance, the ultimate
undoing of the square bags was simply design and flight characteristics. The
projectile was intended to strike the body on a flat plane, spreading the impact
energy over a wider area. Due to air resistance and stability of the bag in flight,
the seam where the bag was sewn together was relatively rigid and could tip on
end, focalizing the impact energy in that area. If that portion strikes the body
first, penetration could occur into the chest cavity, creating a serious or fatal
injury due to a substantial increase in energy density (Chapters 5 and 6).
Discussions swirled over whether the type of barrel used (smooth vs.
rifled) could relate to the projectiles flight stability, and several scientific
papers were released related to the deaths associated with these rounds.
Studies demonstrated that firing the round through a rifled barrel tended
to stabilize the round in flight, creating a higher probability that the round
would fly as designed [9]. When fired through a smooth bore (similar to most
police shotguns), the round tended to tumble, fly irregularly, and tip on end
during its flight downrange to the target.
The design of the square bag would eventually lose favor due to that trait,
making way for refinements with different weapon systems and projectiles in
an effort to make them safer, yet more effective. The current popular 12-gauge
platform is referred to as the sock or drag stabilized beanbag round. With

no rigid ends to impact the skin and concentrate energy, they tend to reduce
injury potential by dispersing the impact energy and inflicting blunt trauma
over a wider area (thereby reducing energy density). Several manufacturers
produce this type of munition; however, independent testing revealed differ-
ences in the same type of round from different manufacturers (Chapter 5).
The initial use and deployment of square beanbags is a splendid example
of the importance of preparing officers for an unintentional negative outcome.
It is crucial for policy makers and trainers to understand that use of force is
always accompanied by the risk of unforeseen injury and resulting future
inquiry. While officers are forced into split-second decision making, the
results of these decisions will be scrutinized over weeks, months, and years.
That scrutiny will arise from uneducated parties who will become part of the
reviewing and accountability process. This risk can be minimized through
independent testing of the weapons that are deployed to truly understand
their capabilities and limitations.
The Intent of Less Lethal
The term less lethal is often interpreted by the public as a minimal or even
no risk of injury to those people subjected to them. While this is certainly
the goal, factors beyond the operators control can affect the final outcome.
As outlined in Chapter 1, demands from politicians and the general public
require officers to de-escalate a situation by whatever means possible. While
the situation dictates the tactic, the force used is typically determined by
the actions of the subject(s) based on their threat level and willingness to
cooperate. Many of these individuals suffer from mental illness and/or drug
addiction and may not necessarily be intentionally malicious toward police.
For the most part, lethal responses by law enforcement are clearly justified
and accepted by society as a whole in these unfortunate situations. However,
less lethal interventions are often open to interpretation and scrutiny, even
when deadly force was a viable option. As with the first-generation beanbags,
what comes under scrutiny is the unintended and unexpected outcome to a
lawful police action (a common statement by Steve Ijames). Law enforcement
conflicts must accommodate interactions with individuals of all shapes and
sizes, male and female, young and old, weak and strong, healthy or sick, and
often influenced by mental illness and drug addiction. The responding officers
may not know many of these factors and may only have one tool to deploy.
Those decisions will often be evaluated after the fact, even if the deployment
is within departmental policy.
In an imperfect world, there are times that the response and outcome are
less than desirable, despite the intention. Police instructors can teach end users
about primary, secondary, and tertiary targeting (Chapter 7) when deploying

an impact munition, but they cannot predict the physical responses by the
individuals. Humans are all different, and responses will vary depending on
motivation, pain threshold, fatigue, and level of anger. A normal lucid person
will usually not choose a violent conflict with five police officers, and the sub-
ject who does choose the conflict with five police officers may not succumb to
the physiological and psychological effects of a less lethal deployment.
Physiological Responses
Based on evolutionary survival tactics, the most effective physiological
response to change a behavior is pain. Sticks and stones have been used in
conflict for thousands of years. The pain response can encourage compliance
or retreat, which achieves goals in controlling the situation. The injury poten-
tial is dictated by many factors, but mainly where and how hard that stick
or projectile strikes the person. The use of beanbag shotguns, both 37mm
and 40mm delivery systems, offer police similar blunt-trauma effects from
a distance as utilizing a baton, nightstick, or PR-24. These munitions, often
referred to as extended range batons, can inflict intense pain and perhaps
influence a change in behavior from the subject (Figure 2.6). In addition,
Figure 2.6 Most less lethal options rely on a response to pain to be effective
(Courtesy of Ryan Stock).
they offer the element of surprise, allowing more accurate targeting and
minimizing an anticipation response or movement. However, a round that
creates enough physical dysfunction to debilitate an individual who poses
a serious threat might not be suitable for dispersing a crowd caught up in
a contagious mentality and doing property damage. This is where training
and proficiency become paramount in ensuring that the end user has a thor-
ough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the deployed round.
(Chapter 7).
Psychological Responses
While a lethal weapon attempts to defeat an adversarys ability to resist, a
less lethal device attempts to defeat his will to resist. An adversarys ability
to resist is visible, measurable, and concrete. For example, the military com-
munity uses algorithms to predict the degree of damage and destruction from
artillery rounds, bombs, and even small-arms fire. Every bomb, naval shell,
rocket, artillery, or mortar round can be rated according to such things as
killing radius, wounding radius, and shrapnel radius. A persons will, on the
other hand, is intangible. It defies measurement. When employing less lethal
devices, abundant examples exist of people who have resisted despite being
struck by different devices scores of times. Conversely, weve had crooks who
surrendered after a nonlethal device was fired and missed!
Sid Heal
The mental effect on a person during an encounter with police is typi-

cally underestimated and should be explored whenever possible. There
have been numerous incidents reported of a suspect being shot with a less
lethal munition such as a beanbag and responding as though shot with a
bullet. The subject sees the police, sees what appears to be a gun, hears a
BANG and experiences pain. Assuming that he was just shot, he psycho-
logically responds accordingly, in fear of impending death. This provides
a window of opportunity for law enforcement to gain control. However,
there have been other occasions where the subject realized a few moments
after the beanbag deployment that he was not really shot and immediately
returned to the behavior that brought law enforcement to the situation in
the first place. Conversely, subjects have been struck with beanbags dozens
of times with seemingly no effect (Figure2.7).
Figure 2.7 Some may not respond as expected when struck with a less lethal
projectile.
The anxiety-fear-panic response [10] allows planning for contingencies

when a force option is not successful. Anxiety is the fear of the unknown:
What is happening to me? Fear is the realization of what is happening or
has occurred: Why am I having trouble breathing and my eyes are burning?
Panic is the response that follows, which may be fight, flight, submission, or
even fainting (Figure2.8). People have been trampled fleeing from a deploy-
ment of a chemical irritant, although risk of death is practically nonexistent
(Figures2.9 and 2.10). In On Killing, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman [11] states that
human encounters are broken down to four basic responses: posturing, flee-
ing, fighting, or submitting.
Figure 2.8 The mere presence of a less lethal tool can incur a psychological
response.
One tool that has gained a legendary reputation for compliance has
been the Taser. Injury rates are extremely low, and the psychological effects
are nearly unmatched compared to other less lethal systems. This may be
because mammals are inherently frightened by electricity, or it could be
that the devices effect is so overwhelming to the senses that most indi-
viduals feel completely helpless. The psychological effect is so far-reaching
that suspects have immediately surrendered when the Taser is observed
or the word Taser is spoken. Career criminals have stated that their fear
of being tasered far outweighs their fear of being in a physical fight with
police.
Figure 2.9 The use of smoke (obscurants) is a common psychological tool.
Figure 2.10 OC (oleoresin capsaicin) gas is a common chemical irritant used

by law enforcement.
Life Safety
In confronting the individual in crisis, less lethal tools allow the opportunity
to control, distract, and temporarily incapacitate those who present danger
to themselves or others. The first concern for the police officer is to ensure
the safety of surrounding citizens that may be tangentially involved in the
incident, other officers, and lastly, the safety of the subject.
Life preservation should follow these priorities [12]:

1. Hostage(s)
2. Innocent civilians
3. Police officers
4. Suspect/subject
The type of threat an individual can pose to a responding officer becomes
a concern in determining the type of less lethal options a department makes
available to its personnel.
Safety of Crowds
Crowd-control situations, either hostile or celebratory, create a whole new set
of problems for law enforcement personnel. In the vast majority of situations,
only a small percentage of individuals within a crowd pose an immediate
threat. This requires smart less lethal choices that take into account the ability
to focus on violent individuals, ultimately reducing injury risk to the masses.
For supervisors making the decisions in crowd-control situations where
violence has broken out and created life-safety concerns, masses can be
moved or relocated with a relatively harmless less lethal device, while instiga-
tors in the crowd can be addressed with more high-energy specific less lethal
applications. This concept requires a clear understanding regarding the dif-
ferences between crowd management and crowd control.
Incident Stabilization and Property Protection

Crowd management [13]
Strategies and tactics employed by the law enforcement agencies to
deal with lawful assemblies in an effort to prevent escalation of
events into an unlawful assembly or riot.
Crowd control [13]
Law enforcement response to a preplanned or spontaneous event,
activity, or occurrence where there is a potential for unlawful
activity or the threat of violence.
Police presence in most situations relating to an individual or crowd can sta-
bilize most incidents; however less lethal options can assist if personnel are
trained and practiced to be effective when the order is given. As discussed in
Chapter 1, allowing self-policing or lack of decision making can rapidly lead to
an out-of-control incident. The use of less lethal options becomes paramount
in creating an uncomfortable environment so those involved in unlawful
behavior have a strong desire to leave the area. By taking action that in some
instances will be unpopular initially, a larger incident can be prevented.
Although always last on the priority list, property protection must be a
consideration in maintaining peace, and less lethal options can assist to that
12 GAUGE BEANBAG
MK SQUARE SUPER SOCK DEF TEC SOCK EXACT IMPACT
PEPPERBALL
68 CALIBER
12 GAUGE
ACCUSOX WEST PEPPER

COAST AMMO FN 303 BALL
ALS PEN PREVENT
CTS SUPER SOCK DEF TEC BEAN BAG ALS PEN PREVENT 32CAL STINGER
40 MM
DEF TEC DEF TEC

K01 ALS CTS
ARWEN K08 ORANGE EXACT IMPACT
SAGE REACT IMPACT FOAM BATON
SAGE NOSE OC BLUE NOSE
40 MM
37 MM
Figure 2.11Police agencies must choose from a wide variety of less lethal
options to meet their force-model goals.
end. The risk must be weighed in allowing protesters to break windows or

topple trashcans versus the possible escalation in addressing it. The potential
also exists that the instigators may be emboldened by lack of police action
and escalate on their own. The political ramifications in allowing property
destruction must also be deliberated prior to authorizing force.
It is the duty of police command staff to educate inquiring parties to
prevent criticism and scrutiny from politicians, media, and the community.
Applications of force are typically applied to what is referred to as force mod-
els or a use-of-force continuum (Chapter 7), which establish guidelines on
when and how to apply force based on the actions of the threat (Figure2.11).
The utility of a continuum for understanding force conceptually, let alone

explaining it to a lay audience, provides comprehension and clarity that are
lacking by other means. The beginning of the force continuum is initiated by a
threat, while deadly force takes its proper position at the other end. Nonlethal
alternatives allow a commander to increase and decrease the amount of force
necessary to accomplish a mission. Movement up and down the force contin-
uum is generally continuous and seamless, yet a careful examination reveals
some broad categories.
Sid Heal
Although use-of-force policies vary greatly across jurisdictions, the continuum

concept helps to fill the void between sticks and firearms in terms of explain-
ing or describing how a particular less lethal option was utilized given the
situation.
Those outside of the law enforcement community often rely on TV,
movies, or media interpretations when evaluating police actions. The pub-
lic expects and even demands that police control situations with little or no
force. In reality, training and experience have demonstrated that there is no
perfect tool for every encounter, but prepared and concise deployment of less
lethal options can greatly increase the likelihood of a satisfactory resolution
while minimizing risk to all parties.
References
1. Plant, L. 1993. Less-than lethal weapons: New solutions for law enforcement.
Executive brief. International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), December.
2. Davison, N. 2006. The early history of non-lethal weapons. Occasional Paper
no. 1. Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP), Department
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, December.
3. Lewis, J. M., and T. R. Hensley. 1998. The May 4 shootings at Kent State
University: The search for historical accuracy. Ohio Council for the Social Studies
Review 34 (1): 921.
4. Enger, D. O., and L. W. Williams. 1975. Standard scenarios for the less-lethal
weapons evaluation model. U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory memo-
randum, August.
5. Shank, E. B., D. Campbell, B. K. Thein, and M. J. Wargovich. 1974. A comparison of
various less-lethal projectiles. Army Land Warfare Laboratory. Technical report, June.
6. Enger, D. O. 1977. The evaluation of less-lethal weapons. U.S. Army Human
Engineering Laboratory memorandum, December.
7. Davison, N. 2007. The development of non-lethal weapons during the 1990s.
Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP), Department of
Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. Occasional Paper no. 2, March.
8. Klinger, D., and K. Hubbs. 2000. Citizen injuries from law enforcement impact
munitions: Evidence from the field. Wound Ballistics Review 4 (4): 913.
9. Macpherson, D., D. Hudson, and R. Marouka. 2000. 12 gauge beanbag fatality
risk investigation. Wound Ballistics Review 4 (4).
10. Reiss, S. 1991. Expectancy model of fear, anxiety, and panic. Clinical Psychology
Review 11 (2): 14153.
11. Grossman, D. 2009. On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war
and society. New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company.
12. Ijames, S. 1995. Less lethal force: Concepts and considerations in the de-escala-
tion philosophy. Tactical Edge, Summer: 5155.
13. California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. 2003. Crowd
management and civil disobedience guidelines. Revised March.
Prevailing Less
Lethal Options for
Law Enforcement
R. T. WYANT
3
Contents
Beyond Sticks 44
Delivery Systems 46
Impact (Baton Rounds) 47
The 12-Gauge 47
Weapon Confusion 48
40mm and 37mm Platforms 49
Barrel Type Considerations 56
New 40mm Products 56
Air-Driven Less Lethal Systems 58
Chemical Irritants 59
Distraction Devices 62
Rubber Grenades 65
Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs) 67
Specialized Systems 72
Emerging and Alternative Options 73
Psychological and Physiological Effects 74
Determining What Works 75
References 77
The premise behind the need for and subsequent use of less lethal options
outlined in Chapter 2 is clear, but how and when to deploy those options
often is not. As one would suspect, there are many types, shapes, and sizes
of less lethal options. Most options available to law enforcement today are
carryovers from military devices [1]. Current law enforcement options can
be classified into five categories: impact, chemical, electrical, distraction, and
other. Mechanical devices such as caltrops, spike strips, glues, and nets will
not be discussed for the purposes of this chapter.
43
Beyond Sticks
Traditionally, the quintessential police officer type carried only two weapons:
a firearm for lethal encounters and a stick for everything else. Of course,
when the stick comes out, it is within close proximity to the suspect, thus cre-
ating a reasonable chance of that baton striking in an unintended location.
As stated in Chapter 2, people tend to move when a stick is being swung at
them (Figures3.1 and 3.2).
The early use of truncheons by London police would certainly be exam-

ples of nonlethal weapons that would meet the modern definitions and can
be reliably dated back to the second decade of the nineteenth century and
probably earlier than that. Whether referred to as truncheons, billy clubs,
nightsticks, saps, blackjacks, or batons, they remain in use throughout the
world today in a wide variety of materials and configurations, arguably as
the most common nonlethal option available to police anywhere in the
world. They are also the most primitive, and only the skill and intent of the
person wielding them prevents serious injury or death. The fact that they
remain popular speaks loudly for the primitive nature of other nonlethal
options that would displace them given a commensurate degree of effective-
ness and cost.
Sid Heal
Figure 3.1 People react when batons are swung at them, possibly altering the
impact site.
Prevailing Less Lethal Options for Law Enforcement 45
Figure 3.2 In this figure the baton has been lowered, thus changing the impact
site.
It was not until later in the twentieth century that attention was given to
bridge the gap between sticks and guns [2]. Systems have emerged in recent
years, including electrical weapons, directed-energy weapons, nontraditional
methods, and refinements to traditional systems. As outlined in Chapter 2,
a variety of less lethal options must be available to rapidly address a mul-
titude of encounters. Studies on the police use of force have demonstrated
reduced injuries to both suspects and officers when the conflict is quickly
resolved [3]. Chemical irritants like tear gas (CS) or pepper spray (OC) are
often used to de-escalate a situation. Applied to the face of an individual, an
irritant can incapacitate and disorient in order to quickly take the individual
into custody. Applied in less concentrated delivery systems, it can disperse or
discourage a crowd. With impact weapons, their effectiveness relies on the
location and concentration of application. For instance, the effectiveness and
subsequent injury of a baton strike is directly related to how hard the stick is
swung and where on the body the subject is struck (Figure3.3).
The search for more effective nonlethal options has gained more momen-
tum in the last three decades than in all previous history. Law enforcement
agencies across the globe daily encounter situations that justify the use of
lethal force. Accordingly, any nonlethal alternative is appealing. On an even
grander scale, innumerable social and political issues ranging from pollution
and global warming to the reunification of Korea or Palestinian nationalism
have created a global impetus to provide options short of deadly force. The
need has been so desperate in some circles that it has been compared with the
search for the Holy Grail. Notwithstanding any altruistic motivations, any
developer who finds a nonlethal technology that is even moderately effective
while remaining truly nonlethal will immediately become wealthy beyond his
wildest dreams. In the field of nonlethal technologies, the common expression
is the search for the magic bullet.
Sid Heal
Delivery Systems
When compared to a dynamic, hands-on encounter using a baton to control

an adversary, distance can increase the safety of the officer and the suspect.
As stated previously, people can react or move as the stick is swung, possibly
causing an impact in a vital area. An impact (or kinetic) projectile that is
launched affords the element of surprise to the intended target. Chemical
agents can be sprayed, launched, projected, or thrown utilizing a vari-
ety of media, including foam, powder, aerosols, gels, and others. Electrical
devices can create distance by firing tethered probes or launching from a
Law Enforcement Less Lethal Taxonomy
Mechanical Electrical Distraction Chemical Emerging
NFDD
Nets Probe Stun Rubber Grenades
Launched or Thrown Acoustic
Foams Directed Energy
Restraints Taser Handheld Soporifics
Water Canons Obscurants (smoke)
Karbon Belts Malodorants
Baton Impact CS (blue)
Lasers
Others OC (orange)
Shields
Other (CN, DM, CR)
12 Gauge Baton Other/Air

40/37 mm
Straight FN 303
Expandable Pepperball
Single Multiple Signal Side Handle
Single Multiple Signal (PR-24)
Beanbag Rubber
Fin-Stabilized Ceramic Foam/Sponge Wood
Frangible Plastic Beanbag Plastic
Solid Plastic Foam
Barricade Rubber Rubber
Hybrid Frangible
Other Barricade
Hybrid
Figure 3.3 Taxonomy of common less lethal options for police.

self-contained system [2]. Other methods such as rubber grenades or distrac-

tion devices are thrown, creating more separation for an engagement. As the
field progressed, crossovers or hybrids between weapon types and delivery
systems emerged in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of these devices
during real-world applications.
Impact (Baton Rounds)

This category of less lethal options had remained relatively unchanged for
nearly 30 years. They share the same intent as other less lethal weapons: to
deliver temporary and reversible effects while not causing unnecessary suf-
fering [4]. Although they receive great attention when displayed or deployed,
impact weapons are utilized only 17% of the time when compared to Taser
and chemical agent deployments, according to a Policeone.com survey in
2013. The ease of use and availability of Taser devices and defense sprays
on officers duty belts would be a sensible explanation. Traditionally, impact
munitions are launched by gunpowder-driven firearm platforms such as a
shotgun or grenade launcher. Other systems have emerged in recent years
using compressed air, easing restrictions in some jurisdictions related to fire-
arms. The premise of this class of weapons is quite simple: Deliver a blunt-
force impact similar to a baton strike at a safe distance. There have been
numerous designs and types of materials with the intent of accomplishing
this. In addition to the major manufacturers that support a preponderance
of law enforcement agencies, an Internet search will yield myriad launchers
in all shapes and sizes. Many manufacturers claim to have created the magic
bullet, combining safety and effectiveness. In reality, these companies never
seem to gain much traction in the law enforcement market and quickly
disappear.
Historically, projectiles fired in a less lethal capacity are larger and slower
than traditional bullets, so skin penetration is greatly reduced. Energy is dis-
persed on the body over a greater area on the outer surfaces of skin. This
presents a problem for operational and effective ranges. A projectile that is
heavy and slow is subject to rapid trajectory degradation, meaning the pro-
jectile begins to drop much quicker over a distance than a traditional bul-
let. Point of aim versus point of impact can change over a relatively short
distance. Trajectory curve charts are not often created or distributed by
the manufacturer, leaving the guesswork to the purchaser. End users must
account for this when determining how far their adversary is at the time of
deployment (Chapter 7).
The 12-Gauge
As discussed in Chapter 2, the most popular less lethal impact munition
(LLIM) is the 12-gauge sock round or beanbag. Although the first beanbag
Figure 3.4 Examples of 12-gauge beanbags from a variety of manufacturers.
types were directly attributed to deaths during field deployments due to

chest penetration (Chapter 6), their popularity has remained with changes
in design. Cost and versatility with a familiar weapon system has no doubt
been a factor in the selection of the 12-gauge by agencies. As departments
converted to the AR-15 rifle platform for patrol functions, many 12-gauge
shotguns were converted to a dedicated less lethal platform. Every major less
lethal manufacturer markets some type of 12-gauge beanbag round, with a
few smaller companies joining in as well. Most modern beanbags are a round
sock shape designed to distribute energy upon impact and often incorporate
some variant of a tail to increase stability in flight (Figure3.4).
Several alternatives to the traditional sock or beanbag rounds have
emerged over the years, such as the Burns 1401 (Integrity Ballistics) and sev-
eral payload types from Rio Manufacturing/Maxam. The Burns 1401 pro-
jectile is a soft rubber ball (0.73 inch/18 mm) formed into a 12-gauge sized
shell (0.73 inch/18 mm) surrounded by a three-petal orange wad (Figure3.5).
Rio Manufacturing/Maxam offers a variety of 12-gauge less lethal rounds
including a beanbag, different calibers of rubber buckshot, and plastic shot
(Figure3.6).
Weapon Confusion
One concern with the 12-gauge platform is the ability to fire standard lethal
shotgun ammunition. Incidents have occurred when the firearm is loaded
with incorrect ammunition and then deployed with the intent of a less
lethal application. Departments have instituted strict policies to prevent this
Figure 3.5 Examples of less lethal alternatives to beanbag projectiles.
occurrence, including clearly marking dedicated weapons as less lethal and

preventing commingling of lethal and less lethal ammunition (Figure3.7).
40mm and 37mm Platforms

The most versatile dedicated less lethal platform is the 40mm. Based on the
military-style grenade launcher [1], an enormous variety of munitions are
available, including smoke (obscurant), CS (tear gas), OC (oleoresin capsa-
icin), single-impact baton projectiles, beanbags, multiple projectiles (wood,
foam, rubber), barricade penetrators, rubber buckshot, and others, that can
Figure 3.6 Burns 1401 projectile unfired (left) and formed into shot shell (right).
Figure 3.7 Less lethal shotguns must be clearly marked as such and never used
with lethal ammunition.
be fired with no modifications to the weapon system. Increasing in popular-

ity are impact projectiles called marking rounds. These projectiles contain a
paint or powder payload that disperses on the target surface upon impact,
marking that individual for later arrest. The types of 40mm projectiles
(Figures3.83.14) and their wounding potential will be explored further in
Chapters 5 and 6.
Confronted with the troubles in Ireland, the British continued to develop

nonlethal projectiles as nonlethal alternatives. Substituting rubber and plastic
for the original wooden dowels, they developed projectiles capable of being
fired from larger caliber launchers, most notably the 37mm/40mm size. One
of the earliest was made of hard rubber and first used in Northern Ireland in
1970. By the end of 1974, an estimated 55,000 of these so-called rubber bullets
had been fired.
Sid Heal
The 37mm platforms offer some of the same versatility as the 40mm
(Figure3.15). They are not subjected to the same firearms restrictions of the
40mm, as they cannot fire military grenades, and thus are generally more
attainable for police agencies. Most 37mm launchers are referred to as gas
guns designed to launch aerosols and other projectiles through smooth-bore
Figure 3.8 40mm offers a variety of available ordnance.
Figure 3.9 Single- versus multi-launcher 40mm platforms (Combined Systems).

Figure 3.10 Examples of 40mm multiple projectiles.
barrels. Rifled 37mms are available, but they are designed to fire dedicated,
specialized projectiles such as those manufactured by ARWEN and Sage
Control Ordnance. The British also utilize a dedicated launcher that fires a
hard plastic 37mm projectile called the AEP-L60A1 (attenuated energy pro-
jectile), which replaced the older L21A1 (Figure3.16). Since the mid 1990s
Figure 3.11 40mm rubber baton including wadding, which could also impact
target.
Figure 3.12 Examples of 37/40mm beanbags.
the British have utilized a dedicated launcher which forms part of their
nationally approved 37mm Less Lethal Weapon system, which includes the
launcher, sights, projectile and guidelines. In 2001 as an interim measure
a much more accurate L21A1 baton round replaced the previously used L5
plastic baton rounds was introduced for use by police across the UK.
Figure 3.13 Examples of 40mm barricade penetrators.

Figure 3.14 Examples of 40mm direct-fire projectiles.
Figure 3.15 Author with 37mm ARWEN at Yuma proving ground.

Figure 3.16a 37mm ARWEN (left) and Sage Control Ordnance projectiles.
Figure 3.16b The British AEP (attenuated energy projectile, left) and L21A1.
The attenuating energy projectile (AEP) was introduced into operational

service on 21 June 2005. As the successor to the L21A1 baton round, it is sig-
nificantly safer, while retaining overall effectiveness.
Unlike predecessor rounds, the AEP is not a rigid baton. It behaves dif-
ferently from previous rounds and is both distinct and safer when compared
to the L21A1. For example it:
attenuates its energy by reducing peak forces

extends the duration of impact and thus spreads the area of contact.
Barrel Type Considerations

When selecting particular less lethal options for your department, accuracy
and precision are imperative. Repeated throughout this text, the authors rec-
ommend firing a significant sample size out of the launcher to be used in
the field prior to selection of the final round. Do not rely on manufactur-
ers claims or data. Not only can variance be identified in the round itself
(Chapter 5), tolerances can fluctuate between weapon manufacturers brands
and action types (pump, semiautomatic, single or multilauncher). The barrel
type can contribute significantly to performance, especially with 12-gauge
projectiles. Like traditional firearms, rifling in the barrel will generally pro-
vide more accuracy. Imparting a spin as the projectile is forced down the
barrel, the rifling will gyrostabilize the projectile in flight, like a football,
increasing range and accuracy (Figure3.17).
New 40mm Products

Recently released on the market are 40mm warning/signaling projectiles
that, when fired, travel downrange and deflagrate much like a flashbang at
their designated distance (Figures3.18 and 3.19). They are available in three
Figure 3.17 Smooth (left) versus rifled bores.

Figure 3.18 40mm warning/signaling round (100 m).
ranges: 100, 200, and 300 m. The intent of the design is to fire overhead to
motivate or drive individuals out of an area, but from a much longer distance
than traditional methods such as a thrown rubber grenade.
Some less lethal companies have also added a long-range version to
their standard direct-fire impact projectile. In addition, the projectiles have
Figure 3.19 Recovered fired 40mm warning/signaling round.

Figure 3.20 High-velocity, extended-range 40mm round by Defense Technology

(left) and by Combined Tactical Systems.
a boat-tail shape similar to high-powered rifle bullets to lessen drag on the

projectile as it flies through the air, increasing range and flight characteristics
(Figure3.20). The extra range is coupled with an increased minimum stand-
off distance, which also leaves a margin for increased risk if not deployed
properly or confused with a standard-velocity round.
Air-Driven Less Lethal Systems

The most prevalent less lethal platform using a nonfirearm is the Pepperball
(Fort Wayne, Indiana), which is based on a standard recreational paintball
system. It fires a 68-caliber (17mm) encapsulated plastic ball with syn-
thetic pepper powder called PAVA (Chapter 4) or traditional OC (oleoresin
capsaicin) using a compressed-air or CO2 cylinder. The projectile breaks
upon impact, releasing the powder in the air and adding an irritant effect.
Projectiles have relatively low energy and high magazine capacity to allow
the engagement of multiple subjects or to rapidly saturate an area with chem-
ical irritant. Other companies, such as Veritas Tactical, have followed this
design. The barrels are not rifled, and the projectiles are spherical, preventing
appreciable accuracy but allowing a consistent impact surface. The author
was able to place eight Pepperballs in the chest area (center of mass) on a
human volunteer for a television segment (Chapter 6).
Fabrique Nationale (FN) took the air-driven encapsulated-round concept
a step further and developed the dedicated launcher called the FN303. Shaped
roughly like a standard bullet, the 68-caliber (17mm) proprietary frangible

projectile contains powdered bismuth in the nose with the payload in the rear.
Diagonal fins shaped on the projectile are designed to impart a spin similar
to rifling, adding improved accuracy and range from its Pepperball counter-
parts out of a 15-round drum magazine. Unfortunately, improper training
and deployment led to a high-profile fatality of a 21-year-old woman celebrat-
ing after a sports event, resulting in a sizeable settlement (Chapter 11).
Chemical Irritants
For centuries, various substances have been used for less lethal applications,
with most chemical formulations being developed around World War I [4].
These formulas, commonly referred to as riot-control agents (RCAs), were orig-
inally developed for military applications and subsequently tailored for civilian
law enforcement. Since the 1980s, there have been two main formulas of RCAs
used by U.S. law enforcement and the military: CS (ortho chlorobenzalmalo-
nonitrile) and OC (oleoresin capsicum). Discussed at length in Chapter 4, both
of these chemical irritants have been field proven and determined to be safer
and less toxic than other formulations (Figures3.21 and 3.22).
Figure 3.21 Chemical irritant sprays.

Figure 3.22Newest types of chemical irritant sprays (Sabre and Defense

Technology).
Effects of less lethal chemical agents [5]:
Lacrimation (tearing)
Blepharospasm (involuntary closing of eyes)
Respiratory distress (difficulty breathing)
Emesis (vomiting) in extreme cases
Pain, burning sensation on skin, eyes, nose, and throat
CS and OC have been dispersed utilizing an assortment of methods,

including sprays in handheld dispensers to launched munitions in powder,
liquid, or gas form. For high-volume dispersion such as saturating a house or
filling a street corridor, grenades or pyrotechnic canisters incorporated with
chemical irritants are widely utilized (Figure3.23).
Chemical irritant grenades are based on the traditional military-
grade grenade with a bouchon-type initiator (pin, spoon, and delay fuze)
(Figures 3.243.27). Almost exclusively, the military-grade M201A1
mechanical fuze is utilized for law enforcement devices with a 12-second
delay element. When the pin is pulled and the spoon (safety lever) is released,
a primer is struck, igniting the fuze compound. The burning compound in
Figure 3.23 A plethora of chemical grenades used in law enforcement applications.
the canister ignites the agent-infused contents, generating smoke capable of

filling a large area (Figure3.28).
Although the use of chemical irritants is effective for a variety of law
enforcement missions, aftercare must be a consideration following a deploy-
ment. The subject (or officer) may need to be decontaminated or medically
Figure 3.24 Standard M201A1 fuze on chemical grenades (with safety ring).
Figure 3.25 Components of a common grenade fuze.
treated after exposure, as effects can last up to an hour with a concentrated

dosage [5].
Distraction Devices
The most common devices in the distraction category are the controversial
NFDD (noise flash distraction devices) or flashbang. They use the same type
of fuze as the previously described grenades, but they are not technically
referred to as grenades, since they do not expel fragments or particulate.
Percussion
Primer
Striker
Delay
Element
Safety
Ignition Lever
Mixture
Figure 3.26 Anatomy of a grenade fuze.

Figure 3.27 Mass production of fuzes.
Working on the premise that every animal is afraid of thunder and light-
ning, they utilize a small explosive to generate a brilliant flash (up to 8
million candela) and large report (up to 180 decibels) to temporarily disori-
ent with an overstimulating amount of light and sound [5]. NFDDs have
undergone several design changes since inception due to safety concerns
[6]. Current NFDD configurations do not move significantly after initia-
tion, thereby preventing secondary injury from the steel body of the device
(Figures3.293.32).
Figure 3.28 Ignition of chemical grenade.

One impressive success was the use of a flashbang by the Israelis during the
rescue of their hostages at Entebbe, Uganda, on July 3, 1976. While early uses
were all focused on increasing the effectiveness of lethal force, they were soon
adopted by law enforcement agencies throughout the world and remain the
only nonlethal option capable of supporting dynamic entries when arresting
barricaded suspects and rescuing hostages. They have also been used in con-
trolling mobs during riots.
Sid Heal
Figure 3.29 Anatomy of a NFDD.
Figure 3.30 NFDD initiation.

Figure 3.31 NFDD deflagration (tactical for explosion without fragments).
They are mainly utilized to motivate barricaded subjects to surrender or,

in some cases, for tactical entry and hostage rescue. Lawsuits and resulting
case law have centered on the use of and the injuries related to these devices
(Chapter 10). Since they are considered pyrotechnics, they have been known
to cause unintentional fires if deployed near flammable material.
Rubber Grenades
In terms of crowd control, one of the most successful less lethal tools that the
authors have encountered in 10 years of research and testing has been the
rubber grenade. They are intended to disrupt or move a crowd by providing
Figure 3.32 NFDD remains in place.

Figure 3.33 Irritant-dispersion rubber grenade (ALS).
an overstimulation of the senses such as the flashbang or NFDD but without

the heavy metal housing, which can be used as a weapon against police. They
look very similar to military lethal fragmentation grenades, but with a rub-
ber housing. There are two basic types: irritant dispersion and exploding
(Figures3.33 and 3.34).
Figure 3.34 Exhaust port of an irritant-dispersion rubber grenade (ALS).

The irritant dispersion type does not explode; rather, it expels gas via
exhaust ports around the equator of the grenade body, much like the canister
types described previously. The advantage of these types is that the soft hous-
ing makes them less likely to injure subjects during deployment and, more
importantly, reduces the opportunity to injure police if hurled back, unlike
other gas-dispersion grenade types.
One group of nonlethal weapons are those that are thrown. They are distin-
guished from those that are hand held because they function after leaving the
control of the user. The most common type is called a stingball which looks
like a black rubber softball, but explodes and flings small rubber pellets that
sting when they hit, hence the name. One of the advantages of stingballs is
that they provide an ability of striking targets in defilade, that is, combatants
who are using obstacles to shield them from projectiles and the like. This situ-
ation commonly occurs during riots, when agitators and provocateurs throw
missiles at law enforcement officers or peacekeeping forces from behind cars,
buildings. and even other members of the mob.
Sid Heal
Exploding rubber grenades such as Blastballs (Defense-Technology) and

Tearballs (Combined Systems, Inc.) have been used with great success in the
Seattle area to disperse crowds with no reported injury. The payloads vary
from rubber sphere/buckshot projectiles (Stingball) to (OC or CS) powder
(Blastball or Tearball) (Figures3.353.38). The grenades containing rubber
buckshot can be unpredictable, as the projectiles are propelled by the explo-
sion, not by direct fire. Velocity and trajectory of the projectiles can vary
greatly [7]. Adding chemical irritant powder to the ball, although not inca-
pacitating, can also create an uncomfortable environment, encouraging rev-
elers to move elsewhere.
Rubber grenades are relatively safe compared to other options, as the metal
fuze assembly (submunition) separates from the rubber housing shortly prior
to explosion, dramatically reducing risk of dangerous projectiles. Their safety
was evaluated using a testing protocol with ballistic gelatin (Chapter 5). During a
filming of a television show (Chapter 6), the authors deployed nine Blastballs
at the feet of the actor to demonstrate their safety margin. The star of the show
suffered no injuries or ill effects from the deployment (Figure3.39).
Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs)

The CEW is one of the greatest advances in less lethal weaponry available to
law enforcement in the last decade (Figure3.40). When deployed properly, it
Figure 3.35 Tearball (Combined Tactical Systems, Inc.) rubber grenade.
can incapacitate and completely control an aggressive suspect with little to

no injury. Countless studies and surveys have been conducted regarding the
dramatic reduction of injury rates to both officers and suspects after adop-
tion of these devices [3]. From a statistical standpoint, CEWs are a risk man-
agers dream, but a handful of questionable and controversial deployments
have overshadowed their remarkable success.
By far the most popular electrical device in this category is the Taser
(Taser International, Scottsdale, AZ), particularly the model X26 (Chapter 9).
Approximately 17,000 agencies are deploying this device, with millions of field
applications. In recent years, new models from Taser International have entered
the market offering multishot (model X2) and more advanced waveform and
data-capture capability (model X2 and X26P) (Figure3.41). The latest genera-
tion not only captures firing data, but also reportedly provides power output
and diagnostic information, which is available to the officer upon download.
Several other CEW manufacturers are emerging with products designed
to incapacitate an individual using electrical shock. In addition to other
U.S. manufacturers such as KarbonArms (Tampa, Florida) and Phazzer
(Davenport, Florida), which offer types of electronic devices, international
companies are also entering the market from Taiwan (Raysun X-1), Russia
(Electroshoker), and Brazil (SPARK).
Figure 3.36 Blastball (Defense-Technology) rubber grenade.
Figure 3.37 Stingball (Defense-Technology) rubber grenade.

Figure 3.38 Blastballs are designed to separate at the equator.
The handheld CEWs that fire the barbed probes into a subject receive
the most media attention, but there are also a number of other less lethal
tools that employ an electrical component to deter behavior. These include
stun belts, stun shields, stun flashlights, and the generic handheld stun
gun. Recently, Taser International has released a stun flashlight, called the
Strikelight (Figure3.42).
Figure 3.39 Nine Blastballs at the feet of Ryan Stock for Discovery Canada.
The use and aftermath of CEW deployments is somewhat controversial

to the uneducated based on deaths proximal to their deployment. Put simply,
the research and statistics in regard to their relative safety tell the story [8].
In-custody deaths are discussed further in Chapters 8 and 9.
The use of electrical devices, primarily the Taser, has proven to be one of
the most effective nonlethal weapons and one of the most controversial. Like
chemical agents, the more serious injuries from electrical devices are nearly
always second-order effects, but activists have claimed that hundreds of peo-
ple have died as a result of Tasers, however, these claims have been refuted by
numerous studies. For all practical purposes, then, the focus for users needs
to remain on avoiding second-order injuries. Tasers work by inducing muscle
tetanization (more specifically, clonus), which is a medical term for involun-
tary muscle contractions. Understandably, a person who loses control of his
muscles will have difficulty maintaining balance, resulting in injuries from
falls. Recognizing that circumstances are seldom ideal for preventing injuries,
some are so dangerous as to preclude the use of this type of force unless death
is acceptable. Examples include suspects in danger of falling from high places
or falling into traffic, water, or machinery.
Sid Heal
Figure 3.40 Conducted-energy weapons (CEW) and components.

Figure 3.41 The model X26P (top) and X2 (bottom) from Taser International.
Specialized Systems
Other options for less lethal systems have deviated from the norm in an
attempt to maximize effectiveness on subduing a hostile target. One such
product is the extended-range electronic projectile (XREP) 12-gauge deliv-
ery system developed by Taser International that functions as both an impact
device and a CEW [9]. This product was the first of its kind to be sold to
the law enforcement market. Unlike traditional handheld conducted-energy
weapons (CEWs), the projectile itself houses electronic components capable
of delivering an electric shock to the subject. When launched, the projectile
strikes and embeds in the subjects skin and unravels, allowing enough dis-
tance between the electrical terminals to create a suitable electrical circuit
Figure 3.42 Strikelight from Taser International.

for effect. The authors were involved in testing and evaluating this round
on two separate occasions (2005, 2010), including evaluating the impact
wounds and electrical effects. The XREP was produced and deployed in the
field in several jurisdictions, but ultimately the round did not meet the high-
performance expectations that the company desired, and the product was
discontinued in 2012. The concept of a projectile capable of complete inca-
pacitation is a fascinating concept and one we are likely to see reemerge as
technology progresses.
Emerging and Alternative Options

This category encompasses a large number of ideas or conceptions of less
lethal options that have not been completely developed or proven to be suc-
cessfully integrated into mainstream law enforcement. As research contin-
ues, they may be seen as acceptable alternatives for current law enforcement
tools in the near future.
Categories of emerging devices [1]:
Malodorants: highly unpleasant, noxious smells; unfavorable olfac-

tory stimulation
Calmatives (soporifics): sedation chemicals designed to thwart an action
or tranquilize
Acoustic devices: intolerable sounds; unfavorable ear stimulation
Directed-energy weapons: produce uncomfortable sensations with
microwave energy or other means; also referred to as active denial
systems (ADS) (Figures3.43 and 3.44 show prototypes of directed-
energy weapons.)
While malodorants are just beginning to be seriously considered as a nonle-

thal alternative, they promise at least five advantages over conventional riot-
control agents. The first is that malodorants are effective in extremely small
amounts, usually less than one part per billion. Accordingly, the logistical
burden in storing, transporting, carrying, wielding, and so forth is reduced
dramatically. The second is that they are self-dispersing. All this means is
that once a provocateur is contaminated with a malodorant, the substance
will continue to be dispersed as it blows off his clothing and body. This cre-
ates somewhat of a dilemma for him. If he moves toward the peacekeep-
ing force, he will be arrested, but if he moves back into the mob, he carries
and releases the malodorant, effectively dispersing the crowd as he moves
through it because no one can stand to be around him. Moreover, anyone
who also becomes contaminated, as in brushing against him, also becomes a
dispersing agent. In this manner, he becomes the functional nonlethal equiv-

alent of Typhoid Mary. Third, law enforcement and peacekeeping forces are
often confronted with a tactical dilemma of their own when a provocateur is
inciting to riot. If allowed to continue, the chances of a riot are more likely,
but if authorities attempt to arrest him, they run the danger of starting the
very riot they are trying to avoid, not to mention being blamed for inaction
if the riot starts without an intervention and overreaction if it starts because
of their attempts to remove the provocateur. Dousing him with a malodor-
ant, however, will quickly remove his audience without requiring an arrest.
Fourth, malodorants can be formulated for different durations, from minutes
to weeks. As an antipersonnel option, the effects can be tailored more pre-
cisely than conventional riot-control agents, and as an area-denial capability,
a malodorant can provide some safeguards for empty and unprotected build-
ings or staging areas during a riot or other disturbance. Fifth, counteragents
that eliminate the stench of the malodorant have been developed and have
proven effective. Consequently, a small amount applied underneath the nose
will eliminate the need for a gas mask.
Sid Heal
Psychological and Physiological Effects
As discussed in Chapter 2, one must consider the psychological effects (per-

ception of injury or doom) as well as the physiological effects (true injury or
peril) when selecting a particular less lethal option. In personal experience,
suspects have surrendered and practically placed themselves in handcuffs
after a mere mention of a Taser. The same can be said for impact munitions,
where they either miss the target or graze the subject, creating instant com-
pliance. However, the most important consideration from a risk manage-
ment standpoint is when the opposite applies. Subjects are hit with numerous
Taser cycles or impact rounds only to escalate the situation, thus increasing
the risk of serious injury or the potential for lethal force. The importance of
the psychology involved in a less lethal deployment cannot be overstated and
must be a major consideration in any training program (Chapter 7).
In the controversy surrounding nonlethal options, one example of pseudo-

symmetry occurred in 2002 after the Dubrovka Theater siege in Moscow,
Russia. The use of soporific chemicals (calmatives) as a nonlethal option had
never before been attempted, and even though hundreds of hostages were
saved, 129 lost their lives.
Sid Heal
Figure 3.43 Author with prototype directed-energy weapon.
Determining What Works
In the United States, no standardized testing of less lethal options has been
mandated by the government or the industry [1]. In other countries, such as
the United Kingdom, structured government evaluation and defined opera-
tional requirements help guide the selection of less lethal options available to
Figure 3.44 Sid Heal with prototype directed-energy weapon (ARD).
officers [10]. Manufacturers can claim their product can do almost anything
with often no method to verify performance or intended outcome. Few man-
ufacturers conduct concise structured and independent scientific testing or
subject their products to practical scenarios before their release into the mar-
ket. The absence of defined standards in testing, evaluation, effectiveness,
and safety can also prevent new product categories from being adopted by
law enforcement. The common practice in the industry is to produce some-
thing that looks similar to a current successful product and market it. This
can create a nightmare scenario for the risk manager or city attorney when
a negative outcome derives from an inferior product purchased by a thrifty
department purchaser. As discussed in Chapter 5, it is imperative that man-
agers and trainers explore the necessity for independent testing of less lethal
devices prior to their deployment in the field.
One of the biggest differences between products that the authors have
seen in testing has been in the impact-munitions category. Although the
muzzle energy and weight were similar, dramatically different wound pro-
files were seen between two different products. Based on the construction of
the projectile, they interacted with tissue simulants differently. The design,
weight, and velocity of the round are all considerations in determining the
injury potential of that round. The energy density (discussed in Chapter 5)
of that particular round upon impact can predict how it interacts with the
body, which is a crucial factor, as it relates directly to injury. Other concerns
with some less lethal devices are tolerances and quality control. Authors
have seen extreme variances in velocity during testing, which could spell
disaster in a real incident. Tours of the factory to evaluate quality control
procedures are strongly encouraged, and be leery of manufacturers that do
not offer them.
To date, there is not one less lethal option that can fill every operational
need in a police department. In selecting from the options discussed in this
chapter, one must consider scenarios for which these tools will be used for
a less lethal program while maximizing effectiveness, minimizing risk and
injury to officers and clients, as well as consideration to overall cost. Once the
tools are selected, determining how they are deployed, who deploys them,
and how the deployments are documented can determine the success or fail-
ure of your less lethal program.
References
1. NIJ Special Report. 2004. Department of Defense nonlethal weapons and equip-
ment review: A research guide for civil law enforcement and corrections. NCJ
205293, October.
2. Weapons and Protective Systems Technologies Center. 2010. A guidebook for
less-lethal devices: Planning for, selecting, and implementing technology solutions.
Applied Research Laboratory, Penn State University.
3. Mesloh, C., M. Hench, and R. Wolf. 2008. Less lethal weapon effectiveness, use
of force, and suspect and officer injuries: A five-year analysis. Florida Gulf Coast
University. National Institutes of Justice report, September.
4. Davison, N. 2009. Non-lethal weapons. In Global Issues series, ed. J. Whitman.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
5. Defense technology instructor manual. 2012. Safariland Inc.
6. Bender, S. F. A., M. Steyskal, B. V. Ingram, B. M. Melof, K. J. Fleming, T. A.
Broyles, E. J. Mulligan, T. T. Covert, and H. M. Anderson. 2003. Less-than-lethal
flashbang diversionary device. Sandia National Laboratories. SAND2003-4045,
November. http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2003/034045.pdf.
7. Mesloh, C., J. James-Mesloh, L. Medley, and R. Wolf. 2012. Evaluation of rub-
ber ball grenades: Applications for law enforcement and corrections. Law
Enforcement Executive Forum 12 (3): 8090.
8. Taser International. 2013. Taser conducted electrical weapons (CEWs): Field

data and risk management.
9. Wyant, R. T., and B. J. Smelser. 2010. Comparison qualities of the wireless Taser
(XREP) and the Mossberg X12 LLS. AFTE Journal 42 (3): 25963.
10. Symons, M., G. Smith, G. Dean, S. Croft, and C. OBrien. 2008. Less lethal tech-
nologies: Review of commercially available and near-market products for the
Association of Chief Police Officers. Home Office Scientific Development Branch.
Publication no. 49/08, June.
RCAs: Chemical
Irritants (OC, CS) and
Flammability Testing
with Conducted-Energy
4
Weapons (Tasers)
R. T. WYANT
Contents
Use of Peripheral Sensory Irritants for Standard Police Operations 80
Tear Gas (CN and CS) 81
Oleoresin Capsaicin (OC) 82
Confusion in Labeling 85
Are the Sprays Flammable? 86
Introduction of CEWs into the Mix 88
Flammability Guidelines 90
Conveying the Importance of Practical Testing 91
CRT LL Testing Protocol 93
Experiment Setup 94
Both Probes Embedded in Mannequin 98
Bug Bombs 98
Scenario-Based Training 99
Conduct Periodic Testing 99
References 101
Riot-control agents (RCAs) have been in use since the late nineteenth cen-
tury as a means to gain tactical advantage over the enemy. RCAs are defined
as any chemical that can produce rapid sensory irritation or disabling
physical effects that disappear within a short time following termination
of exposure [1]. As the Industrial Revolution drew to a close, there were a
large variety of chemical agents with varying effects, toxicity, and risks. The
Geneva Protocol in 1924 and subsequent Chemical Weapons Convention,
which banned chemical weapons for warfare use, left a window open for the
deployment of nonlethal, temporarily incapacitating chemical compounds
79
for law enforcement. During the civil rights and antiwar demonstrations in
the 1960s, cities were losing control and called on the National Guard to
perform law enforcement functions. The success of RCAs throughout those
events stimulated their involvement in police special operations (SWAT) and
civil disturbance functions.
Toward the late twentieth century, these agents (primarily oleoresin
capsaicin) became more prevalent in controlling and subduing unruly indi-
viduals with a lower amount of force than traditional methods. Handheld
dispersers became commonplace for routine patrol operations for use in con-
frontational situations. Their use tended to decrease injury to the involved
parties while increasing officer safety [2].
During the 1960s and 70s, both the United States and the United Kingdom
experienced large-scale protests, demonstrations, and riots which in turn
spurred renewed interest in finding better nonlethal alternatives. By and large,
tear gas remained the preferred nonlethal option in the United States and tear
gas, especially chloroacetophenone (CN), had been in use since the 1920s.
The U.S. Armys Chemical Warfare Service had conducted extensive research
on CN and had promoted it for civilian use. It was still the preferred agent
by American law enforcement through the early 1960s, when it was widely
replaced by 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS).
Sid Heal
Use of Peripheral Sensory Irritants for

Standard Police Operations
There are a number of chemicals that can affect the human body in a vari-
ety of ways (Chapter 3). Law enforcement was particularly interested in
RCAs described as peripheral sensory irritants (PSIs) (Figure4.1). In the
late 1980s, portable PSIs (tear gas and pepper spray) began to gain popular-
ity for police operations and are standard issue for the majority of officers
today. These irritant sprays, also known as personal defense sprays, typi-
cally prove helpful when attempting to control resistive or violent subjects
while not inflicting serious injury and preventing an escalation of force
[1]. They can also be used as a force multiplier (area denial) in crowd-
control disturbances where officers are likely outnumbered. Since wide-
spread deployments in the early 1990s, there have been relationships made
between PSI deployment and in-custody deaths [3]. Most of these deaths
were later associated with ExDS (excited delirium syndrome, Chapter 8).
In reality, there have been countless deployments of these sprays worldwide
with few injuries reported [4].
RCAs 81
Figure 4.1 Types of peripheral sensory irritants (PSI) tested.
Tear Gas (CN and CS)

Although there are several chemical agents categorized as tear gas, chlo-
roacetophenone (commonly known asCN) was the first agent in this cate-
gory, developed in 1864. Two Americans, Ben Corson and Roger Stoughton,
developed the compound, 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS) in 1928, which
reported higher safety margins and easier contamination when compared
to CN [1]. The key ingredient in CS (formula: C10H5ClN2) is considered the
least toxic and most effective of the agents in this class and is the most
likely tear gas to be deployed in law enforcement scenarios. CS affects the
moisture on the skin and mucous membranes, creating an inflammatory
effect and impeding breathing. A majority of modern deployments of CS in
the United States are in canister/grenade form for crowd control and SWAT
purposes [5]. CS powder has also been included in less lethal projectiles,
such as barricade penetrators, specifically developed for SWAT operations
Figure 4.2 CS and OC delivery systems are manufactured in many sizes and
configurations.
(Chapter 3) (Figure4.2). Concentration calculations have been identified to

determine how much agent can be deployed before the level reaches inca-
pacitation and lethal levels. Numerical values referred to as LC50 (lethal
concentration) and IC50 (incapacitation concentration) are easily calcu-
lated with accepted formulas; however, the utility of these values has been
questioned [6].
Oleoresin Capsaicin (OC)

The most common PSI currently used by law enforcement is oleoresin cap-
sicum, otherwise known as OC or pepper spray. The active ingredient in
OC is capsaicin (N-[4-hydroxy-3-methoxy-phenyl-methyl]-8-methyl-6-
nonenamide), which is extracted from the Capsicum genus of pepper plants
[1]. Although the effects of pepper are well known and have been used as
weapons for centuries, the modern aerosol formula for OC was developed in
the 1960s as an animal repellant. It wasnt until the 1970s that the formula
was considered for use in nonlethal human applications. The first widespread
application of pepper spray was in the 1980s by the U.S. Postal Service,
intended to thwart aggressive animals, and it is still used fairly extensively to
help protect mail carriers. In the late 1980s, the FBI began an extensive study
on OC, evaluating its effectiveness and safety and began to deploy it with
their agents in the early 1990s [2, 7]. The legitimacy of this study was later
scrutinized, as the writing of the report was found to have received finan-
cial compensation from a major manufacturer. Nevertheless, law enforce-
ment agencies across the United States and abroad began to embrace OC
RCAs 83
Figure 4.3 OC aerosol grenades.
and include it in some form to their arsenal of tools. It was available in fogs,
gels, streams, foams, powders, vapors, and pyrotechnic and aerosol grenades
(Figure 4.3). OC is occasionally combined with CS formulations to make
handheld aerosols for use in police patrol operations [8].
DISPERSION TYPES FOR OC/CS

Cone or fog: Disperses the agent in a fine mist to cover a larger
area. Although it provides a higher chance of affecting the sub-
ject, it also increases the chances of officer contamination.
Stream: Disperses the agent in a narrow, concentrated stream that
must be aimed to be effective. This type of delivery minimizes
exposure of bystanders.
Foam and gel: Disperses similar to the stream, but its gelatinous
consistency allows it to stick to the target more efficiently.
However, its range can be limited.
Powder: Irritants in powder form are typically designed for gre-
nade applications (pyrotechnic or aerosol) or encapsulated in
impact rounds (Chapter 5).
Vapor: The latest delivery system for OC.
Projectors: Specialized devices such as the jet projector (JPX)
can fire OC an extended distance.
OC affects the sensory system by inflaming skin, mucous membranes,

and eyes (lachrymator). It causes bronchoconstriction (closing of lung tis-
sue) and vasodilation (opens vessels). Most notably, it intensely stimulates
pain receptors (release of the chemical Substance-P). In addition, the tactical
advantages of OC are its rapid onset and blepharospasm (involuntary closing
of the eyes) [9]. As formulations of OC are typically considered food grade,
toxicity and environmental contamination issues are virtually absent versus
CS or CN. The effects and safety of OC have been intensely studied and results
previously published [1] as well as being proven with extensive field usage.
Adding to its relative safety, decontamination of a subject affected by OC
is usually straightforward and predictable and usually requires water deluge
and a little wait time (up to 45 minutes typically). The potency of the OC for-
mula can vary, as it is dependent on the harvested pepper that the capsaicins
Even under ideal conditions, most sprays have a range of 15 feet or less, requir-
ing close proximity to a belligerent to be effectively applied. Moreover, OC
spray only works when it gets in the eyes, necessitating that the adversary
generally be facing the user. The duty experts here are law enforcement offi-
cers who commonly use a distraction of some sort when applying pepper
spray; otherwise the adversaries can take effective countermeasures, usually
as simple as turning their head or blocking the spray with their hands. Once
applied, however, some of the more belligerent combatants become enraged
and will immediately attack, and a lot of the injuries to all parties occur dur-
ing this period. Taking evasive action, then, becomes a sound consideration.
Conversely, suspects who have anesthetized themselves with drugs or alcohol
may exhibit little or no discomfort. As a general rule, if OC didnt work the
first time, it wont work at all, and a different force option needs to be quickly
applied to avoid a rapid escalation.
Sid Heal
RCAs 85
Figure 4.4Tom Burns prepares to expose volunteers for United Kingdom

documentary.
originate from. A synthetic analogue of capsaicin, PAVA (pelargonic acid

vanillylamide), was developed to allow easier control of the potency of the
product. PAVA is used in the United States, but it is more popular in aerosol
form abroad in countries like Great Britain [10] (Figure4.4).
Confusion in Labeling
Over the years, the effectiveness of different concentrations of capsaicins in

OC formulas has been debated. Historically, the potency of pepper sprays
was measured on the Scoville heat scale. Wilbur Scoville was a pharmacist
who developed a protocol to measure the potency of peppers in 1912. His
method involved preparing solutions of pepper extracts and offering them
to human tasters. The solutions were diluted until the tasters could no longer
detect the burning effect. The arguably subjective perception of heat from
taste was quantitated and described as the Scoville Heat Unit (SHU) [11].
The higher the SHU value, the hotter the spice and the greater the subse-
quent level of capsaicins in the solution. Under Wilburs scale, pure capsaicin
would be approximately 15 million units, with the jalapeno pepper coming
in at about 5,000.
The SHU scale had been a unit of measurement used by manufacturers
for decades to quantify the potency of products and, arguably, their effective-
ness. Most OC formulas were rated between 1 million and 5 million SHUs,
but there was typically only 5% or 10% of that solution per can. The SHU
scale was clearly a subjective test based on the taste of human panel members.
Debate began on what amount of capsaicin would be effective in stopping

an attacker while maintaining low injury risk and relatively low recovery
time. The debate was further fueled by the inconsistencies of harvested pep-
pers based on environmental and other factors that can affect an agricul-
tural yield, meaning that a jalapeno pepper may vary as much as tenfold
on the SHU scale. The unpredictable nature of a particular peppers potency
led to inconsistent percentages in active ingredients, which could lead to
unintended outcomes when deployed in the field. Modern scientific testing
(HPLC, i.e., high-pressure liquid chromatography) was able to specifically
quantify the level of capsaicinoids (capsaicin and its secondary metabolites)
in a particular product [1].
In the late 1990s, most OC sprays on the market were labeled 5% or 10%
capsaicin, which is simply the percentage of the OC solution inside the con-
tainer among the other ingredients mentioned previously. That number did
not equate to the actual level of active ingredient in the solution. Currently,
most OC manufacturers label their sprays based on the major capsaicinoid
(dihydrocapsaicin, nordihydrocapsaicin, and others) level (0.2%, 0.4%, etc.),
which is more accurate than previous labeling, specifically defining its con-
tents. The intent of the more accurate labeling is to allow customers to more
intelligently select a level of effect that suits their needs [8]. Even so, the
reported capsaicinoid concentrations have been shown through independent
testing not to match manufacturers claims [9J.
Are the Sprays Flammable?
One must understand that the nature of a pressurized solution dispersed

into the air has the potential to ignite when exposed to a flame or spark. To
grasp the flammability risk of OC sprays, one must first know what is inside.
Some sprays are oil-based, while others are water-based, depending on the
intended application [8]. Both types offer certain advantages, but it is a popu-
lar misconception that water-based sprays are nonflammable.
In order to dispense the product uniformly and reliably, the formulas
contain several critical components, including an emulsifier, carrier, and
propellant [12]. The emulsifier is the component that extracts the capsaicins
from the pepper plant, which is typically some kind of alcohol, such as etha-
nol. The carrier is the solution that the capsaicin is suspended in and keeps
the concentration of the formulation consistent in its container. Carriers can
consist of a variety of toxic solvents, including tetrachloroethylene and other
ominous chemicals. Currently, less toxic carriers such as ethanol, water,
propylene glycol, and isopropanols are more commonly used in these com-
pounds. The propellant is the final major component of the mixture, which
RCAs 87
dispenses the solution out of its container to the target. Historically, the pro-
pellant has varied widely, including flammable gases such as propane and
butane to refrigerants such as freon (dichlorodifluoromethane, R-12) and
R134A (1,1,1,2-tetrafluoroethane) to naturally occurring gases such as nitro-
gen and carbon dioxide [1]. As the OC industry flourished, the toxic and
environmentally unpopular components seemed to diminish, replaced with
safer formulas. Regardless of the mixture, nearly all formulas contain some
form of alcohol to prevent the mixture from freezing under operational con-
ditions, thus providing a potential vehicle for ignition. The type and amount
of that alcohol can affect the flammability of the solution.
As the defense spray industry is intensely competitive, formulas generally
remain unknown, as manufacturers guard this as proprietary information.
The only way to confirm the exact chemical makeup of a particular spray is
to perform specialized scientific testing such as liquid chromatography/gas
chromatography and mass spectroscopy on a sample of the product, which
is generally not practical for the average law enforcement agency. Moreover,
while the testing may confirm the level of active ingredients, it still may not
predict the substances flammability potential [13]. In addition, manufactur-
ers may change their formulas (unbeknownst to the customer) in an effort
to increase effectiveness or lower costs [14]. Not only do the ingredients vary
from the myriad manufacturers, but the agent is delivered to the target a
number of ways and in several different sizes to accommodate a variety of
needs. Each of these types of dispensing methods offer their own pros and
cons to their use and effectiveness. The dispersion type may also affect the
flammability potential (Figures4.54.7).
Figure 4.5 Distribution on T-shirt from fog-type dispersion.

Figure 4.6 Distribution on T-shirt from stream-type dispersion.
Figure 4.7 Testing involved a variety of modalities that could potentially ignite.
Introduction of CEWs into the Mix
In addition to other ignition sources that may be present in the environment

when OC is deployed, the flammability potential of PSIs when used in con-
junction with police weapons must be considered. With the introduction of
the modern Taser device in 1999, the flammability potential of these chemi-
cal irritant agents, particularly those in handheld sprays, suddenly became a
liability concern. The Taser and other conducted electrical weapons (CEWs)
RCAs 89
operate by generating an electric pulse that constricts (clonus) the voluntary

muscles of the body (Chapter 9). That high-energy pulse is capable of igniting
flammable substances such as gasoline and alcohol under the right circum-
stances [15]. In the first few years of the Taser M26 being deployed, there were
some anecdotal occurrences and some media stories of suspects being set
afire after a Taser was deployed near a flammable substance.
Since there was no requirement to standardize them, a wide variety of
PSI formulations were prolific and unchecked [13, 14]. Although not a rou-
tine occurrence, simultaneous deployment of two less lethal options on a
person can and does occur in the field [4]. As previously stated, the aerosol-
ized OC or CS chemical compound may contain some amounts of alcohol
or other flammable substances. Combustible substances in the gaseous state
have low mass and require a smaller amount of energy for ignition [16]. It is
logical that spray aerosolizing when leaving the nozzle has the potential to be
more flammable than its liquid form. In the early 2000s, the authors recog-
nized the potential that a suspect may be inadvertently set afire (Figure4.8).
Testing protocols were developed to evaluate the flammability potential
of these sprays if they were deployed in conjunction with a Taser device or
other conducted electrical weapon (CEW). The test was performed by simul-
taneously deploying a can of pepper spray onto an open spark generated from
a Taser M26. Lo and behold, some OC products labeled nonflammable cre-
ated a substantial fireball. After the first evolution of testing was performed,
the protocols viability was confirmed when an unintended ignition of a
suspect occurred when two officers from neighboring agencies (Kenosha,
Wisconsin) attempted to subdue him. The media sensationalized the occur-
rence, and manufacturers took notice and began adopting the protocol for
Figure 4.8 Dont wait until it happens in the field to discover that your OC is
flammable with Taser use.
testing of their products. Attention to the topic eventually led to the authors
testing being showcased on TV episodes of CSI and Mythbusters.
In August 2005, police officers in Kenosha, Wisconsin, discovered their Tasers

and pepper spray didnt mix when a suspect literally caught fire as they tried
to subdue him. Kenosha Police Department Sergeant Ron Bartholomew told
local television station WDJT, When they deployed the Taser, it ignited the
OC spray that was on him. It was like a quick flash fire. The suspects face,
head and the grass around him burst into flames.
Law Officer Magazine, 2007
Flammability Guidelines
So how could a can of OC labeled nonflammable ignite so readily when

sparked into a Taser spark? A little research discovered that manufacturers
of aerosol products in the United States, such as those who make chemical
irritant sprays for law enforcement, must follow federal guidelines for flam-
mability in order to label a product nonflammable [17]. These standards
do not accurately address the environment created with an electrical pulse
similar to one generated by a modern CEW.
USEPA STANDARDS FOR FLAMMABILITY

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has set standards
for rating the flammability of liquids [17]:
16 CFR 1500.43 and 43(a)Flash point: The lowest temperature

at which a liquid product containing a combustible ingredient
that gives off a flammable vapor will ignite. This type of testing
requires a specified testing protocol and equipment.
16 CFR 1500.45Flame extension: Conducted by holding the
aerosol can 6 inches from a flame and discharging the product
across the flame. Flame extension of more than 18 inches or
flashback of flame to the can would dictate the labeling of the
product as either flammable or extremely flammable.
It has been proven through experimental testing that the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agencys flash point and flame extension tests
alone cannot accurately predict an ignition during a simultaneous field appli-
cation of OC spray and Taser (or other CEW) [13]. Law enforcement agen-
cies and other purchasers of these products should not rely on these testing
guidelines when selecting a PSI projector to use in an environment that may
RCAs 91
contain an ignition source. Most responsible PSI companies will test their
products for CEW compatibility beyond EPA guidelines. Typically that test-
ing protocol is not available, but one would like to assume that they are fol-
lowing a protocol similar to that of the authors. Like any other tool discussed
throughout this text, it is strongly recommended that structured independent
testing be conducted on any less lethal tool to be deployed in the field. In the
case of PSIs, the chemical formulas are unregulated (in the United States) and
can even change between lots, further making the point.
Conveying the Importance of Practical Testing
Word of the initial test had spread among some CEW instructors, but
regional testing by trainers of their sprays seemed inconsistent. One method
shared with the authors was to spray some OC in a parking lot and apply
a Taser to the pool of solution. If no ignition was observed, it was ruled as
safe. Rumors persisted that water-based sprays were Taser-safe, so often no
testing with the Taser was performed at all. Plans were needed to develop a
standard method, apply it to numerous sprays, share the results with the law
enforcement community, and dispel the myths. Most importantly, the proto-
col had to be reproducible so that agencies could test their sprays themselves.
MYTHS ASSOCIATED WITH PEPPER SPRAYS

(OC) AND CEW/Taser DEPLOYMENT
Water-based sprays will not ignite and are Taser safe.
Sprays labeled nonflammable and nonalcohol-based for-
mulas will not ignite.
We spray the face, so there is no chance of ignition on the
body.
The Taser spark doesnt reach a suitable temperature to ignite the
spray.
In 2004, the authors developed a test protocol that would evaluate the
flammability potential of these sprays in police operational conditions, not
laboratory conditions. The test protocol was intentionally designed to be a
worst-case, yet realistic and reproducible, scenario to evaluate the interaction
of the two less lethal tools. First and foremost, the protocol must be simple
enough to be applied locally with limited equipment. During the first evolu-
tion, there were some surprising results as products labeled EDW Tested
and Safe were highly flammable under the testing protocol, fully engulfing
the test mannequin (Figures4.9 and 4.10) [13].
Figure 4.9 Practical testing involves the use of mannequins for realistic vapor
distribution.
Figure 4.10 Testing should include video and infrared photography.

RCAs 93
As word of this testing spread, more agencies and manufacturers con-

tributed samples of sprays for testing. Several manufacturers asked to evalu-
ate their entire product line under the testing protocol. Most companies saw
the implications and value of the testing. However, one company refused to
submit samples or even sell them to the authors for testing. The representa-
tive stated, We know the Taser spark is only 120 degrees, and the flash point
of our spray is 200 degrees, so we are confident that it is safe. Confused by
this logic and the statements accuracy, the authors abandoned their attempts
to obtain samples. A wise person should be suspicious of any company not
willing to have their product tested independently.
In four different testing phases spanning three years, over 60 different
formulas and several other flammable substances were tested. Most of the
aerosols passed the protocol; however, some results were very concerning, as
agencies could unknowingly and unintentionally ignite a suspect and severely
injure that person. The list of the sprays that failed during the testing was
published and given to any person who requested it. The liability of any injury
a suspect sustained could fall squarely on the officer and the police depart-
ment. The protocol was distributed to departments wishing to test their sprays
and was eventually published in a police magazine. The hope was to help pro-
tect agencies and the public from an unintended outcome and from subse-
quent accusations of failure to provide proper testing and training prior to
deployment.
CRT LL Testing Protocol

The testing of irritant spray compatibility with a CEW was designed for any-
one to adopt and utilize. The premise for the testing is that it is assumed
that the evaluator has no idea what is inside the can of pepper spray. The
chemical formulas, alcohol content, and type of propellant are all irrelevant
for the purposes of testing. We simply want to know if it will catch some-
one on fire during a worst-case scenario. Scientific equipment is minimal,
which makes testing affordable for agencies to reproduce. The goal of the
protocol is to simulate a realistic situation to evaluate the sprays interac-
tion with the Taser spark in the worst conceivable condition. The theory
behind this protocol is that if the spray did not ignite the test mannequin
under those conditions, it passed the protocol and could be determined as
relatively safe under routine situations (Figures4.11 and 4.12). The results
are not and cannot be all inclusive and applicable to every situation that may
be encountered in actual deployment, but the risk and liability of using that
formula is greatly reduced.
Figure 4.11 Mannequin preparation includes conductive material (aluminum

foil) and insulating layer (duct tape).
Experiment Setup
Forensic testing mannequin: It is important that the test medium be
1.
similar to the human form (Figure4.13). The mannequin can be any
human-shaped object that can withstand a brief flash fire without
burning to the ground. The shape, height off of the ground, and the
ability to add clothing are all factors to be considered. It should have
the ability to stand upright and lie horizontal on the ground to simu-
late deployment conditions. The mannequin is set up to mimic the
electrical effects of the human body. The chest and waist area are
first wrapped in aluminum (aluminium if you are English) foil to
Figure 4.12 Covered with T-shirt to simulate common clothing (also acts as
wicking medium).
RCAs 95
CRT Protocol For Testing Flammability of

Chemical Irriatant Aerosols vs. CEW
Mannequin Layers:
1- Aluminum foil
2- Two layers duct tape
3- Cotton t-shirt spark gap
3 feet for 5 seconds

OC
CEW
1 foot
CEW:
1- Apply 10 seconds
2- Wait 20 seconds
3- Apply 10 seconds
Figure 4.13 Protocol for flammability testing.
simulate the conductive qualities of human tissue under the skin.

The foil is wrapped with two to three layers of common duct tape to
simulate the insulating qualities of the outer layer of skin. Finally, a
standard cotton T-shirt tops both layers. The purpose of the T-shirt
is not only to simulate common clothing, but also to provide a con-
duit for the spray formulation to separate.
CEW/Taser probe set up: It is not uncommon for a Taser/CEW probe
2.
to become loose in the clothing during an actual deployment. This not
only diminishes the effect on the subject, it generates a spark for which
to ignite flammable substances. The loose probe in the clothing cre-
ates a spark gap, increasing potential of ignition of a flammable sub-
stance. A cartridge from the CEW is fired into a material that allows
unaltered capture of the probes. The probes are then placed on specific
Figure 4.14 Taser probe is attached to fixture at an angle to ensure spark is

precisely inch away from insulating layer under the T-shirt.
locations on the mannequin while remaining attached to the wires and

cartridge. The top probe from the cartridge is placed in the upper mid-
dle chest area (common field deployment placement). The top probe
is attached to the mannequin via a fixture that creates a distance of
inch (13 mm) from the tip of the probe to the duct tape on the manne-
quin surface (Figure4.14). This creates a spark gap commonly observed
in scenarios where the probe comes loose from the clothing. The fixture
provides a consistent spark gap and thus an ignition source for flamma-
ble aerosols. The second probe (bottom) is placed 1 foot (0.3 m) below
the top probe near the waist area and embedded through the T-shirt
and duct-tape into the foil. Care must be taken to observe the integrity
of the CEW wire and cartridge as it attaches to the CEW device.
Simultaneous CEW and irritant spray deployment: For those who
3.
have deployed OC in the field on an unruly subject, many will testify
that it does not always strike the target and often other officers are
sprayed as well. It is certainly possible to spray the subjects clothing
when attempting to strike the face with the spray. For purposes of
testing, the spray is deployed in a constant area on the body to maxi-
mize the aerosol concentration. The spray is deployed unshaken, 3
feet (1 meter) horizontally from the top probe fixture, and deployed
for 35 seconds directly into the spark gap while the CEW is cycled
for 10 seconds (two 5-second cycles). After a 20-second wait time,
the CEW is cycled again for at least 10 seconds. The delay is to allow
wicking of the solution into the cotton fabric and physical separation
of spray formulation. This wicking action was initially just a theory
RCAs 97
Figure 4.15 Some ignitions occurred after a brief time when the chemical mix-
ture was separated by wicking action of the cotton T-shirt.
by the author, but this did result in a delayed ignition in some of the
formulas tested (Figure4.15).
Video and thermal imaging: All testing evolutions are video recorded
4.
start to finish to ensure consistency of the protocol guidelines. All
testing is also simultaneously captured with infrared or thermal
imaging, as some irritant spray formulas do not visibly ignite, and
severe injury may occur before being noticed. Some formulas gener-
ated significant heat without ignition of the cotton outer garment.
Both of these results would fail under the testing parameters and
would likely indicate further testing to evaluate the injury potential
on a human tissue surrogate. The thermal camera (most fire depart-
ments have one) was also particularly useful when testing other
flammable substances, such as high-proof liquors and gasoline, mea-
suring the extreme heat delivered to the mannequin (Figure4.16).
Record weather conditions: As temperature, wind, and relative humid-
5.
ity can directly affect the volatility and dispersion of vapors, it is
required to record these data points at regular intervals (every 15 min-
utes) during all testing. The test area is shielded to minimize wind
Figure 4.16. Thermal imaging may discover intense heat not visible to the
naked eye.
current to help maintain a worst-case scenario. It is recommended to

repeat the testing under a variety of weather conditions and scenarios.
Creativity of the variety of testing can be your ally to build confidence
in the safety of the spray when deploying in a real scenario.
Change clothing and clean mannequin after each test: To prevent mix-
6.
ture of formulas and contamination of the test materials, the man-
nequin is completely stripped and cleaned between each test. As OC
is food grade, water and surfactant (mild soap) are typically sufficient
to clean the mannequin. After drying, the T-shirt is replaced, and a
5-minute wait time between testing evolutions should suffice in most
circumstances. If the mannequin does catch fire, more time will
likely be required. If CS or an OC/CS blend is tested, scrubbing of the
mannequin or even replacing the insulating layer (duct-tape) may be
necessary to remove all of the CS particles before additional testing.
Repeat testing with mannequin horizontal on ground: Typical hostile
7.
encounters with a suspect begin with all parties vertical, but will most
likely conclude with one or more of them in the horizontal position.
Vapors dispensed from the canister may be lighter or heavier than the
ambient air, depending on the temperature, humidity, and of course,
the formula inside. The vapors may behave differently based on the
position of the subject and its interaction with the Taser spark.
Both Probes Embedded in Mannequin

When a particular OC formula ignited under the testing protocol, the test
was repeated with both of the probes embedded in the test mannequin, cre-
ating a good circuit without a spark gap. In nearly all instances, no ignition
was observed, indicating that the small spark gap at the probeknot junction
(Chapter 9) exhibited insufficient energy to ignite the aerosol. Even if a flam-
mable spray was deployed with a CEW, the probe would need to make a poor
connection for ignition to occur. As one cannot guarantee that both probes
would imbed in the subject upon deployment, this was judged as a failure
under the protocol.
Bug Bombs
Aerosol grenades, referred to as bug bombs, are similar to their handheld sib-
lings, except they are designed to activate (open the valve) and toss into an
area. They are intended to completely empty and disperse a high volume of
nonpyrotechnic agent in a short period of time. These devices are particularly
popular for corrections or jail environments for cell extractions. Although they
are not as likely to be sprayed directly on an individual, the cloud they produce
may be subjected to a spark from a CEW if the space is confined enough. The
RCAs 99
same testing protocol described previously was applied to two types of these
bug bombs with impressive results. Not only did the mannequin ignite on a
can labeled nonflammable, the flame traveled rearward toward the operator.
If these devices are to be included in your operational plan, practical testing
prior to deployment cannot be overstated if the use of CEWs is to be considered.
Scenario-Based Training
As repeated throughout the text, the need to incorporate scenario-based test-
ing into a less lethal program cannot be overstated. Even if the spray that the
agency is carrying has passed all testing protocols, the operators need to be
cognizant of simultaneous deployment of CEW as well as environmental fac-
tors that may create an unintended outcome. Chemical irritant sprays are not
the only flammability concern the officer faces in the field when deploying
CEWs. Other ignitions have occurred during deployments when the subjects
have come in contact with gasoline or other flammable substances tangen-
tial to arrest. These cases have led to an increase of training and situational
awareness for officers using the devices. Training conducted locally found
that on a few occasions, the officer was quick to deploy the Taser in a practice
scenario, even when the actor-suspect was holding a gas can (Chapter 7).
Conduct Periodic Testing
The less lethal arena is continually changing, and the average police depart-
ment trainer may not be up to date with current trends and new products.
Typically, when a force option is selected and policy is written, it remains in
place for quite some time. But as manufacturers evolve, trying to make a bet-
ter mousetrap and notch out their piece of the market, they may change their
formula to increase effectiveness or minimize cost. One should not assume
that all products or models from the same company remain constant, par-
ticularly chemical irritant sprays. Prior to any field deployment, the authors
recommend performing a quick test following the proffered method on every
lot of sprays as they arrive.
Other entities such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [12] and the Home Office Scientific Development Branch is now
known as the Home Office Centre for applied Science and Technology (CAST)
[10] have developed a version of the authors initial test protocols for testing
sprays. Some parameters were modified based on their particular preferences,
but the premise of deploying the spray into a spark gap remains a constant and
reasonably accurate method for predicting an ignition during a field deploy-
ment. Under the four testing evolutions conducted, over 60 types of PSI sprays
were evaluated under the authors testing protocol, making the testing the
most extensive flammability evaluation to date. The results of the flammability
Figure 4.17 Aftermath of significant ignition.
testing directly led to some manufacturers reevaluating and revamping their

formulas. Since the testing protocols inception in 2004, it has been modified
slightly to include different scenarios, such as a horizontal subject. Regardless
of the specific testing method, evaluating a spray under the worst-case condi-
tions should limit the likelihood of an unintentional outcome (Figure4.17).
The prediction is that multiple officers attempting to subdue a subject may use
any tool on their belt in an attempt to effect an arrest. In reality, as a dynamic
situation unfolds and the officers are focused on the actions of an individual,
one officer could use a chemical aerosol while the other deploys a Taser. Both
officers would likely be unaware of the others actions.
Currently, there are no standards for chemical makeup (carriers, pro-
pellants, potency), delivery, or other safety standards for the contents of OC
sprays. The solution that contains the active PSI compound and/or the means
by which it is distributed into the air may contain some amounts of alcohol
or other flammable substances. The initial tests and subsequent structured
testing from the authors proved that cans labeled nonflammable or EDW
tested and safe can pose a significant risk to the officer and the subject being
sprayed. The sentiment echoed throughout this textto not implicitly rely on
manufacturers testing methodscannot be overstated. Although the confi-
dence has improved that companies have undoubtedly adopted more stringent
testing guidelines to prevent suspect ignitions, due diligence dictates periodic
independent testing to minimize risk to the agencys less lethal program.
RCAs 101
References
1. Olajos, E. J., and W. Stopford, eds. 2004. Riot control agents: Issues in toxicology,
safety and health. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
2. Edwards, S. M., and O. J. Granfield. 1997. Evaluation of pepper spray. NIJ,
Research in Brief, February. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/162358.pdf.
3. Steffee, C. H., P. E. Lantz, R. L. Flannagan, R. L. Thompson, and D. R. Jason.
1995. Oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) and in-custody deaths. American
Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology 16 (3): 18592.
4. Stratton, S. J. 2009. Sudden in-custody death. In Taser conducted electrical weap-
ons: Physiology, pathology, and law, ed. M. W. Kroll and J. D. Ho, 30114. New
York: Springer.
5. National Institute of Justice. 1985. Hand-held aerosol tear gas weapons. NIJ
Technology Assessment Program, NIJ Standard 110.0, September. http://info.
publicintelligence.net/DoJ-TearGasSpray.pdf.
6. Whitson, D. 2005. Chemical agent concentration review for CS: Recommendation
against concentration calculations. Tactical Edge, Fall: 4862.
7. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1989. Oleoresin capsicum training and use.
Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy.
8. Safariland Group. 2012. Safariland Training Academy manual. Casper, WY:
Defense Technologies Federal Laboratories.
9. Reilly CA, Crouch DJ, Yost GS. Quantitative analysis of capsaicinoids in fresh
peppers, oleoresin capsicum and pepper spray products. J Forensic Sci 2001;
46(3):502509.
10. Lee, R. J., R. L. Yolton, D. P. Yolton, C. Schnider, and M. L Janin. 1996. Personal
defense sprays: Effects and management of exposure. Journal of the American
Optometric Association 67:54860.
11. Croft, S. 2008. Standard for CS and PAVA sprays for operational police use. Great
Britain Home Office Scientific Development Branch, Revision 1, May.
12. Peter, K. V., ed. 2000. Handbook of herbs and spices. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
13. National Institute of Justice. 2008. Standard for oleoresin capsicum canisters. NIJ
Standard 0118.0, Draft, October.
14. Burns, T. J., C. Myers, and R. T. Wyant. 2007. Taser safe, or flammable? Law
Officer Magazine, August. http://www.lawofficer.com/article/magazine-feature/
taser-safe44-or-flammable.
15. Burns, T. J., C. Myers, and R. T. Wyant. 2006. Electronic control device safe: Can
you trust the label? PoliceOne.com, April. http://www.policeone.com/less-lethal/
articles/128036-Electronic-control-device-safe-Can-you-trust-the-label/.
16. Taser International. 20072012. Instructor training materials. Versions 1318.
Scottsdale, AZ: Taser, International.
17. NFPA. 1995. Guide for fire and explosion investigations. NFPA 921.
Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association. http://www.nfpa.org/
codes-and-standards/document-information-pages?mode=code&code=921.
18. USEPA. 2012. Physical or chemical hazards. In Label review manual, chap. 9.
Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Less Lethal Impact
Munitions: The
Forensic Testing Model
R. T. WYANT AND LUCIEN HAAG
5
Contents
Intent and Design of Common Kinetic Rounds 104
Effective and Safe 104
Backyard Testing and Its Value 105
The Need for a Testing Protocol 106
The 40mm 106
Scientific Method 108
University Testing Models 108
Muzzle Safe 109
Evolution of the CRT Testing Model 111
Speed (velocity, v) and Weight (mass, m) 114
Accuracy 115
Precision 115
Density (E/A) 116
Effective Range 117
Consistency 117
Muzzle Energy: A Common Misconception 118
Round and Weapon Tolerances: Often-Overlooked Considerations 119
FBI Ammunition Test Protocol 120
Origin of Ordnance Gelatin 121
Synthetic/Plastic Gels 124
Glycerin Soaps 125
Tissue Simulants and Less Lethal Munitions 125
Gelatin Calibration and Use for Less Lethal 126
Employing a Practical Testing Model 128
Firing Setup 128
Bare and Covered Gelatin 129
Penetration and Movement of Gelatin 130
Stability in Flight 132
Yuma Proving Ground 132
Ballistic Clay, Perma-Gel, and MBM Ballistic Soap 133
103
Three-Phase CRT Testing Model 135

Assisting Manufacturers in the Development of New LLIMs 137
Step Away from the Air Cannon 137
Ballistic Gelatin for Rubber Grenade Evaluation 138
Self-Evaluation 139
References 140
Intent and Design of Common Kinetic Rounds
The premise behind less lethal impact munitions (LLIMs) is simple: Deliver
blunt impact similar to a baton strike, but from an increased distance
to decrease the potential for both the subject and officer being seriously
injured. Designed to inflict pain, LLIMs are referred to by many terms:
plastic bullets, extended-range batons, rubber bullets, sponge grenades,
baton rounds, beanbags, and kinetic rounds. The intent of the deployment
of these devices is, of course, to stop an action or gain the compliance of an
unwilling subject. LLIMs come in a multitude of shapes, sizes, and calibers
(Chapter 3). Materials used for these projectiles have varied greatly, includ-
ing wood, plastic, rubber, and foam. They are generally categorized into
rigid, soft (flexible), and frangible and may have varying injury potential
and thus different applications (levels of force). The interaction of these
rounds with the human body is of the utmost concern, yet suitable inex-
pensive methods have not been developed to evaluate and compare rounds.
Impact weapons have long been the bread and butter of nonlethal force. They
are called impact weapons because they forcefully strike some object, usu-
ally a body, to cause an effect. Because motion is always required, they are
also referred to as kinetic weapons. Currently, and for the foreseeable future,
every weapon in this category works on pain compliance; the intent is to
inflict enough pain on an adversary to diminish the will to resist. Pain com-
pliance has proven an effective method of achieving tactical objectives, and to
be perfectly frank, we in law enforcement are quite comfortable with it. Its the
trauma that is used to achieve it that is problematic.
Sid Heal
Effective and Safe

Most agencies require that the device be both effective and safe, which
are subjective terms when applied in the context of less lethal. As stated in
Less Lethal Impact Munitions 105
Chapter 3, there is no governing body or standard for law enforcement per-

taining to impact munitions, so each agency wishing to deploy these options
must trust the manufacturer, conduct their own testing, or seek independent
evaluation of the round.
Many less lethal trainers are generally unaware of the wounds a LLIM
can inflict. Manufacturers often struggle to explain how a particular round
interacts with the body, as this type of testing can be expensive and requires
a significant knowledge base to be useful. Some studies have been per-
formed by academics, and testing models have been developed, but often
the data is specific to a particular round and may not apply to the inquir-
ing end user [1]. Hence, most departments do their own determinations
on what device will be effective and safe to comply with their policies. In
the United States, significant data on the performance of these devices in
the field has not been obtained, primarily due to many law enforcement
agencies deploying a wide number of options with no defined criteria or
mandate to obtain post-event data. The only prevalent data obtained are
from negative outcomes, typically stemming from lawsuits, which are sub-
jected to conjecture and interpretation. Additionally, there is limited data
available to correlate most ballistic testing models to practical applications
in the field (such as skip firing, Chapter 7) and to the wounds LLIMs may
inflict on the human body.
While a lethal weapon is judged on its effectiveness, a nonlethal weapon is

judged on both effectiveness and safety. This is particularly problematic in
that frequently these are competing objectives. As effectiveness increases,
safety decreases, and vice versa. Indeed, most nonlethal options work by pain
compliance, that is, by inflicting sufficient pain to attain a desired change in
behavior. Given its primitive nature, pain is usually caused by some type of
physiological distress, most commonly trauma of some sort. Since all uses of
force are attempts at changing human behavior, coupled with the fact that the
amount and type of force required is never completely apparent or universally
applicable, some injury can nearly always be expected.
Sid Heal
Backyard Testing and Its Value

When one of the authors of this text first started training his department for
the deployment of LLIMs in the 1990s, he was stunned to learn that no stan-
dard testing protocols existed. Aside from the limited information from the
manufacturer, there was little independent data that a police department
could utilize to evaluate new products. Little was available to train police
officers for a crowd-control event or to properly address a negative outcome

of a deployment. There were some testing reports available from academic
institutions, but end users tend to want to witness a projectiles performance
firsthand. What often occurs is that police agencies create their own testing
protocols and fire their new munitions into plywood, plastic drums, phone
books, or other media to provide them with a sense of what the round may
do when it strikes a person. Occasionally, the end user can perform a side-
by-side comparison to rounds that they have previously used. This is referred
to as backyard testing, which certainly would not carry much weight in a
courtroom. This type of testing can lead to a false sense of security or mis-
lead the trainer or end user as to how the round can perform when actually
applied in the field to an individual. Testing must be scientifically valid, yet
simple enough that police agencies can conduct testing themselves. Proper
testing follows the scientific method with specific, reproducible, practical
protocols.
The Need for a Testing Protocol

Thoroughly testing a LLIM is not generally practical for most police depart-
ments. LLIMs are used relatively infrequently in most jurisdictions compared
to other force options such as conducted electrical weapons (CEWs, e.g.,
Tasers) or pepper spray (OC). LLIM performance only receives consideration
when a bad deployment occurs from either poor judgment of the officer or
performance of the round itself. An easily reproduced testing model needed
to be developed that would compare the performance and effects of LLIMs.
For the purposes of this chapter, the 40mm single projectile will be utilized to
underscore the evolution and use of this forensic testing model. The authors
have devised a systematic protocol to evaluate the physical characteristics,
effectiveness, and relative safety of different LLIM rounds. This protocol can
help end-user agencies assess the practical qualities of LLIM rounds and
make educated selections regarding the usage of a wide variety of less lethal
projectiles.
The 40mm
The 40mm less lethal platform was based on the Vietnam War era 40mm
M79 and M203 grenade launchers, with the metallic high-explosive pro-
jectile being replaced with a less ominous plastic projectile with a soft and
yielding tip. The composition of the average 40mm is straightforward, typi-
cally consisting of an aluminum or plastic cartridge with a friction-fitting
projectile on top. The propellant is typically a small center-fired smokeless or
black-powder charge, similar to a blank. A wide number of round types are
Figure 5.1 40mm BIP rounds (SDI).
available for the 40mm platform, making it extremely versatile for a broad
range of operational needs (Figure5.1).
Launchers can be single or multiple (Chapter 3) and utilize simple firing
mechanisms like their grenade-launching parents. This weapon system in
a less lethal platform was used with great success (no serious injuries) hun-
dreds of times during the 1999 WTO riots in Seattle (Chapter 1). Despite
the lack of serious injuries during the three-day event, top administrators
from the police department tasked the less lethal and crowd-control train-
ers to devise testing methods to evaluate all of the impact rounds utilized
during that engagement and assess their relative safety. In 2003, less lethal
trainers from the Seattle Police Department requested assistance from the
Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory. That initial collaboration and
the data obtained instilled concepts and testing methods that are still in use
today (Figure5.2).
Figure 5.2 Scientist employing the scientific method.

Form Conclusions and

Make Observations Publish Results
Pose a Question Collect Data
Form a Hypothesis Create an Experiment
Conduct Research Control Variables
Figure 5.3 Scientific method chart.
Scientific Method
As with any testing performed by researchers, the approach to investigate

the behavior of LLIMs for the purposes of evaluating their wound potential
begins with the scientific method. The scientific method is a structured series
of steps that involve systematic observation to obtain empirical, measurable,
and reproducible data to answer a particular question (Figure5.3).
Steps of the scientific method typically include
Forming a hypothesis: a reasonable guess as to what may occur

Conducting research
Designing experiment to test hypotheses: structured and objective
Controlling variables
Making observations
Compiling and evaluating data
Assembling opinions
Repeating experiments to verify consistent data and outcome
University Testing Models

At least locally, it was revealed that most police departments do not heavily rely
on scientific studies and typically trust the manufacturers claims on which tools
to choose and deploy. What was surprising is that most manufacturers had no
idea how their product actually behaved in flight, how reliable it was, or how it
interacted with the human body. Scientific research regarding the performance
of impact/kinetic energy weapons had been conducted by a handful of enti-
ties to evaluate round performance. As live-animal testing fell out of favor for
humanitarian reasons in the 1970s, academics began to search for alternatives.
The Applied Research Laboratory (ARL) at Penn State, Wayne State University,
and other scientific entities had developed methods for testing that comprised
four main categories: ballistic pendulum/force plate, mechanical human fac-
simile (three-rib model), cadaveric, and tissue simulant models [24].
Each method exhibited some scientific value, but few tested the round
as it was to be used operationally. In addition, some background is required
to extract the applicable data from the published document. Although the
data is useful, one must be able to put a study into context on whether or not
the conclusions are applicable to how that round will typically be deployed.
For example, one study utilized cadavers averaging 80 years old. One can
surmise that an 80-year-oldespecially a dead one with thinner skin, less
muscle mass, and no blood pressure or skin elasticitymay interact differ-
ently with a kinetic round than the quite-alive 22-year-old anarchist that law
enforcement may encounter during a civil disturbance. One can certainly
attempt to compensate for the discrepancy mathematically, but it could lead
to a lack of confidence in the research. The less lethal trainer must make the
effort to weigh the data accordingly or consult scientists that can help put
the data obtained in perspective. The goal was to develop testing protocols
that would bridge the gap between the police and scientific communities.
Muzzle Safe
Often a dynamic police situation will deteriorate, and the officer may deploy
a less lethal option much closer than its intended operational distance. A
police administrator wants to be assured that even in the worst-case scenario,
Neither the terms effective or safe have been adequately defined in the force
domain. For example, if you use a nonlethal weapon to knock a belligerent
on his butt and he gets back up, a manufacturer would be quick to point out
that the device performed as designed, but you couldnt find a street cop on
the globe that would claim it was effective. The initial problem remains, and
the only option is another application of force. Likewise, safe is a relative term.
Safe from all harm? Safe in comparison to greater injury? The fact that an
adversary survived an encounter that would have otherwise resulted in his
death doesnt meet the standards of safe in many circles.
Sid Heal
Figure 5.4 Muzzle safe is not an accurate term.
the LLIM will not cause death or serious injury. Trainers often ask if a round
is muzzle-safe. Although an important parameter of testing is to evaluate
the LLIM at close ranges, safe is a relative and subjective term that should
be used cautiously (Figure5.4). Relative safety at close ranges is a tall order
given the trajectory curves of most LLIMs (trajectory degradation, Chapter
7). The velocities of the projectiles diminish much faster than their tradi-
tional firearm counterparts.
The nature and intent of the less lethal projectile is to travel downrange
and strike the target with accuracy and precision and inflict blunt trauma
(Chapter 6). To accomplish this while minimizing serious injury, the pro-
jectile must be light and small, such as a Pepperball projectile, or large and
heavy, such as a beanbag (sock round). Force from air resistance is imme-
diately imparted on the projectile as it leaves the muzzle, slowing it down.
Lighter projectiles will have less momentum, so they require a higher veloc-
ity as they come out of the muzzle to help overcome this resistance. Wind
resistance is generally reduced on a heavier projectile (more momentum),
but they are typically traveling at a slower rate, creating a steeper trajectory
curve. Although gravitational attraction (acceleration) is constant no matter
what the object, a slower projectile is subjected to gravity for a longer dura-
tion. Lastly, some rounds require several feet past the muzzle to flight stabi-
lize, increasing the risk of a tangential or oblique impact on a subject at close
range, aggregating injury potential (Figure5.5).
To accomplish a safer round at the muzzle, reduction of velocity is
required. The point of aim and point of impact of the round will suffer a
steeper trajectory curve. As that trajectory curve drops downrange, the point
of aim must be raised. In some instances the launcher must be aimed at the
head at maximum range in order to strike the optimal target area. This could
Figure 5.5 The ARWEN requires several feet past the muzzle to become stable
in flight (Yuma Proving Ground 2008).
prove disastrous if the officer misjudges the distance and strikes the subject
in the head. Take heed of those who judge a round intended and capable of
creating blunt trauma as safe. Under a proper scientific protocol, one would
never rate a LLIM as safe; rather it should be rated as one that passed/failed
the testing protocol based on comparison of other rounds with known out-
comes (Figure5.6).
Evolution of the CRT Testing Model
In 2003, a testing protocol was developed to provide a practical apples-

to-apples comparison of a variety of rounds that surpassed manufacturer
evaluation protocols [5]. Relying on previous research, there was a desire to
scientifically evaluate relative safety, effectiveness, and injury potential of the
projectile impact with reliable and reproducible results. Having a solid back-
ground in forensic ballistics and the understanding of how projectiles behave
in flight and interact with targets, the authors approached the LLIM test-
ing as similar to testing a new bullet fired from a firearm. Knowing that the
protocol would have to be modified to accommodate the slower and larger
projectiles of less lethal munitions, the baseline began with the FBI testing
protocol for round performance on human targets. This method of testing
was useful, as it subjected the tested bullet to realistic scenarios utilizing
tissue simulant that was widely accepted as a suitable surrogate. Before the
tested round was subjected to tissue simulant testing, preliminary data on
the specifics of a particular round was obtained, primarily to determine if it
would perform satisfactorily to meet operational needs.
Figure 5.6 All testing should be thoroughly documented.
Since writing my first forensic article related to firearms evidence in 1975, I

have seen many advances in this forensic specialty. However, there was one
area that had not progressed significantly when I entered the field of foren-
sic science in 1965, and that was the development of reliable, representative
soft-tissue simulants used for the study of wound ballistics. As the use of
live animals and human cadavers decreased, ordnance gelatin in a 20% by
weight formulation became the predominant medium in the research of bul-
let behavior by the U.S. military and the wound ballisticians at the Edgewood
and Picatinny arsenals. But details regarding its method of preparation, stor-
age practices, and temperature at which it should be shot were often lacking
in the results of these early studies. Most of all, no method of calibration was
included in these publications dating as far back as the 1960s.
Lucien Haag
The CRT testing protocol was initially developed to conduct in-house

testing of the current LLIMs in the Seattle Police Department arsenal. The
Defense Technology blue-nose foam baton (then the model 1006) and the
ARWEN AR-1 were the two primary LLIM platforms used by the SWAT team
and crowd-control cadres (Chapter 1). To help develop the testing protocol
further, a request for samples yielded rounds from several major manufactur-
ers of less lethal rounds. Defense Technology (Safariland), CTS (Combined
Systems), ALS (AMTECH), and Sage Ordnance all donated rounds for the
purpose of this study. Although our sample size (n) was relatively small, the
initial testing model was applied to a variety of rounds within the same cat-
egory to obtain some useful data.
To address these factors in the initial evaluation of LLIMs, the seven-
step SWAPDEC method (see sidebar) was devised to assist in assessing the
operational needs of the LLIM prior to any human tissue surrogate evalu-
ation and comparison (Figure 5.7). Muzzle velocity, weight, accuracy/pre-
cision [6], effective range, and consistency (dimensions, etc.) were carefully
documented. The most important factor is energy density, which is calcu-
lated based on the speed, weight, and size of the impact area measured on
tissue simulants such as ballistic soap or gelatin.
To evaluate all seven of these factors, at least 15 rounds should be fired
through a suitable chronograph (measures velocity) positioned at an appro-
priate and known distance on a static target evaluating the markers to iden-
tify any inconsistencies. Unlike most traditional firearms ammunition, a
large variability was discovered in the performance of some LLIMs when
assessing them under the SWAPDEC protocol. Most of these seven data
points commingle, meaning that if one were askew it would generally affect
Figure 5.7 Some of the equipment needed for SWAPDEC evaluation.

the outcome of the others. The tested round would need to pass the initial
testing before applying the next phase (gelatin testing) of the model.
The CRT less-lethal testing protocol (SWAPDEC) includes the evaluation of

speed (velocity) and weight (mass): used to determine momentum, force,
and energy
Accuracy: point of aim equals point of impact
Precision: strikes target in same area consistently
Density of impact energy: relates to shape, size, and material of projectile
Effective range of the device: does the trajectory path apply to operational
needs?
Consistency: weight, dimensions, flight characteristics within tolerance
Speed (velocity, v) and Weight (mass, m)

It is important to determine how much speed the round is losing from the
time it leaves the barrel until it strikes the target at its ideal distance. These
velocities are measured by placing matched chronographs near the muzzle
and at the target (Figure5.8). Manufacturers may increase the muzzle veloc-
ity to ensure accuracy at desired range, making a pound extremely unsafe at
close distances. Mass of the projectile can influence the speed in a dramatic
way. The more rapidly the round is losing velocity, the quicker is the drop of
the projectile as it travels downrange (trajectory degradation), decreasing its
Figure 5.8 Firing setup for velocity testing.

accuracy and precision. Inconsistencies between muzzle and target velocities

may also identify problems in flight stability. Measured velocities can be used
with the weight of the projectile to determine the kinetic energy and momen-
tum of the projectile.
Accuracy
Accuracy is defined as point of aim versus point of impact. In the first pre-
liminary test in 2003, the difficulty of striking an 8-inch by 8-inch target at
a 10-foot standoff distance was observed with some LLIMs that were on the
market at the time. Despite what interaction the round may have with the tar-
get, the first priority of a LLIM is does the round strike where I am aiming?
Precision
Precision is defined as the variance between impact areas on a target using a
constant point of aim and target distance. Some manufacturers are content
with a general area of impact near the point of aim, as expectations are lower
compared to traditional firearm projectiles. Considering the stress that a less
lethal deployment could incur on the end user, precision must be a priority
when selecting a LLIM.
TYPES OF LESS LETHAL TESTING MODELS [24]

Ballistic pendulum (force plate): Measures the momentum (P) of
the round as it strikes a steel plate. The device is fitted with
transducers, which allow an accurate calculation of movement.
Researchers admit that this testing model does not simulate the
human body, but has been used to intercompare LLIMs.
Cadaver/porcine: The use of deceased subjects in the course of
medical testing has been a common practice for centuries. This
model can closely predict injury to live subjects, but it is costly
and requires strict adherence to dignity and health protocols.
Obtaining a significant sample size in the similar area on the
body is often problematic [7, 8].
Mechanical human models (three rib): This model was derived
from the automotive industry to predict trauma in car acci-
dents. Data is captured by measuring the movement on a rep-
lica of the human chest, referred to as the three-rib model.
Tissue simulants/analogues
Gelatin: The 10% and 20% formulations are comprised of primar-
ily animal collagen products and have been determined to
closely simulate living human tissue. With testing protocols

developed by Dr. Fackler and other wound ballistics scien-
tists, gelatin is a widely accepted method for evaluating the
performance of small-arms ammunition.
Ballistic clay: Traditionally utilized for the testing and rating
of ballistic vests, this model has been adopted by some for
testing less lethal rounds [9].
Perma-Gel: This is a synthetic facsimile with qualities loosely
similar to 10% ballistic gelatin, but it can be utilized at
room temperature.
MBM ballistic soap: This is the current commercial version of
Swiss/Yugoslav ballistic soap. The authors have determined
that this media is very useful in the evaluation of LLIMs.
Regardless of which form they take, nearly all impact munitions are projectiles
of some sort and are plagued by a physics problem called trajectory degrada-
tion. All this means is that once a projectile leaves the barrel of its launcher and
is no longer being propelled, it is falling. Accordingly, the amount of energy
attached to a projectile diminishes with distance, and the projectile eventu-
ally falls to the ground, hence the term trajectory degradation. While this is
true of all projectiles, it is particularly troublesome with nonlethal munitions
because of their slower velocity and poor ballistic coefficient. Since the idea
is to transfer just enough energy to an adversary to cause sufficient pain to
overcome resistancebut not so much as to cause serious injuryit presents
some complex physics problems.
Sid Heal
Density (E/A)
The injury inflicted on an individual after being subjected to a kinetic
round is directly related to the energy transfer of that round onto the tis-
sue. Whether rigid, soft, or frangible, the projectile material plays signifi-
cantly into performance. The hardness (durometer) of the projectile also
heavily influences its interaction with the target. The manner in which
that round distributes energy becomes a primary concern when evaluat-
ing LLIMs. The energy density of a particular round can change when the
projectile strikes partially or directly on edge. When this happens, the
energy from the round can be transferred to a smaller area on the body,
creating a substantially different wound profile and possibly changing
(QHUJ\ZHLJKWYHORFLW\ ,PSDFW$UHD
Figure 5.9 Energy density (E/A) is calculated by the energy of projectile divided
by the area of impact.
the injury potential (Figure 5.9). Some publications have expressed this
value in J/cm 2 (joules per square centimeter) or ft-lb/in.2 (foot pounds per
square inch).
Effective Range
The typical deployment range is a common requirement for the consider-
ation of a particular less lethal tool. Ideally, we want our LLIM to strike a
target at 100 meters with a flat trajectory yet be muzzle safe, meaning that
a point-blank deployment will not cause serious injury. In reality, this is not
achievable given the very nature of kinetic weapons. As LLIMs are generally
sizable (wide and heavy) to prevent penetration of the skin and to disperse
their energy over a wider area on the target, their trajectories are typically
not flat, which necessitates firing in an arc to achieve a maximum effective
range. As many of these munitions leave the muzzle, they can be doing so at a
considerable velocity in order to be accurate at the standard deployment dis-
tance. The testing parameters must satisfactorily evaluate the effective range
as it relates to operational needs.
Consistency
A particular kinetic round is only as good as its repeatability. To help assist in
the prediction of consistency of a particular lot of munitions, measurements
of the round are imperative, including dimensions, powder charge, weights,
and velocities. The evaluator should establish acceptable variances between
rounds. In addition, how that round interacts with the particular launching
platform can also be of concern. A manufacturer once lamented that their

round did not fit into the launcher at an offsite demonstration due to vari-
ances in weapon tolerances. It is certainly preferable to identify this during
testing rather than in the throes of a riot.
Muzzle Energy: A Common Misconception
Some manufacturers have used muzzle energy to demonstrate a rounds

safety or effectiveness. This is a standard method to determine performance
of firearm bullets, primarily because most of them are designed in a similar
fashion (copper jacket, lead core). Muzzle energy is typically measured in
foot-pounds in the U.S. and is simply calculated by how much the round
weighs and how fast it is going as it leaves the barrel of the weapon. However,
in the world of less lethal impact munitions, muzzle energy does not entirely
account for how the round interacts with the body upon impact and cannot
be used as a reliable indicator of a rounds effectiveness.
There have been many attempts, and even some recommendations, to iden-
tify the amount of energy necessary to be effective but short of being seri-
ously injurious. The transfer of energy, however, is a factor of both design and
velocity. When we consider the fact that a young college student in Boston,
Massachusetts, was accidentally killed after being struck in the eye with a pro-
jectile that imparted only about 25 foot-pounds of energywhereas suspects
routinely ignore the impacts of 37mm and 40mm baton rounds that consis-
tently release in excess of 90 foot-pounds of energyit is clear that there is no
completely reliable fail-safe formula.
Sid Heal
Although the speed and weight of the projectile certainly play a role,
the most important factor in the SWAPDEC protocol is energy density, not
muzzle energy, in understanding how a LLIM interacts with the human
body. Certainly, the material and design of the LLIM is the primary factor
on how that energy is distributed. Consider that a sponge-nose projectile will
deliver its energy into the body differently than a frangible one given the
same speed and weight upon impact. Simply put, two types of rounds with
the same muzzle energy may interact with the target differently (Chapter
6). One example used in teaching is to equate energy transfer to a closed
fist striking a surface. The energy is distributed on that surface through the
knuckles and the base of four fingers. If a standard ball-point pen is placed in
(QHUJ\ZHLJKWYHORFLW\ ,PSDFW$UHD
Figure 5.10 Although each punch is of equal force, the energy is concentrated
on the pen tip of the lower image, increasing energy density and injury potential.
the fist protruding from between the fingers, all of the energy from the force
of the punch is concentrated on the tip of the pen. Although the total force
of both punches is equal, the damage they inflict on a target is dramatically
different (Figure5.10).
This principle can easily be applied to LLIMs if a testing model is
properly designed. Rigid rounds tend to have concentrated energy, while
soft/flexible and frangible rounds tend to distribute their energy over a wider
area. A perfect example of this is the tragic story of a 21-year-old girl who
was killed in a major city as a result of a poor application of a less lethal tool.
That particular platform only delivers approximately 2526 foot pounds of
muzzle energy compared to 80120 foot pounds of most other LLIMs. The
projectile, however, was small enough to enter her eye socket and cause the
fatal injury.
Round and Weapon Tolerances: Often-

Overlooked Considerations
With regard to the previous discussion of consistency, two significant fac-

tors that can influence the SWAPDEC evaluation are variances in round
manufacture and the weapon platform. Variances in manufacturing, either
by quality control or design, will affect round performance, including pow-
der charge variation, dimensions, weight, and crimping/seal tolerances.
The weapon system or firing platform must be considered as a variable as
well. The type of action (locking) and manufacturing specifications such
as chamber fit and barrel/rifling tolerances can greatly affect the function
and consistency of the round. LLIMs are typically made of materials much
softer than the steel of the launchers bore. The seal between the projectile
and the bore of the launcher must be consistent to ensure standard veloc-
ity. In addition, since the rounds are made of softer materials, barrel fouling
(especially in rifled barrels) can occur more rapidly and severely affect shot-
to-shot consistency.
After SWAPDEC of the round is established to be within acceptable lim-
its, it is then considered for the next testing phase. As noted previously in
this chapter, ballistic gelatin has been established as a suitable simulant for
human tissue, but modification of the FBI testing protocol was required to
accommodate the typical behavior of the LLIM with the body. The testing
model must be capable of capturing the data as it interacts with the gelatin,
as one would expect penetration into bare gelatin from a less lethal round to
be minimal or nonexistent. One of the biggest differences when comparing
LLIMs to traditional firearm projectiles is that the speed, size, design, and
materials vary greatly.
FBI Ammunition Test Protocol

A highly publicized shootout involving the deaths of two agents (Dove and
Grogan) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in April 1986 prompted a
new look into bullet performance. Although both suspects received fatal
injuries from the agents return fire, they were still able to continue shoot-
ing for a significant time before succumbing to their injuries. The agents
issued ammunition and its related incapacitation potential received great
scrutiny, prompting a review. The FBI began to explore ways to evaluate and
test new ammunition for their agents to carry. Dubbed the FBI Testing
Protocol, it was a simple, yet specific, process using 10% ballistic gelatin as a
test medium and various intermediate barriers between the muzzle and the
gelatin. The purpose of the barrier was to measure the performance of a bul-
let after impact into an intervening object most likely encountered in a law
enforcement engagement. The Ammunition Test Protocol (ATP) using this
gelatin is composed of eight test events, with five shots for each event. The
complete test consists of firing 40 shots through
1. Bare gelatin
2. Heavy clothing
3. Steel (automobile thickness)
4. Wallboard
5. Automobile glass
Bullet performance was rated based on muzzle energy, consistency,

bullet weight retention, penetration depth, and temporary cavity measure-
ment in the test medium after the bullet passed through the barrier. This
protocol is still applied today for entities wishing to evaluate pistol and rifle
ammunition.
Origin of Ordnance Gelatin
Significant advancements in the use of ordnance gelatin occurred in the 1980s

by the Letterman Army Institute of Research Wound Ballistics Laboratory
at the Presidio in San Francisco, led by Dr. Martin Fackler, a former mili-
tary surgeon with considerable experience in the wounding effects of bullets
from his service in the Vietnam War. Dr. Fackler observed a close correlation
between the behavior of bullets fired into swine muscle and 250-A ordnance
(Kind and Knox) gelatin formulated at a 10% w/w concentration with water
and chilled to 4C [10, 11] (Figure5.11). Luke Haag later contributed a mul-
tipoint calibration procedure using common 0.175-inch-diameter steel air-
rifle BBs to ensure that the 10% w/w gelatin blocks were properly formulated
and not degraded, which is usually the consequence of overheating during
preparation [12].
Dr. Facklers work ultimately resulted in a reproducible testing model for
scientists to utilize to help predict bullet behavior (i.e., penetration depth,
expansion, fragmentation, deflection) in human muscle tissue [13]. There
remain limitations, however. Unlike a block of 10% w/w ordnance gelatin,
the human body is not homogeneous, and in this respect the variability in
projectile behavior in properly formulated ordnance gelatin will be less than
that in a gunshot victim. A careful study of the variance bars for muscle
tissue and 10% ordnance gelatin in Figure 5.12 demonstrates this. These
results compare the average penetration depths of steel spheres of the same
diameter, weight, and impact velocity into the various media listed in this
figure. Steel spheres are the ideal projectiles for penetration studies, since
they do not yaw, do not deform, and produce straight wound paths in all
of these media. As can be seen in this figure, the classic 20% ordnance gela-
tin at 10C is somewhat more resistant to projectile penetration than muscle
tissue and Dr. Facklers 10% gelatin formulation. Also added to the mix is a
relatively recent American entry into the glycerin soap category (MBM) that,
if brought to the proper temperature (ca. 30C), has given comparable results
to 10% w/w ordnance gelatin at 4C and muscle tissue [14].
It only requires a little thought to realize that lung tissue, liver tissue,
a full bladder, an empty stomach, and muscle tissue all have difference
Critical Research and Training

Providing training, analysis, and independent testing of less lethal
systems by combining experience and science
CRT Less Lethal, Inc
CRT Less -lethal Impact Testing Protocol -2012

Part 2A -
Directions for mixing 25 pounds of 10% Ballistic Gelatin for Less-Lethal
impact munition testing
The Fackler research has demonstrated t hat properly calibrated 10% ordnance gelatin is
a reliable tissue simulant. Calibration of ballistic gelatin is verified by firing a .177 steel
BB at 590 feet per second (fps), plus or minus 15 fps, into the gelatin resulting in 8.5
centimete rs (cm), plus or minus 1 cm, penetration (2.95" 3.74" or 7.5cm 9.5cm ).
The gelatin MUST be stored at 4 C (39.2 Fahrenheit). The temperature of the gelatin is
critical, because penetration varies significantly with temperature.
Weigh out exactly 2 lbs. of gelatin powder and place in a 1 gallon zip lock bag.
Add 4 pounds (4 pints) of filtered tap water, temperature range 45C (80F).
Add half of water, agitate, then add the remainder.
Eliminate the air while sealing the bag quickly.
Gently mix the contents. The contents of the bag will become very stiff within
10 minutes.
Bring at least 15 pounds of filtered water to a boil.
Use a clean 5 gallon bucket with a lid. Place the bucket, without the lid, on a
scale note the weight or tare of the scale.
Break up and place the contents of the bag in the clean 5 gallon bucket.
Place the bucket on the scale and carefully add 14 pounds of boiling water into
the bucket until you have exactly 20 pounds of the mixture.
Account for the weight of the bucket, if the scale has not been tared.
Gently stir the mixture with drill/paint mixer for 30 seconds. Place the lid on
tight.
After cooling the mixture for 4 hours, tare the less lethal mold and pour 10
pounds of mixture into mold and place in refrigerator.
A househo ld refrigerator will take approximately 24 hours for the 10 lb block to
set properly. A commercial refrigerator will cool the block faster.
!
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PO Box 94579 Seattle WA 98124 -6879!
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CRT Testing Protocols 2012 Page 1 of 1
Figure 5.11Procedure for preparation of 10% gelatin blocks for less lethal
testing.
densities and vary greatly in elasticity. These properties affect bullet penetra-
tion and behavior; consequently, there is no perfect medium for predicting
wound potential and injury. Nonetheless, properly formulated ballistic gela-
tin closely approximates the behavior of projectiles fired into muscle tissue.
One of the foremost advantages of ordnance gelatin over other media (such
Soft Tissue Simulants
Relative Penetration Depths

Steel Spheres
Thorax
Abdomen
Muscle
Gelatin: 10% 4C
Swiss and* Maki Ballistic Medium (MBM)
Yugoslav Soap
Gelatin: 20% 10C
Swedish Soap
Clay
0 40 80 120 160
Range Mean pen. depth
Figure 5.12 Penetration depths of steel spheres into varying tissue simulants.
as ballistic soaps and animals) is that it provides a transparent medium,

which lends itself well to high-speed photography. This allows the visual-
ization of energy disposition, temporary cavitation, and bullet behavior as
the bullet makes its way into and through this medium. The static after-
math provides useful information regarding penetration depth, permanent
wound channel, bullet fragmentation, bullet expansion, and terminal bullet
weight. This information can also be compared to autopsy results from gun-
shot victims shot with the same ammunition. Comparisons with autopsy
results in gunshot deaths is a missed opportunity and an alternative means
of calibrating any formulation of ordnance gelatin or any other proposed
soft-tissue simulant [15].
Shots into properly formulated ordnance gelatin can also be used to
provide useful insight into what one can expect for the future use of any
tested ammunition when employed against a human adversary or victim.
Selected path lengths of 10% w/w 4C ordnance gelatin can also be useful
in assessing velocity loss for a particular bullet involved in perforating gun-
shot wounds. This requires the use of two matched ballistic chronographs
or a Doppler radar system designed for ballistic studies. Such determina-
tions can be of critical importance in the reconstruction of certain shoot-
ing incidents. For example, consider a situation where a decelerated and
destabilized 9mm pistol bullet only has sufficient remaining velocity to pass
through an interior sheetrock wall and comes to rest in the fiberglass insula-
tion. Laboratory testing subsequently reveals that a velocity of only 150170
feet per second is required to accomplish this. A deceased gunshot victim

is found outside the house with multiple gunshot wounds. Two of these are
perforating wounds: one through the left bicep (ca. 2-inch wound path in
muscle tissue per the pathologist) and one through the lower abdominal
area (ca. a 12-inch wound path). It should be evident how velocity-loss stud-
ies using the responsible gun and ammunition combination and 2-inch ver-
sus 12-inch blocks of properly formulated ordnance gelatin could be used
to exclude one wound and associate the other wound with the low-velocity
projectile strike to the wall.
Certain types of bullets are more easily deflected than others during
their passage through soft tissue and ordnance gelatin. The issue of bullet
deflection or deviation from the bullets original course during perforating
wound production can also be effectively studied with soft-tissue simulants
such as ordnance gelatin using a fixed mechanical rest for the firearm and
a downrange witness panel at a known distance from the tissue simulant.
Bullet deflection during wound production stands to be an issue in cases
such as the previous example. Multiple test shots will provide a reasonable
estimate of the sort of deflection one could expect in the actual shooting.
Fortunately, deflection angles will be small and on the order of a couple of
degrees or less for most pistol bullets. Elongated, nondeforming rifle bullets
present the greatest candidates for deflection as they pass through a gunshot
victim.
Synthetic/Plastic Gels
Several companies have sprung up in recent years that offer synthetic gelatins,
for lack of a better term. These products consist of one or more transparent
plastic polymers dissolved in mineral oil. Their totally clear and colorless
nature is a distinct advantage, as is their total immunity to bacterial attack
(a definite problem with ordnance gelatin) and the ability to shoot them at
room temperature. Like ordnance gelatin, synthetic gelatins also behave in
an elastic manner to projectile penetration. However, there are at least two
downsides to these products: Their densities are less than 1 g/cc, and projec-
tiles that do not completely pass through the product experience snap-back.
Muscle tissue and 10% w/w ordnance gelatin have densities of 1.031.04 g/
cc. Consequently, the retardation of a projectile in these synthetic gelatins
will invariably be less than in muscle tissue, and this will result in greater
penetration for any projectile being tested. If this parameter is important,
some sort of correction factor will have to be worked out for the particular
synthetic gelatin used. The phenomenon of snap-back means that the wound
path will extend beyond the projectiles final position of rest, usually on the
order of 0.51 inch. This will be visually obvious and will also have to be
dealt with if penetration depth is of importance. These products should not
necessarily be dismissed for certain wound or terminal ballistic studies, but
these shortcomings need to be kept in mind when one considers their use in
some studies or experiments.
Glycerin Soaps
A return to Figure5.12 will reveal that a number of countries have developed
ballistic soaps as soft-tissue simulants, and several of these would appear to
produce comparable results to muscle tissue insofar as projectile penetration
depth. This writer has tested several of these formulations of glycerin soaps
and found this to be the case, including the expansion of soft and hollow-
point bullets. These products offer several advantages to the wound ballistic
researcher over ordnance gelatin. Since they respond to projectile penetra-
tion in a plastic manner rather than an elastic manner, the wound chan-
nel and any temporary cavity remain in the positions and shapes in which
they were formed, i.e., they do not collapse following the projectiles passage.
This makes certain dimensional measurements much easier to obtain. This
includes the penetration depth at which any bullet yaw starts. The downside
of ballistic soaps is their lack of transparency. Videography is also obviated as
a consequence. and samples must often be sectioned along the wound path in
order to full appreciate the results.
Tissue Simulants and Less Lethal Munitions
All of the foregoing has dealt with small-arms projectiles and the parameters
of bullet expansion, penetration depth, destabilization, yaw, deflection, and/
or velocity loss for selected wound-path lengths. With the exception of pen-
etration depth, these parameters are likely to be of little interest or impor-
tance with less lethal munitions such as bean bags, shot-filled socks, rubber
buckshot, and baton rounds. The three parameters that are important are
penetration depth in a suitable soft-tissue simulant, orientation at impact,
and the parameter of energy density. The classic example would be one of
the early pillow-shaped 12-gauge beanbags that fails to unroll in flight and
strikes a subject on end. In this unfortunate situation, the energy density
(E/A) is high, and depending on the range and body area struck, this beanbag
may breach the skin and enter the body.
Shots into properly formulated blocks of 10% ordnance gelatin com-
bined with high-speed videography can provide insight into what one can
expect insofar as the displacement of soft (muscle) tissue during impact. A

suitable ballistic soap offers a special advantage due to its plastic behavior to
projectile impact. Its usefulness can be demonstrated by impressions left in
MBM ballistic soap by the impacts of two CTS Super-Socks. One was fired
from a Remington 870 with a rifled barrel and the other from a traditional
smooth bore. As discussed previously, the in-flight rotation of the Super-
Sock launched from the rifled bore caused it to expand to its maximum pos-
sible diameter, whereas the Super-Sock from the smooth bore retained its
normal in-flight diameter. The diameters of these impacts, the weights of
the Super-Socks, and their impact velocities (if known) can be used to calcu-
late energy density, which is a critical consideration in the study and under-
standing of less lethal munitions. Penetration depth and the uniformity of
the penetration can easily be measured in this medium. This information
would require high-speed videography and the inclusion of a suitable scale if
ordnance gelatin were used for this particular purpose. In addition, volume
displacement of the resulting cavity can be determined to evaluate consis-
tency and differences between similar projectile types [16].
Gelatin Calibration and Use for Less Lethal

Dr. Facklers protocol, which uses 10% Ballistic Gelatin (Kind & Knox 250-A)
mixed by weight and stored at 4C (39.2F), was determined to be most suit-
able for less lethal testing [17]. Each gelatin block must be calibrated before use
to ensure that its composition is within defined parameters. It is important to
note that properly prepared gelatin will have a linear association between the
penetration of a small steel sphere (BB) and velocity. Ideally, a BB fired out of
a standard air rifle at 590 feet per second should penetrate about 3 inches.
The linear plots from published documentation can be reviewed if neces-
sary to ensure that the gelatin is properly performance checked. Calibration
of ballistic gelatin is verified by firing a .177-caliber steel BB at 590 feet per
second (fps) (180 m/s) 15 fps (4.5 m/s) into the gelatin, resulting in 8.5
1 cm (2.953.74 inches) of penetration [12]. The gelatin was mixed using a
specific procedure and formed into blocks. Models utilizing 20% gelatin can
also demonstrate a suitable tissue simulant, although calibration parameters
are different.
Traditionally, a wound profile from a particular bullet can be determined
based on
Amount, type, and location of gelatin disruption

Projectile mass, velocity, construction, and shape (before and after shot)
Projectile deformation and fragmentation where appropriate
Penetration depth and cavity measurements
Figure 5.13 Ten-pound (4.5 kg) 10% ballistic gelatin block used for less lethal testing.
These parameters can be loosely applied to LLIMs if the correct consider-

ations are taken.
Once the gelatin is mixed, it is formed into 10-lb (4.5 kg) rectangular
blocks, which was determined to be an appropriate weight to evaluate inter-
action with LLIMs (Figure5.13). A block of 10 lb provides sufficient resis-
tance to work against the round as well as being small enough to measure
movement after impact. The block is placed on a patch of 3-mm-thick neo-
prene to provide a friction surface while still allowing movement. The block
must be allowed to move as it is impacted to capture the transfer of energy on
high-speed video (Figure5.14).
Figure 5.14 Editor calibrating gelatin using Fackler standards.

Employing a Practical Testing Model
The FBI protocol and Facklers standard were used as guidelines to develop
a forensic testing model for LLIMs; knowledge of how these weapons are
applied in the field was also incorporated into the testing parameters. A
round performing perfectly at the recommended operational distance may
be disastrous in a real-world application where the end user misjudges a
distance due to the stress of the situation (Chapter 7). In addition, a round
that interacts perfectly with the body in terms of energy transfer and blunt
trauma may not be accurate from shot to shot based on its interaction with
the launch platform. The round may not strike the target consistently due to
its shape or flight characteristics. A slight yaw of the projectile at the point
of impact could alter the wound profile dramatically. A researcher must
consider the practical application of these rounds and related factors when
conducting studies. The SWAPDEC evaluation should identify these char-
acteristics in the early stages with proper measurements, but interaction of
that round with tissue simulants will predict its performance in the field.
MEASURING EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR GELATIN TESTING

Carpenters level
Zero edge scale (up to 6 inches)
Chronograph capable of recording .177-caliber BB and 40mm
projectiles (200650 fps)
Digital caliber
Balance to measure weight of recovered fired projectiles
Still and high-speed photography equipment
Firing Setup
This phase of the protocol is designed to evaluate the round and its inter-
action with the gelatin to estimate a wound profile on human subjects
(Figure5.15). Accurate data requires the round to strike the face of the gela-
tin as close to the center as possible. The gelatin blocks are placed on a solid
platform to allow measurable rearward movement. Mitigating factors such as
round accuracy and precision, shooter ability, weapon platform consistency,
and other factors are controlled as much as possible. All firing takes place
on a solid, seated bench-rest position to reduce variability in the shooters
accuracy. The launcher is placed near horizontal and is aimed at the center
of the end of the level gelatin block. The launcher bore is inspected every few
shots and is cleaned often to reduce variability in velocity and round stability
Figure 5.15 Firing setup for gelatin testing.
due to fouling. Two chronographs are set up to monitor velocity consistency

between muzzle and target, much like in the SWAPDEC evaluation. The
launchers optical sighting system is zeroed at the two firing distances: 10 feet
(3 m) and 35 feet (10 m). The two firing distances are designed to evaluate the
worst-case scenario and the typical operational distance.
Bare and Covered Gelatin

It was determined that to fully grasp the characteristics of LLIMs, it was nec-
essary to test the round/gelatin interaction with both a bare strike face and a
covered one to simulate skin. In most circumstances, skin is easily overcome
by the penetrating power of a standard firearm projectile and offers little
resistance related to tissue simulant testing. As LLIMs are designed to be
stopped by the skin and not penetrate, the testing model must accommo-
date this parameter. Penetration of a less lethal projectile into bare gelatin
does not equate to penetration into the human body, but it stood as a good
example of the energy density that was already predicted mathematically.
To create a more precise prediction of wound profiles and energy transfer
into the gelatin, it was determined that a realistic, reproducible skin simu-
lant would be necessary. Previous research regarding air rifles and BB guns
placed value on skin penetration to estimate lethality potential. The research-
ers concluded that a skin simulant should give a threshold velocity (penetrate
the material) on the order of 330360 fps (100110 m/s) to be viable [1820].
A number of materials, including cotton twill, rubber, and chamois cloth,
were attempted. In addition to its ease of availability, 3-mm neoprene met
this threshold required in the literature and was determined to be the most
suitable skin simulant for the testing of LLIMs.
Figure 5.16 A 37mm beanbag striking gelatin covered in 3-mm neoprene.
Penetration and Movement of Gelatin

Based on the FBI protocol, a typical round of ammunition from a law enforce-
ment duty pistol will penetrate 1215 inches (3038 cm) of bare ballistic gela-
tin. With an accepted medium used as a solid foundation that would reliably
predict bullet behavior, the testing protocol needed to be adapted for the use
of slower and heavier less lethal rounds to accurately predict wound profiles.
The impact of the round into the gelatin was captured via video at multiple
angles, with the result being extensively still-photographed (Figure5.16). A
high-speed camera (minimum 250 frames/s) is placed 90 from the strike
face of the gelatin to capture slow-motion video of the penetration (tempo-
rary or permanent) and movement of the block.
With the impact and wound data collected from the 1999 WTO riots
in Seattle (Chapter 1), a sufficient baseline of field data from known out-
comes of LLIMs helped to establish a minimal requirement. Ideally, the
LLIM should intrude slightly into the gelatin, transfer its energy, and move
the block without significant penetration (Figure5.17). Initial tests revealed
that the less lethal rounds penetrated bare gelatin 1 inches (4 cm) or less
and moved the entire block 8 inches (15 cm) or less rearward (Figure5.18).
When a round penetrated and moved the gel block more than the average
distances, it proved to be an accurate predictor of the excessive energy den-
sity of a particular LLIM, bringing into question a rounds relative safety.
Common formulas used to understand the behavior of LLIMs

Force: F = ma (mass acceleration)
Momentum: P = mv (mass velocity)
Energy (KE): E = mv2 (one-half of mass velocity squared)
Figure 5.17 A 40mm sponge-nose projectile bouncing off bare 10% gelatin.
Formulas used to predict injury of LLIMs

Viscous criterion (VC)
VCmax = max[v(t) C(t)] (velocity chest compression); catego-
rizes rates as crushing, viscous, or blast injuries based on
numerical value
Blunt criterion (BC)
BC = ln[KE/m1/3td], where m = total mass of torso, t = skin/mus-
cle/fat thickness, and d = diameter of projectile
Energy density (E/A)
Energy of round over area of impact surface; typically measured in
ft-lb/in. or J/cm2
Figure 5.18 Capture of temporary intrusion into 10% gelatin (also calibration BB).
Figure 5.19 Examples of 12-gauge beanbags missing target at operational distance.
Stability in Flight
During the initial evolution of the testing protocol, it was observed that
soft types of LLIMs such as beanbags or drag-stabilized sock rounds fired
through standard police shotguns were unstable at close ranges. High-
speed photography demonstrated that some of these rounds were tumbling
and missing the target at both of the test distances of 10 feet (3 m) and 35
feet (10 m). This suggests that the tails of these rounds are not creating a
drag or stabilizing effect, perhaps from insufficient mass or due to gases
from firing.
During testing, most 12-gauge beanbag (sock) rounds demonstrated
accuracy variances at as close as 10 feet when fired through a smoothbore
shotgun (Figure 5.19). Sock rounds responded better to a rifled bore, fly-
ing more accurately and spreading the shot to the outer rim with centrifu-
gal force, a finding that was supported by previous research [1]. This quality
could affect point-of-aim versus point-of-impact on a subject, thereby creat-
ing an increased likelihood of serious injury (head or upper chest strike).
The data also suggested that all beanbags are not created equal. Some rounds
are constructed with a tighter, more compact housing, which can affect its
shape in flight and thus its wound profile and potential injury. This differ-
ence in construction was observed during our forensic testing and was dem-
onstrated during human exposure while filming a television documentary
(Chapter 6).
Yuma Proving Ground

Described previously in this chapter, some LLIMs experienced inconsistent
penetration in the initial gelatin, suggesting projectile stabilization issues
as the rounds departed the muzzle. In 2008, the U.S. Army was generous
enough to grant an opportunity to conduct some experiments at the Yuma
Proving Ground (YPG). Two platforms (ARWEN 37mm, model AR-1; and
Defense Technology 40mm, model 100) were evaluated using high-speed
photography and maximum distance testing with Doppler radar. The video
revealed that the AR-1 projectile out of the provided launcher was unstable
as it departed the muzzle, which tipped the round, and flew asymmetrically,
Figure 5.20Doppler radar testing of ARWEN projectile at Yuma Proving

Ground.
splashing into ballistic soap at 45 (Figure5.5). If it strikes a human target at

this range, the energy density (E/A) is increased, thus increasing the poten-
tial of penetration and/or increased injury at the impact site. The origin of
the destabilization was not determined and could have been attributed to
launcher tolerances. Nevertheless, this test demonstrated the need to evalu-
ate the LLIM at close range to identify potential flight-stability concerns.
During the YPG testing in 2008, both launchers were evaluated with the
U.S. Armys Doppler radar system to evaluate maximum range. It had been
determined through previous research that the angle of fire to determine
maximum range of most traditional handgun calibers is approximately 30
35. Both the 40mm (Exact Impact 1006 and Direct Impact) and ARWEN
projectiles were graphed and plotted with departure angles within that range
(n = 3) (Figures5.20 and 5.21). The maximum range for the 40mm 1006 Exact
Impact, 40mm Direct Impact-OC, and the 37mm AR-1 was several hundred
yards at a departure angle of approximately 3033, although some variabil-
ity was identified, perhaps due to round or launcher tolerances.
Ballistic Clay, Perma-Gel, and MBM Ballistic Soap

As mentioned previously in this chapter, the temporary intrusion into bare
10% gelatin can be captured on high-speed video to demonstrate the energy
density of a particular LLIM. The documentation of this interaction is a cru-
cial factor in how the round will react with the body, but it does require some
skill and interpretation. Additional options were required to demonstrate
round performance and predict the wound potential.
Figure 5.21 Doppler radar testing of 40mm projectile at Yuma Proving Ground.
Ballistic clay or roma plastilina #1 has been used for decades to test the
performance of ballistic vests. The clay is placed behind the vest as a projec-
tile (typically a handgun bullet) is fired into the vest. The cavity in the clay as
a result of the energy transfer through the vest is measured and quantified.
This measurement is referred to as a back-face signature (BFS). The NIJ con-
ducted extensive testing and determined that a BFS of greater than 44 mm in
diameter was considered likely to cause significant injury [21]. This method
has been used to evaluate LLIMs, but this medium did not adequately char-
acterize the effects of less lethal impact projectiles or correlate to what was
observed in the gelatin testing.
Mentioned previously, a relatively new product called Perma-Gel (mar-
keted by Safariland) claims to be equivalent to 10% ballistic gelatin, but can
also be stored at room temperature and has an indefinite shelf life. Although
a useful medium for demonstration purposes, tests conducted with standard
pistol ammunition and LLIMs has shown it not to be equivalent in replicat-
ing the energy transfer qualities (disruption and damage) found in standard
ballistic gelatin.
Forensic science colleagues in firearm examination had previously used
ballistic soap to compare bullet tracks of different ammunition types. Maki
ballistic medium (MBM, Maki Creations, Inc.) is the current commercial
version of Swiss/Yugoslav ballistic soap [22]. When properly calibrated, the
medium claims to be equivalent in performance to 10% ballistic gelatin, but
it can be stored at room temperature and has an indefinite shelf life. This
medium has successfully been used to evaluate the injury potential of less
lethal munitions by other researchers [23].
Preliminary testing into MBM determined it to be an excellent medium

for permanently capturing the temporary intrusion seen in the high-speed
video results of ballistic gelatin testing. Not only could the depth and diam-
eter of the resulting cavity of the soap be measured and quantified, but the
volume displacement of the soap proved to be another testing method to
intercompare LLIMs. The manufacturer recommends two different equili-
bration temperatures for the MBM block, depending on its use. Warming
to 82F (28C), MBM demonstrates a linear plot of penetration versus veloc-
ity equivalent to 10% ballistic gelatin and 39F (4C) for calibration with
BBs. MBM does not require preparation or special storage needs and can be
melted and reused just like Perma-Gel. MBM was added to the testing pro-
tocol to evaluate the wounding potential of new LLIMs prior to the ballistic
gelatin testing phase.
Three-Phase CRT Testing Model
Several evolutions of testing were conducted with a variety of rigid, soft,

and frangible projectiles into 10% ballistic gelatin and MBM analogues
(Figure5.22). They were also covered with a variety of materials to simulate
the resistance of clothing and human skin. The intrusion and impact size cap-
tured in the media were documented using high-speed video (Figure5.23).
The testing demonstrated that injury/wound potential is a combination of
velocity, weight, flight stability, and construction, disproving theories that
evaluate performance strictly on muzzle energy. These methods have proven
Figure 5.22 A 40mm Exact Impact projectile fired into MBM ballistic soap.
Figure 5.23 Flight of 40mm Exact Impact (blue nose) projectile captured on
high-speed video at Yuma Proving Ground.
to be useful when comparing impact munitions to estimate wounds and

blunt trauma resultant on human subjects. In addition to the surface docu-
mentation of LLIM wounds, the testing model was further validated when
compared to ultrasound scans of wound profiles from lateral thigh impacts
of human volunteers (Chapter 6).
THREE-STAGE CRT FORENSIC TESTING MODEL OF LLIMS

Phase One: Preliminary evaluation
Establish accuracy, consistency, and maximum range on
static targets
Capture wound profile in ballistic media (MBM ballistic soap)
Disassemble and cross-section projectile to evaluate con-
struction qualities
Phase Two: Ballistic media

Establish injury potential with 10% ballistic gelatin
Fire from two standoff distances: 10 feet (3 m) and 35 feet
(10.5 meters)
Use bare gelatin medium and covered with 3-mm neoprene
(skin simulant)
Measure intrusion and impact size on gelatin medium
Evaluate the round postfiring
Phase Three: Human exposure

Enlist volunteers for wound profiling
Use a similar target area (lateral midthigh) on all subjects
Capture velocity and weight of projectile
Conduct ultrasound measurements of pre- and post-wound
areas
Document the condition of wounds for 72 hours
Compare the observed wounds with those from other
projectiles
Assisting Manufacturers in the Development of New LLIMs
Most extensive studies on less lethal devices are funded by grants and may take
years to be in a publishable state for a law enforcement trainer to access. The
advantage of the CRT model is that useful results can be obtained relatively
quickly. In addition, a poorly performing product can be eliminated from con-
sideration early on by comparing acceptable parameters and known outcomes
from previous testing. After the initial testing evolutions of gelatin testing, the
opportunity surfaced to evaluate several LLIMs (kinetic rounds) on human
subjects (Chapter 6). This demonstrated that not only was the testing model a
valuable means to intercompare LLIMs in a controlled setting, but also to pre-
dict the wounds inflicted by these projectiles. This experience has been pivotal
in assisting manufacturers with the development of new products.
In 2012, Security Devices International was interested in evaluating a new
impact round, called the blunt impact projectile (BIP). The round was subjected
to the testing model and passed when compared to data compiled from previous
testing. During a demonstration of the device, police officer volunteers wanted
to experience the effects of the projectile. Taking advantage of this opportunity,
the arrangements were made to document the wounding of the volunteers with
ultrasonography. Before the final wound-profiling phase of testing, the volun-
teers were scanned using ultrasonography before and after the impact to mea-
sure blunt trauma inflicted by the impact. With great satisfaction, the depth of
damage documented in the volunteers was very similar to what was predicted
with the volume-displacement data from the MBM and the intrusion measure-
ments in the ballistic gelatin (Chapter 6). Based on feedback as a result of the
testing, the manufacturer modified some of its features and requested assis-
tance in training their development engineers in the testing protocol.
Step Away from the Air Cannon

What has been learned over the years with working with manufacturers is
that many utilize an air cannon to design the round and to conduct testing.
Although useful in the early stages to reduce costs, an air-cannon platform for
final testing of a round is not viable. The pressure curve of compressed air ver-
sus the curve produced by burning powder and expanding gas is not equiva-
lent, although the velocity as the round leaves that muzzle may be similar. The
heat generated as the powder burns may affect how the base of the round seals
gases in the barrel (obturation) and can aid in stability as it leaves the muzzle.
More than once, the author has seen an engineers sad face after the round
that he or she developed using an air cannon fails miserably when launched
out of a practical platform. As stated previously, weapon and round tolerances
can severely affect how the projectile performs. The slightest change in design
requires that the entire test be repeated to ensure that unanticipated variables
do not affect the overall performance and safety of the LLIM.
Ballistic Gelatin for Rubber Grenade Evaluation

Exploding rubber grenades (Chapter 3), marketed under names such as
Stingball (Figure5.24), Tearball, and Blastball, are designed to create a light-
ning-and-thunder effect that naturally frightens all animals, but in a safer
package than the traditional NFDD (noise flash distraction device). They
come with a variety of types, including CS and OC payloads as well as rubber
buckshot. The device is quite complex, as the main body separates from the
steel fuze assembly fractions of a second before the explosion. The separating
Figure 5.24 Gelatin setup for Stingball rubber grenade testing.

Figure 5.25 Setup to evaluate separating submunition (spoon) injury.
function prevents the fuze assembly from becoming a projectile from the
blast (Figure5.25). Blastballs were used with great success in the WTO riots,
but questions arose as to what injury they could cause in a worst-case sce-
nario, such as a deployment near the face.
With a strong knowledge base built on the behavior of ballistic gelatin
as it interacted with LLIMs, an experiment was devised that would test the
wounding potential of the rubber buckshot, the separating fuze (submuni-
tion), and the blast from the main body. Blocks of calibrated 10% gelatin were
placed around the device and detonated remotely. The separating fuze (sub-
munition) was captured on video as it struck the gelatin and bounced away.
The grenade body rolled against the gelatin face and exploded. No visible
damage to the gelatin was observed from either test aside from some thermal
changes to the outer surface.
Nonlethal weapons can provide moral alternatives in inherently amoral cir-

cumstances, but completely safe and effective technologies remain elusive. In
the search for these options, only objective approaches to examining them can
balance the risks and benefits of their use. Protecting the peace while preserv-
ing life is a gallant calling, but these are far more difficult to achieve without
objective science and fair reporting.
Sid Heal
Self-Evaluation
Studies have demonstrated that less lethal options are not always effective
in the field and have led to deaths from use or escalation to lethal force due
to their ineffectiveness [24]. It has been demonstrated that simple tests can
identify discrepancies in performance of a less lethal option. Identifying

these in a controlled setting can certainly minimize risk when later applied
operationally. Agencies are strongly encouraged to perform empirical, use-
ful, practical, and reproducible testingeither themselves or by an inde-
pendent entityprior to any deployment of products in the field. With a
structured scientific approach accompanied by sound research of the lit-
erature, less lethal options can be objectively evaluated to verify manufac-
turers claims on the capabilities and limitations of their devices. Firing a
few rounds into plywood and stating, Wow, that is awesome! just will not
suffice in the modern climate of risk management. Careful documentation
and high-speed video of testing can be powerful allies when justifying the
use of a tool during an event or defending its use in court.
References
1. Dahlstrom, D. B., K. Powley, and M. L. Fackler. 2001. Drag-stabilized (bulb with
tail) 12 gauge shotgun bean bag projectile. Wound Ballistic Review 5 (1): 812.
2. Bir, C. A., D. Viano, and A. King. 2004. Development of biomechanical response
corridors of the thorax to blunt ballistic impacts. Journal of Biomechanics
37:7379.
3. Kenny, J. M., S. Heal, and M. Grossman. 2001. The attribute-based evaluation
(ABE) of less-than-lethal, extended-range, impact munitions. Applied Research
Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University. February.
4. Wayne State University. 2011. Test methodologies for the assessment of less-lethal
kinetic energy rounds. U.S. Department of Justice report. December.
5. Wyant, R. T., C. Myers, and T. J. Burns. 2006. Evaluation of less-lethal impact
munitions. Presentation at 58th Annual Meeting of American Academy of
Forensic Sciences, Seattle. February.
6. Haag, M. G. 2008. The accuracy and precision of trajectory measurements.
AFTE Journal 40 (2): 14582.
7. Lucas, S. R., J. C. McGowan, T. C. Lam, G. T. Yamaguchi, M. Carvr, and A.
Hinz. 2013. Assessment of the Taser XREP blunt impact and penetration injury
potential using cadaveric testing. J. Forensic Sci. 58 (Suppl. 1): S6068.
8. Bir, C. A., S. J. Stewart, and M. Wilhelm. 2005. Skin penetration assessment of
less lethal kinetic energy munitions. J. Forensic Sci. 50:142629.
9. Wilhelm, M., and C. Bir. 2008. Injuries to law enforcement officers: The back-
face signature injury. Forensic Sci. International 174:611.
10. Winter, J., and D. Shiler. 1975. The material properties of gelatin. BRL Contract
Report No. 217. Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD. March.
11. Fackler, M. L., and J. A. Malinowski. 1988. Ordnance gelatin for ballistic studies.
Am. Jour. For. Med. and Path. 9 (3): 21819.
12. Haag, L. C. 1989. Suggested method for calibration of gelatin blocks. AFTE
Journal 21 (3): 48389.
13. Dahlstrom, D. B., K. D. Powley, and D. V. R. Penk DVR. 1998. 12 Gauge bean
bag ammunition penetration. IWBA Wound Ballistics Review 3 (3): 3841.
14. Haag, L. C. 2004. MAKI ballistic medium: A new tissue simulant. Presentation
at AFTE Training Seminar, Vancouver, BC. May.
15. Haag, L. C. 2003. Contemporary less lethal munitions: Their source, design,
exterior and terminal ballistic properties. Presentation at European Association
of Forensic Sciences Seminar, Istanbul, Turkey. September.
16. Nicholas, N. C., and J. R. Welsch. 2004. Institute for Non-Lethal Defense
Technologies report: Ballistic gelatin. Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania
State University.
17. Corzine, A. J. 1993. Correlation of ordnance gelatin penetration results between
20% at 10C and 10% at 4C. AFTE Journal 25 (1): 25.
18. Haag, M. G. 2002. Skin perforation and skin simulants. AFTE Journal 34 (3):
26886.
19. Haag, L. C. 2010. Standard steel BB perforation of fresh pigskin over standard
ordnance gelatin. AFTE Journal 42 (1): 5660.
20. Jussila, J., A. Leppaniemi, M. Paronen, and E. Kulomaki. 2005. Ballistic skin
simulant. Forensic Science International 150:6371.
21. MacPherson, D. 2002. Modeling blunt trauma from projectile impact. AFTE
Journal 34 (1): 2647.
22. Maki Creations. 2003. Procedure for the longhand calibration of Maki Ballistic
Media (MBM).
23. Kunz, S. N., J. Adamec, B. Zinja, D. Mnzel. P. B. Nol, S. Eichner, A. Manthei,
N. Grove, M. Graw, and O. Peschel. 2013. Wound ballistic evaluation of the
Taser XREP ammunition. Int. J. Legal Med. 127 (1): 11926.
24. Hubbs, K., and D. Klinger. 2004. Impact munitions: Data base of use and effects.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
Validating the LLIM
Testing Model,
Documenting
Wounds/Injuries
6
R. T. WYANT, C. WIGREN, AND T. HATCHER
Contents
Three LLIM Platforms 145
Pepperball 145
FN 303 147
40mm Direct Impact-OC 148
Volunteer Wound Profiling 148
Valuable Data from 2005 148
Guinea Pig Season 2 149
UK Guinea Pigs 150
Loaded Volunteer 151
Why Do We Care about Volunteer Wound Profiling? 151
Pathology Examinations Related to Less Lethal Impact Injuries 152
Approach to Injuries 153
Photography with One-to-One Superimposition 155
Examination of the Firearm or Launcher 157
Projectile Complexity and Resultant Wounds 157
Interpreting Projectile Wounds 158
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Abrasions 158
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Contusions 159
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Lacerations/Skin Penetration 160
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Fractures 161
Assumptions of Impact Surface 161
Assessing Internal Injuries: Mortality and Morbidity due to Head
and Neck Injuries 161
Assessing Internal Injuries: Mortality and Morbidity due to Chest
Injuries 162
Assessing Internal Injuries: Mortality and Morbidity due to
Abdominal Injuries 162
Documenting Injury with Ultrasonography 163
Evaluating Wounds from Less Lethal Munitions 167
New Products 168
References 168
143
The testing model described in Chapter 5 presented the authors a means

to compare different kinetic/impact rounds to evaluate relative safety and
wounding potential. With the addition of MBM ballistic soap, the static
capture of the temporary energy transfer into the body was obtained by
measuring dimensions and volume displacement. The combination of these
two media applied in a structured testing model allowed accurate apples-
to-apples comparison between varieties of less lethal impact munitions
(LLIMs). However, the model was missing the aspect of human exposure to
truly validate what was presented in the testing model as injury potential.
Was what the authors had observed in testing of the ordnance gel and bal-
listic soap a true representation of what wounds in people would look like?
The principal goal of nonlethal options is to prevent death or serious injury. In

reality, deaths are possible and injuries are likely. It would seem prudent, then,
to have an understanding of what types of injuries are probable, how likely they
are to occur, and what can be done to minimize them. It is, of course, impos-
sible to list every potential injury, much less how to avoid them, in a single
chapter or even a single book. Of necessity then, this chapter will focus on
identifying what causes the most common injuries from nonlethal weapons, to
whom and under what circumstances they occur, and those proven measures
for avoiding them.
Sid Heal
The authors were first given the opportunity to apply the forensic testing
model in a realistic setting when asked to assist in the filming of a documen-
tary for the Discovery Channel (Canada) in 2005. Ryan Stock, the star of the
documentary, subjected his body to a variety of traumatic experiences such
as being in a car crash and being punched by a professional boxer. The pur-
pose of this segment of the series, called Guinea Pig, was to demonstrate the
effects of various less lethal tools on the human body (Figure6.1). During
the first installment, Ryan was subjected to three LLIMs: Pepperball, FN
303, and 40mm Direct Impact (Orange nose) rounds, all in one day. In
addition, he was exposed to a significant amount of OC spray and the Taser
X26 within the same 24-hour period. The impact areas from the LLIMs
were evaluated and photographed at regular intervals to demonstrate the
surface damage to the tissue and how those wounds progressed over pre-
determined time intervals. Since all three of the LLIM platforms had previ-
ously been applied to the forensic testing model, the authors were confident
of the relative safety based on the target areas (sternum and lateral thigh)
selected. Medics were on standby, and first aid was immediately rendered
after exposure.
Validating the LLIM Testing Model, Documenting Wounds/Injuries 145
Figure 6.1 The first installment of Guinea Pig was filmed in 2005.
Three LLIM Platforms
Pepperball
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Pepperball (PepperBall Technologies, Fort
Wayne, Indiana) launcher is a slightly modified paintball gun, with the
spherical projectiles launched by compressed air (Figure6.2). This platform
was determined to be the least intrusive of the selected less lethal platforms
due to its low energy and frangible projectile (Figures6.3 and 6.4). A signifi-
cant prong of the platforms effectiveness is based on the dispersal of PAVA
Figure 6.2 Standard Pepperball launcher.

Figure 6.3 Pepperball PAVA projectile.
(synthetic oleoresin capsaicin, Chapter 9) to the mucous membranes of the

mouth, eyes, and nose. During a previous conversation, Sid Heal had stated
that his department deployed the Pepperball an average of seven times per
event. To concentrate the PAVA agent for increased effect, eight rounds were
fired in close succession at a 15-foot standoff distance.
Figure 6.4 Wounds immediately after impact from pepperball (double strikes
at top).
Figure 6.5 Standard FN 303 launcher.
FN 303
The FN 303 (Fabrique-Nationale, Belgium) less lethal launcher is also
a compressed-air-driven projectile with a specially designed launcher
(Figure6.5). The FN projectile is plastic with a bismuth (nontoxic) powder
in the nose and a payload (paint, marking, training, and OC types) in the
rear (Chapter 2). Like the Pepperball, it is designed to fragment on impact,
dispersing its energy (Figure6.6). At about twice the muzzle energy as the
Pepperball, two rounds were fired at a distance of 60 feet (18 m) to dem-
onstrate the range and accuracy of the system. The thigh was chosen as a
target area (Figure6.7).
Figure 6.6 FN 303 marking projectile PAVA projectile.

Figure 6.7 Two wounds immediately after impact from FN 303.
40mm Direct Impact-OC

Lastly, Ryan was shot with the 40mm Direct Impact-OC (Defense Technology,
model 6320, Safariland, Jacksonville, Florida) frangible round. This round
(referred to as the orange nose) is the cousin of the popular eXact iMpact
model 6325 (blue nose) sponge round deployed numerous times during the
WTO riots (Chapters 1 and 3). The orange nose, classified as a hybrid
round, inflicts both impact and chemical irritant effects. Unlike the other two
platforms that used compressed air, the 40mm utilizes smokeless powder to
propel the projectile out of a Defense Technology model 1325 single launcher.
This round was targeted at Ryans other midlateral thigh at a 60-foot standoff
distance. All three wounds areas (Pepperball, FN 303, and orange nose) were
photographed over time to document injury healing (wound progression).
Volunteer Wound Profiling
Valuable Data from 2005

For the first time, the testing model created in Chapter 5 was yielding
legitimacy. The impact areas predicted were realized in actual human sub-
jects of this wound profile study. Frangible rounds were selected to control
variables for comparison. The data compiled from the injuries on Ryan
were invaluable, particularly because of his willingness to document the
rounds over a period of time, providing a fantastic record of the healing
process for LLIMs. The FN 303 wounds were of particular interest. After
24 hours, the impact area looked surprisingly similar to that of the 40mm,
Figure 6.8 Wounds versus profiles predicted with testing media (MBM).
although the two rounds boast dramatically different sizes, weights, and
muzzle energies. This validated the hypothesis that impact energy den-
sity was highly significant in the evaluation of LLIMs (SWAPDEC model,
Chapter 5).
Guinea Pig Season 2

For filming of season two the following year, Ryan was exposed to a num-
ber of additional less lethal tools. He was shot with 12-gauge beanbags as
well as 32-caliber rubber buckshot fired from a 40mm launcher. He was also
exposed to a significant amount of CS gas and a civilian Taser. During a mock
riot as part of the show, nine rubber grenades (Blastballs) were deployed and
exploded at Ryans feet. For the LLIM scene, MBM (Maki Ballistic Media,
Chapter 5) was used to predict the wound we would see with the beanbag
deployment (Figures6.8 and 6.9). Ryan was shot with two different types of
sock rounds (one loose and one tightly wound) sequentially in each midlat-
eral thigh. The rifling from the shotgun bore affected the flight characteris-
tics of each round, which created dramatically different insults to the tissue
based on construction differences between the beanbags.
Figure 6.9 Wounds versus profiles predicted with testing media (MBM).
Figure 6.10 Blue nose and orange nose LLIM (Defense Technology models 6325,
6320).
UK Guinea Pigs
A similar television show involving three individuals from the United
Kingdom further expanded the knowledge base of how impact rounds inter-
act with the human body. In addition to exposing all three members of the
show to OC pepper spray and the Taser X26, two were shot with the 40mm
blue nose (Defense Technology, model 6325) and one with the orange nose
(Defense Technology, model 6320) (Figure 6.10). This gave the authors an
opportunity to compare wound profiles from each of the two rounds on indi-
viduals. The Direct Impact-OC, or orange nose, was touted by the manu-
facturer as being equivalent in effectiveness to the blue nose, but with the
addition of OC powder. Initial testing demonstrated that the wound profiles
might vary slightly due to the difference in construction materials (foam
versus frangible) (Figure 6.11). The resulting impact areas verified that the
Figure 6.11 Gelatin testing of orange nose LLIM.

Figure 6.12 Orange nose LLIM (Direct Impact-OC).
two rounds indeed affect the tissue differently, as the orange nose spreads its
energy over a wider area, whereas the energy dispersion of the blue nose was
more concentrated (Figures6.12 and 6.13).
Loaded Volunteer
Another volunteer from the United Kingdom traveled to Seattle to be sub-
jected to myriad less lethal tools for the purposes of a human interest article in
a popular mens magazine in the United Kingdom. He had a similar body type
to the other three lads from the previous U.K. show and was subjected to the
40mm blue-nose projectile. Like the others, his wounds were photographed
over specified periods of time and proved to be consistent with other volun-
teers in terms of size of impact site and wound progression over time.
Why Do We Care about Volunteer Wound Profiling?

Most deployments of LLIMs result in contusions, bruises, and generalized
blunt trauma to the impact area. However, as stated in Chapter 2, deploy-
ments of less lethal munitions in the field have also resulted in serious injury
and death. These injuries are typically related to penetration, laceration, or
fracture due to location of impact and type of projectile [1]. Relating the
forensic testing model to wounds in human subjects can serve to estimate
energy density (E/A) and thus prediction of injury. The volunteers reactions
and wound profiles (skin insult and blunt trauma) proved to be invaluable to
validate the ballistic gelatin and soap testing models. Physicians and other
medical personnel can use this data to assess and evaluate injury in the field.
Figure 6.13 UK Guinea Pig wounds (from left: blue nose, orange nose, blue nose).
In addition, officers who deploy these weapons in the field rarely see the sub-
jects impact areas as they progress over time. The appearance of the wound
at the time of arrest will vary greatly over the appearance even a few hours
later. Knowledge of the natural healing process may also prevent frivolous
claims after a person intentionally alters an impact site after a less lethal
deployment.
Pathology Examinations Related to

Less Lethal Impact Injuries
The forensic pathologist may be called upon to assess wounds arising from
the use of less lethal rounds. Although the subspecialty of forensic pathol-
ogy is commonly associated with examination of deceased persons, it must
be remembered that this area of medical expertise encompasses the study of
injuries and the impact of those injuries to persons whether they are living or
dead.
In order to effectively assess less lethal impact injuries, it is imperative
that the forensic pathologist be familiar with the armamentarium of devices
utilized by local law enforcement jurisdictions (Chapter 3). Exemplars of less
Figure 6.14 Cutaways of LLIM projectiles can help understand their interaction
with the human body (from top left, clockwise: blunt impact projectile (BIP),
Def-Tec 6325 Bluenose, CTS 4557, Sage KO1).
lethal rounds may be requested from law enforcement agencies or local crime
laboratories and maintained at the coroners or medical examiners office for
future use in wound comparison studies. Ensure that a complete unfired
cartridge is collected, as many LLIMs are composed of multiple parts, some
of which may incidentally impact the subject. Preliminary dissection of the
archival rounds into individual components together with diagrams to assist
with later reconstruction may be helpful, as well as cutaway examples, to grasp
the inner construction aspects of the projectile (Figure6.14). Photographs of
the surfaces of the individual projectile components with an incorporated
measuring device can also be useful in streamlining the process of later one-
to-one superimposition studies (see Figure 6.16).
Approach to Injuries
As stressed in other chapters, injuries due to less lethal rounds must be thor-
oughly documented. The external examination should include a detailed
body diagram depicting the wound, including the size, shape, color, orien-
tation, and associated injuries. Much like bullet wounds and Taser probe
impacts, the location on the body should be documented from either the
top of the head or position above the heel. The distance from midline should
also be included (Figure9.24, Chapter 9). Distance from a recognizable body
landmark (i.e., nipple, umbilicus, ear lobe) will help laypersons better visual-
ize the positioning of the impact site.
It was reported that the British used short wooden dowels fired from shotguns
to ricochet into the legs of rioters as early as 1958. Not unexpectedly, seri-
ous injuries are not only possible from these so-called knee knockers but are
likely. Even so, as primitive as they were, they were still less injurious than
lethal alternatives and are still manufactured and sold today.
Sid Heal
Following diagrammatic depiction, the injury should be photo-

graphed utilizing an overall, midrange, and close-up (macro) perspec-
tives. The macro photograph must be 90 from the plane of the wound to
be of value (orthogonal). All photographs should incorporate an ABFO
(American Board of Forensic Odontology) measuring device with patient
identifiers/case number (Figure 6.15). A colorimetric scale may be use-
ful in assessing the color of contusions (bruises). It is also helpful to
include the involved projectile in the photo next to the wound. Caution
should be exercised when incorporating either the exemplar or the actual
round in these photographs to avoid contamination of potential evidence.
In decedents, the subcutaneous tissue underlying the cutaneous injury
Figure 6.15 Proper less lethal wound photo (BIP round).

Muzzle Energy Material

Impact -Foam
-Weight -Gel Expansion
Surface
-Velocity -Frangible
Energy Density
Wound
Profile
Figure 6.16 Factors that contribute to wound profile.
is examined by dissection and documented photographically [2]. Any

corresponding injuries to viscera and associated hemorrhage are docu-
mented in the report.
Photography with One-to-One Superimposition

Assessing injuries requires wound comparison studies. This is best accom-
plished utilizing straightforward one-to-one superimposition of the wound
and the impacting projectile. This process requires photographs of the LLIM
and its individual components (such as the nose, base, wadding, and overload
cap) as well as the wound itself (Figure6.16). This is accomplished by pho-
tographs perpendicular to the surfaces of the less lethal round components
with an incorporated measuring device such as an ABFO ruler or, when this
is not readily available, the use of currency such as a penny.
Similar photographs of the wound, perpendicular to the skin surface,
can be used in a simple enlargement process such that the incorporated mea-
suring devices in each photograph match in scale (Figure6.17). Commonly
available programs such as PowerPoint can be utilized to accomplish this
enlargement process of the digital images and subsequent one-to-one
superimposition. Oftentimes, the involved round will not be available to
the forensic pathologist. Therefore, the archival rounds previously supplied
by local law enforcement agencies and maintained by the forensic patholo-
gist will be important in wound comparison studies. The responding offi-
cers may use multiple types of rounds during an incident, and front-end
Figure 6.17 Wounds taken by officers of beanbag deployments in the field (not
properly scaled or framed).
knowledge can assist the pathologist in rendering rapid and useful opinions
and conclusions.
Examination of the Firearm or Launcher

The forensic pathologist in collaboration with the firearms examiner
should correlate the injuries with the firearms laboratory examination. As
discussed in previous chapters, the interaction between the launcher and
projectile can affect flight characteristics and must be included in the assess-
ment of the injuries. To assist further research, the forensic pathologist is
obligated to either include the firearms examination as an addendum to the
report or to at least include reference to the report in the final autopsy/clini-
cal findings.
Projectile Complexity and Resultant Wounds

Another aspect of wound comparison studies is to understand the complex-
ity of the rounds based on their construction. As discussed in Chapter 3,
there is a wide variety of LLIMs, including single projectile, multiple projec-
tile, and beanbag types constructed from a multiplicity of materials.
Some LLIMs are composed of a main projectile but may also contain
wadding such as overpowder and overload caps (Figure6.18). The overpow-
der cap, as the name implies, is situated between the charge and the pro-
jectile to seal propellant gasses to increase reliability and consistency. This
overpowder cap may, depending on construction (typically plastic or card-
board) and distance to the subject, impact the skin (cutaneous) surface,
Figure 6.18 The wadding can remain with the main projectile with appreciable
energy upon impact (beanbag into bare 10% ordnance gelatin).
Figure 6.19 Overload wad impact on skin from beanbag round.
creating blunt-force injury separate and distinct from the round itself. In
a similar fashion, the load cap may also incidentally impact the skin sur-
face (Figure6.19). It is possible that a beanbag round with overload wad may
leave three separate wounds on the target: one wound corresponding to the
overpowder wad, one wound corresponding to the beanbag, and one wound
created by the overload wad (cap). Therefore, the distinction of blunt-force
injuries caused by the components of a less lethal round relies on a thorough
understanding of their construction.
Interpreting Projectile Wounds

The injuries created by LLIMs are associated with blunt force caused by the
impact of the round as it strikes the body surface. Blunt-force injury may
result in a scrape (abrasion), bruise (contusion), tear (laceration) of the skin,
and fractures of bone. On occasion, the projectile may penetrate the chest
cavity much like a traditional firearm bullet [3]. If the subject is deceased,
dissection (flap-by-flap technique) of the impact area is necessary to deter-
mine the depth and extent of injury to the area [2].
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Abrasions

Scrapes of the skin (abrasions) can be categorized by the direction of the
force in relation to the skin surface. A blunt force that lands against the sur-
face of skin at an angle such that it does not allow the projectile to slide and
abrade the adjacent skin as it encounters and interacts with the surface cre-
ates the classic impact-type abrasion. This is usually the result of a blunt force
impacting the body surface at a 90 angle (perpendicular to the skin). These
impact abrasions may create an imprint on the surface of the skin, leaving a
stamp of the impacting object. Therefore, impact abrasion imprints can be
Figure 6.20 Tangential impact creating abrasion.
very helpful in matching the pattern left on skin (cutaneous surface) by the
impacting object.
An example is an impact abrasion produced by the face of the head of a
roofing hammer as it hits the surface of the head at a 90 angle. The cross-
hatching of the surface of the hammers face is imprinted on the skin by the
blow. This skin imprint can be matched to the face of the hammers head
through one-to-one superimposition of photographs of both the implement
and the injury. Blunt force tangential to the skin surface can scrape the skin
surface, effectively bulldozing the abraded skin to one side of the injury.
This is known commonly as a scrape. The less lethal round may often impact
the surface tangentially, creating an abrasion (Figure 6.20). Directionality
may be implied by the skin heaped at one edge of the wound and may be
noteworthy in later reconstruction.
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Contusions

Contusions are the result of blunt force that impacts the skin and causes the
rupture of the underlying vessels present within the soft tissue (subcutaneous
tissue). These torn vessels leak, with blood seeping into the tissue adjacent to
the torn vessels. This is manifest on the skin surface as a red to purple color.
Examination of the bruise (contusion) may reveal a coincident impact abrasion,
depending on construction. The amount of blood that composes a contusion
depends on the individual. For example, a person with a bleeding disorder may
develop a very large contusion that evolves into collection/pooling of blood
(hematoma) that eventually exaggerates the size of the impact site, and may
lead to misinterpretation (Figure 6.21). Concentrated kinetic energy (energy
density, E/A) from the LLIM may cause contusions of internal organs of the
Figure 6.21Contusions from blunt trauma more prominent 24 hours after

impact (BIP).
chest and abdomen. Lung contusion may also result from impact. Collections
of blood on the surface of the liver (hepatic subcapsular hematomas) may arise
from impact to the right upper abdomen. Contusion of the bowel may result
from central abdominal impacts.
Of the deaths and serious injuries that have been reported, nearly all have
been from impacts in the chest region, either by a projectile penetrating the
chest cavity or by breaking a rib, which lacerates a vital organ. One of the best
solutions has simply been to change the aiming point from center mass to
the belt buckle. While penetrations of the abdominal cavity are still possible,
life-threatening injuries are greatly reduced by avoiding organs like the heart,
lungs, liver, and spleen.
Sid Heal
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Lacerations/Skin Penetration

Lacerations occur when the tensile strength of the skin and underlying tissue
is exceeded by the blunt-force impact or by sharp-force injury. This causes
the rupturing of the skin and tissue, resulting in a tear (laceration). Although
the intent of the less lethal projectile is not to penetrate the skin, it can occur,
depending on the body surface involved and the angle of the impinging blunt
force [4]. The production of a laceration depends heavily on the construction
of the projectile and the presence of nonmalleable (hard) edges that can effec-
tively catch the skin focally and exceed tensile strength of the tissue. Internal
organs can also be lacerated if a round impacting the abdomen concentrates
sufficient kinetic energy to tear the capsule of the liver and cause internal
bleeding within the abdominal cavity (hemoperitoneum). Similarly, an impact
to the left upper quadrant may lacerate the spleen, causing hemoperitoneum.
Interpreting Projectile Wounds: Fractures

Fractures of bone are the result of a large force impacting a small (focal) area.
The type of bone struck by the round is also a factor. Ribs of the anterior
and lateral chest are also vulnerable due to their approximation to the skin
surface. Likewise, the temporal bone of the skull, commonly fractured by
errant baseball throws, can be easily fractured by the less lethal round, with
subsequent collection of blood in the brain (epidural hematoma). The pres-
ence of bone pathology is another factor. For example, the elderly and women
may suffer from osteoporosis, making these populations more vulnerable to
pathologic fracture as a result of the projectile impact.
Assumptions of Impact Surface

Although it is commonly assumed that the projectile (nose) impacts at a 90
angle to the skin surface, this is often not the case, as humans are typically
not flat. More likely, the impact is glancing, hitting the skin (cutaneous)
surface at an angle. When this occurs, the nose slides over the skin surface,
either creating a scrape (abrasion) or, with the imparting of increased energy,
a tear (laceration) of the skin.
The round itself may develop yaw as it travels to the target and, in some
instances, completely invert by the time it encounters the target surface.
Therefore, comparing the less lethal round ballistics to that of a traditional
bullet is an oversimplification and may lead to misinterpretation of the
wound.
Assessing Internal Injuries: Mortality and

Morbidity due to Head and Neck Injuries
Several types of wounds can result from an impact of a LLIM to the head
and neck region. The soft tissue in the neck houses several sensitive struc-
tures that do not react well to crushing or blunt trauma. The resulting
contusions or hematomas (blood clots) can occlude the airways and major
blood vessels leading to and from the brain. Therefore, injuries to the neck
should be treated with the same caution as strangulation victims: computed
tomography (CT scan) to assess hemorrhage (blood) and edema (fluid in
tissue) with concomitant admission to the hospital for observation.
Impacts to the head from the deployment of LLIMs have occurred inad-
vertently due to a number of factors, including errant rounds, errant shot
placement, and subject movements/reactions (double tapping, Chapter 7)
with multiple rounds [5]. Injuries to the cranial region (head) include con-
cussions, loss of consciousness, lacerations (due to thin skin thickness), skull
fractures, and severe brain injuries. One of the most vulnerable regions on the
body, the eyes, can be penetrated if the round is small enough with sufficient
mass and velocity [6]. Larger rounds may also cause orbital fractures due to
the thinness of the bone structures in that region. For example, the bone of
the inner (medial) wall of the eye orbit (lamina papyracea of the ethmoid
bone) is extremely thin and vulnerable to fracture with minimal impact
force. Injuries from LLIM strikes to the head have ranged from a simple knot
(hematoma) to substantial brain injury or death. Impacted neck structures
may swell or inflame as a result of the trauma and may occlude the airway or
major blood vessels if not treated quickly. The depth of injury from impacts
to the head and neck should not be underestimated and warrants complete
imaging for medical treatment.
Of the deaths and serious injuries that have been reported, nearly all have
been from impacts in the chest region, either by a projectile penetrating the
chest cavity or by breaking a rib, which lacerates a vital organ. One of the best
solutions has simply been to change the aiming point from center mass to
the belt buckle. While penetrations of the abdominal cavity are still possible,
life-threatening injuries are greatly reduced by avoiding organs like the heart,
lungs, liver, and spleen [7].
Sid Heal

Morbidity due to Chest Injuries
Most fatal injuries related to LLIMs are due to penetration of the chest, with
injury to the thoracic organs [8] and rib fractures causing liver laceration.
Deaths from penetrations into the chest are not exclusive to the square bean-
bag penetrations outlined in this text [9]. Additionally, the projectile need not
penetrate into the chest cavity to cause a fatal injury. A plastic baton round
fired from 10 feet (3 m) fractured a rib, which then penetrated the heart and
lung of a 60-year-old male [10]. Morbidity due to chest injuries can be min-
imized with proper selection of round and weapon [11, 12] (rifled barrels,
Chapter 2). At close ranges, the projectiles can be traveling faster than their
intended impact velocity, which can contribute to chest cavity penetration
[13, 14]. With any potential chest penetration, X-rays are strongly advised, as
the laceration to the impact area has not always been initially attributed to a
penetration, with the beanbag round being recovered at autopsy.

Morbidity due to Abdominal Injuries
Injuries from abdominal impacts from LLIMs are lessened compared to
impacts to the head and chest due to the air spaces in the abdomen and natu-
ral cushioning of most individuals. Potential injuries include hepatic (liver)
contusions, lacerations, hemoperitoneum (blood in intestines), and in some
reported cases, penetration into the abdominal cavity [15] (peritoneum). Due
to the reduced risk of impact injuries related to strikes to the abdominal area,
many departments have changed their training to include primary target-
ing of this region for a less lethal deployment. From a treatment standpoint,
thorough examination of the impact site, including ultrasound imaging to
deduce the extent of the injury, is advised.
Documenting Injury with Ultrasonography
With the injury potential of the deployment of LLIMs well known, improved
methods to predict their behavior upon impact were explored. Early in the
development of the testing protocol in Chapter 5, the authors realized that
utilizing medical diagnostic scanning of the impact areas could yield some
valuable data as to the interaction of impact munitions with tissue. Diagnostic
ultrasound is an imaging modality that uses high-frequency sound waves to
graph the patterns of soft tissue (Figure6.22). Ultrasound also has the capa-
bility to detect and graph tissue motion and blood flow and has been used
Figure 6.22 Ultrasound scanning of subject.

Figure 6.23 Ultrasound imaging provides a cross-sectional view of the skin and
underlying tissue.
for over a decade as a tool to measure and evaluate blunt trauma [16]. For the
purposes of tissue characterization, the pulse-echo technique could be used
to interrogate the insult from an impact of a less lethal projectile. The images
obtained provide a cross-sectional view of the skin and tissue layers in order
to visualize damage and trauma to the area (Figure6.23).
An opportunity arose to apply this scanning technique to several police
officer volunteers as part of an evaluation of a new less lethal impact projec-
tile. Prior to each exposure, the target area of the lateral thigh was imaged to
establish a baseline image of the underlying tissue, including muscles, sub-
cutaneous fat, and superficial skin layers. The area was scanned and marked
using a permanent marker with an X. The permanent marker X was used
to maintain consistency between imaging and the shot placement. The skin
layers, but more importantly the deeper subcutaneous layers, were visualized
with mid- to low-level echoes and captured up to 4 cm into the thighs of the
volunteers (Figure6.24). Images were obtained using a 7-MHz linear trans-
ducer and recorded using a Medison ultrasound machine in real time in two
panes (sagittal and transverse).
The three sets of the sonographic images from each of the seven test
subjects (baseline, 5 minutes postfiring insult, and 60 days postfiring insult)
were compared to each other (Figure6.25). Using sonographic parameters,
the tissue disruption from the insult of impact (blunt trauma) was apparent
by the release of bloody fluids from the normal spacing within the subcuta-
neous spaces (hypodermis). Within the hypodermis layer are fibrous bands
anchoring the skin to the deep fascia, fat, and blood vessels on route to the
dermis; lymphatic vessels on route from dermis; hair follicle roots; nerves;
corpuscles (Pacinian); and fine flat sheets of muscles. When these areas are
Figure 6.24 Imaging can evaluate damage to tissue from blunt trauma.
crushed and compressed by the impact of the less lethal round, damage in
the form of bruising of the epidermis, dermis, and hypodermis results in
the loss of mid- to low-level echoes. These pattern changes in the structures
can be easily visualized (echogenicity) as blood and fluids leave their normal
spaces and mingle within the skin (dermal) layers.
Although the sample size was small, preliminary data indicated that the
measurements obtained from the forensic testing model in Chapter 5 closely
resembled the injury documented in the human volunteers (Figure 6.26).
During gelatin testing for this particular round, intrusion into the 10% ord-
nance gelatin was measured at about 2.53 cm, which was similar to the
depth of injury and tissue disruption captured on the ultrasound scans of
Figure 6.25 Sonograms from subject D from top: prefiring, postfiring, and 60
days postfiring.
Figure 6.26 Anticipating performance of new rounds.
the subjects. The 60-day postfiring scans demonstrated substantial healing,

nearly matching the prefiring scans.
Evaluating Wounds from Less Lethal Munitions
If the less lethal platform was properly tested prior to deployment, the depart-
ment trainer and investigating authority should already expect the types of
wounds or injuries they will encounter. The evaluation and documentation of
wounds and injuries from LLIMs should be no different from the documen-
tation of blunt-force injuries (baseball bats), sharp-force injuries (knives),
or gunshot wounds [16, 17]. Each wound site should be photographed,
measured, and annotated noting injuries such as abrasions, contusions,
lacerations, fractures, and round penetrations [18]. Blunt trauma to the sur-
rounding body structures can be evaluated and measured with ultrasound
imaging. Head impacts, fractures, round penetrations, and severe damage
to soft tissue such as neck structures require more aggressive and thorough
imaging diagnostics. Clinicians and pathologists must be educated on the
capabilities of the LLIM to produce injury and, if possible, included in the
selection and testing process of the round. A solid knowledge base allows
a more educated and thoughtful process when investigating a negative out-
come from a less lethal deployment.
New Products
The experimental protocol outlined in Chapter 5 was validated by the

wounds seen in human volunteers and was further supported by ultrasound
data. One could apply the testing model for the evaluation of new less lethal
impact munitions as they enter into the market to determine if they would
fill an operational need for the police agency. With solid testing procedures
and means to compare the product to other established rounds, research-
ers can test and verify manufacturers claims as to performance and relative
safety. As stated in other chapters, there can be substantial variability in the
performance, accuracy, and consistency of rounds. More importantly, some
manufacturers do not know the extent of the wounds or injury that their
rounds produce. A strong background into the behavior of LLIMs, sound
scientific protocols, and significant sample size would be required prior to
any exposure to human volunteers, even in an informal setting. Examining
impact sites from volunteers can yield valuable data, but as discussed here,
not understanding a less lethal rounds full potential prior to human expo-
sure can lead to serious injury or death.
References
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2003. Injury patterns related to use of less-lethal weapons during a period of
civil unrest. J. Emerg. Med. 25 (2): 21927.
2. Freminville, H., F. Rongieras, N. Prat, and E. J. Voiglio. 2011. The flap by flap
dissection in terminal ballistic applied to less lethal weapons. Am. J. Forensic
Med. Pathol. 32:14952).
3. Wawro, P. A. S., and W. R. Hardy. 2002. Penetration of the chest by less-than-
lethal beanbag shotgun rounds. J. Trauma 52:76768.
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Rizoli. 2009. Penetrating injury to the chest by an attenuated energy projectile:
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Training for a
Successful Less
Lethal Program
7
Contents
Selecting the Right Trainers 171
Accountability 172
Addressing Department Needs 174
Platform Selection 175
Know What It Does 178
Thoughts on Incapacitation 179
Student Exposure 179
Live-Fire Training 181
Trajectory Degradation and Targeting 184
Skip-Firing: Warning! 186
Breaking Firearm Habits 187
Rubber Grenade and Flashbang (NFDD) Training 189
Evidence Collection 191
Assessment and Scenarios 192
Crowd Control and Crowd Management 194
Staying Current 195
Documentation: Will Save Your Bacon 195
References 199
Selecting the Right Trainers
The success of the less lethal munitions program for a police department is
strictly dependent on the personnel chosen to oversee it. This undertaking
comes with a great amount of responsibility for the instructor and program
manager to provide useful and practical information to their students. An
instructor may be passionate, experienced, and understand that less lethal
options can be a tremendous asset, but also a liability if deployed improp-
erly. Poor applications can impact individual officers, their departments,
and even the communities they represent. It is crucial that the instructor
171
be willing to share information and be open to new ideas on how to train,

apply, and document the use of these weapons. This person or persons
should attend more than one instructor development training course
to help explore different approaches and learning methods. Trainers must
heavily stress in their curriculum lessons learned from good and bad less
lethal applications from their own agency and others. Excellent instructors
absorb and distribute information from many disciplines, styles, and phi-
losophies, helping to cultivate successful programs with limited negative
outcomes and associated litigation.
As there are no U.S. standards for less lethal deployments, policies for
police departments are generally directed by case law and court rulings
based on incident outcomes. These case opinions will influence how, when,
and at what level (low, medium, high) less lethal force is deployed. The law
enforcement instructor must start by building a solid knowledge of historic
decisions as well as researching recent ones that apply to the use of force and
less lethal deployments. Staying proficient in current decisions in the court
system not only helps prepare students for incidents in the field, but can
also influence and guide changes to departmental policy (Chapter 11). The
instructor should anticipate being involved with all aspects of a controver-
sial deployment and be willing and available to educate interested parties. In
addition, members of the police command structure should be encouraged
to attend a user-level course to gain a basic understanding of how the selected
less lethal options are used. By learning the physiological and psychological
features of the tool, they can intelligently articulate tactics and intent to the
media, politicians, or the public.
Accountability
The first priority for the training program is to ensure that students compre-
hend the complexity of decision making that applies to less lethal deploy-
ments. Most encounters involving the use of lethal force are straightforward:
Suspect pointed a gun at police and he was shot and killed (Figure7.1a).
Although these incidents can be initially scrutinized, the outcomes are usu-
ally justifiable and clearly understood by the public. Instructors must convey
that the deployments of less lethal options could often be in a gray area, par-
ticularly to the undereducated. What if that same person is holding a long
piece of wood in a similar manner. Does that justify shooting him with a
beanbag? The answer is maybe.
For example, take the person in Figure7.1b. The police policy authorizes
beanbag deployment if he makes a move endangering public safety. Then
how many beanbags? Does one round then justify ten? If he does not comply,
Training for a Successful Less Lethal Program 173
(a) (b)
Figure 7.1 (a) Subject holding a firearm almost always justifies lethal force; (b)
subject holding a stick may or may not justify less lethal force.
when should the officer try another tactic? In one case, so many rounds were
fired that officers drove back to the police precinct to retrieve more beanbags
after the suspect would not come out from under a porch. This choice would
shock the conscience of a normal citizen, but the officers stood behind the
decision, stating they were within policy, even though the suspect was cov-
ered with dozens of wounds.
The use of force is always accompanied by risknot just the risk of injury, but
the risk of ridicule. Assessing risk, then, becomes an important factor in con-
sidering what force options will reliably accomplish operational objectives.
Both the military and law enforcement communities are quite comfortable
with identifying the criteria that justify lethal force. After all, its a thresh-
old, and once crossed you can only be so dead. Nonlethal force, however, has
no such threshold. Instead, there is a huge gray area where legitimacy and
acceptability are blurry.
Sid Heal
The high level of accountability must be impressed upon students,

and realistic deployment expectations should be clearly outlined. Even in
instances where the use of a less lethal tool was clearly justified, the tim-
ing of the deployment, the number deployed, and the areas of impact could
be questioned. Although the instructor cannot prepare students for every
possible scenario, making students aware of potential inquiry based on their
decisions can encourage smarter engagements, reducing or even preventing
negative outcomes from the deployments of less lethal options.
During training classes, the authors say, Every department has a
knucklehead, and if you think you dont, then you are the knucklehead.
This joke always gets a laugh, but there is certainly some truth to the state-
ment that the choice of who is issued a less lethal tool cannot be taken
lightly. As illustrated many times throughout this text, one poor choice
involving a less lethal deployment can end a less lethal program or even
a career. It is critical, however, that everyone on a police department be
trained in the philosophies, concepts, and tactics of less lethal. A brief famil-
iarization course can mitigate ignorance from other divisions when a criti-
cal event occurs. During work on a forensic Taser case, the detectives did
not even know the SWAT team had these devices, much less what to look
for and collect at the crime scene.
In addition to supervising end-user development, one important
prong in providing adequate structure to a less lethal program is the
monitoring of equipment and inventory. Program managers should have
a tight grasp on who has weapons and rounds along with detailed track-
ing documentation, since it is likely that more people in the department
will be trained than those who actually have equipment. Serial numbers
of impact launchers and the lot numbers of training and duty rounds/
grenades should be logged, with the expiration dates tracked. Successful
Taser programs typically involve detailed tracking of devices and car-
tridges, including a notebook binder for each device containing perti-
nent history of that particular device, including the files of previously
downloaded firing data. If a critical or controversial incident occurs, the
instructor or program manager can provide detailed information to the
risk manager or investigating authority.
Addressing Department Needs
The choice of police equipment has always been constrained by budget con-
siderations and operational priorities. Preparing for major incidents such as
a barricaded suspect with hostages or significant civil disturbances requires
large amounts of training and specialized equipment. Some departments have

been creative by assembling regional teams for critical incidents, spreading
the operating and equipment costs over several departments. Others utilize
larger agencies to assist on warrant service and SWAT-type callouts. Having
specialized teams available to respond to critical incidents is a necessity, but
departments must also consider how to equip individual officers to address
incidents in the early stages.
Frequently, the call of a crazy guy with a pipe hitting occupied cars
does not allow the time to call a tactical team. For the first responder, types
of less lethal tools like Tasers, pepper (OC) sprays, and blunt-trauma deliv-
ery systems like 12-gauge beanbag shotguns are normally considered. Often
the correct timing and placement of a less lethal option can mitigate or
even avoid escalation of an event and remove the need for an expensive
and timely callout of a specialized team. In developing a less lethal pro-
gram, it is important to evaluate a number of selection criteria that will
assist in determining what will work best for a department. As outlined in
Chapter 3, there are a variety of options that deliver various levels of risk
and injury. Unlike our Canadian counterparts and others in the world, the
United States currently has no national standards for when and how force
is applied. There are general guidelines based on case law as well as models
for conflict management. Historically, police departments applied a use-
of-force continuum (Figure7.2), which has been gradually supplanted by
wheel, quadrant, and staircase models [1]. The models describe the types
and levels of a suspects behavior coupled with appropriate force options
available to the officer. Force options are typically described as levels 1, 2,
and 3. Level 1 begins with officer presence and ends at Level 3 with use of a
firearm/lethal force. Between presence and the use of a firearm is wherein
all less lethal options lie. It is the individual police departments decision
on where to place that option in the force structure, but most agencies place
their force options in roughly the same areas on the severity scale. Individual
department policies can vary, but most follow a standard of reasonable
objectiveness established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989) [1].
Platform Selection
As stated previously in this text, agencies can employ their old police shot-
guns as less lethal platforms. While beanbags (sock rounds) fired from a
shotgun lack the range and accuracy of their 40mm counterparts, they are
Figure 7.2 Use-of-force continuums can help guide decisions in the field.
inexpensive by comparison. The advantage of using a weapon system already

in place reduces training time, as officers are already familiar with the fire-
arm. Conversion of old weapons also reduces initial fiscal output for a less
lethal program. Conversely, when new weapons systems are employed,
such as an FN 303 or 40mm multilauncher, diligence must be given to the
students for practice and repetition to acquire the muscle memory involved
in becoming proficient on a new platform (Figure7.3).
Less lethal platforms must be dedicated and marked as such, especially
shotguns. There cannot be firearms allocated to fire both lethal and less
lethal rounds. Even with colored and clearly marked stocks, there have
Figure 7.3 Selection of less lethal options.

been incidents where lethal buckshot rounds were loaded and fired out of a
dedicated less lethal shotgun [2] (Chapter 11). There must be strict protocols
put in place to ensure that lethal and less lethal rounds are separated and
clearly marked. These points must be stressed during classroom and range
time with follow-up emphasis during continual training and certification.
Know What It Does

Once the choice is made on the selection of the types of less lethal options
for the department arsenal, the instructor will likely attend the manu-
facturers course on that particular platform and train on the munitions
associated with it. The company will provide product specifications such as
general material, mass, velocity, and operating range recommendations. A
common practice for manufacturers is to only list specifications that make
a particular round desirable. The durometer, for instance, is a tool for mea-
suring a materials softness. Rounds containing rubber projectiles will list
durometer value in the product specs because they are soft, but the durom-
eter value on the wooden projectile is absent. There is no fault, as they are
simply featuring the particular round in a positive light. The onus is on
the instructor to explore which features are going to best suit a particular
operational need.
Nonlethal projectiles are made from a variety of materials, including wood,

rubber, foam, plastic, lead, and even sand. Some are even made of soft rubber
and filled with a fluid. When dealing with a single composition, such as wood,
rubber, foam, or plastic, hardness is measured by using a durometer scale. A
reading of 100 is about as hard as a piece of wood, while a reading of 10 to 20
is about the resistance of a dry sponge. Human skin varies in hardness, but
generally is about 20.
Sid Heal
Observations and results obtained from testing and evaluation of

myriad less lethal options outlined in previous chapters demonstrates the
crucial need to go beyond information provided by the manufacturer. The
authors urge the query of manufacturers regarding any independent test-
ing that has been done on their product and advise being highly suspect
of those who have not. Additional testing to explore the capabilities and
limitations of those tools prior to conducting courses for end users may be
required.
Thoughts on Incapacitation
Frequently, manufacturers use the term incapacitation in law enforcement
and media circles to describe the intent or result of deploying a lethal or
less lethal force option. Incapacitation in the less lethal context is defined as
immobilization or submission, facilitating arrest. Unlike lethal options, the
effects must be reversible. An ARWEN striking the temple area on the head
of a subject has a high probability of incapacitation, but would most certainly
have detrimental consequences.
Most effects related to the usage of less lethal options rely on subject
pain tolerance and motivation and are highly dependent on the physical and
mental characteristics of the particular individual. A single beanbag deploy-
ment may drop an aggressor where he stands, where others may behave as
though the shot missed the target. Other modalities such as chemical irri-
tants undoubtedly have a physiological component affecting the subjects
ability to see or breathe, but can still have no effect on certain individuals.
It must be stressed to students that incapacitation is not guaranteed from
impact munitions [2] and chemical irritants. The only class of weapons that
can completely incapacitate an individual regardless of mental motivation,
drug levels, or physical strength are properly deployed electric devices such
as the Taser. Irrespective of the device employed, behavior changes will differ
between people and circumstances and must be anticipated. Administrators
and trainers should not use the term incapacitation so as to avoid impart-
ing a false sense of security to the end user. More accurately describing the
intended and actual effects of these options can help reduce liability poten-
tial for students and instructors when challenged in court. From the training
perspective, this approach plants the seed to foresee contingency plans when
the outcome of the less lethal deployment is not ideal.
Student Exposure
It has long been a law enforcement practice to expose police cadets to the
effects of OC (oleoresin capsaicin) to demonstrate the debilitation and
decontamination qualities of these chemical irritants. Instructors must con-
centrate on the practical teaching points of exposures as well as displaying
empathy to the students (Figures 7.4 and 7.5). Lining the students up and
exposing them for the purposes of the pain experience alone can be counter-
productive. Applications in the field usually do not go as planned, and stu-
dents should be prepared for exposure to themselves and colleagues during
the process. Students should be given tasks after the exposure to prove that
the effects are surmountable and then given sufficient resources to decon-
taminate (water source, open air, time).
Figure 7.4 Student exposure to Taser (CEW).
Some trainers have also exposed student volunteers to beanbags and

impact rounds as part of a course demonstration or product evaluation. The
authors strongly advise against exposures with impact munitions without
an intimate understanding of round performance following the SWAPDEC
criteria and modeling with ballistic simulants with a significant sample size
(Chapter 5). As described in other areas in this text, the qualities of some
Figure 7.5 Volunteer exposure to OC (oleoresin capsaicin) spray.

projectiles (wadding, shape, flight characteristics) can behave unpredictably

and leave significant wounds. Do not rely on a manufacturers claims of safety.
Police officers routinely subject themselves to experiencing the application

of Tasers during training. Indeed, estimates range well over 1 million appli-
cations on police officers who have voluntarily been tased. What is nearly
never reported, however, is that all the deaths recorded have been suspects and
none have been police officers, even though the exposure rate is one order of
magnitude greater than for suspects!
Sid Heal
For over a decade, Taser International has preached the value of volun-
tary exposures in their training program to master instructors. They serve
to validate the effects of the device to the observing students and allow the
volunteer to experience the overwhelming incapacitation results and recov-
ery time of the exposure. As with OC, this is a perfect teaching opportunity
to demonstrate the unintended results, less-than-ideal probe placements,
and other tactical options. Most agencies mandate or recommend exposure
prior to certification to carry the device, but some have prohibited this prac-
tice for fear of liability and injury. Forbidding volunteer exposures is not
without risk. An officer involved in a foot pursuit was accidentally tasered
from behind by a backup officer. She received the full effects of the device and
fell to the ground, striking her head. Having not been previously exposed to
the Taser and completely overwhelmed by the device, she believed she had
been shot with a firearm. She expressed such over the police radio, prompt-
ing the expected overresponse from neighboring agencies.
Live-Fire Training
The firing of the selected platform is the instructors opportunity to demon-
strate any additional testing performed outside of the manufacturer train-
ing. Although costs have prevented this for some agencies, it is imperative
that the operators have trigger time with the actual round that they will deploy
during an actual incident. Requiring only classroom instruction is inviting
disaster from a liability perspective. End users must demonstrate proficiency
on how to properly operate the selected platform. Training rounds provided
by some manufacturers have value in terms of targeting and accuracy. They
must be used to supplement, not replace, live-fire training and exercises.
Despite manufacturers claims, the authors have found that some training
rounds are not necessarily ballistically equivalent, related to the interface
Figure 7.6 Demonstrations of accuracy should include chronographs to record

velocity consistency.
with the firearm/launcher (internal ballistics), flight characteristics (exter-

nal ballistics), and how they interact with ballistic simulants (terminal bal-
listics)[3] (Figure7.6).
Some agencies have not required the firing of rounds during training as
a prerequisite for becoming a certified operator. This has occurred where the
department will spend the majority of the less lethal budget on expensive
multilaunchers with holographic sights, leaving no money for ordnance for
which to practice and train [4]. One agency practiced firing the rounds at
the range by shouting BANG and then simulating a reload of the launcher.
This cannot be accepted if one wishes for a successful program. Imagine an
attorney getting hold of that fact while investigating an injury claim from
a deployment of that round. The payout as a result of a barebones training
program could buy several launchers and practice rounds. In reality, a suc-
cessful claim from an unintended outcome of a deployment could dissolve
the program altogether.
The effects of the deployment on the subject, particularly with impact
munitions, must be discussed as well. Deploying a few rounds into a tis-
sue simulant (Chapter 5) can speak volumes to the operator trying to
grasp the pain and injury that may be inflicted during the deployment
(Figures7.7a and 7.7b). An extensive study of field deployments of impact
munitions showed that there are a number of injuries imparted from these
(a)
(b)
Figure 7.7 Authors urge measurement (a) of projectiles before and (b) after firing
into simulant to help demonstrate the performance of rounds to students.
weapons, from a simple bruise to skull fractures and chest penetrations

[2] (Figure7.8).
There have been some tragic outcomes from deployments related to impact
munitions. As described in Chapter 2, aerodynamics can affect the projectile,
destabilizing the round in the air and creating an unintended penetration and
injury. The authors recommend demonstrating the rounds flight characteris-
tics to the operators during training. If high-speed photography is not available
Figure 7.8 The study of cutaways of the projectiles can help visualize energy
transfer upon impact.
(Chapter 5), the instructor can set up witness panels (blank paper targets) at
5-foot increments. As the round passes through the panels, the profile of the
round in flight can be seen, demonstrating the behavior in flight.
Research has revealed that more than the range or the type of projectile, where
a person is hit has a greater effect on the severity of injury. Of the deaths and
serious injuries that have been reported, nearly all have been from impacts in
the chest region, either by a projectile penetrating the chest cavity or by break-
ing a rib, which lacerates a vital organ. One of the best solutions has simply
been to change the aiming point from center mass to the belt buckle. While
penetrations of the abdominal cavity are still possible, life-threatening inju-
ries are greatly reduced by avoiding organs like the heart, lungs, and spleen.
Sid Heal
Trajectory Degradation and Targeting

As stated in Chapter 5, LLIMs travel slower and are heavier than their lethal
counterparts and thus are affected by gravity more quickly than a traditional
bullet. Trajectory degradation must be demonstrated in training and empha-
sized during practice firing. These projectiles traditionally do not have the
flat trajectory of standard bullets at operational distances, although precision
of the less lethal is actually more critical. Once lethal force is justified, little
significance is given as to whether a bullet strikes the neck, groin, or major
joint, which cannot be said for less lethal deployments. One study placed a
vast majority of impact munition deployments in the field between 10 and 39

feet [2]. Instructors should illustrate where that round would strike at differ-
ent distances within that range and beyond. Place the target at an unknown
distance and quiz the students on the point of aim versus point of impact.
Ensure that the students realize that this distance will not be static during a
real confrontation and may also be misjudged under stress.
Most impact projectiles lack the precision and accuracy of the firearms
that officers are accustomed to shooting. From a confidence-building and a
liability standpoint, instructors are urged to demonstrate the accuracy with
a number of rounds on a small target similar to a thigh, not just by firing at a
large piece of plywood 5 yards away. This difference in round accuracy and at
what distances the round will reliably strike a small target must be instilled
in the students minds before they are involved in a critical incident.
Historically, less lethal impact munitions were targeted similar to the
lethal encounters: center of mass or sternal area of the chest. After several
negative outcomes nationwide, many agencies have chosen the navel area or
even below the waist as the primary target areas. Some departments have
chosen complicated zonal targets depending on the level (primary, second-
ary, and tertiary) of force they choose to employ (Figure7.9). This philosophy
tends to be problematic, as people tend to move and impact areas are rarely
that precise, especially with standard beanbag projectiles.
Figure 7.9 Example of a less lethal target demonstrating colored zones for pre-
ferred targeting.
Skip-Firing: Warning!
For decades, users have been instructed that many less lethal options may
be skip-fired to increase effectiveness and safety margins. Skip-fire is
generally described as aiming at the ground slightly before the intended
target, usually with a less lethal option that contains multiple projectiles.
The projectile allegedly strikes the ground and deflects at a low angle, strik-
ing the knees or shins of the subject(s). While this occurrence is likely in
most situations regarding deployments in urban environments, where
hardened surfaces such as concrete and pavement are predominant, bad
things happen if the surface is soft such as grass or sand. As Luke Haag has
demonstrated in some of his reconstruction training of shooting incidents
with traditional firearms [3], a soft surface such as grass or sand can have
a trampoline effect where the projectile deflects at a much higher angle
than expected.
During the initial testing evolutions in 2004, the authors tested this
premise with several less lethal options on several surfaces with vary-
ing results (Figure 7.10). For the most part, a softer surface will deflect
less lethal projectiles similar to firearm bullets, but at much higher angles
(Figure 7.11). This phenomenon was further confirmed by the injury of
a protester with a 37/40mm wooden baton round (Chapter 3). The indi-
vidual was struck in the face with two of the three wooden batons, causing
severe injury to the jaw and neck. An analysis of the scene revealed the
projectiles likely struck a rubberized dock and deflected at a high angle,
Figure 7.10 Impact round ricochet off concrete with K.C. McAuliffe.
Figure 7.11 Impact round ricochet off grass (high angle) with K.C. McAuliffe.
creating an unintentional result from a seemingly proper deployment.

Skip-firing on a variety of surfaces should be demonstrated to students
and included in assessments in the field as to where and how to deploy a
less lethal option.
Breaking Firearm Habits

Police officers have long been taught to double-tap, or draw and fire two
rounds quickly. Lieutenant Dan, a firearms instructor from Texas, once told
the author, Whats worth shootin once is worth shootin twice. This mantra
does not typically apply to less lethal deployments, however. As stated pre-
viously in this chapter, there must be objective reasonableness to use force.
Common sense would dictate that one shot would be fired; the response of
the subject is assessed; and then a second shot is fired if necessary to meet this
standard. The instructor should make this a major component of the live-fire
training. The point is further emphasized by several cases where the sec-
ond shot from a beanbag shotgun struck the individual in the head, severely
injuring or killing him [2]. A breakdown into these occurrences reveals
what can occur. The standard duty round from a police sidearm is traveling
roughly four times faster than the average beanbag. The slower beanbag takes
longer to reach the target, allowing the subject more time to react. Two shots
are fired in rapid succession. As the first round strikes the thigh, the subject
Figure 7.12 Often a strike from an impact round will cause a subject to bend
over (Direct Impact-OC).
bends over in response to the pain inflicted by the impact or bending in an

effort to run (Figure7.12). When the subject bends over, the second round is
already airborne, striking the head, which has now migrated into the target
zone (Figure7.13). Even though the officer was deploying the option within
policy and in accord with agency instructions, the officer and the agency are
now subjected to heavy scrutiny and inquiry.
Figure 7.13 When two rounds are fired in succession, the subject may react
before the second shot strikes, resulting in a head impact.
Rubber Grenade and Flashbang (NFDD) Training

Distraction devices (Chapter 3) are fantastic force multipliers and, honestly,
tactically awesome. Great care must be taken in their storage, transport,
use, and documentation, as their use incurs remarkable liability. Many
misadventures have occurred with these devices (Chapter 11), and safe
habits must be instilled during training. Lecture and hands-on instruc-
tion must be reinforced with specific policies and protocols on when and
how these devices are deployed (Figures7.14 and 7.15). For practical exer-
cises: the Palm, Prep, Peek, Pull, and Pitch method has been very effective
in creating consistent proficiency between students with bursting (rubber
grenades) and nonbursting (noise flash distracting device, NFDD) types
that use the standard military fuze. Manufacturers have developed grenade
bodies specifically for training (typically colored blue) to facilitate repeti-
tive and safe instruction.
Figure 7.14Student properly demonstrating the pitch of a rubber grenade

(Blastball).
5 PS FOR SUCCESSFUL GRENADE/NFDD DEPLOYMENT
Palm: Place spoon of device in palm of hand with fuze assem-

bly facing up
Prep: Prepare the fuze pin by rotating out of the locking mech-
anism or squeezing the ends of the pin together
Peek: Look to the intended target area
Pull: Remove pin with a quick and deliberate pull
Pitch: Pitch device toward desired target area
Figure 7.15 Exploding rubber grenade with rubber housing in center of blast.
Evidence Collection
Many types of less lethal deployments will leave evidence behind that is avail-
able for collection. After the live-fire exercises, walk the students around and
retrieve some of the remnants for demonstration and their placement related
to the target (Figure7.16). It is wise to start getting the students in the proper
mindset of documenting the aftermath of the incidents for defense in court
and education of a jury (Chapter 10). As those rounds are collected, compel
them to estimate the effect they may have on the body and discuss poten-
tial expected and unexpected outcomes (Figure7.17). Although penetrating
injuries are rare with modern products, review the potential consequences
and how to manage and document (photos, Chapter 6) the event to minimize
fallout if the incident is later scrutinized. It is important that the end users
understand that they are ambassadors for the weapons they use, and they
may be relied upon to educate investigators and crime-scene technicians.
The authors have seen a number of cases where a Taser deployment did
not have the desired result, and the incident concluded with the subject being
shot with a handgun. In the aftermath, the Taser and associated evidence was
ignored or not collected. The lethal outcome becomes the primary focus of
the investigation. It is only later in the investigation or during civil inquiry
when the effect of the Taser application is questioned, when it is too late for
any appreciable examination of the evidence. Collection of Taser-related evi-
dence allows a properly trained person to download and test the device and
evaluate the cartridge, probes, and wires to look for clues that can explain
an unintended or questionable outcome (Chapter 9). Photos of the crime
Figure 7.16 Note location of evidence left from less lethal deployment.
Figure 7.17Round recovered from volunteer exposure and resulting wound

(subject from Figure 7.14).
scene and a detailed description of the events will also assist in the evidence
analysis and prepare for potential litigation (Chapter 10).
Assessment and Scenarios
The requirement of a user to have a working knowledge of how a less lethal

option performs, its intended use, and the potential injury it can inflict can-
not be overstated. Most less lethal programs require at least a written test on
policy and general weapon operation in order to carry and deploy the chosen
system or platform. As with other police training, it is important to sub-
ject students to practical training once that foundation of product aptitude
is laid. It is certainly easier to select the round, load, fire, hit the target, and
reload when on the sterile gun range during a sunny day. Range practice is
indeed vital, but forcing students to also move as a team and fire at a moving
target while wearing their gas masks in a smoke (or chemical irritant) envi-
ronment is far more useful and defendable.
The instructor shall prepare students for the proper assessment of a threat
as well as the targeting areas of a suspect prior to the less lethal deployment.
It is important to utilize the time to have students verbalize the strengths
and weakness of that particular option, including expected or possible physi-
ological and psychological effects (Figure7.18). Many agencies, like Seattle,
impose scenario-based instruction (also referred to as force on force
training) as a significant portion of the training. Setting up scenarios can
safely evaluate students abilities to make less lethal deployment and other
Figure 7.18 Live-fire training should be structured but informal to facilitate

interaction.
decisions under a variety of situations and conditions. Mistakes that agen-

cies have made include tailoring less lethal training to always involve a less
lethal deployment. Encompass traditional tactical decision making into the
scenarios, including contact and cover, concealment, verbal crisis control,
and defensive tactic options. Sometimes the proper verbalization and com-
mands to the actor may de-escalate the situation, thereby eliminating the
need for a less lethal deployment. Mixing up the outcomes during training
translates to smart choices in the field (Figure7.19).
It is important to incorporate practical scenarios to provoke conversation
and discussion as to when and how to deploy a particular less lethal option.
Most scenarios are based on negative outcomes from previous deployments,
but they could be as simple as a deploy the Taser, do not deploy the Taser
situation. One popular scenario in the Seattle area is to douse the actor in
water and then sit him next to a red gasoline can holding a lighter. The offi-
cers are evaluated based on their scene observations as to whether or not to
deploy their Taser when the subject refuses to comply with their commands
or drop the lighter. The results were surprising, as many students focused on
the actors lack of compliance while ignoring other clues and fired the Taser.
In a real scenario, the spark from the Taser on the subject would have ignited
the flammable liquid/vapor, causing serious injury or death. The advantage
Figure 7.19 Author selecting rounds for 40mm live-fire training.
of these smaller scenarios is that they can be repeated many times with a
large number of officers with minimal set up time. Similar to the philosophy
of volunteer exposures, trainers should avoid only demonstrating the ideal
deployment during scenarios, as this can provide a false sense of security
regarding the capabilities of the tool and prove to be detrimental when an
unanticipated outcome occurs.
Crowd Control and Crowd Management
A crowd-control component should be integrated into the less lethal practi-

cal scenario training . As public protests are becoming more popular and
widespread, even the smallest of agencies must be prepared to handle an
unruly crowd with a detailed incident command plan. Specialized teams
are typically formed to monitor civil disturbances; give dispersal orders; be
familiar with protest and demonstrator tactics, mass arrest techniques, and
less lethal use; and practice efficient and effective line formations involv-
ing troop movement [5]. Crowd-management and crowd-control strategies
must be incorporated into any less lethal program and practiced regularly.
Departments have found mock riots with actors dressed as violent protestors
(masks, shields, drums) to be helpful in rehearsing methods and tactics to
manage and control these incidents. As with any exercise, it is far more use-
ful to anticipate and address problems in a controlled setting of a training
evolution before the chaos of the real-life scenario is encountered [6].
Figure 7.20Trainers should be aware of new products entering the market

(e.g., long-range impact munitions from Defense Technology).
Staying Current
In addition to being aware of new products on the market, the trainer should
also be familiar with trends and case studies related to less lethal deploy-
ments (Figure7.20). The Seattle Police Department set up an e-mail program
to update all end users on recent case law, department policy, and procedure
changes. Since the Taser is the most prevalent form of less lethal application
in the field, the bulletin outlines Taser incidents that have received media
attention. A brief review of the incident is discussed, and information related
to the application is highlighted. This is followed by a summary of the les-
sons learned by the incident to educate the officer prior to a similar incident
(Figures 7.21a and 7.21b). The department also issues regular police force
reports that are available to the public on their website, demonstrating the
agencys transparency to its operations (Chapter 11).
Documentation: Will Save Your Bacon
After the students have studied policy, seen numerous demonstrations, fired
the chosen platform, and participated in training scenarios to build confi-
dence in the less lethal option they will soon have at their disposal, their
success in completing the training program should be documented and filed.
The final portion of the course should involve demonstrating how to properly
report an application in the field. In reviewing case law related to the use of
force and post-event analysis involvement in critical incidents throughout
(a)
(b)
Figure 7.21Some police training, like (a) line formations and throwing gre-
nades, (b) is timeless. (Note the young Sid Heal in background.)
the world, the authors have found that important elements relating to officer
statements are often missing. Although it seems simple, often these cases spin
out of control simply because the officer did not properly detail and articulate
in the report the justification for the force used. The suspect resisted, so I
deployed my Taser often does not suffice in the eyes of juries, media, and
sometimes the police administration.
Documentation comes in many forms. Traditionally, the totality of the
investigation relied on officer statements, witness statements, and perhaps
a few photos. In modern policing, there is access to in-car video, on-officer
video, video from witnesses, video from business and traffic cameras, and
video posted online in addition to any written statements. What must also be
considered is that we now live in a CSI culture where it is expected that vast
amounts of physical evidence will be collected and analyzed. Evidence col-
lected at the scene can assist in telling the objective story of what occurred.
Less lethal deployments can leave a bounty of evidence: Tasers, probes, car-
tridges, wire, antifelon identification (AFID) tags, beanbag shotgun rounds,
wadding, impact munitions, distraction devices, and chemical-agent delivery
systems (OC and CS). The location of these items after the incident can provide
vital information, although this is often overlooked during the investigation.
Collecting and documenting physical evidence of the less lethal deployments
can limit conjecture and self-interpretation on what took place. Since incidents
involving force are a relative rarity in the scope of day-to-day law enforcement,
checklists can be very useful in completing a thorough report (Figures7.22 and
7.23). A comprehensive and detailed incident report will not only help detec-
tives in the investigation, but also protect the officer in the event of litigation.
The importance of proper documentation must be impressed upon students in
the early stages of less lethal training. Report writing related to risk manage-
ment of less lethal options is discussed further in Chapter 10.
Many real-world examples can be given to demonstrate the necessity
of a comprehensive and practical training program. The aspects described
in selecting and testing less lethal products in previous chapters must be
integrated into the training program. All of the facets and potential out-
comes of the weapons deployed by end users must be emphasized in the
early stages, including the expected and possible reactions of the impacted
subjects. Instilling good decision-making instincts in the end users can-
not be over emphasized, including the field assessment of targeting areas
and subject characteristics such as size and stature. In addition to proper
firearm handling, the use of voice command during training can introduce
good habits in the officer and will establish the officers intent during the
incident. This can prove invaluable when cell-phone videos of the incident
surface during an investigation. In total, the risk management of less lethal
options centers on the training, proficiency, and accountability of the end
users deploying them.
USE OF FORCE CHECKLIST

PREFACE - Department pre -statement if required (This is a true and involuntary statement given in
compliance with department policy and procedure directive 0.00.00.)
ESTABLISH CONDITIONS - Time, location, reason for contact and assignment.

(This should include the known actions of the subject prior to arrival, if he was a threat to himself or others, if
weapons or access to weapons. Other statements of concern)
NEED AND NATURE OF THE SEIZURE: Probable cause, reasonable suspicion, life safety.
ASSESSMENT OF THREAT: Specific nature, type and severity of threat.

(Who is at risk? Officers, bystanders, victims or is the subject a threat to themself. Is there a presence of
aggravating circumstances like multiple subjects, hostile environment e.g. , bars, workplace, known gang hangout
or neighborhood. Environmental issues such as bridges, ledges, water or heavily travelled roadways. Weapons or
immediate access to them.)
SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS: Size, age, demeanor, impairment, prior history, demonstrated willingness
for violence to achieve ends, disregarded for own safety and the safety of others.
NEED FOR RESPONSE: Why? Explain urgency. Alternatives considered and why force was preferable to
other options.
ACTION TAKEN: Specific actions, intended purpose, was warning given?

if not , explain why it was not feasible.
REASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT: Change in behavior, effective application of force?
ADAPTATION OF THE RESPONSE: Did the action taken escalate or de-escalate the situation?
FOLLOW -UP: Control, Res traints, Injuries? (ALL PARTIES) Treatment? Notification of supervisor?
C LOSING Disposition of subject (Hospital or jail) with reports included.
Figure 7.22 Use-of-force checklist for officers.

TASER Model (M26, X26, X2 or X3)
TASER Serial Number
Number of Cartridges Deployed
Cartridge Serial Number (label on back of cartridge or AFID tags)
Approximate Distance of Deployment
Probe/Contact Placement
Drive Stun/Contact Placement
Effect , Suspect Behavior
Approximate Number of Cycles
Evidence Collection
Follow -up Treatment , Medical Evaluation
Firing Data Download (if applicable)
Screening Supervisor Approval
Figure 7.23 Taser use checklist.
References
1. Hughes, E. L., and R. Osborne, eds. 2010. A guidebook for less-lethal devices:
Planning for, selecting, and implementing technology solutions. U.S. Department
of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Weapons and Protective Systems
Technologies Center, Applied Research Laboratory, Penn State University.
2. Hubbs, K., and D. Klinger. 2004. Impact munitions: Database of use and
effects. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice report, Pro Tac
International, CA.
3. Haag, M. D., and L. C. Haag. 2006. Chap. 7 In Shooting incident reconstruction.
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
4. Whitson, D. 2009. Less-lethal impact systems: Training concepts and deficien-
cies. Tactical Edge, Winter 2009: 2230.
5. California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. 2003. Crowd
management and civil disobedience guidelines. California Commission on POST.
6. Heal, S. 2013. Adaptive decision making. Tactical Edge, Spring 2013: 8284.
http://www.ntoa.org/massemail/SP13Heal.pdf.
Arrest-Related
Death, In-Custody
Death, and Excited
Delirium Syndrome
8
R. T. WYANT
Contents
ExDS Defined 202
Meanwhile, in 1849 203
Stimulant Drugs 204
Hyperthermia and Other Clues as Police Converge 204
Insensitivity to Pain and Superhuman Strength 205
Period of Peril 206
Autopsy Findings 206
Police Response Must Mitigate Negative Outcomes 207
Identify 208
Control 210
Taser-Related Death 211
ExDS Deaths with No Taser 213
Police Can Be Their Own Worst Enemy 214
Information Sharing 214
References 218
One of the biggest personal challenges and stress-inducing situations facing

the street officer today is when someone is uncontrollable and then dies dur-
ing attempts to effect an arrest. Despite the cause or origin of the medical
crisis that ensues during or after a struggle with police or corrections officers,
the responding officer is nearly always immediately blamed. Some of the fin-
ger pointing has led to criminal charges being levied upon officers, dividing
the community and fueling the decrease of public trust. Typically, officers are
exonerated only after lengthy litigation, with the inevitable inclusion of duel-
ing medical experts on both sides. The result is of great cost to the depart-
ment and the officers well-being. What is often overshadowed is the toll that
an unexplained death can have on family members of the deceased who do
not understand why their loved one was beat to death by police with no
evident or conclusive cause of death. Only in recent years has a condition
been recognized and generally accepted by those in the medical community
[13]. Dubbed as the salvation for wrongly accused officers, this condition
201
has quickly became the catch-all diagnosis for anyone who does not comply
or fails to thrive when arrested by police. With the proper recognition and
response by police and medical personnel, these individuals in grave danger
can be helped, thereby preventing or mitigating negative outcomes.
ExDS Defined
Not unlike the description of less lethal options outlined in Chapter 2, this
disorder has been called a variety of things based on the opinion of the aca-
demic doing research on the topic: in-custody death syndrome, police-custody
death syndrome, agitated delirium, manic exhaustive syndrome, cocaine psy-
chosis, cocaine-associated rhabdomyolysis, sudden custody death syndrome,
acute exhaustive mania, and drug-induced excited delirium all relate to the
same condition. For the purposes of this chapter, the conditions described
shall be referred to as excited delirium syndrome (ExDS) [4].
This condition can most easily be described as an altered state of con-
sciousness leading to overexertion and sometimes death [5]. This state can be
accompanied by paranoia, hallucinations, extreme agitation, disorientation,
shouting or keening (animal noises), unintelligible speech, refusal of food,
panic, eyes wide open (referred to as bug eyes), insensitivity to pain, vio-
lence, excessive strength, and bizarre behavior. As some of these indicators
could apply to some of the indigenous downtown population on a typical
Saturday night, one sign that often leads to 911 calls (000 in Australia) and
police involvement is extreme aggressive behavior. This behavior manifests
itself in a number of ways, including harm to self and others, from hitting
passing cars to chasing pedestrians and growling at them. As this individual
progresses, his safety and that of the public become the responsibility of the
responding police officer. Once the police arrive on scene, they typically do
not have the option of leaving and must address the situation, in effect taking
responsibility for this person.
MYTHS ASSOCIATED WITH EXDS [6]

ExDS is not a recognized medical term.
ExDS is a term made up by law enforcement or Taser
International.
ExDS is always fatal.
Law enforcement should not attempt to diagnose a medical
condition.
First responders can de-escalate every situation with words.
It is all about police covering up.
Arrest-Related Death 203
Meanwhile, in 1849
A doctor named Luther Bell of the McLean Asylum for the Insane in
Somerville, Massachusetts, first described bizarre behavior from patients in
his mental institution in 1849. They would overheat, fight staff, work them-
selves into a frenzy, and die. Bell believed he had discovered a new disease,
coined the condition Bells mania, and published a paper in the American
Journal of Insanity. This syndrome was taught in medical schools as a dis-
order where people would die after exhausting themselves. As psychiatric
medicine progressed along with the advent of psychotropic drugs, people
normally relegated to mental institutions were controlled with medication
and released into society. Around 1950, descriptions of this condition disap-
peared from medical education and literature; however, the deaths were still
occurring [1].
With the modern medical community generally uninformed of this con-
dition, these patients became the problem of law enforcement. Police were not
properly trained or equipped to manage people in a psychotic medical crisis
and subsequently resorted to what they knew: dominate, restrain, throw into
jail, and make them think about what they had done. Not surprisingly, these
people were dying on the streets, in the back seats of patrol cars, and in jails.
Scrutiny and criticism increased on police practices related to these deaths
and on the methods of restraint that the police used.
In the early 1980s, the LVNR (lateral vascular neck restraint) or carotid
sleeper hold, incorrectly referred to as the choke hold, was the first to be
in the crosshairs for causing these fatalities [2]. Although other types of
neck-restraint techniques caused documented injuries, they were grouped
together, and all became taboo. Next, a method of controlling a combat-
ant, called hog-tying, was believed to be causing deaths due to positional or
restraint asphyxia. Medical papers were published, and use of the methods
generally ceased. These methods of restraint were later debunked as a cause
of death by a number of subsequent studies [2]. Interestingly, that did not
significantly reduce the rate of individuals dying in police custody.
In the 1990s, pepper sprays began to be commonly used in law enforce-
ment, and it was their turn to be accused of causing in-custody deaths,
although the chemicals safety margin has been scientifically proven. As
Tasers reemerged in the early 2000s, the blame shifted. Conducted-electrical
weapons (CEWs and Tasers) have been studied more (exponentially) than
any other less lethal option, yet they continue to take the brunt of the blame
for any in-custody or arrest-related deaths.
The exact cause of ExDS is not known, but most experts can agree that it
is typically associated with chronic drug use and/or individuals with a his-
tory of mental illness. There are certain individuals who are simply deter-
mined to confront police, such as an inebriated hockey fan. Then there are
those in a genuine medical crisis, who need to be dealt with accordingly.

Although officers are typically not trained medical professionals, the public
perception is that they can recognize the difference. Individuals in the throes
of ExDS are just thatpeople in need of immediate medical intervention.
Involving medical aid early in the process can mean the difference between
saving a life and a tort claim for excessive use of force.
Stimulant Drugs
Although certainly not the only cause of this condition, stimulant drugs are
involved at least 80% of the time [1]. These drugs include cocaine, metham-
phetamine, ecstasy-MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine),
LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), PCP {1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl)piperidine},
and some prescription medications. What can now be purchased over the
counter in some areas are marketed and referred to as psychoactive bath salts,
synthetic cathinones, or MDPV (methylenedioxypyrovalerone) [7]. Its ease
of availability is just as frightening as the potential effects. One instance in
Florida allegedly involved an individual high on bath salts attacking, killing,
and eating the face of his victim. Police witnessed this behavior as they arrived,
promptly shooting him to death after he did not respond to commands.
There have been a small percentage of examples of ExDS where stimulant
drugs were not involved. Cases with alcohol, withdrawal to some psychotro-
pic drugs such as lithium, and sometimes no drugs at all have been reported.
Individuals free of drugs in their systems at the time of death often have a
history of psychotic disease [1].
Hyperthermia and Other Clues as Police Converge

One of the significant and easily identifiable signs of ExDS is excessive over-
heating, or hyperthermia. As their bodies are responding to the breakdown of
muscle due to overexertion or chemical imbalance, individuals are profusely
sweating and are hot to the touch. They typically seek water, shed their clothes,
and have even been known to stick their heads in ice machines (a clue). Anyone
in law enforcement or one who follows police activity can probably recall an
incident or a news article with the headline naked man fights with police.
As officers are responding to a naked, out-of-control individual being
aggressive toward others, they should listen to dispatchers description
of other behavior. Subjects in ExDS can be attracted or may even become
violent toward light and sound stimulus, such as breaking glass or flashing
lights. Callers often describe them as being out of it or acting crazy and
not responding normally to attempted communication. Police should expect
that this person might not follow their instructions and have another plan
in place.
Insensitivity to Pain and Superhuman Strength

Street cops who have been in a prolonged fight with an individual in the
throes of ExDS will tell you that the person exhibited a pain tolerance and
strength the likes of which they have never seen. Numerous videos used for
police training will show three, four, or five officers on top of a seemingly
average-built male, being thrown off him as he struggles to get away. Other
videos show a man cutting off his penis, punching all the way through a
wooden fence, then walking away as five officers scream orders and one
deploys pepper spray. As described in Chapter 1 with Sword-man, a
person can be sprayed directly in the face with concentrated amounts of
chemical agent such as OC and CS with no effect. This extreme intoler-
ance to pain can and will strike fear in an officer, possibly affecting his/her
decision-making ability (Figure8.1). In one of the authors cases, officers
shot a man off the roof of their police cruiser with their handguns after he
displayed superhuman strength. Prior to his encounter with police, wit-
nesses described seeing him on fire after crashing his vehicle and then run-
ning into traffic. This negative outcome naturally prompted a lawsuit and
Figure 8.1 Improperly trained officers are surprised by the strength of an ExDS
subject.
large payout. When teaching courses on ExDS, it seems just about everyone
can report a similar story about a past encounter where the person had
inordinate strength.
Period of Peril
Many cases investigated by the authors have revealed what is referred to as

the period of peril. As seen in video and read in witness statements, the
subject fights violently for a long period of time and suddenly appears calm,
which many officers have mistaken for the suspect complying. That calm is
followed by apnea (not breathing) and then cardiac arrest. Historically, this
has been when the ambulance is called. Once a person has reached this state,
there is rarely a successful resuscitation. Individuals have entered the period
of peril in the emergency room and could not be revived or they remained
in a coma for a few days and then perished. Officers have rolled into the
sally port of a jail only to realize that their prisoner, who complied after the
fight, had died en route to the jail. Incidents have occurred in the correc-
tions environment, where the prisoner is confined to a restraint chair after
a fight with staff. He becomes tranquil and dies as the jail personnel watch
helplessly. These cases and many like them demonstrate the need to identify
signs of this disorder much, much earlier.
Autopsy Findings
Often the results of an autopsy and related gross examination of the ExDS
patient reveal no obvious cause of death. What are typically prevalent are
the observations and evidence of a violent struggle, which include contu-
sions (bruising), lacerations (cuts), and tearing of muscles from overexertion.
These observations have directly or indirectly implicated police causation,
although some, if not all, of these wounds may be self-inflicted as such
individuals strike objects or fight restraints. The lack of physical findings
related to the fatality (head injury, heart condition, etc.) can be problematic
for a pathologist pressured to render a conclusion. The findings often force
forensic pathologists to rely on scene circumstances and toxicology results
(blood analysis for drug content) before reporting cause and manner of death
(Chapter 6) [1]. Results of these blood tests can take weeks, frequently fueling
conspiracy and cover-up theories to excessive use of police force. Even with
a positive toxicology screen, levels for chronic users typically do not reach
overdose levels, leading some medical experts to argue their significance.
Most experts agree, however, that chronic stimulant drug use can have an
overall effect on brain chemistry and increases susceptibility for ExDS.
COCAINE LEVELS FROM TOXICOLOGY SCREEN

Overdose = 6 mg per liter of blood
Fast acting, minutes to hours
Delirium = as low as 0.6 mg per liter of blood
Chronic use, days
The literature suggests that the origin of ExDS is likely from a combination
of factors. Unfortunately, there is no current test to conclusively diagnose
ExDS, which makes it intensely controversial. There have been some stud-
ies evaluating dopamine receptors and other markers in the brain that can
be analyzed to help determine causality [8]. The brain of the decedent must
be removed and shipped to an outside laboratory, which most jurisdictions
will not allow. Medical examiners are relegated to conclude that ExDS was the
cause of death after ruling out other causes and considering the totality of the
situation. From a procedural standpoint, they may list force used by police as a
contributing factor, including the use of chemical sprays, hobbling (a restraint
technique), or Taser usage. The media, activist groups, and plaintiffs attor-
neys may take these factors to heart, but often, under court examination, the
pathologist will admit that no data was obtained to report such an inclusion.
One proposed explanation as to what causes people to succumb are high
amounts of lactic acid (acidosis) and electrolytes (sodium and potassium)
in the blood stream as a result of rhabdomyolysis (muscle breakdown) from
overexertion. The harder they fight or struggle (as with police), the higher
their temperature rises and the quicker the buildup. The bodys natural
mechanisms in compensating for and adapting to these increases of acid and
electrolytes are absent or diminished. This could explain why early sedation
and antiacid injections such as sodium bicarbonate have been successful in
reversing the process [9]. Without intervention, lowering pH levels will even-
tually affect the chemistry of the heart muscle, restricting its ability to work,
causing arrhythmia and then death. Some ExDS protocols, like the one in
Seattle, recommend obtaining medical records related to patient tempera-
ture and blood electrolytes prior to death to include in police reports.
Police Response Must Mitigate Negative Outcomes
Based on some of the high-profile incidents profiled in Chapters 1 and 9,

departments in Seattle worked to develop better ways to respond to critical
incidents. A trainer for the Seattle Police Department, Officer Chris Myers,
helped to pioneer a program to educate officers on the concerns of ExDS in
the early 2000s. The department produced an educational video required for
all patrol officers to describe ExDS and the response expectations. The pro-
gram was highly successful, and Officer Myers was called to assist with sim-
ilar protocols for other departments and organizations looking to develop
education programs on the topic.
Based on the success in Seattle regarding first-responder protocols, a
panel of nearly all of the leading experts on the topic met in Seattle in 2011
[3, 4]. The workshop, hosted by the authors and Penn State University, was
funded by NIJ (National Institutes of Justice) in order to create a productive
forum in which to discuss potential ways to increase the effectiveness of the
first responder when addressing individuals afflicted with ExDS. The patrol
officer, or administrators for that matter, does not need a firm grasp on the
pathology and origins of ExDS, just how to properly confront subjects in
its throes. Part of that workshop involved a presentation from the authors
highlighting a program in Seattle that involved the addition of medics to
help control and sedate these individuals in the field. The cooperation and
coordination between the police and medical communities has produced
stellar results, including two documented saves in the field [3].
During the study of ExDS cases occurring in the Seattle area, it was real-
ized that a vast majority of the people afflicted were well known to beat offi-
cers, many with significant criminal records. Another important finding of the
study is that they exhibit many of the signs of ExDS without progressing to the
period of peril. It was apparent that this disorder may be occurring more often
than previously thought and at different levels of severity. This may help explain
the death of a deputy in the Seattle area in 2002. Deputy Herzog, responding
to a call of a naked man in the street hitting cars, was attacked as he arrived.
Herzog attempted to pepper spray him and retreated. The suspect chased after
him; they fought; and he acquired the deputys firearm, emptying it into Deputy
Herzog [10]. He fled and was arrested less than one hour later, fully clothed and
seemingly calm, posing the argument that ExDS is reversible under the right
conditions. One wonders what would have happened had six officers responded,
overwhelmed the suspect, restrained him, and put him in the back of the patrol
car. Would the suspect have died like others in similar situations?
Identify
As stated in Chapter 1, police use physical force a very small percentage of
the time, and ExDS incidents are a small percentage of that. But when police
encounter them, these potentially life-threatening and career-ending scenarios
must be handled decisively and with purpose using the proper tactics and tools.
All on the Seattle panel agreed that early recognition and medical intervention
were vital to successfully manage these individuals. Vancouver Police Sergeant
Joel Johnston stated, ExDS is a medical problem masquerading as a police call.
COMMON SIGNS OF EXDS (COMPILED

AT SEATTLE NIJ PANEL [3])
Extremely aggressive or violent behavior
Constant or near-constant physical activity
Does not respond to police presence
Attracted to/destructive of glass/reflective
Attracted to bright lights/loud sounds
Naked/inadequately clothed
Attempted self-cooling or hot to touch
Rapid breathing
Profuse sweating
Keening (unintelligible animal-like noises)
Insensitive to/extremely tolerant of pain
Excessive strength (out of proportion)
Does not tire despite heavy exertion
The panel derived a simple procedure and checklist, that can be made
into quick-reference, pocket-sized cards (Figure8.2). In the event of encoun-
tering an individual experiencing ExDS, responding officers can quickly
refer to the card. One side of the card lists the four major categories: Identify,
Control, Sedate, and Transport [3]. The third and fourth steps are related to
medical intervention, which prompts the responding officer to begin think-
ing about involving medics. On the back of the card are common behaviors
associated with ExDS to which the officer can refer for assistance in iden-
tifying the syndrome. Studies of police force and arrest-related death have
shown that the more of these factors that are observed related to the behavior
of the individual, the higher is the likelihood of death [9].
STEPS FOR THE FIRST RESPONDER

Identify: Observe the signs and behaviors related to this syndrome
for early medical intervention. Handle primarily as a medical
condition.
Control: Contain and/or restrain subject as soon as possible to
reduce risks associated with a prolonged struggle.
Sedate: Apply sedation in the field as soon as possible to help stop/
reverse the process.
Transport: Take to a hospital as soon as possible for full medical
assessment and/or treatment.
EXCITED DELIRIUM SYMPTOMS (OR OVERDOSE) INCIDENT CHECKLIST
Altered Level of Consciousness

Paranoia, hallucinations
Extreme agitation, disorientation
Shouting or keening (animal noises), unintelligible speech
Panic
Wide open or bulging eyes
Insensitivity to pain
Hyperthermia (overheating)
S weating, hot to the touch
Rapid breathing
Seeking water
Inappropriate attire or no clothing
Danger to Self or Others

Bizarre and/or aggressive behavior
Violence towards others
Constant physical activity
Unexpected physical strength and stamina
To t he point of damaging self or self-mutilation
Violence or attraction two glass, reflection or lights
Including emergency vehicle lights
Figure 8.2 ExDS checklist for officers.
Control
This is the component of the police interaction with the person that can
make all of the difference between success and failure. The officer has prop-
erly identified this person as being in the throes of ExDS. He/she listened
properly to dispatch while en route, and backup and medics are on scene
and waiting. After verbal attempts to control the situation have failed, now
what? Traditionally, the polyester pile was the chosen technique for this situ-
ation. Remember, we are trying to reverse this process, since a person fight-
ing against five or six large officers on top of him will likely exacerbate the
unfavorable chemical reactions occurring in the body. Given the current less
lethal options available to the patrol officer, the Taser (or other conducted
electrical weapon [CEW], Chapter 9) is the best choice. It does not rely on
pain compliance to be effective, and it allows a window of opportunity to
apply handcuffs while the subject is electronically restrained. The challenges
to this tactic require the device to be used judiciously and have a team ready to
go in quickly and restrain the subject while the Taser is activated. A poor con-
nection or extended use will likely worsen the situation and increase liabil-
ity. This person will likely not surrender after the Taser deployment and will
likely resist further when the electric cycle is complete. Officers have made
the mistake of applying many Taser cycles, expecting the suspect to relent.
Ideally, your patient (yes, at this point the suspect is a patient) succumbs
to one Taser cycle, falls to the ground, and is handcuffed before the cycle is
completed. Now the officers assist the medics to get the person to a gurney to
administer aid (sedation) and rapid transport for medical help. After thorough
use-of-force paperwork is completed (Chapter 7), the officers are done. In con-
trast, if the Taser is ineffective, meaning the probes are too close together or
at least one probe misses, the conflict is likely to intensify. When this occurs,
plan B typically involves more cycles of the Taser combined with the previously
mentioned polyester pile. Both authors have been involved in plan B scenarios,
both in person and during post-event analysis. There is still margin for a suc-
cessful outcome if medics are present and able to render care as soon as the sub-
ject is under control. The Taser can be reapplied with an additional cartridge,
but if multiple cycles are applied, forensic analysis should be required to deter-
mine how much electrical discharge the subject actually received (Chapter 9).
Despite literature to the contrary, it is becoming increasingly difficult in the
courts to defend prolonged Taser use, especially if the subject expires.
Taser-Related Death
As the author types this, a headline is read from a jurisdiction less than an
hour away: Man Dies after Being Tased by Deputy. Sadly, this headline is
repeated with regular frequency all over the world, usually with no basis for
that conclusion other than the presence of the Taser (CEW) at the scene.
Political groups will add this case to the list of CEW-related deaths, cur-
rently over 500 [11], undoubtedly with no background or facts attached. The
duration of the Taser exposure notwithstanding, if the patient died at any
time after exposure, the headline will read Suspect Dies after Taser Use.
This number touted by activist groups is erroneous, based on the authors

personal involvement in the investigation of at least one of these deaths and
reading the facts of many other cases. Sometimes, the Taser was forensically
proven to have never made a connection with the decedent and, therefore,
could not have been involved in the death. Not surprisingly, there is probably
an expert out there willing to testify that the person died after being scared
by the sound of the Taser. Deaths related to CEW deployments have been
debated ad nauseam for years and will not be belabored here [12]. Regardless,
proper collection of the Taser evidence after a critical incident can help to
weigh its involvement (Chapter 9).
A fallacy occurs when an argument or statement is supported by an invalid

inference. In the case of nonlethal weapons, it is most commonly mani-
fested by either ignoring the influence of other factors or making assump-
tions that exceed the evidence. No better example exists than in the claims
of hundreds of Taser-related deaths. Without ignoring the possibility that
Tasers might have a role in the deaths, it is disingenuous not to consider that
many of the people who have died after being shocked with a Taser had seri-
ous, often preexisting life-threatening medical issues, many times because
they self-medicated themselves with cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine, or
other drugs.
Sid Heal
Many high-profile incidents involving ExDS and CEW use have ensued
all over the United States and abroad. The authors were involved with two
such incidents outside the United States. In both cases, the inquiry took on
a life of its own, lasting years and costing millions, with experts from many
disciplines submitting opinions. In 2007, one incident was caught on video,
and the preconflict documentation of this incident was fascinating. A male
was walking around calmly, yet visibly sweating and breathing heavily, mov-
ing chairs and small tables in front of an automatic door. Onlookers express-
ing concern tried to talk to him with little or no response. Police contacted
him, and within seconds the Taser was deployed. The duration of the activa-
tion was outside the routine interval but was arguably not excessive. Within a
short time, he quit breathing and died. After the inquiry, involving testimony
from 91 witnesses, the Taser use was judged to be unjustified in a final report
consisting of over 1,000 pages. This incident also led to the institution of
Taser power-output testing guidelines, which are still being debated in 2013.
Passing no judgment regarding the officers actions, this makes one ponder
the outcome if medical personnel would have been present prior to contact.
The subject may have still expired, but wouldnt the public perception of the
confrontation have been more favorable?
ExDS remains a lively topic of discussion, as judging from the frequency
of calls made to the authorson average twice a month. Police agencies and
attorneys routinely query about an incident involving the excessive use of
the Taser. Nearly always, the subject had exhibited some signs of excited
delirium either before or during the skirmish. Most attorneys are so fixated
on the use of the Taser during the conversation that they entirely overlook
the diagnosis of the suspects medical condition. Responding officers did not
recognize it, and medics were not notified. The force continued to escalate in
an effort to gain control of the suspect with a negative result.
In many situations, they were engaged in life-threatening behaviors that

required some type of intervention to protect human lifeincluding their
ownand without an ability to employ an effective less lethal option, they
might very well have been killed outright. In these circumstances, even the
noble attempts to save their lives are made to appear contemptible.
Sid Heal
ExDS Deaths with No Taser
As stated in the opening paragraph, people have been dying in custody since
at least 1849. Many modalities have been blamed, but none more so than
the Taser. What rarely captures media attention are people who die during a
struggle with police with no involvement of Taser or other less lethal options.
Subjects have been found deceased in bathrooms covered in wet towels in an
attempt to cool themselves [13]. There is a video making the rounds through
law enforcement from Florida where a film crew documents the arrival of the
officer as he contacts a person running toward vehicles in the middle of the
road. The film rolls as the officer tries to convince him to get out of the street.
He is sweaty, breathing heavily, and complies with some commands. Other
officers respond, wrestle with him slightly, and place handcuffs on him. As
the film continues, he lies on the ground, grunting and fighting against the
restraints all the way to his period of peril and subsequent death. Other than
simple control techniques to place cuffs on him, no force options such as
kicks, knee strikes, punches, baton impacts, LVNR, hog-tying, or CEWs
were used. A lawsuit was immediately filed against the police department
and then dropped when the video was reviewed.
Police Can Be Their Own Worst Enemy
Some of these situations resulting in the death of the combatant during a

struggle are made exponentially worse by the statements, actions, and reac-
tions of the officers involved. At one incident, officers approached a subject,
and during the exchange, an officer is heard saying, See these fists, theyre
about to f**k you up. One can certainly expect the public outrage that
resulted when this person died after force was used to take him into cus-
tody, including multiple strikes to the face and Taser deployments. To make
matters worse, the incident was videotaped and did not necessarily coalesce
with the officers statement. It becomes very hard to argue that the officers
recognized that he was in a medical or mental crisis and needed help. This
is not to say there are not bad apples in law enforcement; all professions
can describe colleagues with some deficiency in scruples and competence.
However, in a vast majority of these controversial police incidents, the offi-
cer is attempting to do the right thing. The perception of that effort can be
skewed due to an error in judgment based on training, ego, or sometimes
simple indifference.
In one case, the police recognized the signs of ExDS, followed protocol
by having medics on the scene, were actively involved in saving the mans life,
and yet were still sued for millions. The city defended the accusations of exces-
sive force by stating that the officers acted within policy; however, they failed
to describe the extent of the struggle, the details of ExDS, and the extensive
attempts to save this persons life during the period of peril. The man suf-
fered permanent brain damage, and although the city admitted no wrong-
doing, a settlement was reached for nearly $2 million. One wonders if the
outcome would have been different with a proactive response to this incident,
with police administrators describing in detail to the media what occurs dur-
ing ExDS and the danger officers put themselves in confronting the mentally
ill and, more importantly, relating how the officers immediately shifted into
lifesaving mode by beginning CPR. What could have been an opportunity
for risk management through education (Figure8.3) becomes damage control
through ineptitude and silence. The reality of many of these cases is that the
dispensing of truth is often a futile venture, as cities would rather settle the
case in court with a substantial dollar payout than prolong the ordeal with
expensive litigation to attempt to defend the officers actions in court.
Information Sharing
Seattles success in the risk management of ExDS incidents has been directly
related to information sharing across disciplines. The police responding to
these incidents as medical emergencies will gain little traction without others
Excited Delirium Syndrome, is a medical

crisis that may be due to a number of under-
lying conditions. Subjects can demonstrate
some or all of the indicators below in law
enforcement settings. More indicators will
increase the need and urgency for medical
attention.
Extremely aggressive or violent behavior
Constant or near constant physical activity
Does not respond to police presence
Attracted to/destructive of glass/reflective
Attracted to bright lights/loud sounds
Naked/inadequately clothed
Attempted self-cooling or hot to touch
Rapid breathing
Profuse sweating
Keening (unintelligible animal-like noises)
Insensitive to/extremely tolerant of pain
Excessive strength (out of proportion)
Does not tire despite heavy exertion
Excited Delirium (ExD) Panel Workshop (April 2011),
The NIJ Technology Working Group (TWG) on Less - Lethal Devices
The Weapons and Protective Systems Technologies Center
Figure 8.3 Response cards produced by NIJ. (continued)

Observe, record, and communicate the

indicators related to this syndrome
handle primarily as a medical emergency.
(SEE REVERSE SIDE)
Control and/or restrain subject as soon as

possible to reduce risks related to a
prolonged struggle
Administer sedationas soon as possible.

Consider calming measures. Remove
unnecessary stimuli where possible,
including lights/sirens.
Take to hospital as soon as possible forfull

medical assessment and/or treatment.
This material is based upon work supported by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) under a Cooperative
Agreement Award No. 2010-IJ-CX-K005. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations are those
of the author(s), is the best knowledge currently available and does not necessarily reflect the views of the NIJ
and should not be construed as an official Department of Justice position, policy, or decision.
Figure 8.3 (continued). Response cards produced by NIJ.

involved. Within the department, dispatchers, administrators, public infor-

mation officers, crime scene personnel, and risk managers should all have a
basic understanding of ExDS [14]. The training does not need to dive in to
the depths of the physiological and chemical responses of disorder, but staff
should be able to describe the police response and policy. That policy is pub-
lic record on their website.
SUGGESTED CHECKLIST FOR FIRST RESPONDERS FOR EXDS

Dispatch
Stage medics at scene = dual response
Ask specific follow-up questions related to other signs of
ExDS
Relay to responding personnel
Arrival
If possible, assess at a distance; attempt verbal techniques
Call back-up as needed, minimum of three to four officers
Coordinate medical response
Contact
Establish decisive control; expect fight/flight; the longer the
fight, the greater chance of lethality
Without restraint, treatment is not possible
Maximize ventilation once restrained
Medics assess as soon as possible; consider chemical
restraint
Assign someone to watch and monitor subjects face
Post-event follow-up
Gather medical records; meet with doctors
Read actual body temperatures (to document hyperther-
mia) as well as other vital information (pulse rate, blood
oxygen level, blood temperature, etc.)
Gather statements
Experience shows that medical personnel might not know all of the intri-
cacies of ExDS. It occurs in only a small percentage of cases, and turnover
of ambulance and fire crews along with emergency room staff could easily
lead to a lack of education or information sharing. Smaller jurisdictions have
coroner systems for death investigations, and they may not be familiar with
excited delirium syndrome or even believe that it exists. With the display of
a few choice videos, people quickly get the enormity of these occurrences
and what first responders face, but this must be followed by a detailed dis-
cussion of the roles and expectations for all of the people involved, especially
those who can make a difference by knowing how to treat people who are
in a state of ExDS. Getting everyone on the same pagerecognizing that
these events are medical emergencieswill start down the path toward sav-
ing lives and reducing the liability of law enforcement departments. From
a risk-management standpoint, the founder of the Medic One program in
Seattle, Dr. Copas, said it best: If they are going to die, I would rather they
die in my ER trying to save their life, than in the back of your police car on
the way to jail.
References
1. Di Maio, T. G., and V. J. M. Di Maio. 2006. Excited delirium syndrome. Boca
Raton, FL: CRC Press.
2. Ross, D. L., and T. C. Chan, eds. 2006. Sudden deaths in custody. Totowa, NJ:
Humana Press.
3. Hughes, E. L., ed. 2011. Special panel review of excited delirium. Less-Lethal
Devices Technology Working Group, U.S. Department of Justice, National
Institute of Justice, Weapons and Protective Systems Technologies Center,
Applied Research Laboratory, Penn State Univ. https://www.justnet.org/pdf/
exds-panel-report-final.pdf.
4. Vilke, G. M., M. L. DeBard, T. C. Chan, J. D. Ho, D. M. Dawes, C. Hall, M. D.
Curtis, et al. 2012. Excited delirium syndrome (ExDS): Defining based on a
review of the literature. J. Emerg. Med. 43 (5): 897905.
5. Vilke, G. M., J. Payne-James, and S. B. Karch. 2012. Excited delirium syndrome
(ExDS): Redefining an old diagnosis. J. Forensic Leg. Med. 19 (1): 711.
6. Johnston, J. A. 2012. Stop the madness. Blue Line Magazine 24 (3): 610.
7. Ross, E. A., M. Watson, and B. Golderger. 2011. Bath salts intoxication. New. Engl.
J. Med. 365:96768. http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc1107097.
8. Mash, D. C., L. Duque, J. Pablo, Y. Qin, N. Adi, W. L. Hearn, B. A. Hyma, S. B.
Karch, H. Druid, and C. V. Wetli. 2009. Brain biomarkers for identifying excited
delirium as a cause of sudden death. Forensic Sci. Int. 190 (1): 1319.
9. Hall, C. 2013. Frequency of signs of excited delirium syndrome in subjects
undergoing police use of force: Descriptive evaluation of a prospective, con-
secutive cohort. J. Forensic Leg. Med. 20 (2): 1027.
10. Joseph, B., and Vinh, T. 2002. Deputy shot dead after man takes gun. Seattle
Times, June 23. http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20
020623&slug=deputy23m0.
11. Trimel, S. 2012. Amnesty International urges stricter limits on police taser use
as U.S. death toll reaches 500. Press release, February 15. http://www.amnesty-
usa.org/news/press-releases/amnesty-international-urges-stricter-limits-on-
police-taser-use-as-us-death-toll-reaches-500.
12. Juachem, J. R. 2011. Pathophysiologic changes due to Taser devices versus

excited delirium: Potential relevance to deaths-in-custody? J. Forensic Leg. Med.
18 (6): 291.
13. Takeuchi, A., T. L. Ahern, and S. O Henderson. 2011. Excited delirium. Western
J. Emerg. Med. 12 (1): 7783. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
3088378/.
14. Burns, T. J. 2011. Excited delirium: A U.S. operational view. Presented at
International Law Enforcement Forum, Vancouver, BC.
Forensics: Conducted
Electrical Weapons
(Taser)
R. T. WYANT
9
Contents
The Taser in Seattle 224
Birth and Evolution of Modern CEW (Taser) Forensics 225
Investigation of CEW/Taser Incidents 226
Stun Devices 227
How Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs) Work 228
Determination of Taser X26 CEW Function 230
Testing the Power Output of CEWs 233
Download of the CEW Firing Data 234
Taser CAM 235
Taser X26 Generations 236
New Models 237
Forensic Analysis of CEWs 238
ProbeKnot Junction Analysis 239
The Probe Side of the PKJ 243
CEW Cartridge Analysis 245
CEW Wire Analysis 248
Probe Impact and Trace Evidence 251
Crime Scene Investigation 254
Evidence Collection 255
Conclusion 257
References 259
The history of conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) or Tasers used in law

enforcement dates back to the 1970s. Jack Cover invented the technology as
an alternative use of force in response to civil unrest (antiwar and civil rights
demonstrations) in the late 1960s. Covers device was the first of its kind to use
electrical energy with launchable probes to incapacitate an aggressor. It was
released to the public in 1975 as the Taser Public Defender, model TF-1 (sold
under the company name Taser Systems Inc., later Tasertron). The device
looked and functioned like a flashlight and was intentionally designed not to
look like a firearm. The term Taser was derived from Thomas A. Swifts elec-
tric rifle, a phrase borrowed from Covers favorite childhood book. The Taser
221
Public Defender was deployed in a limited capacity due to its configuration.

The Public Defender deployed its probes out of a replaceable cartridge with
gunpowder, and the device was thus listed by the BATF (Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. federal organization that regulates firearms)
in the category of any other weapon (AOW) in May 1976 [1, 2].
Little attention was given to Taser usage until the highly publicized
Rodney King incident in Los Angeles in 1991. A video of the incident, which
was shown worldwide, recorded a confrontation between King and several
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. While repeated kicks and
baton strikes were the focus of the scrutiny of the officers actions, the video
also showed repeated deployments of the Tasertron device, which failed to
immobilize King. Its failure in the field was overshadowed by the alleged
use of excessive force, but the event highlighted the devices shortcomings,
particularly the devices inability to thwart a focused assailant. The Tasertron
device, with a few different versions, remained in use in a handful of depart-
ments throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but they were certainly not the
main tools of choice for law enforcement (Figure9.1). The AOW classification
required special license, which undoubtedly limited their popularity.
The intent of the Taser device was to provide an alternative to lethal force
by inducing temporarily debilitating muscle contractions without permanent
injury or death. Adding to the law enforcement applications, there were dis-
cussions in 1970 to incorporate Taser technology into the U.S. Sky Marshals
Figure 9.1 One version of the Tasertron (model TE-93) with cartridge.
Forensics 223
program to prevent hijacking of airliners [1]. History strangely repeated itself,

as this discussion resurfaced after the September 11 terror attacks in 2001.
The idea of Tasers in the cockpit really never took off, although the landscape
of law enforcement would be forever changed. Over the last several decades,
and particularly since 2003, Taser has become a household name.
In the early 1990s, two brothers from Arizona, Rick and Tom Smith,
were motivated to revitalize the technology after the shooting death of two
of their friends. After a road-rage incident, both of the friends were shot
and killed along an Arizona highway. A genuine passion grew with Rick
and Tom to offer an effective alternative for lethal force [3]. Using exist-
ing circuitry, they developed a system that would propel the probes with
compressed air, not gunpowder, making them easier to distribute and sell.
They sold their nonfirearm civilian model as a self-defense alternative,
called the Air Taser in the United States and Europe, under the com-
pany name Air Taser, Inc. (Figure9.2). In addition to the air propulsion,
Figure 9.2 The newest model of civilian Taser C2 (left) and the original Air
Taser.
this device introduced new features, such as a 30-second duration (to

allow escape after attack) and weapon and cartridge tracking ability along
with laser sighting [4]. The unit came with spare cartridges along with an
instructional VHS video. Today, the company still offers civilian models
such as the C2.
However, the Smith brothers soon realized that the existing circuitry
would not truly incapacitate a highly motivated individual. As the brothers
were waiting for authorization to distribute to the American law enforce-
ment market, they began plans to develop a more powerful, yet relatively safe
Taser device. The model 26, which delivered a claimed 26 watts of power (over
the claimed 7 watts from the Tasertron) was released in 1999 under the new
company name Taser International (TI). Unlike its predecessor, the M26 was
designed to look and feel like a firearm and was roughly the size and weight
of a standard duty pistol. It was powered by 8 AA batteries that installed in
the handle of the device, similar to a firearm magazine. The M26 also had
download capability of the firing data, adding a layer of officer accountability
and protection [5]. The company launched a publicity campaign that dem-
onstrated the incapacitation potential on volunteers. The device gained great
momentum in law enforcement circles in a relatively short period of time.
The timing of the release of this new device could not have been more perfect
for the Pacific Northwest.
The Taser in Seattle
In early 2000 in Seattle, Washington, an emotionally disturbed man,

named David Walker, was confronted by a grocery store security guard
after attempting to shoplift from the establishment. During the confronta-
tion, he was pepper sprayed. He removed a firearm from his waistband and
fired two shots toward the guards and then fled. He tucked the firearm in
his waistband and brandished a large butcher knife as he skipped down the
sidewalk. A foot chase with Seattle police ensued through a busy downtown
area that lasted over mile, winding through the Seattle Center where the
Space Needle is located. At some point during the pursuit, pepper spray was
deployed again, but was unsuccessful. News cameras captured the pursuit
all the way to the final fatal encounter. As Walker and police approached a
busy intersection, he was shot and killed after he lunged toward one of the
pursuing officers. The chase and the fired shot were broadcast that evening
on the local news, sparking a debate about force applications by police.
Although deadly force was certainly justified in the Walker case, public
outcry ensued, demanding that police have more options to address emo-
tionally disturbed people. The Seattle Police Department began to explore
Forensics 225
more nonlethal options at their disposal to confront resistant or combat-

ive subjects. As they evaluated solutions to their problem, they reflected on
another person who had proved difficult, the Sword-man as discussed in
Chapter 1. A fire hose and a ladder were required to subdue him after with-
standing several less-lethal impact rounds and chemical agent applications.
This would later be recognized as a classic case of ExDS (Chapter 8), with the
subject suffering from schizophrenia and chronic drug use.
Driven by the scrutiny of these high-profile events, the Seattle Police
Department selected and implemented the Taser M26 device as their new
less lethal tool in the later part of 2000. The Taser was initially deployed by
the SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team with some success, and they
began to increasingly deploy it in high-risk situations. The next year, in 2001,
the less lethal tool was deployed when SWAT was called to assist patrol offi-
cers with a barricaded suicidal man. He was locked in a small room and was
holding a large knife to his neck. As SWAT entered the room, two Taser M26
units were fired at the individual. Neither succeeded in immobilizing him,
and he quickly charged one of the officers with his knife. The subject was able
to get close enough to that officer to slice his uniform shirt before lethal force
from another officer fatally wounded him. The M26 had been extensively
researched and chosen by police administrators as the solution to problems
related to resistive subjects. Now the question was quickly asked as to why
the device had failed.
Birth and Evolution of Modern CEW (Taser) Forensics
The Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory analyzes all forensic evidence
for the Seattle Police Department. The bullets, cartridge cases, and firearms
from the SWAT incident were already being submitted to the crime lab for
analysis, so the Taser units were also submitted in hopes that forensic scien-
tists would be able to diagnose the failure of the Taser deployment. Although
there were a few scientific papers written on the Public Defender Tasertron
devices [1, 2] and one written on the Air Taser [4], a literature search yielded
that no forensic work had yet been performed on the new M26 devices. In
an effort to understand the operation and deployment of these devices, the
author attended an instructor-level course and polled engineers in the area to
ascertain power-testing protocols. It was quickly learned that no one outside
of the manufacturer was conducting any post-event analysis of these devices.
A vast amount of information could be gained from the evidence left by a
Taser deployment that could be used to diagnose a failure in the field [5]. As
a result of the efforts to reconstruct the incident, forensic analysis of modern
conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) was born.
It was discovered during the initial investigation of the incident in

2001 that first responders and assigned detectives were not educated on the
dynamics of Taser deployments. Much of the Taser-related evidence was not
preserved or collected after the incident, and many key components were
lost. Medics had severely cut the clothing, and most of the Taser probes were
lost in the process. As the investigation of the incident progressed, a need
arose to develop specific protocols to properly collect and analyze the evi-
dence related to a CEW deployment [5]. It was quickly learned that the car-
tridge, probes, wires, the device, and even the wounds on the subjects could
all provide clues to reconstruct an incident.
Investigation of CEW/Taser Incidents
As Taser International (TI) grew, other competitors emerged on the mar-

ket, so the generic terms also grew: conducted electrical weapon (CEW) was
coined along with other synonyms such as conducted-energy device (CED),
electro-shock weapon (ESW), electronic-control device (ECD), electronic-
immobilization device (EID), electric-discharge weapon (EDW), and others.
Taser International began to dominate the market in 2003 with the release
of the model X26, a smaller, lighter, and more accountable device than the
M26 (Figure9.3). Proponents and critics alike soon realized that the face of
law enforcement was about to be revolutionized as sales rapidly increased.
According to Taser International, by far the leading manufacturer of CEWs,
there have been 715,000 Taser brand devices sold in 107 countries with 1.8
Figure 9.3 Clear versions of the Taser M26 (left) and X26 (right).
Forensics 227
million field applications as of February 2013. Taser International (TI) prod-

ucts are the most likely CEWs that an investigator will encounter, more spe-
cifically the model X26 [3].
There are many facets to the forensic analysis and reconstruction of a
Taser-related event. The investigation of a lethal-force incident proximal to
a Taser deployment focuses, for the most part, on the function of the Taser
devices and the firing-data download. However, like most investigations,
the scientist must consider the totality of the evidence. These examinations
include the cartridge components, such as probes and wires.
In cases such as an in-custody death or an excessive-force claim, the
investigator may be asked to download the internal firing data to establish
the function of the device in question. Furthermore, there are simple exami-
nations that the analyst can perform to ascertain whether the CEW is operat-
ing properly. Spark tests, firing-data capture, and interpretation of that data
can often provide clues as to the devices function. Extensive testing of the
power output of the device involving the use of an oscilloscope as well as
load, voltage, and current probes can be performed, but these may not always
be necessary. Power-output testing and waveform analysis often require the
expertise of electrical engineers, who will also need to understand the basic
function and deployment of the device. Nevertheless, these tests can offer
some comfort to nervous administrators.
Stun Devices
Although considered a CEW by some, stun devices are often confused with
Tasers and other CEWs, which launch probes downrange into the target.
Stun devices are inexpensive electrical devices (as low as US$10) that come
in a variety of shapes and sizes (Figure 9.4). They generate a spark across
terminals on the front of the device, which are designed to deliver a pain-
ful jolt. They have very limited incapacitation potential, as the device itself
requires contact with the subject to be effective, thus affecting a very small
area on the body [6]. These devices are nonregulated and are often accompa-
nied by outrageous claims such as 5 million volts and targets aggressive
centers in the brain [7]. A commonly held myth surrounding these devices
is one perpetuated by movies and TV shows that these devices will render
the subject instantly unconscious. In one instance, a case was submitted to
the laboratory where a perpetrator attempted to subdue a female walking
down the sidewalk with one of these stun devices. His intent was to get her
to pass out so he could drag her into nearby bushes to sexually assault her.
Instead, she screamed and ran down the street as he chased after her, repeat-
edly applying the device to her body. Analysis of these stun devices can be
performed, but it is limited, since testing protocols used for Taser devices
Figure 9.4 Examples of various common stun guns.
would not apply. Stun devices typically leave burn marks or abrasions on the
skin that will correlate to the size and width of the terminals of the device
used, which may assist in determining which device was used in the incident.
How Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs) Work
A CEW is designed to incapacitate a subject by overriding normal volun-

tary muscle activity by firing two small barbed probes into the body. When
properly deployed (both probes strike the body, completing a circuit), the
person will become immobile, either encouraging submission or allow-
ing apprehension. These CEWs are not to be confused with the traditional
stun-gun that does not fire projectiles and relies on pain compliance only.
Devices marketed by Taser International are the most popular in the law
enforcement market. There are several Taser models for law enforcement on
the market, including the M26, X26, X3, X2, and the newest X26P. There
are competitors in the CEW marketplace that the investigator should be
familiar with, such as Stinger/Karbon as well as other emerging technolo-
gies. The Taser X26 model is currently the likely device to be used in an
incident and encountered in casework due to the hundreds of thousands
sold and currently deployed in the United States and abroad [3].
The Taser device consists of a main unit and detachable cartridge. Most
Taser models (including the X26) also feature an LED flashlight and a laser
sight. The laser sight on the X26 is aligned with the top probe impact at
approximately 13 feet (4 m) from the device. The X2 and X3 models feature
a dual-laser sight representing both top and bottom probe impact. The device
Forensics 229
Figure 9.5 Taser cartridge and its components.
is deployed by firing a proprietary Taser cartridge that launches two wire-

tethered barbed probes downrange toward the target. The cartridge is fired as
the trigger of the device is pulled. When the trigger is pulled, the Taser device
will automatically cycle for 5 seconds and show a countdown of the cycle on
the rear display, known as the central information display (CID). Electrical
energy from the device arcs across the front of the cartridge, igniting a small
primer on the nose of the cartridge, which forces a nitrogen capsule rearward
into a hollow puncture pin. Compressed nitrogen is released into two cham-
bers, forcing the probes, blast doors, antifelon identification (AFID) tags, and
other items forward out of the cartridge (Figure9.5). The AFIDs, blast doors
and plastic (Mylar) sleeves fall out the front and are deposited near the area
where the cartridge was when it was fired [8]. Additionally, without a car-
tridge attached, the X26 functions as a direct-contact stun device.
The AFID tags, carried over from the civilian market origins, are micro-
scopically marked with the cartridges serial number. The two barbed metal
probes (composition dependent on generation type) are attached to thin
insulated wires. The barbed probes impact the body, and current flows from
the Taser device through the wires and between the probes (one positive, one
negative). Both probes must hit the subject and complete a circuit for the Taser
to be effective. The electrical energy from the Taser can arc up to almost 2
inches (approximately 4 cm cumulative between both probes) through the
air if direct contact is not achieved.
The current in the Taser, just like any electrical current, will flow through
the most conductive path, the path of least resistance. Typically, human tissue
(mostly water) provides this path for the Taser current to flow, but several
factors (clothing, intervening objects, missed probe) can impede that flow.
The nerves in this path are stimulated by the electrical energy, contracting
the muscles in that area. This creates clonus (alternating involuntary muscu-
lar contraction and relaxation in rapid succession) as the device sends many
Figure 9.6 Cutaway versions of the Taser X26, cartridge, and battery supply
(DPM).
electrical pulses a second through the wires. In a deployment, the probes

can miss the target, become dislodged during the incident, or can come to
rest greater than 2 inches (4 cm) from a conductive surface. If any of these
occur, the electrical energy will complete its circuit by arcing across the elec-
trode terminals on the front of the attached cartridge or sometimes across
the wires (Figure9.6). A poor or incomplete circuit is clearly audible, as the
pulses loudly arc through the resistance of the air. This characteristic could
be important when asking questions related to an investigation.
SOME MYTHS ASSOCIATED WITH CEWs
Delivers 50,000 volts to body

Does not work in water
Will cause electrocution if deployed in water
Will interrupt pacemaker function
Can instantly stop heart
Is working properly when there is a sound of loud arcing
Determination of Taser X26 CEW Function
Examination of evidence related to a CEW deployment begins with the evalu-

ation of the device itself. The condition of the device as it is received should be
thoroughly documented, such as the serial number, safety function/position,
Forensics 231
trace material present, battery type (referred to as the DPM), and cracks or
deformities. If a cartridge is attached (fired or unfired), it should be removed
and the serial number recorded. If the cartridge is fired, note its orientation
on the unit, as it may be important for event reconstruction (top probe versus
bottom probe).
The battery or digital power magazine (DPM) is an essential component
of the Taser X26. The DPM housing contains two 3-V lithium camera batter-
ies and a small circuit board. Not only does it provide power to the device, but
the circuit board interfaces with the main unit, such as firmware upgrades,
etc. The incorrect selection or placement of the battery could alter the device.
If the unit is received without a battery, the internal firing data may be lost or
the device itself may become corrupted. The manufacturer recommends that
the battery not be left out for an extended period of time. The period of time
without power that will prevent data loss can vary from device to device. The
author recommends no more than 1 hour.
For a proper evaluation, the CEW should be sparked several times to
evaluate its shut-off functions:
14 seconds and manually turned off with the power switch

5 seconds to determine function of automatic shut-off
510 seconds to determine if device shuts off after trigger is released
10 seconds to determine consistency of spark rate
After a controversial CEW deployment, the first question investigators

often ask is whether the unit was functioning properly. One of the initial
examinations performed is to determine if the device is arcing properly.
The field examination to ascertain the proper function of a Taser device
is referred to as a spark test. Sparks can be seen and heard as the device
discharges electricity from its capacitors and completes a circuit by arcing
between the two metal terminals at the front of the device. The examiner
turns on the device and pulls the trigger to activate the 5-second cycle to
ensure that the unit produces a consistent spark rate. If the spark rate slows
or is erratic, it is an indication that the unit is malfunctioning. The author
advises one cycle of the Taser for 5 seconds prior to any data download,
with the date and time noted to ensure that the download information is
correct. Once the download is performed, it is necessary to spark-test the
device again to evaluate normal shut-off functions and to evaluate the spark
consistency over a longer duration.
Taser International recommends that operators spark-test the device
prior to every shift. This field check will keep the device conditioned, and the
practice can be verified in the firing data history. Experience has shown that
devices not spark-tested regularly are more prone to problems such as zeroed
clocks and poor spark quality/rate.
It does take some experience of test sparking Taser devices to get accus-
tomed to what a clean consistent spark rate should sound like. The author
suggests capturing a video of the 10-second cycle in addition to comparing
the questioned device to at least two properly functioning units (controls).
An erratic spark or a slowing spark rate can easily be detected using this
method. A checklist for the overall function of the Taser device can be useful
(Figure 9.7). This evaluation should suffice in most circumstances, but the
examiner may still be asked to perform measurable power output testing and
waveform analysis.
Figure 9.7 Checklist for Taser X26 evaluation.

Forensics 233
Testing the Power Output of CEWs
For a more quantifiable examination of the function of a CEW, the electrical

waveform, voltage, current, and spark rate can be captured by oscilloscope to
ensure that the electrical output is within the manufacturers specifications
(Figure9.8). Taser International, Inc. (Scottsdale, Arizona), has established
defined protocols for this testing, and these protocols have been verified by
outside laboratories as a valid method to ascertain the proper function of the
device [9].
In October 2007, there was an incident in the Vancouver, British
Columbia, airport where a subject was involved in a fatal struggle with
police. As a result of this event, a very extensive inquiry was conducted
focusing on the use of the Taser. The commission recommended testing of
all Taser devices in Canada for function and electrical output. This inquiry
has influenced agencies worldwide to more closely scrutinize the operation
of Taser devices related to deployments with negative outcomes. There have
been proposals put forth by some U.S. government organizations to promote
standardized power output testing of Taser devices. Some have argued that
manufacturer specifications are not stringent enough and that more detailed
evaluation must be conducted. This has led to the inevitable emergence of
experts and, in some cases, pseudo experts, stating that they can test and
evaluate CEWs. Some engineers who were not properly trained on the gen-
eral function of the devices conducted studies resulting in false data. This
has led researchers to attempt to standardize the testing parameters of these
devices [10]. Despite the push to measure the output of the CEWs, experience
testing these devices has demonstrated that a Taser model X26 that can spark
Figure 9.8 Standard setup for Taser X26 power-output and waveform testing.
continuously and consistently for 10 consecutive seconds is likely operating

within the manufacturers specifications [9].
In 2001, the first known forensic analysis including independent power
output testing of modern Taser International (TI) devices occurred. The field
failure of two model M26 devices was analyzed from the case of the suicidal
man mentioned previously in this chapter. In an effort to help diagnose the
failure, the assistance of a local power company and their engineers were
enlisted. Testing determined that one of the devices experienced a component
failure, and the other simply had a depleted power supply (human error). Since
2001, specific power-testing protocols have been developed and distributed
by the manufacturer (Taser International). The Aerospace Cooperation and
independent forensic testing firms have utilized these power-output specifi-
cations to evaluate main phase charge, peak loaded main phase voltage, and
pulse rate of the device. It is important to note that these specifications cite a
range designated by the manufacturer to ensure safety to the individual and
effectiveness of incapacitation. One should review and consider all published
testing protocols in their analysis and recruit qualified electrical engineers
to interpret the methods and data. Equipment to perform these tests is quite
expensive, and care must be taken in selecting a firm to test CEWs, as poor
methods and interpretation can lead to incorrect conclusions. It is impera-
tive to remember that power testing of the device itself is only one prong of
a forensic analysis.
Download of the CEW Firing Data
All modern Taser models, including the X26, are equipped with an onboard
memory that records the activation time and duration of the firing (along
with some other data) of the device. The data can be extracted and utilized
for officer accountability and forensic analysis. The firing records are captured
via proprietary hardware and software from the manufacturer. The software
takes a snapshot of the data housed within the unit and cannot be altered dur-
ing the process. The extraction of the data is fairly straightforward; however,
there are different generations of software that the investigator can utilize,
from the traditional Dataport software or the newer Evidence SYNC software
(both from Taser International). The Evidence SYNC software provides more
detailed data on the newer models from Taser International such as the X2,
X3, and X26P, to be discussed later in this chapter. For the X26, both software
platforms provide the same data; however, some interpretation is generally
needed. Scanning the downloaded data will indicate errors throughout the
life of the unit, including clock changes, lost data, codes, and misplaced firing
events. To ensure that the data is accurate, it is imperative for investigators to
check the onboard time and perform their own spark tests at known times and
Forensics 235
intervals. It is not uncommon for the internal clock to drift and not reflect the
actual time of the event [7]. If a miscommunication occurs between the device
and the battery, the internal clock may zero or reset to time 00:00:00 on date
01/01/00. Data lines with a zeroed internal clock may be present throughout
the firing history of your device. Additional software from the manufacturer
may need to be utilized to correct the times of those particular firing events.
KEY POINTS TO OBSERVE IN THE

Taser X26 FIRING HISTORY
Increases in battery percentage
00 battery at any time in the history
Time-change records
Missing or garbled data
Dates out of sequence
Dates around year 2000 (clock will zero to 00:00:00 GWT on
01/01/00)
Erroneous numbers on sequence 1 (error codes)
Routine spark tests
Even after the device passes a power test and firing data is determined to
be accurate, the data does not necessarily equate to the duration of electric
energy received by the subject. The firing data on the model X26 only gives
information about how long the device fired and does not distinguish between
energy to the suspect and energy across the terminal gap at the cartridge or
between wires. Further analysis of the fired cartridge, wires, and probes is
required to help determine where the current went after the trigger was pulled.
Taser CAM
Another aspect of the CEW that may need to be tested to determine proper
function is any accessory on the device. Most Taser products like the X26 have
the ability to install video cameras on the device, called the Taser Cam and the
Taser Cam HD. The camera unit replaces the standard DPM and is recharge-
able. It is important to note that the camera begins recording video and audio
immediately when the power is switched on (not when the trigger is pulled)
and cannot be deleted, as it records on a loop. There are infrared LEDs incor-
porated within the unit that aid in low-light recording. Separate hardware and
software modules are required to download the video data. It is recommended
that test videos be made to test the function and data recording accuracy and
that all files be saved separately and included in case files.
Figure 9.9Examples of the many types and generations of Taser cartridges

since the late 1990s.
Taser X26 Generations
As the production of the X26 began in 2003, the manufacturer made sev-
eral modifications in direct response to feedback from the field. A small
LED was added inside the device to continuously energize a gas capsule,
significantly reducing hang fire (delay in cartridge ignition) problems of the
device. This upgrade can be identified by looking between the frame seam
for a light near the front sight when the unit is powered up. Another upgrade
to the device was to inset the front terminals to reduce abrasions to the skin
when the device is used in drive-stun mode. In addition to the updates made
to the devices, the cartridges and probes have been adapted over the years to
be more effective. The cartridges have undergone many changes since incep-
tion with different colors and probe configurations (Figures9.99.11). The
presence or absence of these upgrades may be important in reconstructing
an event.
Figure 9.10 Types of blast doors of Taser cartridges (newest on left).

Forensics 237
Figure 9.11a Generations of Taser probes.
Figure 9.11b Examples of other CEW probes: Tasertron (left) and two genera-
tions of Stinger Systems.
New Models
Since the release of the X26 in 2003, a number of new models from Taser
International (TI) have been released with updated technology and features.
The X3 (three-shot) and X2 (two-shot) models offer a semiautomatic firing
mode (Figure9.12). These models have dual lasers to aim both of the probes,
thinner static-free cartridges, and separate spark and firing modes. TI claims
that these devices have an optimized pulse that delivers more effective
Figure 9.12 Taser models X3 (top) and X2.
electrical energy to the body. The online software generates more complex
firing data than the X26. The most significant feature in terms of post-event
analysis is the biofeedback data that claims to capture the energy delivered
to the body at the time of deployment [3]. These devices have not been on the
market long enough to have been analyzed after a critical incident. If this fea-
ture can be independently confirmed, analysis of the probes (discussed later
in this chapter) could be verified, adding another layer of certainty to the
reconstruction of a critical incident. The latest TI product, the model X26P,
was released in January 2013. This newest device has the same features as the
X2 and X3 but uses the traditional cartridges like the X26.
Forensic Analysis of CEWs
During the last decade, various scenarios have played out in police jurisdictions
throughout the United States and abroad involving the deployment of CEWs
during a critical incident. Most unintended outcomes appear in two forms:
Device fails to incapacitate and the force applied was escalated.

The suspect was critically or fatally injured proximal to the use of
the device.
These cases are often controversial and receive a lot of media attention. One
of the most common questions is how much, if any, electrical energy the subject
received during the CEW deployment. Unfortunately, forensic considerations
of CEW deployments are often overlooked in training programs. In turn, post-
event investigations can often be costly and ultimately prove harmful to the
Forensics 239
overall less lethal program of the department. A thorough analysis of the event
can answer questions, but only if the evidence is collected. This oversight has led
to expensive investigations and large monetary payouts. It is extremely impor-
tant that all Taser-related evidence be identified, collected, and preserved.
ProbeKnot Junction Analysis
After the CEW is fired, one or both probes can become dislodged, the wires
can break, or one or both probes may never strike the target. The wires and
probes can be examined to determine if an electrical circuit flowed through
them. The insulated wire from the Taser cartridge is connected to the metal
probe body by a single knot tied at the base of the probe (Figure9.13).
The cut insulation at the end of the wire provides the path of least electri-
cal resistance from the wire to the probe. When the CEW is activated, cur-
rent travels down the wire to the end of the knot and arcs across the air gap
to the surface of the probe. The air gap is referred to as the probeknot junc-
tion (PKJ). Due to the impedance of the air gap, the current creates heat and
energy as it travels across the junction. During an exam in 2003, the author
observed that changes to the wire end were dependent on the duration of the
completed electrical circuit. The electrical arc across the PKJ results in physi-
cal changes to the wire and probe that appear as:
1. Melting, bubbling of the plastic insulation of the wires

2. Scoring/pitting/cratering of the probes
3. Carbon deposits (product of combustion) on the knot end and the
inner surface of the probe
Probe Knot Junction (PKJ)
Figure 9.13 Probeknot junction (PKJ) of Taser probe.

The presence of these changes indicates a completion of an electrical cir-

cuit through the probe. When changes at the probeknot junction are not
observed, it can be stated that the two probes did not complete a circuit and
that the subject received no effect from the device (unless used in drive-stun
mode). This can occur when one or both probes do not strike or are not
within 2 inches (4 cm) of a conductive target.
Extensive published studies were conducted to validate and quantify
this phenomenon [11]. PKJs from many probe samples at various electrical
durations were examined with a stereomicroscope and a scanning electron
microscope (SEM) (Figure 9.14). The physical changes (carbon residue,
wire insulation melting, probe body scoring and pitting) indicated that the
duration of the completed circuit between the probes could be estimated.
However, the variability of the wire knot lengths, geometry of the knot end
relative to the probe body, and other factors all can affect the morphological
SEM Area
Figure 9.14a Example of arcing from knot end to probe body.

Forensics 241
Cratering from pulses
Fig 9.14 C
Melting and distortion

from pulses
Wire end
100X
Figure 9.14bSEM imaging of the probeknot junction (PKJ) demonstrating

melting of the wire end and cratering of the outside of the probe body from elec-
trical pulses. (SEM imagery provided in cooperation with CASE forensics.)
Figure 9.14c High magnification of one crater area on the probe body. (SEM
images courtesy of CASE Forensics, Mountlake Terrace, WA.)
Figure 9.15a Exposure of the knot end for examination.
changes on the knot. The knot end of the Taser device wire is easily exposed
for examination by inserting the wooden end of a standard cotton collection
swab and pushing the knot away from the probe body (Figure9.15a). This
method does not modify or alter the area, and the knot can easily be returned
to its original location with a gentle tug on the wire from the probe base.
Figure 9.15b Candling due to extensive CEW duration.

Forensics 243
The original research into observable PKJ changes versus duration was
limited to 30 seconds or less. Since then, a phenomenon, coined candling, was
observed (thanks to our Australian friends) at extended application durations
typically over 30 seconds. Candling occurs when enough heat is generated
across the PKJ that it completely melts away the insulation around the wire
end. Although this does not always occur, the result is easily observed, with
the exposed wire looking very similar to a candlewick (Figure9.15b).
One of the authors expert-witness cases involved a suicidal female who

was holed up in a motel in a small town. After a few text messages to her
family implying suicide, the local police department was sent to perform
a check of her welfare. The woman answered the door holding a pistol and
threatening to shoot herself. While the woman was holding the firearm
at her side, officers attempted negotiation. A Taser was deployed in an
attempt to end the standoff. Moments after the Taser was fired, she raised
her pistol and fired a number of shots toward the officers. The officers
retreated uninjured and notified a tactical team. The woman surrendered
and was arrested. Soon after, she claimed the Taser caused her to invol-
untarily fire her weapon. One probe was removed from her chest and
the other was located on the floor of the hotel room. Subsequent forensic
analysis of the PKJ revealed that there was no significant current through
the probes. Her claim was proven to be invalid, and she was convicted of
attempted murder of a police officer.
The Probe Side of the PKJ
The probe surface itself (sometimes referred as the probe side of the air gap
or bore-hole) can also be examined and evaluated for cratering, scoring,
pitting, and carbon buildup to determine if energy had passed through the
probeknot junction (Figure9.16). The heat and energy generated from the
electrical pulses (approximately 1819 pulses per second from a properly
functioning X26) can damage the metal surface on the inside of the probe in
a number of ways and can be observed with traditional stereomicroscopy and
SEM. The probe side of the junction should not be relied upon as the only area
of examination to determine duration of the application. Although examina-
tion of the probe surface can be corroborative, data suggests that too much
variability exists between samples of the same duration to rely on this exami-
nation without considering the wire knot end. However, sometimes the knot
is missing or lost, and the probe body is the only examination available. This
examination is particularly useful if multiple areas on the inside of probe are
observed indicating movement of the subject (struggle or ineffective).
Since the impact sites are variable and occur on a concave surface, it is
difficult to consistently stereomicroscopically examine or aim the beam of
the SEM with reliability. Aside from the challenge of finding and aiming the
SEM beam at the disrupted area, there are many other factors that can hinder
the examination of the probe side of the junction. The tool marks left inside
the probe shaft hole as a result of manufacturing, biological contamination
(e.g., blood), and knot tail length can obscure microscopic visual clues as to
the impact sites of the electrical energy.
Figure 9.16a Taser probe hole.
Figure 9.16b SEM image of inside probe hole. (SEM imagery provided in coop-
eration with CASE forensics.)
Forensics 245
Figure 9.16c One electrical pulse in probe hole under 2000 magnification.
(SEM images courtesy of CASE Forensics, Mountlake Terrace, WA.)
The microscopic differences observed on the PKJ with multiple CEW

cycles may be categorized based on morphological changes, but precise dura-
tions are not scientifically conclusive based on studies. An experienced ana-
lyst may be able to narrow down the CEW duration within a suitable range,
such as 1020 seconds. The analyst must have a practical working knowledge
of the CEW device field use and a thorough sample database of many stereo-
microscopic examinations. In most cases, however, conclusions should be
limited to a hit versus miss or short duration versus long duration. In
cases where there is an extreme duration such as 30 seconds or more, obvious
insult to the wire end (e.g., candling) is observed. Examination of the probe
side of the junction (bore-hole) can add corroborative data, but this is not
scientifically conclusive as a sole means of analysis. The probeknot analy-
sis technique to evaluate CEW duration has been tested and passed under
the Frye standard in U.S. courts and has met the criteria to meet a potential
Daubert challenge [7]. Analysis of the PKJ should always be conducted after
a critical incident involving a CEW.
CEW Cartridge Analysis
The cartridge that houses the propellant, wires, and probes can be analyzed
to help determine the fate of the electrical pulses from the CEW. On the X26,
the cartridge base that mates to the front of the Taser device can be oriented
either way due to a canted channel on the device. This allows the top probe
to fire straight while the lower probe launches at a downward angle, so they
spread as they travel downrange. The manufacturer claims the separation of

probes on their traditional cartridges to be approximately 8, but experimen-
tation places that number closer to 6.6 [12]. The distance of the probes from
each other on the target can help determine the range from the device at
the time of firing. As mentioned previously in this chapter, there are several
types and ranges of cartridges: 15-foot civilian type, 21-foot standard type,
25-foot XP (extra-penetration) type, and 35-foot extended-range model. The
35-foot model is unique in deployment method and separation angle and
must be oriented only one way on the X26. The types of probes and colors of
cartridges have changed through the years, including the dramatically differ-
ent smart cartridge that feeds the newer X2 and X3 models. There are also
training cartridges available for all models that have nonconductive wires.
In the traditional cartridge used by the X26, the wires housed in the
cartridge are attached inside the cartridge to metal terminals. They mate to
the terminals of the main device when the cartridge is attached and provide
an area for forensic examination. If a good circuit is achieved through the
probes (strike body), the current enters the cartridge through the ends of the
wires near the terminal. If there is a bad or loose connection, or if the device
is used in drive-stun mode, the current will flow through the terminals in the
cartridge and arc inside or on the front of the cartridge (Figure9.17). This will
leave obvious electrical damage on the terminals that can be observed micro-
scopically. These differences between the completed circuits can be observed
with a microscopic examination of the base of the cartridge and offer another
Mates with Device
End of Terminal
Figure 9.17a Area where Taser cartridge interacts with device (arrow) and the
terminal end of the cartridge for drive-stun mode.
Forensics 247
Cartridge Terminal
End of Wire
Figure 9.17b The two areas on the cartridge where the energy is conducted: the
wire end and the cartridge terminal.
Electrical damage on terminal
Figure 9.17c Damage and pitting to terminal on cartridge terminal (not the
wire end) indicating a miss with one or both probes or use in drive-stun mode.
prong of forensic analysis. This data can be utilized in conjunction with the
CEW firing data download and PKJ analysis.
Two Taser cartridges were submitted for analysis associated with criti-
cal incident and subsequent in-custody death. Only three of four probes
were submitted for analysis, and two of them demonstrated no circuit
(a miss) based on analysis of the probeknot junction (PKJ). The bases of
the cartridges were analyzed and microscopically compared to controls
at known durations. The scientist was able to determine which Taser car-
tridge was applied to form a completed circuit and which cartridge likely
missed the subject (no circuit downrange) based on the morphological
changes observed on the base of the cartridge. A conclusive result as to
which officer deployed the Taser effectively was achieved.
CEW Wire Analysis
The wires that connect the probes to the CEW are thin, copper-coated steel
covered by Teflon insulation. They are wound into channels in the cartridge
in an accordion fashion. The integrity of the shape of the wires (if preserved)
can possibly help establish a hit or miss with the probe [7]. When the probe
reaches maximum distance (if it misses the target), the shape is lost and
the wire appears straightened. If it strikes a target, some of the wire will be
straight and some will retain its accordion shape. The most reliable way to
observe this is at the wire at the front of cartridge, as it is less likely to be
altered as a result of a struggle or movement. Moreover, the wire can get
caught in the channel and not properly deploy. The wire must be collected
with as little disruption as possible and not wound around the outside of the
cartridge. Good photographs during the collection of the cartridge may yield
very useful information.
Depending on the circumstances surrounding an incident, it is possible
that the subject may receive a partial or ineffective cycle from the CEW. If
both probes do not embed in the target, or become dislodged, the device will
seek to complete the electrical circuit. This will occur via the path of least
resistance between the positive and negative poles. A circuit can still be com-
pleted if a probe or wire comes in close contact with the opposing probe wire
or the subject (conductive material) the other probe is imbedded in. When
the probes do not complete a circuit downrange, the device will often arc
across the terminals on the front of the cartridge. The insulation of the wire
is typically sufficient so that electricity will not arc from the wire unless it is
breached or is otherwise compromised. However, persistent electrical energy
Forensics 249
in the same area may arc to the wire and burn through the insulation. If this
occurs, the expected incapacitating effect may diminish or be absent alto-
gether as the current searches for a circuit to complete. Microscopic exami-
nation of the burned wire can determine the site of the wire-to-wire arc, and
the duration of the short circuit can be approximated (Figure9.18).
A peer-reviewed scientific paper on this subject was published evaluat-
ing discharge cycles of 1, 5, 10, and 20 seconds in duration to determine the
Figure 9.18a Arc of an X26 Taser across the wires.
Figure 9.18b Microscopic examination of wire damage from a short circuit of

Taser wire.
approximate size of the wires burned area [13]. Using the air-gap method,
an electronic digital micrometer was used to measure the breach in the insu-
lation and exposed wire. Averages were calculated for each time interval.
Based on the average measurements, it is possible to identify and document
arcing locations where CEW pulsed energy is short-circuited away from the
intended target. Although some experimental parameters had to be tightened
to reproduce these phenomena, the technique can prove useful to help verify
and reconstruct the circumstances surrounding an incident. This occurrence
in the field is not common, given the standard thickness of insulation on the
wire, but the experimental results proved that durations of the short circuit
on the wire could be approximated when it occurs.
In addition to the electrical insults to the wire, abrasions, tears, and
breaks in the wires can occur during a Taser deployment, particularly when
involved with a struggling or fighting subject. The wires are designed to
break relatively easily to prevent entanglement of the suspect or the arrest-
ing officers. This component is often overlooked during evidence collection,
as it is often felt to have little importance. A 25-foot cartridge used by law
enforcement houses well over 50 feet (15 m) of wire. Wires are typically bro-
ken into several pieces, either during the incident, intentionally by officers
effecting the arrest, medics during medical treatment, or technicians collect-
ing the evidence. It is often unknown how the wires were broken when they
are analyzed. It is recommended that, when applicable, wires be labeled and
cut (Figure9.19).
Microscopic examination is a critical component of any forensic analysis
of Taser evidence, particularly when the integrity of the circuit or effectiveness
Figure 9.19 The author recommends that Taser wires be flagged and cut for
proper evidence collection.
Forensics 251
of the Taser application is in question. Most significant breaches in the wire

can be observed with the naked eye, but microscopic examination is required
to confirm if the insult to the wire is due to electrical activity or some other
method. Cut wires can be distinguished from torn or abraded wires. This
examination can prove crucial to determine whether the probes became dis-
lodged during the incident and whether the subject received a diminished
effect from the device. It is highly recommended that all of the Taser wire
be collected and the lengths be examined as part of the normal investigative
procedure for a critical incident involving a Taser deployment.
A field application of the Taser occurred overseas on an individual in

the throes of excited delirium syndrome (ExDS) (Chapter 8). Two car-
tridges were deployed as the subject struggled against two officers over
the course of several minutes. The scene was further complicated by
water on the floor from a broken toilet and blood from the subjects self-
injuries. The firing data indicated a significant firing event from the Taser
X26. Although the probeknot junction (PKJ) analysis did demonstrate
evidence of a prolonged circuit, microscopic analysis of the Taser wire
collected from the scene also detected multiple areas of electrical dam-
age. This indicated that the probes had become dislodged from the sub-
ject during the incident as the Taser continued to cycle, arcing through
the wires. This evidence helped demonstrate the subject did not receive
the complete application of the Taser and helped to exonerate the officers
involved.
Probe Impact and Trace Evidence
If the probes do not strike the intended target, they can leave forensic clues
as to the surface they struck. Defects on the probe body and needle can be
observed from impacts into concrete, walls, glass, and other surfaces that
can prove useful in understanding what occurred. When the probes do
impact into a subject, the fishhook quality of the probe barb can capture a
variety of forensic evidence, including clothing fibers, skin, blood, and other
trace materials. These materials can be identified using SEM with energy-
dispersive spectroscopy (EDS). The collection of biological material from the
probe barb is often sufficient enough that DNA can be extracted to identify
the individual struck with the probe. Care should be taken to preserve and
collect these probes in a manner appropriate to retain that evidence to allow
further examination if necessary. It is highly recommended to individually
package the probes in a sealed container to preserve trace and biological evi-
dence (Figures9.209.23).
Figure 9.20 Example of improperly packaged Taser probes.
Figure 9.21 Impact of a probe into a baseball cap.

Forensics 253
Figure 9.22 Probe removal, and observation of trace material under probe barb.
Figure 9.23a Microscopic examination of trace material.

Fibers from under probe barb
Blood
Skin
80x
Figure 9.23bSEM and EDS examination of the fiber recovered, identifying

blood and skin under probe barb. (SEM imagery provided in cooperation with
CASE forensics.)
Crime Scene Investigation
In most instances, at least some Taser evidence is collected at the scene of a

major incident. However, if gunplay is involved during the event, this evi-
dence may be overshadowed by the fired cartridge cases lying around and
holes in walls. The priority quickly becomes the officer-involved shooting
evidence and not necessarily the circumstances leading up to it. Only after
the scene has been processed do the administrators and risk managers ask:
Why did the Taser fail, forcing us to shoot him? A well-known rule for
crime scene investigators is that there are no second chances to collect evi-
dence before it is lost or contaminated. The same holds true with evidence
related to a Taser deployment, which includes properly collecting the device
as well as the bounty of evidence the fired cartridge leaves behind from
the unit to the target. Another complication to the scene is the evidence
lost due to medical intervention. Emergency medical technicians (EMTs)
cut Taser wires, remove probes, shear clothing, and sometimes lay waste in
an effort to save lives. Evidence preservation is secondary or even further
down the list in some cases. Notwithstanding, sterile scenes are rare even in
a jail or correctional setting, but it is the police departments responsibility
to educate the medics, EMTs, and firefighters in their area to preserve as
much evidence as possible.
The wounds on the subject can also help put the pieces of an event
together. If the CEW probes have been removed, either during the incident of
by medics, the wounds can be examined. If the subject is deceased, histology
Forensics 255
examination can be performed at autopsy to determine if the wound is con-

sistent to electrical/thermal changes or by other means [7]. This examination
helped the author in the first case in 2001 referenced at the beginning of the
chapter. The subject had been shot and killed as a result of the Taser failing to
incapacitate him. With the probes lost, it was imperative to determine which
wounds in the subject were from the Taser application and which wounds
were from self-inflicted punctures from a knife. What is just as important
as origin of the wounds is where the wounds are located on the body. CEW
probes can affect a person differently, depending on where they strike, and
their location must be properly documented. The author advises document-
ing probe impacts similar to bullet wounds at autopsy (Figure9.24).
Armed with the forensic tools outlined in this chapter, the crime scene
investigator will have a solid foundation of what CEW evidence can be col-
lected and the best way to preserve that evidence for analysis. It is imperative
that investigators and detectives also grasp the dynamics and use of CEWs in
the field to better understand the evidence they are collecting. Key evidence
has been overlooked simply by lack of education. All crime scene investigators
and case detectives should take a user-level CEW course to understand the
components and how the devices are deployed in the field. A proper investiga-
tion can determine where in the scene the device was deployed and whether
the CEW units were functioning properly, interpret and validate CEW fir-
ing data, and examine the wires and probes (grossly and microscopically)
to determine other data such as duration of application and what the probes
struck using microscopic examination, trace evidence, and DNA analysis.
Evidence Collection
Collection begins with the CEW device itself. After a critical incident involv-
ing a CEW, particularly one where the device did not perform as expected,
it is a typical practice to test-spark the unit soon after the event to see if it is
functioning properly. It is highly recommended that the device not be test
sparked proximal to the incident to be certain the logged firing data during
the incident is clearly separated from any diagnostic checks. Preferably, the
device should be secured and packaged at the scene for later analysis. The
most important point for the collection of Taser units is to leave the bat-
tery installed. Since the battery pack in the Taser unit is placed and removed
much like a firearm magazine, the untrained person may remove the battery
(referred to as DPM) in an effort to make the unit safe for collection, pack-
aging, or transport. The consequence of long-term battery removal can result
in erasure of the internal firing data. The unit can remain safe with the bat-
tery in place by removing any unfired cartridges and taping down the safety
switch or by installing a Taser safety clip [8]. If the cartridge (fired or unfired)
Documentation of CEW Probe Impact Areas on Body
Distance from top

of Head
Top
Probe
27
Bottom
Probe 38
Distance from Midline

Top Probe 3
Bottom Probe 5
Figure 9.24 CEW probe impact locations must be documented similar to bullet
wounds.
is attached to the Taser device upon collection, note its orientation on the
unit before removal, as the cartridge is designed to attach two ways. Remove
the cartridge, note its serial number, and place it in secure packaging, taking
care to preserve the integrity of any attached wires.
The probes are the most important evidence items related to a CEW
deployment. Care should be taken to preserve the PKJ and the probe barb for
Forensics 257
reasons discussed previously in this chapter. The wire should never be pulled
from the base of the probe. This will result in the wire knot falling out, los-
ing valuable forensic evidence. One method to collect the probe is to place it
in a white slider box, allowing the wire attached to it to trail out. This is also
effective if the wire is still attached to the cartridge. All items can be pack-
aged together, maintaining the integrity of the wire.
Responding to a call about a man with a machete, police officers were soon
in a foot pursuit with the subject. Running through a residential neighbor-
hood while wielding a machete, the suspect was ignoring all commands
to stop or to drop the weapon. At some point during the chase, a Taser
was deployed and failed. He was eventually cornered, and officers were
forced to shoot and kill the man when he failed to comply with commands
and charged an officer. Subsequent collection of the evidence was able to
prove where the officer fired his Taser based on the location of the AFID
tags. Additionally, analysis of the barb under the probe revealed trace evi-
dence of common lawn grass, indicating that the probe had missed the
subject, explaining the failure of the deployment.
Any wire associated with the Taser deployment should be collected

and packaged, disturbing the wire as little as possible. If there are separate
lengths of Taser wire, collect them separately, noting their location when
found. If the wire must be cut to allow packaging, mark the area and cut the
wire rather than tearing it. The wires should never be spooled around the
cartridge or any other object.
In addition to the probes and wires, there are other components to a fired
Taser cartridge that should be collected. Antifelon identification (AFID) tags
are dispensed with each fired Taser cartridge. These confettilike disks (approx-
imately 0.2 inches or 5 mm) contain the microscopic serial number of the fired
cartridge and can provide an approximate location of the cartridge deploy-
ment. They are pink, yellow, and clear, and some can be seen using a forensic
light source (FLS). Blast doors, foam disks, probe protectors, and Mylar strips
all come out the front of the cartridge as well when it is deployed. These items
do not have high forensic value, but they can certainly help place the location
as to where the cartridge was fired or provide clues to a cartridge malfunction.
Conclusion
The investigation and forensic analysis of a CEW incident begins with the under-
standing of the dynamics of a CEW application, including the devices capa-
bilities and limitations. This is followed by proper collection and preservation
of all CEW-related evidence, including the device, cartridges, wires, probe

bodies, and other products of deployment. Other critical components such as
video, witness statements, and proper documentation of wounds must be con-
sidered [7]. Since critical incidents involving CEWs are typically rare events,
checklists can be useful to ensure that all bases are covered (Figure9.25).
It is usually necessary to download the firing data shortly after the event,
but care must be taken to thoroughly document the download and limit test
Critical Research and Training

Providing training, analysis, and independent testing of less lethal systems by combining experience and science
CRT Less Lethal, Inc
Forensic Analysis Checklist

Electronic Control Device (ECD)
Incident Date :__ ____ _ ____ ___ _ Case Number: __ _ _____ ____ _____
Scene photos Video of Incident Sketch/Diagram of Scene
Subject:
Age/Size of Subject:_____________________
Evidence of drug use, mental illness , or excited delirium Core T emperature ________
ECD ineffective during incident Thick Clothing/Jacket
Prolonged struggle during incident Drive -stun mode u sed during incident
Other relevant details of incident (number of applications, subjects reactions, etc.):

____________________________________________________________
________________ ________________ ___________________________
(attach summary if nee ded)
Electronic Control Device (ECD)

TASER Other__________ with camera stun gun serial number__________
Model: X26 S200 M26 C2 X2 X3 XREP Other_______
Power source/b atteries used in incident (s ubmit to lab)
Type : DPM TASER CAM Other % remaining_ _______ Software version ______
Alkaline B rand:___________ NiMH Date/Time last charged? ________
Batteries/DPM remain in unit Safety -clip in place
Unit data download after incident Printout attached
Unit fi red/spark tested since incident Error code _______
Internal clock changed since incident
Unit function test requested Known Problems with ECD unit
Unit power/output requested _________________________
Multiple ECD cyc les suspected
Cartridge Components
Number of cartridges fire d in incident? _______ Collected as evidence Item # (s) _____________
Serial Number (s) : _________ ____ ____ ________ ____ ___ ______ __ Type: _______
Collected from: ______ _____________ _______________ __
Wires attache d Wire missing /lost
Wires and probes attached Trace/Micro/ Bio -DNA evidence Trace collected
Wires compromised How____________________
AFID tags, blast doors collected
Probes
Collected as evidence f rom____________
Probe penetration of skin Mark
Probe(s) remain in clothing #_ ___ ____ approximate
Clothing collected as evidence location of:
Photos of location and spread of probes
Distance (inches) of probe spread:______________ Probes O
Wound photos with scale
Wires at probes intact (PKJ) Drive stun X
Addition al
Evidence p reviously examined
Medical/Autopsy report s
Toxicology report
Officer, W itness statements /video
PO Box 94579 Seattle WA 98124 -6879

www.CRTLessLethal.com
Figure 9.25 Example of a CEW forensic checklist used by investigators.

Forensics 259
firing of the device after it is collected. In a major incident, such as an arrest-

related death, it is imperative to log the device into evidence and not return
it to service. In some instances, testing the output of the device is prudent.
If the evidence is properly collected and documented, microscopic qualities
present on the probes and wires can be compared to the data recorded in
the device itself to help approximate duration of electric energy the subject
received during the incident. These analyses are pivotal in a successful recon-
struction of the event.
Even when all potential evidence is identified and collected, a forensic
reconstruction of a CEW event is often complex, particularly when compli-
cated by the combination of a shooting or other arrest-related death. The
investigator must ensure that all case information is collected and available,
including subject clothing, medical/autopsy reports, photos, videos, and
statements from all parties. All of the case data culminates with the analy-
sis and testing of the forensic evidence. Interpretation of results combined
with scientific testing can aid in a practical reconstruction of the event that
most accurately represents what occurred. To be further detailed in Chapter
10, a proficient forensic expert should be well versed in courtroom presenta-
tions and the generation of demonstrative aids to educate juries that expect
CSI-type testing and results. Although a reconstruction can be seen as a
subjective interpretation of events, testimony should focus on objective data
provided by scientific testing and analysis to help demonstrate the events
of the incident. A full understanding of what occurred based on a forensic
analysis helps to limit liability to the officers involved and assists in a more
accurate assessment of excessive-force complaints.
References
1. Johnson, A. C. 1976. The Taser public defender (TF-1). AFTE Journal 8 (4):
3240.
2. Lutz, M. 1981. Tom Swifts electric rifle Taser (public defender). AFTE Journal
13 (3): 1819.
3. Taser International. Press releases. http://investor.taser.com/releases.cfm.
4. Nichols, R. 1998. Forensic aspects of the Air Taser. AFTE Journal 30 (1): 10811.
5. Wyant, R. T. 2004. The advanced Taser M26, X26: Forensic considerations.
AFTE Journal 36 (4): (26774).
6. Robinson, M. N., C. G. Brooks, and G. D. Renshaw. 1990. Electric shock devices
and their effects on the human body. Med. Sci. Law 30 (4): 285300.
7. Dawes, D., M. Kroll, and J. Ho, eds. 2012. Atlas of conducted electrical weapon
wounds and forensic analysis. New York: Springer Press.
8. Wyant, R. T., T. J. Burns, and K. M. Geil. 2011. Crime scene considerations: elec-
tronic control device (Taser) deployment. Association of Crime Scene Reconstruction
17 (3): 3747. http://www.acsr.org.php5-19.dfw1-1.websitetestlink.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/08/Wyant-Burns-Geil-reduced.pdf.
9. Wyant, R. T., and T. J. Burns. 2012. Basic function tests of electronic control
devices (Taser) for firearms examiners. AFTE Journal 44 (1): 47.
10. Adler, A., D. Dawson, R. Evans, L. Garland, M. Miller, I. Sinclair, and
R. Youmaran. 2013. Toward a test protocol for conducted energy weapons.
Scientific Research, Modern Instrumentation 2 (1): 715. http://www.scirp.org/
journal/mi.
11. Wyant, R. T., and K. M. Geil. 2010. Examination of the probe-knot junction to
estimate duration of electronic control device (Taser) exposures. AFTE Journal
42 (3): 25358.
12. Wolslagel, P., and E. Brown. 2005. Distance determination and performance of
the Taser International model 26. AFTE Journal 37 (3): 22628.
13. Kido, A., and R. T. Wyant. 2008. Analyzing electronic control device (Taser)
wire to determine duration of short circuit. AFTE Journal 40 (4): 34853.
Aftermath: Post-
Event Report Writing,
Evidence Collection,
and Court Preparation
10
JOHN ALLGIRE, R. T. WYANT, TOM
BURNS, AND RON MCCARTHY
Contents
Make Your Report Go to 11 262
Considerations When Writing a Use-of-Force Statement 262
Threat Assessment and Urgency 263
Environmental Conditions 264
Emotions 265
Lewinski and Force Science: Understanding Behavior under Stress 265
The Suspects Actions 267
Informational versus Educational Report Writing 268
Sweat the Small Stuff: Do Not Overlook Forensics 270
Aftercare of Suspects Subjected to Less Lethal Options 273
Forensic Photography 274
Video Evidence: Police and Civilian 276
The Courtroom: Testifying to the Whole Truth 276
The Report Is Your Safety Net 278
Unscrupulous Opposing Attorneys and Experts 279
Education Is the Key to Successful Testimony 280
Preparing for the Worst in the Aftermath 281
References 281
In the event a controversial or high-profile deployment occurs, steps can be

taken to minimize the impact on the agency, community, and the entire less
lethal program. Once the force event has concluded, documentation from
many areas must be gathered and compiled to justify the actions and ensure
that procedures were followed to limit liability on the officer and the depart-
ment. Thorough documentation procedures will help prepare for inquiry
or court proceedings, including what evidence can be analyzed by forensic
scientists and other crime laboratory personnel to objectively affirm officer
and witness statements. The common approach to police report writing is to
261
incorporate some sort of acronym or technique to assist the officer in recall-

ing central components to include in the report. The most prevalent would
be the who, what, where, when, why, and how method of writing reports.
Some acronyms have their place and can assist an officer in remembering
important facts, such as the Sid Heal SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit,
time, equipment) when reporting on a gaggle of anarchists approaching a
line of outnumbered officers [1]. Lessons learned from incidents that were
either improperly, poorly, or just plain not documented emphasize the need
to go beyond traditional police report-writing approaches when explaining a
less lethal deployment.
Make Your Report Go to 11
If it is not in the report, it didnt happen. This has been the standard police
report-writing mantra for modern U.S. law enforcement for many years. In
todays litigious climate, this simply is not good enough. The new baras set
by recent court cases followed by large payouts or, in some cases, criminal
charges for the officeris If it is not fully explained, someone will explain
it for you.
In their training, the authors use the example of comparing famous paint-
ers: Pablo Picasso and Norman Rockwell. In a Picasso, the interpretation
is left up to the viewer. The paintings are abstract and often with minimal
detail, allowing one to self-indulge and impart ones own beliefs as part of
the interpretation. In a Rockwell painting, every minute detail is painted,
allowing the viewer to see exactly what is occurring in the piece, the emo-
tion, and the message the artist is trying to convey. This concept is outlined
during training by stressing that the actions, evidence, and reports can-
not be left open to interpretation. Being detailed in an educational manner
allows outsiders to see the what, who, where, how and why from the officers
point of view. If the law enforcement officer at the scene, briefly describes
the force used during the incident and doesnt write the complete story,
then the only persons left to write about it are the suspect and his attorney.
Considerations When Writing a Use-of-Force Statement
When the authors teach courses outlining police-force situations and how
less lethal options are applied, they often begin with a classroom discussion
by asking students, Who determines if force is used? The response is usu-
ally mixed. Some say it is the police, and others say it is the suspects choice.
The correct answer is the suspects behavior forces police to make decisions
for the sake of public safety. As with training, practice, and predicated by
Aftermath 263
case law, when using force based on the subjects actions, police should always
defer to the lowest amount of force necessary to achieve the desired goal.
Yet when police statements are written pertaining to a critical incident, the
environmental conditions, other involved parties, emotions, threat, urgency,
and the specific need for taking an action are often deemphasized or omitted
entirely. All of the elements related to a decision must be carefully articulated
in reports so that the stress, danger, and urgency of the force used are prop-
erly conveyed to the reader.
USE-OF-FORCE RULES BY RON MCCARTHY

Rule 1Discuss in detail the suspects resistance and present
an accurate account of the force used.
Rule 2Ensure that restraints are placed within policy and
documented in report.
Rule 3Always provide medical attention when less lethal tools
are applied, even when it does not appear to be necessary.
Rule 4 Arrest reports related to use of force should be
inspected by supervisors.
Rule 5 Obtain video of incident when applicable.
Rule 6Those deploying less lethal options must be properly
trained by certified instructors.
Rule 7Thoroughly prepare for depositions and courtroom
testimony. Avoid whenever possible: I do not recall
or I dont remember.
Rule 8Use common language when addressing the court and
avoid police dialect.
Threat Assessment and Urgency

As stated in Chapter 1, police officers only use force about one percent of
the time. For the vast majority of reports that officers are required to submit
for the routine call, basic information is all that is necessary to relate what
occurred. In force situations, not only are officers required to address a vio-
lent or aggressive subject, but they must remember what occurred in great
detail after a physical and sometimes emotional event. For these events, offi-
cers must break routine to describe the full nature of the incident along with
the urgency of the situation and the threat of the individual in detail.
Properly documented initial observations prior to the force encounter
(assessment of the threat) afford the reader a sense of the danger from the
officers perspective. The size of an individual, physical presence, age, and
demeanor all contribute to the tactics and response. Likewise, the officers
size, age, physical abilities, and demeanor play a role in the situation, the
justification of the use of the less lethal option, and potentially the outcome.
THREAT ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS TO

CONSIDER FOR REPORTING
Is the subject responding to simple commands?
Did the subject present in a way that made police believe he has
fighting ability?
Are there martial-arts or gang-affiliated tattoos?
Did the individual show the propensity for violence through
their actions or statements?
Are there signs of drug use or mental illness?
Is there a past history with the subject?
Although U.S. case law allows officers to respond to an urgent situation

if there is an imminent danger to public safety, officers have been criticized
in the courts for not properly explaining the reasons for which they acted.
As stated in Chapter 7, writing a good statement relating to the use of force
begins in the training curriculum. Training officers to write educational
use-of-force statements that include key elements such as threat assessment,
environment, emotion, and detailed accounts of the suspects behavior will
mitigate scrutiny of the event after the fact. Since these incidents are a rar-
ity, using the provided checklists in Chapter 7 can remind officers of the key
areas they must cover to write a comprehensive report.
Environmental Conditions
Observations regarding the general environment are often-overlooked com-
ponents in police reports are. Lighting, weather, and other environmental con-
ditions can play a role in how the officer responded to the threat. Contacting
someone in a tourism corridor at one in the afternoon will elicit a different
tactical approach than the same contact at three in the morning. A residence
full of debris is much more difficult to navigate in an attempt to control and
wrestle an aggressive subject. Reporting that threats can be present anywhere
in a cluttered home versus in a sparsely furnished home can be important. In
the relatively clean house, officers can easily scan the area looking for potential
weapons. Increase of potential danger occurs if the opposite were true. Most
officers are aware that changing conditions greatly affect tactical responses, but
often that is not discussed in the report. Officers must take the time to include
specific details of the total environment, how it impacted their responses, and
any urgency the conditions appeared to create (Figure 10.1). This helps the
reader to understand why the officers reacted the way they did.
Aftermath 265
Figure 10.1 Describing the environment in which force is used can play a role
in justifying it. The photo of the aftermath may only tell part of the story.
Emotions
After a stressful event, back in the safety of their precincts, officers will gather
and share their experiences of the incident with each other. Often during
these exchanges, statements are made concerning the danger of the incident
and the personal fear the officer experienced. Even though the officers were
scared, they took action to stop the threatening behaviorwhat some define
as courage. Courage is the ability to control fear and respond to a danger-
ous situation while controlling our natural fear response. Fear is a natural
and acceptable response to danger, but what separates police officers is their
training and experience in stressful and life-threatening situations. This does
not negate the fact that fear can play a role in how police explain taking an
action to control a situation. That fear and stress may also play a substantial
role in how the officer perceives and subsequently documents that event [2].
Lewinski and Force Science: Understanding

Behavior under Stress
Traditionally there has been a significant divide between the researchers

who study police force and those actually applying it. An Internet search
will yield all sorts of experts in the field of human behaviors willing to
explain what occurred during an incident with little or no science behind

their opinion. Officers have been accused of dishonesty simply because they
interpreted an action differently due to the stress of the situation. An officer
insist that he fired 5 rounds at the suspect, yet there are 17 fired cartridge
cases on the ground along with an empty magazine. He may insist that the
suspect was facing him, yet there are two shots in the suspects back. Officers
such as these have been skewered by the courts and by their departments for
not telling the truth. In recent years, Bill Lewinski and his group at Force
Science Institute (FSI) have developed an entire field of study that relates to
how humans process and react to high stress. They were able to scientifically
explain and reproduce how perception of a life-threatening event or crisis
situation can affect behavior. FSI embodies the concept of how science can
be merged with real problems faced by law enforcement. Their body of work
produced in this field is unparalleled and has certainly contributed to help-
ing the truth prevail in civil proceedings after the fact. Lewinski has taken
a proactive approach to address these issues before they happen by offer-
ing intense and comprehensive certification courses to help investigators,
administrations, and attorneys understand why officers perceive and react to
a threat the way they do. Officers armed with a working understanding of FSI
research are better prepared to describe and document the realities of their
job in a relatable way. Additionally, the officer should discuss FSI research
with prosecutors or civil attorneys as a means to educate them to the poten-
tial expert-witness testimony available.
I learned that courage was not the absence of fear, but the triumph over it. The
brave man is not he who does not feel afraid, but he who conquers that fear.
Nelson Mandela
In reviewing thousands of use-of-force reports, rarely have the authors

seen emotions documented in the narrative. The emotions experienced
during the incident, and oftentimes discussed after the incident, should be
included in the narrative to encompass the totality of the circumstances.
When articulating responses related to the reasonable-officer standard, offi-
cers shortchange themselves by not including these emotions. Describing
the stress experienced during the event is an essential component, as it
allows the reader to stand in the officers shoes for a moment in time. As the
officer is the only person who experienced the emotions at the time, that
officer is the only one who can insert these emotions into the testimony. The
documentation of fears and apprehension has nothing to do with ego. If
officers minimize the reasons they took action, they may remove the neces-
sity from their actions. The absence of necessity from a use of force equates
to an assault on the suspect. The laws in the United States clearly allow the
Aftermath 267
police to use force on citizens, but they require a justification. A lawsuit filed
against a police officer is essentially a litmus test assessing whether there
is justification for the assault on a citizen.
The Suspects Actions

Although it seems simple, one must fully articulate the suspects behav-
ior during a force encounter. As discussed previously, the polices actions
are merely reactions to what the suspect was doing. Simply stating, Mr.
Anderson then took an aggressive stance may suffice for the sergeant to
comprehend, but this does not properly describe the threat for the jury. It
is critical that every movement and action of the suspect prior to the use of
force against him be explained in every aspect: I asked Mr. Anderson if he
had any warrants. As he stated, No sir and stepped back with his right foot,
I observed his forearms tense up. I know from my training and experience
that that behavior is consistent with a fighting stance. In many of the cases
related to Taser deployments that the authors have reviewed from all over the
United States and abroad, this description is often missing, particularly with
excited delirium cases (Chapter 8). Without video documentation, it is hard
for most people to grasp how violently one person is able to fight five officers
at one time. The burden falls on the responding officers to make their own
video in the form of thorough written documentation.
The deployment of less lethal solutions toward a subject who is the source of a
police response is really only the first half of the event. The dynamics of a tacti-
cal intervention require a significant level of officer performance:
1. Verbalization that is appropriate for the situation
2. Identifying and deploying the less lethal tool at the appropriate
target area
3. Using effective control and cuffing techniques to end the con
frontation
Too often, it is after the less lethal deployment that problems mount for the
agency and the officer(s) involved. Reports are lacking, decontamination is
not conducted appropriately, and medical attention is lacking. Much of the
time the fault lies with poor supervision and inadequate follow-up after the
arrest. The application of less lethal solutions can lead to litigation and pos-
sibly a federal civil rights case. The agency and the officer(s) will be at risk
even when they do everything right. Be smart, be prepared, and always be
professional.
Ron McCarthy
Informational versus Educational Report Writing
Informational reporting can be defined as documenting the facts surround-

ing an incident absent of emotions and perspective. While the reporting of
use-of-force incidents in an informational way will typically be sufficient for
departmental needs, it will not survive the scrutiny of a lawsuit. In reality,
the review of use-of-force situations and ultimately the responses and deci-
sions made by the officer will be evaluated in a courtroom. The officer will be
judged by persons who have no knowledge base of police tactics and likely
have never been in a life-threatening situation. The average police officer
has experienced situations that would shock the conscience of most jurors.
A statement from the viewpoint of the officer must be relayed in a way that
encapsulates the knowledge he or she possessed at the time based on previous
experiences. Documenting the officers perspective also gives insight to the
court as to what a reasonable officer might have done in the same situation.
A majority of people chosen for a jury likely receive their knowledge base
from TV or movies. They may have preconceived ideas on how police should
act and respond. It is the job of the officer and the trainer called as the less
lethal expert to educate the court as to the realities of law enforcement and the
intent, capabilities, and limitations of the weapons they employ. Ideally, this
begins by creating an educational report of the event from the onset. Imagine
using the report as a script to teach jurors from the officers assessment of the
situation. Describe why the actions taken were necessary to de-escalate the
situation by including clear and concise descriptions of the suspects actions,
including thoughts, emotions, and observations as they occurred.
Example of an Informational Police Report

When I entered the room, I could clearly see a knife on the table and the suspect
reached for it. I yelled, Police, dont move. The suspect did not comply, and I
deployed a single 12-gauge beanbag round to the subjects left thigh. The sus-
pect was not incapacitated and reached toward the knife. I fired an additional
12-gauge beanbag round to the suspects left thigh. The suspect dropped to the
ground but would not respond to any commands. My cover officer moved in
and cuffed the suspect.
Example of an Educational Police Report

When I entered the room, I could clearly see a knife on the table about seven
steps away from me. The suspect was standing near the couch about ten steps
away from me. The suspect looked at me, and it appeared to me that his focus
shifted to the knife as he moved toward the table, reaching for the knife with
his right hand. I feared the suspect was attempting to arm himself and assault
me or my cover officer. I considered transitioning to my duty handgun and
employing lethal force if the suspect was able to pick up the knife and charge
Aftermath 269
me. I yelled, Police! Dont Move! The suspect ignored my order and contin-
ued lunging toward and reaching for the knife. I decided against transitioning
to my handgun because my partner had drawn his handgun for lethal cover. I
knew my less lethal shotgun appeared to be the only alternative to lethal force.
In an attempt to stop the suspect from gaining access to a deadly weapon,
which would have resulted in the use of deadly force by my lethal cover officer,
I fired a 12-gauge beanbag round into the suspects left thigh. I chose this tar-
get because I knew through my training that the thigh contains many nerves
and in the past suspects have responded to this shot by giving up. This target
area increases safety over a chest shot. I reloaded my less lethal shotgun in
case the first shot did not result in the suspect giving up. As I was cycling my
pump shotgun, I could see the suspect react to the first shot and for a moment
I was relieved because it appeared the shot had worked as intended and broken
the suspects focus on the knife, thereby stopping him from arming himself.
A moment later I could see the suspect refocus as he continued to reach for
the knife. Knowing that my lethal cover officer would be forced to shoot the
suspect if he got to the knife, I again attempted to stop him by firing a second
12-gauge beanbag round into his left thigh. The second shot appeared to be
effective because the suspect dropped to the ground. I told the suspect to stay
on the ground and place his hand out flat on the ground in front of him. From
where I was standing I could see the suspect was holding his left leg near where
I had deployed the beanbag. From my training and experience, I know that
suspects can secrete items in their waistband, and I was afraid that if my cover
officer moved in, he might be injured if this suspect had a weapon hidden on
his body. I considered shooting a third 12-gauge beanbag round in order to get
him to comply with my orders, thereby making it safer for my cover officer to
move in and handcuff the suspect. After a few moments, an additional cover
officer came into the room. I decided not to deploy the third shot because it
appeared to me that the suspect was in considerable pain and may not have
been able to respond to my commands. My cover officer moved in and hand-
cuffed the suspect. Out of concern for the suspect, I immediately checked the
welfare of the suspect and called for a medic unit. Once medic unit cleared him
to be transported to the jail, I photographed the suspects wound areas on his
left and right thigh.
In the informational report, the reader is informed only of what the

officer did. In the educational report, the reader learned that the offi-
cer was forced to deploy the 12-gauge beanbag rounds twice because of
the suspects actions. The reader was also informed that the suspects
actions caused the officer to be in fear for his safety and the safety of his
cover officer. The reader has the opportunity to learn that the officer was
concerned that additional force would be necessary if he did not deploy
his less lethal option and that lethal force was a certain possibility if the
beanbag was unsuccessful.
It is beneficial to have a jury understand that the situation and the sus-
pects actions could have called for the use of deadly force. The officers chose
an attempt to de-escalate the situation by employing the very weapon the
plaintiffs attorney could call excessive. A thorough educational report will
be the foundation of the officers testimony should the officer be called as a

witness for the prosecution of the suspect or named as a defendant in a civil
lawsuit.
Sweat the Small Stuff: Do Not Overlook Forensics
If you fired a 12-gauge less lethal shotgun, think big picture and document
all items as you would for a weapon used in an assault. The simple truth
is, until the actions are justified, it may be viewed as such. Write down the
serial number, how many and what type of rounds were fired, and docu-
ment the evidence. As previously discussed in Chapter 7, collecting the
specific round that impacted the suspect makes it available for analysis by
a forensic scientist. In addition to matching up the round with the wound,
the rifling imparted on some rounds (particularly 37mm and 40mm) can
be compared to a specific launcher (Figure 10.2) [3]. This may be impor-
tant in civil disturbances, where it might be unknown which specific officer
fired the round. Trace evidence on the recovered projectile can also offer
clues. Take the skip-firing scenario from Chapter 7. Marks on the projectile
can discern whether the projectile struck concrete or dirt and may help
disprove a false statement (Figures10.3 and 10.4). Certain rounds will also
pick up pattern impressions from the suspects clothing (Figure10.5).
The authors have long used the mantra, Why speculate when you can
replicate? This applies to gathering the known facts of the case, combining
Rifling Impressions
Figure 10.2 Projectiles (40mm in this case) can have rifling marks unique to
the launcher they were fired from.
Aftermath 271
Figure 10.3 Trace material and damage on projectiles can provide clues: dirt
(top) and scuff from concrete (bottom).
results from the analysis of the physical evidence and re-creating what
occurred. Following the scientific method outlined in Chapter 5, a reason-
able attempt can be made at reconstructing the incident. This method has
been extremely useful when presenting the case in front of juries, espe-
cially relating to the use of Tasers or other conducted-energy weapons
(Figure10.6). One case involved a foot pursuit of a car theft suspect over a
long distance. When the officer caught up to the suspect, he was climbing
the fence when the Taser was fired as he apexed the fence. The suspect fell
Figure 10.4 Scuff mark from Taser probe striking pavement, not the suspect.
Figure 10.5 Some rounds (blunt-impact projectiles or BIPs) can capture pattern
impressions upon impact (seam from clothing).
on the other side of the fence. The question was raised whether or not the
suspect received less electrical charge given that the wires were over the
metal fence. An experiment was devised to answer that question using a
steak soaked in saltwater (resistance intentionally high and measured with
an ohm meter), a similar fence, and a mannequin. This experiment could
easily have been conducted in a laboratory, but efforts were made to control
Figure 10.6 Data obtained from reconstructing an incident is more useful to a

jury than guessing what occurred.
Aftermath 273
as many variables as possible and make it a realistic scenario for a jury

member to understand.
Aftercare of Suspects Subjected to Less Lethal Options
If an arrest was preceded by the deployment of a less lethal option, officers

must account for the force used. In Taser deployments, it is necessary to docu-
ment the location of probe strikes, how they were oriented in the skin when
found, whether they were folded over or torn out by the suspect, etc. Simple
probe removal from a nonsensitive area or nonpenetrating probe strikes may
not need medical attention, but they will require documentation and pictures
(Figure 10.7). One of the authors had a Taser deployment where, just prior
to the firing of the Taser, the suspect slipped and the top probe struck the
suspect in the throat. After a full cycle of the Taser, the suspect dropped the
sharp object he had in his hand and was arrested. Medics were called to evalu-
ate the suspect prior to transporting him to the hospital for probe removal.
The author was chastised for taking photographs of the probe still in the sus-
pects throat. While discussing the transport, a new firefighter said something
to the effect that its no big deal and proceeded to yank out the probe. The
authors department has a policy that any probes that strike sensitive areas will
be removed by medical personnel. The suspect was transported to the hospital,
where an ER doctor made sure there was no damage to anything important.
Considering that the nature of the suspects actions required an officer
to induce the application of OC pepper spray, attempting to decontaminate
the subject afterward may be difficult. Document the efforts to provide assis-
tance/decontamination after the application. If decontamination efforts are
not possible because of the suspects continued efforts to resist, then document
Figure 10.7 Immediate scaled photos of impact wounds are required.

the subjects actions and how they precluded you from providing assistance.
Always remember that it is OK to wake up a firefighter to request assistance
in providing clean water for deluge of the eyes. If the suspect continues to
resist decontamination efforts, the responding firefighters can provide wit-
ness accounts of the suspects actions following a use-of-force encounter.
In the same vein, when a beanbag round is deployed to a suspect, it is
good practice to have a medic unit check the wound and overall welfare of
the suspect. If the subject is refusing to be evaluated by medic units, trans-
port the subject to a hospital. It is always better to have medical personnel
document the suspects refusal of aftercare. Knowing the amount of injury
a less lethal option can produce should prompt the end user to take steps
to ensure that the subject is not seriously injured. Impact rounds can cause
blunt trauma that results in bruising and collection of fluid under the skin.
The fluid buildup may cause further injury if not properly assessed. If that
round in any way breaches the skin, medical intervention should occur with-
out delay. Law enforcement should not rely on suspects to make good deci-
sions about their welfare, as their poor decisions put them in this situation
to begin with. Once a person is in custody, it is the officers responsibility to
make good choices on his or her behalf to ensure that any injuries are prop-
erly attended to.
Remember to account for rounds fired at the suspect. Check the suspects
entire body. Search not just for injuries related to the primary use of force,
but also any potential injuries as a result of a fall or the suspects resistance
during cuffing. Full body photographs are recommended when feasible.
Forensic Photography
Courses in forensic photography have been available for decades. One author
instructed a college course in 2000, when digital photography for law enforce-
ment first became prevalent. One of the main points of the course was that
the basics have remained the same whether the evidence is shot with tradi-
tional film or digital. As any crime scene reconstructionist will state: Film is
cheap; you have one shot to do it right! If the evidence is not properly docu-
mented and collected, valuable clues as to what occurred during the event
may be lost forever. The first component of preserving this evidence is proper
forensic photography. Walk your scene; if you see something, photograph it
in place, and bag it for collection. A minimum of three shots should be taken
of every item to be collected for evidence: an overall to show where that item
lies within the scene, an intermediate shot to show that items orientation to
other landmarks, and a scaled close-up (or macro) photograph to demon-
strate the details of that item. To reduce future court challenges, preserve all
photos taken, even unintentional or out-of-focus shots.
Aftermath 275
Figure 10.8 A good photograph can be a powerful piece of evidence.
A case in Chapter 9 involved a suicidal subject who fired at police after

attempts to subdue her with a Taser were unsuccessful. Crime-scene photos
of the Taser used during the incident totaled two, with only two photos of
one of the recovered probes. Since shots were fired, the use of the Taser was
ignored initially, yet later the suspect claimed the Taser deployment caused
her to involuntarily fire her pistol at police. The lack of photographic evi-
dence of the Taser became a significant point of discussion. Approach every
use of force as if it were going to be scrutinized, because you may end up in a
courtroom three years later trying to justify two out-of-focus photographs of
the crucial evidence (Figures10.810.10).
Figure 10.9 Whenever possible, photograph the item in place (in situ).
Figure 10.10 A photograph of the round components for the case file can help
in court preparation.
Video Evidence: Police and Civilian
Understand that the use of video cameras, cell phones, still cameras, and sur-
veillance cameras is part of the culture in the modern age and likely to be
involved in some aspect of a police-force incident. Camera footage has been
used to convict officers but, more importantly, also to exonerate them. Every
effort should be made to collect any video related to the incident and use these
assets to show the event in an objective and unbiased light. As seen in the
medias reporting of controversial police encounters, occasionally, the camera
does not tell the entire story. One officer appeared to shoot a running suspect
in the back from the vantage point of his dashboard camera. The same type
of camera on the cover officers car clearly showed the suspect pulling a gun
and turning toward the pursuing officer. Angle of the camera and lighting
were just right to prevent that. Administrators should not rush to judgment
from a YouTube video of one of their officers without first gathering as much
information as possible. It is the responsibility of the officer to not allow the
video to write the report for them. Complacency in properly reporting facts
may lead to misinterpretations of any video evidence related to the incident.
The Courtroom: Testifying to the Whole Truth
Considering that public speaking is the greatest fear reported, even reported
more often than the fear of death itself, it would be safe to say most police
officers would rather confront an armed bank robbery suspect than testify in
court (Figure10.11). Testifying is just unnatural, as the entire production is odd.
Aftermath 277
Figure 10.11 Public speaking is feared by most people.

Entering the courtroom full of people who are waiting for you to tell them what
happened, taking your seat all by yourself, being made to swear that you intend
to tell the truth, and remembering that there are things, even though they are
the truth, you cannot talk about because in a courtroom the whole truth and
nothing but the truth does not include the suspects criminal history.
According to most studies, peoples number one fear is public speaking.

Number two is death. Death is number two. Does that seem right? That means
to the average person, if you have to go to a funeral, youre better off in the
casket than doing the eulogy.
Jerry Seinfeld
Then there is the way the attorneys talk. They talk in the presence of
witnesses, to the judge, and at times in little secret circles called side bars.
If one attorney doesnt like what another attorney has asked or said, they
interrupt by standing up and yelling objection, and the judge will decide if
the question or statement is relevant to the testimony. Sometimes the judge
will agree with the person interrupting, and you wont get to answer the pre-
vious question or continue talking at all.
As if that wasnt odd enough, you are not allowed to just tell the court
what you did or saw during the day in question. The prosecutor appears to
know the answers, but leaves you hanging while he asks vague non-leading
questions. The defense counsel, on the other hand, asks short, curt questions
Sometimes the defendants attorney treats you with such righteous indig-
nation, it feels as though you are the one on trial (and depending on how
this goes, you might be). You might spend most of your time being cross-
examined, trying to figure out where in the hell the defense is going with
their line of questioning. To top it all off, a defense attorney will require a
yes-or-no answer to a question that requires extreme explanation in order
to not mislead the jury. This behavior is not acceptable in any other setting
Hawa courtroom.
The Report Is Your Safety Net
The truth is the easiest story to tell because it really happened. When tes-
tifying, you should stop worrying about where the opposing attorneys are
going with their line of questioning. Listen to each question and answer
each question honestly. If by some smoke and mirrors the opposing attor-
ney has crafted a series of questions that ends with your answers painting a
false picture, remember that the prosecutor has the opportunity to correct
this. If it seems as though the courtroom stage has you acting as an aerialist
Aftermath 279
walking a tightrope, do not forget that your report is your safety net. If you
have documented your point of view with a detailed account of the event
in your report, you can always refer to it. In the courtroom, if you dont
communicate the details in your narrative to the jury, it will be as if they
did not occur. A jury listening to an officer who is answering each question
honestly and emphatically will quickly understand the truth. Remember to
own your mistakes, as the jury understands that no one is perfect.
It is imperative that you spend time with your prosecutor or civil attor-
ney. Educate the attorney about the force you used and why it was necessary.
Never assume an attorney has read the entirety of your report. Never assume
he or she knows how a less lethal option is deployed. When in a courtroom,
assumptions can be costlyin monetary damages and, in some cases, in the
freedom of the officer. If your attorney has hired an outside expert, inquire on
what that person is planning to say and whether he or she read your report.
Preparation through communication will give the officer a better chance to
educate the jury as to the officers point of view when it is the officers turn in
the witness box.
Unscrupulous Opposing Attorneys and Experts
It is helpful to approach a court testimony objectively and not be jaded by

a previous bad experience. It is wise to be professional and courteous to
everyone you encounter. There are certainly attorneys who will challenge
your qualifications, honesty, and credibility, but try not to take it person-
ally and remain calm. They are searching for any impropriety that may put
reasonable doubt in the jurys eyes. Most will move on if they sense they will
not elicit a negative response. A good opposing attorney does encourage
cops to approach their job more intelligently, and a smart officer recognizes
it as such.
In addition to the contention created by the opposing attorneys, the
experts that they hire to help their cause can be equally as frustrating. Be
aware that there are unscrupulous experts willing to bend the truth or flat-
out lie to fit the defense or plaintiff. Some do it purely for money, referred
to as liars for hire, and there are those who truly believe what they are
saying, referred to as inept experts. The principal authors have had sev-
eral run-ins with Taser experts who have never deployed the device in the
field. They may not even have attended a user-level course or have any appre-
ciable knowledge base. One expert admitted on the stand that the author
was far more qualified than he was to render an opinion on Taser function.
Oftentimes these experts have no real basis or proof for their opinion and
rarely back up their statements with precedence, science, experimentation,
or reconstruction. When they do quote a statistic or study, encourage your

attorney to verify it, as some will cite information with such confidence that
the attorney assumes it must be true. Juries typically see these witnesses for
what they are, and the truth normally prevails. With the officer adhering to
the facts of the case, physical evidence and a thorough incident statement
will usually give the experts interpretation of the case the weight it deserves
with the jury.
Simply put, much of the science cited by detractors of nonlethal options is

either fundamentally flawed, misunderstood, mischaracterizes the evidence,
or ignores influences beyond the control of the user. It is an exceedingly rare
occurrence when any of this so-called science is subject to peer review by
objective researchers, cited authoritatively in reports by other scholars or sci-
entists, used in supporting references, or corroborated with other research by
bona fide scientific or academic institutions.
Sid Heal
Education Is the Key to Successful Testimony
One successful method to combat the mudding of the water with use-of-force
cases is to have a strong relationship with the attorney. The attorney fighting
for the truth and your cause may have no idea what a less lethal device is,
much less how it should be deployed and its expected result. Pretrial confer-
ences will help prepare him/her on what questions to ask you and the oppos-
ing expert. Encourage attorneys to challenge junk science and misstatements
from opposing experts. Without holding these experts accountable, they will
move on and make another cops life hell in another jurisdiction. Approaching
your testimony like a less lethal class explanation will build a rapport with the
jury and probably put you at ease. Remember, in the CSI age, juries expect
more and no longer take the cops word on what happened. It is important to
know your limitations on the scope of your testimony. If by your training you
are qualified as an expert, the opposing side may try to test your knowledge.
It is OK to say, I dont know, rather than take a guess and get stomped, losing
any credibility you may have had with a jury. A common tactic in Taser cases
is to get the instructor or department expert tied up in knots on electricity
theory, asking for definitions of volts, amps, coulombs, residence, heart safety,
calcium channels, etc. It is acceptable to tell the opposing counsel that the
question is outside your expertise. An expert can train officers in the use
of a Taser without an electrical engineering degree. For instance you could
respond, I dont need to know how many transistors there are in my cell
phone to make a call.
Aftermath 281
Preparing for the Worst in the Aftermath
We dont usually get sued when things go right. The sad reality surrounding
that statement is that it is becoming more false by the day. U.S. law enforce-
ment is getting sued when less lethal tools are deployed in a reasonable and
judicious manner, and even in situations where the deployment clearly saved
lives. Departments are also being sued for not having less lethal options
available at the scene where a person was either shot or committed suicide.
They are even being held responsible for not recognizing medical conditions.
U.S. law enforcement is getting sued because even if the option is applied cor-
rectly, the documentation is sorely lacking.
Law enforcement is not getting sued for what they did; they are getting
sued for what they didnt explain. Although it is impossible to prevent all liti-
gation relating to the use of force, the goal of this text is to reduce liability for
officers and departments through collaboration and education. A complete
educational report, proper collection of all relevant evidence, and compre-
hensive testimony to what occurred offer the best protection from frivolous
lawsuits and provide a means of documenting accountability and limiting
liability, thereby effectively managing risk.
References
1. Heal, S. 1998. Topic area: Intelligence (SALUTE reports). Tactical Terminology,
Fall: 7374. http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Heal/Intelligence-SALUTE%20
Reports.pdf.
2. Honig, A., and W. J. Lewinski. 2008. A survey of the research on human
factors related to lethal force encounters: Implications for law enforcement
training, tactics, and testimony. Law Enforcement Executive Forum 4 (4):
129152.
3. Malikowski, S. 2012. The identification of fired 40mm less lethal projectiles.
AFTE Journal 44 (2): 17072.
Risk Management
for Law Enforcement
in Modern Society
R. T. WYANT AND JOHN ALLGIRE
11
Contents
Time Magazines Person of the Year 2011: The Protester 283
Applying Lessons Learned 286
Why Less Lethal Options Are Necessary 288
Influential Events Involving Less Lethal 289
Choosing the Right Tool for the Box 289
Thoughts on Policy 293
Independent Testing: You Need It 293
Training: Take It Seriously 295
ExDS and Taser Forensics: Who Knew? 297
Documentation: Better Have It 298
Dont Wait until Something Bad Happens 299
Sharing Information 300
Risk Management through Consistency, Accountability, and Education 301
Looking Forward: Significantly Reduce the Likelihood of Injury 303
References 304
The intent of this text was to demonstrate how risk management of less lethal
options requires a complex multitiered approach, with no simple answer
or quick fix. The authors liken this approach to Mr. Miagis in the classic
American movie, The Karate Kid. The student begins with many assigned
menial tasks while impatiently waiting for the real karate training to begin,
not knowing that by waxing cars and painting fences he was learning the
essential lessons of karate all along. Each of the preceding 10 chapters in this
text represents the menial tasks from which to build the skills and knowl-
edge necessary to effectively integrate risk management and liability reduc-
tion within a less lethal program.
Time Magazines Person of the Year 2011: The Protester
With more protests being played out on a world stage, the scrutiny of law
enforcements management of these events has steadily increased. The
Occupy movement of 2011 certainly brought more media coverage to
283
Figure 11.1 Large demonstrations are commonplace in major cities.
organized protests and arguably more public sympathy to their message.

Protests related to the economy, governmental policy, religion, political
beliefs, social views, and military conflicts are celebrated by the masses in
most major cities in the United States and abroad (Figure 11.1). There are
often those in the crowd not expressing rage for a particular ideology, but
instead are present solely to make public mayhem in the form of property
damage or assaults on persons. As arrests in these events are logistical chal-
lenges, many minor crimes are overlooked and even tolerated, especially
direct disdain for the police. During routine patrol operations, most officers
would not allow someone to get in their faces and yell obscenities. However,
the public expects acceptance of this in protest situations. Forbearance at this
level is frequently a hard concept for police officers to manage and should be
discussed in the crowd-control training program (Figure11.2).
The current societal expectation is that police will attempt to employ
the minimum amount of force necessary to protect life and property while
also protecting the civil rights of those who are there to propagate their mes-
sage. As demonstrated in the civil disturbance events discussed in Chapter
1, these are frequently competing objectives. Generally, this minimal force is
dispensed by the mere presence of police and via less lethal tools that permit
measured responses to hostility. A blending of malicious groups and law-
abiding protesters during civil disturbances necessitates police response to
address this diversified mass, further complicating the public perception of
the response. Even successful deployments may be called excessive uses of
Risk Management for Law Enforcement in Modern Society 285
Figure 11.2 Protests may even be about police response toprotests.
force by a variety of entities, especially if innocent parties are caught in the

fray. All of these factors combine to place a tremendous burden on police
administrations to make critical and timely decisions on when and how to
maintain order with force. The frustrating part for most line officers is that
even when everything goes right, the police will be scrutinized and often
criticized.
The likelihood of both suspects and users being injured when a nonlethal
weapon has not proven immediately effective rises dramatically with both the
duration of the event and the number of failures. It would seem sensible, then,
that when force is necessary it should be applied decisively rather than esca-
lating from lesser methods. Somewhat ironically, this results in less injury to
both suspects and users.
Sid Heal
The damned if you do and damned if you dont paradigm can be miti-
gated by a clear message from law enforcement officials. Getting in front
of the media and discussing the dangers presented by the malicious enti-
ties can justify how the use of force was necessary to ensure the safety of
all parties involved. As displayed in the Seattle WTO riots in 1999 and the
Mardi Gras disturbance in 2001, waiting to act until the situation is out of
control can result in extensive property damage, serious injuries, and even
death, requiring more force to stabilize the situation. Furthermore, failure
to communicate the intentions of the police and the expectations of demon-
strators to the media prior to, during, and after the event can severely affect
public perception. Using force on people who pose no threat to police or oth-
ers will never be acceptable unless dispersion orders are clearly expressed,
documented, and relayed to the media. Conveying the realities of the con-
tagion effect to the public and to the line officers is crucial to manage these
events.
Applying Lessons Learned
Seattle police were again challenged with a group of demonstrators related to

May Day protest marches. In 2012, the police response was lax and resulted
in property damage and assaults on police officers. The 2013 May Day dis-
turbances promised to be a repeat of the previous year. Exploring the les-
sons learned from the past Seattle mass civil disorders outlined in Chapter 1,
one of the authors, Tom Burns, was tasked with putting together less lethal
training and response plans. Utilizing rubber grenades (Blastballs) and
bicycle officers to move the crowd, the agitators were driven from the down-
town corridor (Figures11.3 and 11.4). Quick and decisive tactics during this
disturbance ultimately dissolved the crowd and allowed specific individuals
to be targeted. The situation was resolved within hours with minimal force,
resulting in no loss of life, injury, or even significant property damage.
Contrary to the belief of some, a force that has a nonlethal capability gains
advantages over one that does not. When force is viewed (and reviewed), as
it always is nowadays, even a failure of a nonlethal option can be a success
in that it sends an implicit message of restraint. The fact that the technol-
ogy is still too primitive to provide the same effectiveness as lethal force is
not the fault of the user. The mere attempt becomes a noble effort. Secondly,
even when an adversary is killed after a failure, it is nearly impossible for
faultfinders and mudslingers to make a credible case for a rash or impetuous
act, or even a lack of patience or compassion. In all situations where force is
required, the pathway to the moral high ground is protected by nonlethal
options.
Sid Heal
Figure 11.3 Bicycles are powerful crowd-management tools.
(a)
Figure 11.4a,b Blastballs (rubber grenades) are an efficient means to deliver

bright light, loud sound, and chemical irritant powder with minimal risk of
injury. (Continued)
(b)
Figure 11.4b(continued). Blastballs (rubber grenades) are efficient means to

deliver bright light, loud sound, and chemical irritant powder with minimal risk
of injury.
Why Less Lethal Options Are Necessary
Most societies around the world demand that an alternative to deadly force be
at least considered by civilian law enforcement. The demand has even made its
way into the military branches deployed around the world, as some are now
issuedand at times required to utilizeless lethal weapons while engaging
noncombatants. A police department that has a viable less lethal program
certainly has advantages over one that does not. The public expects the use of
less lethal options to control hostiles whenever necessary. They can de-escalate
a situation by their use and sometimes by their mere presence at a scene. The
deployments of these options have certainly saved lives by bringing safe resolu-
tions to situations that otherwise would have likely been met with deadly force.
ADVANTAGES OF LESS LETHAL OPTIONS

Bridge the gap between sticks and guns
Improve public perception of minimal force
Provide deterrence, psychological effect
Provide early control
State police intentions
Reduce lethal force
Serve as a force multiplier
The challenge with deploying these devices is walking the fine line
between safety and effectiveness. Throwing a foam football at an aggressor is
certainly safe, but this will be unlikely to resolve the situation and may even
escalate it. Conversely, firing a small, hardened projectile at a high rate of
speed may be effective, but this will likely fall outside the standard of objec-
tive reasonableness and severely injure the subject. The tolerance between
safety and effectiveness can be established by objective scientific testing com-
bined with field data [1]. As discussed in Chapter 2, improperly researched
projectiles have led to serious injury and death simply due to unintended
flight characteristics of the payload.
Influential Events Involving Less Lethal
One of the most high-profile uses of a less lethal deployment was the incident
in Los Angeles involving Rodney King in 1991. During the attempt to subdue
him, an older model Taser (Tasertron, Chapter 9) failed to gain his compli-
ance or incapacitate him. The product of that failure led to repeated baton
strikes that were captured on video and aired worldwide. The subsequent
acquittal of the officers led to massive rioting and resulted in thousands of
serious injuries, looting, fires, and 53 deaths. One could speculate a poten-
tially different outcome if the initial Taser deployment had been successful in
subduing Mr. King, thereby de-escalating the situation.
Just a few years later, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) raided a religious compound in Waco, Texas. A failed attempt at serv-
ing a search warrant for weapons violations at the Branch Davidian com-
pound led to the deaths of four ATF agents and several sect members. The
agents retreated, which led to a nearly two-month standoff and, eventually,
the deaths of nearly all of the occupants. This political disaster prompted
Attorney General Janet Reno to explore and fund federal research into force
options, including less lethal weapons [2].
Choosing the Right Tool for the Box
The challenge for most police agencies is anticipating and selecting the less
lethal tools that would apply most specifically to their operational plan.
Agencies are often overwhelmed by the complication of the sheer number of
types to choose from with varying cost and quality.
Sadly, there is no single option that will fit every need (the proverbial
magic bullet) and apply to the wide range of tactical situations that police
confront. Law enforcement is often forced to do more with less due to shrink-
ing budgets. Tactics are subsequently adjusted so that limited options must
be used in more types of situations. Administrations must be mindful of
Figure 11.5 It takes an extreme amount of CS gas to reach lethal levels.
this and avoid painting their officers in a corner with policy and limiting
their tactical options in the field. Arguably the most versatile tool available to
modern law enforcement is the chemical-irritant class of options (typically
OC and CS, Chapter 4). In their various forms, functional uses are referred
to as the 8 Ds: distract, disrupt, deny, deceive, disable, disperse, disorient,
and detect. The level of safety is well documented, and lethal concentrations
(LCt50, ICt50) are nearly impossible to achieve in most operational set-
tings [3], although their decontamination requirements can be challenging
(Figure11.5). Until the late 1990s, this and a baton were really the only less
lethal options police could carry on their belts.
OC, CS, and even CN are short lasting and dosage dependent. Individuals
who have been exposed to an agent in a plume cloud are far less contami-
nated than those who have been directly sprayed. By far, more people are hurt
because they have tripped, fallen, or been run over by other people attempting
escape the effects than from the actual chemical agent. This has long been
known in law enforcement, and when chemical agents are used to quell riots
or suppress the actions of mobs, avenues of escape are calculated into the
deployment plan. CS is the preferred agent for these purposes because it is

persistent only when people remain in the contaminated area. After moving
to a clean air source, the effects last only about 1520 minutes and require no
additional decontamination procedures.
Sid Heal
It has been said many times in law enforcement circles: If you have a ham-
mer, every problem looks like a nail. This has not been truer than with the
emergence and proliferation of the Taser device in 1999. The use of these devices
has showed great success in reducing both suspect and officer injuries [4, 5].
Officers have stated that they were removing their OC and batons from their
belts, as the Taser works for everything. From a risk-and-liability standpoint,
this is naturally a bad idea, as it can lead to weapon dependence. A practical
training scenario demonstrated this when an actor in a redman suit (heavily
padded) attacked a student officer. As the actor closed in, the officer abandoned
all defense tactics training, retreated, and drew his Taser, repeatedly pulling the
trigger and reloading cartridges as the actor continued to strike him. When
interviewed afterwards, the officer stated, Well, the Taser usually works.
It is essential not to relegate all less lethal options to tactical teams or super-
visors. Most SWAT (tactical) teams have the advantage of training as a team
on a regular basis, which affords more room for a variety of different tools for
particular needs. Although the specialized teams will respond to standoff situ-
ations that require far fewer lethal options, patrol officers must have options
available to mitigate the escalation in the early stages. A popular option that
is used across the board is the chemical irritant because the concentration of
dose can be used for varying levels of force and situations. They may not be
suitable for all incidents, so departments should also have impact weapons and
other options available as well. The Seattle Police Department has instituted a
rubber grenade (Blastball, Chapter 3) program for patrol functions for this pur-
pose. The program has been successful in thwarting potentially volatile events
by placing a relatively safe psychological option in the hands of first responders.
SITUATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN

SELECTING LESS LETHAL TOOLS
Individual aggressors
Crowd management, crowd control, riots
Suicidal subjects with weapons
Subjects with hostages
Barricaded subjects
It is important that police and corrections agencies do not reinvent

the wheel in determining when and how their less lethal options should
be deployed. While there are no mandates for U.S. agencies, a lot of use-
ful information can be gleaned from the successes and failures from other
department policies and tactics, including the incidents to which those poli-
cies and tactics were applied. Sadly, some weapon systems are politically
eliminated from consideration strictly due to a bad deployment elsewhere.
In one case, the FN 303 (Chapters 3 and 6) was used improperly due to
bad judgment. An FN 303 round penetrated the eye socket and directly
caused the death of an innocent woman. Just months before this incident,
the authors had completed testing of this platform citing its accuracy, con-
sistency, and relative safety compared to other devices in its class. These
conclusions, however, were predicated on the proper and judicious use of
the platform. Despite that report, the FN 303 was pulled from service in
the Seattle area based on the negative association of its improper use on the
other side of the country.
During a mass celebration following a baseball game in 2004, 21-year-old

Victoria Snelgrove was fatally shot by police using a less lethal option. When
deployed properly, this weapon system is extremely accurate and effective as a
pain-compliance tool. When applied to the neck or face, such as in this case,
the projectile impact can be lethal. Although this result is clearly stated in
manufacturer product warnings, a lawsuit against the manufacturer cited by
Snelgroves family accused the gun manufacturer of negligence and wrong-
ful death, alleging that it created the false impression that the FN 303 was
nonlethal. The police department was also included, based on negligence and
improper training. A settlement was reached in a $10 million lawsuit.
Sid Heal
Most police agencies follow the norm when it comes to selection of

less lethal options for their arsenal, usually following other departments or
devices that have been tested and proven in the field. It is wise to have dif-
ferent levels of force options, considering the psychological and physiologi-
cal effects of each. Some type of personal-defense spray (OC or CS) will be
selected for line officers, with perhaps a Taser or other CEW (conducted
electrical weapon) as well. For specialty teams, chemical irritants and dis-
traction devices are used for barricade situations and crowd-control events.
Impact munitions are utilized all over the board, from beanbag shotguns to
specialized 37mm/40mm platforms for line officers, supervisors, and tacti-
cal and civil-disturbance teams. Some departments consider using their less
lethal options in atypical ways, such as the Seattle PDs program to integrate
rubber grenades into patrol functions. Agencies must ensure that they are
still within the confines of case law decisions and write smart policy regard-
ing their use and accountability.
Thoughts on Policy
Perhaps you have noted that there has not been a lot of discussion in this
text on writing use-of-force and less lethal policy. This is not an omission;
it was intentional. There are 16,000 police agencies in the United States,
and each has its own policies and opinions for writing such documents.
Instead of preaching the right way to write policy, the authors chose
to nudge readers in the direction of common sense based on experience,
scientific testing, and lessons learned from negative outcomes worldwide.
One important consideration for writing a good less lethal policy is to
involve end users in the policy decision process. Officers often can have
their hands tied in the field from policies authored by someone who does
not possess a working knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of
a particular less lethal option. Seattle Police Department installed the
FORG (Force Options Research Group), which consists of end users and
administrators who share ideas and concepts to jointly construct and
institute field policy [6]. This group has been fundamental in successfully
reducing liability, lawsuit payouts, and excessive-force claims related to
less lethal deployments.
Independent Testing: You Need It

Testing data produced by manufacturers is an important component for the
selection of a tool, but it is imperative to understand how that option will be
applied in the field. Consider the testing of chemical-irritant sprays for flam-
mability. In Chapter 4, the authors recognized that EPA testing criteria for the
labeling of products did not suffice when introduced in a practical environ-
ment with a spark from a Taser CEW. Products labeled nonflammable and
EDW (electric-discharge weapon) tested and safe violently ignited the testing
mannequin. Although this realization of the misleading labeling was discov-
ered nearly a decade ago, inquiries from police agencies still occur today. The
developed testing protocol made it possible for agencies to evaluate their own
sprays for flammability, instilling confidence in the product prior to deploy-
ment. While many manufacturers have changed their formulas as a direct
result of the authors testing from 2004, it is wise to employ a famous line from
Ronald Reagan: Trust but verify with every lot of spray that is purchased.
Verifying marketing claims is also important with LLIMs (less lethal
impact munitions), as performance can vary greatly between type and
Figure 11.6It is prudent to verify manufacturers specifications. (Here the

author is checking velocity with a chronograph.)
manufacturer (Figure11.6). The SWAPDEC method outlined in Chapter 5

can also help to predict deficiencies and highlight triumphs in consistency
and repeatability. The evaluation of a particular LLIM can be explored fur-
ther with ballistic simulant testing in gelatin and soap to predict wounds
and injury. According to a study of impact munitions, most field deployment
distances ranged between 10 and 30 feet [1], so the testing protocol included
those bracketed ranges for performance testing.
From a liability standpoint, it is prudent to query manufacturers as to
the extent and level of their testing. Credible manufacturers will solicit an
independent evaluation of their products and make those results available
to interested parties. Be leery of manufacturers who are resistant or avoid
inquiries of outside testing. The authors often use the mantra repeating is
believing to verify a manufacturers claims of safety or effectiveness. To
help gain confidence in a particular option, the authors strongly recommend
applying the selected less lethal platform in a worst-case scenario. The data
collected will reduce or eliminate surprises when used in the field during
an operation. If a deployment does not go as expected, it is encouraged to
share this information with manufacturers, as this represents an often-over-
looked avenue for change and risk management. While some manufacturers
may dismiss your feedback, the enlightened ones will relish the opportunity
to improve their products based on real-world applications.
In spite of their shortcomings, nonlethal options will continue to grow in pop-

ularity. As a result, not having them available, or at least not seriously consid-
ering them, will diminish credibility for those responsible for using force in
asserting humanitarian compassion and respect. This has already been noted
in law enforcement circles during civil court proceedings after someone was
killed because nonlethal alternatives were not available. A conspicuous lack
of a nonlethal capability sends a tacit but conspicuous message of indifference
or negligence.
Sid Heal
Training: Take It Seriously
The training program must be centered on current case law and on the
enormity of the decision making that occurs when these tools are deployed.
Although less lethal deployments are rare in the overall scope of police prac-
tice, they are often subjected to more scrutiny than lethal force applications.
Chris Myers (Seattle Police Department) said it best during filming of a
Discovery Channel documentary: The level of injury depends on where I hit
you and how hard I hit you. This statement was subsequently validated by
studies of impact-munition wounds on different areas of the body [7].
As with the example of the FN 303 incident described previously, poor
judgment can destroy a less lethal program and the use of a superior tool. It is
important for the trainer to be intimate with the device, but it is equally criti-
cal that the trainer shares the information with the end users. Instructors
must be aware that most people learn and absorb information by different
means and at different rates. Trainers and students must be held account-
able to relate and retain crucial criteria regarding an application. The FN
303 incident might have ended differently if the instructor had fired the
weapon during the user course into bare ballistic gelatin, demonstrating a
3-inch (7.6 cm) penetration. Simply stating, Avoid the head and neck or bad
things can happen, may not be enough to convey the seriousness of a poten-
tial injury that can occur from an improper deployment. As discussed in
Chapter 6, impact munitions can impart a variety of injuries, some quite
serious [8, 9]. Establishing the injury and wound potential with end users
can facilitate smart and judicious use of the less lethal options in the field. A
keen understanding of the tool being deployed in a crowd-control situation
is also required. For example, an officer wanting to deploy a 12-gauge bean-
bag round on a male subject throwing a beer bottle from 60 feet (18 m) away
should understand that the round will only be traveling less than 300 feet
per second (90 m/s). In the time it takes the officer to aim and fire, the crowd
behind the subject may have changed drastically.
Live firing of the weapon platform during training must be included in
the less lethal program budget. This allows room to express the capabilities
of the option and can also serve to demonstrate shortcomings of the device.
Hands-on experience of maximum range, accuracy, skip-firing precautions,
trajectory degradation, and injury potential cannot be overemphasized. Part
of that training should also include a lesson in forensics and evidence collec-
tion of the less lethal option. The end users should consider themselves ambas-
sadors for the tool. Proper use, documentation, and follow-up of that use can
preserve its efficacy. Knowing what a given less lethal option does upon use
can help protect the user and the department from liability. Training the end
user in aftercare precautions and injury documentation is also an important
risk-management prong to protect against frivolous claims and associated liti-
gation relating to the deployment. Furthermore, all training must be correctly
recorded for future inquiry to strengthen defense of the option.
One of the biggest liabilities for law enforcement is the use of NFDDs
(noise flash distraction device) or flashbangs. Their misadventures are noto-
rious, ranging from fires to injuries for both suspects and officers [10]. Efforts
have been made in the last 5 years to facilitate a greater safety margin. One
improvement has been design of the main housing to port gases out evenly
so that the device remains very close to where it lands.
Controversies have condemned the use of various nonlethal options in the

United States, especially the use of pepper spray and Tasers. Since the early
1990s, claims have been made in the United States that people have died
unnecessarily after being exposed to tear gas and pepper spray. In 1999, the
American Civil Liberties Union claimed that scores of people were dying as a
result of pepper spray and that it was being used as a form of punishment and
torture comparable to a chemical cattle prod. A series of lawsuits attempt-
ing to ban or limit the use of pepper spray followed. News reports repeated
sensational claims that it appeared that one person dies for every 600 times
pepper spray is used. Studies that repudiated such claims from the National
Institute of Justice and the International Association of Chiefs of Police were
slow in coming but provided strong evidence that the claims were greatly
exaggerated, if true at all. Follow-on studies also supported the use of pepper
spray as an effective and relatively safe method of controlling violent persons,
especially when other alternatives were inappropriate or unavailable. As the
evidence continued to accumulate, the controversy, and related news value,
diminished.
Sid Heal
ExDS and Taser Forensics: Who Knew?
After decades of its occurrence in the field, suitable research and education
is coming to light about excited delirium syndrome (ExDS) and law enforce-
ments role in addressing it (Figure11.7). Highly publicized deployments of
the Taser that failed to subdue individuals who subsequently died during the
arrest have brought this condition to the forefront. It is important to note
that subjects with this condition rarely give up (comply) and will continue
Figure 11.7 Tom Burns sharing his ExDS study with the International Law
Enforcement Forum (ILEF).
to struggle until they receive medical treatment or expire. Although studies

have expressed the relative safety of Taser devices, it is recommended that
repeated applications be avoided [11]. The key to management of ExDS is rec-
ognition. Discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, guidelines for involving medics in
the early stages, in addition to evidence collection and analysis protocols, can
greatly mitigate the liability incurred when these unfortunate deaths occur.
Forensic analysis should always be considered if a controversial use occurs.
Often the Taser probes miss their target or become dislodged during what
is often a violent struggle, thereby minimizing their effect on the subject.
However, this can only be identified after proper collection and analysis of
the evidence performed by a qualified scientist. These analyses can exonerate
an officer accused of excessive force. Now that statistics and data are being
collected related to in-custody deaths, it is being realized how often this con-
dition occurs (with or without Taser usage) and that all first responders must
be educated on how to properly identify and manage it.
Documentation: Better Have It
Convincing officers to write detailed statements regarding a use-of-force

application is often a challenging task. Law enforcement typically attracts
personalities who are short-term problem solvers, which is the routine
nature of the job. When a critical incident occurs, sometimes little effort
is given to write a detailed statement on the suspects actions, the force
taken, and the subsequent result [12]. All force is presumed reasonable if
there is lawful justification for it. In order to justify the force, the circum-
stances that necessitated use of force must be communicated, preferably in
a way that can be understood by an attorney or jury member. Frequently,
it is unknown at the time if the less lethal deployment will be challenged
or is somehow contentious. With some in-custody death cases, when the
struggle is over and the subject is handed over to medics, everyone high-
fives each other on a job well done. When the subject lapses into a coma
and dies days later, urgency for thorough documentation ensues, giving
the appearance of coverup. If the case escalates into a civil suit, the oppos-
ing side will likely retain an expert who will second-guess the officers
every decision, commonly passing judgment with little or no knowledge
or basis for such an opinion. A case where the police did everything right
now becomes damage control relating to excessive use of force.
An incident overseas in 2009 emphasizes the importance of proper training,

deployment, and post-event analysis of less lethal devices. A meth user known
by the police was acting irrationally and destroying property, and officers were
called. The subject was exhibiting nearly all of the signs of excited delirium
syndrome (ExDS, Chapter 8). The officers, untrained in recognizing and
managing these types of subjects, were unaware of the fight that awaited them
as they arrived. Two officers, one a trainee, began to attempt to take the suspect
into custody. Two Taser cartridges and minutes later, the subject was dead.
The officers actions were heavily scrutinized. Questions were raised for not
recognizing the signs of ExDS and not having medical aid respond immedi-
ately. What received the most extensive inquiry was the prolonged use of the
Taser. The firing data captured over 2 minutes of application when the unit was
downloaded. Not only were the two officers subjected to a lengthy and costly
coroners inquest, but their careers and even their freedom were in jeopardy.
In this particular jurisdiction, many attorneys representing the police union,
the police officers themselves, the coroners office, the government, and the
victims family were all involved. Each party was entitled to employ its own
expert witnesses. One of the principal authors was hired by one of the attor-
neys to fly overseas and help analyze the evidence as outlined in Chapter 9. The
wires and cartridge base were analyzed, and it was determined that most of the
Taser energy arced across the wires and cartridge, and not through the probes.
This not only demonstrated that the subject did not receive the entire 2-minute
application, it was a testament to the incredible struggle that was occurring as
the two officers attempted to gain control of the subject.
During video testimony, practical aids were used to demonstrate the arcing
of the Taser and the types of examinations performed. By U.S. standards, the
inquest took place over an extended time (from 2009 to 2012), with a final reso-
lution in favor of the officers and with the forensic analysis conclusions being a
pivotal component of that finding.
Incidents with identical outcomes occur often all over the world. The authors
experience is that many of these negative outcomes can be avoided with the
proper training, response, thorough documentation, evidence collection, and
analysis to properly investigate what occurred. The importance of recognizing
the signs of ExDS and having a plan involving medical intervention cannot be
overstated. Such practices might have avoided the death of this person.
Dont Wait until Something Bad Happens
For years, the principal authors of this text have instructed a course on risk
management for less lethal tools. This course is available to any agency will-
ing to host and covers many of the ideologies and guidelines highlighted in
this text. Without exception, all the classes have been hosted by agencies that
have already had a high-profile death or use-of-force incident. Americans call
that closing the barn door after the horse is gone. It is discouraging to see
that departments and cities will see the importance of training and prepar-
ing for an unintended or negative outcome only after it occurs and they have
settled with a large payout (Figure11.8). The principal authors were conduct-
ing a crowd-control course near a major metropolitan area when a news story
reported police payouts for the city averaging $40 million a year. The authors
proposed training the entire department on less lethal risk management for a
minuscule portion of that cost, and the answer was a resounding No, thank
you. Most administrators and politicians see the cost of risk-management
Figure 11.8 Unintended outcome: avulsion from a less lethal projectile. (Photo
courtesy of Steve Ijames.)
training and the cost of police force settlements as two separate issues, while
this logic would appall the average taxpayer.
Simply having the education does not suffice in avoiding liability. One
city attorney contacted the authors about a standard in-custody death involv-
ing the use of a Taser in an attempt to subdue an individual. As the attorney
described the behavior of the suspect, it was mentioned to him that it sounded
like excited delirium syndrome (ExDS, Chapter 8). The attorney stated that
that was what the officers said in their report. The author asked, What did
they do to address that? The attorney stated that medics were not called, no
precautions were taken, and the suspect was placed in a patrol car after being
handcuffed, where he fell into cardiac arrest. The implication that the officers
did not address the medical condition gave the city attorney little chance to
repel a large settlement.
Sharing Information
With the first pepper-spray flammability test in 2004, the authors realized
the value of applying science to police work, and this unique approach was
the foundation for this text. Other entities have mirrored bridging the gap
between law enforcement and science, such as Bill Lewinski and his group at
Force Science. Governmental institutions have attempted to align disciplines
such as the International Law Enforcement Forum (ILEF) and Technical
Working Groups (TWG), both funded by the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ). A fascinating lesson the authors have learned over the last decade is
that professions rarely share information with persons outside of their com-
mon circles. As much attention as ExDS has received over the years, it is not
uncommon to come across a medic who has never heard of the condition or
how much havoc it has created for law enforcement. It is crucial that relevant
data and information be shared across different disciplines. Forensic scientists
are unique because they typically become involved after it all goes wrong. They
must inquire from many different viewpoints to help answer a specific question
about a case. They work with medical examiners, firefighters, doctors, attor-
neys, engineers, SWAT team members, investigators, police administrators,
risk managers, and often with media outlets and the general public through
education programs. This affords the opportunity to build relationships, as
much can be learned from debating differing viewpoints and sharing ideas.
Risk Management through Consistency,

Accountability, and Education
Anyone working in law enforcement long enough knows that what can go
wrong during an incident usually does. Officers were attempting to subdue
a suicidal subject armed with a handgun. In an attempt to save the subjects
life, a LLIM was deployed. The impact was unsuccessful in changing the sub-
jects mind, and he took his own life. The question was raised whether the
police should have used something more powerful to incapacitate the sub-
ject. The officers on scene managed the physical risk of injury by firing the
impact round, which had the possibility of a positive outcome in lieu of lethal
force. In the aftermath, police administrators managed the legal and political
risk [13]. It is critical that administrators be on the same page as the officers
on scene in terms of the intent and purpose of applying less lethal options.
What is written in police statements from the officers should match what
administrators tell the media, mayor, city council, etc.
A simple point should be incorporated for administrators to explain out-
comes of less lethal applications to the layperson: People are not the same,
but less lethal weapons assume that they are. Aside from their state of mind,
people differ in age, body makeup, pain tolerance, and mobility, and all of
those differences may influence their ability to comply with commands and
react/respond to a less lethal option. Also consider the ever-present camera
and how the use of force may be spun or interpreted by others. The less lethal
tool deployment deemed acceptable to use on a 19-year-old man will most
likely not be viewed as suitable when applied to a member of the Seattle
Raging Grannies. In cases such as these, it is the responsibility of the police
leadership to explain and educate why the force was used based on the actions
of the arrestee versus the available options. There have been cases where the
chief displayed the less lethal tools at a press conference in an attempt to
proactively mitigate the fallout. Another common tactic is to pose the ques-
tion to reporters, Mr. Smith was throwing five of my officers around the
room. If we hadnt deployed the Taser, what other weapon should they have
used?
Risk management and liability reduction is often described as all of the
precautions taken prior to a controversial incident. Everything after that is
damage control. Safeguards, however, cannot completely prepare depart-
ments for the poor judgment of one officer. A record $2.3-million payout by
the city of Portland involved a less lethal shotgun mistakenly loaded with
lethal buckshot, then fired four times at a homeless man in a park [14]. The
man suffered serious injury, and the officer remains on paid leave, years later.
Officers have also tried to blame lapses in judgment on training and the
manufacturer itself. One officer repeatedly activated his Taser for almost 3
minutes on a subject, stating that the manufacturer said it was safe and no
one ever said I couldnt Taser someone for that long. Albert Einstein defined
insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting differ-
ent results. With such a prevalent reference, it makes 141 beanbag deploy-
ments on one subject quite hard to defend in front of a jury. There are poor
performers in every profession, but few have the expectations reserved for a
police officer. Mistakes by a lone officer are somehow spun to imply systemic
problems, which results in additional damage control and scrutiny of train-
ing and accountability practices of an entire department.
Occasionally we are all reminded that every use of force is an assault
by the police officer until justified. Although a simple notion, police justify
many of their activities on a regular basis. A search of a residence by police is
a burglary unless the reasons for the search are articulated to a judge and he
signs a warrant making the search legal. If the judge disagrees with the offi-
cers reasoning, the search is not justified. In cases related to the application
of force, the intentions for the action must be justified to people who may not
know anything about police procedures, and this requires additional detail
and education in the officers subsequent statement. When the officer is
subjected to a criminal, civil, or even public inquiry, this is where a solid less
lethal risk-management program pays dividends. Ignorance will not save you
in a civil tort claim, as juries expect due diligence to attempt de-escalation
and judicious use of force. To defend the department or officer (hopefully
both), the risk manager can ideally take to the city attorneys office volumes
of documentation, including manufacturers specifications, independent
testing publications, training curriculum, officer training records, weapon
and round tracking records, departmental testing documentation, complete
and thorough officer incident reports, previous field usage, and wound data/
medical records from other deployments.
Looking Forward: Significantly Reduce

the Likelihood of Injury
The future of less lethal weapons is certainly brighter now than it has been
in the last 30 years. Technology advances combined with public demand
will likely provide more effective and safer impact, chemical, electrical, and
directed-energy weapons. From a liability standpoint it is hazardous for a
police department to adopt a less lethal option that has not been proven
elsewhere. This unfortunately does not prevent some agencies from imple-
menting a new system while trusting the manufacturers claims and data,
with potentially disastrous results. Agencies should thoroughly explore and
evaluate any new technology and avoid being seduced by the possibility of
the latest magic bullet.
At the very least, trainers and less lethal program managers should
consult a qualified forensic scientist or proven experts in the field to look at
things from another perspective.
Calmatives provide tactical advantages that cannot be attained by any other

nonlethal option; not the least of which is separating victims from combat-
ants. The most notable example to date occurred in October of 2002 at the
Dubrovka Theater in the southern outskirts of Moscow, Russia. Approximately
50 armed and suicidal Chechen rebels took an audience of nearly 900 people
hostage and demanded an end to the Chechen War and the withdrawal of all
Russian forces. After several days of largely futile negotiations, a calmative
was pumped into the building, rendering nearly everyone unconscious. While
nearly 700 hostages were rescued, at least 130 died from exposure to the gas,
resulting in a storm of controversy.
Sid Heal
Emerging methods such as calmatives and malodorants are receiving

attention and funding for research. Desperation and haste, like the incident
in Russia in 2002, can bring a new idea such as calmatives (soporifics) to the
forefront in a bad way. Although this technology shows promise, calmatives
are years or even decades away from the hands of law enforcement. Until
then, CEWs, chemical irritants, and impact munitions will likely be the norm.
Making smarter choices when training, deploying, and documenting the cur-
rent and future less lethal options will improve the efficiency and safety of the
force used by officers, thereby managing risk and reducingliabilityto the police
department.
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10. Gleba, L. 2012. When the use of a flash/sound diversionary device goes wrong.
Tactical Edge, Spring: 7275.
11. Higgins, B. 2011. Final findings from the expert panel on the safety of con-
ducted energy devices. NIJ Journal, no. 268: 3235. https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/235894.pdf.
12. McCarthy, R. 2013. Officer involved shootings and use of force lawsuits. Tactical
Edge, Summer: 104111.
13. Watt, S. R. 2009. Risk management: A leadership responsibility. Tactical Edge,
Winter: 5051.
14. Bernstein, M. 2013. Record settlement in shooting by Portland police officer
should push police reforms. The Oregonian, April 30. http://www.oregonlive.
com/portland/index.ssf/2013/04/record_settlement_in_shooting.html.
FORENSICS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Risk Management of Less Lethal Options

Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath, and Forensics
Force used to quell out-of-control demonstrations or detain unruly individuals can result in litigation
and bad press for law enforcement agencies. Injury or loss of life can best be avoided if agencies
have accurate knowledge and proper training in less lethal options. Risk Management of Less Lethal
Options: Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath, and Forensics discusses how lessons learned from
major disturbances have helped law enforcement professionals develop concepts and techniques that
police departments can apply to increase successful outcomes, manage risk, and limit liability.
The methods presented in this book were developed over a decade of testing, training, evaluating,
deploying, analyzing, and testifying related to the use of these tools. Topics include:
The evolution of the less lethal paradigm through the analysis of the outcomes
of major incidents
Categories of less lethal optionsincluding impact, chemical, electrical,

and distraction
Riot-control agents (RCAs), which produce rapid sensory irritation or disabling

physical effects that disappear within a short time
Less lethal impact munitions (LLIMs) that deliver blunt trauma, including the study
of their capabilities and limitations
Important factors for developing a successful less lethal training program
Challenges caused by arrest-related death, in-custody death,

and Excited Delirium Syndrome (ExDs)
The use and forensic analysis of conducted electrical weapons (CEWs)/Tasers
Effective post-event report writing, evidence collection, and court preparation
Risk management of less lethal options requires a complex, multi-tiered approach. This volume provides
law enforcement professionals with guidelines to manage risk from the street to the courtroom when
utilizing less lethal options to subdue offenders.
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Risk Management of

Less Lethal Options

R.T. Wyant Thomas Burns

CRT Less Lethal, Inc.

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the

2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

No claim to original U.S. Government works

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4665-6305-6 (eBook - PDF)

and the CRC Press Web site at

1 Police De-escalation Tactics: A Personal Account 1

2 Why We Use Less Lethal 27

3 Prevailing Less Lethal Options for Law

4 RCAs: Chemical Irritants (OC, CS) and

5 Less Lethal Impact Munitions: The Forensic

6 Validating the LLIM Testing Model,

7 Training for a Successful Less Lethal Program 171

8 Arrest-Related Death, In-Custody Death, and

9 Forensics: Conducted Electrical Weapons (Taser) 221

10 Aftermath: Post-Event Report Writing, Evidence

11 Risk Management for Law Enforcement in

Rick and Tom

R. T. Wyant received his masters

Tom Burns has worked as an officer

John Allgire received his BA in psy-

impact munitions and helped to evolve their scientific protocols. Allgire

Charles Sid Heal retired as a com-

Steve Ijames has been a police officer for

Lucien C. Luke Haag is a for-

Ron McCarthy retired from the

Dr. Carl Wigren received his medical degree

Darren Hall is a fifteen-year veteran of the

Terry Hatcher has been a sonographer since 1981

The cost of doing business in law enforcement is an expensive undertaking

risk and minimize negative outcomes of police encounters. Furthermore, the

THE WEBSTER DICTIONARYS

It is important for all facets of the criminal justice system to understand

EXAMPLES OF DE-ESCALATION THAT MAY NOT FIT

The Sword-Man: A Lesson in Less Lethal Options

Several marked patrol cars had formed a semicircle containing a man

Addressing the Threat

guilty to more serious charges by reason of insanity. It was later relayed by

Less Lethal Deployment on Sword-Man

Many situations rapidly evolve from less dangerous circumstances before

Training versus Reality

Final Outcome and Lessons Learned

WTO: The Battle in SeattleA Less Lethal Success

Contagion effect is a psychological observation that refers to the ten-

Pre-event Police Planning

Line Officer Training

Tactical CART Preplanning

Pre-event Protester Planning

Figure 1.6 A majority of protesters are peaceful and nonviolent.

On the first day of the conference, temporary barriers to keep people

Priorities: Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, Property Protection

ACTIONS OF WTO PROTESTERS BASED ON

CART Ran Out of Ordnance

USE-OF-FORCE INCIDENTS DURING WTO

taken seriously by every police department anticipating a major gathering

Seattle Mardi Gras Riots 2001: Celebration Took a Turn

partygoers with skateboards and brass knuckles. Innocent citizens could be

Lessons Learned after Mardi Gras 2001

Figure 1.12 Anatomy of a rubber grenade.

Canadians Love Hockey: Stanley Cup Riots, Vancouver, BC