Stuart Koschade Thesis

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST
CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF
TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN
CONTEXT
STUART KOSCHADE
Bachelor of Arts (First Class Honours)
Centre for Social Change Research
Queensland University of Technology
Thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy qualification
2007
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KEYWORDS: terrorism, terrorist cells, terrorism studies, social network analysis,
Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Ustashi, Ustasha, Aum Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e-
Taiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, history of terrorism, Australia, destabilisation techniques,
betweenness, critical node, counter-terrorism, Willie Brigitte, Faheem Khalid Lodhi,
Shoko Asahara, Imam Samudra, Muklas, Bali bombing, Islamic extremism.
ABSTRACT: The rise of the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement, which was mobilised
by the al-Qaeda attacks of and responses to September 11, 2001, heralds a new period in the
history of terrorism. The increased frequency and intensity of this type of terrorism affects
every nation in the world, not least Australia. Rising to meet the challenges posed by
terrorism is the field of terrorism studies, the field which aims at understanding, explaining,
and countering terrorism. Despite the importance of the field, it has been beleaguered with
criticisms since its inception as a response to the rise of international terrorism. These
criticisms specifically aim at the fields lack of objectivity, abstraction, levels of research, and
levels of analysis. These criticisms were the impetus behind the adoption of the methodology
of this thesis, which offers the distinct ability to understand, explain, and forecast the way in
which terrorists interact within covert cells.
Through social network analysis, this thesis examines four terrorist cells that have operated in
or against Australia. These cells are from the groups Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo
(Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood), Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), Lashkar-e-Taiba
(Army of the Pure), and Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community) and operated between 1963
and 2003. Essentially, this methodology attempts to discover, map, and analyse the
interaction within the cells during the covert stage of their respective operations. Following
this, the results are analysed through the traditional social network analysis frameworks to
discover the internal dynamics of the cell and identify the critical nodes (leaders) within the
cells. Destabilisation techniques are subsequently employed, targeting these critical nodes to
establish the most effective disruption techniques from a counter-terrorism point of view.
The major findings of this thesis are: (1) that cells with a focus on efficiency rather than
covertness were more successful in completing their objectives (contrary to popular belief);
and (2) betweenness centrality (control over the flow of communication) is a critical factor in
identifying leaders within terrorist cells. The analysis also offered significant insight into how
a Jemaah Islamiyah cell might operate effectively in Australia, as well as the importance of
local contacts to terrorist operations and the significance of international counter-terrorism
cooperation and coordination.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Firstly I would like to thank my family for their
support Mum, Dad, Michael, and Fiona - without you this project would have been
all the more difficult. Equally vital has been the support from my principal supervisor
Dr. John Synott, whose guidance has been fundamental in the completion of this
thesis. Additionally my associate supervisors Dr. Ian Wells and Dr Jean-Louis Durand
have also been essential, their advice and guidance has been invaluable.
To my most excellent band of brothers, my friends, thank you for your support in an
endeavour that could surely threaten to send the sanest of people around the bend:
Nigel Lee, Grant Gilmore, Ross Marks, Elliot Wren, Stewart Forsyth, Jolon Knight,
Jonas Howard, Chris OHallaren, Dave Hartley, Robert Hueston, Steven York,
Matthew Wren, and Shannon Boyd. Similar sentiments go to the Grange Thistle
Football Club.
I must also thank many staff at QUT for their support: Professor Clive Bean,
Associate Professor Gavin Kendall, Dr. Ken Parker, Dr Paul Harrison, Dr Mark
Brough, Dr Barbara Hanna, Waveney Croft, Gail Stringfellow, Chanel Hopkinson,
Kerry Pert, Margaret Miles, Eve Teague, and Christie Anne Williams.
My sincerest thanks also go out to the following: Noni Kenny, Chad Whelan, Luke
Howie, Sally Hose, Mark Branagan, Martin Chulov, Jeff Penrose, Chantal Enter, Liz
Jackson, Flt Lt Ian Tindall, Dr Carl Ungerer, Lucia Falzon, Ian Shaw, the Research
Network for a Secure Australia, the Australian Homeland Security Research Centre
and Athol Yates, Chris Flaherty, John McDonald, Dave Lawson, Jane Doutre, Anna
King, Danelle Dobson, Jonathan Farley, and Kathleen Carley.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi
STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP xiii
TERMS, PHRASES & LANGUAGE xiv
CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION 1
1. TERRORISM 2
2. ORIENTATION OF THESIS 4
3. SUMMARY OF THESIS 5
3.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 5
3.2 THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 6
3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 7
3.4 DATA, ANALYSIS, & CONCLUSIONS 8
4. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 9
CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 11

1. A HISTORY OF TERRORISM 14
1.1 ANCIENT TERROR & ASSASSINATION: C4 BC C1 AD 15
1.2 ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: CIRCA C1-C13 16
1.2.1 PERIOD SUMMARY 18
1.3 LEFT-WING & REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: CIRCA 1790 1910 19
1.3.1 THE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT 19
1.3.2 RUSSIAN TERRORISM 21
1.3.3 ANTI-OTTOMAN TERRORISM 22
1.3.4 IRISH TERRORISM 23
1.4 RIGHT-WING & POST WWI TERRORISM: CIRCA 1917 1960 24
1.4.1 THE IRON GUARD 25
1.4.2 ZIONISM 25
1.4.3 THE USTASHA 26
1.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 27
1.4.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM 28
1.5 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CIRCA 1960 TODAY 30
1.5.1 CONTINUING GROUPS 31
1.5.1.1 THE IRA(s) 31
1.5.1.2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 32
1.5.2 NEW GROUPS 33
1.5.2.1 PALESTINIAN GROUPS 33
1.5.2.2 ARMENIAN GROUPS 35
1.5.2.3 COMMUNIST GROUPS 36
1.5.2.4 HEZBOLLAH 38
1.5.2.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM 39
1.5.2.6 AUM SHINRIKYO 40
1.5.2.7 AL-QAEDA 41
1.6 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 45
1.6.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 46
1.6.2 CHECHEN REBELS 48
1.6.3 THE AL-QAEDA MOVEMENT 48
1.6.4 THE WAR IN IRAQ CONSEQUENCES 49
2. TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA 51
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2.1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE 52
2.2 EARLY TERRORISM 53
2.3 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 53
2.3.1 USTASHI GROUPS 53
2.3.2 PALESTINIAN TERRORISM 57
2.3.3 THE HILTON BOMBING 58
2.3.4 THE JCAG 58
2.3.5 AUM SHINRIKYO 59
2.4 DOMESTIC TERRORISM 60
2.5 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 62
2.5.1 PRE 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 62
2.5.1.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH MANTIQI 4 & JACK ROCHE 62
2.5.1.2 SYDNEY OLYMPIC GAMES 64
2.5.2 POST 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 65
2.5.2.1 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 65
2.5.2.2 MALLAH & THOMAS 66
2.5.2.3 THREATS TO AUSTRALIA 67
2.5.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM RAIDS NOVEMBER 2005 67
3. SUMMARY 68
CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 71

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD 72
1.1 EARLY LITERATURE 73
1.1.1 EARLY 1970S POLITICAL SCIENCE RESPONSES 73
1.1.2 MID 1970S INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 74
1.1.3 1980S BOOM PERIOD 78
1.1.3.1 SCHMID & JONGMANS APPRAISAL 79
1.2 CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM STUDIES 80
1.2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 81
1.2.1.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM 82
1.2.1.2 TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM 82
1.2.2 TERRORISTS 83
1.2.2.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 84
1.2.2.2 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 84
1.2.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES 86
1.2.2.4 POLITICAL SCIENCE 87
1.2.3 TERRORIST TACTICS 88
1.2.3.1 TARGET SELECTION 88
1.2.3.2 WMD & CBRN 89
1.2.3.3 SUICIDE ATTACKS 90
1.2.3.4 CYBER-TERRORISM 92
1.2.3.5 GENERAL TACTICS 93
1.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM 94
1.2.4.1 NATIONAL 94
1.2.4.2 INTERNATIONAL 95
1.2.4.3 NON-STATE 96
1.2.4.4 GENERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES 97
1.3 AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE 98
1.3.1 USTASHI LITERATURE 98
1.3.2 THE HILTON BOMBING & ANANDA MARGA 100
1.3.3 TERRORISM IN EARNEST 101
1.3.3.1 POST 2001 RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA 107
2. ISSUES WITHIN TERRORISM STUDIES 110
2.1 CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF TERRORISM STUDIES 111
2.1.1 OBJECTIVITY 111
2.1.2 ABSTRACTION 112
2.1.3 LEVELS OF RESEARCH 112
2.1.4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 113
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3. POST 2001 ANALYTICAL RESEARCH IN TERRORISM 113
STUDIES
4. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS 118
CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 121

1. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 122
1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD 122
1.1.1 SOCIOMETRIC ANALYSIS 123
1.1.2 HARVARD APPROACH 126
1.1.3 MANCHESTER APPROACH 127
1.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS COVERT NETWORKS 127
1.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS & TERRORISM STUDIES 130
1.3.1 VALDIS KREBS 131
1.3.2 FURTHER TERRORISM RESEARCH 136
2. IMPLEMENTATION 136
2.1 THESIS OBJECTIVES 137
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 138
3. METHODOLOGY 139
3.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 140
3.1.1 THE CASE STUDY 140
3.1.2 DATA COLLECTION & SOURCES 141
3.1.2.1 GOVERNMENT SOURCES 142
3.1.2.2 NGO & MEDIA SOURCES 142
3.1.2.3 INTERVIEWS 144
3.1.3 NEGATING CRITICISMS CASE STUDIES 145
3.2 RELATIONAL DATA 146
3.2.1 INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA 147
3.2.1.1 MATRICES 148
3.2.1.2 GRAPHS 150
3.3 NETWORK ANALYSIS 152
3.3.1 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES 152
3.3.1.1 SIZE 153
3.3.1.2 DENSITY 153
3.3.1.3 DEGREE OF CONNEXION 154
3.3.1.4 AVERAGE COMMUNICATION SPEED 155
3.3.1.5 CLUSTERS 156
3.3.1.6 NETWORK FORMATION 157
3.3.2 NODE LEVEL MEASURES 158
3.3.2.1 ACTOR LEVEL DEGREE CENTRALITY 159
3.3.2.2 ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS CENTRALITY 160
3.3.2.3 ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 161
3.3.2.4 CLIQUE COUNT 162
3.4 DESTABILISATION TECHNIQUES 163
4. ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE 166
CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO 169

1. THE CROATIAN REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERHOOD 170
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: OPERATION KANGAROO 172
2.1 AREA COMMAND FOUR 173
2.2 THE TROIKA 175
2.3 ACTION KANGAROO 176
2.3.1 THE NINE 176
2.3.2 RECRUITMENT & TRAINING 177
2.3.2.1 TRAINING IN AUSTRALIA 177
2.3.2.2 CAMP IN AUSTRALIA 178
2.3.2.3 TRAINING IN EUROPE 179
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2.3.3 INSERTION INTO THE SFRY 180
2.3.3.1 TOLIC/OBLAK/STOJIC TROIKA 181
2.3.3.2 FUMIC/PERKOVIC/ZDRILIC TROIKA 182
2.3.3.3 PODRUG/TAPSANJI/LEKO TROIKA 182
2.3.3.4 GEZA PASTI 182
2.3.4 TRIALS 183
3. RELATIONAL DATA 184
4. ANALYSIS 189
5. DESTABILISATION 192
6. SUMMARY 194
CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO 197

1. AUM SHINRIKYO 198
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: BANJAWARN CELL 201
2.1 MAIN GROUP ARRIVES 203
2.2 OPERATION BEGINS 204
2.3 OPERATION ENDS 206
4. ANALYSIS 212
6. SUMMARY 220
CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 221

1. LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 222
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2003 SYDNEY CELL 224
2.1 WILLIE VIRGILE BRIGITTE 224
2.2 FAHEEM KHALID LODHI: THE QUARTERMASTER 228
2.3 RECRUITING 228
2.4 PREPARATIONS 230
2.5 OPERATION UNDERWAY 231
2.5.1 TARGET SELECTION 233
2.5.2 MELANIE BROWN 234
2.5.3 CHEMICALS 235
2.6 CELL FAILS 235
4. ANALYSIS 241
6. SUMMARY 247
CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 249

1. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 250
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2002 BALI OPERATION 252
2.1 TENGGULUN 252
2.2 OPERATION BEGINS 254
2.3 SOLO MEETING 256
2.4 TEAM LIMA 257
2.5 PREPARATIONS: BUILDING THE BOMB 259
2.6 BALI: CELL ESTABLISHMENT 262
2.7 IMPLEMENTATION 264
4. ANALYSIS 270
6. SUMMARY 278
CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS 279
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1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CELLS 280
1.1 CONTEXTUAL OBSERVATIONS 280
1.2 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES 281
1.3 NODE LEVEL MEASURES 283
2. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA: A MODEL FOR
INSIGHT 286
3. DESTABILISATION DISCUSSION 287
3.1 CRITICAL NODES 288
3.2 ALL-CHANNEL NETWORKS 289
3.3 DESTABILISATION APPLICATIONS 290
3.3.1 HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO 290
3.3.2 AUM SHINRIKYO 291
3.3.3 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 291
3.3.4 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 293
4. SUMMARY 294
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION 295

1. REVIEW 296
2. MAJOR FINDINGS 297
2.1 EFFICIENCY OVER COVERTNESS 297
2.1.1 APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 298
2.2 BETWEENNESS AS CRITICAL 298
2.3 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA 299
3. FURTHER APPLICATIONS 300
3.1 LOCAL CONTACTS 300
3.2 INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 301
4. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 301
4.1 TERRORISM STUDIES 302
4.1.1 SUBDUING THE CRITICISMS 302
4.1.2 FURTHER RESEARCH 303
4.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AS AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
TOOL 304
4.2.1 FURTHER RESEARCH 306
5. TERRORISM STUDIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 306
ENDNOTES 309
REFERENCE LIST 355
viii
LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES
CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGY

FIGURES
FIGURE 1: SEPTEMBER 11 AL-QAEDA GRAPH 131
FIGURE 2: KREBS LINE NETWORK 132
FIGURE 3: GRAPH: EXAMPLE ADJACENCY MATRIX 150
FIGURE 4: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 151
FIGURE 5: CLUSTER GRAPH 157
FIGURE 6: NETWORK FORMATIONS 157
FIGURE 7: ORA EXAMPLE GRAPH 164
FIGURE 8: B REMOVED 165
TABLES
TABLE 1: BINARY ADJACENCY MATRIX: MEMBER BY MEMBER 148
TABLE 2: ADJACENCY MATRIX: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA 150
TABLE 3: DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CENTRALITY 159
TABLE 4: DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS 161
TABLE 5: DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS 162
TABLE 6: CLIQUE COUNT 162
CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO

FIGURES
FIGURE 1: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO GRAPH ACTION 188
KANGAROO
FIGURE 2: ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH 193
FIGURE 3: TOLIC REMOVAL 193
FIGURE 4: TAPSANJI REMOVAL 194
FIGURE 5: ZDRILIC REMOVAL 194
TABLES
TABLE 1: HRB BINARY RELATIONS 186
TABLE 2: HRB INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 187
TABLE 3: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA 189
TABLE 4: ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 189
TABLE 5: BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 189
TABLE 6: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES 190
CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO

FIGURES
FIGURE 1: AUM SHINRIKYO GRAPH BANJAWARN OPERATION 211
FIGURE 3: TOYODA REMOVAL 217
FIGURE 4: HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF AUM SHINRIKYO BANJAWARN 219
OPERATION
TABLES
TABLE 1: AUM SHINRIKYO BINARY RELATIONS 210
TABLE 4: CLOSENESS & BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 213
CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

FIGURES
FIGURE 1: LASHKA-E-TAIBA GRAPH SYDNEY CELL 2003 240
FIGURE 3: LODHI REMOVAL 245
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FIGURE 4: SAJID REMOVAL 246
TABLES
TABLE 1: LET BINARY RELATIONS 238
TABLE 2: LET INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 239
CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

FIGURES
FIGURE 1: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH GRAPH BALI OPERATION 2002 269
FIGURE 3: SAMUDRA REMOVAL 278
FIGURE 4: IDRIS REMOVAL 278
FIGURE 5: MUKLAS REMOVAL 279
TABLES
TABLE 1: JI BINARY RELATIONS 267
TABLE 2: JI INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 268
CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS

TABLES
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE NETWORK LEVEL RESULTS 282
TABLE 2: CRITICAL NODE CENTRALITY RESULTS 284
TABLE 3: RANKED BETWEENNESS LEVELS FOR HRB, LET, & JI 285
x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABC: Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

ACT: Australian Capital Territory.
AFP: Australian Federal Police.
AK-47: Automat Kalashnikov Model 47.
ASALA: Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.
ASIO: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
BO: Boevaya Organisasia, Battle Organisation.
CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (Weapons).
CHOGM: Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.
CI-CE-CT: Counter-Intelligence Counter-Espionage Counter-Terrorism.
CIRA: Continuity Irish Republican Army.
CMF: Citizen Military Forces.
DST: La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, Directorat for Territorial
Surveillance.
EPR: Ejercito Popular Revolucionario, Popular Revolutionary Army.
EU: European Union.
ETA: Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom.
FIS: Front Islamique du Salut, Islamic Salvation Front.
FLN: Front de Liberation Nationale, National Liberation Front.
GIA: Groupe Islamique Arme, Armed Islamic Group.
GPO: General Post Office.
GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat, Salafist Group to Call and
Combat.
HAMAS: Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia, Islamic Resistance Movement.
HIRO: Hrvatska Ilegalan Revolucionarna Organizacija Croatian Illegal
Revolutionary Brotherhood.
HRB: Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood.
HOP: Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret, Croatian Liberation Movement.
HM: Hrvatska Malde, Croatian Youth.
HNO: Hrvatski Narodni Otpor, Croatian National Resistance.
IMRO: Inner-Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation.
INTERFET: International Force East Timor.
IRA: Irish Republican Army.
ISI: Inter-Services Agency.
IYM: Islamic Youth Movement.
JCAG: Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide.
JI: Jemaah Islamiyah, Islamic Community.
JRA: Japanese Red Army.
JTJ: Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, Monotheism and Holy War Movement.
KGB: Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee of State Security.
LET: Lashkar-e-Taiba, Army of the Pure/Righteous.
MAK: Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab, Afghan Services Bureau.
MDI: Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad.
MI5: Military Intelligence section 5.
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
NAA: National Archives of Australia.
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
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NATP: National Anti-Terrorism Plan.
NGO: Non-Government Organisation.
NMO: Irgun Zvai Leumi, National Military Organisation.
NV: Narodnaya Volya, Peoples Will.
NSW: New South Wales.
OAS: Organisation de lArmee Secrete, Secret Army Organisation.
OIW: Offensive Information Warfare.
ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
PFLP-GC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command.
PFLP-SC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Special Command.
PFLP-SOG: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Special Operations
Group.
PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army.
PLF: Palestinian Liberation Front.
PLA: Peoples Liberation Army.
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organisation.
PSCC: Protective Services Coordination Centre.
RAA: Royal Australian Army.
RAF: Rote Armee Fraktion, Red Army Faction.
RB: Brigade Rosse, Red Brigades.
RB-CCCP: Red Brigades for the Construction of a Combatant Communist Party.
RB-UCC: Red Brigades Union of Combatant Communists.
RIRA: Real Irish Republican Army.
SASR: Special Air Service Regiment.
SFRY: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
SHUMS: Saveza Hrvatske Ujedinjene Mladei Svijeta, Croatian United Youth of the
World.
SMS: Short Message Service.
TNT: Trinitrotoluene.
UDBA: Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti/Sigurnosti/Varnosti, State Security
Administration.
UHREC: (QUT) University Human Research Ethics Committee.
UK: United Kingdom.
UN: United Nations.
UNHj: United Croats of West Germany.
UNSW: University of New South Wales.
US: United States (of America).
USS: United States Ship.
UTM: University of Technology Malaysia.
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction.
xii
STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best
of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or
referenced except where due reference is made.
Signature:
Date:
xiii
TERMS, PHRASES, CONVENTIONS, AND LANGUAGE
Throughout this thesis the use of acronyms will be employed. At the beginning of
each chapter the individual acronyms will be reintroduced as used throughout the
thesis to increase comprehensibility. The acronyms employed will be those most
commonly used within the terrorism studies literature. For example, Irgun Zvai Leumi
(National Military Organisation) will be referred to as the NMO, while Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic Community) will be referred to as JI. The list of acronyms on
pages xi-xii will further assist in their comprehensibility. Commonly used acronyms
and abbreviations such as PhD, AM, PM, Dr, will not be included in this list.
This thesis has in a majority of places used the conventional English spelling of
Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, Croatian, and Indonesian names and places. For example Abu
Bakar Basyir will be referred to as Abu Bakar Bashir.
On their introduction within the text, non-English words will be presented in italics
followed by their English translation. From that point onwards the word will be
referred to in normal font. For example Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) would
subsequently be referred to as Aum Shinrikyo.
The popular Western names of individuals within this thesis will be used, for example
the Jemaah Islamiyah member Ali Ghufron will be referred to as Muklas. When
individuals such as Muklas are introduced, or when there is ambiguity over an
individuals identity, the name by which they will be referred to throughout the thesis
will be given followed by the individuals real name or nom de guerre.
Additionally, quotations (unless presented as a blocked quote) will use double

inverted commas to indicate text taken verbatim from another source, while single
inverted commas will be used for the introduction of concepts.
Finally, unless otherwise indicated, all monies referred to are represented as

Australian Dollars.
xiv
THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK
ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This chapter, as the introduction to the thesis, will outline its orientation. This
discussion will establish the significance of the phenomenon of terrorism within a
global context, as well as its significance within an Australian context. The chapter
will then discuss the research objectives and questions of the thesis, followed by a
summary of the subsequent nine chapters, to firmly establish the course of the thesis,
discussing:
i. Chapter II: The Phenomenon of Terrorism this chapter focuses on the
establishment of the principal concepts of the thesis, terrorism and terrorism in
Australia;
ii. Chapter III: The Field of Terrorism Studies this chapter is essentially the
literature review, which examines the field of terrorism studies and the
objectives of the project;
iii. Chapter IV: Social Network Analysis: A Methodology this chapter outlines
the methodology of the thesis and examines social network analysis, the
research questions, and the orientation of the thesis.
iv. Chapters V-X: Data, Analysis, and Conclusions a brief outline of the
substance and progression of these chapters will be discussed.
This chapter will conclude by discussing the potential significance of the project.
1. TERRORISM
While the first incidents of terrorism can be traced to the Fourth Century BC,
terrorism has been a significant international issue since the emergence of
International Terrorism from the late 1960s. International terrorism was a
revolutionary phase within the phenomenons history. This period witnessed infamous
events such as the Black September groups hostage-taking of Israeli athletes at the
1972 Munich Olympic Games (in which 11 of the athletes, a police officer, and five
of the terrorists were killed) and the Japanese Red Armys machine gun and grenade
attack at the Lod Airport in Israel in 1972, resulting in the deaths of 26 people. The
period of international terrorism saw the rise of many terrorist groups championing
many different political and religious causes. In the thirty years between 1968 and
1996 there were 6 956 incidents of international terrorism around the world resulting
2
in 7 049 fatalities.1 These figures illustrate the formidable force that was posed by the
many groups that constituted international terrorism.
The rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism from the late 1990s culminated in the al-
Qaeda attacks against New York and Washington in September 2001. This single
operation resulted in 2 986 deaths and signalled a new phase within the history of
terrorism. 21st Century Islamic extremism, headed by the Islamic extremist group al-
Qaeda (The Base), has since continued its campaign of terrorism with attacks and
attempted attacks all over Europe, Asia, America, and the Middle East. To illustrate
the increase in the frequency and intensity of 21st Century Islamic extremism over
international terrorism, in the ten years between 1996 and 2006, there have been 1 354
incidents of terrorism resulting in 7 249 fatalities.2 i While no successful attacks have
yet to take place on Australian soil, there have been significant attempts on and scares
to Australias internal security.
In a White Paper released by the Australian Government on July 15, 2004, entitled
Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, the specific threats to Australias
security were outlined. The White Paper discusses the reasons that Australia has
become a target for Islamic extremism, citing multiple statements by al-Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden and his deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri between 2001 and 2003.
These statements include references to Australia as a target due to its alignment with
the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), as well as its military
deployment to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The bombing of nightclubs on the
Indonesian island of Bali in 2002 (and later in 2005), which specifically targeted
Australians and other Westerners, solidified Australias position as a target for Islamic
extremists. Since the al-Qaeda attacks of September 2001, the Australian
Government has spent around $6.2 billion on counter-terrorism measures (a figure
which excludes deployment and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq).ii The budgets of
Australias intelligence agencies have been increased by significant margins, some as
much as almost 300%. The organisation of Australias high level counter-terrorism
i
These figures do not include domestic terrorist events that may otherwise be included in figures of
21st Century Islamic extremism. This note particularly applies to terrorism in areas such as Indonesia
and Iraq.
ii
Current as August at 2005.
3
committees and arrangements have also been rearranged to maximise efficiency and
national coordination.3
Australia has been targeted by Islamic extremists prior to 2001, as Chapter II will
demonstrate, but it has also been the training ground, testing facility, and the site of
international conflicts for terrorist groups motivated by the many varying facets of
both religion and politics. As yet, many of these groups, cells, and events have not
been examined within the media or academia at any great level of detail, much less so
examined within the academic field of terrorism studies to understand how these
groups have operated.
2. ORIENTATION OF THESIS
The objectives of this thesis have been synthesised from a review of the terrorism
studies literature in Chapter III. This literature review examines the development of
the terrorism studies field from the 1970s, outlining the developing methodological
and analytical criticisms that remain unresolved today. This review also determines
that there is almost no research on terrorist groups that have operated in or targeted
Australia. As such, the objectives of this thesis are:
i. To describe, understand, and explain the organisation and communication of
terrorist groups that have operated in Australia;
ii. To attempt to provide a methodology that satisfies the criticisms of terrorism
studies; and
iii. To employ a method of analysis that can contribute to a predictive capability
within terrorism studies.
In order to meet these objectives, the thesiss research questions are posed in Chapter
IV. These research questions are:
i. How have terrorist cells in Australia operated?
ii. How might a Jemaah Islamiyah cell operate in Australia?
iii. What are the most effective methods of destabilising these cells?
Guided by these research questions, this thesis will attempt to examine the Hrvatsko
Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), Aum Shinrikyo
(Supreme Truth), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous, LET), and Jemaah
4
Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) cells that operated in or against Australia in the
thirty years between 1963 and 2003, through social network analysis. From the insight
into the JI cell that is examined, the thesis attempts to offer insight into how the group
might operate in Australia, hoping to contribute (on some level) towards a predictive
capacity within the field. The thesis will also use theoretical destabilisation techniques
that have been employed previously within the social network analysis field to
attempt to generate the most effective counter-terrorism techniques for use against
these cells for further counter-terrorism applications.
3. SUMMARY OF THESIS
This section of the chapter will outline the direction and course of the thesis through
an in-depth review of the following three chapters, briefly discussing the major
concepts and theories involved throughout the thesis. These subsequent chapters aim
to instil firstly, a comprehension of the phenomenon of terrorism, secondly how
terrorism is studied and understood, and finally to lay a firm base for the thesis
through the definitive establishment of the major concepts, methodology, and
orientation of the project. The data, analysis, and conclusion chapters will also be
briefly discussed for a more intimate conception of how the thesis is structured and
aims to achieve its objectives.
3.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM

Chapter II establishes the definition and conceptual framework of terrorism that the
thesis will be using. A vital component of establishing this conceptual framework is
the adoption of a definition of terrorism.iii Chapter II avoids an extensive debate on
what many believe is the Achilles heel of terrorism studies so as to not consume time
on such a complex and controversial topic. This discussion does, however, firmly
establish the contextual and definitional basis of terrorism that will be employed
throughout this thesis, specifically, terrorism in Australia.
Following this definitional establishment, the chapter moves on to examine the

development of terrorism through six succinct phases. These phases map a selected
history of terrorism from below, beginning with ancient terror through tactics such as
iii
A valid, reliable, and generally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist and is a pressing
dilemma within the field of terrorism studies.
5
regicide and tyrannicide, to the development of terrorist groups, to terror from the left,
terror from the right, international terrorism, and the development of 21st Century
Islamic extremism. This section offers a detailed snapshot of the groups that
facilitated the development of terrorism since the Fourth Century BC, through to the
events leading to the development of 21st Century Islamic extremism and an
assessment of this type of terrorism today.
The chapter then takes the same approach to examine the history of terrorism in
Australia, which unlike the coverage of the overall history of the phenomenon, is a
reasonably advanced and comprehensive history due to the limited and intermittent
nature of terrorism in Australia.
The purpose of the chapter is to firmly establish the phases, modus operandi, and
development of the two major concepts of this thesis. These concepts are terrorism
and terrorism in Australia, which will be definitively discussed and defined through
historical examples to instil a comprehensive understanding of these concepts.
3.2 THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES

The aim of Chapter III is to understand how terrorism is studied within the academic
field of terrorism studies. This chapter will examine the development of the field of
terrorism studies and where the field is currently positioned. This examination begins
in the early 1970s following the response of political science to the rise of
international terrorism, and examines the literature from other disciplines that
challenged political sciences dominance in the field in the mid-1970s. The review
then follows the rapid growth of the field through the 1980s, highlighting the
criticisms that emerged in this period.
The chapter moves to a review of the contemporary literature and examines a range of
articles from the two major terrorism studies journals, Terrorism and Political
Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,iv classifying the various foci of
research within the field. The review then examines terrorism research that focuses on
terrorism in Australia, demonstrating that there is a disproportionately small body of
iv
Andrew Silke (in 2001) argued that these two journals, as the core journals of the field, provide a
reasonably balanced representation of research in the field.
6
academic research on terrorist organisations and groups that have operated in
Australia. The review establishes that in recent years the field in Australia has been
expanding, but there remains no research that aims to better understand and analyse
terrorist cells, groups, and organisations that have operated in Australia.
The next section of Chapter III revisits the criticisms of terrorism of the 1980s,
proposing that they remain contemporary criticisms of the field. Following the
establishment of these criticisms, a quantity of post-2001 literature is reviewed and it
is discovered that despite a significant rise in the quantity of studies within the field,
there are significant criticisms within the field such as to warrant new
conceptualisations and methodological approaches. It is through these criticisms that
the thesiss research objectives are established
Chapter III will conclude by noting that there is a methodology that facilitates the
description, understanding, and explanation of the way in which terrorist cells operate,
communicate, and are organised, through a firmly grounded analytical approach, and
hence facilitate fulfilling the objectives. This method also has been utilised for past
studies that attempt to provide predictive insight. This method is Social Network
Analysis.
3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Social network analysis is a framework for the analysis of the interaction and
communication of a group of individuals. The method provides an ability to
mathematically map the interaction between the individuals of a network and can
determine different significant criteria of the network and its dynamics such as
density, degree of connexion,v and size.4 Additionally, the method determines the
individual measures of each of the networks members through criteria such as:
amount of activity within; ability to control the interaction and communication within,
and; ability to access the rest of the network. It will be made clear within this chapter
that the adoption of social network analysis satisfies the objectives of the project,
some of the criticisms of terrorism studies, and has potential applications within the
counter-terrorism and intelligence fields.
v
Connexion is a technical term within social network analysis and will be used throughout.
7
Chapter IV of this thesis comprehensively outlines the development of the social
network analysis methodology from its psychological, mathematical, and sociological
structural functionalist roots of the early 1920s to its applications in the analysis of
covert networks today. This examination extends to the applications of the method to
terrorism studies, many of which revolve around the work of Valdis Krebs5 and
Kathleen Carley.6 This section finds that while integration between the two fields
exists, there has been very little application of social network analysis to terrorist
cells, and no such studies on cells that have operated in Australia. Following these
assertions, the chapter moves to outline the research questions. The chapter then
thoroughly establishes the methodology of the thesis, discussing in specific detail the
social network analysis methodology adopted to fulfil the research objectives and
answer the research questions. The chapter concludes by outlining how each of the
subsequent data chapters will examine the four terrorist cells.
3.4 DATA, ANALYSIS, & CONCLUSIONS

Following the establishment of the thesis methodology in Chapter IV, Chapters V
through VIII each examine one of the four cells. These chapters begin with a
background on the terrorist group that the cell is from. This is followed by the
contextual background of the cell, extensively detailing the operation and the
interaction within the cell. From this background, the relational data is synthesised
and presented in adjacency matrices. From these tables, the cell is mathematically
graphed to more clearly demonstrate the relationships and interaction within the cell.
This data is then employed within a social network analysis, providing scores on the
different network and nodal level measures of the methodology. These results are
discussed to determine their meaning and significance, including the leaders within
the cell and the level of covertness or efficiency of the cell. The results and
conclusions of this analysis are applied to the theoretical destabilisation techniques
that attempt to effectively disrupt the cell through the removal of critical links or
individuals.
Following the completion of the data chapters, Chapter IX provides a comparative

analysis of the results and the destabilisation techniques of each of the cells. The final
8
chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis through a review of the data, results, and
analysis, to put forth the major findings, further applications, contribution to
knowledge, and an evaluation of the directions of terrorism studies in the 21st Century.
4. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH
This thesis aims to contribute specific applications to the fields of terrorism studies,
social network analysis, counter-terrorism, and intelligence through its findings. As
mentioned earlier, the application of this methodology to terrorist cells in Australia
provides research into two specific areas in which little or no such literature exists.
The application of social network analysis to examine a variety of terrorist cells offers
the opportunity for comparative analysis of these cells.
Because the projects objectives have been synthesised from the criticisms of the
field, the thesis specifically attempts to address those criticisms. The generation of a
methodology that can provide a framework for objective and applied research may
potentially provide an example of a methodology that has a high degree of reliability
in its application within terrorism studies and constitute a foundation for further
research. The potential applications and generation of avenues for further research are
significant, building on the appropriate application of the methodology.
The application of any methodology in an attempt to understand aspects of the

operation of terrorist cells and to allow insight into and possible prediction of these
cells has significant potential implications for the intelligence and counter-terrorism
fields. Specifically, the method allows the identification of the leaders within
networks and the determination and comprehension of the internal dynamics of the
cell. Additionally, the theoretical examination of the most effective methods to
destabilise such cells has similar potential significance for the counter-terrorism and
intelligence fields.
In this introductory chapter, the orientation and direction of the thesis were
established, as well as some insight into the major concepts of the thesis in addition to
the direction of the data, analysis, and conclusion chapters. The next chapter provides
9
an understanding of terrorism from below, particularly a definitive comprehension of
two of the central concepts of the thesis: terrorism and terrorism in Australia.
10
CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF
TERRORISM
CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM
As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, an overwhelming majority of the

literature focusing on terrorism begins with definitional discussions of the
phenomenon of terrorism in order to establish the context or framework of the ensuing
research and analysis. This thesis will emulate this trend within this chapter, although
this context will be established through a selective examination of the history of the
phenomenon of terrorism. It is contended that the construction of a descriptive,
contextually rich history of terrorism is infinitely more useful to establish a context
for the basis of a thesis (particularly due to the definitional dilemmas within the field
to be discussed below). This chapter aims to categorically construct a selected
history of terrorism in order to establish a clear context for the central concepts of the
thesis, firstly the phenomenon of terrorism, and secondly, terrorism in Australia.
Additionally, this history will situate each of the four groups examined within this
thesis in their historical contexts. The establishment and construction of this history is
critical in the establishment of these concepts and provides an essential understanding
of, and insight into, the development of the phenomenon, the major trends and stages,
and the current state of terrorism today: the period of Islamic extremism.
Terrorism (in its varying forms) is an age-old phenomenon that has been employed all
over the world for many different purposes through many different motivations. The
concept of terrorism has been known by other names, and indeed, has implied other
meanings. Terrorism is a concept that is constantly evolving and as such is a concept
that escapes definition. The complex phenomenon of terrorism has been employed by
people of different races, religions, ideologies, and periods, resulting in the constant
changing of the phenomenon itself. Terrorism is specifically different in every event,
hence the difficulty in defining it. According to Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur,
and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, One writer, Walter Laqueur, simply threw up his hands,
arguing that terrorism had appeared in so many different forms and under so many
different circumstances that a comprehensive definition was impossible.1
12
Since the rise of international terrorism on the world stage, academics, politicians, and
law-makers have struggled to define the phenomenon for the above reasons. There is
yet to be a single generally agreed upon definition. Schmid and Jongman discuss the
blurring between the major concepts and boundaries of terrorism and list them as:
i. Assassination; v. Crime;
ii. Guerrilla warfare; vi. Insanity; and
iii. Revolutionary violence; vii. Political violence.2
iv. Warfare;
While all of these concepts are intrinsically linked to the diverse phenomenon of
terrorism, the principle arguments are based around where the borders between these
concepts and terrorism lie. In addition to the conceptual discrepancies, definitions can
be based on the motivation of the terrorist act, the objective or goal of the act, and the
target of the act.
The disparity surrounding the defining of such a prevalent and universal phenomenon
has led academics such as Jay Shafritz, Earl Gibbons, and Gregory Scott to deduce
that it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon.3 Any
definition of terrorism is dependent on a single variable: the subjective nature of the
defining party. For the purpose of this project, which aims to examine terrorist cells
that have operated in or against Australia, it will employ the following definition from
the Australian Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003:
[A] Terrorist act means an action or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subjection
(3); and
(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a
political, religious, or ideological cause; and
(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:
(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the
Commonwealth or a State, Territory, or foreign country; or
(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or
(b) causes serious damage to property; or
(c) causes a persons death; or
(d) endangers a persons life, other than the life of the person taking the
action; or
(e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public; or
(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic
system including, but not limited to:
(i) an information system; or
13
(ii) a telecommunications system; or
(iii) a financial system; or
(iv) a system used for the delivery of essential government services;
or
(v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; or
(vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system.
(3) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) is advocacy, protest, dissent, or industrial action; and
(b) is not intended:
(i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or
(ii) to cause a persons death; or
(iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than the person taking the
action; or
(iv) to create serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a
section of the public.4
Clearly this is not a historical or even an academic definition. However, for the
purposes of examining terrorism in Australia, the definition is appropriate. The
adoption of this definition assists in setting the context, terrorism in Australia, for this
thesis.
While the genealogy of terrorism dates back to before Christ, what follows will be an
overview of significant terrorist groups and events that have led to the development of
the phenomenon of terrorism from below, as this is the form of terrorism to be
examined within the scope of this project. As such, this history will exclude forms of
terrorism such as terrorism from above (or state terror), mainstream political
violence, and forms of warfare. Although some of the groups and campaigns detailed
below may not conform to traditional or contemporary definitions of terrorism from
below, their inclusion indicates the importance of the particular movement or event to
a comprehensive history of the development of bottom up terrorism. The aim of this
chapter is not to determine the causes and sources of terrorism, but to establish and
descriptively examine the development of terrorism from below, the phenomenon
itself, and where it stands today, through the events and groups that have shaped it.i
1. A HISTORY OF TERRORISM
As mentioned previously, the history of terrorism to follow examines only terrorism
from below and will examine only a small number of the terrorist groups that have
operated over the past 2000 years. This will be a small snapshot of an extensive and
i
As such, this chapter will provide a background into many of the groups discussed throughout the
thesis.
14
exhaustive history of the phenomenon, to establish a context for the research project,
and by no means intends to be a comprehensive treatment of the history of terrorism.ii
This context is necessary to establish the development of the phenomenon and an
understanding of the vital events leading up to the development of 21st Century
Islamic extremism. The history to be presented below has been arranged in six
chronological phases of terrorism:
1. Ancient Terror & Assassination: C4 BC C1AD;
2. Origins of Terrorism: C1 C17 AD;
3. Left Wing and Revolutionary Terrorism: Circa 1790-1910;
4. Right Wing and Post WWI Terrorism: Circa 1916-1960;iii
5. International Terrorism: Circa 1960-Today, and;
6. 21st Century Islamic Extremism.
Again, this examination of the development of terrorism limits its scope to terrorism
from below, as that is the specific theme of the project.
1.1. ANCIENT TERROR & ASSASSINATION: C4 BC C1 AD

While Walter Laqueur in 1977 claimed that terrorism is a new, unprecedented
phenomenon [and][f]or this reason, its antecedents (if any) are of little interest,5
Grant Wardlaw in 1982 emphasised that [t]he history of terrorism is a full-scale
investigation in its own rightit is important that some of the landmarks should be
pointed out in order to view current groups in perspective.6 Following the logic of
Wardlaw, this chapter contends that these ancient incidents and events are vital to any
comprehension of the development of terrorism, and so the ancient precedents will be
briefly discussed.
This history of the antecedents of terrorism begins with Aristotle and his work in the
promotion of tyrannicide around the mid-Third Century BC. Aristotle claimed that
there:
are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies hatred and contempt.
Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their
destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their
power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for living in
ii
The author acknowledges that many significant groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, have not been treated in detail within
this history.
iii
There was a revision to left-wing terror towards the end of this period.
15
luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their
assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects.
It is oftentimes even more ready to strike the angry are more impetuous in making
an attack, for they do not listen to reason. And men are very apt to give way to their
passions when they are insulted.7
Essentially, Aristotle was promoting assassinations against tyrants. Assassination is

the earliest form of terrorism from below.
One of the most notable instances of ancient tyrannicide was the assassination of
Julius Caesar in 44 BC. Although he did not play a role in the assassination, Ciceroiv
justified Caesars death:
There can be no such thing as a fellowship with tyrants, nothing but bitter feud is
possibleFor, as we amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have
ceased to circulate, because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who, under
human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast, should be severed from
the common body of humanity.8
Assassinations justified through tyrannicide and regicidev became commonplace from

the times of Aristotle. Examples of such assassinations include:
i. Philip II of Macedon, in 336 BC;
ii. Nero, Emperor of Rome, in 68;
iii. Henry III, King of France, in 1589;
iv. Henry IV, King of France, in 1610;
v. Peter III, Tsar of Russia, in 1762, and;
vi. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States (US), in 1865.9
Following the assassination of US President Abraham Lincoln, his assassin, John
Wilkes Booth jumped onto the theatre stage screaming sic semper tyrannis (thus
always to tyrants).10
1.2. ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: CIRCA C1 C13

It is in this second period (60 1400) that the origins of terrorism can clearly be
distinguished, as recognised groups of motivated and unified individuals began to
undertake terrorist agenda and operations. The earliest significant case of a terrorist
group can be traced to the Sicarii, a collection of highly organised religious men of
iv
Roman philosopher and politician (106 43 BC)
v
The killing of a king.
16
the lower ranks active in the Zealot campaign against Roman rule in Palestine
between circa 60-70. According to Laqueur, the Sicarii were known for their use of
unorthodox tactics, such as attacking their enemies by daylight, or on holidays, with a
concealed short sword called a sica (from which the groups name was derived). The
Sicarii destroyed the house of Ananias, the palaces of the Herodian dynasts, public
archives, granaries, and sabotaged the water supply of Jerusalem.11 vi The Sicarii were
eventually defeated after the siege of Masada, where 960 of the group committed
suicide rather than be taken by the Romans.12 vii
From around 1094-1273, a group known as the Assassins, an offshoot of the Ismailis,
a sect of Muslim Shiites, undertook a terrorist campaign against the Seljuqs. Based in
Persia, the Assassins expanded to operate in Iraq and Syria, where the Fidaiin
(fighters) disguised themselves as strangers or Christians and operated against
orthodox Muslims and Christians in secrecy.13 The Assassins killed caliphs, prefects,
government officials, and even Conrad of Montferrat, the Crusader King of
Jerusalem. Like the Sicarii, the Fidaiin also used small-bladed weapons to dispatch
their targets. The Assassins were eventually quelled by the Mongols in the 13th
Century.14
In India from the 13th Century until the mid-19th Century, a group known as the
Thuggee or Thugs, who followed the Hindu goddess Kaliviii (the goddess of death),
undertook a campaign of strangulations along Indias remote roads and highways.15
The Thuggee operated in groups of between ten and fifty men, and used advanced
tactics to scout, approach, and subdue their largely random victims. Andrew Sinclair
details their method of dispatch, which was most often strangulation, the bodies of
their victims mutilated both to satisfy the cults religious demands and to erase the
victims identity.16 Membership of the group was through birthright, and the group
was often protected by local rulers, who shared in the spoils of the cult. The Thuggee
were eventually subjugated through the loss of support of the local rulers and
vi
The significance of the sabotage of Jerusalems water supply lies in the suggestion that it is perhaps
the first instance of a terrorist group attempting to use large scale bio-terrorism.
vii
While the sicarii are an example of resistance against foreign rule, similar to the resistance
movement in Europe during Nazi occupation, they are cited for their use of these tactics, which is
important in the development of terrorism.
viii
There was also a significant number of Muslims in the group.
17
population through the expansion of British colonial rule into these formerly isolated
areas.17
In the first attempted terrorist attack in Britain, in 1605, Catholic extremist Guy
Fawkes and co-conspirators planned to blow up Westminster Palace in London on the
opening of Parliament, killing King James I and his government. The group planned
to then install the Catholic Pope as the head of England. This motivation stems from
King Henry VIIIs separation from the Roman Catholic Church after he was denied
an annulment of his first marriage and formed the Church of England. Fawkes plot
involved detonating large amounts of gunpowder in the cellar of the British
Parliament, and as a result the operation is now commonly referred to as the
Gunpowder Plot. The mission failed when a letter one of Fawkes co-conspirators
sent to his brother-in-law, warning him to stay away from the proceedings, found its
way to the King. Fawkes was captured guarding the gunpowder in the cellar, and he
and his gang were eventually drawn and quartered in front of an enthusiastic crowd at
Westminster.18 This example is significant as the operation shows a modus operandi
far beyond its time, through the use of (and scale of) explosives, and the consequential
innocent casualties the attack would have caused.
1.2.1 PERIOD SUMMARY

The terrorism of this period was characterised by the assassination tactic. While
assassinations were performed long before the Sicarii (as was established through an
examination of ancient terrorism), and this tactic is not confined to terrorism but is
also a feature of mainstream political violence, the organisation and underground
methods of the Sicarii, the Ismali assassins, the Thuggee and the gunpowder plot
make them significant groups within a history of the development of terrorism.
Interestingly, the Sicarii attempts to sabotage the water supply of Jerusalem exhibit
characteristics of biological terrorism, a tactic of terrorism far beyond their time.
Furthermore, the Ismali assassins, the Thuggee (to a degree), and Fawkes, seem to be
the first large scale examples of religious extremism within terrorism. The principal
motivations for the adoption of terrorism as a tactic in this period were resistance to
foreign rule and religious motivation - two motivational themes that persist through
the entire history of terrorism.
18
1.3. LEFT WING & REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: CIRCA 1790 - 1910
The rise of left wing terrorism coincided with the ascendancy of the philosophical
traditions of anarchy and communism throughout Europe. Because many of Europes
governments were embedded in monarchs and theocracies,ix these philosophies were
transformed into powerful tools of violent revolution.
1.3.1 THE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT

The Anarchist movement initially developed through the writings of William
Goodwin in 1793 and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in 1840. These writings principally
concerned the possession of property as theft, and the promotion of extreme
minimalist government.19 Bruce Hoffman maintains that the physical applications of
Anarchist philosophy to the concept of revolution were implemented through the
work of Carlo Pisacane, who had discarded his birthright as the Duke of San Giovanni
in Italy to fight for the Anarchist cause.20 Pisacane was the pioneer of what would
eventually become known as the Propaganda of the Deed doctrine through the
writings of Paul Brousse. Essentially, this doctrine promoted decisive action on an
individual level to inspire further action by others.21 Pisacane wrote [t]he propaganda
of the idea is a chimeraIdeas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and
the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are
free.22
These early works on Anarchism provided a base for German radical democrat Karl
Heinzen, in 1848, to establish what terrorism expert Walter Laqueur articulates as the
first full-fledged doctrine of modern terrorism; most elements of latter-day terrorist
thought can be found in the writings of this forgotten German.23 Heinzen justifies
terrorism on a large scale in his essay Der Mod (Murder) of 1848:
If you have to blow up half a continent and pour out a sea of blood in order to destroy
the party of the barbarians, have no scruples or conscience. He is no true republican
who would not gladly pay with his life for the satisfaction of exterminating a million
barbarians.24
In his 1849 Die Evolution (The Evolution) essay, Heinzen goes further to state:
We must call a spade a spade. The truth must out, whether it seems amiable or
terrible, whether it is dressed in the white of peace or the red of war. Let us be frank
and honest, let us tear away the veil and spell out in plain speech what the lesson is
ix
Such as Russia, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom.
19
which is now being illustrated everyday before our eyes in the form of actions and
threats, blood and torture, cannons and gallows by both princes and freedom-
fightersto wit, that murder is the principle agent of historical progress.25
Such statements provided an impetus for Anarchist terrorists and philosophers to

partake in and advance a violent Anarchist doctrine.
These ideas were transformed again by Mikhail Bakunin in his Principles of the
Revolution published in 1869, which had built on the work of Pisacane. These
principles called for the destruction of state, military, and religious institutions and
structures, as well as the murder of individuals who submitted to the dominance of
these institutions. In 1886, French Anarchist Paul Brousse coined the phrase
propaganda of the deed (discussed previously), which encompassed the work of
Pisacane, Bakunin and other Anarchists of the time, and (as mentioned previously)
became the driving doctrine behind the Anarchist terrorist movement.26
In 1881 the Anarchist International organisation was formed in London and

championed violent anarchist doctrine. This period of the early 1880s saw the
Anarchist movement gain momentum. In 1884, in the September 13 edition of the
London newspaper Freiheit (Freedom), John Most offered advice to budding
Anarchists: What is the purpose of anarchists threats an eye for an eye, a tooth for
a tooth if they are not followed up by action?.27 The Anarchist International, as
well as the Freiheit newspaper were resolute supporters of terrorism.
Such propaganda added fuel to the fire of the Anarchist movement for the remainder
of the 19th Century and ensured a spate of attacks throughout France in particular,
including the assassination of French President Sadi Carnot. Many accounts of the
anarchist movement, including that of Grant Wardlaw, claim that the individuals were
no more than common criminals who only used the propaganda of the deed doctrine
as a superficial justification for violence.28 The significance of the anarchist
movement is that it was not confined to one country. The Anarchist movement was a
formidable movement outside central Europe, in areas such as Mediterranean Europe,
and throughout Latin America.29
20
1.3.2 RUSSIAN TERRORISM
In Imperial Russia under Tsar Alexander II in January of 1878, the Russian
revolutionary movement Narodnaya Volya (Peoples Will, NV) undertook a terrorist
campaign against Tsarist authorities after one of the groups members, Kovalski,
attempted to resist arrest. The incident occurred during the movements resistance to
Tsarist economic, cultural, military, and educational reforms in Imperial Russia. NVs
campaign included the shooting of the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, the
assassination of the head of the Tsarist political police, and several attempts on the
life of Tsar Alexander II. The Tsar had been sentenced to death by the revolutionary
tribunal of the NV,30 and was eventually assassinated in 1881 by a team of NV bomb
throwers.31 Morozov, one of the groups leading theorists, believed that terrorism
was a cost effective form of struggle which would overthrow the Tsarist tyranny.32
The group believed that the use of terrorism would incur fewer civilian casualties than
a mass uprising.33
According to terrorism expert Paul Wilkinson, after strict regulations enforced upon
NV members by the Tsar allowing summary arrests and sentencing, combined with
increased pressure by Alexander IIIs secret police, and the deep infiltration by
informers within the group, NV was forced out of St. Petersburg and then forced to
southern Russia. The groups funding from St. Petersburg eventually dwindled,
bringing about the demise of the group.34
The members of NV that remained were absorbed into the Social Revolutionaries in
the late 1890s.35 In 1902, the Social Revolutionary Party sponsored and gave
autonomy to its fighting organisation, the Boevaya Organisasia (Battle Organisation,
BO).36 In that year, the BO assassinated the minister of the interior. The group
continued this campaign between 1903 and 1910, assassinating hundreds of state
officials, including the Grand Duke Serge Aleksandrovich. Paul Wilkinson writes that
following the defeat of NV, the Tsars secret police had become more sophisticated
and efficient, its efforts focused against the BO. A double agent of the secret police,
Azev, rose to command the BO and created division with their parent organisation,
the Social Revolutionary Party. Eventually the BO dictated to the Social
Revolutionaries. After Azev was discovered and executed, the BO never recovered,
with the assassination numbers decreasing to close to zero by 1910.37
21
Following the Bolsheviks seizure of power in Russia in 1917, the Communists vied
for a world revolution as inspired by the philosophy of Karl Marx. In 1920, Karl
Katusky, in his book, Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the National
History of the Revolution, wrote: It is, in fact, a widely spread idea that terrorism
belongs to the very essence of revolution, and that whoever wants a revolution must
somehow come to terms with terrorism.38
1.3.3 ANTI-OTTOMAN TERRORISM

Throughout the late 19th Century, the government of Ottoman Turkey increased its
policy of persecution of the Armenian population, imposing high taxes and
restrictions of civil liberties.x In the periods preceding and following the outbreak of
the First World War in 1915, the Ottoman government labelled the Armenians a
national security threat, and began distributing propaganda material illustrating that
threat.39 In this year, hundreds of Armenian leaders were arrested and executed. The
entire population of the Armenians in Turkey was ordered to be deported to the Syrian
Desert. Andrew Sinclair contextualises these circumstances by detailing that
Armenians within the Ottoman Army were murdered, and concentration camps and
death factories were constructed.40 The estimated death toll of the Armenian Genocide
perpetrated by the Turks stands at about 1.5 million.41 However, despite being one of
the worst genocidal actions in modern history, it remains unrecognised as genocide by
both the Turkish and US governments.
In 1921, the leader of the Ottoman government, Mehmed Talaat Pasha, was
assassinated by an Armenian student in Berlin, for his part in the Genocide.42 The
following year, Ahmed Djemal Pasha, high ranking government official and Minister
for Marine, was also assassinated by Armenian nationalists.43 Armenian terrorism
continued sporadically until the 1990s, through groups such as the Justice
Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). These two groups and their campaigns will be
discussed in detail later in the chapter when examining International Terrorism.
x
The Armenian Revolution Federation launched an unsuccessful revolt in 1896 in response to a lack of
reforms by the Ottoman government.
22
Like Armenia, by the late 19th Century Macedonia had been under Ottoman rule for
five hundred years. Throughout this period, the Ottoman state persecuted and forced
the Christian population to convert to Islam.xi With the promised reforms of 1895 by
the Ottoman government not taking place, the Inner-Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation (IMRO) launched a terrorist campaign against the Ottoman Government
in the hope of achieving an independent Macedonia.44 The IMRO were heavily
influenced by socialist doctrines and were linked to the anarchist Macedonian Secret
Revolutionary Committee. Despite an apparent leftist position, the IMRO were
financially supported by the Italian Fascists,45 and attained technical and tactical
assistance from Armenian revolutionary groups.46 The group undertook a series of
bombings leading up to the unsuccessful Ilinden uprising of 1903. The IMRO
continued its struggle until the mid-1930s when it was suppressed by the Bulgarian
government (where the group was based) following their support of high profile
Ustashi assassinations.47
1.3.4 IRISH TERRORISM

One of the most significant terrorist movements to be formed in the early 20th Century
was the Irish Republican Army (IRA), effectively created in 1916 through the
merging of two rebel groups opposed to British rule in Ireland: the Irish Volunteers
and the Irish Citizens Army. These groups (supported by Germany) embarked on and
promoted a popular rebellion against the British in Ireland. This uprising, known as
the Easter Rising, began on April 24 when the groups seized strategic locations within
the city of Dublin. Thomas Hennessey details that there was little public support for
the uprising, which was quelled on April 29. Fifteen leaders of the rebellion were
executed the following month.48 The Easter Rising marked a significant turning point
in the history of Irish independence, distinguishing a division between the terrorist
tactics of the republicans and the political strategies of the nationalists.
By 1919 the republican rebels were officially known as the IRA and commenced
guerrilla style attacks on police and military targets, as well as violence directed
against the Protestant population. Between 1919 and 1921, during the fight for
independence, the IRA commenced a terrorist campaign consisting of ambushes and
xi
Often these measures extended to forced circumcision, which the Ottoman state had also applied to
the Armenian population.
23
raids against British and Loyalist targets. The IRA sustained 752 deaths in this period,
while inflicting around 600 on the Crown forces.49 The introduction of the
Government of Ireland Act of 1920 divided the island of Ireland into two jurisdictions
with their own parliaments, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.50 In July of
1921, a truce was signed between the IRA and the Crown forces.51 While a majority
of the IRA joined the new national army of the Irish Free State, a number of the
members remained and initiated a civil war against the Irish Free State between 1922
and 1923.52 As will be discussed later in this chapter, terrorism committed by Irish
Republicans did not end here but continued into, and was transformed by, the period
of international terrorism.

The left-wing and revolutionary period of terrorism is perhaps the most influential in
the history of the phenomenon, inspired and motivated through the rise of new
political ideologies of liberalism, communism, and anarchism. The most significant
aspect of this period of terrorism was the introduction of the bomb as a weapon of
assassination. Small-scale indiscriminate terrorism began during this period with
bombings by the Anarchist movement. The organisation and cell structure of the
groups in this period developed significantly, with formal military organisation and
more structured formation. As in the previous period, this form of terrorism was
predominantly limited to small scale murder and assassination. Significantly, the
anarchist campaign of the late 19th Century spanned over all of Europe and through
South America. This was the first campaign that spanned such a distance. Unlike
terrorism in the previous period, which was characterised by religious motivation, the
motivations of the above groups were revolutionary or separatist. Like the religious
motivations behind terrorism, the politically stimulated separatism and revolutionary
motivations are two that have continued throughout the phenomenons history. The
left-wing and revolutionary period of terrorism instilled the phenomenon as a
successful form of political opposition.
1.4. RIGHT WING & POST WWI TERRORISM: CIRCA 1917 1960
Following the end of World War I, there was a significant decrease in terrorism from
the left side of the political spectrum, countered by the emergence and rise to
significance of right wing terrorism. Towards the end of this period, particularly after
24
the defeat of fascism in 1945, there was a resurgence of left wing terrorism. By the
1960s, the era was shared equally by both types of groups.
1.4.1 THE IRON GUARD

According to terrorism expert Walter Laqueur, the Iron Guard was founded in 1927 as
a fascist, anti-parliamentary, anti-Communist, anti-Semitic group in Romania by
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, and was reportedly financed by the Polish Government.53
The group, originally known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael, was established
as a military organisation operating through the use of terrorist tactics. The Iron Guard
was banned by Romanian Premier Ion Duca in 1933 and was forced to operate as the
All for the Fatherland Party. In retaliation, within days the group assassinated Duca.
In 1938 Codreanu was killed while imprisoned by the Romanian government. The
following year a new government was installed with Armand Calinescu as Prime
Minister. Several months later he was assassinated in retaliation for Codreanus
death.54 Subsequently, the Iron Guard assisted in the installation of Marshall Ion
Antonescu, and formed the National Legionary State in 1940. Ioanid Radu
maintains that through this partnership, the Iron Guard and Antonescu massacred
Jews, murdered former government ministers, and undertook a campaign of political
assassinations, which included the assassination of ex-Premier Nicolae Iorga in 1940.
The Iron Guard attempted a coup against Antonescu in 1941, but this was successfully
suppressed, forcing the group into exile once again. The Iron Guard vanished from
Romanian politics with the collapse of the Axis powers at the end of World War II in
Europe.55
1.4.2 ZIONISM
The Zionist movement for a Jewish homeland in Palestine gained both significance
and pace in 1917, following British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfours declaration of
support for the establishment of a Jewish state. This resulted in a mass immigration of
Jews from around the world to Palestine. Leading up to World War II, this movement
gained pace and as a consequence, Arabs in Palestine rioted and declared their
opposition to further Jewish settlement in Palestine.56 As a response to Arab attacks
on Jews in Palestine, in 1936 the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation,
NMO) was as an ultra-nationalist, right-leaning movement with a disciplined, military
structure. The political objective of the group was the creation of a Jewish
25
independent state within its biblically defined boundaries. Irgun undertook bombing
campaigns against the Arabs and the British in Palestine. When the group attempted
to halt all operations against the British on the outbreak of World War Two, a splinter
group, the Stern Gang, separated from the NMO and continued attacks against
British targets. The group operated in cells of three members with only vertical
connections to the upper echelons of the group. The Sternists were responsible for the
assassination of the British Minister of State for the Near East, Lord Moyne, in 1944.
In 1944 Menachem Begin, who would become Prime Minister of Israel in 1977,
became the leader of the NMO and resumed hostilities against the British.57
The NMO continued its operations against the British and the Arabs through the
1940s using the tactics of an underground army, such as ambushes and raids. The
Irgun terrorists targeted buildings within Palestine, the bombings of which resulted in
numerous civilian casualties. The most renowned attack by the NMO was on the
British Headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on July 22, 1946, where 91
people were killed.58 The NMO continued attacks against the Arabs, and attacked
attempts by the British to intervene.59 When the British Mandate in Palestine expired
on March 14, 1948, Israel proclaimed itself an independent state and was quickly
recognised by the US, the Soviet Union, and many other independent nations. The
NMO dissolved following the attainment of independence and many members joined
the newly established Israeli Defence Forces, fighting in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War
which followed the proclamation of the Jewish state.60
1.4.3 THE USTASHA

The Ustasha (insurgent) were a fascist Croatian separatist terrorist group that operated
within and outside Yugoslavia post-World War I. In 1929, the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia banned all nationalist parties and as a result, the Croatian Party of Rights
founded the Ustashi movement. The group undertook guerrilla warfare operations
within Yugoslavia and assassinated Yugoslav officials abroad. The Ustasha received
support from the Hungarian and Italian governments and cooperated with the
Macedonian IMRO until the IMROs defeat in 1930.61 In 1934 the group assassinated
the Yugoslav King Alexander and the French foreign minister Barthou. The Ustasha
leader, Ante Pavelic, was held responsible for the killings. In April 1941, Hitler and
26
Mussolini invaded Yugoslavia, installing the Ustasha leader, Pavelic, as Fuhrer of
independent Croatia.
Pavelics regime was as barbaric as (if not worse than) the Nazi regime that installed
it.62 The Ustashi government massacred around 330 000 Serbs, Jews, Muslims, and
Gypsies, and also deported thousands of people to Nazi concentration camps.63 The
Ustashi Government was opposed by the Tito-led National Liberation Army
(Yugoslav partisans). Following the liberation of Europe and the defeat of Nazi
Germany, many of the Ustasha forces fled to areas such as Spain, Latin America, the
US, Canada, and Australia.64 In many of these countries, the Ustasha began creating
terrorist organisations aimed at the destruction of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) (formed after the allies liberation of Pavlecs Croatia) and the
liberation or reinstallation of Croatia. The Ustashi groups that operated in Australia
and their activities will be discussed later in the chapter when examining terrorism in
Australia.
1.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

In Egypt, 1928, Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood after the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire in order to revive the Islamist movement. Following the
empires collapse, the caliphatexii system of government was forbidden. Al-Banna,
previously a school teacher, taught Islam as a religion but also as a comprehensive
way of life based on the principles of Wahhabism.xiii Over the following twenty years
the Brotherhood gained a strong constituency and an increasing influence. Through
this powerful influence, the Muslim Brotherhood developed a political party, the anti-
Egyptian Party of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood began establishing
military training camps through its close ties to individuals within the government,
particularly Anwar al-Sadat. The individuals who trained in these camps became the
Armed Battalions of the Muslim Brotherhood.65 The group sided with the Palestinians
in the 1948 war against Israel and began terrorist operations inside Egypt. In 1948 the
Brotherhood was responsible for the assassination of Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, the
Prime Minister of Egypt.66 Following this assassination, the Muslim Brotherhood was
xii
The system in which the Caliph rules over all Muslims, essentially translating to Successor of the
Prophet (Muhammad).
xiii
Wahhabism is a fundamentalist movement within the strand of Sunni Islam.
27
outlawed by the Egyptian Government and in 1949, the organisations founder, al-
Banna, was assassinated by an Egyptian Government agent.67 xiv
Toward the end of this period of terrorism, there was a resurgence of left-wing
terrorism, signifying a strong swing from the right-wing groups of this period. Among
these was the 26th of July Movement in Cuba during the late 1950s. Campaigns such
as this led to the anonymous phrase one persons terrorist is another persons
freedom fighter after their actions were labelled as terrorism. These events (among
others) are responsible for the blurring between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, when
political actors with vested interests defined these campaigns as terrorism.xv Defining
groups or movements as terrorist organisations has allowed the demonisation and
delegitimisation of the causes and struggles of various groups.
1.4.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM

The socialist Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN)
engaged the French colonialist government in Algeria in 1954 through a terrorist
campaign with the aim of an independent Algeria. The FLN executed indiscriminate
attacks by bombing heavily populated civilian areas such as buses, shops, markets,
and stations.68 The FLNs resistance developed into the 1954 war of independence,
where the FLN employed guerrilla tactics against the French. The FLN claimed that
its aim was the restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state
within the framework of Islamic principles.69 The FLNs socialist ideological leaning
separates the group from the other organisations of this period. However, the
prominence and longevity of this group justifies its inclusion in this
period/categorisation of terrorism. Throughout the conflict, the FLN engaged in the
attacking and killing of civilians, including the massacre of 123 civilians in the town
of Philippeville, in 1955. The French response to civilians suspected of supporting the
FLN was brutal, and usually resulted in a village being subjected to aerial
bombardment or artillery strikes. The FLN was also engaged in a conflict with rival
groups vying for power in Algeria. These groups, such as the Mouvement National
xiv
It is significant to note that the Egyptian Brotherhood is the first modern Islamic extremist group,
from which many other similar organisations branched and splintered.
xv
Again we see that the definition is dependent on the defining party.
28
Algerien (National Algerian Movement), engaged in terrorist attacks against each
other, and the civilians on either side.70
By 1958, the French had suppressed the FLNs military campaign, and the group
reverted to acts of terrorism both in France and Algeria. In 1961, the French
government opened a dialogue with the FLN and established a cease fire the
following year. During these talks and the consequent referendum for reforms, the
Organisation de lArmee Secrete (Secret Army Organisation, OAS), a right-wing
group opposed to Algerian independence, launched a terrorist campaign to disrupt the
cease fire. The OASs campaign was the worst of the war, with attacks against both
the FLN and the French government. The OAS was responsible for an average of 120
bombings per day over the month of March, 1962, with targets such as schools and
hospitals. The campaign of the OAS was unsuccessful, with the cease fire enduring,
and the French conceding power over Algeria to the FLN in late September, 1962.71

As in the previous periods, assassination remained the primary method of terrorism.
Large-scale indiscriminate bombings were the innovation of this period. Groups such
as the NMO, the FLN, and the OAS targeted innocent individuals for the purpose of a
greater emotional and psychological impact on their enemies, the public, and the
media. Such large-scale attacks against civilians proved relatively successful during
this period, with the NMO and the FLN accomplishing their goals. Right-wing and
post-World War I terrorism established the use of military tactics through their
organisational arrangements and the establishing of what became known as terrorist
cells, increasing the sophistication of cells in the previous period. This organisation
of independent covert groups of terrorists became the most effective method of
conducting terrorist operations, a method of operating that continues successfully
today. While such organisation could be found in Irish groups of the previous period,
the modus operandi adopted by different groups with different motivations, from
different areas of the world, denotes a significant development in terrorism. We can
also identify the beginnings of modern Islamic extremism through the formation and
development of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the frequency of terrorism the media
attention it received in the right-wing and post-World War I period was not as
momentous as the next two periods, the development of terrorism in this forty year
29
period was among the most significant in terrorisms history, firmly establishing the
phenomenon for the rise of International Terrorism.
1.5. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CIRCA 1960 TODAY

The terrorist groups and events that arose from the late 1960s to the early 1970s
characterised a significantly new period of terrorism, in that traditional conflicts
began to transcend national borders. In August of 1969, two members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a Trans-World Airline flight to
Tel Aviv, Israel. The aircraft was then directed to Syria, where the passengers were
released and the plane destroyed.72 On September 5, 1972, eight Palestinian members
of the Black Septemberxvi organisation entered the Olympic village in Munich and
made an assault on the building in which the Israeli athletes were staying. The group
demanded the release of 234 prisoners held in Israeli prisons. The terrorists were
allowed to travel to an airport where a trap set by German authorities was
implemented. Five of the terrorists were killed and three arrested, while all nine of the
hostages were grenaded by the terrorists. In the single month of September 1974, the
Japanese Red Army attacked the French embassy in The Hague, a man wearing a
South Vietnamese Army jacket blew up a commercial airliner in midair killing all on
board, and the IRA killed two judges in Belfast.73 These events, along with the rise
and actions of many other groups, and the shift in tactics by existing groups, gave rise
to the concept of International Terrorism.
The characterising feature of this period (and the impetus behind the name) is that
terrorism began to transcend international borders: conflicts that were previously
confined to one nation, spilled over to the rest of the world. This is evident through
the above paragraph, Palestinian terrorists in Syria and Germany, and Japanese
terrorists in Holland. In addition, the terrorism of this period concentrated on mass
casualty attacks under the spotlight of the mass media hence creating a global
dilemma that thrust the phenomenon of terrorism into the international spotlight.
Many of these groups were sponsored by foreign governments whose interests
xvi
Also known as the Abu Nidal Organisation, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, and the Fatah
Revolutionary Council.
30
coincided with those of the terrorists.xvii The advent of international terrorism is,
according to Wardlaw, a consequence of technological change. The most obvious
relevant developments [were] in the fields of transport, communications (particularly
as applied to news gathering and distribution), and weaponry.74 This technological
change and its effect on terrorism is evident as we follow the different periods of
terrorism, from assassinations by blade, to shootings, to bombings, and then to mass
casualty bombings. Two of the most significant factors of international terrorism were
firstly, its effects on existing groups, and secondly the rise of new groups.xviii
1.5.1 CONTINUING GROUPS

The prevalence of international terrorism is demonstrated through groups that have
continued their struggles or campaigns into the international terrorism period.
Traditional methods and areas of operations changed, such as mass casualty bombings
and skyjacking within the borders of other countries, with operations even extending
to countries with no relevance to the groups political aims and motives.xix
1.5.1.1 THE IRA(s)

The IRA continued the campaign of violence and terrorism in the United Kingdom
(UK) as discussed earlier. In late 1969, at a meeting of the IRA, a Provisional Army
Council (Provisional IRA, PIRA) was established. By 1970 the council had splintered
from the group and had begun the reorientation from a defensive strategy to a
retaliatory position.75 On October 31, 1971, the PIRA campaign began in mainland
Britain with the bombing of a (closed) restaurant atop the London Post Office Tower,
achieving only structural damage. This was followed four months later by the
bombing of a public house frequented by British soldiers in Aldershot, which resulted
in seven deaths and 19 injured. In March of 1973, two bombs were detonated, the first
outside the Old Bailey in London, and the other at a Protestant Loyalist event in a
Glasgow Hall. According to Terrence Taylor, more than sixty PIRA bombings were
xvii
Syria, Iran, the United States, and the United Kingdom have all had alleged links to terrorist
organisations through the period of international terrorism.
xviii
It is important to acknowledge the significance of domestic terrorism during this period,
particularly the 1995 Oklahoma bombing which killed 168 people. In order to focus on the
internationalisation of terrorism of this period, domestic terrorism will not be discussed.
xix
The only example of this type of terrorism previously is Anarchist terrorism in the mid to late 1800s
throughout Europe and Latin America.
31
carried out in Great Britain between August and December 1973. The PIRA campaign
in Great Britain in 1973 left 15 dead and 109 injured.76
It is important to note the response from the Protestant community in Northern

Ireland, through the creation of groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster
Protestant Force, and the Ulster Defence Association.77 xx
These Protestant
paramilitary groups were created in the mid 1960s to early 1970s to oppose civil
rights for Catholics and to combat members of the IRA, Sinn Fein Provisionals (the
PIRAs political party), and the general Catholic community.78
According to the United States Department of States Patterns of Global Terrorism

2003, the PIRA continued its campaign against Crown officials, civilians, police, and
military targets until the cease-fire in 1997.79 This ceasefire led to the Belfast (Good
Friday) Agreement in 1998, in which all IRA members within Northern Ireland were
to end the paramilitary campaign and disarm by May 2000.80 Splinter groups such as
the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA) continued terrorist campaigns
through the PIRAs cease-fire with the Crown. The groups goals consisted of uniting
Ireland and disrupting the Northern Ireland peace process,81 a campaign that was
largely successful and continued the violence by the Loyalist paramilitaries and the
various IRA groups.82 On July 28, 2005, the IRAs leadership ordered the stand down
of arms in the Republican campaign and the participation in a peaceful democratic
approach for unity and independence in Ireland.83
1.5.1.2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Despite being banned in 1948 following the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister
Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to operate and
unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Nasser in 1954. However,
the Brotherhood successfully murdered Nassers successor and former ally of the
Brotherhood, Anwar al-Sadat in 1981.84 Through the evolution of international
terrorism, the Brotherhood has expanded to have branches in over 70 countries,
despite being pursued by the Egyptian, Arab, and Western Governments.85
xx
It is alleged that the UK supported some of these Protestant groups.
32
A significant effect that international terrorism had on the Muslim Brotherhood was
the establishment of Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance
Movement, HAMAS) in 1987 as an offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood. According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the groups goal is the
establishment of a Palestinian state in place of Israel. The group is firmly based in the
Gaza Strip, receives aid from Iran, and has sought to achieve its goals through both
terrorism and conventional political processes.86
1.5.2 NEW GROUPS

The initial phase of international terrorism also saw the rise of many new groups from
all over the world, comprising different motivations, tactics, behaviours, and beliefs.
However, as in the instance of HAMAS and the examples of the IRAs, the splintering
of groups is a significant feature of international terrorism, as we will see through the
development of Palestinian terrorist organisations. Although this was seen to a degree
in the NMO, the extent to which it occurred in the period of international terrorism
was unparalleled by previous periods.
1.5.2.1 PALESTINIAN GROUPS

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established in 1964 as a nationalist
group intent on the creation of an independent Palestine. Following the Arab-Israeli
war of 1967, the PLO began an international terrorist campaign in the early 1970s.87
This conflict sparked the rise of several splinter groups such as the PFLP in 1967 and
the Black September group in 1974, which subsequently perpetrated the attack on the
Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics.88
In addition to the attack in Munich, the Black September organisation was responsible
for almost 900 deaths or injuries throughout 20 countries. The groups major
offensives include attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985, which resulted in
20 deaths, the 1986 attack on the Neve Shalom synagogue in Turkey which killed 22,
and the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, which resulted in 22 civilian
deaths and over 150 injuries.89 According to Clive Williams, the group was also
responsible for the 1988 attack on the City of Poros cruise ship, which killed 20 and
wounded 98, and the assassination of a Jordanian diplomat to Lebanon in 1994.90
33
As outlined in the US Department of States Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003
report, the PFLP was founded in 1967 as a Marxist-Leninist umbrella group of the
PLO, carrying out numerous terrorist attacks against Israeli and moderate Arab targets
during the 1970s and 80s. In October 2001, the PFLP assassinated the Israeli Tourism
Minister in retaliation for the death of the PFLPs Secretary General at the hands of
rockets fired from an Israeli helicopter.91 The significance of the PFLP lies not only in
the group itself, but in the movements that splintered from it (and the PLO). In 1968
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC)
split from the PFLP, when members craved a greater concentration on terrorism, and
less on politics. The group carried out numerous attacks throughout Europe and the
Middle East, concentrating on cross-border attacks against Israel. The group is now
significantly involved in operations in Lebanon.92
The PFLP also spawned the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Special
Operations Group (PFLP-SOG). The PFLP-SOG was largely unsuccessful and did not
create much of an impact on an international scale; however, two groups splintered
from this organisation: the 15 May Organisation, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine Special Command (PFLP SC).93
The 15 May Organisation broke away from the PFLP - SOG in 1979, and based its
headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. The group claimed responsibility for the 1980
bombing of a hotel in Lebanon, the bombing of Israels El Al offices in Rome and
Istanbul in 1981, and the bombing of the Israeli embassies in Athens and Vienna in
the same year. In 1982, the group attempted to bomb a Pan Am aircraft in Brazil, and
detonated a bomb on another Pan Am flight from Japan to Hawaii.94 The PFLP-SC
formed in the same year and claimed credit for several bombings in Europe, including
an attack in 1985 on a restaurant in Torrejon,xxi Spain, where eighteen people were
killed.95
In the late 1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) split from the PFLP-GC.
This group was known for aerial attacks against Israel and the hijacking of the Italian
cruise ship, the Achille Lauro. On October 7, 1985, four PLF members took control of
xxi
There was a US Air Force base in Torrejon.
34
the ship off the coast of Egypt, demanding the release of fifty Palestinian prisoners
held in Israeli jails. The hijackers executed American Leon Klinghoffer to
demonstrate their resolve. After being refused permission to dock in Syria, the
hijackers negotiated their safe passage to Tunisia via an Egyptian passenger aircraft.
The aircraft was intercepted by US Navy fighters and forced to land in Italy, where
the hijackers were arrested.96 Palestinian groups continue to operate today, but are
confined to operations against Israel as part of the al-Aqsa Intifada.xxii The Palestinian
May 15 Organisations operations in Australia will be discussed later in an
examination of terrorism in Australia.
1.5.2.2 ARMENIAN GROUPS

In the late 1970s, the JCAG launched an international campaign against Turkey for
retribution for the genocide of the Armenian population in Turkey during the First
World War, and for an independent Armenian nation. As detailed by James Crown, in
1979, the son of the Turkish Ambassador to the Netherlands was murdered, followed
by the 1980 assassination of the Turkish Consul-General to Australia. Two years later
the group claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General
in Los Angeles.97
In conjunction with the JCAGs campaign, the ASALA which formed in 1975
bombed several US airline offices throughout Europe during the early 1980s. This
campaign included the bombing of the Ankara International Airport in Turkey, killing
11 people.98 ASALA continued airport bombings with the attack on a counter of a
Turkish airline in Paris in 1983, which left eight dead.99 During this period, the group
claimed responsibility for a minimum of 140 assassinations of Turkish diplomats and
officials.100 The JCAGs operation in Australia will be discussed below in the
examination of terrorism in Australia.
xxii
The al-Aqsa Intifada is the second wave of the Palestinian uprising against Israel which began in
September 2000.
35
1.5.2.3 COMMUNIST GROUPS
The reversion to left-wing terrorism at the end of the post World War One period of
terrorism provided the impetus for the left-wing groups that characterised the period
of international terrorism.xxiii In 1968 the Baader-Meinhof Group was founded by
Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. The goal of the group was, through the use of
terrorism, to destroy Western capitalism, and bring about the worldwide communist
revolution. The group cooperated with several other left-wing Middle Eastern terrorist
organisations.101 The general ideology of the group was a fusion of Marxism and
Maoism. From the groups inception and transformation to the Rote Armee Fraktion
(Red Army Faction, RAF), until the early 1990s, the RAF undertook bombings,
assassinations, kidnappings, and robberies. The group went about achieving its goals
through the attempted assassination of the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in Belgium in 1979, the bombing of NATO Air Force
headquarters in Ramstein in 1981, the rocket attack on the Air Force base in Rhein-
Main in 1985, the automatic machine gun assault on the US embassy in Bonn in 1991,
and later that year the assassination of the German Trust Agency Director.102 The
RAF dissolved in 1998 claiming in a media release: Almost 28 years ago, on May
14, 1970, the RAF arose in a campaign of liberation. Today we end this project. The
urban guerrilla in the shape of the RAF is now history.103 Jeremy Varon claims that
the RAF marked the emergence of a new type of terrorist, the white middle-class
youth, far from the stereotypical disenchanted Palestinian or Catholic dissident.104 The
effects of the group were extensive:
Theybecame a potent symbol of both the extremes to which New Left rebellion
had gone and the profound social and political divisions their societies experienced in
the 1960s and 1970s. As both a cause and a symptom of broad-based crises of
legitimacy, their violence constituted an important episode in the histor[y] of their
nationof the developed West as a whole, and of global conflict.105
The RAF maintained close ties with leftist groups throughout Europe, one such group
was the Italian Brigade Rosse (Red Brigades, RB),106 created in 1969 by Renato
Curico, with the goal of destroying the Italian government as well as capitalist
organisations. The group operated from a Marxist-Leninist ideological stance and a
military formation composed of columns and brigades, beginning their campaign
xxiii
Although the Palestinian groups were left-wing, their movement was significant in its own right.
36
with a string of fire bombings and kidnappings. The group was responsible for the
kidnapping and murder of one of Italys longest serving (former) Prime Ministers,
Aldo Moro in 1979.107 Following the murder of Moro, the RB toned down their
operations to ambushes and assassinations of capitalist business executives and
government employees.108 Throughout this period, new leftist groups emerged to join
the conflict such as Autonomia Operaia (Workers Autonomy), Prima Linea (Front
Line), Lotta Continua (Fight On), and Potere Operaio (Workers Power).109
In 1981, the RB kidnapped US General Dozier, who was among the highest ranking
US officers in Italy. Dozier was later rescued by Italian authorities.110 In 1984, the RB
split into the Red Brigades for the Construction of a Combatant Communist Party
(RB-CCCP) and the Red Brigades Union of Combatant Communists (RB-UCC).111
The US Department of States Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 maintains that
despite the demise of the Red Brigades following the mass arrests after the
kidnapping of Dozier and the split of the group, the RB-UCC and RB-CCCP have
continued to undertake sporadic small-scale attacks against targets such as Italian
police and political advisors.112 The arrests that took place following the assassination
of Leamon Hunt (the US Chief of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Group)
in 1984 crippled the group, however sporadic attacks have continued to take place.
The RB were described by Xavier Raufer as by far Europes principal armed
communist organisation.113
The Japanese Red Army (JRA)xxiv formed in the early 1970s, and was led by Fusako
Shigenobu until her arrest in 2000. According to the US Patterns of Global Terrorism
2000 report, the goal of the JRA was to depose the Japanese government and install a
communist alternative. As with the previous Marxist groups, the JRA were reliant on
finances and training from the PFLP and other Palestinian groups.114 The group was
responsible for the 1972 machine-gun and grenade-attack at Lod Airport in Israel,
killing 26; several hijackings throughout the 1970s; and the storming of the French
Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands, in which the ambassador and ten others were
taken hostage. This situation was resolved after the JRA negotiated the release of
member Yatuka Furuya, US$300 000, and the use of an aircraft. The 1972 attack in
xxiv
Also known as the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade.
37
Israel saw the first suicide bombings in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict conducted by
Japanese. Rather than be captured, the members of the operation killed themselves
with grenades.115
In August of 1975, the JRA took the US consul and the Swedish charge daffaires to
Malaysia, along with 50 other hostages after assaulting a building containing the two
embassies. In compliance with their demands, five members of the JRA were released
from prison. The JRA launched mortar attacks against Japanese, Canadian, US, and
British embassies in the mid 1980s, as well as bombing a US military recreational
club in Italy, which killed five. The JRA also launched a bombing campaign against
multinational corporations and in one such attack on Mitsubishi headquarters, eight
people were killed. Shortly after these attacks, the JRA was no longer active in Japan,
and was completely reliant on groups in the Middle East for support and finance.116
The group disbanded in 2001, endeavouring to pursue its goals through legitimate
political processes.117
1.5.2.4 HEZBOLLAH
Hezbollah (Party of God) is an Islamic Shiah group which was formed in 1982 as a
reaction to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel. The goals of Hezbollah are the
liberation of Palestine, the defeat of Israel, and the establishment of a Lebanese
Islamic State, governed by Shariah law.xxv As with many other Middle Eastern
groups, like the PLO, Hezbollah participates in the political processes of Lebanon.
The group was behind the 1983 bombing of the US Embassy and the US Marine
barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. These attacks killed 63 and 241 respectively. A second
attack simultaneous with the US Marine barracks bombing occurred on a French
paratrooper barracks, killing 58. Hezbollah has also been responsible for numerous
hijackings, kidnappings, and bombings against US and Israeli targets.118 The attacks
on the US Marine barracks and the French paratrooper barracks were conducted by
suicide bombers who drove the trucks, laden with Trinitrotoluene (TNT), as close as
possible to the targets, and then detonated their payload, killing themselves in the
process.119
xxv
Islamic law, under which all aspects of society are governed through the Koran and Islam.
38
The method of suicide bombing has become extremely prevalent among Palestinian
groups in the al-Aqsa Intifada that began in September 2000. The method is widely
thought to have been perfected by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a
domesticxxvi terrorist organisation struggling for independence within Sri Lanka since
1975.120 The popularity of this method increased further following its use within
Islamic extremism, as will be shown in the following pages.
1.5.2.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM

After the October 1988 riots in Algeria, the government set about creating
constitutional reforms. One of these was the separation of the FLN from the
government. The reforms also allowed for the right to form political parties. In 1989,
the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) was formed and ran in the
1990 municipal elections. Detailed by Peter St John, the FIS received 54 percent of
the popular vote, while the FLN received only 28 percent. Similar results occurred in
the 1991 national democratic elections, which was promptly followed by an iron fist
response by the military, who installed their own High Council of State, effectively
stealing the democratic FIS victory.121
In April 1992, the FIS detonated a bomb in the Algiers International Airport, killing
nine. Between 1993 and 1995, the Groupe Islamique Arme (Armed Islamic Group,
GIA), which was against democracy and democratic processes, but shared the aim of
an Islamic state in Algeria, amalgamated with the FIS. In their joint operations the
groups executed almost 50 journalists (both international and domestic) within
Algeria.122 In August 1993, the FIS kidnapped three French Consular officials, who
were later released, carrying the message Foreigners leave the country. We give you
one month. Between the deadline and December, 23 foreigners had been executed.123
These tactics were effectively used to keep foreigners out of Algeria. In 1994, on the
third anniversary of the election win that should have seen the FIS gain power, the
GIA hijacked an Air France commercial jet bound for Algiers. Three passengers were
executed before the aircraft was assaulted by the French Special Forces after landing
in Marseilles.124 According to the USs Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FISs
armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in 2000, and a large number of
xxvi
With the exception of attacks in India.
39
militants from other groups surrendered under a national reconciliation amnesty
program.125
1.5.2.6 AUM SHINRIKYO

Another group that developed in this period was the Japanese religious cult, Aum
Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth). Aum was established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, and was
approved as an official religious entity under Japanese law in 1989.xxvii The ultimate
goal of the group was to take over Japan, followed by the world. Known as a
Doomsday or Armageddon groupxxviii within modern terrorism studies literature,
Aum believed that the US planned to initiate World War III with Japan, an action
which would result in Armageddon.126
In 1992, under the subterfuge of one of the cults companies, Aum attempted to
secure a sample of the Ebola virus from a medical mission to Zaire. The operation
was eventually unsuccessful. Between 1993 and 1994, Aum attempted to extract
uranium from a purchased farm ranch in Western Australia. Throughout the early
1990s, the group was held responsible for various chemical attacks (including
anthrax) in Japan, resulting in hundreds of injuries.127
As detailed by Mark Juergensmeyer, at 7:45am, on March 20, 1995, five of Aums

scientists from the cults Ministry of Science and Technology boarded trains that were
set to converge on Kasumigaseki station underneath Japans principal government
buildings. Before the trains converged on their target, the five Aum members pierced
plastic bags of Sarin concealed in newspaper with the pointed end of their umbrellas.
The members quickly exited the trains before the fumes of the deadly nerve agent
filled the carriages. The nerve agents effects were severe, the Tokyo commuters
symptoms including convulsions, vomiting, oral bleeding, loss of bowel control, and
loss of consciousness, and the agents lethal effects focusing on the brain, lungs,
heart, stomach, and nerves. The attack killed 12 commuters and injured 5 500.128
xxvii
These laws were implemented into Japanese law at the urging of the US after World War II to
prevent the persecution of such religious organisations, as was the practice before 1945.
xxviii
A group that believes in an impending Armageddon and usually sets about bringing about such an
event through violent means.
40
Following the arrests in relation to the Tokyo attacks, the group changed its name (to
Aleph) and publicly abandoned its terrorist ambitions following the Tokyo subway
attacks and the consequent arrests and response from the Japanese Government. This
group and its activities in Australia will be expanded on below.
1.5.2.7 AL-QAEDA
In 1979, the Soviet Army, under the orders of General Secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party, Leonid Illyich Brezhnev, invaded Afghanistan to consolidate
communist control over the politically volatile capital of Kabul, and to reinforce the
ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The anti-communist groups that
were challenging the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and
causing the initial instability, became the principal resistance against the Soviet
invasion. Neamatollah Nojumi writes that these groups comprised political-militant
organisations such as the Hezb-e-Islami (The Islamic Party), Jamaiat-e-Islami of
Afghanistan (The Islamic Society of Afghanistan), Afghan Melat (Social Democratic
Party of Afghanistan), and Ikhwanis (The Brethren).129 The members of this
resistance became known as the Mujahideen (Strugglers),xxix who partook in the jihad
(struggle)xxx against the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan. Jihad (more specifically)
translates to Struggle in the defence of Islam,130 and the resistance to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was seen as such by the ummah (Islamic Community).131
Until 1984, the mujahideen consisted of Afghans from the countrys various
provinces, with only several hundred Arabs assisting in the jihad against the Soviets.
Between 1984 and 1986, the numbers of Arab mujahideen increased significantly,132
this also saw members from Southeast Asian Islamic movements such as Darul Islam
(House of Islam) participate in the jihad from 1985.133 The International Crisis Group
asserts that the international mujahideen recruits were instructed on explosives, land
mines, weapons, topography, and infantry and urban warfare tactics in training camps
established around Afghanistan.134
According to Rohan Gunaratna, in 1984, Islamic scholar Abdullah Azzam and his
student Osama bin Laden established the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-
Arab (Afghan Services Bureau, MAK). MAK served as an office for the jihad against
xxix
It is often translated as Holy Warrior, however, this meaning is not always explicit.
xxx
Implies a holy struggle, contemporarily the meaning implies a violent struggle.
41
the Soviets; housing, training, and financing Muslims to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan. The MAK offices were established throughout 35 countries (including
30 offices in the US) and distributed propaganda acting as recruiting centres for the
jihad.135 Azzam issued a clear fatwa xxxi for jihad in Afghanistan entitled Defence of
the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman that declared that the killing of
kuffar (unbelievers) was an obligation of all Muslims.136 The Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade notes that around 25 000 Muslims from all over the
world rallied to Afghanistan to join the local resistance against the Soviets.137
In addition to the international recruits flocking to assist in the jihad in Afghanistan,

the mujahideen were supported by the Pakistani Intelligence, the Inter-Services
Agency (ISI), which funnelled the mujahideen funds that were provided by the US
and Saudi Arabian governments. US military aid escalated in the same manner as
international recruits; in 1980 the US Government provided US$30 million and in
1985 provided US$250 million in assistance.138 In addition to these funds, again
distributed through the ISI, the American Government began distributing Surface-to-
Air Stinger Missiles to the mujahideen in Afghanistan.139
The Islamic resistance to the invasion was fought over treacherous terrain against one
of the worlds two superpowers, and after 22 000 casualties and 75 000 injured, the
Soviet Army pulled out of Afghanistan into neighbouring Uzbekistan in early 1989.
The mujahideen had defeated one of the worlds two superpowers; however the
Soviet invasion was brutal: the Soviets killed over a million people, and displaced
over five million.140
Azzam wrote in his book Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Mans Most
Important Duty:
The duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan, jihad will remain an individual
obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will
reign again: before us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the
Philippines, Burma, southern Yemen, Tashkent, and Andalusia.141
This statement signalled the concept of the global jihad. These goals would
culminate in the reestablishment of the rule of the Islamic caliphs.
xxxi
Essentially a religious decree.
42
The jihad in Afghanistan saw the formation of many new terrorist organisations such
as Harakat Ul-Mujahideen (Movement of the Holy Warriors)xxxii and Lashkar-e-
Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET).142 The most significant movement to
emerge from the Soviet jihad was al-Qaeda, which was to be transformed from MAK.
During the Soviet withdrawal, Azzam and bin Laden were in the process of changing
MAK into an Islamic strike force, although the pair disagreed significantly on the role
of this new organisation. Bin Laden continued to train mujahideen in camps around
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. After Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb
in 1989,xxxiii bin Laden effectively merged MAK into al-Qaeda. Borrowing from the
ideology of Azzam, bin Laden set the specific goals of the removal of US military
forces from Saudi Arabia and the establishment of Sunni Islamic governments
throughout the Middle East governed by Shariah law (re-establishing the rule of the
caliphs). These goals advanced al-Qaedas fundamental ideology which is based on a
fusion of the religious and political dimensions of Salifism and Wahhabism, from
within the Sunni sect of Islam, creating al-Qaedas distinct political ideology.143
In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda focused on training and funding jihads in Chechnya,
Kashmir, Indonesia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt.144 In 1993 al-
Qaeda had involvement in the first World Trade Centre bombing, which killed six and
injured over 1 000. The group also planned the elaborate but failed 1994 Oplan
Bojinka (Operation Explosion), which involved the assassination of Pope John Paul
II, and US President Clinton, as well as the destruction of 11 US airliners and the CIA
in Langley.145
On June 25, 1996, a bomb consisting of approximately 4 000 pounds of explosives

attached to a fuel truck driven by an Islamic extremist exploded outside the Khobar
Towers military complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, which housed US Air Force
personnel. Nineteen US servicemen were killed and 372 were injured.146 The inquiry
into al-Qaedas most devastating operation, The 9/11 Commission Report, which was
to come five years later, noted that al-Qaeda is likely to have assisted the Saudi
Hezbollah guerrillas in the attacks.147 The Khobar Towers operation saw the adoption
xxxii
Now known as Jamiat Ul-Ansar.
xxxiii
No responsibility was claimed for the assassination, however Gunaratna (2002) maintains that bin
Laden condoned the attack.
43
of suicide bombing within this strand of international terrorism. Jason Burke asserts
that while suicide operations were not an innovation of Islamic extremism, and were
first employed by the JRA (which in turn took the concept to Hezbollah), the
combination of suicide operations with the notion of martyrdom created a
significantly effective modus operandi. In Islam, one who dies in a legitimate jihad is
called a shahid (witness/martyr)148 and is honoured with a place in Jannah (paradise)
with 72 Houri (fair women of paradise). In the second chapter of the al-Qaeda
manual, Necessary Qualifications and Characteristics for the Organisations
Member, qualification four reads: Sacrifice: He [the member] has to be willing to do
the work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and
establishing the religion of majestic Allah on earth.149
In August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa entitled Declaration of War against
the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. This fatwa essentially
listed the crimes of the US and Israel, calling for all Muslims to fight against these
occupying forces and drive them out of the Middle-East. The fatwa praised the
attack on the Khobar Towers complex.150 When addressing his Muslim Brothers, bin
Laden states:
Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon
your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy --your enemy and
their enemy-- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you
can, with ones own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated,
out of the sanctities of Islam.151
This fatwa was followed by another in February of 1998. The Jihad against Jews and
Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement claimed:
For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the
holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers,
humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the
Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim
peoples.152
In response, the fatwa instructs that to kill Americans and their allies civilians and
military is an individual duty for every Muslim...this is in accordance with the
words of Almighty Allah. 153
44
Six months after the release of this fatwa, the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked by al-Qaeda suicide bombers. On August 7
1998, at approximately 10:30am, a Nissan truck carrying a several hundred pound
explosive device comprising TNT and aluminium nitrate exploded outside the US
embassy in Nairobi killing 213 and injuring over 4 000. Nine minutes later, a truck
packed with between 400 and 500 packets of TNT combined with oxygen-acetylene
cylinders, exploded outside the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, killing 11.154
On October 12 2000, a zodiac,xxxiv driven by an al-Qaeda member, filled with over

500 pounds of explosives rammed the destroyer United States Ship (USS) Cole in the
port of Aden, in Yemen. The resulting explosion killed 17 US servicemen and injured
39. The explosion created a hole 60 by 40 feet in the hull, causing US$250 million in
damage to the destroyer.155
The emergence and development of al-Qaeda on the world scene of international

terrorism during the late 20th Century was considerable in pace. In the decade
between the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the bombing of the USS
Cole, al-Qaeda was involved in numerous operations against US civilian and military
targets. Al-Qaedas development in this period is shadowed by the events of 2001,
which set in motion events that would see the end of the international terrorism
period, and greet the period of 21st Century Islamic extremism, led by its foundation
al-Qaeda.
1.6. 21st CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

On September 11, 2001, 19 members of al-Qaeda hijacked 4 commercial airliners.
The first, American Airlines Flight 11, crashed into the north tower of the New York
World Trade Centre at 8:45am. The second aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175,
crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Centre at approximately 9:05am.
American Airlines Flight 77, the third hijacked aircraft, smashed into Americas
military headquarters, the Pentagon, at 9:39am. At 9:59am, the south tower of the
World Trade Centre collapsed. Eleven minutes later, the final hijacked aircraft,
United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a deserted area of Stoney Creek, Pennsylvania,
xxxiv
A type of small boat.
45
after passengers attempted to take over the plane en route to Washington DC. At
10:28am, the north tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed. Each of the hijacked
aircraft was carrying approximately 60 000 pounds of jet fuel, and travelling at
around 300 miles per hour. Almost 3 000 people died in these attacks,156 which
mobilised the Salafist movement into action not only in the Middle East, but all over
the world.
1.6.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs white paper on
transnational terrorism, Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) formed within the
Darul Islam separatist movement that emerged in Indonesia during the 1950s. The
goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state and the movement
was responsible for several uprisings during the 1950s and 60s in Indonesia. While
Darul Islam was suppressed and forced to operate underground during the mid 1960s,
several armed militant organisations formed from the group in the mid-to-late 1980s.
One of these groups was JI.
The goal of JI is the creation of a pan-Islamic state that includes most of Southeast
Asia, which (like al-Qaedas vision) restores the rule of the caliphs.157 JI established
radical Islamic boarding schools and expanded their influence into Malaysia and
throughout South East Asia. The groups leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar
Bashir, began sending recruits to mujahideen training camps in Afghanistan and
Pakistan in the late 1980s. It is during this period that the links were formed between
JI and al-Qaeda. During the late 1990s, JI began establishing similar camps in the
Philippines,158 in which al-Qaeda recruits would train with members of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
The links forged during the Afghanistan conflict provided ideological backing,
military training, funding, and expertise for JI and other South East Asian groups such
as the MILF.159 The links between al-Qaeda and JI were most strongly demonstrated
in the relationship between JIs number two, Hambali, and al-Qaedas military chief
(and planner of the 2001 attacks), Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.160 These links have
been essential to the success of operations in South East Asia by JI.
46
As detailed in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trades East Timor in
Transition, 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge states, on August 30, 1999,
the people of East Timor successfully voted for their countrys independence in a
United Nations (UN) sponsored and supervised ballot. Following the ballot, pro-
integration militia backed by members of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian
National Armed Forces) began a campaign of widespread violence against civilians,
journalists, and UN officials. Following the lack of response by the Indonesian
government, the UN passed UN Security Council Resolution 1264 allowing an
Australian-led International Force [in] East Timor (INTERFET) to restore order in
the country.161 The INTERFET arrived in Dili on the morning of 20 September 1999,
led by nine Australian warships. The two Australian infantry battalions (including
Australias elite Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) forces) deployed to East
Timor secured the sea and air ports around the capital and INTERFET quickly
consolidated control of the newly independent country.162 According to Sally
Neighbour, the Australian-led operation was seen by JI leaders Sungkar and Bashir as
a direct assault on Islam, equal to that of the US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia.
This turn of events solidified Australia as an enemy of Islam in the eyes of JI.163 xxxv
On Christmas Eve of 2000, eleven teams of JI operatives planted 38 devices in

churches and in the homes of priests throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The
devices detonated between 8:30pm and 10:30pm killing 19 people and injuring
120,164 signifying the beginning of the rise and rise of JI as a force of Islamic
extremism within Southeast Asia.
JI was responsible for the bombing of night clubs in Bali on October 12, 2002, which
left over 200 people dead, including 88 Australians. The group is also responsible for
the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta on August 5, 2003, which killed 17 and injured
100,165 and the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, on September 9, 2004,
which killed ten and injured over a hundred.166 The most recent attack targeted the
tourist destination of Bali for the second time on October 1, 2005, killing 23 and
injuring 129.167 The JI cell that conducted the 2002 Bali bombings will be the subject
of a social network analysis in this project.
xxxv
Bin laden and his deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri have also cited Australias involvement in East
Timor as a source for conflict.
47
1.6.2 CHECHEN REBELS
Separatist Islamic Chechen rebels have undertaken numerous attacks against Russia,
such as the December 2003 train bombing which killed 42,168 the February 2004
subway bombing which killed 39 and injured more than 130,169 and the taking of over
700 hostages in a Moscow theatre in October 2002, which resulted in the deaths of
129 hostages and 41 of the terrorists. Chechen rebels have been supported and trained
by al-Qaeda.170
On September 1, 2004, approximately 30 armed Chechen Islamic extremists took

over School Number One in the town of Beslan, North Ossetetia, Russia. The
terrorists covered the gymnasium, in which they held a majority of the hostages, with
explosive devices. Following unsuccessful negotiations between the Russian forces
and the rebels, an agreement was reached that allowed medical workers to enter the
gymnasium to retrieve the bodies of the hostages already killed. During this retrieval,
an explosive was detonated (the cause of which remains a matter of debate), and both
the terrorists and the Russian forces opened fire. The school children who attempted
to flee were caught in the middle. The ensuing fire fight and collapse of the
gymnasium resulted in the deaths of 344 civilians.171
1.6.3 THE AL-QAEDA MOVEMENT

Since the rise to significance of al-Qaeda through the attacks in 2001, scores of
Islamic extremist groups, which were previously unknown or considered minor
groups, such as JI, have risen to join the al-Qaeda-led campaign against Western
nations. In April of 2002, in Tunisia, an al-Qaeda bomber detonated a truck carrying
natural gas outside a historic Jewish synagogue, which killed 21 people.172 On May
12, 2003, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, four expatriate housing complexes were attacked
by suicide bombers in explosive-filled vehicles. 25 bystanders were killed in the
attacks, which were later attributed to al-Qaeda.173 Later that month, twelve al-Qaeda-
linked suicide bombers attacked Spanish and Jewish sites in Casablanca, Morocco,
killing 33 people.174 In November, two Jewish synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey were
bombed, killing 23 people. Just days later, the British Consulate, and the British
owned HSBC bank were attacked by suicide bombers, killing a further 27 people.
Joint responsibility was claimed between al-Qaeda and the Great Eastern Islamic
Raiders Front.175
48
1.6.4 THE WAR IN IRAQ CONSEQUENCES
On March 20, 2003, a coalition led by the US, but consisting of forces from the UK,
Poland, and Australia, invaded Iraq. The invasion was justified as anticipatory self-
defence in light of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that the coalition
claimed Iraq possessed.176 A secondary justification for the invasion was based on
tentative links between the Saddam Hussein-led Iraqi Government and al-Qaeda. On
May 1, following a successful initial campaign, US President George Bush announced
the conclusion of major combat operations.177 In the months following this
announcement, it appeared clear that the insurgency in Iraq, led by foreign terrorists,
threatened to plunge the newly liberated Iraq into a guerrilla form of civil war.
The terrorist campaign in occupied Iraq directed against US soldiers, security forces
and civilian contractors, has claimed thousands of lives. On August 19, 2003, a truck
laden with explosives detonated outside the Canal Hotel where the UN had based
their headquarters in Iraq. 22 people died, including the highest ranking UN envoy in
the country, Brazilian Vieira de Mello. Over 150 people were injured.178 Similar
attacks against institutions committed to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, civilians,
and US forces within Iraq have been claimed by and attributed to groups such as the
Holders of the Black Banner,179 the 1920 Revolution Brigade,180 the Army of Ansar
al-Sunna,181 the al-Qaeda Organisation for Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers,182 the al-
Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula,183 and the European Branch of Al-
Qaeda (also known as Al-Tawhid).184
Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a veteran of the Soviet jihad, was the leader of the
Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War Movement, JTJ) that
formed in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. JTJ renamed itself Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004
and later that year al-Zarqawi swore his allegiance to Osama bin Laden.185 Al-
Zarqawi and his group led the Sunni mujahideen in Iraq, coordinating many of the
above attacks and groups,xxxvi and developing a folk hero status similar to that of bin
Laden in Afghanistan. In addition to the resistance in Iraq, al-Zarqawi had been
xxxvi
A distinction must be made between the different groups that constitute the insurgency, that is, that
there are political anti-occupation groups, jihadi groups, and groups that espouse a mixture of both
ideologies. The major difference between these groups is the targets of attacks; the jihadis are
responsible for a significant majority of attacks against civilians, while the liberation groups
concentrate attacks solely against US and occupation forces.
49
coordinating preparations for large scale attacks in Europe, signifying the emergence
of a new amir (commander)xxxvii-like leader within the global jihadist movement.186
Al-Zarqawi was killed by a US air-strike on June 7, 2006.187 Despite the loss of the
movements leader, al-Qaeda in Iraq and what has become known as Zarqawism,
the indiscriminate and specifically savage terrorism that aims to divide any Sunni and
Shiite unity within Iraq, threatens to continue.188
A fatwa concerning Iraq was released on November 5, 2004, by the Saudi Sheikhs
Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah, and Ali bin Awad al-Qarni entitled An Open
Address to the Struggling Iraqi People, declaring jihad in Iraq is the responsibility of
every able person.189 The resistance in Iraq increasingly resembles the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan: Saudis are joining the mujahideen,190 new terrorist groups are
emerging, training camps are being established, mujahideen are flocking to fight, and
Islamic extremist groups from all over the Middle East are participating together in
the jihad in Iraq. Any withdrawal of US forces will surely be heralded by Islamic
groups as a victory over the worlds sole superpower. The resistance has not been
confined to Iraq, and the latest attacks on Western nations have been justified through
their involvement in the invasion of Iraq in addition to existing complaints of Western
imperialism.
On March 11, 2004, ten explosive devices were detonated on four trains during peak
hour in Madrid, Spain. The explosions killed 190 people, and injured over 1 400.191
An Islamic brigade claiming to be an arm of al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the
attacks in a video taped message from al-Qaedas military chief in Europe, in which
he said: We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly 2.5 years
after the attacks on New York and WashingtonMore blood will flow if the
injustices [in Iraq] do not stop.192
Islamic extremists carried through with al-Qaedas threat on July 7, 2005, when
suicide bombers detonated explosive devices carried in backpacks on three London
Underground trains within 50 seconds of each other at 8.50am and one on a double-
decker bus at 9.47am. The bombings killed 56 people and injured over 700. Within
xxxvii
An Islamic term for an individual of high importance, title, or nobility.
50
hours a statement was released by The Secret Organisation Group of al-Qaeda in
Europe. This statement declared:
Nations of Islam and Arab nations: Rejoice, for it is time to take revenge against
the British Zionist crusader government in retaliation for the massacres Britain is
committing in Iraq and Afghanistan. The heroic Mujahideen [holy warriors] have
carried out a blessed raid [ghazwxxxviii] in London. Britain is now burning with
fear, terror and panic in its northern, southern, eastern, and western quarters.
We have repeatedly warned the British government and people. We have fulfilled
our promise and carried out our blessed military raid in Britain after our
Mujahideen exerted strenuous efforts over a long period of time to ensure the
success of the raid.
We continue to warn the governments of Denmark and Italy and all the crusader
governments that they will be punished in the same way if they do not withdraw
their troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. He who warns is excused. 193 xxxix
It is clear that al-Qaeda is no longer simply a terrorist group; it is a movement, an

ideology, and as its name implies, a foundation for 21st Century Islamic extremism.
Thus far, this chapter has examined the origins, phases, and development of the
phenomenon of terrorism and the motivations and modus operandi of these groups all
over the world, establishing 21st Century Islamic extremism as the major form of
terrorism at present. While traditional groups within the period of international
terrorism such as the RIRA and PIRA have continued their campaigns, they are vastly
overshadowed by the enormity and frequency of events and groups of Islamic
extremism. The next section of the chapter will examine how the phenomenon of
terrorism has developed in Australia.
2. TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA
The previous section of the chapter has shown the evolution of terrorism from a form
of political violence to a defined and succinct tactic in its own right. This section of
the chapter aims to construct a history of terrorism in Australia, in the context of the
development of the phenomenon world-wide. This procedure is necessary to set the
context for any examination or analysis of terrorism in Australia (the central concept
of this thesis). Australia experienced only two small scale sporadic instances of
xxxviii
An attack for the purposes of conquest.
xxxix
The last sentence is a rebuttal to Muslims who condemn Islamic terrorism, indicating that through
the Koran, if a warning is given, the resulting violence is excused.
51
terrorism before the advent of international terrorism in the 1960s. Through the
advancements of technology and the influence of globalisation, conflicts originating
in other areas of the world were brought to Australia, a country whose borders were
previously significantly isolated from the phenomenon of terrorism. The period
between the 1960s and the 1980s was the height of Australias experience with
terrorism. In this period, groups such as the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo
(Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), the Palestinian May 15 Organisation,
the JCAG, and Ananda Marga (Path of Bliss) operated within Australias borders.
The affluence of international terrorism during this period gave impetus to a number
of domestic terrorist organisations that operated against various arms of the Australian
Government and major corporations in Australia. The rise of 21st Century Islamic
extremism appears to be creating another period of heightened terrorist activity within
Australia.
2.1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Australia has a significant history of political violence, albeit a rather low-scale and
sporadic one. In the early 1790s, military staff stationed on Norfolk Island rioted
against the authority of the Governor of the island.194 In 1804, 300 Irish convicts
armed themselves and marched on Sydney. This revolutionary attempt was quickly
quelled by colonial forces. In 1808, the Governor of New South Wales (NSW),
William Bligh, was overthrown by a group of dissident military officers over attempts
to control the sale and purchase of rum. In 1921 a minor state legislative candidate
was assassinated in South Australia.195 The Eureka Stockade of 1854 resulted in the
deaths of 30 miners and five troopers. The early 20th Century saw significant violence
from trade unions and workers parties, including attempted derailments of trains and
bombings.196 While some of these events may resemble the cases of terrorism from
below discussed in the previous section, and may also fit the definition of terrorism
adopted for this project, these cases have historically been considered acts of political
violence and industrial action, not commonly regarded as terrorism. Traditional acts
of political violence through protest and industrial action will not be included in this
history of terrorism as the focus on the significant instances of terrorism from below
is significantly more beneficial to examining a history of terrorism in Australia.
52
2.2 EARLY TERRORISM
The first instance of terrorism in Australia was in 1868, when Prince Alfred, the Duke
of Edinburgh, was picnicking at Clontarf Beach in Sydney and was shot in the back
by Irishman James OFarrell. OFarrell was an Irish nationalist with alleged links to
the Fenian Brotherhood (the Irish Republican Brotherhood).197 xl
The Fenian
Brotherhood embarked on a struggle to bring about an Irish republic in the mid 1800s,
and normally operated in cells of ten men adopting the guerrilla warfare style modus
operandi used in the American Civil War, through the returning Irish-Americans
involved in the conflict.198
The next significant terrorist incident occurred in 1915 when two Afghans partaking
in jihad, Mullah Abdullah and Muhammad Gul, opened fire on a picnic train outside
Broken Hill, killing four Australians. The organisation responsible, headed by the
Sultan of Ottoman Turkey, claimed the attack and the jihad was in retaliation to
Australias military operations against Islam. The two extremists were killed in their
exploit.199 This was the last significant terrorist event in Australia until the 1960s.
2.3 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The lack of terrorism in Australia before the 1960s and the comparative abundance of
terrorism in Australia after the 1960s gives authority to the concept and influence of
international terrorism, as conflicts originating within nations outside Australias
borders had transgressed to terrorist campaigns and operations within Australia
between the mid 1960s and the mid 1980s. This period experienced scores of small to
medium scale terrorist incidents and activities. The most prolific of the groups that
operated in Australia during this period would have to be the various Ustashi
movements.xli
2.3.1 USTASHI GROUPS

As discussed in the Right-Wing and Post World War I period of terrorism, following
the fall of the fascist Ustashi government in the Independent State of Croatia in 1945,
the victorious forces led by Tito installed the SFRY. Members of the hierarchy of the
xl
There is debate among Australian historians as to whether OFarrell had Fenian links or was simply a
mentally unstable alcoholic motivated by his Irish heritage.
xli
The Ustasha is used as a general term encompassing all fascist groups involved with the Croatian
liberation movement.
53
former fascist government, pursued by the socialists for their brutal war crimes
against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, escaped and migrated to Spain, Canada, and
Australia. Aided by a strong Croatian Diaspora in Australia, the former Ustashi
members established the Australian section of the Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret
(Croatian Liberation Movement, HOP) following its establishment by Pavelic in 1956
while exiled in Argentina. As reported by the Commonwealth Police, the most violent
of the Croatian independence groups was the HRB, which was established on June 9,
1961,200 by Jure Maric, Ilija Tolic, Josip Oblak, Geza Pasti, and Drazden Tapsanji
following their dissatisfaction with the HOPs lack of militancy and revolutionary
action.201 xlii The Australian branch of the Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National
Resistance, HNO) was based in Melbourne and was linked to the HNO headquarters
in Spain, as well as to other arms of the Ustashi movement around the world. The
Australian branch was led by Srecko Blaz Rover.202 Rover was heavily involved in
the Ustashi movement; in 1967 Rover constructed a bomb disguised as an expensive-
looking pen, which seriously injured a young Yugoslav at a Yugoslav National Day
Ball.203
The Australian branch of Ujedinjen Hrvati Njemacki (UHNj, United Croats of West
Germany) was formed around June 1971 in Sydney, and led by Jakov Suljack. In
October of 1972, Suljack was arrested and charged with another count of assault and
possession of an unlicensed pistol.204 Suljacks commitment to the liberation of
Croatia was clear: in the 1971 November December edition of the Croatian Call,
he stated: It is our duty to support the Croatian liberation strugglefor without a
bloody shirt there will be no independent state of Croatia.205 The meetings for the
Australian branch of the UHNj were held at the Irish National Associations Ulster
room in Sydney.206
From the early 1960s, the Ustashi groups began conducting military training in
Australia, many run by the HOP, and attended by members of the other organisations.
Perhaps the most significant of these camps was run by the HOP in 1963 near
Wodonga in Victoria.207 In close proximity to this camp, the Australian Citizen
Military Forces (CMF) were undertaking manoeuvres using their standard armament
xlii
A much more detailed account of the development of the HOP and HRB in Australia will be given
in Chapter V.
54
in addition to armoured vehicles. The CMF were approached by HOP members who
were in turn given a demonstration of the equipment and weapons. Photos of HOP
members holding CMF weapons and sitting on armoured vehicles were subsequently
published in the HOP magazine, Spremnost.208 This camp was attended by members
of the HRB.209 In early July 1963, two HRB members who were at the Wodonga
camp, along with seven other Australian residents, illegally entered the SFRY through
Italy for the purpose of waging a terrorist campaign against the Yugoslav government.
The nine individuals were caught and sentenced to severe prison terms by the SFRY
Government ranging from six to fourteen years.210 The incursion cell of this
operation, known as Action Kangaroo, will be the focus of a social network analysis
in this project (to be discussed in further detail in Chapters IV and V).
From their formation, these groups also engaged in a violent campaign against
Yugoslav officials, interests, and individuals within Australia. Various small scale
incidents of political violence appeared in the early to mid 1960s against Yugoslav
institutions such as the premises of the Consulate-General and the Yugoslav Settlers
Association. By 1966, the violence had escalated to death threats, stabbings, and
attempted murders. In the mid to late 1960s, the Ustashi activities in Australia had
advanced into the realm of terrorism. On September 17, 1966, a parcel bomb
exploded prematurely in a parcel chute in the General Post Office (GPO) in
Melbourne. The parcel was addressed to Marijan Jurjevic, a Yugoslav that had set out
to publicise the Ustashi groups activities since the early 1960s.211 Between January
1967 and November 1971, seven separate bombings were carried out against the:
i. Yugoslav Consulate-General in Double Bay;
ii. Yugoslav National Day ball;
iii. Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney;
iv. Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra;
v. Yugoslav Consulate-General in Melbourne,
vi. a Serbian Orthodox Church; and
vii. a Yugoslav travel agency in Sydney.212
These operations, in addition to the 1963 incursion into Yugoslavia, posed serious
questions as to the level of the Australian Federal Governments response to anti-
Communist terrorism. The inability of authorities to act also exposed organisational
55
and collaborative weaknesses between state and federal authorities. The change in
government in 1972 levelled severe measures against the Croatian groups. 213
The HOP military training continued into the 1970s, when the Ustashi groups had to
constantly increase and revise their security measures.214 By this stage, the HOP had
established the Saveza Hrvatske Ujedinjene Mladezi Svijeta (Croatian United Youth
of the World, SHUMS) and the Hrvatska Maldez (Croatian Youth) movements, and
were training with automatic weapons and high-powered explosives in remote areas
of Victoria and South Australia.215 SHUMS was led by Srecko Blaz Rover, who had
earlier also led the HOP (in 1963) and HNO.216 The Secretary of SHUMS was
Zdenko Marincic, who arrived in Australia in early 1970. In 1972, Marincic he flew
to Frankfurt, West Germany, without any form of permit or visa, and was
subsequently refused entry. Marincic returned to Australia and was arrested after
concealing a rifle in his luggage, as well as four silencers concealed in a toy koala.217
On April 6, 1972, simultaneous bombings were executed against the Australia and
New Zealand Banks Migrant Advisory Centre in Melbourne, and the residence of
pro-Yugoslavian figure, Jurjevic.218 As stated in a report by the Attorney-Generals
Department, on September 16, two explosive devices were detonated, the first at the
Adria Travel Agency, in George Street, Sydney. The second device, also on George
Street, was detonated inside the General Trade and Tourist Agency. Sixteen people
were injured in the second explosion, two of whom were injured critically.219 A third
explosive device was removed from the Adria Travel Agency.220
In 1972, the HRB become known as the Hrvatska Ilegalan Revolucionarna

Organizacija (Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation, HIRO). In June 1972, six
Australian citizens and three others who had previously lived in Australia entered
Yugoslavia through Austria as part of a larger group of Croatian terrorists, in the
HRBs second Australian-launched incursion into Communist Yugoslavia.221 All but
one of the Australian insurgents were either killed or tried and executed by SFRY
security forces.222
56
In 1974, an inquiry was established by the Whitlam Government under Justice Hope,
leading to a much sharper focus on accountability within Australias security
agencies. This in turn led to a much harsher response from agencies such as ASIO,
and the decline of groups such as the HIRO.223 The Croatian independence
movements discussed above show that the activities undertaken by the more violent
groups such as the HRB, the HIRO, and the UHNj, resulted in these movements
constituting the longest and most sustained terrorist campaign in Australias history.
2.3.2 PALESTINIAN TERRORISM

According to Simon Reeve, the Munich operation undertaken by the Palestinian group
Black September in 1972 thrust the Palestinian cause into the world spotlight, set the
tone for decades of conflict in the Middle East, and launched a new era of
international terrorism.224 Australia became part of this new era of terrorism on
September 23, 1972, when two envelopes containing explosives concealed within
cardboard containers were discovered at the Sydney GPO. These envelopes were
addressed to personnel at the Israeli Consulate in Woollahra, NSW. Two days later,
three similar envelopes were discovered at the GPO in Canberra, addressed to
personnel at the Israeli Embassy.225 Sir Alan Hulme, the Postmaster-General, stated
that the letter bombs were posted from Amsterdam on September 18, and were
disposed of by the NSW Police and the Department of Army Disposal Squad.226 The
bombs were attributed to Arab groups by Attorney-General Ivor Greenwood in a 1972
cabinet submission released the same month entitled Terrorism in Australia.227
Palestinian terrorism was revived in Australia in 1982 through the Palestinian May 15
Organisation, and through Australia-based Palestinian groups.
In 1982 a new group emerged in Australia: the Palestinian May 15 Organisation. Two
members of the organisation flew into the country and using established networks,
bombed the Israeli Consulate in Sydney and the Jewish Hakoah club at Bondi, both
on December 23. No one was killed in the incidents.228 Palestinian terrorism extended
into Australia again in 1996, when Mohammad Hassanein, who had ties to extremist
groups in Egypt, travelled to Australia on a false passport, was arrested and deported.
His arrival coincided with a major Jewish Congress and it was suspected that he
would have led or assisted in attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets with established
cells in the country.229
57
2.3.3 THE HILTON BOMBING
The second most fatal terrorist attack in Australian history took place in the early
hours of February 13, 1978. As detailed by Jenny Hocking, at approximately 1:40am
a bomb that was planted in a rubbish bin outside the Sydney Hilton exploded inside a
garbage truck immediately after the bin had been collected. The leaders and delegates
from the nations of the Commonwealth were staying in the Hilton for the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). The resulting explosion
(which intensified inside the garbage truck) killed the two garbage-collectors and a
police officer guarding the entrance to the Hilton.230
The CHOGM representatives were to have met in Bowral for a luxury retreat the
following day. Nearly two thousand troops from the Royal Australian Army (RAA)
were deployed in Bowral in addition to Kiowa helicopters which patrolled the skies
over the small town.231 Following the Siege at Bowral, as it became known,
authorities made the wrongful arrest of Tim Anderson, Ross Dunn, and Paul Alister,
who were all members of the religious organisation Ananda Marga. Ananda Marga
was created in 1955 by Prabhat Rainjain Sarkar in India, as a spiritual social
movement, which expanded rapidly, reaching two million members by 1975. In 1971,
Sarkar was arrested, and Ananda Marga was outlawed four years later. Sarkar was
sentenced to life in prison in 1976 for conspiracy, abetment, and murder. Sarkars
followers claimed that the charges were fabricated.232 The leader was eventually
released in 1978 following a change of government the previous year. From 1977 to
1979, Ananda Marga undertook terrorist attacks against diplomatic targets and
airlines and airports around the world.233 While there are conspiracy theories
regarding the motivation and responsibility for Australias second most fatal terrorist
attack, the responsible party remains a mystery.
2.3.4 THE JCAG

The development of Armenian terrorism has been discussed previously, but in 1980,
the JCAG brought their campaign of anti-Ottoman/Turkish terrorism to Australia.
Authorities believe that the group used a similar method of operations to that of the
Palestinian May 15 Organisation, when two members of the group from overseas flew
into the country and prepared for the operation with local support. On December 17,
two Armenians assassinated the Turkish Consul, Sarik Arijak and his bodyguard,
58
Engin Sever, at Dover Heights in Sydney. The terrorists used an automatic pistol fired
from a motorbike. According to Clive Williams, the two assassins are suspected to
have left the country following the completion of the operation and have never been
located.234
In 1986, two members of the JCAG residing in Sydney attempted to detonate a car
bomb in the basement car park of the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne. One of the
bombers, Hagop Levonian, was killed in the attack when the bomb detonated
prematurely. The other member, Levon Demirian, was arrested through information
from the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and served ten
years in prison.235 The JCAGs operations in Australia ceased around the same time
that the group ceased its international terrorism operations.
2.3.5 AUM SHINRIKYO

Aum Shinrikyo (discussed previously) was a Japanese religious cult formed by
Chizuo Matsumoto in 1986.236 The groups religious doctrine espoused a combination
of Tibetan Buddhism, Hinduism, and yoga.237 Documented in an investigation by the
United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
the group believed in a range of apocalyptic scenarios, the most popular of which was
that in 1997 a war would break out between the US and Japan, leading to a world war
and consequent Armageddon. The group planned for the war and set about its
instigation by undertaking military training and manufacturing conventional,
chemical, and biological weapons.238
This group provides perhaps the most threatening incident in Australias history of
international terrorism. In April of 1993, two members of the group arrived in
Australia and began inspecting properties in Tasmania, South Australia, and Western
Australia. The group eventually purchased the Banjawarn property in Western
Australia, about 600 kilometres northwest of Perth, through companies created and
owned by the group. On this property, the 20 strong group carried out experiments
with the nerve agent Sarin, testing it on the sheep on the station, and also made
59
attempts to extract uranium.xliii Approximately six months later, Aum used Sarin in
attacks in the city of Matsumoto, killing seven, and the Tokyo subway which killed
twelve and injured over 5 500.239
Following the subway attacks, a majority of the groups hierarchy including

Matsumoto, were arrested and many have been sentenced to death. The group was not
outlawed by the Japanese Government and has changed its name to Aleph.240
2.4 DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Domestic terrorism is essentially the use of terrorism by an internal group against the
state, citizens, institutions, and structures within that state; for example the Russian,
anti-Ottoman, and Muslim Brotherhood campaigns discussed above are examples of
domestic terrorist movements. Domestic terrorism is specifically different from acts
of Islamic extremism inside Australia due to Islamic extremisms global campaign
against Western governments. Australia has had very few instances of domestic
terrorism and the following domestic terrorist events meet the definition given in the
Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003. The inclusion of domestic terrorist
events which follows is necessary to a history of terrorism in Australia, in order to
contrast the significance of the effects of international terrorism on Australia.
The events discussed in this section occurred after the rise of international terrorism in
Australia. In the 1972 Terrorism in Australia submission to cabinet referred to
previously, Senator Greenwood detailed the domestic groups that were then active in
Australia. At the top of the list were the Palestine-Australian Solidarity Committee,
based in Melbourne, and the Australian-Palestine Solidarity Committee, based in
Sydney. The report continued and cited the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), an anti-
US, anti-Vietnam War, and anti-National Service group responsible for attacks
against corporations such as Honeywell and General Electric, and attacks against the
Department of Labour and National Service. The report also mentioned the National
Socialist Party for their bombings of structures owned by Leftist interests in
Melbourne.241 Excluding the last example, most of the Australian domestic terrorist
xliii
The Aum cell that operated in Australia in 1993 will be examined through social network analysis
as a part of this thesis.
60
groups were left-wing, mirroring the trend within international terrorism during this
period.
The Greenwood submission outlined numerous attacks which were undertaken

against the US Consulate-Generals in both Sydney and Melbourne, Australian
premises of US corporations, and Australian military and Department of Labour and
National Service institutions between 1970 and 1972. In 1970, the US Consulate-
Generals in Sydney and Melbourne were attacked with a Molotov cocktail, a home-
made bomb, and when butyric acid was dispensed into the air conditioning system.
Over the following three years, American corporations such as Honeywell, General
Electric, Keep Bros and Woods, and the Du Pont Corporationxliv were attacked with
shotguns, petrol bombs, and other incendiary devices. Only one of these attacks was
publicly claimed by the PLA. The PLA also later claimed responsibility for the
gelignite bombing of the Torrens River Pump House which caused extensive damage.
This period also saw several attacks against the Department of Labour and National
Service, through firearm attacks and letter bombs, and also the bombings of
Australian Defence Force bases, depots, armouries, guardrooms, training depots, and
cadet facilities.242 No deaths resulted from these attacks.
The next domestic terrorist movements to appear were the anti-nuclear and
environmentalist movements. The following incidents were more a case of violent
action by social movements rather than attacks by terrorist organisations. Several
eco-terrorism incidents occurred in reaction to the nuclear research conducted by the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission, and the research centre at Lucas Heights, as
well as the attempted construction of the Franklin Dam. In 1977, a fire broke out at
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission at Mascot, New South Wales. This was
followed by the defusing of an explosive device consisting of gelignite and
ammonium nitrate at the Lucas Heights Research Establishment in Sydney, in 1983.
Both of these incidents were blamed on anti-nuclear groups.243 Also in 1983, at the
height of the Franklin Dam protests, the hijacking of a Trans-Australian Airlines
aircraft was unsuccessfully attempted.244
xliv
This attack was unsuccessful and the petrol bomb ignited a solicitors office below the Du Pont
Corporations offices.
61
Right-wing racist groups were another form of domestic terrorism which emerged in
its most violent form during the 1980s. While a majority of the activities that right-
wing groups undertake would generally be classified as political violence, the
Australian National Movements (founded in 1984) bombing of Chinese businesses in
Perth would transcend the boundaries of political violence.245 While this and other
right-wing groups, such as National Action and Confederate Action Party, have at
times walked the fine line between political violence and terrorism, their existence
and activities deserve mention.
As has been established, Australia has enjoyed a history of extremely low scale, zero
casualty domestic terrorism. This remains the case today; there are no significant
domestic terrorist groups within Australia.
2.5 21st CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORISM

The previous examination of the development of 21st Century Islamic extremism
contested that Islamic extremism is the most significant terrorist threat the world faces
today. In the same fashion that saw international terrorism reach Australias borders,
Islamic extremism has also threatened Australias internal security.
2.5.1 PRE 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

Just as the emergence of al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism in the late 1990s was felt by
the US and other areas of the world, preceding their rise to infamy and the War on
Terror in 2001, Islamic extremist operations were also directed towards and within
Australia.
2.5.1.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH: MANTIQI 4 & JACK ROCHE

Mantiqi 4 (of four: the JI structure will be discussed in Chapter VIII) was the division
of JI whose area of operations covered the geographic regions of Australia, West
Papua, and the Maldives. Mantiqi 4 was established in Australia around the early
1990s. The leader of Mantiqi 4 was the high ranking Abdul Rahim Ayub. Ayub lived
in Sydney and had previously hosted visits from JI leaders Abdullah Sunkar and Abu
Bakar Bashir. While Mantiqi 4 was dwarfed by the other three divisions of JI, Ayub
maintained absolute secrecy and slowly recruited members into JI, while engaging the
divisions main purpose of fund-raising. Ayub and his group began associating with
62
the Lakemba-based Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) and their publication the Nidaul
Islam (The Call of Islam), facilitating a strong relationship between the two groups.246
In 1997 Abdul Rahims twin brother Abdul Rahman Ayub, a veteran of the
Afghanistan conflict and high ranking al-Qaeda member (Abdul Rahman wrote
sections of the al-Qaeda manual), joined his brother in Sydney.247
In mid-1998 following a violent conflict with members of the mosque they attended at
Dee Why, the Ayub twins moved to Perth in Western Australia and continued
recruiting and fundraising activities, while the rest of Mantiqi 4 moved into Lakemba.
Following the move of the Ayub brothers, Mantiqi 4 began jihadi training, including
treks through the Blue Mountains, and extended to military style combat drills and
exercise. The Perth group used an associates property for paintball skirmishes, used
for both physical and combat training. Mantiqi 4 also began send recruits to train in
camps in Mindanao with members of al-Qaeda and the MILF.248
In 2000, Mantiqi 4 recruit Jack Roche, a British expatriate, was sent to Indonesia to
meet with JIs operational leader Hambali. On their meeting, Hambali informed
Roche that he wanted to set up an operational cell in Australia, suggesting the Sydney
Olympics as a possible target.xlv Roche was sent to Afghanistan via Pakistan for
training. In Pakistan he met with al-Qaeda operations chief Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed to discuss potential operations in Australia. Roche then made his way to a
training camp in Afghanistan where he had a fleeting meeting with Osama bin Laden
and took a ten day course on explosives, basic espionage methods, and counter-
measures.249
According to Sally Neighbour, after returning to Australia Roche began attempts to

recruit cell members (as instructed by Hambali and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) and
conducted surveillance on the Israeli Consulate in Sydney and the Israeli Embassy in
Canberra. Roche was not tight-lipped about his budding operation, causing discontent
within the local Islamic community and significant amounts of animosity from the
Ayub twins who had been left out of the operation. Following dissent from the Ayub
twins and a meeting between Roche and Abu Bakar Bashir (in which Bashir initially
xlv
This target was later seen not to advance the causes of JI.
63
instructed Roche to continue with the operation), the operation was eventually put to
rest when Bashir called Roche and instructed him to cease all activities.250 Roche was
arrested in November 2002 and received a nine year sentence after being convicted of
conspiring to blow up the Israeli Embassy in June 2004.251
While this chapter is concerned with the history of terrorism in Australia, it is

important to note JIs continued attacks against Western interests in Southeast Asia,
which since 2002 have killed 93 Australians, as detailed previously.
2.5.1.2 SYDNEY OLYMPIC GAMES

There were several other significant terrorist threats in the lead-up to the 2000 Sydney
Olympic Games. The first was the discovery by New Zealand police of a terrorist cell
in Auckland. In this operation police uncovered what appeared to be a virtual
command centre complete with maps of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor. The plans
surfaced after a raid on what was a suspected Afghan crime syndicate. Media sources
speculated that the group was tied to Osama bin Laden.252 xlvi
The second event in the lead-up to the Sydney Games was the discovery of an alleged
al-Qaeda training camp in bushland near Braidwood, New South Wales. The camp
was discovered by police after residents reported hearing automatic gunfire from the
area. The 138 hectare site was a known camping area for the IYM and the camp is
known to have been accessed by al-Qaeda members. Evidence of bomb-making, a
small arsenal of Automat Kalashnikov 1947 model (AK-47) assault rifles, and target
ranges were found at the site by police.253
Around the same period (late 1990s) al-Qaeda had established money-raising support
cells in Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide.254 The IYMs leader, Bilal Khazal, was
alleged by a CIA report in 2002 to be al-Qaedas chief organiser in Australia,
substantiated by his travel to Afghanistan in 1998, where the report claims he met
with Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri,255 and the warrant issued
by Lebanon for his involvement in a string of bombings and a failed assassination
xlvi
It is necessary to emphasise that these speculations were made before the World Trade Centre
attacks in 2001, and the hype surrounding al-Qaeda after these events.
64
attempt against the US Ambassador to Lebanon.256 A second training camp was
discovered by ASIO near Melbourne in 2002.257
As is evident from these examples, Islamic extremism posed a threat to Australia prior
to September 11, 2001, and the Bali bombings in the following year.
2.5.2 POST 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

There have been numerous threats to Australias internal security since the World
Trade Centre attacks of 2001. Perhaps the most potentially threatening was the LET
cell centring on Frenchman Willie Brigitte.
2.5.2.1 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
The LET-trained Willie Virgille Brigitte flew into Australia on May 16, 2003,258 and
after meeting with Australian LET contacts, quickly immersed himself within the
Islamic communities in the Sydney suburb of Lakemba.259 Brigittes principal contact
in Australia, the Pakistani-born Faheem Khalid Lodhi, arranged Brigittes mobile
phone (registered in a false name) and accommodation in Lakemba. These two
individuals formed the nucleus of the cell, with medical student Izhar Ul-Haque and
Abdul Rakib Hasan among those on the periphery of the operation.260 The operation
consisted of eight individuals, with the orders originating in Pakistan from Sajid, a
mid to senior-ranking Pakistani within LET, under whom most of the individuals had
trained.261
This cell aimed to detonate an explosive device attempting to destroy one or more of
the following targets:
i. the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor;
ii. the SASR headquarters at Perths Swanbourne barracks;
iii. the Garden Island Navy Base;
iv. the Holsworthy Army barracks in Sydney; and
v. the national power grid.262
The cell had done reconnaissance work around the Lucas Heights nuclear facility, and
Lodhi had procured aerial photographs of various military installations.263 Around
September 2003, the group were awaiting the arrival of an explosives expert, believed
to be Abou Salah, the man who trained Willie Brigitte in explosives in Pakistan. This
65
cell member was supposed to have travelled into Australia disguised as a Georgian
rugby supporter for the 2003 Rugby World Cup, but had difficulties in obtaining an
Australian visa.264
On October 9, 2003, Willie Brigitte was arrested for visa violations and taken to the
Villawood detention centre, following communications from the French Direction de
la Surveillance du Territoire (Directorate for Territorial Surveillance, DST) in Paris
who had tracked Brigitte to Australia.265 Izhar Ul-Haque was arrested on April 15,
2004,266 and Lodhi was arrested a week later on April 22.267 On August 23, 2006,
Lodhi received a sentence of 20 years for his involvement in the plot.268 In March
2007, Brigitte was convicted by a French court of associating with a terrorist group,
receiving a nine year sentence.269 This cell will be examined through social network
analysis as part of this project.
2.5.2.2 MALLAH & THOMAS

In early December 2003, Zekky Mallah, an Australian born Lebanese man was
arrested in his home and charged with planning a terrorist act which was to involve
killing members of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and ASIO. Mallah
was also attempting to become Australias first suicide bomber, seeking permission
from the radical Sheik Abdul Salam Zoud.270
Joseph Terrence Thomas was charged by the Australian Government of training in the
al-Farooq al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan during March of 2001, where he met with
Osama bin Laden on more than one occasion.271 In Afghanistan, Thomas fought
against the Northern Alliance and assisted in obtaining passports for al-Qaeda
members. When Thomas attempted to return to Australia in January of 2003, he was
arrested by Pakistani authorities and eventually returned to Australia in June. After 17
months of freedom back in Australia, Thomas was arrested again, this time by the
Australian Federal Police (AFP), and charged with providing support to al-Qaeda.272
Thomas was acquitted of providing resources for a terrorist attack, but convicted of
receiving funds from a terrorist organisation. This conviction was later overturned;
however, Thomas was placed on a control order restricting his movements and
contacts.
66
In July, 2005, Australian security sources revealed that ASIO had compiled a list of
over 100 al-Qaeda (and affiliated groups) trained individuals who at that time resided
in Australia,273 presenting a clear picture of the threat that 21st Century Islamic
extremism poses to Australia.
2.5.2.3 THREATS TO AUSTRALIA

In August 2005, an Australian man (identified as such only through accent and
believed to be Matthew Stewart) dressed in Arab clothing and armed with an AK-47,
appeared in a video released by al-Qaeda.274 In this video, the man, citing Western
involvement in Iraq, stated:
It is time for us to be equalsAs you kill us, youll be killed. As you bomb us, you
will be bombedThe honourable sons of Islam will not just let you kill our families
in Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir and the Balkans, Indonesia, the Caucasus and
elsewhere.275
This threat was followed by another shortly after to mark the fourth anniversary of the
September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington. The man in this tape was
American al-Qaeda member Adam Yahiye Gadahn, who asserted:
Yesterday, London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and Melbourne, Allah
willing. And this time, dont count on us demonstrating restraint or compassionWe
love peace, but when the enemy violates that peace or prevents us from achieving it,
then we love nothing more than the heat of battle, the echo of explosion and the
slitting of the throats of the infidels.276
In addition to such threats, Australian institutions overseas, such as the Australian

Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, have received threats from Islamic extremist
organisations, along with other nations involved in the war in Iraq.277
2.5.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM RAIDS NOVEMBER 2005

Between the late hours of November 7 and the early hours of November 8, 2005,
Australian security and counter-terrorism authorities launched Operation Pendennis, a
series of raids on suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne.278 Eight Sydney men
and 10 Melbourne men were arrested and charged with offences ranging from
279
Conspiring to manufacture explosives in preparation for a terrorist attack to
280
Being a member of a terrorist organisation. In preparation for an attack, the
Melbourne cell had allegedly conducted surveillance of Flinders Street Station, the
67
Melbourne Stock Exchange, and the Casselden Place high-rise which houses many
Commonwealth departments. The group also conducted paramilitary training in
remote areas of Victoria.281
These assorted events, threats, and incidents indicate that Australia has had a
considerable history of terrorism that has, to a degree, developed in unison with the
stages of the phenomenon globally. While Australia had next to no terrorist events
before the 1960s, international terrorism brought groups from all over the world who
conducted operations aimed at specific sections of Australian society, but not at
Australia or its government. The incidents of domestic terrorism differed in this
regard, but by definition, domestic terrorism aims at conducting violence (or threats of
violence) against the government or people of their nation. The rise of 21st Century
Islamic extremism has dramatically changed general perceptions of terrorism in
Australia. For the first time, Australians and the Australian Government are the
targets of terrorism, and not simply the innocent bystanders in conflicts that have
transgressed to Australia. Although no genuine damage has occurred on Australian
soil as a result of Islamic extremism, the comparative quantity of events over the last
few years compared to the thirty-odd years of international terrorism experienced by
Australia demonstrates that Islamic extremism poses a clear and substantial threat
now and into the future.
3. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the phases, groups, modus operandi, and development of
the phenomenon of terrorism from ancient terror, to the formation of organised and
unified groups through the Sicarii, the Assassins, and the Thuggee, and followed it
through its development into a tool of revolution, separatism, anti-colonialism, and
religious extremism. Through the descriptive summaries of the selected groups that
have used terrorism as a tool to achieve their ends, the chapter has also presented the
development (largely driven through the advance of technology) of the different
tactics: from assassination, to bombings, to mass casualty bombings, to biological
terrorism, to suicide bombings. As has been established, Islamic extremism is the
major form of terrorism in the early 21st Century.
68
The goals of the groups that make up the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement
differ markedly from those that defined international terrorism throughout the late
1960s to 1980s. The organisation and sheer volume of the Islamic extremist groups
resembles the development of Palestinian terrorism. However, the goals of the two
strands of terrorism are markedly different. The goals of the Palestinian groups are
nationalistic and have been largely limited to or involved the destruction of Israel, the
liberation of Palestine, and in some cases, the instalment of Shariah law in selected
countries. These groups have also focused attacks against US interests in the Middle
East. 21st Century Islamic extremism builds on the Palestinian goals by seeking the
full withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East, and the establishment of a global
Islamic government operating under Shariah law, re-establishing the rule of the
caliphs. Often, Islamic extremism does not distinguish between Christians and less-
pious Muslims through its doctrines and its attacks. The global nature of the Salafi
movement is significant in itself, with attacks and operations taking place in every
corner of the globe. It is markedly clear that Islamic extremism and the Salafist
global jihad herald a new period in the history of terrorism and are not simply a new
facet of international terrorism. Regardless, Islamic extremism poses a clear,
significant, and immediate threat, not just to Western governments but to
governments all over the world.
This chapter has examined the development of terrorism as a phenomenon,

establishing clearly the concept of terrorism from below, and examined terrorism in
Australia, and established a context for the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter has
clarified the contemporary situation which both the world and Australia face. This
examination has identified the key issues in the development of terrorism and the
concepts critical to a further understanding of terrorism and terrorism in Australia.
Additionally, this chapter has located a contextual basis and location in history for the
four groups to be examined within this thesis. While this chapter has undertaken the
pivotal role of understanding terrorism, its progression, and its current state, the
following chapter aims to examine how the phenomenon has been studied within
academia.
69
70
CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF
TERRORISM STUDIES
CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES
The previous chapter has discussed both the development of the global phenomenon
of terrorism and the development of terrorism in Australia, establishing a context and
the major concepts of the thesis. This chapter will examine the development of the
field of Terrorism Studies, which is the interdisciplinary academic field that
examines all facets of the phenomenon of terrorism. This examination will explore the
founding and evolution of the field, the nature of its contemporary interdisciplinary
frameworks and the current foci of the field. The chapter will then move to discuss the
historical and contemporary criticisms and weaknesses within the field. This
discussion will lead to the development of this projects primary objectives.
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD

During the 1960s, there existed very few studies or research examining terrorism.1
Following the rise of international terrorism,i an initial response of applying general
political violence theory was generated within the political science field. At the head
of this approach was Ted Gurr, who in 1970 applied traditional theories of political
violence to terrorism, most notably relative deprivation theory.2 ii Gurr and his fellow
scholars attempted to understand exactly what terrorism is, and were frequently
undermined by non-academic counter-terrorism and intelligence professionals. The
formal meta-theoretical approaches from political science began to falter when they
came under increasing criticism from wider academia, and consequently, were
publicly labelled inept.
By the mid-1970s, many academics had abandoned the strictly political science
approach and widened the fields scope through sociological, communicative, and
psychological theories aiming at explanatory research in relation to terrorism.3
Following this expansion, the field began to witness a relatively sharp increase in the
amount of research and dissertations on terrorism. After the faltering of terrorism
studies as a sub-field of political science purely based around the study of political
violence, perspectives were offered through other disciplines such as psychology,
i
The development of which was discussed in the previous chapter.
ii
The tension that arises from inconsistency between individuals value expectations and reality,
consequently resulting in violence.
72
sociology, international relations, criminology, psychiatry, anthropology, and law,
thus creating a multidisciplinary sub-field based within political science.4
1.1 EARLY LITERATURE

1.1.1 EARLY 1970s - POLITICAL SCIENCE RESPONSES
Paul Wilkinsons Political Terrorism of 1974 was among the earliest literature within
the field and was the benchmark text for the field throughout the 1970s.5 As a review
of the early literature of terrorism studies indicates, the initial focus of the literature
was on the definitional problematic surrounding terrorism.iii In approaching this,
Wilkinson attempted to distinguish political terror from general terror, then to define
political terrorism, and finally, to distinguish both political terror and terrorism as
independent forms of political violence.6 Wilkinson emphasised the importance of the
study of terrorism in that period, and the general neglect of terrorism studies and
research, specifically the insignificant foundation-based research undertaken prior to
the early 1970s.7
Wilkinson then moved to a typology of the major varieties of political terrorism

through their definitions, historical origins, attributes, and sub-types. From these
categories he identified three typologies: revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, and
repressive terrorism.8 From there, Wilkinson, using a series of case studies, focused
the study on the revolutionary and sub-revolutionary forms of terrorism.
Revolutionary and sub-revolutionary terrorism were closely examined through their

varying forms. These six types were: the righteous assassin, terror against indigenous
autocracy, liberation from foreign rule, resistance against totalitarianism, terror
against liberal democracies, and international and sub-revolutionary terrorism.
Wilkinson cited examples for each of these forms of terrorism throughout history,
ranging from terrorism in ancient Japan and Rome to the contemporary Irish
Republican Army (IRA).9
iii
As discussed in the previous chapter, this remains a significant problem within the field today.
73
Wilkinson then shifted his focus to assess the state of the field of terrorism studies in
its preliminary stages, in the face of mounting criticism of the pure political science
approach, asserting that:
there is as yet no adequate and generally accepted scientific theory of political
violence or of terrorism. Much of the most valuable insight yielded by modern
analysis of political violence belongs to a far older tradition of statecraft and political
wisdom, a tradition which it is most foolish to despise.10
This assessment of the state of terrorism studies is echoed over nearly three decades
by academics and researchers within the field, as reviews of contemporary literature
will demonstrate.
In 1975, Lester Sobel edited a piece of literature that comprised historical summaries
of various terrorist activities and events in differing areas of the world in order to
provide a history of terrorism from the late 1960s through to the 1970s. These reviews
provided comprehensive reports of terrorist conflicts, kidnappings, assassinations,
bombings, and all manner of terrorist activities and issues, from the Middle East,
Canada, Ireland, and West Germany. These summaries offered explanations of the
origins, tactics, successes, and methods of these groups. Sobels piece concluded by
examining the international action taken to counter terrorism. This examination
included United Nations (UN) discussions of terrorism, the international responses to
skyjacking, and pilot strikes as a response to the lack of action being taken against the
terrorist tactic. While Sobel offered valuable and current information and insight into
terrorist groups around the globe (elements which are essential for understanding
terrorism), the accounts were descriptive only and offered little analysis or insight into
the directions of the field.11 This work, while offering an important descriptive review
and extending the literature within terrorism studies, did not contribute to what
Wilkinson would have termed an accepted scientific theory of political violence or
terrorism.12
1.1.2 MID 1970s - INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES

Similar to the work of Sobel, International Terrorism: National, Regional, and
Global Perspectives, edited by Yonah Alexander, provided alternate perspectives on
international terrorism in 1976.13 This work reviewed terrorism activities in Canada,
the United States (US), Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Soviet Union, Africa,
74
Britain, South Asia, the Middle East, and included a perspective from the UN. While
these chapters focused on different areas of the world, the approaches also varied. For
example, Robert Freedman examined Soviet policy towards international terrorism
(including the sponsoring of Palestinian groups). This provided specific analytical
elements that were lacking in Sobels effort of the previous year.14 Another example
of this analysis is provided through Edward Weisband and Damir Rogulys
examination of Palestinian terrorism and the motivations and struggle for legitimacy
of the groups.15 While Sobels offering to the field provided a much more
comprehensive review of terrorist events around the world, the works within
Alexanders collaborative piece provided a level of in-depth analysis into the
phenomenon and hence, appear to have made a stronger contribution to the
development of the field.
In 1976 Fredrick Hacker offered to terrorism studies a psychiatric perspective.16 As is

discernable from the title Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in our
Time, Hacker acknowledged three types of terrorists: the crazies, the criminals, and
the crusaders. Hacker addressed state terrorism and terrorism from below through
these three perspectives. He then moved to explore the motivations of the three
classifications of terrorists, which were examined through the varying goals and
beliefs of the different terrorists. These motivations were relatively abstract, and
resembled behavioural generalisations rather than actual motivations behind terrorism.
These speculations were applied to the reviews and biographies of different
organisations. Hacker then applied his experience of psychology to the methods of
conversion and programming utilised by terrorist groups to indoctrinate their
members. Finally, as with the earlier literature, Hacker concluded with an application
of his findings to counter-terrorism strategies and responses.17 This piece of literature
was among the first to offer a credible alternative to the political science approach to
terrorism studies.
Until the late 1970s, only singular approaches from a small number of disciplines had
been offered within the field, with no attempt to unite the disciplines into an
interdisciplinary framework. In 1977, the first step was taken towards this goal. The
book Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Yonah Alexander and
75
Seymour Finger presented the perspectives of terrorism as provided through the fields
of history, political science, law, the media, psychology, and the social sciences.18
The historical perspectives dealt with the general overview of terrorism, the
definitional dilemmas of the phenomenon, and the origins of international terrorism.19
Robert Friedlander assessed the principal dilemma with terrorism studies since its
infancy:
Disagreement within the world community regarding the nature of the threat
presented and the failure to agree upon effective remedial action results in part from
confusion over both the origins and the composition of international terrorism. It has
become commonplace to assert that a precise definition is lacking and that a working
model has yet to be developed.20
The political science perspectives offered frameworks for understanding political

violence movements through a conceptual approach,21 terrorism as a military
weapon,22 and deterrence within the USs policies on terrorism.23 The legal
perspectives addressed terrorism within international law (and its implications)24 and
extradition and prosecution processes.25 The media perspectives that were put forth
examined terrorisms relationship with the media26 and the comparative distinctions
between these relationships in the US27 and the Middle East media spheres.28 These
approaches were valuable contributions to the multidisciplinary approaches within
terrorism studies.29
One of the more remarkable perspectives presented in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary

Perspectives was the statistical approach presented by Edward Mickolus, which made
an attempt at predicting terrorist activity.30 This approach took into account the type
of attackthe location, the identity and nationality of the victims, the targets and
demands of the terrorists, the types and extent of demands made, and the outcomes
(damage, casualties, governmental responses).31 Mickolus claimed that while a
statistical approach could offer close to predictability (when used by capable
analysts),
we must remember that statistical analysis alone cannot answer everything. All
disciplines and methods of analysis are useful, including contributions from
international law, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, police, intelligence, political
science, as well as statistics and mathematics.32
76
The psychological approach was presented again by Joseph Margolin who, from the
outset, was critical of previous psychological behavioural approaches, describing
them as narrow, parochial, and [using] highly questionable effort to apply
conventional psychiatric methods.33 Again, the state of terrorism studies was
assessed: No area in the study of terrorism is receiving adequate attention today. 34
As with Mickolus, Margolin endorsed a multidisciplinary approach which
incorporated the assertions, opportunities, and limits of other disciplines. The study
assessed the various methods within psychology and psychiatry and the
appropriateness of their application to the study of terrorism. In particular, Margolin
noted the need for interdisciplinary approaches to terrorism studies.
Walter Laqueur, a professor of political science and sociology, provided a political

sociological approach to terrorism studies in 1977 through his book Terrorism.35 As
with a majority of the literature of this period in the field, Laqueur began by defining
terrorism through a historical review of terrorism and its associated facets of political
violence.36 His focus then shifted to a study of the structure of various terrorist groups
around the world examining the finance, intelligence, arms, tactics, the media, and
counter-terrorism strategies associated with these groups. After examining the
motivations of terrorists, including the frustration-aggression hypothesis,iv Laqueur
claimed that the results of the application of political science to the study of internal
conflict, far from proving anything, have been quite negative, no truly scientific (that
is predictive or explanatory) theories have emerged.37 Laqueur provided three
reasons for this: firstly, a quantitative index cannot possibly reflect deprivation
38
which defies objective measurement; secondly, that research was unhistorical
and ignored the fact that theories cannot be applied to all groups; and thirdly, analysis
has been one-dimensional and assumed democracies to be the norm, ignoring modern
dictatorships.39 Laqueur went further to claim that fiction holds more promise for the
understanding of the terrorist phenomenon than political science.40 Here, Laqueur
characterises the dissent against the pure political science approach that characterised
this period of terrorism studies.
iv
The frustration-aggression hypothesis is essentially the theory in which frustration increases the
likelihood of aggression.
77
1.1.3 1980s - BOOM PERIOD
Following the development of the sub-field of terrorism studies in the 1970s, the
1980s saw a dramatic rise in the amount of research and literature on terrorism.41 This
period was described by Gordon as the take off years within the field.42 This period
saw the launch of the two core journals of the field, with Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism in 1977, and Terrorism and Political Violence issuing its first volume in
1989.
In 1982, Grant Wardlaw offered the field an approach from criminology in the book
43
Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures. Again, the opening
discussion dealt with the definitional problems of terrorism, promptly followed by a
historical summary of various forms of political violence and terrorism. The most
significant aspects of this study were the authors conflict resolution approaches,
which he maintained could be achieved through policy change,44 a totalitarian state
(which he argued is not appropriate), adequate support for counter-terrorism
personnel, and adopting a policy of not meeting any political demands made by
terrorists.45 The majority of the study dealt with counter-terrorism models and hostage
negotiations and strategies. Wardlaw closed by acknowledging the contributions and
validity of the behavioural sciences and encouraged these disciplines to increase their
participation in the field.
In the literature reviewed from 1974 to 1982, the period in which the field of
terrorism studies began to flourish in light of the rise of international terrorism,
approaches were offered from political science, sociology, psychology, psychiatry,
law, history, mathematics (statistical analysis), and criminology. Each study offered
differing approaches and perspectives to the study of terrorism. Gordon asserted that
terrorism studies was, and remained, a multidisciplinary field, with political science
the core discipline to which the subject is attached.46
The first distinction of the terrorism studies literature from the 1970s to the mid 1980s
is that the definition of terrorism and its associated concepts were problematic in that
there was not a single or universal definition of terrorism. Instead, it seems that there
were many definitions which were applied by the various approaches. The second
distinction was that a significant portion of the literature applied its findings to
78
counter-terrorism strategies and relevant policy. The final and most significant
generalisation was the demand for a comprehensive and interdisciplinary framework
for the study of terrorism.
1.1.3.1 SCHMID & JONGMANS APPRAISAL

In 1988, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman released Political Terrorism: A New
Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature; this book
essentially became the Bible for terrorism research.47 The book was written as an
assessment of the field of terrorism research, examining: terrorism and related
concepts; theories; data and data bases on state and non-state terrorism, and; the
literature of terrorism. This piece of literature also contained an extensive
bibliography of political terrorism, and a World Directory of Terrorist and other
Organisations Associated with Guerrilla Warfare, Political Violence, and Protest.
The first chapter examined the definition of terrorism through interviews with the
fields leading researchers whose definitions of terrorism differed dramatically. The
authors examined the issue in fine detail, addressing conceptual concerns from
symbolic violence, narrow and broad definitions, the concept of one definition of
terrorism or many definitions for the varying forms, terrorism as a method of combat,
terrorism without terror, the communication function, and additional conceptual
problems with the definition.48 Jongman and Schmid then moved to examine the
numerous typologies of terrorism. The authors presented the definitional issue as a
grave dilemma within the field.
The next chapter examined the theories of terrorism, with a wide scope, including
theories of political violence, common wisdom, terrorism from above, terrorist
theories of terrorism, psychological theory, communication theory, and sociological
theory. Jongman and Schmid made it obvious through their analysis of responses
from leading researchers that the state of theory development within the field was
poor, and focused more on policy than scientific advancement.49 The researchers
pleaded for interdisciplinary approaches or comparative studies, both contemporary
and historical, as a means to advance the state of thinking.50
79
The final chapterv assessed the literature of terrorism, through an analysis of both
macro-studies, which focused on historical and political/sociological studies, and
micro-studies, which in turn focused on preventative, medical, psychology, strategy,
and countermeasure research.51 Again, this section of the field was severely criticised.
Jongman and Schmid cited the lack of substantive research within the field,
describing the bulk of the literature as:
impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often pretentious, venturing far-
reaching generalisations on the basis of episodal evidence. The subject matter is not
one which invites dispassion, and the sense of moral outrage and resulting eagerness
to condemn has often hindered authors from a deeper understanding of
terrorism...There are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so
much is written on the basis of so little. Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the
literature is not research based in any rigorous sense; instead, it is too often narrative,
condemnatory, and prescriptive.52
Jongman and Schmid sum their assessment of the field through a question posed to
the leading researchers: Where do you see the elements of cumulativeness and
maturation in the literature on terrorism?.53 The responses ranged from virtually
nowhere to nowhere as yet. 54
1.2 CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM STUDIES

The contemporary study of terrorism remains a multidisciplinary area of study and
has developed significantly into a recognised field that encompasses any study of
terrorism and its associated effects, concepts, theories, and counter-measures. As
mentioned previously, terrorism studies has two core academic journals, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism and Terrorism and Political Violence, which encompass the
works that epitomise the field. These journals lead the field in publishing studies from
the varying disciplines examining the phenomenon of terrorism. The field has
continued the strong tradition of interdisciplinary approaches called for by the early
works of the 1970s. Terrorism studies is based in political science because terrorism is
a social phenomenon and must therefore be examined through the social sciences.
Terrorism affects many aspects of society and human experience, and can therefore be
examined by all of the areas it affects; hence its interdisciplinary nature. As a result of
this interdisciplinary nature and the rapid development of the field, the literature and
the research relating to terrorism are available through multiple sources ranging from
v
The chapter on data and data bases on state and non-state terrorism will be overlooked as this
chapters relevance is insignificant.
80
law journals and local periodicals, science and technology journals, general interest
journals, economic, business and management journals, and traffic and shipping
journals,55 in addition to the core terrorism journals. The growth and interdisciplinary
nature of the field after the 1980s is evidenced through the fact that research on
terrorism can be sought through a diverse variety of databases such as the Aerospace,
Engineering Index, MEDLINE (DIALOG), INSPEC, and UNCOVER databases.56
Due to the breadth of the terrorism studies research area, there are many foci within
the field. The following section of the chapter will briefly outline the main foci of the
field synthesised from a study by Avishag Gordon, which examined the academic
study of terrorism after 2001.57 To demonstrate the foci and the areas of study within
each focus, contemporary terrorism research is examined through the articles of the
two chief terrorism studies journals mentioned previously. In an examination of the
levels of data and analysis within terrorism studies, Andrew Silke claimed that these
two journals can be regarded as providing a reasonably balanced impression of
research activity in the field58 and as such will be used in this examination. The
articles examined were published between 1998 and 2006 (with one from 1991). This
analysis does not intend to be an exhaustive and definitive map of the field, but rather
a guide to the areas of focus and research within terrorism studies. The analysis of the
contemporary literature within the major journals indicates that terrorism studies
research can be divided into four major foci:
i. The Phenomenon of Terrorism iii. Terrorist Tactics
ii. Terrorists iv. Counter-Terrorism
There is research that lies outside these areas, however, its focus will usually be
within the general categorisation of one of these areas. Each of these areas is
interdependent and each focus has been developed such that its separation and
independent understanding is necessary for insight into the total framework of
terrorism studies.
1.2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM

The first focus of the literature aims to examine the phenomenon of terrorism. The
scope of the focus is broad, ranging from treating issues such as the definitional
dilemmas regarding the phenomenon to treating and categorising the concepts that
concern the field. The literature below gives examples of examinations of concepts
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and definitions associated with the phenomenon and the different typologies of
terrorism.
1.2.1.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

The first article within this area, by Alex Schmid, investigates the location of
terrorism in relation to the concepts and contexts of crime, warfare, politics,
propaganda, and religion.59 Schmid asserts that if a framework of terrorism is
employed using a single context, incidents lying within the other contexts are
inevitably ignored. The author examines the situation of terrorism within each of these
contexts, with each providing useful understanding and insight into different forms of
terrorism. Schmid sums by suggesting that a unilateral approach would possibly result
in misunderstanding the full nature and scope of the terrorist motivations and modes
of operation. All relevant aspects need to be properly considered to understand
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.60
In an attempt to determine why a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism has

eluded the field, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler employ
an empirical analysis of the definitions used within the major terrorism journals.61
Weinberg et al. base their study on Schmid and Jongmans 1988 research with the
same focus, measuring 22 definitional elements used in definitions of terrorism
ranging from violence, to intimidation, to publicity, and to fear. From the 55 articles
examined, Weinberg et al. determined through the most popular definitional elements
that the consensus definition is: Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving
the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a
significant role.62 The authors concede that this definition is too general to be
operable, and leaves out many important concepts. As a result, the authors state that
unless the field is willing to concede that terrorism as a very broad and wide-ranging
concept, it may benefit from finding an alternative governing concept.
1.2.1.2 TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM

In an examination of the nature of religious terrorism, Mark Sedgwick analyses the
political roots in the objectives of religious terrorist groups.63 Sedgwick uses al-Qaeda
as the subject of his analysis, examining the goals and strategy behind the 2001
attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Through this analysis, Sedgwick
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finds that al-Qaedas strategy is comparable to the anarchist propaganda of the deed
doctrine (discussed in the previous chapter), aiming to mobilise its Islamic
constituency. The article finds that while al-Qaeda is clearly a group espousing
religious terrorism, its objectives are as political as those of any other group.
Sedgwick notes that a terrorist group with political goals can be responded to through
political measures, just as any other variety of terrorism.
In another article examining the religious variant of terrorism, Ayla Schbley attempts
to define the religious terrorism typology.64 Schbley begins this attempt by rewording
the definition of terrorism, moving away from traditional political approaches (which
were subjective) and advocating a concise, apolitical, criminal definition. In an
attempt to define a religious terrorist, which was not completely possible within the
article, Schbley uses psychometric measures synthesised from data collected from 356
terrorists (341 surveys and 15 interviews). From the results of this survey and an
anthological study of taped self-immolations of 15 terrorists and 918 zealots, the
author presents a 32 point profile of a religious terrorist. To demonstrate, the first two
points of the profile are:
1. Shia religious terrorism is a method of forcefully communicating a
perceived divine message/command.
2. Shia religious terrorism is performed by elements with strong ethno-
religious identity.65
While Schbley acknowledges that this profile is based on Lebanese Shiite religious
terrorism, the profile may also be applicable to Sunni groups. Schbley sums by
introducing the typology of International Islamic Terrorism, of which the above
profile examines a certain strand (despite its applicability to other areas) and
advocates further theory-building within the International Islamic Terrorism
typology.
1.2.2 TERRORISTS
The examination of terrorists and terrorist organisations is an immense area of the
field and is perhaps the focus which best demonstrates the fields interdisciplinary
nature. Studies in this focus examine terrorism from perspectives such as
anthropology, sociology, political science, international relations, psychology, and
psychiatry.
83
1.2.2.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Zachary Abuzas article provides a historical review of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) and their operations in the Southern Philippines from 1978 to 2005.66
Abuza begins his examination by focusing on the peace talks that have been taking
place between the MILF and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
facilitated by the US. Abuza then moves to discuss the possibility of factionalism
within the MILF, leading into an assessment of the current military strength and
capacity of the group, with estimates as low as 12 000 and as high as 100 000. The
author then discusses the links between the MILF and other terrorist organisations
such as Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) and the Abu-Sayyaf Group.
Abuza concludes his article with an assessment of the state of the MILF, stating that
the group have clearly demonstrated a level of competence on the battlefield that
indicates that they will not be defeated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but
inversely can never achieve victory through armed struggle.
Another example of a qualitative descriptive review is provided by Mark Wrightes

profile of the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Army, EPR) in
Mexico.67 This profile examines the historical origins, tactics, splinter groups, and
terrorist activity of the EPR, followed by a comparison to the Zapatista National
Revolutionary Army. These examples and the focus itself are vital within the
literature and the field. Descriptive historical reviews provide a contextual
background and the basis of understanding for any analysis from any discipline. The
importance of this area is proven when examining the literature within the other areas.
Each study must begin with at least some level of qualitative review focus, to
establish a contextual background for the study.
1.2.2.2 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

In an article espousing a sociological approach, Fernando Reinares examines an
empirical assessment of the evolving social and demographic profiles of the Euskadi
ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, ETA) terrorist group.68 Reinares
analyses an extensive range of characteristics of over 600 ETA members. Through
this analysis, the article finds that a large majority of members who joined ETA were
male, recruited between their late teens and early twenties and were born in and
resided in urban areas. The largest distribution of members was from the working
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class and almost half were born in the Guipuzcoa province of Basque country.
Reinares also found that the distribution of ETA members sociological characteristics
was consistent with the profiles of other Western secular terrorist organisations that
developed from the late 1960s. The final finding of the article was that an inversion of
the ETA members profile had taken place between 1970 and 1995. The average
recruitment age of the group lowered in the mid-1980s and recruits originated from
urban and metropolitan backgrounds with a low proportion of euskeravi speakers. The
working class base of the groups recruitment also changed to students below the
university level.
The second example of a sociological perspective is presented by Anwar Alam and

provides a sociological examination of al-Jamaa al-Islammiyas (Islamic Group) rise
and operations in Egypt in order to establish a historical and cultural context of
Islamic terrorism.69 Alam begins the article by discussing the development of al-
Jamaa and their shift towards terrorist operations in the early to mid-1990s. The
vii
author then notes that the large majority of the group members were of a Saidi
background.
The article conducts an examination of the social influences and clashes within and
between the northern and southern regions of Egypt. Alam maintains the argument
that al-Jamaa rose in Egypt through political, social, and economic factors that
affected its local context, and as such al-Jamaa signifies a socio-political movement
to fight for social equality, justice, and dignity as well as to have a legitimate share in
the power arrangement of local and provincial administration.70 Alam sums by
illustrating that the case of al-Jamaa and the differences in origins and motivations
from other Egyptian groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jihad,
demonstrate that within Islamic terrorism, different groups are aligned with different
agendas and are motivated by varying causes.
vi
The language spoken by the Basque people.
vii
Saidi refers to southern Egypt, also known as Upper Egypt.
85
1.2.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES
The behavioural foci area of the literature offers multidisciplinary perspectives on
terrorist and terrorist group behaviour, with a majority of the literature being produced
by the psychological, sociological, and anthropological disciplines. The first example
of this is provided by Jacob Rabbie, whose article presents a Behavioural Interaction
Model with the aim of providing a framework for the socio-psychological study of
terrorism.71 Rabbie briefly engages in the debate of defining terrorism, noting that for
the purpose of his article terrorism is considered a form of psychological warfare
employing violence. The article then introduces the behavioural interaction model and
the two major foci of the model. The first is the environment, which consists of three
components: physical environment; internal and external social environment; and the
structure of interdependence between the subjects/organisations. The second focus of
the model is the psychological orientation, which had the following components:
cognitive, emotional, and normative orientations; action tendencies, intentions, and
behaviour; and evaluation of goals and achievement. Rabbie concludes that the model
is in a preliminary stage and currently only provides useful only as a descriptive
mechanism; the model was created with the intention of providing some coherence to
terrorism studies. The article finishes with the hope that this framework can stimulate
further research on the behaviour of terrorists through the socio-psychological
approach.
Another piece of literature within this focus is provided by Max Taylor and John
Horgan72 in their examination of the behavioural bases between Islamic extremism
and violence and how it is possible to understand ideological and religious control of
an individuals behaviour. The central contention of this piece is an attempt to explain
the behaviour of Islamic terrorists through the nature of the Islamic state and anti-
Western sentiment, following an examination of the bases of Islamic fundamentalism.
Taylor and Horgan examine the processes of fundamentalism through psychological
and behavioural approaches, finding that the processes of fundamentalism are not
beyond analysis, nor do they fall outside the conceptual structures already available to
psychology.73 The authors state that the comprehension of the concepts examined in
the study will assist in better policy-making and benefit the conceptualisation of
fundamentalism within psychological approaches to terrorism. The article concludes
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by noting the significance of research that aims at understanding fundamentalist
behaviour, encouraging empirical research in the area.
1.2.2.4 POLITICAL SCIENCE

As the review of the early terrorism studies literature demonstrated, the field has
always been based within political science and the various approaches that the
discipline espouses. This remains the case in the contemporary literature as the
following articles establish. While many of the other articles within this review
originate within and champion a political science approach, this section specifically
examines literature that uses political science as an approach to examining terrorists
and terrorist groups.
The first example of this approach, provided by Magnus Ranstorp,74 was an

examination of the Osama bin Ladens fatwa released on February 22, 1998, as well
as the Declaration of War, which was released in 1996. Ranstorp maintains that
these two documents provide an insight into what he calls the bin Laden
phenomenon.viii The article provides comprehensive analysis and insight into bin-
Ladens ideology and his fatwa. The first insight is that the issue of the fatwa is a
means of undertaking psychological warfare against the enemies of Islam. Ranstorps
analysis also concludes that the fatwa illustrates bin Ladens significant and
comprehensive knowledge of the political, geographical, and operational
environments on local, regional, and global issues and contexts. The fatwa is also the
first demonstration of bin Ladens alliance with other radical Islamic groups. Ranstorp
notes bin Ladens lack of Islamic scholarship, specifically noting that the fatwa is not
binding to Muslims. Ranstorp continues and notes the inclusion of Sheikh Mir
Hamzah as a signatory, which provides religious authority and broader approval for
the fatwa. The article also establishes the clear appeal for application of the fatwa
through jihad, supported through the Koran and Islamic history and the mobilisation
of the Islamic masses. Ranstorp sums by assessing that bin Ladens fatwa is nothing
new or revolutionary, but represents many broad consciences within the Middle East
and the Islamic community. As such, the ideology can be seen as novel when
viii
This is especially insightful, as the article was published in 1998.
87
examining these two documents, as it represents an unfolding ethnopolitical and
religious [force] in the Middle East.75
James Piazza, in his article, examines the hypothesis that terrorism is caused by
poverty, inequality, and low economic conditions.76 Piazza firstly examines the
incidence of terrorism versus the average gross domestic product per capita within
various countries as initial evidence that the previously mentioned factors were not
determinants of terrorism. The study then employs regression analysis models to
examine terrorist operations and attacks in 96 countries between 1986 and 2002.
Piazzas results negated the popular theory that terrorism was caused by poverty and
low economic development, also invalidating the similarly popular relative
deprivation theory. The study instead found factors such as population, ethno-
religious diversity, increased state repression and most significantly, the structure of
party politicsto be significant predictors of terrorism.77 Piazza concludes by
suggesting that social cleavage theory is a more appropriate model with which to
examine the causes and predictors of terrorism, with the paradigmatic cases of this
approach being India, Israel, and Columbia.
1.2.3 TERRORIST TACTICS

The third focus area of the field to be treated is the terrorist tactics focus. This focus
essentially examines the modus operandi of all manner of terrorist organisations.
These examinations include the weapons used, target selection, methods of
communication and interaction, overall long-term strategy, area of operations, and
goals. The literature used to demonstrate the nature of this focus examines the
different types of research examining terrorist tactics, including target selection,
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear weapons (CBRN), suicide attacks, cyber-terrorism, and general reviews of
tactics.
1.2.3.1 TARGET SELECTION

The first example of an article examining the target selection methods of terrorists and
terrorist organisations is provided by C.J.M. Drake.78 Drake begins his article by
discussing the factors involved in the target selection of terrorists, noting that ideology
is a fundamental process within this selection. Despite the centrality of ideology
88
within this process, Drake notes that no single factor can explain terrorists target
selection. Drake defines ideology as the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives
however ill-defined or tenuous by which a group defines its distinctive political
identity and aims.79 The article moves to discuss exactly how ideology influences the
target selection of terrorists, focusing on how an ideology identifies and dehumanises
enemies of the group and assigns guilt to particular institutions and individuals,
establishing what are called legitimate targets. Drake provides specific examples of
this process, citing the Symbionese Liberation Army, Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA), Red Brigades (RB), Red Army Faction (RAF), and (Irish) Loyalist
terrorists. Following comparative analysis of the targets selected by groups of
different ideologies, Drake finds that ideological differences lead to differences in
target selection of the differing groups. The article concludes by stating that the target
selection of terrorists is crucially affected by ideology.
In a second example of research focusing on the target selection of terrorist groups,

Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Daphna Canetti-Nisim examine the social
profiles of suicide bombers and their victims during the second intifada in Israel and
the Occupied Territories.80 The authors firstly examine what a suicide bomber is, and
then evaluate the Palestinians use of the tactic, noting the success of its use within the
second intifada. Following this, Weinberg et al. establish that the profile of a suicide
bomber (contrary to popular belief) is an older, more experienced member within the
organisation. The focus shifts to the victims of suicide bombings, the authors noting
that as the intent of the tactic is to kill as many Jews as possible, the targets are public
transport facilities and vehicles, shopping centres, and popular restaurants. As a result
of the selection of these targets, people at the lower end of the socio-economic scale
and students comprised the highest proportion of casualties.
1.2.3.2 WMD & CBRN

The study of WMD and CBRN, and their use, or potential use, in the hands of
terrorists is an area of the field that has gained increased attention in recent years.ix
Robert Bunkers study, Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism,81 attempts to
provide a conceptual framework for the understanding of weapons of mass
ix
As the review of post-September 11 analytical work (below) will demonstrate.
89
disruption.x Bunker begins by examining the traditional definition and conceptual
frameworks of WMD and CBRN in light of emerging forms of weapons such as
information warfare, electronic warfare, directed energy weapons, and advanced non-
lethal weapons. After establishing a conceptual framework for weapons of mass
disruption through concepts such as weapon morphology and effects, weapon
threshold, and destruction and disruption, Bunker presents the following as examples
of weapons of mass disruption:
i. Radio Frequency Weaponry
ii. Isotropic Radiators
iii. Non-Lethal Chemical Agents
iv. Radiological Devices (Genetic Altercation)
v. Liquid Metal Embrittlement
vi. Computer Viruses
vii. Non-Lethal Biological Viruses.82
Another example of the research into WMD is provided by Daniel Gressang,83 who
looks at the potential use of WMD by terrorists by firstly examining previous
arguments and works on the subject. In doing so, Gressang draws on the behavioural
foci, ideological analysis focus, and the understandings of the different types of
terrorists (provided through descriptive reviews). Gressang went further to look at the
intended message behind the use of WMD. Again, these two studies differ in their
specific aims within the WMD and CBRN focus but are equally important: while
Bunker looked at the differing types of WMD and other weapons intended for the
same purpose, Gressang assessed the potential use of those weapons through the
applications of understandings within other fields and areas of focus. Because the use
of a CBRN or WMD by a terrorist group is arguably the single greatest threat posed
by the phenomenon, this area of focus is vital to the field.
1.2.3.3 SUICIDE ATTACKS

In examining the tactic of suicide bombing employed by Palestinians during the
second intifada, Assaf Moghadam presents a two-stage model which explores the
factors and procedures behind the tactic.84 The article examines suicide attacks
x
As opposed to Weapons of Mass Destruction.
90
conducted by Palestinians against Israel that occurred between September 2000 and
June 2002 through a two-phase model. The first phase, the motivational phase,
examines why an individual is motivated to become a suicide bomber through aspects
such as religious motives, personal motives, nationalist motives, economic motives,
and through sociological aspects. The second phase, the organisational phase,
examines areas such as organisational goals and motives, the different Palestinian
groups that employ suicide tactics, and the recruitment, training, indoctrination,
planning, execution, weapon procurement, division of labour and
compartmentalisation, and target selection of those groups. Moghadam finds that a
large majority of individuals who choose to become suicide bombers are motivated by
multiple factors. Moghadam concludes his article with the counter-terrorism
applications of his research, stating that the Israeli targeting of organisational
structures to prevent terrorism will have short-term effects on these groups, but they
need to adopt a long-term strategy of reducing the incentives and motivations for
individuals to participate in suicide terrorism.
Andrew Silkes article examining the suicide tactic offers a historical review of the
tactic of such attacks in an attempt to offer advantages and insight into current
endeavours to understand and counter suicide terrorism.85 Silke begins by examining
suicide as a political weapon, citing Catos suicide as a message of defiance to Caesar
in 44BC and the use of setsujoku (suicide to avoid disgrace) and kanshi (suicide to
protest) by Japanese samurai.
The articles treatment of suicide as a political statement moves to look at the

suffragette movement in Britain in the early 1900s, the RAF members who committed
suicide in Stammheim prison in West Germany, and the hunger strike of imprisoned
members of the IRA in 1981. The focus of the article then shifts to examine suicide in
acts of violence, citing Samsons suicide, King Leonidas of Spartas last stand at the
hands of Xerxes invading army in 481BC, Hussein ibn Alis (Muhammads
grandson) fatal stand against Yazids troops, and the defenders of the Alamo in 1836.
Finally, Silke conducts a review of and then compares the kamikaze pilots of World
War II with Islamic extremist suicide bombers, drawing parallels in relation to the
rejection of calling the event suicide, and instead labelling their bodies as weapons
for use in a righteous act against their enemies. Silke concludes his article by
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establishing that historical reviews of suicide as an instrument of war and politics
offers many objective insights into the tactic employed by Islamic extremists in the
present day. This assessment is made on the basis that objectivity and dispassion
regarding Islamic extremism are difficult due to the contemporary and recent nature
of such events.
1.2.3.4 CYBER-TERRORISM
Gabriel Wiemann, in the article Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears, assesses the
threat of the tactic of cyber-terrorism.86 As defined by Weimann, cyber-terrorism is
the use of computer network tools to harm or shut down critical infrastructure.87
Weimanns article attempts to assess the present and potential threat that the tactic
actually poses. Weimann examines the increasing alarm (propagated by politicians
and the media) over the tactic and distinguishes cyber-terrorism from hackers. The
article concludes that conventional tactics currently used by terrorists pose the
significantly greater threat. However, he warns against the complacency that resulted
in the September 11 attacks. Weimann proposes the possibility of a large scale
conventional attack combined with a cyber-terrorism attack on communications
infrastructure, the result of which would be potentially catastrophic. The evidence
suggests that while terrorist groups are extensively using the internet in their current
operations, they have yet to resort to cyber-terrorism. The threat may be exaggerated
and manipulated in some spheres, but its threat and existence cannot be denied or
ignored.
In another example of an examination of the cyber-terrorism tactic, Michael Knights

and Lorenzo Valeri88 examine Offensive Information Warfare (OIW)xi and its use
by terrorists to attack symbolic and critical infrastructure targets. OIW is described by
the authors as the set of activities carried out by individuals and/or groups with
specific political and strategic objectives, aimed at the integrity, availability, and
confidentiality of the data collected, stored and transferred inside information systems
connected to the internet.89 The study outlines the rationale behind OIW, then
examines the formulation of terrorists operational style (including target selection)
and examines the likely terrorist uses and methods of OIW, particularly against the
xi
Which they refer to as a component of Arquilla & Ronfeldts Netwar, to be discussed in the
following chapter.
92
critical infrastructure of a nation. The study goes further to examine the effects and
implications of OIW on the trust that underpins the commercial and financial
operations of wide-area networks.90 The article ends by evaluating the threat of the
tactic and examining the counter-measures available against the tactic, including those
that have already been implemented.
1.2.3.5 GENERAL TACTICS

Peter Johns91 study of the process of skyjacking discusses the processes and
instances of the tactic and addresses the responses adopted by various governments.
John describes the effects of this tactic:
Airport property or even the plane itself may be blown up. Human lives may be
threatened or taken. Backed by periodic torture or even killings, threats may be used
to extort money, or to obtain the release of prisoners, the publication of manifestos,
or safe conduct to another country far away from the scene of the crime.92
John examines the history of the tactic throughout the world, followed by an in-depth
case study of the crash of the Pan Am 103 (the Lockerbie disaster). The case study
examines the various theories behind the publicly unsolved disaster. These theories
include the Libyan intelligence agents involvement; the Iranian Governments
revenge for the US Navys shooting down of Iran Air flight 655; the possible
blowback from US interference in the Lebanese drug trade; and the assassination of
a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hostage negotiation team. John then progresses
to discuss the warnings that were given and the intelligence failures that contributed to
the disaster as well as the flaws within the aviation industrys security measures. John
sums up his article by evaluating the threat of skyjacking and aerial terrorism,
discussing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East as a result of US
foreign policy.
Another example of the study of a terrorist tactic, although a relatively new one, is
Joseph Foxells examination of the Agro-Terrorism tactic.93 Foxell succinctly
defines agro-terrorism as attacks on a societys agricultural infrastructure,94 and his
article attempts to examine the increasing threat of this tactic. The article examines
Imperial Germanys use of bio-agricultural warfare in World War I, when German
agents infected American horses and livestock bound for British and French armies
with anthrax and glanders. Foxell discusses the US vulnerabilities to agro-terrorism
93
and the potential economic impact of such an attack. The methods of a potential agro-
terrorism attack are then discussed, examining the contamination of crops or
livestock, contamination of animal feed, scenarios with adulterated seeds, and the
contamination of municipal water supplies. The motivations of the use of the tactic
are discussed in relation to newer forms of terrorism where the destruction of the
society is the goal. Like the examination of cyber-terrorism by Weimann, Foxells
concludes that we must be prepared for the event of agro-terrorism, despite the lower
likelihood of such an event happening.
1.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM
As demonstrated in the review of the early literature within the field, counter-
terrorism research has always been a prevalent focus within terrorism studies. The
approaches that are most common to this stream of terrorism studies are legal studies,
political science, policing, and intelligence. Most literature within the field will
employ elements of counter-terrorism to the findings and applications of their
research. This section concerns the specific counter-terrorism focus itself and the
literature to follow will specifically focus on counter-terrorism strategies and
applications.
1.2.4.1 NATIONAL
In an examination of national counter-terrorism measures, Ami Pedahzur and Magnus
Ranstorp discuss the limits of liberal democracy in combating terrorism,95 with
specific reference to Israel. The article assesses whether a criminal justice model or
a war model is more appropriate to the pursuance of counter-terrorism strategies.
Using the example of Israel, the article outlines the war model approach adopted by
Israel shortly after its inception in 1948, and its move to the criminal justice approach
by the 1970s. The authors outline the expanded criminal justice model, which was
previously a grey area between the two aforementioned models.
Bradley Bamford provides another example of an article examining national counter-

terrorism in his analysis of the counter-terrorism arrangements of the United Kingdom
(UK) in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.96 It must be acknowledged that
this article was published in 2004, before the bombings in London on July 7, 2005.
Bamfords article begins with an assessment of the threat of terrorism to the UK,
94
noting its extensive experience with terrorism through the Northern Ireland troubles.
This assessment notes the previous Islamic extremist plots to attack the London
Underground in 2002, Heathrow airport in 2003, and the Ricin plot, also in 2003. The
author examines the threats posed by al-Qaeda, North African extremists, and other
Islamic extremists devoted to the cause. Bamford then examines the UKs response to
the September 11 attacks and the threat currently posed by such groups. This
examination covers the counter-terrorist agencies such as Military Intelligence section
5 (MI5) and the Special Branches within the local police forces, discussing their
counter-terrorism roles.
The article then shifts to examine the role of intelligence in the UKs counter-
terrorism efforts, discussing the difficulties of gathering intelligence on al-Qaeda prior
to 2001. Bamford then examines the increased intelligence cooperation between states
since 2001, as well as the proactive legal and financial approaches, target hardening,
emergency planning, interagency cooperation, and military deployment. Bamford
concludes by acknowledging that the fact that there has not been an attack on the UK
since 2001 is either an indication that the counter-terrorism measures are working, or
that terrorists have not made a concerted effort to attack. In sum, Bamford says it is
unrealistic to expect total security.
1.2.4.2 INTERNATIONAL
The counter-terrorism focus is examined on an international scale by Oldrich Bures in
an article examining counter-terrorism policy implemented by the EU following the
2001 al-Qaeda attacks.97 Bures begins this exploration with an analysis of the roots of
the EUs current counter-terrorism policy, beginning with the policies of the European
Political Cooperation in the early 1970s. This analysis traces the development of the
policy to 2001, which leads to an examination of the response to the al-Qaeda attacks
of the same year, particularly the adoption of the Plan of Action (the European policy
to combat terrorism). This analysis examines the introduction of the European Arrest
Warrant, law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing in the form of
Europol, the establishment and expansion of Eurojust, the introduction of a universal
definition of terrorism, and the freezing of assets belonging to identified and
presumed terrorists. Bures then moves to examine the counter-terrorism arrangements
in light of the al-Qaeda attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which saw the revision
95
and enhancement of the EUs counter-terrorism policies. Bures concludes his article
by suggesting that the EU will have difficulty in implementing the political
agreements that are required to establish more effective counter-terrorism policy. In
this suggestion, Bures cites the multitude of cultural, legal, and political changes
required, and the policymakers failure to address the causes of terrorism.
In another article examining international counter-terrorism measures, Nora Bensahel

examines the various coalitions against terror, arguing that a single coalition against
terror is misleading.98 Bensahel claims that the notion of a coalition of coalitions is
a more appropriate term. The first coalition outlined by the article is the military
coalition, whose role it is to track down and eliminate terrorist leaders and bases,
demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. The
second is the financial coalition, which attempts to trace and seize the financial
networks of terrorist organisations consisting of national and international agencies.
The next coalition concerns international law enforcement efforts which are required
for the apprehension of the modern international terrorist. The fourth is the
intelligence coalition which aims to reduce terrorist capabilities and to provide
warning of impending attacks. The final coalition is the reconstruction coalition which
aims at reconstructing unstable areas where terrorist organisations can increase their
support and recruitment bases. Bensahel then examines the scope, costs (of both
formation and maintenance), the utility of Non-Government Organisations (NGO),
sub-state, and private actors, and preventive versus reactive policy in relation to the
different coalitions. The author sums by saying that successful counter-terrorism
policy must employ all of the coalitions and that the strategy adopted will determine
the importance of each coalition.
1.2.4.3 NON-STATE
An example of an article examining a non-state approach to counter-terrorism is
provided by Jayantha Dhanapala in the analysis of the UNs response to the
September 11 attacks.99 Dhanapala traces the development of UN policy following the
2001 attacks, specifically the speedy adoption of Resolution 1373 and the
establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The author discusses the
importance of the UN to maintaining human rights in the campaign against terrorism,
a principle function of the UN. Dhanapala also examines the actions of the General
96
Assembly and the Secretariat, which condemned the attacks and (through a policy
working group) aimed to dissuade aggrieved movements from adopting terrorism,
denying them the means to undertake terrorism, and to cooperate internationally
against terrorism. Dhanapala makes a final recommendation that a commission on
terrorism should be established within the Economic and Social Council of the UN to
provide an annual meeting within the international community to discuss specific
issues related to terrorism and the appropriate responses.
1.2.4.4 GENERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES

Patrick ONeil examines the complexity involved in the implementation of a
biometric system for the purpose of countering terrorism.100 This examination
contends that the enterprise of the modern terrorist aims to subvert complex systems
in order to create mass destruction and disorder. ONeil builds on this assertion to
claim that the establishment of a complex counter-terrorism system, such as a
biometric national identity card, would merely create another target for terrorists to
attack. The article examines the development of the biometric debate in recent years
through risk and organisational theory, in an attempt to determine whether biometrics
would make people safer. 101
Another example of a general counter-terrorism focus is offered by David Veness.102

From the outset, Veness offers seven propositions of the worlds of terrorism and
counter-terrorism. It is important to note that this article was published in September
2001, just prior to the September 11 attacks. Veness propositions can be synthesised
as:
i. Low intensity and high impact conflict complemented by variation and
complexity are the key features of terrorism;
ii. Newer, more diffuse forms of terrorism are complementing the old challenges
posed by terrorism;
iii. The traditional geographical basis of terrorism is transforming, with a
particular emphasis on South East Asia;
iv. Terrorism and crime are collaborating on more fronts;
v. Newer tactics such as cyber-terrorism and the use of WMD deserve serious
but rational examination; and that
vi. Counter-terrorism methods must be flexible, innovative, and continuous.103
97
Veness considers the evolution of terrorism and the various strategies to be adopted
to combat this evolution, placing importance on intelligence, forensic science, and the
cohesion and flexibility of counter-terrorism elements, while following the
development of terrorism and counter-terrorism simultaneously.104
1.3 AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE

The terrorism studies field in Australia has developed in stark contrast to the field in
the rest of the world. Although Australia has yielded many influential terrorism
researchers, such as Grant Wardlaw,xii the research concerning terrorism in Australia
is sparse at best, with modest academic qualitative literature and little quantitative
research or substantive analysis into the phenomenon in Australia. The history of
terrorism in Australia, presented in the previous chapter, indicates that while Australia
does not have a very extensive history of terrorism, there have been significant events
and groups worthy of academic analysis (both qualitative and quantitative). The
following paragraphs review the qualitative literature concerning terrorism in
Australia. While some of the following literature may not be considered within the
academic field of terrorism studies, their inclusion in such a review is vital, firstly due
to the limited literature on the subject, and secondly, to ensure a comprehensive
coverage of that literature. The development of the Australian literature responded to
terrorist events in Australia, the principle two events being the Ustashi movements
and the Hilton bombing.
1.3.1 USTASHI LITERATURE

Most of the early literature on terrorism in Australia is limited to subjective
descriptive reviews of the Ustashi movements in Australia. In a piece of literature
released by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundationxiii in 1972,105 the organisation
attempted to raise awareness of Ustashi groups in Australia. The short book detailed
the crimes of the Ustasha government in the former fascist Croatia and the political
debate within Australian political circles as to the validity of reports of Ustashi groups
in Australia. The author examined literature detailing the history, tactics, vows, and
goals of such organisations, as well as their ties to organisations such as the Croatian
Soccer Club in Sydney. The Ustashis activities in Australia were then detailed,
xii
Currently the National Manager of Intelligence for the Australian Federal Police.
xiii
An organisation that aims at the achievement of peace, human rights, and social justice.
98
ranging from their bombings in Sydney and Canberra, to their training camps, and
their insurgent cells sent into Yugoslavia. The booklet sums by saying:
The Ustasha is a fascist organisation; it is a weapon in the hands of Australian and
foreign reaction; its activities in Australia should be exposed and stopped; and those
who aid and abet and cover up their criminal activities should be pushed from
office.106
Also in 1972, Dave Davies released a publication entitled The Ustasha in Australia,107
for the Communist Party of Australia. Like the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,
Davies attempted to expose Ustashi activities (particularly the Hrvatski Narodni
Otpor (Croatian National Resistance, HNO), Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret (Croatian
Liberation Movement, HOP), and Hrvatska Maldez (Croatian Youth, HM)) in
Australia. The publication was similar to the previous piece, detailing a history of the
fascist Ustashi Government during the Second World War, then moving to
discussions of the various Ustashi movements in Australia and their relations to
organisations such as various Roman Catholic identities within the Croatian
community, the Croatian Soccer Club, and several politicians. Davies also detailed the
work and threats on the life of Marijan Jurjevic who, as has been seen (in the previous
chapter), was a central figure in the movement to expose the Ustashi movement in
Australia. Davies closed with a strong message: Democratic forces in Australia
cannot be complaisant about fascism in Australiadecisive action, including united
organisation against all those concerned with democratic rights must be organised to
stamp out these criminal groups in Australia.108
As is discernable from its title, Trial by Slander: A Background into the Independent
State of Croatia and an Account of the Anti-Croatian Campaign in Australia, Les
Shaws 1973 offering was (like the left-wing Davies publication) far from
objective.109 The piece was separated into two sections, the first on the development,
installation, and fall of Fascist Croatia, and the second on what the author called
[t]he alleged terror in Australia. 110 In this section, the author essentially set about a
character assassination of anti-Ustashi campaigner Marijan Jurjevic, and other such
anti-Ustashi campaigners. Shaw attempted to cast doubt on the validity of Croats
responsibility for the bombings in Australia, even suggesting that Jurjevic blew up his
own apartment in order to spark further investigation into Ustashi groups.
99
On the other side of the coin, Marijan Jurjevic presents his 1973 Ustasha Under the
Southern Cross.111 Like the work of Shaw, this piece was divided into two sections, a
background on the Ustasha and the independent state of Croatia, and the Ustashas
activities in Australia. In this latter section, Jurjevic began by examining the military
training undertaken by Ustashi groups in Australia, principally the HOP and the HPA,
citing articles and photos from the HOPs Spremnost magazine talking of the
liberation of Croatia.xiv This led the author to detail the 1963 and 1972 Ustashi
incursions into Yugoslavia. From here, Jurjevic set about discussing the main players
in the movement, their various associations (including religious and government ties),
and the support of the Australian community. The author detailed the intimidation
tactics used by the movements, some of which he experienced, including the bombing
of his home, his bashing resulting in two broken ribs, a parcel bomb exploding before
reaching his residence, and death threats (of which he received an average of ten per
year). The purpose of Jurjevics work was to alert the wider public to the Ustashi
threat. His work closes with Only public awareness can destroy [extremist fascism]
forever.112
1.3.2 THE HILTON BOMBING & ANANDA MARGA

There are several pieces of literature concerning the Hilton bombing in Sydney, which
was for a period attributed to the religious group Ananda Marga. The following works
were written by those who were falsely imprisoned and accused of the Hilton
bombing and other terrorist activities. While the following books cannot be
considered academic research or within the academic field of terrorism studies (like
the previous research), its existence does add some weight to the research on terrorism
in Australia.xv Paul Alisters 1997 Bombs, Bliss, and Baba: The Spiritual
Autobiography Behind the Hilton Bombing Frame-Up,113 was essentially his
autobiography, focusing on his involvement with Ananda Marga, his false
imprisonment, and the court proceedings involving the Hilton bombing and other
terrorism charges. Similarly, Tim Andersons 1985 Free Alister, Dunn, and
Anderson: The Ananda Marga Conspiracy Case,114 discussed the persecution and
imprisonment of the three Ananda Marga members.
xiv
One such article included a photo of HOP members on an Australian Defence Force tank (discussed
in the previous chapter).
xv
Especially when considering the lack of literature regarding the event, in addition to the lack of
academic research regarding terrorism in Australia.
100
1.3.3 TERRORISM IN EARNEST
It seems that the first scholarly piece of literature on terrorism in Australia was
published in the Australian Readers Digest, by Director of the Australian Institute of
Criminology William Clifford in 1981.115 Cliffords article, Terrorism: Australias
Quiet War, began by claiming that for the first time in Australia, Australians must
fear terrorism.116 The article began within an examination of the history of terrorism
and political violence in Australia, reiterating the fact that a Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting (CHOGM)xvi was to be held in Melbourne within days of the
articles publication. Clifford discussed the threats of terrorism within Australia,
briefly diagnosing the nations civil liberties, city sizes, modes of transport, and
multiculturalism as conducive to terrorist operations in liberal democracies, citing that
in contrast, authoritative communist nations are not troubled by terrorism.117
Clifford then moved to weigh the risks of terrorism against the amount of liberty we
are to surrender in order to be safe. In this line, Clifford made reference to two major
incidents. The first was the counter-terrorism proposals by the government that
followed the Hilton bombing, as well as the establishment of the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) following this event. The second reference was an incident in April
1979, when Domenico Speranza took a woman hostage at Sydney airport, held a knife
to her throat and attempted to detonate an explosive device.118
The subsequent discussion found that Australias principal security risk was that of
international terrorism, and that the organisation responsible for countering this threat
was the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).119 The author used the
(then) upcoming 1981 CHOGM as a hypothetical example of a terrorist scenario,
detailing the National Anti-Terrorism Plan (NATP) directed through the Protective
Services Coordination Centre (PSCC), specifying the coordination between the AFP
and various state police forces, ASIO, the Australian Bomb Data Centre, and
Immigration in the event of such a scenario.120
xvi
It was during a CHOGM that three individuals were killed by a terrorist bomb at the Sydney Hilton
in 1978.
101
Cliffords article finished by examining the changes that terrorism has instilled in
contemporary life, particularly concerning security within the executive business
world (with regard to kidnapping) and security within and around embassies in
Australia, arguing that a liberal society is the best defence against terror.121 This
article was the first to provide a significant overview of terrorism in Australia, and the
first to examine the subject and its future in earnest.xvii
Following from his influential 1982 effort, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and
Counter-Measures, Grant Wardlaw released an article entitled Terrorism and Public
Disorder: The Australian Context, in The Australian Criminal Justice System: The
Mid 1980s.122 This article began by discussing the sensationalisation of terrorism in
Australia through the media and questioning the validity of the imminent threat of
terrorism propagated by the media and Australian Government.123 Wardlaw
progressed to detail a history of public disorder in Australia and the government
responses to and actions against such public disorder.124 The article shifted to a
discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Australia, displaying scepticism when
examining the frequency and severity of terrorist events in Australia, specifying the
development of Australias counter-terrorism responses such as the PSCC, the
Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection
Against Violence, and ASIO, detailing the roles of each organisation under the
NATP.125 Wardlaw examined the conditions and circumstances under which the
Defence Force can be deployed within Australia to assist in policing, as was executed
following the Hilton bombing in 1978.xviii The dissection of Australias counter-
terrorism policy continued, assessing Australias response to a hypothetical hijacking,
again detailing the appropriate measures such as the AFP, the Anti-Hijack
Committees, and the Crisis Policy Centre.126
Wardlaw concluded by stating that Australias counter-terrorism measures adequately

meet the terrorist threat to Australia. However, while Australias responses to specific
(isolated) instances of terrorism have been appropriate, the responses to public
disorder have been over-authoritarian. The author warned against such a response to
xvii
Incidentally, Crown (1986) (to be discussed below) cited Cliffords (1981) article as the only real
attempt at examining terrorism in Australia.
xviii
This will be discussed in further detail when examining Hocking (1993).
102
either form of political violence in the future.127 In this piece, Wardlaw focused his
knowledge and experience on terrorism (and public disorder) in an Australian context,
to provide a small but valuable contribution to the literature on terrorism in Australia.
Australia: The Terrorist Connection, by James Crown,128 published in 1986, was the
third piece included in the sparse Australian literature that can be considered within
the academic field of terrorism studies, and, like Clifford in 1981,129 examined
Australias position within the 1980s world of international terrorism. Crown began
with two hypothetical terrorist incidents, the first, a hijacking of an aircraft bound for
Melbourne Airport, and the second, a kidnapping of a wealthy businessman,
proposing Australias ill-preparedness for such events.130 This assertion was in direct
contention with that of Wardlaws of the same year.131
These hypothetical scenarios were followed by an account of terrorism in Australia,

leading into the most likely sources of a terrorist attack in Australia, which ranged
from Australias relationship with the US, to Australian criminal organisations and
their assorted links with terrorist groups. Crown also examined major terrorism issues
ranging form the Hilton bombing to Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafisxix
involvement in international terrorism. 132
Crown examined the new world of international terrorism, its effects on previously
isolated nations like Australia, and considered the volatility of the political situations
of Australias neighbours, particularly in Southeast Asia.xx Crown offered another
fictional scenario, regarding an Australian pro-Indonesian position on East Timor, and
the retaliation by East Timorese groups.xxi The focus then shifted to New Caledonia
and the right-wing pro-independence Forces Caledoniennes Libres (Caledonian
Liberation Force) organisation and left-wing Kanak Socialist National Liberation
Front. Crown considered the implications of these groups for Australia and for
Australians in New Caledonia.133
xix
Leader of the Libya since 1969.
xx
As this book was written in the mid-1980s, the threat of communism was still considered significant.
xxi
This threat was demonstrated in 1998 when bomb threats were made on three Australian airliners
bound for Denpasar by the East Timor Liberation Front.
103
The book concluded by offering an assessment of Australias security from terrorism,
and set about offering significant policy recommendations for protective and security
agencies. These recommendations ranged from the protection of arms and explosives,
to intelligence, and the identification and protection of likely terrorist targets. The
most academically significant aspect of this piece of literature, however, was
presented in the postscript:
For Australia, far too little has been written about the terrorist threat and the potential
for politically motivated violence this country faces.In order to document the facts
I have quoted throughout this book I have turned to the only source of record
available on the Australian scene newspapers, magazines, and the recollections of
individuals involved and the journalists who reported these incidents.134
It is clear that the study of terrorism in Australia during this period was almost non-
existent, despite Crown presenting a clear cause for (at least some) alarm for
Australia regarding terrorism and terrorism research. Crowns assessment had little
impact, as the next serious offering within the field came five years later.
The article Terror Australis, written by Malcolm MacKenzie-Orr in 1991,135

presented a short and succinct history of terrorism in Australia (confined to three
events) in contrast to Australias sophisticated, centrally coordinated organisation for
counter-terrorism and protective security.136 MacKenzie-Orr listed the reasons that
Australia could be considered safe from international terrorism: its commitment to
civil rights, liberties, and multiculturalism; its even-handed foreign policy; its sparse
population and; its remoteness from conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and South
America. The author then moved to outline the risks associated with international
terrorism in Australia, and the reasons for Australias high counter-terrorism
preparedness. These were: Australias growing ethnic population among which over
fifty percent of immigrants are from Asian and Middle Eastern nations with domestic
conflicts; Australias involvement in Operation Desert Storm; Australias perceived
weakness in light of increased security measures throughout Europe and the US, and;
domestic conflicts within nations in Australias region, in nations such as Papua New
Guinea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Vanuatu, and Fiji.137
This article offered some insight into the threat of terrorism to Australia, despite an
insubstantial examination of terrorisms history in Australia. Despite the limited
length of the article, value was found in its assessment of the existing risks of
international terrorism in Australia.
104
In 1992, Therese Taylor published her article Australian Terrorism: Traditions of
Violence and the Family Court Bombings,138 in the Australian Journal of Law and
Society, examining the 1984 campaign of bombings against judges of the Family
Court and their families. Taylor compared this campaign of political violence against
Australias conventional history of terrorism, citing the bombing of the Hakoah Club,
the Hilton bombing, and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)
assassination of the Turkish Consul-General to Australia and his bodyguard.139 She
then discussed the motivations of the Family Court bombings through an analysis of
the Australian Family Law Act and the flaws within the legislation that led to such a
violent response. The article examined the way in which these bombings incited
wide-spread criticism, particularly within the media, against the Family Court and not
against the perpetrators of the violence.140 Taylor argues that this was the basis of
Australias only completely successful terrorist campaign, due to the fact that [t]he
perpetrators were not apprehended, the security services were unable to halt the
campaign, and the target was delegitimated.141 This article provided an in-depth
analysis of the Family Court bombings and a shift from the study of main-stream
terrorism, adding to the academic literature on terrorism in Australia.
Crowns 1986 call for terrorism research was met convincingly by Jenny Hocking 142
in her 1993 book Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security
State. Hocking hails from a legal background and attempted to examine the
development of Australian internal security arrangements and legislation through a
history of terrorism and other such national security threats. As in all academic
literature on terrorism before her, Hocking began with a detailed and comprehensive
definition of terrorism, and examined its place within social and political spheres as
an ideological construct.143 Hocking then moved briefly to state that political
motivation is the defining feature of terrorism, before shifting to distinguish between
terrorism from above and terrorism from below, and terrorism from political
violence.144 The author then examined the theoretical approaches to terrorism and
terrorism studies which, she claimed were marred by simplistic and evaluative
approaches and by a common failure to recognise the essentially political nature of the
use of the term terrorism and consequentially of these theories themselves.145
Hockings criticisms continued, aiming at descriptive reviews within terrorism
105
studies. Hocking then examined the development of the counter-terrorism theories and
the security state, drawing on the work of Hirsh and Jurgen Habermas.146
Following this establishment of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the security state as

central concepts of the study, Hocking examined the history of Australias internal
security arrangements from the 1907 establishment of the Australian Intelligence
Corps and its disbandment following the outbreak of the First World War, when
Military Intelligence took over the internal security responsibilities. The groups under
the watchful eye of these organisations were pacifist and left-wing groups.147 Hocking
offers an account of the development of the Counter-Espionage Bureau, the Defence
Security Bureau, the Commonwealth Investigation Service, and finally ASIO.148
Hockings analysis of ASIO followed the organisations creation through its charter
and constitutional basis, through to its counter-subversion and counter-espionage
orientation, and its relationships with various Federal Governments.149 The authors
focus then shifted to the Hilton bombing in 1978 and the constitutional basis for the
deployment of Australian Defence Force personnel. Hocking then examined the
creation of a distinction between terrorism and domestic violence within the
Australian political arena.150 This examination led the author to an assessment of the
history of terrorism in Australia since 1963, including Ananda Marga, Croatian
separatists, the JCAG, the Family Court bombings and other isolated instances of
political violence.151 xxii
Following this detailed assessment, Hocking discussed the focus of internal security
arrangements reverting to counter-subversion in the wake of the Hilton bombing. The
response to the bombing of the Hilton was a renewal of large-scale surveillance by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies and included the introduction of the ASIO
Act 1979. This legislation radically changed the organisation and powers of ASIO.
Hocking examined the act and its implications for civil liberties. These changes
included the redefinition of security, terrorism, politically motivated violence,
and subversion. The changes gave ASIO powers to enter premises and remove
records (providing warrants are issued), powers to intercept communications, and a
xxii
As distinct from terrorist incidents.
106
reduced accountability for the organisation.152 Hocking concluded with an assessment
of Australias counter-terrorism arrangements, ranging from law enforcement
agencies, to the PSCC, the NATP. Hocking closed this conclusion by prompting the
Federal and New South Wales (NSW) governments to investigate alleged security
and military involvement in the bombing of the Hilton, because [w]ithout such an
inquiry public speculation will remain that the much-vaunted single act of terrorism
in this country was in fact perpetrated by the very organisations established to protect
us from it.153 Hockings 1993 publication provided the most comprehensive piece of
literature on terrorism in Australia, clearly surpassing all previous efforts (and many
future ones).
1.3.3.1 POST 2001 RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA

Following the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks in the US, Clive Williams authored the
newspaper article Terror Trails on the Home Front which provided an extremely
brief yet relatively comprehensive coverage of Australias history of terrorism.154
Williams summed up by posing the possibility of Islamic extremist cells in Australia
in light of the 2001 attacks, discussing the incidence of illegal immigrants in Australia
and the opportunity for the introduction of a national identity card.155 Williams
followed this article with further research on terrorism in Australia, to be discussed
shortly.
In 2004 Hocking followed her 1993 work with her book Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-
Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy.156 This publication essentially expanded on
her past work in light of the events of September 11 and the 2002 Bali bombings, and
the consequential legislative changes made to Australias internal security
arrangements. Hocking began in the same manner as in her previous effort, examining
the definition of terrorism and its associated concepts, and moving to the history and
development of ASIO and Australias internal security arrangements. The new
offering differed when addressing the Second Wave of counter-terrorism, which
developed as a consequence of the September 11 attacks and the Bali bombings by al-
Qaeda and JI respectively.157 Hocking cited the establishment of the National
Counter-Terrorism Committee and the billions of dollars in increased budgets for
counter-terrorism and border security funding, and noted that the post-September
2001 changes to internal security arrangements were the most dramatic since the
107
establishment of ASIO in 1949.158 Hocking examined the legislation behind these
changes, such as the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 and the
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, the latter of which she
compares to the controversial and ultimately unsuccessful Communist Party
Dissolution Act 1950.159
The author progressed to examine the development of the Australian Security

Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, in light of
executive detention, detention in the absence of suspicion, the detention of children,
the removal of the right to remain silent, the denial of legal representation, and the
possibility of torture without accountability.160 These legislative changes, Hocking
stated, test the boundaries of the constitutionally structured and politically practiced
relationship between law and politics.161 Hocking contended that such changes
challenge the basis and validity of democracy and closed by stating that:
[i]f we consider that acts of extreme political violence, labelled terrorism, may
reflect a local but systemic failure in participatory democratic practice, then the
narrowing of acceptable discourse and legitimate political activity may well be one of
the precipitating factors of terrorist activity. If so, then what is needed as part of the
struggle against terrorism are not further constraints on effective political
participation, but a more inclusive politics; not less democracy, but more.162
Hockings follow up improves and updates her previous work in light of the rise of
21st Century Islamic extremism and its effects on Australian legislation.
In late 2006, Martin Chulov released Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism
from Within and Without.163 This book detailed an extensive history of Islamic
extremism in Australia that began before the 2000 Sydney Olympics, detailing the
major plots, arrests, and events that have occurred since. Chulov provides a strong
(pseudonyms aside) historical account of pre-2000 Islamic extremist training in
Australia, accounts of Mamdouh Habib, Jack Thomas, Zak Mallah, and David Hicks,
the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) cell centring around Willie Brigitte and Faheem Khalid
Lodhi, as well as the operations of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). This piece of literature
provides a strong historical context for terrorism studies in Australia and offers an
important platform for analytical approaches within the field.
108
Apart from the three pieces of literature above, little literature has been produced in
the first six years of this century that assists in either a qualitative or quantitative
understanding of terrorism in Australia. Despite the lack of literature aiming to
understand the phenomenon of terrorism in Australia, there has been a significant
amount of research literature from the counter-terrorism focus of terrorism studies.
This body of literature includes research such as that of Aldo Borgu who in 2004
examined a framework for regional cooperation by governments to combat terrorism
in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta in the
same year.164 In this vein, threat assessments are also popular (as the Australian
literature on international terrorism demonstrated). An example of such an assessment
is Carl Ungerer and Dallas Rogers evaluation of the threat of agroterrorism to
Australia in the international Studies in Conflict and Terrorism journal.165 A large
portion of the contemporary literature examines Australias legislative responses that
have developed since 2001, such as Clive Williams 2002 Australian Security
166
Policy, Post 11 September, Jenny Hockings 2003 Counter-Terrorism and the
Criminalisation of Politics: Australias New Security Powers of Detention,
Proscription and Control,167 and Christopher Michaelsens 2005 Anti-Terrorism
Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?.168
While research such as this is of immense value to the field, next to no research has
explored terrorist operations in Australia and no research exists on gaining a more
comprehensive understanding of how these groups have operated. Such an endeavour
would surely provide significant insight into the understanding of international
terrorism, 21st Century Islamic extremism, and the development of counter-terrorism
policy and applications.
This section of the chapter has established that while there is a noteworthy amount of
Australian research into terrorism, little research is being undertaken to understand
the phenomenon in Australia. The review indicates that an overwhelming majority of
the works have been situated within the counter-terrorism focus. While each of the
foci of the field are important, very little of the previous literature focused on
terrorists or terrorist organisations in Australia and attempted to either qualitatively or
quantitatively understand or explain terrorism in Australia. An even smaller number
employed methodologies that attempted to facilitate analytical techniques that would
assist in research, or would advance the field through understanding, explaining or
109
predicting terrorism in Australia. As we have seen through the early literature and
will continue to see within the criticisms of the contemporary literature, this criticism
cannot be confined to the literature on terrorism in Australia, but is a significant issue
within the field as a whole.
2. ISSUES WITHIN TERRORISM STUDIES

As we have seen, terrorism research has developed significantly since the 1970s.
However, as Gordon states, the field is still not yet established as a mature or stable
discipline in [academia].169 This failure has been attributed to many elements, the
earliest of which was the lack of researchers and trainees within terrorism studies, the
lack of co-ordination of the terrorism studies literature, and the absence of an
academic organisation that would identify terrorism and co-ordinate funding for the
new studies on terrorism.170 These issues were first identified in the early 1980s.171
Preceding this failure, during the late 1960s and early 1970s was the failure of the
political science sub-field to contribute to government policy making on terrorism.172
These failures were seen as preventing the terrorism research sub-field from becoming
a speciality, consequentially resulting in the delay of the evolution of terrorism studies
as an independent discipline.
Merari attributes the failures within terrorism studies to the numerous autonomous
approaches to and forms of terrorism, the lack of interest from the social sciences, the
lack of government and academic collaboration, and the clandestine nature of terrorist
organisations.173 During the rapid growth of terrorism research in the 1980s, the field
was subject to many sub-specialities, which again resulted in the uncoordinated state
of the literature.174 As asserted in the review of the early literature of the field,
Andrew Silke claims that one of the greatest dilemmas within terrorism research is an
agreed upon universal definition of terrorism, this, and the consequential conceptual
framework, he regards as the holy grail of the field.175 James Poland concurs, stating
176
that the definitional dilemma is the most confounding problem within the field.
E.F. Gibbons, Gregory Scott, and Jay Shafritz, go as far as to say it is unlikely that
any definition [italics in original] will ever be agreed upon.177
110
As the review of the contemporary literature within terrorism studies demonstrates,
the research area has developed into a speciality and a field of its own, stopping short
of becoming a discipline in its own right. Many of the issues that have been discussed
above have continued to plague terrorism studies. The following will examine the
criticisms of the field today, drawing on the initial criticisms above, and those made
by Schmid and Jongman in 1988.
2.1 CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF TERRORISM STUDIES xxiii

In 2001, Andrew Silke published an article entitled The Devil You Know:
Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism.178 This article drew from the 1988
work of Schmid and Jongman and attempted to examine the state of the contemporary
field in light of Schmid and Jongmans criticisms of 1988. This article, along with
similar research, indicates that terrorism studies continues to suffer from long term
methodological and analytical issues. These problems can be separated into four
broad criticisms: Objectivity, Abstraction, Research, and Analysis.
2.1.1 OBJECTIVITY
The first of these criticisms is that research into terrorism studies is not objective.179
180
Essentially, these criticisms attack the fields value-neutrality as a school within
the social sciences. Take a statement from Andrew Silke for example: researchers
have traditionally not been overly concerned with remaining objective and neutral in
how they view the subject and its perpetrators.181 xxiv The achievement of objectivity
is vital to any scientific form of inquiry. While it is admittedly difficult to remain
objective in the study of terrorism (particularly post-event), objectivity is a necessary
component within the field, and must be achieved for successful research.xxv
xxiii
It must be noted that a large majority of the contemporary criticisms of terrorism studies were made
prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the consequential expansion in the works within the field.
xxiv
We have seen this extensively in the Australian literature.
xxv
Objectivity in this regard is an issue that concerns many academic research areas, for example
research focusing on domestic violence, sexual assault, rape, and murder.
111
2.1.2 ABSTRACTION
The second criticism is that terrorism research no longer deals with terrorists, or that
research is too abstracted from the phenomenon which is to be studied. For instance,
Bruce Hoffman argues that too often terrorism research is conducted in a vacuum,
divorced from the reality of the subject.182 Similar claims are made by Brannan et al.:
terrorism studies has remained profoundly unaware of the internal dynamics and
human characteristics of its subject; this is one of the reasons why some other
branches of the social sciences regard terrorism studies as shallow and devoid of
intellectual credibility.183
The authors articulate that [m]any researchers remain profoundly isolated from
their research subjects, a state of affairs that seriously diminishes the ability to
understand the phenomenon under study or to offer relevant advice on appropriate
responses to it.184
2.1.3 LEVELS OF RESEARCH

The third criticism entails that works in terrorism studies are not based in empirical
research. This claim focuses on the fields lack of research based in empirical and
primary data. Schmid and Jongman, in 1988, asserted that as much as eighty percent
of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense,185 a figure more recently
established by Silke.186 In the same year as Schmid and Jongman, Gurr observed that
[w]ith a few clusters of exceptions there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of good
empirically-grounded research on terrorism.187 Three years later, Merari claimed that
even this was an understatement and that only a small proportion of the terrorism
literature is based on primary resources.188
In an attempt to provide a stronger framework for terrorism studies, Brannan et al.,

after pointing out that terrorism studies has remained profoundly distant from its
research subject,189 claimed that primary sources were the missing essence of
research within terrorism studies. They claim that the greatest of primary sources is
the terrorist and encouraged interviews with terrorists in order to gain this primary
research. It must be noted that Brannan et al. were writing prior to September 11,
2001. Since these attacks, the rise of world-wide 21st Century Islamic extremism and
the War on Terror, members of terrorist organisations, particularly al-Qaeda, have
become profoundly more reclusive than before the attacks in New York and
112
Washington. Even before these attacks, al-Qaeda was an enigmatic organisation,
making interviews near impossible at best.xxvi However, their point remains valid.
This third criticism essentially entails a complaisant reliance on secondary and tertiary
documents and research, and no generation of primary documents or data within
terrorism studies. 190 191
2.1.4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

The final criticism to be found within the terrorism studies literature cites the levels of
analysis within the field. A majority of the research in terrorism studies has been
qualitative research complemented by an inadequate quantity of explanatory or
predictive studies. The rationale behind this dilemma is the neglect of established and
experimental forms of analysis. Silke cites that quantitative analysis is not applied
enough in terrorism studies; specifically, he suggests statistical analysis
methodologies. Furthermore, only around three percent of the research within the field
uses inferential forms of analysis. 192 Brannan et al. sum the situation: The prevailing
laissez-faire approach to methodology must be consigned to the past if the aim of
terrorism studies is genuinely to seek understanding.193
3. POST 2001 ANALYTICAL RESEARCH IN TERRORISM STUDIES

Since the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, and the advent of 21st Century
Islamic extremism, the field of terrorism studies has experienced another take off
period similar to the 1980s, through the rapid growth and development of the field.
Terrorism studies is becoming less confined to academia. Institutions such as the
Federation of American Scientists and the Research and Development Corporation
provide large amounts of research to the field, with specific policy implications and
applications. Research in the field has increased dramatically, assisted by the millions
of dollars poured into research and development by Western governments as a
response to the September 11 attacks. The bulk of this literature concentrates on
WMD and CBRN prevention, and responses and extensive work within the counter-
terrorism focus.
xxvi
Several interviews have taken place with Osama bin Laden. See work by Peter Bergen (2002).
Interviews have also taken place with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Ramzi bin al-Shibh through the
al-Jazeera media network.
113
Since 2001, a significant amount of research on terrorists and terrorist groups has
been undertaken, that essentially constructs a history of and general assertions about
the state, capabilities, and modus operandi of 21st Century Islamic extremist groups.
The most influential and accurate of these are supplied by Peter Bergen, in Holy War
Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden194 and The Osama bin Laden I
Know: An Oral History of al-Qaedas Leader,195 and Jason Burke, author of Al-
Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam.196 Similar literature includes that of Rohan
Gunaratna,197 Jane Corbin,198 and Sally Neighbour.199 Neighbours examination of
Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) is the pinnacle study of this group. This
area of literature serves as a foundation for further analytical research and
understanding of these groups and 21st Century Islamic extremism.
The inflation in the amount of research within the field has also increased the amount
of concrete analytical studies called for by Jongman, Schmid and Silke, and the
improvement of terrorism studies research in relation to the criticisms outlined above.
This was demonstrated by the research examined in the Contemporary Terrorism
Studies section of this chapter in the articles by Rienares, Weinberg et al., Piazza, and
Moghadam who applied substantive forms of analysis within their research.
Abdelaziz Testas in his 2004 article Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World:
An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis,200 empirically attempts to quantify the
factors behind Islamic extremism in 37 different Muslim counties by building on the
previous work of Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova in 2003.201 This endeavour
directly meets the criticisms of the levels of analysis of terrorism studies through its
use of high levels of empirical analysis. Testas employs a Poisson Regression Model
in which the count variable is the average number of terrorist attacks per year and
measures explanatory values, educational attainment, and economic conditions. This
research builds on Krueger and Maleckova by examining additional variables such as
political repression and civil war.202
Testas found that education and civil war were positive determinants of terrorism, and
furthermore, that political repression initially decreased terrorism, but over time
eventually increased it. The income variable was found to be a negative determinant,
but this finding was considered weak unless examined within the context of civil war.
114
The author concluded the article by calling for further empirical research into the area
to focus the method and analysis on specific countries and cases, and to further
examine the educational variable within the approach.203 In this article, Testas
provided an empirically-driven research project using a quantitative methodology that
aimed at achieving understanding and explanation to provide a platform for further
research in this approach.
In a different analytical approach published in the same year, Caron Gentry examined
the relationship between new social movement theory and terrorism.204 The article
examined the roles of leadership, membership, personal ideology, and gender within
social movement theory, and examined new social movements' abilities to develop
into a terrorist group. Gentry introduced New Social Movement Theory as capable of
answering the criticisms inherent in both terrorism studies and international relations
through its ability to examine the internal dynamics of terrorist organisations and to
do so on the micro, macro, and meso levels. The author asserted that new social
movement theory provides a theoretical framework for terrorism studies to develop a
more thorough and less biased way of studying those who engage in political
violence.205 The article examined the development of the left-wing US terrorist
group the Weather Underground Organisationxxvii from its parent organisation, the
Students for a Democratic Society, through new social movement theory, specifically
focusing on the female members of the group. Like Testas, Gentrys article provided a
new analytical approach to terrorism studies that further contributed to the
development of analytical approaches within the field.206
In Laurita Denny, Jerrold Post, and Ehud Sprinzaks 2003 study The Terrorists in
their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,207 the
trio seem intent on meeting Brannan et al.s recommendations for quelling the levels
of research criticism through the use of the terrorist as a source of primary data.
Denny et al.s methodology involved the use of semi-structured interviews with
incarcerated members from religious extremist groups such as Harakat al-Muqawama
al-Islamiyah (HAMAS), Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, as well as secular members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Fatah, and the Democratic
xxvii
The Weather Underground Organisation (also known as Weatherman) operated between 1969 and
1975 in the US against the US Government.
115
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The project was undertaken through the
behavioural focus, aiming to attain an understanding of the psychology and decision
making-processes, as well as in relation to WMD.
The respondents within their project were examined on factors such as: family
background and early life; socialisation and recruitment; decision-making and the
structure of their organisation; views on armed attacks; justification for suicide
bombings; attitudes towards casualties and WMD; and sense of remorse.208 Following
an examination of the results, Denny et al., contrast the generalisations of these
individuals with those of the September 11 al-Qaeda members. This study provides a
methodology that specifically answers the criticisms of methodologies within the field
over the past two decades. Despite this, the study concludes with no recommendations
for counter-terrorism or policy initiatives and applications.
Jessica Stern has also responded to the criticisms of terrorism studies in her book,
Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, 209 in which she interviews
terrorists, both incarcerated and at large, from groups such as the Covenant, the
Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, HAMAS, Laskar Jihad, the Temple Mount Faithful,
LET, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and anti-abortion groups, to name
a few. This research is presented in two parts: Grievances that Rise to Holy War
and, Holy War Organisations. Although not conducting any interviews with al-
Qaeda members,xxviii Stern gives an excellent assessment of the groups through almost
every facet possible, from the groups relations with nation-states, to weapon
acquisition, funding, mission planning and procedures. Stern goes on to make her
conclusions regarding religious terrorism, and the application of her findings to US
policy. This study shows clear purpose, using substantially tangible and concrete
methodology and theory, satisfying the criticisms of the field.
Continuing the terrorism studies tradition of multidisciplinary approaches, David

Lester, Mark Lindsay, and Bijou Yang attempted to use psychological profiling in an
analysis of suicide bombers, contributing to the behavioural foci of terrorism studies
in 2004.210 To begin, the authors examine previous attempts at profiles on suicide
xxviii
Stern did conduct interviews with family members of some members and attended court hearings
for members.
116
bombers, ranging from sociodemographic approaches to psychodynamic speculations,
yielding two assertions from this literature: 1. That suicide bombers are not
characterised by the risk factors associated with suicide; and 2. That psychological
profiles are impossible.211 Lester et al. argue that these assertions are false, or at least
premature.
The authors established that no academic study has collected extensive biographical
data on suicide bombers, noting that if detailed biographical information were
collected on suicide bombers, evidence might be discovered that indicated a high
frequency of the suicide risk factors (which are traditionally discovered through
biographical data).212 The authors also suggest that typologies might be possible for
particular suicide bombers, illustrated by the case of Timothy McVeigh.xxix Lester et
al. pointed to the significance of an individuals childhood, specifically when the
individual reaches maturity accepting certain beliefs and views of leaders that result in
such violence. The authors sum up by claiming that only when these detailed
biographies become available will academics be able to gain some understanding of
the psychodynamics and typologies of the suicide bomber.213 These assessments by
Lester et al., again point to a lack of primary research within terrorism studies.
These works, while limited in quantity, demonstrate a positive shift towards new
methods and frameworks of analysis within contemporary research, providing
primary data, new insight, and new direction within the field. Despite the field of
terrorism studies dramatic expansion and rise to significance (particularly post 2001),
as well as the increase in the amount of substantive analytical studies, a majority of
the methodological and analytical problems that have compromised the field for the
last two decades still exist. Silke states that [t]he ultimate aim for any research field
is to progress from one level of understanding to the next, until a significant number
of studies can be conducted at explanatory level.214
While many of the major criticisms of terrorism studies continue to surface in a

significant number of contemporary studies, there is an significant movement to build
upon the existing strong qualitative and descriptive bases of terrorism studies with
xxix
The individual behind the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in April, 1995.
117
analytical research that focuses on not only the expansion of knowledge within the
field, but also on the understanding and explanation of the phenomenon and its
concepts. Movement in this area will continue to see criticisms of the field diminish
and the calls for a terrorism studies discipline strengthen. Since the second
renaissance period of the field, this strengthening has increased ten-fold, with specific
university courses and schools being established that focus on the study of terrorism.
4. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS

As we have seen, terrorism studies has matured from a sub-field of political science
through the 1970s, into a multidisciplinary field, and continued to develop through the
1980s and 1990s, stopping short of attaining the status of an independent discipline.
We have seen that since the second boom period of terrorism studies (post 2001)
there has been significant progress and growth in important areas of terrorism studies.
Despite this, the field continues to suffer from long-term problems, sharply
compounded by the contemporary criticisms of terrorism studies objectivity,
abstraction, levels of research, and levels of analysis. Silke sums up the situation
rather concisely in stating:
[i]t seems relatively clear that terrorism research exists in such a state and that after
over 30 years of enquiry, the field shows little evidence that it is capable of making
the leap to consistently producing research of genuine explanatory and predictive
value.215
Furthermore, we have seen that relatively little research exists on terrorism in

Australia. Through this review of the literature and the identification of the major
gaps and problems within the field, three clear objectives can be established. These
are:
1. To attempt to describe, understand, and explain the organisation and
communication of terrorist groups that have operated in Australia.
2. To attempt to provide a methodology that satisfies the criticisms of
terrorism studies.
3. To employ a method of analysis that may contribute to a predictive
capability to terrorism studies.
While the many approaches to terrorism studies are invaluable and contribute greatly
towards a complete and comprehensive field, there is one comprehensive analytical
118
approach that shows promise in providing new insight into the organisation and
communication of terrorist cells, and which may effectively contribute to an
explanatory and predictive capability within terrorism studies. This approach is Social
Network Analysis. The following chapter will examine the development and
applications of social network analysis to the study of covert and terrorist
organisations. This discussion will lead to a review of the thesis objectives and
introduce the research questions of the project. Following the establishment of social
network analysis as the principal analytical framework of this project, the
methodology will be proposed in detail.
119
120
CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK
ANALYSIS
CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
There is an area within the social sciences which aims to examine and understand how
groups of individuals operate and consequentially, how they behave. This area is
social network analysis, a methodological form of analysis that fuses mathematics,
anthropology, psychology, and sociology.1 i This chapter will examine the historical
development of the social network analysis field and its applications to covert and
terrorist networks. From there, the chapter will review the thesis objectives and re-
introduce the research questions. The projects methodology will then be outlined in
detail. The chapter will conclude by assessing the methodology in relation to the
thesis objectives of the project and discuss the analysis chapters to come.
1. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

A Social Network can be defined as a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or
relations defined on them.2 Therefore, social network analysis is a mathematical
method for connecting the dots[and] allows us to map and measure complex,
sometimes covert, human groups and organisations.3 The method focuses on
uncovering the patterning of peoples interactions.4 Correctly interpreting these
networks assists in predicting behaviour and decision-making within the network.5
Furthermore, the ability to understand and predict behaviour of members in a social
network allows the analyst to evaluate specific courses of action that will influence
the members of a social network in a desirable manner.6 Steven Aftergood, of the
Federation of American Scientists, claims that social network analysis provides a
useful way of structuring knowledge and framing further research. Ideally it can also
enhance an analysts predictive capability.7
1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD

Social network analysis developed from the early 1920s through three major
approaches:
i. the Sociometric Analysis approach;
ii. the Harvard approach; and
iii. the Manchester approach. 8
i
Note the interdisciplinary nature similar to terrorism studies.
122
The sociometric analysis approach was the original approach of the field, developing
from the 1920s, and was followed by the research of Harvard structuralists in the
1930s. The Manchester approach built on the research and developments of both
schools of thought from the 1950s, with all three methods advancing the theoretical,
empirical, and mathematical elements within social network analysis.9
1.1.1 SOCIOMETRIC ANALYSIS

The first of the fields approaches was the sociometric analysis approach, which
originally developed through psychology. This approach was very much the more
technical approach of the three, providing advances through the application of graph
theory.10 The earliest foundations of this approach lie in the educational and
developmental psychology of the 1920s. The research of John Almack11 in 1922 and
Beth Wellman12 in 1926 focused on the choices among pairs of school children, and
recorded the interaction of the pairs combined with intelligence quotas and other
psychological data. In 1927 Eugeine Chevaleva-Janovskaja designed the fields first
structural study of group interaction and again, this research was based on young
school children, examining (among other things) the impact of age on group
formation.13 Between 1928 and 1933, Helen Bott,14 Ruth Hubbard,15 and Elizabeth
Hagman16 also conducted research into the interpersonal connections and interactions
between young children. While these studies were far removed from social network
analysis in its contemporary form, they formed the basis for the structural and
interpersonal research into networks within psychology.
One of the most important and earliest antecedents of the strands that developed into
social network analysis originated in psychology through Gestalt theory and the
work of Wolfgang Kohler, through his research on the psychology of primates in
1925.17 Gestalt theory concerned the networks and organised patterns that structure
the perceptions and thoughts within the mind. This theory was eventually integrated
into the structural analysis of society through Jacob Moreno in Who Shall Survive?: A
New Approach to the Problem of Human Interactions, published in 1934. Moreno
began his revolutionary work by examining the theories leading to the formation of
the psychological planning of society, originating through the varying approaches of
Henri-Louis Bergson,18 Sigmund Freud,19 Hippolyte Bernheim,20Auguste Comte,21
123
Karl Marx,22 and Francis Galton.23 Moreno defined the methods of his proposed
approach to the psychological planning of society as:
1. Socionomy:
a science which is concerned with the psychological properties of
populations and with the communal problems which these properties
produce. Its principal concern is with the intricate interrelations of various
groups and their activities and the way in which these activities affect the
welfare of the community;24
2. Sociometry: the part of socionomy which deals with the mathematical study of
psychological properties of populations, the experimental technique of and
the results obtained by application of quantitative methods,25 and;
3. Sociometric Test: An instrument to measure the amount of organisation shown
by social groups.26
Moreno conducted such experiments through various educational facilities in the

United States (US). After detailing the methodology of his experiments,27 he
presented his tabulated results. From these tables, Moreno attempted to represent the
formal configurations of social relationships, and the value of such relationships
through the subjects psychological processes via the application of Gestalt theory.
Through this application and the structural work within psychology before him,
Moreno invented the Sociogram, a visualisation of a network in which individuals
were represented as nodes and the relationship between these nodes as lines or
links.28 In his analysis, Moreno compared the sociograms of different school
children of different ages, discovering three succinct divisions of psychological
development. These were defined as the Pre-Socialised Period, the First Socialised
Period, and the Second Socialised Period. Moreno then examined these cleavages
in groups and the concept of age within group development.29 Moreno extended his
experiment in this piece of literature to examine the organisation of groups within
cottage families and work shops such as a steam laundry, applying similar forms of
analysis to those experiments. The 1934 work of Moreno revolutionised the study of
societal structure, not only within psychology, but also within sociology and
anthropology, as will be demonstrated subsequently.
124
Moreno continued his work, focusing on the relationship between psychology and
social configurations, through the founding of the Sociometry journal in 1937. In an
article in the first volume of the journal, Moreno discussed the state and development
of the sociometry field which he claimed was a relatively new field that had
developed gradually since the First World War. Moreno claimed that sociometry
aims to determine objectively the basic structures of human society.30 ii
Moreno
outlined the significance of the science in stating that it is essential to know the
actual structure of human society at a given moment.31 The article discussed
sociometry and its relations to and within the social sciences, and the types of
sociometric procedures within the field. Moreno outlined the four approaches to
sociometry:
(1) the research procedure, aiming to study the organisation of groups; (2) the
diagnostic procedure, aiming to classify the positions of individuals in groups and the
position of groups in the community; (3) therapeutic and political procedure, aiming
to aid individuals or groups to better adjustment; and finally, (4) the complete
sociometric picture, in which all these steps are synthetically united and transformed
into a single operation.32
The article then proceeded to discuss the research and presentation of data within
sociometry, as well as the major concepts within the field.
Building on the revolutionary work of Moreno, the mathematical integration of

sociometry began through the work of Kurt Lewin in 1951, when he began analysing
social space through techniques such as topology and set theory.33 Graph Theory, in
its contemporary from, was developed by Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary in
1956. The two built on the methods of Moreno, developing a framework in which
they claimed that graph theory allowed for the mathematical analysis of the
sociogram.34 Graph theory is defined as consisting of a body of mathematical axioms
and formulae which describe the properties of the patterns formed by lines.35 The
development of social network analysis through graph theory allowed a set of criteria
to be developed to portray the formal properties of networks, as well as representing
networks through graphs (as opposed to sociograms).36 iii
Cartwright and Harary
endeavoured to advance the network graphs further, allotting the lines values such as
ii
Note the early focus on objectivity in relation to the previous chapters criticisms of the lack of
objectivity within terrorism studies.
iii
The principle difference between a sociogram and a graph is that a graph is considered a precise
mathematical object and as such is a mathematical representation of a network.
125
positive and negative to represent the nature of the relationship (signed graph),
numerical values to indicate the strength of the relationships (valued graph), and also
arrows to indicate the direction of the exchange or the relationship (directed graph).37
1.1.2 HARVARD APPROACH

The Harvard approach was based on the same fundamental concepts as the
sociometric approach, that is, those that evolved through developmental psychology.
Unlike the sociometric analysis approach, however, the Harvard approach developed
along with Structural Functionalism within sociology and anthropology. The
Harvard approach developed through the 1920s and focused on the patterns of
interpersonal connection and the formation of Cliques.38 A clique was then defined
as an intimate non-kin group, membership in which may vary in numbers from two
to thirty or more people.39 More recently a clique has been defined by Wasserman
and Faust as (simply) a group involving a minimum of three nodes.40
The Harvard approach developed in unison with the psychological approach in a non-
technical fashion by anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, considered among the
most influential contributors to modern anthropology and structural functionalism,
during the 1920s and 1930s. Radcliffe-Brown applied structural functional theory to
studies of tribal groups in the Andaman Islands41 as well as Australian Aborigines.42
This research aimed to look beyond family and kinship relations, and examine
friendship and other such associations. Radcliffe-Brown examined these relations by
discussing the web of society. Following this work, a number of academics from the
sociology and anthropology disciplines adopted Radcliffe-Browns concepts of the
fabric and web of societies. This work was taken up principally by Harrison White
and fellow Harvard University anthropologists.43
By the 1960s, the Harvard academics had instituted a clear and developed social
network analysis methodology. In 1963, Harrison White employed matrix algebra in
the simplification of the classification of kinship relations.44 In 1969, John Boyd
examined the mathematical applications to group theory in relation to class and
kinship,45 three years later, Francois Lorraine and Harrison White examined the
structural equivalence of individuals within social networks.46 The Harvard school of
thought was responsible for the foundations of a coherent framework of social
126
network analysis through the work of White and his students that emigrated to the
departments of different institutions all over the world.47
1.1.3 MANCHESTER APPROACH

The third approach in the development of social network analysis is the Manchester
approach, which was cultivated by academics of the University of Manchester. The
approach combined the previous two to investigate the structure of interpersonal and
community relations within tribal societies.48 In the 1950s, the Department of
Anthropology at Manchester University began examining conflict within tribal groups
and societies. These academics examined the density and texture of these societies,
initiating an abundance of technical and applicational work through the 1960s and
1970s. The most important of these works were heavily influenced by the work of
Radcliffe-Brown and were led by John Barnes 1954 work in which he applied
significant analytical thoroughness to the previous concepts of social network
analysis.49 Elizabeth Bott followed in 1957, with a network examination of urban
families and the roles and relationships within them,50 and later came Clyde
Mitchells applications to urban social networks in 1969.51 This strand of social
network analysis also included Jeremy Boissevain and his study Hal-Farrug: A
Village in Malta in 1969.52 Boissevain and Mitchell later jointly authored Network
Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction in 1973.53
The contemporary field of social network analysis, the culmination of these three
approaches, has developed into a strong but relatively small area of study, headed by
the International Network for Social Network Analysis, the Journal of Social
Structure and the Connections periodicals. The works within this field originate from
psychology, anthropology, sociology, and mathematics, and concern the many fields
and facets of human. The area of social network analysis that concerns this thesis is
the research examining covert networks.
1.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS COVERT NETWORKS

There has been an abundance of social network analyses into crime and criminal
networks, largely stimulated by Sparrows 1991 work on the application of network
analysis techniques to intelligence analysis. This work focused on the identification of
network vulnerabilities within the different types and forms of criminal networks.
127
Sparrow began his article by asserting that intelligence agencies have remained
largely unsophisticated in their use of analytical concepts and frameworks, stating
that social network analysis has much to offer intelligence agencies in this area.54 The
author established that despite these important applications, there was little research
overlapping the two fields. Sparrow exhibited three contentions regarding the
importance of integration between the two areas of research:
i. the pertinent application of social network analysis to intelligence analysis;
ii. the significant opportunity within the field for adapting network analysis to
the intelligence field, and;
iii. the profound benefits of such collaboration to both fields.55
The article then outlined some of the current methods of analysis within the
intelligence community, examining the characteristics of criminal networks through
network analysis. Sparrow identified three major difficulties in examining covert
networks through social network analysis. The first was Incompleteness, which
acknowledges that all data on covert organisations will inevitably be incomplete. The
second was Fuzzy Boundaries. This concern addressed the ambiguous boundaries of
covert networks. Individuals may be a part of many different networks, or only on the
periphery of the network in question. The final problem within the study of covert
networks was that such networks are Dynamic, meaning that they are never static,
and that the relationships and contacts are constantly changing.56 Sparrow then
examined the relevant concepts and applications of social network analysis to
criminal networks.57 This article outlined the specific significance and applications of
social network analysis to the academic study of criminal networks and the
intelligence field, setting the foundations for the social network analysis of covert
networks.
Subsequent to Sparrow, Wayne Baker and Robert Faulkners study of illegal

networks within the heavy electrical equipment industry examined the organisation of
price fixing conspiracies and these networks. Following an analysis of the networks,
the authors found that the individuals involved in these activities operated in networks
that traded concealment for efficiency.iv Baker and Faulkners methodology
iv
Further measures of concealment/secrecy and efficiency of networks with regard to density will be
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
128
specifically aimed to close the perceived gap between the theory and technique of
social network analysis.58
Peter Klerks work on various criminal organisations observed the developing and
contrasting approaches to examining criminal networks, noting that the network
mode of organisation between people and functional entities has proven to be far
better adapted to modern modes of collaboration, trading and communication than the
traditional hierarchical structures.59 He then examined three phases of network
analysis within intelligence analysis. The first involved the use of hand-drawn charts
and maps using different coloured pins. The second phase employed computer
software such as i2s Analysts Notebook and Netmap produced by Active Analysis.
Klerks identified the third phase with an intense focus on the content of the contacts,
on the social context, and on the interpretation of such information.60 v
Klerks
article essentially indicated the important and necessary role that social network
analysis (or third phase intelligence network analysis) has to play in the intelligence
and law enforcement fields.
Social network analysis has also been employed in military and intelligence
applications such as Robert Deckro and Richard Renfros analysis of the Iranian
Government in 2001. In this study, sponsored by the National Security Agency, and
conducted through the (US) National Air Intelligence Centre, the authors attempted to
develop a social network analysis of the Iranian government to determine their
specific decision making processes and the influential individuals within the Iranian
Government. Through this methodology, Deckro and Renfro discovered the
individuals within the Iranian government who wielded the most influence in the
decision making processes of the various bodies of government. In this way, they
identified which individuals could be pressured or targeted to alter the decisions of
the Iranian Government in favour of US interests.61 These results allow for
predictions of the likely actions of the Iranian Government and how these decisions
would be made. Such research has obvious and profound applications to the political,
military, and intelligence spheres.
v
The computer software to be employed in the third phase intelligence analysis of this project will be
discussed in the methodology section of this chapter.
129
1.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS & TERRORISM STUDIES
Despite the previously discussed literature on covert networks, very little literature
existed that examined terrorist networks through social network analysis before
September 11, 2001. Following this event and the consequential resources poured into
terrorism research, the social network analysis and terrorism research area began to
form. Arquilla and Ronfeldt were among the first to take up the challenge. Arquilla
and Rondfeldt in a 2001 book entitled Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror,
Crime, and Militancy, synthesised previous work, the sum of which introduced and
developed the concept of netwarvi and its applications to terrorism, crime, and
militancy. This book outlines the previous work and its development through the
various areas of netwar. The authors examined the development of social network
analysis, outlining the theory behind the practice. They assessed that the field of
network analysis, writ large, has been dominated by social network analysis, but
organisational network analysis can be even more helpful for understanding the nature
of netwar.62 They then shaped a framework of Organisational Network Analysis.
This framework comprises five levels: the organisational level, the narrative level, the
doctrinal level, the technological level, and the social level.63 The organisational
network analysis framework differs from social network analysis in that it does not
employ the use of robust empirical methods and mathematics to measure the values of
the network, but rather focuses on criteria such as the strategies and methods
employed, and the information systems used in the network. Arquilla and Ronfeldts
work provided an important framework for the analysis of the networks of terrorist
cells and groups. Despite the important research and attempted development of the
network analysis area, this study did not actually apply their theoretical approaches to
real historical terrorist networks using any form of sociometric, organisational
analysis, or graph theory.
vi
Netwar as a concept concerns conflict through which nonstate actors are organised within networks
rather than hierarchies.
130
1.3.1 VALDIS KREBS
FIGURE 1: SEPTEMBER 11 AL-QAEDA GRAPH 64
This figure is not available online.

Please consult the hardcopy thesis
available from the QUT Library
The first significant social network analysis of terrorism, which applied graph theory
and network and sociogramatical analysis,vii is Valdis Krebs 2002 analysis of the
September 11 al-Qaeda cell (Figure 1). This study began with its focus on the two al-
Qaeda members Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar who were photographed at a
meeting of known and suspected terrorists in Malaysia in early 2000 by Americas
vii
All essential elements of social network analysis.
131
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Krebs then mapped the relationships between the
hijackers on each of the aircraft, and mapped the co-conspirators of the cell using
media sources, shown in Figure 1. This graph shows the complexity and intensity of
the overall network responsible for the September 11 operation. While Krebs did not
outline his theoretical foundations or provide a contextual background, he followed
conventional social network analysis methods in his graph, such as using differing
thicknesses in the ties between nodes to signify the strengths of the relationships.
FIGURE 2: KREBS LINE NETWORK
This figure is not available online.

Please consult the hardcopy thesis
available from the QUT Library
132
Krebs then provided an analysis of his research, using conventional social network
analysis criteria such as Degrees of Connexion, Centrality, Betweenness, and
Closeness.viii The use of this analysis illustrated that cell member Mohamed Atta
was the leader of the network. Figure 2 demonstrates that Krebs also used density and
shape in the analysis of just the hijackers to discover a low density line or snake
networkix which signified that the network was set up to minimise damage if a node
was compromised.x Krebs argued that this formation traded efficiency for secrecy. In
this study, Krebs offered the most profound social network analysis to date of a
terrorist organisation.65
The significance of Krebs work is verified by the research of Phillip Vos Fellman
and Roxanna Wright who used Krebs analysis of the September 11 cell when
demonstrating the effectiveness and utility of social network analysis in the study of
terrorism. Vos Fellman and Wright began their paper by asserting the non-
randomness of terrorism: Randomness and determinism are the poles that define the
extremes in any assignment of causality. Of course reality is somewhere in
between.66 The authors go on to press that terrorist behaviour falls somewhere in
between the purely chaotic and the fully deterministic realms.67 The paper addresses
the possibility of predicting terrorism in a purely chaotic system, and acknowledges
the impossibility of total predictivity within such a system. Vos Fellman and Wright
assert that:
the application of the most recent advances in science is most likely to bear fruit in
the fight against terrorism not at the level of state leadership, and not at the level of
mapping and predicting the behaviour of each individual terrorist, but rather at an
intermediate or organisational level.68
This level is characterised as the mid-range level.
The paper then cited Krebs social network analysis of the al-Qaeda September 11 cell
as the pinnacle study of terrorism at the mid-range and proceeded to a review of the
methodology and the analysis. The authors argued that social network analysis offers
very strong insights into the behaviour of terrorist networks and that previous studies
viii
These criteria will be discussed in detail below.
ix
Different types of network formations will also be discussed below.
x
Zacharias Moussaoui (a member of the al-Qaeda 9/11 network) was arrested while using flight
simulators in the US. Despite this compromise, no damage was sustained by the cell in the lead up to
the operation. Another pilot was used, and the mission was carried out without any further disruption.
133
have treated terrorist networks as an unstructured concept. Furthermore, they argued
that Krebs use of social network analysis uncovers the dynamics of learning and
adaptation within such a network. From this discussion, the authors noted the
importance of social network analysis in the study of terrorism by saying that it
contributes to counter-terrorismthe ability to map the invisible dynamics inside a
terrorist community.69
Vos Fellman and Wright then discussed further measures of networks, social cohesion
and adhesion, and their effects on the development and dynamics of networks, using
arguments from James Moody and Douglas White, and Frank Harary and Whites
discussions of social cohesion and embeddedness. The article examined issues of
cohesion and adhesion as well as embeddedness, solidarity, and the robustness of
networks. Vos Fellman and Wright claimed that a group is adhesive to the extent that
the social relations of its members are resistant to the group being pulled apart, and a
group is cohesive to the extent that the multiple social relations of its members pull
together.70 They inferred that measurable differences in cohesiveness should have
predictive consequences,71 and that in terms of counter-terrorism, this is a clear,
predictive model which can be utilised for the optimisation of effort and resources.72
Jonathan Farley further emphasises the significance of social network theorys

application to terrorism studies by applying order theoryxi to social network analysis
in an attempt to mathematically analyse the extent to which a terrorist cell has been
broken. This application resulted in graphs representing ordered sets, which
essentially represented a ranked sociogram (or network). Farley also drew on the work
of Krebs in these applications. The incorporation of order theory was undertaken due
to Farleys assumption that: A graph inadequately represents a terrorist
cellbecause it fails to capture the fact that, in any cell, there will most likely be a
hierarchy leaders and followers with orders passed down from leaders to
followers.73 The study continues by examining the results of the removal of
individuals within a terrorist cell; this is achieved through the calculation of the
probability that a terrorist cell has been disrupted.74
xi
Essentially a hierarchical approach, examining ordered rank.
134
Carley, Reminga, and Kamneva debate the proposition of hierarchical examinations
of covert and terrorist cells, by stating that such networks:
have network structures that are distinct from those in typical hierarchical
organisations. Their structure is distinct from the organisations that most people in
western culture are used to dealing with. In particular, they tend to be more cellular
and distributed. As such, most people do not have an intuitive understanding of how
they work and instead seek to think of them as hierarchies. However, analysis reveals
that trying to destabilise a cellular distributed network using tactics designed for
hierarchies is likely to be ineffective.75
As Farley discusses, traditional forms of destabilising hierarchical networks aim at

cutting the lines of command and communication between the leaders and the foot
soldiers within networks, for example, the arrest of the head of a cell. Such measures
may produce confusion and a loss of cohesion and effectiveness.76 While these
methods remove the leadership from a cell, a majority of the cell may remain in place
to undertake an operation. The methodology of this thesis will examine the terrorist
cells as dynamic networks. Disruption techniques for cellular and distributed networks
(dynamic as oppose to hierarchical networks) will be discussed below in greater
detail.
Farley concluded his article by suggesting that terrorism is not an academic subject,
citing scepticism as the general response in the search for new tools in the war on
terror.xii However, he articulates that academic methods must aim at the assistance of
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the fight against terror.77 Farleys work
provides a significant piece of research within the field, with some substantive
applications of his study to counter-terrorism fields, and further exploration into the
applications of social network analysis to terrorism studies. While this article offered
significant analysis of Krebs study of the al-Qaeda cell responsible for the attacks on
New York and Washington, a majority of Farleys analysis aimed at the breaking of
theoretical cells, but like the previous attempts, did not apply his theory by mapping
real terrorist cells through order or graph theory.
xii
Farley strongly pushes the abstruse field of mathematics as a source of this scepticism.
135
1.3.2 FURTHER TERRORISM RESEARCH
In 2004, Marc Sageman released Understanding Terror Networks,78 which examined
the rise and development of 21st Century Islamic extremism through the revival of the
Salafist movement. While Sageman did not conduct a social network analysis of this
movement, he provided a succinct contextual examination of the Salafist movement,
examining the ties that bind members together, such as friendship, kinship, worship,
and discipleship, emphasising the importance of social bonds.79 This work resembled
what Arquilla and Ronfeldt called an organisational network analysis, in its analysis
of the new technology that defines the links between nodes, such as the internet, and
its discussion of the organisational design.80 In this book, Sageman provided an
important way of understanding how the Salafist jihad network operates.
Since Krebs social network analysis of the al-Qaeda September 11 cell, there have
been several other analyses of terrorist networks. Carley, Dombroski, Tsvetovat,
Reminga, and Kamneva in 2003 examined an al-Qaeda network that undertook an
embassy bombing in Tunisia and examined destabilisation techniques of this
network.81 In a 2005 study, Carley mapped the communication and interaction within
a 2002 al-Qaeda network, through dynamic network analysis.82 In the same year,
Carley, Diesner, Reminga, and Tsvetovat also examined a terrorist network in the
Middle-East through dynamic network analysis.83 Despite these works, there still
exists little literature in which substantive historical terrorist cells have been mapped
and examined through either social network or other forms of network analysis. None
has been undertaken of terrorist cells that have operated in Australia.
2. IMPLEMENTATION
It has been established that there remains a significant amount of research to be
undertaken combining the terrorism studies and social network analysis fields.
Despite the potentially profound significance of sociogramatical and social network
analysis to terrorism studies, there has been only a handful of substantive studies that
have employed such analysis of real terrorist groups and cells. In light of Silkes
assessment of terrorism studies cited in the previous chapter, social network analysis
136
is a powerful tool capable of providing predictive and explanatory value to the
field.xiii
2.1 THESIS OBJECTIVES

This thesis has employed a social network analysis of historical terrorist groups in
Australia. The adoption of a social network analysis framework as the methodology
of this project meets the first two objectives outlined in the previous chapter:
1. To describe, understand, and explain the organisation and
2. To attempt to provide a methodology that satisfies the criticisms of
terrorism studies.
The first objective is met through the distinct ability of social network analysis to map
and measure the organisation, interaction, and communication of groups of
individuals. The second objective will be met through the methodology and methods
of data collection used within this project. These methods will aim at the objective
collection, presentation, and analysis of the data, the analysis of the internal dynamics
of the terrorist cell, the generation of primary data, and a strong method of analysis.
The third objective of the thesis is:

3. To employ a method of analysis that can contribute to a predictive
capability within terrorism studies.
This objective is met through the use of the social network methodology. Social
network analysis provides the ability to understand and predict behaviour of
members in a social network [and] allows the analyst to evaluate specific courses of
action that will influence the members of a social network in a desirable manner.84 It
is hoped that the adoption of this methodology as the framework for analysis in the
project will contribute towards a predictive and explanatory ability within terrorism
studies, as well as achieve an intimate understanding of the organisation and
xiii
The significance of such research is evidenced by the amount of further research drawn from Krebs
(2002) study.
137
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The first research question provides a direct response to the first research objective
and aims to contribute to the literature on terrorism in Australia. The first research
question is:
A. How have terrorist cells in Australia operated?
In response to this question, three terrorist cells that have operated in Australia have
been selected for analysis. These groups were selected due to their significance within
the history of terrorism in Australia and following preliminary research as to the
feasibility of the collection of appropriate levels of data. The groups selected were:
the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB)
cell that launched an incursion into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) in 1963; the Aum Shinrikyo cell operating in Western Australia in 1993; and
the Lashka-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET) cell operational in Sydney in
2003. An accurate assessment of this question through social network analysis will
provide a useful explanatory evaluation of the operation and communication of these
groups, the strengths and weaknesses of these methods of operating and interacting,
how to counter groups that are operating in a similar fashion, and how these (or
similar) groups may operate in the future.
In order to utilise the predictive capability of social network analysis and to further
satisfy the criticisms of terrorism studies discussed in the previous chapter, a second
question is posed that aims to offer insight into how Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic
Community, JI) would potentially operate in Australia through the following
question:
B. How might a JI cell operate in Australia?
This inquiry will conduct a social network analysis of the 2002 JI Bali cell. The
resolution of this question will attempt to provide insights into and projections of the
organisation, communication, and operation of what is arguably Australias most
pertinent terrorist threat.xiv
C. What are the most effective methods of destabilising these cells?
This question aims to provide specific counter-terrorism applications by establishing
the most effective methods of destabilising the cells that were graphed in answering
xiv
As evidenced by the Bali, Marriott, and Jakarta Embassy bombings.
138
the previous two research questions. The destabilisation techniques to be employed
will be covered in the methodology section of this chapter.
What follows will outline the specific methodology of this project, including the
specific social network analysis frameworks to be used and the methods of presenting
and collecting the necessary data required for the response to the above research
questions.
3. METHODOLOGY
This doctoral project employs a social network analysis methodology. The
methodology of this project required three interdependent stages. The first was the
Contextual Background, in which the context and physical environment of the cells
operation are examined. From this contextual background, the second stage, the
Relational Data stage, was undertaken. Relational data can be defined as the
contacts, ties, and connections, the group attachments and meetings, which relate one
agent to another.85 This stage of the methodology aims to record the relational data
that can be synthesised from the contextual background. Once the contextual
background and relational data stages were complete, the Network Analysis stage
was commenced. The network analysis stage uses the recorded relational data to
measure the different network criteria of the individuals and the overall network.
Through these stages, the project employed both qualitative and quantitative
approaches. While Scott acknowledges that it is possible to undertake quantitative
and statistical counts of relations, network analysis consists of a body of qualitative
measures of network structure.86 Despite the qualitative measures of network
structure, the empirical nature of social network analysis requires both qualitative and
quantitative strategies. This will be clearly demonstrated throughout this section of
this chapter. A retroductive approach was adopted as the project aimed to uncover the
mechanisms that form and sustain terrorist cells that have been operational in
Australia between the 1960s and today.
139
3.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
The first step in any attempt to analyse a social network is to construct a contextual
background. This project provided a contextual background behind the four terrorist
cells and the individuals within these networksxv in order to understand the physical
environment of the network. This background was constructed through a case study
approach, with the data being collated through ethnographic interviews, and primary,
secondary, and tertiary documentary research.
3.1.1 THE CASE STUDY

The case study is among the oldest of methodological traditions within qualitative
research, used in disciplines ranging from anatomy, to biochemistry, psychiatry, and
sociology.87 Specifically, the case study was employed most influentially within the
Chicago sociological tradition throughout the 1920s. According to Yin, the case
study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple
sources of evidence.88 The significance of the method is documented by Bromley
who states that the case study or situation analysis is the bed-rock of scientific
investigation.89 The purpose of conducting this case study was descriptive, to provide
the contextual background of the networks to be examined, and as Yin agrees, this is
one of the methods primary functions.90
The contextual backgrounds within this project have detailed the data on the
group/organisation, the cell, and the individual, to allow a complete understanding of
the context in which the cell is based and is operating. As will be discussed regarding
the data collection below, the contextual background must be objective, and there can
be no assumptions in relation to the data or the relationships between individuals. As
has been discussed, the examination of covert networks can lead to incomplete or
insufficient data. Where educated assumptions are absolutely necessary and feasible,
the evidence supporting such an assumption is presented. All data has been correlated
to attempt to ensure the absolute authority and objectivity of both the data and the
data sources.
xv
The term network/s in this project implies the cell, and not wider terrorist networks, as designated
by the term within broader terrorism studies literature.
140
Despite the significance and prevalent use of the case study method, there are three
major criticisms, particularly when contrasted with quantitative methodologies. Such
issues are necessary to contend with to meet the second objective of the project.
These criticisms are:
i. The possibility of casual research and biased results.91
ii. That case studies are not useful in generalisation and comparison.92
iii. That case studies are arduous and time consuming.93
The first criticism echoes criticisms of terrorism studies and their lack of objectivity.
The solution to this criticism is dependent on the data sources used in the research and
the methods employed, which will be discussed subsequently. The following two
criticisms will also be discussed later in this chapter.
3.1.2 DATA COLLECTION & SOURCES

Inherent in the examination and analysis of data concerning covert groups and their
actions is the difficulty associated with the collection of such data. By its very nature,
the data concerning the groups that have been examined was difficult to procure for
several reasons: 1. A wealth of the data is classified by government agencies; 2.
Government agencies often do not themselves have the data required to form an
inclusive assessment of the group or operation under investigation. These issues
presented problems with regard to the LET cell which involved individuals who have
been charged with terrorism-related offences but not convicted. Additionally, the data
collection of the LET cell discovered individuals within the cell who have not been
publicly identified or charged with any offence related to these activities. The legal
ramifications of this discovery are discussed below.
The HRB cell posed a different dilemma in that while many government documents
on the group have been declassified, the data on the group that the government had
collected was incomplete and not comprehensive. Before discussing the data
collection methods that have been employed in this doctoral project, Sparrows
discussion of the difficulty in examining covert networks must be revisited.94 Any
examination of a terrorist or covert organisation will inevitably be incomplete,
particularly within academia where the data collection methods are far less
comprehensive and far-reaching than those of national and international intelligence
141
agencies. Despite the best efforts of the researcher in this project, the data and the
networks will inevitably be incomplete in some areas.
The contextual background data collected in this project was achieved through
documentary research and interviews. The principal form of data collection in this
project was through open sourcexvi documentary research, and hence, through social
artefacts. Primary data was employed as much as possible.
3.1.2.1 GOVERNMENT SOURCES

These primary sources were retrieved through the National Archives of Australia
(NAA) which included declassified archives from various government departments
and agencies including seized diaries, letters, and pamphlets of the terrorist cells in
question. While some of these sources had already been declassified, applications for
access had to be made and the archives examined for declassification through the
NAA. This was the first type of government data source employed.
The project also employed reports and media releases published by the Australian
government regarding the cells in question. Examples of these are the Police in
Australia Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP
Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia,95 by the Australian
Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Institute of Criminology in 2004, and the US
government, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum
Shinrikyo, by the Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations in 1995.96 Previously classified reports from the AFP concerning Aum
Shinrikyo were acquired through section 15 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982.
These reports detailed the individuals, activities, and interaction which occurred
during the relevant period in Western Australia.
3.1.2.2 NGO & MEDIA SOURCES

Reports by Non-Government Organisations (NGO) such as the International Crisis
Group, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, and the South Asia Analysis Group were also used in the
xvi
With the exception of the documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
142
documentary research for the project. Media sources were the final form of
documentary data utilised by the project. These sources were especially significant in
the process, in respect to both availability and non-availability of data, particularly
those regarding the information detailed in the Brigitte Dossier released by French
Intelligence to select Australian media sources following their interrogation of the
LET-trained terror suspect, Willie Virgile Brigitte. These media outlets included the
Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) televisions Four Corners programme,
Channel Nines Sunday programme, and News Limited newspapers. This dossier
detailed Brigittes history, training, and activities in Australia. A majority of the
media sources used were based on information such as court hearings and reports, and
statements made by Australian intelligence and government authorities and officials.
Attempts were made to acquire the Brigitte Dossier from la Direction de la
Surveillance du Territoire (DST) in Paris, which declined as the matter was before the
courts. The media outlets that were given the dossier also were approached, including
Liz Jackson of the ABC program Four Corners and Ben English of the Herald Sun,
but these individuals were unable to distribute the document. Many of these media
sources were also based on data uncovered during the court proceedings of
individuals involved in the cell.
The Counter Intelligence, Counter Espionage, Counter Terrorism (CI-CE-CT)

websitexvii has been used as a data source for the contextual background of the LET
cell. This is an Australian website aimed at Australian intelligence professionals and
discusses varied topics associated with the concepts encapsulated in the sites name.
The CI-CE-CT mission statement is:
Australia has never had, and does not have a serious dedicated and professional
counter-intelligence capability. A country without a CI capability cannot be regarded
as a serious player in regional and international affairs or a reliable alliance
member.97
The website presents an editorial titled Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

(ASIO) Management and Willie Virgil Brigittes Dark Terrorist Network in
Australia. This editorial presents a chronology of the LET-trained Brigittes activities
in Australia, some of which are presented in what appear to be diary entries.xviii It is
xvii
http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/
xviii
Brigitte tended to carry documents with him.
143
quite possible, although unconfirmed, that these entries are from the Brigitte Dossier
discussed previously. Martin Chulov, arguably the countrys open source expert on
Brigitte and the LET cell, indicated that the documents seemed to be genuine. xix
3.1.2.3 INTERVIEWS
The third form of data collection was through interviews. The first category of
interviews was intended to be ethnographic-orientated interviews with former
members of the HRB such as Kremsimir Perkovic, Victor Kuper, Jure Gojevic, and
Jure Maric. The undertaking of such interviews aimed specifically at responding to
Brannan and colleagues that interviews with the specific subjects of the investigation
were the greatest of primary resources. The interviews conducted attempted to fill
gaps in the data and confirm the data collected.xx Following the approval of the
interviews by the UHREC, letters were sent to each of the intended interviewees at
addresses identified through the White Pages telephone directory. Those that were
contacted were living at the same addresses as during the period examined within the
contextual background. These letters included a cover page detailing the project, a
consent information package regarding the interviews within the project, and the
return details for their responses as to their intentions to participate. Regrettably no
interviews were conducted as a majority of the individuals were not able to be
contacted. The very few who were contacted declined to be interviewed.
The second form of interview was a more general investigative interview with
members of the media and individuals who were formerly in charge of the
investigations into terrorist groups. These interviews often took the form of open-
ended discussions, taking place over the telephone, regarding the different cells
examined within the project. Again, as with the attempted ethnographic interviews,
these interviews aimed at the generation and confirmation of data regarding these
cells. The individuals interviewed in this process were Martin Chulov (The
xix
It is important to note that the data from this source was not used as relational data in the analysis of
the LET cell.
xx
These interviews were to be conducted as semi-structured interviews and (in some cases)
unstructured interviews. The interviews sought Level 3 (Full) Application for Approval to Undertake
Research Involving Human Participants, from the (Queensland University of Technology) University
Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC). This application treated confidentiality as the highest
priority (in addition to the researchers personal safety), both to protect interviewees and encourage
them to participate.
144
Australian) and Liz Jackson (formerly Four Corners) within the media sphere, and
Jeff Penrose (formerly of the Australian Federal Police) who was in charge of the
investigation into Aum Shinrikyos activities in Australia between 1993 and 1994.
During the process of these interviews, some portions of the collected data presented
ethical dilemmas. There were individuals who were identified as part of terrorist cells
who previously had not been identified in the public arena and had not been charged
by authorities in relation to any acts of or association with terrorism. To resolve this
issue, the interview process was halted and consultation with the Research Ethics
Officer was sought. An application for Level 2 (Expedited) Application for Approval
to Undertake Research Involving Human Participants was lodged and approved, with
the legal issues involving sensitive data forming the impetus of the application. The
Committee agreed to the use of pseudonyms and the appropriate camouflaging of
facts that would otherwise allow the identification of such an individual. These
measures were implemented so as to not compromise the interactional details of the
individual or the rest of the network.
The data collected and employed within the contextual background of this project was
verified through alternative sources in order to increase its reliability. The case studies
themselves serve as a background to a social network analysis, and hence, bias is not
applicable in this context. The data collected within this thesis is current as of January
2007.xxi
3.1.3 NEGATING CRITICISMS CASE STUDIES

The proposed methodology met the first criticism of case studies and the objectivity
criticism of terrorism studies through the method of data collection and selection of
data sources. The second criticism of the case study methodology suggests that the
method is not useful in generalisation and comparison.98 Because this methodology
will not compare the case studies themselves, but only the results of the social
networks analysis of the relational data, this criticism is negated. The final criticism of
this method is that case studies are arduous and time consuming.99 The case studies in
this project were specifically focused on the cell in question and the interaction within
xxi
This disclaimer particularly relates to the LET cell, as the cases currently remain before the courts.
145
that specific cell, to provide a contextual representation of the data used for the
analysis, providing a more focused approach. Robert Yin agrees that the final
criticism is negated through such a managed and focused method.100 The use of the
qualitative case study as the basis for analysis in this project illustrates its importance
and utility within both terrorism studies and intelligence analysis.
3.2 RELATIONAL DATA

The next stage undertaken in this social network analysis concerned the storage and
classification of the relational data collected through the above processes and data
sources. According to Scott, there are three principal types of data in research:
Attribute Data; Relational Data, and; Ideational Data. Scott maintains that the data
appropriate to social network analysis is relational data.101 Relational data consists of
the contacts, ties, and connections of the individuals within a network. These
relations are not the properties of the agents, but the systems of the agents
[therefore,]the methods appropriate to relational data are those of network
analysis.102
In the collection and collation of the relational data of covert networks, it is important
to acknowledge (again) Sparrows problems regarding covert networks: 1.
Incompleteness; 2. Fuzzy Boundaries; and 3. Dynamic Networks.103 The
incompleteness of the data is acknowledged as a weakness of this projectxxii and is
inextricably tied to the reliance on open source data and the limited resources
available to the researcher. Sparrows fuzzy boundaries dilemma within covert
networks refers to the difficulty in deciding which individuals to include within the
network. For this project, the individuals who have been included in the relational
data (and analysis) stage were those who were directly involved through interaction
with or direct involvement in the operation once the cell had gone into the covert
stage of its operation.xxiii This timeframe began when the cell finalised its intended
modus operandi and consequentially established itself covertly to undertake its
objectives. This timeframe ceased at the final implementation of the operation, or at
the stage the cell was disrupted by authorities. This measure focuses the analysis on
xxii
As it would be in any examination of covert networks.
xxiii
The use of the word covert to describe the commencement of the cells operation must be
distinguished from the use of structural covertness as a characteristic of a network.
146
how the group operates when it is in its purely covert stage, towards the completion of
the operation, in order to evaluate the best destabilisation methods and counter-
terrorism applications for when the cell is at its most dangerous. This is also the most
likely stage at which a terrorist group will enter or begin operating in Australia. This
interval will be defined and specified in the analysis sections of the specific chapters
on each of the terrorist cells.
The dynamic aspect of covert networks concerns the relationships and interactions
between the individuals within a network over time. In a dynamic network, these
interactions and individuals are not static but mobile, and the interactions between the
individuals have been measured and scored within this timeframe. The values
attributed to these interactions will be addressed through the introduction of
Interactional Criteria and measures.
3.2.1 INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA

Interactional criteria are essentially the criteria measuring the strengths of the linkages
between the individuals within a network.104 These criteria serve as measures for
describing the existence, importance, and type of relationship between individuals.
There are many stages of terrorist operations that include recruitment,

radicalisation/indoctrination, planning, and operational stages. This project is
concerned with constructing and analysing the cell during the operational period. It
must be noted at this point, and it is a contention of this project, that when a group of
individuals undertakes covert behaviour, normal (and previously existing) ties such as
family, religious, racial, and ideological ties between the members of a terrorist cell
become dormant. This period will be referred to as the Covert Stage of the
operation. The only ties that bind the individuals during this period are the
interactions that concern the operation (or act of terrorism) within this period.
Adapted from Boissevains work, the interactional criteria adopted for this project are:
Transactional Content and Frequency and Duration of Interaction.105 The
transactional content measure concerns the exchanges between the actors, which
define that relationship.106 The transactional content measure was used in addition to
the frequency and duration of interaction to define the strengths of the relationships
147
within the network. The frequency and duration of contact criterion is largely self
explanatory, as the criterion serves to qualify the transactional content measure by
indicating the frequency and duration of the links between individuals. This project
will be an interaction or operation based network analysis (as opposed to a Trust
network).
The transactional content measure incorporates both personal and non-personal

interaction and discussions (meetings), communication via email, telephone, letter,
internet chat room, or any other means, and through transactions of any type involving
items such as money, data, weapons, or explosives. This measure determines the
inclusion of individuals within a network (if this interaction is related to or is in aid of
the terrorist operation of the individual cell). The frequency and duration of contact
criterion serves to measure the strength of the interaction between different nodes
within a network. Once the interactions between individuals can be measured, these
interactions need to be stored in adjacency matrices.
3.2.1.1 MATRICES
Scott claims that all social research data, once collected must be held in some kind of
data matrix.107 This is especially essential when storing and organising relational
data. This project used data matrices to store the relational research data synthesised
from the contextual background on each of the cells under investigation. The
relational data for this project has been presented in Adjacency: Member by
Member matrices, such as the matrix in Table 1. The matrix in Table 1 represents a
fictional or example network in which A, B, and C are connected, and D and B are
connected. These connections indicate the binary relationships between the group
members, that is, simply whether a relationship exists or not.
TABLE 1. BINARY ADJACENCY MATRIX: MEMBER BY MEMBER.

Member A Member B Member C Member D
Member A 1 1 0
Member B 1 1 1
Member C 1 1 0
Member D 0 1 0
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Because the covert networks examined are mobile and communicate or exchange on
numerous occasions, a weighted value is assigned to each interaction between the
individuals of a network. This project employed a codification of the interactional
data where numerical values were assigned to the different levels of interaction,
constituting a static weighted representation of a dynamic relationship:
0. No Contact
A score of zero indicates that there was no interaction between the nodes within the
period under examination.
1. Low Level Contact
A low contact level indicates that there is a very low level of contact between
individuals, confined to limited interaction such as a single email, text message, a
telephone/satellite-phone call, a brief conversation in an internet chat room, or a
financial transaction.
2. Moderate Level Contact
A score of two indicates a moderate level of contact between individuals, representing
a relationship which may consist of multiple interactions through email, telephone,
internet, multiple financial transactions, or an extremely limited amount of personal
interaction.
3. Medium Level Contact
The medium level contact represents interaction such as a limited personal interaction
or meeting or cumulative amounts of moderate and low level interaction.
4. High Level Contact
The high level contact indicates interaction such as an extended meeting or
cumulative interaction of a medium, moderate, or low level contact. A score of four
between individuals using low level methods of contact would have required a very
considerable amount of such interaction.
5. Maximum Level Contact
Five is the maximum weighted representation of a dynamic relationship and may
represent interaction such as individuals who reside together or meet frequently.
Table 2 shows the same adjacency matrix represented in Table 1, but uses the
interactional criteria as static representations of dynamic relationships. The static
interaction scores in Table 2 indicate: Member D and Member B have a maximum
level contact relationship; Member A and Member C have a medium level contact
149
relationship; Member B and Member A have a low level contact relationship; and
finally Member C and Member B have also have a low level relationship. No other
relationships exist within the network.
TABLE 2. ADJACENCY MATRIX: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA.

Member A Member B Member C Member D
Member A 1 3 0
Member B 1 1 5
Member C 3 1 0
Member D 0 5 0
3.2.1.2 GRAPHS
As discussed above, covert networks are cellular and distributed, as opposed to
hierarchical. As such, the mapping of the terrorist cells should be through social
network analysis.xxiv Similarly, it is important to note that this methodology does not
involve dynamic network analysis, due to the small size of the networks that have
been examined.xxv This project employed the sociometric analysis approach of social
network analysis. The development of the sociogram and graph theory within social
network analysis was discussed previously. A sociograph or graph (as they will be
termed throughout this methodology and project) is a visual representation of a
network developed through graph theory with the actors represented by nodes, and
their relationships represented by links or lines.
FIGURE 3. GRAPH: EXAMPLE ADJACENCY MATRIX.
xxiv
As opposed to order theory or hierarchical network analysis.
xxv
As discussed previously, dynamic network analysis is used for moderate to large scale networks.
150
Figure 3 shows a graph constructed from the binary adjacency matrix in Table 1. The
graphs in this project have been constructed through the social network analysis
software UCInet version 6.85 made by Analytic Technologies, specifically by the
network analysts Stephen Borgatti, Martin Everett, and Linton Freeman.108 The
UCInet program is one of the most widely used network analysis programs in the field
due to the program being inexpensive, user-friendly, having many powerful features,
and being constantly updated.109 The program allows the direct graphing from an
adjacency matrix input. Figure 3 demonstrates more clearly the relationships between
members A, B, C, and D in Table 1. Figure 4 shows the same graph, but using the
data from Table 2. This graph more clearly demonstrates the links between the nodes
represented in Table 2; it is clear that B and D have extremely high levels of
interaction, which may be a result of the two living together or the pair having
extremely high levels of telephone conversations. Nodes A and C have lower levels
of interaction but still significantly more than A and B, and C and B. The interaction
between A and C may be a result of a brief meeting or numerous financial
transactions and email conversations, while the weaker relationships between A and
B, and B and C, may represent text messages, emails, or financial transactions.
FIGURE 4. INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED.
These interactional criteria were used in the construction of the graphs in this project,
as the formal measures of the relations between the actors within the terrorist cells
were considered imperative in a complete analysis of the network and a comparative
analysis of the cells. For example, an actor with multiple strong links indicates an
important (and perhaps necessary) part of a network.
151
NETWORK ANALYSIS
The frameworks for analysis for this project (to be presented) were based on the
mathematical applications within social network analysis of leading theorists within
the field such as Beauchamp,110 Sabidussi,111 Boissevain,112 Freeman113, Carley,114
Wasserman and Faust.115 The framework also employed elements of Arquilla and
Ronfeldts netwar and organisational network theory.116 The analysis of the data
accumulated from the previous two stages was examined through ten mathematical
criteria designed to measure the properties of the network and the individuals within
the network. These criteria entail ten measures, which are: Size; Density; Degree
of Connexion; Average Communication Speed; Actor Level Degree Centrality;
Actor Level Closeness Centrality; Actor Level Betweenness Centrality; Clique
Count, and; Clusters. Network Formations will also be examined within this
analysis. These criteria are widely used and held as the analysis criteria by social
network analysts and theorists in general.117 While ascribed static analogue
weightings (interactional criteria) have been used in the project and the mapping of
the networks (due to its usefulness in the contextual analysis of links and relationships
within a network, as well as for further analysis), all of the equations will treat the
network links as binary. The ten criteria can be separated into two categories: network
level measures and node level measures.
3.3.1 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES

The network level measures calculate the criteria of the overall network in relation to
every member within that network. The network level measures employed within this
methodology were:
i. Size;
ii. Density;
iii. Degree of Connexion;
iv. Average Communication Speed;
v. Clusters; and
vi. Network Formation.
152
3.3.1.1 SIZE
Size can be defined generally as the number of nodes within a network or data set.
Boissevain describes the size measure as the most important structural criterion of
anetworkthis is because the other criteria are calculated as a proportion of the
total possible or actual links in the network.118 If we use the example network in
Figures 3 and 4, the size of this network is four. This measure was limited in this
project through the network being confined to actors within the terrorist cell or those
involved with terrorist activities in association with the cell during the specific period
being examined. This strict procedure for the inclusion of members in the network
aims to limit the fuzzy boundaries of covert networks discussed by Sparrow. These
limitations of size allowed for the analysis of the cell itself and did not extend to the
groups wider terrorist networks.xxvi
3.3.1.2 DENSITY
Density is described as the the average proportion of lines incident with nodes in the
graph,119 or the extent to which links that could possibly exist among persons do in
fact exist.120 The use of density can indicate how structurally covert a cell is. For
example, Krebs analysis shows that the September 11 cell had a low density,
implying that the removal of a nodexxvii would not compromise the rest of the
network. The result of the density equation is standardised as a percentage. A network
with a density of 100 percent indicates that every possible link within the network is
in fact linked, while a density of zero percent indicates that the minimum possible
links (zero) exist between the nodes in the network. As discussed previously, density
indicates whether the cell in question has a focus on, or has been established to
provide, either structural covertness or efficiency. Networks with low density have
low efficiency but high structural covertness, while networks of high density have
high efficiency but low structural covertness. Density is measured by the Wasserman
and Faust equation:121
D= L
g(g-1) / 2
xxvi
Such measures also ensure that the focus and length criticisms of case studies are abided by.
xxvii
Such as Moussaoui.
153
In this equation: D is density; L is the total number of lines present; and g is the total
number of nodes within the network. To apply this equation to the example in Tables
1-2 and Figures 3-4, the total number of lines in the network is four, and the total
number of nodes in the network is four. The successful completion of this equation
informs us that the density of the network in question is 66.67 percent dense. A
density score of 66.67 percent indicates that a network has a reasonably high density,
indicating lower levels of structural covertness, but higher levels of efficiency.
4
0.6666 =
4(4-1) / 2
The result of the density equation is represented as a percentage of the total possible
density of the network, referred to as a standardised percentage. Many of the
equations to follow will be represented as standardised percentages, the widespread
application of which was devised by Beauchamp in 1965.122
3.3.1.3 DEGREE OF CONNEXION

The third measure of the network level criteria was the degree of connexion criterion.
This criterion allows the measure of the average number of relations each member has
with other members of the network.123 The degree of connexion can qualify the results
of density equations in evaluating the structural covertness of a network by
determining the average number of relations each member of the network has.
Generally (but dependent on the size of the network), the higher the degree of
connexion, the lower the structural covertness. The degree of connexion measure is
useful in comparative analysis between networks. The degree of connexion (d) is
presented by Boissevain in the following equation:124
d= 2L
g
154
To again apply this equation to the example network, the total number of lines present
is four, and the total number of nodes present is 4. Using Boissevains degree of
connexion equation, the average number of relations per node is two, represented in
the following equation:
2x4
2=
4
A score of two represents a high degree of connexion within the network, as the
highest possible score could have been three (due to the total number of nodes being
four). The high degree of connexion score supports the reasonably high density score
of the network calculated in the previous equation.
3.3.1.4 AVERAGE COMMUNICATION SPEED

The average communication speed is calculated through the average shortest path
between each node in the network. This measure further assists the density and degree
of connexion measures in determining the effectiveness of the communication within
the cell. This measure is very useful in attempting to destabilise larger networks when
comparing the reduction in information flow and speed. The equation used for the
calculation of the average communication speed, as proposed by Carley, is:125
-1

d G (i, j ) / D
Average Speed =
(i , j )D
Geodesic distance (dG) is defined as the shortest path between two nodes126 within a
mathematically defined plane. In this equation, dG (i, j) is the geodesic distance
between the i and j within a square network. Essentially, in Carleys equation dG (i, j)
represents the geodesic distance between every node and every other node within the
network. Additionally, D represents the total number of geodesic distances between
dG (i, j), or the total possible relationships within the network. This equation
calculates the average geodesic distance between nodes i and j. In order to better
evaluate the average speed of the network, the result is standardised into a percentage,
155
a number between 0 and 1, to allow a more precise comparative analysis between
networks.
To use the example network again, the sum of the geodesic distances between node
pairs i and j, where such a path exists, is 16, and the total number of geodesic
distances within the network is 12. If dG (i, j) is divided by D, we are left with a result
of 1.333, which is the average number of geodesic distances between the nodes of the
network. When this result is inversed to a standardised percentage to allow
comparative analysis between networks, the result is a value of 0.75 (as represented in
the equation below). Thus, the average communication speed of the example network
is 0.75. As a percentage, this result indicates that the average speed of communication
within the network in question is 75 percent of the fastest possible average speed. As
such a high average speed of communication, this result further supports the
networks leaning towards efficiency already established through the density and
degree of connexion equations.
-1
16
0.75 =
12
3.3.1.5 CLUSTERS
The next network criterion is the clusters measure. A cluster is an area of relatively
high density.127 For example, if we take the example network in question, and extend
the size of the dataset to 11 (Figure 5), we can see that A, B, C, and E form a cluster.
This collection of nodes is an area of high density relative to the rest of the network,
and hence a cluster. The nodes G, H, I, and J in Figure 4 also form a cluster. These
clusters are important to recognise and identify as they indicate closer and tighter (and
hence significantly more efficient) groups within networks.
156
FIGURE 5. CLUSTER GRAPH
3.3.1.6 NETWORK FORMATION

Social networks represented in graphs can take on very different formations and
structures, depending on the network. The analysis of these formations was the final
stage of the network level analysis. Arquilla and Rondfeldt outline the development of
this analytical sub-approach, in their study of covert networks through the research of
social network analysts, social psychologists, and organisational psychologists. This
research led to the assumption that networks, when examined through sociometric and
graph theory, tended to form categorical formations.128 Arquilla and Rondfeldt discuss
these three types of formations: the Chain or Line network; the Hub or Star
network; and the all-channel network.
FIGURE 6. NETWORK FORMATIONS
(i) Chain (ii) Star (iii) All-channel
157
The network in Figure 6 (i) is a line or chain network. In a line network, all
information must travel through the preceding node before arriving at its target,
therefore, there can be no shortcuts when attempting to exchange information. If two
people who wish to communicate are at opposite ends of the network, the information
must travel to every node in between the two individuals. When discussing the line
formation with regards to terrorism or other covert organisations, this formation has a
focus on secrecy, and is therefore less efficient. Also, the removal of a single node
would theoretically stop all communication within the network.
Figure 6 (ii) shows a hub or star formation. This formation demonstrates a network
centralised around a hub or central figure, with all communication within the
network passing through this hub. This individual has the highest centrality (to be
discussed) within the group, which usually denotes the leader, or at least, the most
important individual from a counter-terrorism perspective. The removal of the
centralised individual will theoretically render the network inoperable. This formation
is essentially a trade-off between secrecy and efficiency.
The final formation, the all-channel formation, in Figure 6 (iii), is an extremely

efficient network in which every member can communicate with every other member.
All-channel networks have a density of 100 percent and trade all secrecy for
maximum efficiency. These categorical network formations and the inferences that
can be drawn from them were used in the analysis of the networks examined in this
project.
3.3.2 NODE LEVEL MEASURES

The nodal level measures in this methodology aim to calculate the criteria of each
individual within the network against the rest of the network. These nodal level
measures are:
i. Actor Level Degree Centrality;
ii. Actor Level Closeness Centrality;
iii. Actor Level Betweenness Centrality; and
iv. Clique Count.
158
3.3.2.1 ACTOR LEVEL DEGREE CENTRALITY
Actor level degree centrality is the first node level measure of the employed social
network analysis methodological criteria and is the level at which a node is accessible
to the persons in the network. Essentially, this measures the individuals activity
within the network. Centrality is affected not only by the size of a network, but by the
formation and shape of the network.129 This measure assists the analyst in identifying
the leaders within networks. This does not imply that they necessarily hold the power
in the relationships or indeed the network, but an individuals centrality indicates a
critical importance within the network. The equation for the calculation of centrality is
presented by Wasserman and Faust as:130
CD(ni) = di(ni)
In this equation: CD(ni) is the Degree of Actor Level Centrality Index for node i;
di(ni) is the degree of node i.xxviii The higher the value of CD(ni), the more central
that individual is. In order to compare the different centrality indexes, the result of this
equation, CD(ni), is standardised to a percentage or proportion, CD(ni). The equation
for the standardised degree of actor level centrality index, again presented by
Wasserman and Faust, is:131
di(ni)
CD(ni) =
g-1
Applying this equation to the example network, the following results indicate the
degree and standardised degree of centrality for each individual.
TABLE 3. DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CENTRALITY

Members CD(ni) CD(ni)
A 2 66.667
B 3 100
C 2 66.667
D 1 33.333
xxviii
This degree simply equates to the number of links the individual node possesses.
159
As Table 3 demonstrates, B has the highest degree and is hence the most central node
within the network, with D the least central. These results indicate that B is the most
accessible individual with the highest level of activity within the network and that a
majority of the information and communication within the network goes through B.
The results also demonstrate that C and A have the same degree of centrality, which is
relatively high. A and C are twice as central as D, who is the least central (and
therefore most isolated) node within the network.
3.3.2.2 ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS CENTRALITY

Like actor degree centrality, actor level closeness centrality is a criterion applied to
the individuals within a network, and describes how close an actor is to others in the
network, or the ability of actors within a network to access others.132 The equation for
closeness is presented below and was developed by Sabidussi in 1966 when
examining centrality indexes of graphs.133
1
g
C C (n i ) = d(n i , n j )
j=1
In this equation, CC (ni) is the Actor Level Closeness Centrality Index, g is the total
number of actors within a network, and d(ni, nj) represents the geodesic distance
between node i and node j. Essentially, this equation attempts to establish the sum
of the geodesic distances between the node in question (i) and every other node (j).
The result of this equation, CC (ni), is then multiplied by (g-1), to give a standardised
result as a percentage, CC (ni). This equation is represented by Beauchamp as:134
CC(ni) = CC(ni) x (g-1)
If we apply this equation to the example network again, Table 4 shows the
standardised actor level closeness centrality index (CC (ni)) results. These results
indicate that B has the greatest ability to access the rest of the network. It is important
to note that Sabidussis equation is used only in closed networks and this
methodology will be applied only to small scale terrorist cells, all of which will be
closed networks.
160
TABLE 4. DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS
Members CC (ni)
A 4 0.75
B 3 1.00
C 4 0.75
D 5 0.6
3.3.2.3 ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY

The betweenness structural criterion is another measure of an individuals
activity/ability within a network, measuring the ability to control the flow of
information within a network.135 The equation for the calculation for betweenness,
developed by Freeman in 1977,136 is:
g jk (n i )
CB (n i ) =
j<k g jk
In this equation CB(ni) is the Actor Level Betweenness Centrality Index for node i,
gjk is the number of geodesics linking nodes j and k, and gjk(ni) is the number of
geodesics linking the two actors that include the node i. This equation calculates the
probability that node i will be between an interaction between the other nodes within
the network. Once again, CB(ni) is standardised to a percentage, CB(ni),
(Standardised Actor Level Betweenness Centrality Index) by:
CB(ni) = CB(ni)/[(g-1)(g-2)/2]
Table 5 shows the standardised actor level betweenness centrality index as applied to
the example matrix. These results indicate that B has the highest betweenness value at
66.667, meaning that B controls 66.667% of the interaction within the cell and hence
has the greatest control over the communication. This is clearly demonstrated when
examining Bs position in Figures 3 and 4.
161
TABLE 5. DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS
Members CB(ni)
A 0.000
B 66.667
C 0.000
D 0.000
3.3.2.4 CLIQUE COUNT

The clique count measure calculates the number of distinct cliques to which each node
in the network belongs. Generally, an individual who is involved in a high number of
cliques can facilitate the collaboration of the separate cliques (to work together), thus
illustrating a critical importance to the network.137 Table 6 shows the clique count for
the example network. If looking at Figure 2, we can see that A, B, and C, form a
distinct clique, while D is isolated from this section of the network. Hence A, B, and
C receive a score of one for their clique count, while D receives a score of zero. This
result means that A, B, and C form the central clique of this network and that D lies to
the outer of the network. This measure is better employed against larger networks in
which individuals are involved in multiple cliques, which greatly increases their
influence. It is also important to note which cliques these nodes are connected to, as
within covert operations different cliques usually have different operational tasks.
TABLE 6. CLIQUE COUNT

CLIQUE COUNT
A 1
B 1
C 1
D 0
All of the equations in the data chapters will be calculated through the UCInet
program or the ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser Version 1.5.5 program developed
by Kathleen Carley.138 The Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) program will
162
specifically be used in representing the theoretical destabilisation processes applied to
the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells.
3.4 DESTABILISATION TECHNIQUES

In their paper, Destabilising Networks, Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David
Krackhardt139 propose three indicators of destabilisation of a network. These
indicators propose that a network has been destabilised when:
i. The rate of information flow through the network has been seriously reduced,
possibly to zero.140
ii. The network, as a decision-making body, can no longer reach consensus, or
takes much longer to do so.141
iii. The network as an organisation, is less effective; [for example] its accuracy at
doing tasks or interpreting information has been impaired.142
These indicators will be employed when attempting theoretically to destabilise the
networks of the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells.
Counter-terrorism techniques traditionally aim at neutralising members of terrorist

networks either through capture or death. The removal of a node from a network can
make a cell less able to adapt, reduce its performance, reduce its ability to
communicate, or have little effect at all.143 The node level criteria outlined earlier
allow the identification of the most important and well-connected individuals within a
network, through their high centrality scores. These nodes are known as the critical
nodes within a network.144 The removal or isolation of these nodes ensures that this
removal has maximised the damage to the networks ability to adapt, its performance,
and its ability to communicate. However, simply identifying the leaders or the critical
individuals within the cell and neutralising or isolating them can have the adverse
effect of increasing the networks activity, or creating multiple smaller cells with
multiple leaders.145 There are many other consequences of disruption techniques that
can occur over periods of time, a majority of which are mainly associated with large
networks covered by the dynamic network analysis literature. As this project
examines small-scale cells as opposed to large-scale networks, theoretical disruption
techniques aimed at immediate and maximum disruption will be employed.
163
In endeavouring to effectively destabilise the networks examined in this project, the
analysis has employed the program ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser Version
1.5.5.146 The ORA program will be used to determine the immediate effects of
attempts to disrupt the cell through the breaking of linkages, the removal of nodes,
and the resulting reduction in capacity of that cell. As well as the removal of critical
nodes, the disruption techniques can also attempt to separate the major components of
the network. For example, these techniques can isolate the bombing team from the
command team, or the bomb makers from the suicide bombers (if the network
structure allows for such isolation). Figure 7 shows the example network again
through the ORA program. As the nodal measures employed throughout this chapter
have demonstrated, node B of the example network is critical. Node B has the highest
amount of activity within the network, the greatest ability to access others, and the
greatest control over the flow of information in the network. In an attempt to reduce
the information flow, decision-making, and effectiveness, and to isolate components
of the network, B will be targeted in this destabilisation attempt. Figure 8 shows the
result of the removal of B.
FIGURE 7: ORA EXAMPLE GRAPH
164
Figure 8 shows that the removal of the node identified as the most important within
the network completely isolates and reduces the information flow between D and the
rest of the network, hence reducing the decision-making capacity and the
effectiveness of the network.
FIGURE 8: B REMOVED
Through these destabilisation techniques, this methodology has employed specific

counter-terrorism applications that can effectively reduce the rate of information flow,
separate the leaders and isolate major sections of the network, and reduce the
effectiveness of the overall cell for each of the four terrorist cells examined within this
project. It is important to note that these techniques aim at theoretical and immediate
destabilisation only, and therefore it is impossible within the scope of this project to
determine the likelihood of connections being re-established by members of the
network. For example, in Figure 8, A or C may have the ability to reform the
connection with D, as this methodology only maps interaction that occurs during the
covert phase of the operation. In this case, pre-existing ties that are not mapped may
provide the means to re-establish the connection. Likewise, a member of the
165
organisation not previously involved in the operation may take up the role of B,
reforming the network to its original state.
4. ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE

This chapter has reviewed the history and development of social network analysis,
discussed the lack of social network analysis research within terrorism studies, and
has presented the methodology employed in this project, from the data collection
stage to the frameworks of analysis.
To sum up, in this dissertation the methodology has applied social network analysis to
each of the four terrorist cells, aiming to provide an understanding of the organisation
and communication of the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells. Once the
identification of the interactional, network, and nodal structural measures of the cells
are established this allows for the identification of the critical nodes. These nodes
represent vulnerabilities within different types of cells and allow the formulation of
effective and efficient destabilisation techniques for the theoretical neutralisation of
these cells.
From the understanding gained regarding these cells and the use of the appropriate
destabilisation methods, this project will attempt to provide applications to Australias
counter-terrorism procedures and policy. The applications specifically relate to any
vulnerabilities discovered within the different types of cells and any further directions
that can be engaged to appropriately counter these cells which Australias current
security arrangements may not properly defend against. This includes discovering
which types of cells are more dangerous and effective than others. The fourth cell, JI,
will be examined to provide insight into the cells of one of Australias greatest
terrorist threats.xxix This examination will allow the assessment of the likely
networking modus operandi of JI operations in Australia or future operations against
Australian targets internationally. Through the review of the method, this chapter has
established that the method can be employed to assist in predicting behaviour and
decision-making withinnetwork[s],147 can endow the researcher with the ability
to understand and predict behaviour of members in a social network [and allow] the
xxix
At least within Southeast Asia.
166
analyst to evaluate specific courses of action that will influence the members of a
social network in a desirable manner.148 As was established in the previous chapter,
such abilities are sorely needed within terrorism studies.
While the previous two chapters aimed specifically at understanding the phenomenon
of terrorism and how it is studied, this chapter introduced the social network
methodology as a response to the criticisms of terrorism studies and examined the
development of this methodology and its applications to covert networks. This was
followed by the presentation of the methodology of the thesis. The proposed
methodology has specifically been designed to meet the objectives of the thesis. The
following chapters will apply this methodology through a social network analysis of
the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells. Following this, the project will provide
an analysis of these results and the conclusions, implications, and applications of this
project.
167
168
CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO
REVOUCIONARNO BRATSTVO
This chapter is the first of four analysis chapters, with each chapter conducting a
social network analysis of one of four selected terrorist cells through the methodology
outlined in the previous chapter. Each analysis chapter will begin with an overview of
the terrorist organisation with which the cell is affiliated and then examine the
contextual background of the cell itself. The chapter will then move to an examination
of the relational data synthesised from the contextual background and subsequently
the analysis of these results through social network analysis. The final stage of the
chapter will examine the possible methods for the theoretical destabilisation of the
cell. This construction of the contextual background of the 1963 operation by the
Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB)
offers the most detailed account of the incident within academic literature.
1. THE CROATIAN REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERHOOD

As discussed briefly in Chapter II, the Ustasha was a Croatian separatist movement
which aimed at independence from Serbian control following the establishment of
Croatia within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Serbian King
Alexander from 1929.1 After increasingly Draconian measures were imposed on the
Croats within the Kingdom (including the dispossession of all political rights), Dr.
Ante Pavelic led revolutionary activities against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.i In 1929,
shortly after becoming the leader of the separatist movement, Pavelic was forced into
exile where he pledged his allegiance to the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation (IMRO).2 Bolstered by support from fascist Italy, the Ustasha movement
assassinated Yugoslav officials both within the Kingdom and internationally. In 1934,
Croats assassinated King Alexander and the French Foreign Minster Barthou.3
On April 8, 1941, before the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, the Ustasha and members
of the Croatian Peasants Party led an invasion into Yugoslavia in a revolt against
Serbian rule of Croatia. After two days the Croatian forces had consolidated control of
Yugoslavia. The Croat Colonel, Slanko Kvaternik, declared the independence of
Croatia on behalf of the exiled Ustasha leader Pavelic.4 Following the arrival of the
i
The name of the Kingdom changed following the dissolution of Croat rights.
170
Axis forces and the return of the Ustasha leader, Hitler installed Pavelic as Fuhrer of
Croatia. Pavelics regime proceeded to massacre 330 000 Jews, Muslims, Serbs, and
Gypsies within Croatia, and exported thousands to Nazi concentration camps. 5
A widespread anti-Fascist campaign began in July of 1941 to oust the Ustashi and
German forces from Yugoslavia. This campaign was led by Joseph Broz Tito who
commanded the Peoples Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and Partisan Detachments.
The initial success enjoyed by Tito was countered by the Germans in Fall Weiss (Plan
White) and Operation Schwarz (Operation Black). Both of these operations inflicted
heavy casualties upon the Partisans, but they were able to escape both German
offensives and continue their operations. By 1945, with the support of the Red Army
and the Royal Air Force Balkan Air Force,ii the Partisans consolidated control of
Belgrade.6
Following the fall of the Ustasha regime, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) was established and Tito installed as the Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs. During the war, subsequent to the fall of fascist Croatia and the end
of World War II, mass emigration took place. According to a report by the Australian
Prime Ministers Department in 1967, in the period between October 1945 and
August 1967, approximately 68 000 Yugoslavs entered Australia. This estimate
includes all ethnic groups from the state of Yugoslavia, the major groups being Serbs
and Croats. This figure does not include stateless persons, who at the time would
have included a large number of Croatian migrs. The Australian Government
estimated that during this period approximately 30 000 of the 68 000 migrs were
Croatian.7
The Ustashi movement in Australia was established through the creation of the
Australian section of the Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret (Croatian Liberation
Movement, HOP). The HOP was established in 1956 following Ante Pavelics fall
from power in 1945 and his consequent exile to Argentina. The HOP doctrine and
ideology is based on the original Ustashi principles set out by Pavelic in 1933.iii In
Australia, the HOP was the leading body of the Croatian movements and was
ii
The Balkan Air Force established as a part of the British Royal Air Force.
iii
Which essentially outlined the sanctity, sovereignty, and superiority of the Croatian Nation.
171
supported by groups such as the Australian Croatian Association in Melbourne.8 The
headquarters of the HOP was in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where Pavelic was exiled,9
and the HOP had 25 branches around the world including Canada, the United States
(US), Europe, and Australia. The Australian branch had up to 5 000 members by
1964.10
The HOP in Australia was a purely political movement, the aim of which was the total
severance from the SFRY and independence from Tito-Communist interference and
control.11 The group was led in Australia by Fabian Lokovich,12 a former leader of the
Ustashi Youth Movement and bodyguard to Pavelic during the Ustashi regime.13
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: ACTION KANGAROO

Along with the HOP, many Croatian nationalistic and separatist movements formed
following the mass migration to Australia. These groups and movements served to
create a strong network among former Ustashi members and supporters. Among these
migrs were four men by the names of Jure Maric, Geza Pasti, Ilija Tolic, and Josip
Oblak. Jure Maric arrived in Australia from Austria on September 13, 1958, working
as a fitter. Maric was naturalised as an Australian citizen on August 1, 1963.14 Pasti, a
former Ustashi officer, arrived in Australia in February of 1954.15 Ilija Tolic left for
Australia in 1958, while Oblak arrived in Australia around the same time.16
Maric, Pasti, Oblak, and Tolic were highly active within the Australian Croatian
community. As well as being members of the HOP, Oblak, Tolic, and Maric were
members of the Croatian-Australian Association,17 the Jure de Frantic Croatian
Association, and the United Croats of Oceania group.18 Tolic, who was a forester by
trade but made a living as a factory worker in Australia, was the secretary19 and later
president of the Jure de Frantic Croatian Association.20 Oblak was also a member of
the Croatian Club in Fremantle.21 Like the HOP, the other Croatian groups were
political movements supporting the separation of Croatia from the SFRY. These
groups would (to a degree) support violent separatist activity but not undertake it.
These four men were among the section of the Croatian community who had became
frustrated at the HOPs lack of support and training for terrorist and revolutionary
operations in Croatia.22
172
2.1 AREA COMMAND FOUR
On June 9, 1961, Jure Maric, Geza Pasti, Josip Oblak, and Ilija Tolic23 attended a
lecture in Sydney led by the leader of the Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National
Resistance, HNO), Srecko Blaz Rover. Rover, a former Ustashi officer,24 was among
the first migrs to organise Ustashi movements in Australia following his arrival in
1950.25 The Commonwealth Police believed that Rovers lecture deepened Maric,
Pasti, Oblak, and Tolics dissatisfaction at the lack of revolutionary and violent action
26
taken by the two major Croatian separatist organisations (the HOP and HNO).
Maric claimed that Rovers lecture was a Funerary Oration to the Late Croatia.
Agitated, the four men drove to an outer Sydney suburb and began to discuss the idea
of the formation of a covert organisation for the liberation of Croatia through
insurgent and terrorist means.27 During this meeting, the four men created the HRB,
which was to expand into Europe, and then into Croatia.28 The principles of the
organisation were later set out as follows:
The HRB as shown in its title is a fighting organisation of all the Croatian patriots
who have set themselves the task of liberating the Croatian people from the foreign
yoke and of restoring the State of Croatia within its ethnic and historical
29
boundaries.
The Australian Branch of the HRB was codenamed Command Post Number Four,
with Maric as the General Secretary or Commander of Committee Number Four.30
Area Command One was Croatia and Area Command Two was Europe (primarily in
Germany and Italy), whence operations into the SFRY would be launched. Area
Command Three was fascist Spain where many of the Ustashi hierarchy had fled
following the fall of Pavelics regime.31 The role of Area Command Four was to raise
funds for the operations through the Croatian community in Australia. In addition to
this role was Area Command Fours recruiting and training of HRB terrorists to lead
incursions into the SFRY.32
In just over three years from its formation, the HRB Area Command Number Four
had between one and two hundred members,33 with some Australian Government
estimates as high as 500.34 Every member of each of the international commands of
the HRB was issued with a membership number. The number of Australian members
ranged from 61 to 1000. By 1967 the Australian membership numbers 61 to around
173
330 had been issued. The numbers 1 to 60 were for members of the European
command.35 Each of these members would have taken the Oath of the Croatian
Revolutionary Brotherhood:
I swear by Almighty God and things that are most sacred to me to fight, until the end
of my life, for the liberty and sovereignty of the Croatian People. By voluntarily
joining the ranks of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, I pledge myself to obey
and carry out without demur any orders and instructions given to me and to serve
loyally the Brotherhoods revolutionary principles.
I pledge myself to keep any secrets entrusted to me and not to disclose anything that
might damage the interests of the Brotherhood and of the Croatian People.
If I offend against this oath and the Brotherhoods Revolutionary Principles, my

penalty, under the organisations laws, shall be death. So help me God.36
On their acceptance into the Brotherhood, members were given their membership
number and were assigned to a Stozher. A stozher was a division of the Area
Command and were established in most major cities. Shortly after the creation of the
HRB in 1961, Maric sent Pasti to Melbourne to establish stozhers both there and in
Geelong.37 The Australian command was made up of four stozhers by the mid 1960s:
i. Stozher 1: Sydney;
ii. Stozher 2: Wollongong;
iii. Stozher 3: Melbourne and Tasmania; and
iv. Stozher 4: Geelong.38
Each stozher had a commander, who was a senior member of the HRB and reported to
Area Command Four.
By 1972, at the time of the HRBs second insurgency attempt into the SFRY
(discussed in Chapter II),iv the structure of the group had advanced dramatically,
spanning every state and territory in the country.39 During the early 1960s, the HRB
meetings took place in the home of Maric and later at Rudolf Franjicsv residence at
63 First Avenue, Warrawong. Franjic was another senior member of Area Command
Four.40 These meetings were usually held once a fortnight.41 The Oath of the HRB
was also undertaken by new members at these houses.42
iv
At this stage the group was known as the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation.
v
Franjic arrived in Australia on December 12, 1949, and was later naturalised November 9, 1965.
174
The HRB maintained a high level of secrecy and was largely unknown within either
the Yugoslav (Serbian and Croatian) community or by the Australian Government
until 1964 when the SFRY announced it had captured 9 terrorists who were based in
Australia. In a document entitled Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Maintenance
of Secrecy Fundamental Duty of Revolutionaries Principle of Secret Operation,
issued by Jure Maric and Geza Pasti, the pair outlined the operational security
procedures of the HRB:
a) Membership of the Brotherhood is not to be mentioned in public places;
b) Do not tell even your friends anything that you do not want the Croatian Peoples
enemies to find out;
c) A task allotted to one is to be accepted and carried out without demur;
d) Any suspicions, suggestions, alterations or amendments are to be passed on only to the
superior without anybody elses presence, while it is the latters duty to pass it on to his
superiors and properly competent officials of the organisation, who after a thorough
examination of the material submitted, make their decision.
e) Any printed propaganda material designated for Brotherhood members must never and
nowhere be allowed to fall in the hands of persons who are not members of the
Brotherhood.
f) Maintenance of contacts is effected by coded correspondence, by personal conversation
[section missing];
g) The official title of the organisation must never be mentioned without specific approval
of the Supreme Headquarters;
h) It is strictly prohibited to discuss the Brotherhood in any manner, even in a whisper, in
the presence of outsiders;
i) It is permitted and necessary to propagate, by spoken word and with the pen, the ideas of
the Croatian Revolution as propounded by the Brotherhood, but it must never be stated
openly or hinted that it is our organisation that stands behind them.
j) In propounding and propagating revolutionary ideas, principles, thoughts and
programmes, the source from which the matter has been taken must never be given.43
These operational procedures allowed the group to remain clandestine, to recruit from
within more conservative separatist organisations, and to train with relative freedom.
2.2 THE TROIKA

In a secretive booklet published by the HRB entitled Kletva (The Vow), the details of
the HRBs operational structure were detailed. This organisation (in theory) was
based around an extremely compartmentalised military structure with the terrorist
strike force of the Brotherhood consisting of a three-man cell called a Troika (Geli-
Men).vi The troikas of the HRB are the units which will carry the burden of the
Croatian revolution, 44 and are mobile and can easily be placed among the people.
The troika is not a fighting unit and should not openly fight with the enemy. 45 The
troika is composed of a commander, an intelligence officer, and an explosives expert
vi
This formation is very similar to the military organisation of the Stern Gang cells discussed in
Chapter II.
175
trained in mines, time-delay explosives, booby traps, and other weaponry.46 This last
individual provides the impetus behind the name Troika, which translates to geli-
men (men with gelignite).47 According to the Kletva, to ensure maximum security
within the cell, the troika is formed from individuals who share strong family or
friendship ties to each other so that a spy cannot be placed within the cell and so that
the members are less likely to betray the group. The only person that has contact with
any other members of the HRB is the commander, who communicates with the Roj
commander.48
A roj is composed of four troikas. The roj commander is responsible to the vod
commander, a vod being composed of four rojs. The vod is again part of a larger
group, four vods making a satnija, the commander of which is known as a satnik,
who commands nearly 200 men. Each satnik is responsible to a bojnik. These bojna,
composed of four satnija are again part of a larger group, the stozher. The
commanding officer of the stozher, the stozernik or colone, is in control of over 3 000
men.49
This structure was how the HRB was to operate inside the SFRY during a sustained
campaign and never operated on this scale in Australia. According to the Kletva
document, the individuals making up the troika should not know or communicate with
the individuals of other troikas. This is to ensure the security of each cell. The
commanders of the troikas are the only source of information and interaction between
the roj or area commander.50
2.3 ACTION KANGAROO

The first operation of Area Command Four was codenamed Action Kangaroo and
involved the insertion of three troikas into the SFRY to instigate revolutionary dissent
among the Croatians living there and carry out terrorist activities against the SFRY
Government.51 The planning for this operation was undertaken largely by the high-
ranking members of Area Command Four, such as Maric, Pasti, Oblak, and Tolic, as
well as individuals such as Josip Senic, Rocque Romac, and Adolf Andric. The
logistics of the operation were also developed in consultation with Area Command
Two.52
2.3.1 THE NINE

The proposed operation would use three troikas. The first troika consisted of Ilija
Tolic, Josip Oblak, and Rade Stojic. The second troika was made up of Mika Fumic,
Kremsimir Perkovic, and Stanko Zdrilic. Drazen Tapsanji, Vladimir Leko, and
176
Branko Podrug were the members selected for the final three troika. The members of
these troikas were selected along the guidelines of the Kletva. The troika members
were very close; for example Tolic and Oblak were two of the four founding members
of the HRB, and Fumic and Perkovic were from the same village in Croatia.53
The inclusion of Oblak and Tolic in the cell is quite significant, as these were two of
the founders of the group and among the highest ranking members of the HRB. Like
Oblak and Tolic, Leko was from Sydney, while the rest of the group was based in and
around Melbourne and the regional areas of New South Wales (NSW). 54 A majority
of these members travelled to Australia from refugee camps in Austria and Italy at
different times.55 Tapsanji had lived in Melbourne for around eight years56 before
gaining Australian citizenship in the same year that he joined the HRB. 57 In contrast,
Stojic left Italy for Australia in October 1962, just one year before the operation was
launched. 58 In the months following Stojics arrival in Australia and establishment in
Geelong59 he joined the HRB. 60
Perkovic arrived in Melbourne around 1959,61
followed by Zdrilic, who arrived in Sydney in 1960.62 Mika Fumic also settled in
Melbourne, where he worked in a glass factory. 63
2.3.2 RECRUITMENT & TRAINING

Shortly after arriving, all of these individuals joined either the HOP or the HRB. By
1963 all nine were members of both organisations. Due to the covertness of the group,
the HOP was unaware of its members ties to the HRB and was largely unaware of its
existence, allowing the HRB relative ease in recruiting the more extremist members of
the HOP.64 For example, Zdrilic was recruited from the HOP by HRB member Petar
Brajkovic in 1960.65 The discord between these groups was evident when the HOP
discovered that Pasti was involved with the HRB and was consequently removed from
the HOP committee and the group itself.66 The Melbourne HRB members were either
recruited, trained, or assisted by Viktor Vicic, Ivan Smolcic, Stjepan Sefer, Luka
Bilonic, and Petar Brajkovic.67
2.3.2.1 TRAINING IN AUSTRALIA

The headquarters for training of the Sydney stozher was the Sydney Catholic Office at
121 Queen Street, Woollahra, the office was run by Priest Rocque Romac.68 Romac
arrived in Australia in August of 1955, and in 1957 became chaplain to the NSW
177
Croatian community.69 The Commonwealth Police believed that Romac had joined
the HRB shortly after its inception in 1961.70 Within his Catholic office Romac ran a
Croatian Club.71 On September 15, 1962, Romac established a library in the Catholic
offices where a senior executive within the HRB, Josip Senic, was appointed an
honorary librarian by Romac.72 Using this position Senic instructed HRB members
(including the nine members of the incursion cell) in the military and combat arts as
well as Croatian separatist indoctrination,73 taking care to ensure the lessons remained
clandestine from both the public and from individuals within the Catholic offices. In
these offices between 1962 and 1963, Zdrilic and Podrug were regularly instructed in
map-reading, mines, explosives,74 and hand-to-hand combat and assassination
techniques. 75
The nine insurgents also received instruction on topography and map-reading at the
home of HRB leader Jure Maric76 who resided at 138 Cabbage Tree Lane, Fairy
Meadows, NSW.77 In addition to this instruction, Adolf Andric prepared documents
on:
i. Topographic signs used by the Yugoslav military,
ii. A manual of 20 pages concerning guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia,
iii. A document concerning the types of poisons and acids for to be used for
assassinations and in the overall revolutionary struggle, and
iv. Documents outlining potential activities for terrorists in Yugoslavia.78
Andric arrived in Australia in 1961 and established himself in Geelong.79 Following
his instruction and assistance with the HRBs first incursion operation (Action
Kangaroo), he was killed in the unsuccessful 1972 incursion into the SFRY.80
2.3.2.2 CAMP IN AUSTRALIA

Annually, the HOP held what was later described by the Australian Government as
Picnic Camps, usually in the summer for a week in the Wodonga region of Victoria.
These camps usually served as an annual meeting for HOP members from all over
Australia, with the attendance usually numbering around 100.81 The camps were
guarded by HOP members armed with .22 calibre rifles and wearing army fatigues
and singlets emblazoned with the Croatian shield.82
178
During the camp of 1962, which was conducted on the banks of the Murray River,
members of the Australian Citizen Military Forces (CMF) were conducting
manoeuvres in close proximity to the campers on a Saturday afternoon. HOP
members approached the CMF members and expressed interest in the vehicles and
equipment being used in the exercise. The CMF officer allowed the HOP members to
inspect the vehicles and weaponry, allowed the soldiers to give a demonstration of the
equipment and its uses, and delivered a short speech on the CMF. The HOP members
were also allowed to have their photos taken with the CMF equipment.83 Photos were
subsequently published in the HOP magazine Spremnost of uniformed HOP members
sitting on an armoured car holding sub machine guns in an article entitled Today on
the River Murray; Tomorrow on the River Drina.84 vii
The official government
position on this event (which became extremely embarrassing following the HRB
incursion into the SFRY) was that the local CMF commander saw and took the
opportunity for a low scale recruiting drive.85
Mika Fumic86 and Ilija Tolic87 attended this week long camp in 1962, where they
were told, along with all the members, Today you are emigrants on the Murray
River, tomorrow you will be on the Drava.88 viii
2.3.2.3 TRAINING IN EUROPE

On completion of their preliminary training in Australia, in early 1963 the nine
members sporadically left Australia for Europe to undertake their operation,
assembling in Stuttgart in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). On arrival in
Stuttgart, the nine insurgents rallied with Area Command Two, where they received
advanced lessons in the handling, construction, and use of arms and explosives.89 This
instruction was given by HRB Area Two command member Niko Kovacic90 (who
lived in Stuttgart),91 who instructed the group in pistol shooting in a forest in the
vicinity of the Hotel Bahnhof.92 Kovacic told Podrug that In Yugoslavia you must
shoot, so that they see and hear that the Croatian emigrants are not forgetting their
homeland.93 The additional training, support, and accommodation in Stuttgart was
provided by Area Command Two members Marijan Simundic and Slavko Saric.94
Simundic was later assassinated on September 13, 1967.95 The group was also
vii
The Drina is a river on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.
viii
The Drava is a major river in that runs from Italy and forms the border of Croatia and Hungary.
179
assisted in Germany by Franko Orlovich and Nada Glavic, also members of Area
Command Two.96
Following the training in Stuttgart, the group travelled to Milan, Italy, where they
received further training and instruction concerning crossing the Italy-Yugoslavia
border safely. They were individually briefed on their roles within the operation97 and
were instructed to place pieces of paper with the letters HRB written on them in the
pockets of the Yugoslav military officers they assassinated.98
The group was well-versed in their objectives and was provided with a list of
approved targets. This list included names of Yugoslav public and political figures
marked for assassination. The troikas were also to target critical infrastructure within
northern Yugoslavia (their designated area of operations) such as major bridges,
public buildings, and factories,99 as well as railroads and reservoirs.100 In addition, the
troikas were to target army officers and police (and procure their arms), to rob stores
if cash was required, to locate the addresses of Yugoslav leaders and military storage
facilities, burn down hotels, and kill foreign tourists.101 The final objective was to
focus on the Croatian villages and provincial enterprises in northern Yugoslavia,
spreading anti-communist propaganda and promoting civil unrest.102
The group was armed and supplied with ammunition by members of Area Command
Two.103 On their crossing of the border, the group carried between them 15 kilograms
of explosives, 100 detonators, 100 metres of fuse wire, six Italian Biretta pistols with
450 rounds of ammunition, two daggers, and four radios.104
2.3.3 INSERTION INTO SFRY

The group moved further west from Milan and rallied at Monfalcone near the Italian-
Yugoslav border.105 By this stage of the operation, the HRB members from Area
Command Four were distressed and dissatisfied at the lack of weapons, ammunition,
and resources that Area Command Two had provided them with.106 The three troikas
of Action Kangaroo slipped across the Yugoslav border just after midnight on the
morning of July 7, 1963. 107 The moon was bright, but the cloud cover was sufficient
to provide the group with adequate cover from the Yugoslav security forces.108
Immediately after their insertion, the cell broke contact with Area Command Two, but
180
continued with their mission.109 Following the groups successful insertion into the
communist country, the nine men split into their troikas and headed east towards the
Croatian province of Yugoslavia.110
2.3.3.1 TOLIC/OBLAK/STOJIC TROIKA

The first troika was made up of Tolic, Oblak, and Stojic. In the court proceedings that
followed the cells capture, the SFRY government claimed that Tolic, who was the
overall commander of the operation111 and the commander of his troika,112 led his
troika through the Slovenian province of Yugoslavia from the Italian border. Late in
the night in July while its residents were asleep, Tolic, Oblak, and Stojic arrived in the
village of Ljubljanica, approximately 356 kilometres from Monfalcone. Ljubljanica is
situated near the town of Derventa, in the Bosnia and Herzegovina province of the
SFRY. Tolics family resided in this town, and the group sought refuge and assistance
from them. On their arrival, Tolic showed his brother, Mate Tolic, their array of
weapons and explosives and informed him of his mission.113 Mate Tolic allowed the
men to stay overnight. Ilijas mother, Danica Tolic, cooked food for the trio and
washed their clothes. Ilija proposed a plan to destroy local infrastructure and proposed
that Mate should assist the troika in destroying the Ljubljanica electricity transformer,
to which Mate replied I refuse to bring evil on myself and my village. Dont you
realise Ilija, that things here are not as you were told they were. Go back to where you
114
came from brother. Following this refusal Mate asked the trio to leave. Tolics
mother had advised Mate to report her sons presence and intentions to the Peoples
Militia.115
These discussions with his brother may have prompted Tolic to reconsider his actions.
This, combined with the fact that Area Command Two had under-supplied and under-
supported the men from Area Command Four, resulted in the troika abandoning its
mission, leaving Ljubljanica and attempting to return to the Italian border.116 Ilija
Tolic later stated in court proceedings in Rijeka that I made up my mind to go back. I
gave up every activity. I dragged Oblak and Stojic further and further towards the
Italian border. And then the end came.117 Tolic, Oblak, and Stojic were apprehended
in the city of Rijeka, in the Croatian province of Yugoslavia, approximately 277.5
kilometres from Ljubljanica, and just over 50 kilometres from the border with Italy.118
181
2.3.3.2 FUMIC/PERKOVIC/ZDRILIC TROIKA
The second troika was made up of Fumic, Perkovic, and Zdrilic. This troika headed to
a village outside Brinje, about 154 kilometres from their Monfalcone insertion point,
where Fumic and Perkovic had family. The two families sheltered the troika. Fumics
sister-in-law, Danica, and Perkovics sister Zora, travelled into Brinje, where they
purchased shoes for the three men so that they could move around more easily. While
the families claimed that they were unaware of the purpose of the trios arrival, Zora
hid her brothers Beretta pistol in the cellar of her home.119
Fumics troika was apprehended at Koper, about 126 kilometres west of Brinje,
within days of leaving his familys village.120 The significant distance west into
Slovenia indicates that Fumics troika was attempting to return to the Italian border.
This strongly suggests that Tolics troika was communicating with Fumics troika
through the radios that each of the troikas carried.
2.3.3.3 PODRUG/TAPSANJI/LEKO TROIKA

The Podrug, Tapsanji, and Leko (who was carrying 5 kilograms of explosives and 14
detonators with him)121 troika headed east like the other two troikas; however, it is
unclear where the trio travelled to before receiving orders from Tolic to return to the
Italian border. The troika was apprehended in the mountainous Gorski Kotar region
within the Croatian province of Yugoslavia on a road outside Karlovac by members of
the Peoples Militia.122
The members of the three troikas were arrested within a fortnight of entering the
SFRY by the Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti/Sigurnosti/Varnosti (State Security
Administration, UDBA) and associated forces.123 All nine members were arrested
between July 19 and July 22, 1963 in the towns of Koper, Rijeka, and Karlovac.124 All
had Australian travel documents or passports on them when arrested, creating
considerable embarrassment for the Australian Government.125
2.3.3.4 GEZA PASTI

Pasti (also an Australian citizen) left Australia for Area Command Two around the
time the troikas were discovered and arrested by the UDBA and SFRY forces,126
possibly when Area Command Two lost radio communication with the group. After
182
arriving in the FRG, Pasti was arrested and charged on October 3127 by German police
with the illegal possession of a firearm (which he procured in Italy) and with being a
member of a secret organisation (which was an offence in Germany). Pasti pleaded
guilty to both charges, was sentenced to seven months imprisonment and ordered to
be deported. During the proceedings of the trial, Pasti informed the court that he was
the organiser of the training for the nine men in Yugoslavia.128
2.3.4 TRIALS
On September 20, 1963, the SFRY Government announced that nine men from
Australia (two with Australian passports) were arrested during a terrorist operation
against the SFRY.129 The trial began in March of 1964 in Rijeka130 and ended on
April 19, 1964.131 At the close of the trial, Oblak and Tolic received sentences of 14
years, Tapsanji received a sentence of 13 years, Leko, Stojic, and Podrug received
sentences of 12 years, Fumic and Perkovic received sentences of six years, and Zdrilic
received a seven year sentence.132 Fumic, Perkovic, and Zdrilic received lighter
sentences after they renounced their actions and the HRB.133
As well as causing embarrassment to the Australian Government, the operation

caused had the same effect on the HRB. An open letter to Area Command Four from
Franjo Turk and Josip Senic,ix both members of the European command, said we
continue to be attacked, vilified and spat upon because of the nine Brothers who have
so tragically ended in the Operation Kangaroo.134 The HRB set out to rectify this
embarrassment by distributing a circular giving a description of the aborted operation,
pointing out the mistakes that were made and the lessons that were learned. The
circular then advocated further operations aimed at sabotage and guerrilla warfare
within Yugoslavia.135
Following the trials of the nine HRB members, those who assisted the troikas were
also punished through court proceedings in Rijeka. Mate Tolic was sentenced to ten
months imprisonment for sheltering his brother. Maria Tolic, Zora Perkovic, and
Danica Fumic received sentences of seven months for harbouring the HRB
members.136
ix
Turk was a high ranking member of Area Command Two. Following the 1963 operation Senic
travelled to Europe to take up a position in Area Command Two.
183
3. RELATIONAL DATA
Nine individuals were involved in the HRB Action Kangaroo cell that operated in the
SFRY between July 7 and July 22, 1963. These individuals were:
1. Josip Oblak 6. Stanko Zdrilic
2. Ilija Tolic 7. Mika Fumic
3. Branko Podrug 8. Drazen Tapsanji
4. Kremsimir Perkovic 9. Vladimir Leko
5. Rade Stojic
The group should have been operating as outlined in Kletva. There should have been
no contact between the troikas and all communication should have been made from
the troika commander to the roj commander (Area Two Command). Following the
breakaway from Area Command Two, the two troika leaders would have began
communicating with the mission leader, Tolic. While none of the data available
specifically discusses how the troikas communicated, it is assumed that it was
achieved through the radios that each of the troikas had. All of the groups attempted
to return to the Italian border following Tolics decision to abort the mission. This
indicates that the groups were most definitely communicating with Tolic.
The contextual background establishes that Tolic was the overall commander and the
commander of his troika. The contextual background was not able to definitively
establish who led the other two troikas. It is assumed, for the sake of this analysis, that
Tapsanji was the commander of his troika and that Zdrilic was the commander of the
remaining troika. This assumption is based on two specific assertions from the
available data. The first is that Tolic and Oblak, as founding members and members
of Area Command Four (and Tolic as leader the operation), received a prison sentence
one year longer than Stojic, the third member of their troika. Tapsanji and Zdrilic both
received an extra year in prison than the rest of their respective troikas. It is assumed
that this is because they were the troika leaders. The second basis for the assumption
that Tapsanji held a commanding role within the troika is that Tapsanji lived in
Australia and was involved with Croatian movements much longer than the other
members of his troika.
184
The period to be examined through social network analysis, the covert stage of the
operation (as discussed in the previous chapter), begins on July 7 following the
insertion into Yugoslavia and the cells termination of contact with Area Command
Two and concludes with the arrest of the final troika on July 22, 1963. From the
contextual background above, the following tables have been constructed.
i. Table 1 HRB: Binary Relations, demonstrates the binary relations and
interactions between the nodes in the network.
ii. Table 2 HRB: Interactional Criteria Applied, illustrates the strength and
duration of the different links between each of the nodes established through
the interactional criteria. As discussed in the previous chapter, these results are
static weighted representations of dynamic networks.
185
TABLE 1. HRB BINARY RELATIONS
TOLIC OBLAK STOJIC TAPSANJI PODRUG LEKO ZDRILIC PERKOVIC FUMIC

TOLIC 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
OBLAK 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
STOJIC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
TAPSANJI 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
PODRUG 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
LEKO 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
ZDRILIC 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
PERKOVIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
FUMIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
186
TABLE 2. HRB INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED
TOLIC OBLAK STOJIC TAPSANJI PODRUG LEKO ZDRILIC PERKOVIC FUMIC

TOLIC 5 5 1 0 0 1 0 0
OBLAK 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
STOJIC 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
TAPSANJI 1 0 0 5 5 0 0 0
PODRUG 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0
LEKO 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0
ZDRILIC 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
PERKOVIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
FUMIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
187
188
4. ANALYSIS
TABLE 3. OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA
CELL SIZE DENSITY DEGREE OF AV.
CONNEXION COMMUNICATION
SPEED
SCORE 9 30.555% 2.444 .444
TABLE 4. ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED)

ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY
(Standardised)
TOLIC 30.000
OBLAK 25.000
STOJIC 25.000
TAPSANJI 27.500
PODRUG 25.000
LEKO 25.000
ZDRILIC 27.500
PERKOVIC 25.000
FUMIC 25.000
TABLE 5. BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY

(STANDARDISED)
BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS
(Standardised) (Standardised)
TOLIC 75.000 66.667
OBLAK 0.000 44.444
STOJIC 0.000 44.444
TAPSANJI 42.857 53.333
PODRUG 0.000 38.095
LEKO 0.000 38.095
ZDRILIC 42.857 53.333
189
PERKOVIC 0.000 38.095
FUMIC 0.000 38.095
TABLE 6. RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES

CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS
(Standardised) (Standardised) (Standardised)
TOLIC 30.000 75.000 66.667
TAPSANJI 27.500 42.857 53.333
ZDRILIC 27.500 42.857 53.333
OBLAK 25.000 0.000 44.444
STOJIC 25.000 0.000 44.444
PODRUG 25.000 0.000 38.095
LEKO 25.000 0.000 38.095
PERKOVIC 25.000 0.000 38.095
FUMIC 25.000 0.000 38.095
TABLE 7. CLIQUE COUNT

CLIQUE COUNT
TOLIC 1
OBLAK 1
STOJIC 1
TAPSANJI 1
PODRUG 1
LEKO 1
ZDRILIC 1
PERKOVIC 1
FUMIC 1
The size of the Action Kangaroo cell was nine, consisting of three troikas. The dataset
size would have been larger if the nine had not broken contact with the members of
Area Command Two. Figure 1 clearly shows the organisation of the nine members
190
into their troikas and the communication between the troikas as outlined in the Kletva
document.
The density of the HRB cell was 30.555, a low density score indicating that the cell
had a high level of structural covertness through its operational structure. The high
structural covertness that the cell enjoyed was countered by the low levels of
efficiency that are indicative of a low density network. While the overall network had
a low efficiency, each troika formed a clique of 100% density, or an all-channel
cluster, meaning the overall network was made up of three small but highly efficient
sections. The network in Figure 1 resembles a line network between each of the three
troikas, with each of the individual troikas resembling (small scale) all-channel
networks, and Tolics position resembling that of a star network. This overall
formation constitutes a network that has been specifically designed to be capable of
high efficiency and effectiveness on small scales, while maintaining high levels of
structural covertness for the overall network. The networks low density score is
complemented by the low degree of connexion, with an average of 2.444 links per
node. While the density score indicates that the network has a low level of efficiency,
the average communication speed was .444, a low score illustrating the lack of
efficiency inherent in low density networks.
The actor level degree centrality scores illustrate that Tolic, as operational
commander, had the highest level of activity (actor degree centrality) within the
network (30.000). This result is clearly demonstrated in Figure 1, with Tolic acting as
the roj commander discussed in the Kletva document following the cells break from
the members of Area Command Two. Table 6 indicates that Tolic also had the highest
ability to access others (the highest actor level closeness centrality score) within the
network. The most significant result was that, as expected, Tolic had by far the
greatest control over the flow of communication within the network with an actor
level betweenness centrality score of 75.000, with the next highest score being
42.857. The reasonably low centrality score and the significantly high betweenness
score indicate that Tolic was the sub-group connector within the network, as well as
having the highest ability to control the communication within the network and the
highest ability to access others. While the contextual background identified Tolic as
the operational commander, this social network analysis demonstrates the ability to
191
conclusively identify the leader of the cell (the critical node) and demonstrate the
dynamics of his leadership over the cell.
The other two troika commanders, Tapsanji and Zdrilic, were the next most central
individuals. This was due to their exclusive interaction with Tolic through their roles
as troika commanders. An interesting result of these centrality measures was that only
three members of the network had any control over the flow of communication and
interaction within the network. The troika commanders were the only individuals who
received betweenness scores, acting as gatekeepers (through their use of the radios),
increasing the security of information and information flows within the network as
well as reducing the troika members knowledge of the rest of the network. This
segregation is best demonstrated by the clique count results, which indicate that each
member is only a clique member of their particular troika.
5. DESTABILISATION
Figure 1 and the discussion of the results in Table 6 clearly demonstrate Tolics
importance to the network. This is bolstered further by the contextual background,
which identifies him as the operational commander. As the individual with the highest
activity, greatest ability to access others, and the individual with the most control over
the communication within the network, Tolic is the critical node within the network.
Figure 2 shows the same graph as Figure 1, but through the ORA program. The
theoretical destabilisation techniques discussed in the previous chapter aim to reduce
the information flow, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness of the network, in
turn aiming to separate and isolate critical areas of the network.
As the critical node within the HRB cell, Tolic is the first to be removed in the
destabilisation attempts. Figure 3 shows the effect of Tolics removal on the network,
immediately isolating all three troikas. With the removal of one node, the network is
incapable of communication between troikas. This is the inherent risk in highly
structurally covert networks.
192
FIGURE 2. ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH
FIGURE 3. TOLIC REMOVAL
Although the three clusters have been isolated through the removal of Tolic, the
network still has two intact troikas. Zdrilic and Tapsanji were equally the second most
critical nodes identified through the centrality measures in Table 6. Figure 3 shows
that following the removal of Tolic, the other troika commanders lost the connection
that gave them higher centrality values and hence a higher importance to the network.
While the single-step destabilisation technique has successfully reduced the
information flow, decision-making capacity, and the effectiveness of the network, the
troika commanders should be removed in order to further reduce the effectiveness and
decision-making capacity of the network. The removal of Tapsanji and Zdrilic is
demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5.
193
FIGURE 4. TAPSANJI REMOVAL
FIGURE 5. ZDRILIC REMOVAL
6. SUMMARY
This chapter has conducted a social network analysis of the 1963 HRB incursion cell
through the three major stages of a social network analysis. The chapter conducted a
contextual background, examined and recorded the relational data, and calculated the
network and nodal level measures of the network. These measures were able to
determine the type of network, relative and ranking importance of each node to the
operation of that network, and identify the critical nodes within the network in
addition to the dynamics that put them in this position of power. These nodes were
then the subject of theoretical destabilisation methods. These theoretical
destabilisation methods comprehensively reduced the decision-making capacity and
effectiveness of the HRB cell as well as completely removing the information flow
194
between the major sections of the network. In short, this chapter mapped the HRB
cell, calculated the network and nodal measures, discovered the most valuable nodes,
and theoretically removed those nodes to destabilise the network. The following
chapter will conduct a social network analysis and theoretical destabilisation of the
Aum Shinrikyo cell which operated in Australia in 1993.
195
196

As the second of four analysis chapters, this chapter will focus on the Aum Shinrikyo
terrorist organisation. This analysis will follow the same methodological procedures
as outlined in Chapter IV and as demonstrated in the previous chapter.
1. AUM SHINRIKYO
The development of the religious group Aum Shinrikyo centres on the partially blind
Japanese man, Chizuo Matsumoto, who would become leader of the organisation.1
Before Matsumoto harboured strong religious ambitions, he made several
unsuccessful attempts to gain entry to university. Following his failure to attend a
tertiary institution, Matsumoto developed his spiritual interests and began to operate
an acupuncture centre.2 In 1982, Matsumoto was arrested for selling unregulated
herbal medicines, hence violating Japans pharmacy laws, and was consequently
convicted and fined.3 In 1984 Matsumoto founded the group Aum Shinsenno kai
(Aum Wizards Society), which operated both as a publishing house and a yoga club.4
Matsumoto attempted to further develop his spiritual capacity, advancing forms of
meditation and yoga within his Aum Shinsenno kai yoga club. To further develop his
spiritual commitment, Matsumoto embarked on a journey to the Himalayas, where he
claimed to have discovered the Supreme Truth, and on his return to Japan two
months later in 1986, changed his organisations name to Aum Shinrikyo,5
transforming the Yoga club into a more focused religious group. Matsumoto changed
his name to Shoko Asahara and established himself (the only one who possessed this
supreme truth) as the leader of Aum Shinrikyo.6
Asaharas religious cult grew with considerable pace,i with his followers forced to
divorce their families,7 abstain from sex, and limit their reading to Asaharas
teachings.ii Aums religious doctrine developed markedly over time. Like similar
Japanese religious movements of the period, Aum espoused a millenialist dogma that
was initially optimistic. The Armageddon was avoidable through Asaharas guidance
and spiritual actions. However, this vision of Armageddon became increasingly
violent through Asaharas development of Aum. The foundation of Aums theological
i
Although not with the same pace as other Japanese religious organisations such as Kofuku no Kagaku.
ii
Eventually members were required to hand over their possessions.
198
doctrine was a mix of Tibetan Buddhism, and Hindu, Japanese, and Christian themes,
cosmology, and practice.8 Essentially, the doctrine was based in the concept of the
Buddhist poa, described by Ian Reader as
the transference of consciousness from the living to the dead, so as to enable the dead
to attain a higher rebirth than they would have otherwise meritedin Aums usage this
concept came to imply that the spiritually advanced could enhance the lot after death of
the spiritually backward.9
Asahara claimed that the teachings he gave led individuals to a state of

enlightenment, endowing them the ability to perform feats such as levitation.10
In 1989, Aum Shinrikyo was reluctantly granted official religious corporation status
by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, providing the cult with significant tax breaks
and a level of immunity from government investigation and prying.11 This legislation
that protected religious organisations from government interference and control was
heavily influenced by the United States (US) following its defeat of Japan in World
War II. With this freedom, the cult developed its doctrine further when Asahara
combined his teachings with the rhetoric of an imminent apocalypse.12 Aum had a
number of apocalyptic scenarios, the most prevalent of which was that the event was
to develop through a war between Japan and the US, which would escalate into World
War Three, apparently around 1997.13 The cult conducted initiations for new members
which included self-starvation, hot and cold water immersion, and drug ingestion, not
all of which were voluntary. These initiations were also employed for members
reaching new levels of enlightenment.14 The group sustained some fatalities through
these methods and the bodies were disposed of through industrial microwaves.15
Loyalty rituals were occasionally conducted in which members were to drink the
blood or bath-water of Asahara.16
In November 1989, Aum began its foray into violence against members of the public.
The group targeted Tsutsumi Sakamoto, a human rights lawyer who had launched
lawsuits against the cult on behalf of the families of under-aged members of Aum
who had left home to join the cult. Members of Aum kidnapped Sakamoto, his wife,
and his child, and injected them with lethal doses of potassium chloride. However,
this method was not quick enough, and Sakamoto and his wife were subsequently
beaten to death with a hammer and strangled.17
199
As the cult grew, members were ranked into seven classifications of enlightenment18
and in 1994 the hierarchy of the group was organised into 22 ministries and agencies
that mirrored those of the Japanese government. For example, the cult created
ministries for Science and Technology, Construction, Public Relations, Justice,
Intelligence, Home Affairs, Treatment, and Health and Welfare. Each ministry had a
head, with Asahara holding the position of Supreme Leader. This departmentalisation
was intended to facilitate a smooth transition into government.19 Prior to this, in 1990,
the cults political wing, Shinrinto, unsuccessfully ran in the elections for the Japanese
Lower House of Parliament, with Asahara as one of the candidates.20
Proportional to the exponential growth of the cult, Aum Shinrikyo, - the business,
developed a vast financial portfolio, initially funded by the assets and possessions of
members massive annual donations. The largest of Aums businesses was
Mahaposya, which specialised in almost everything, ranging from brokerage to
farming, manufacturing and retail.21 Aums other business ventures focused on real
estate, publishing, restaurants, and computer store chains. Aums computer chain was
one of the largest personal computer retailers in Japan.22 By 1995 Aum Shinrikyo had
established large facilities with multiple multi-story buildings in both Shizuoka and
Yamanashi.23 By 1995, Aum also had between 40 000 and 60 000 members
throughout Japan, Russia, the US, South Africa, Germany, Sri Lanka, China, South
Korea, and Australia, and had assets that totalled over US$1 billion.24
It is through these expansive financial holdings that the cult planned for both
preparedness for the coming Armageddon, or the instigation of such an event through
the militarisation of its members.25 The group undertook military training.26 The bulk
of this militarisation was facilitated by Aums expansion into Russia around 1992.
Through these connections, the group acquired Automat Kalashnikov Model 47 (AK-
47) assault rifles, rocket launchers, and other military equipment.27 The group
manufactured the AK-47s on the assembly lines of its factories.28 Aum also acquired a
Soviet built MI-17 cargo/attack helicopter from Russia, and undertook military
training in the former superpower, including some tank exercises.29
200
Scientists and technical specialists were recruited for the cult from Japan, Russia, and
other areas of the world. These individuals were sought to assist in the
implementation of Aums production of chemical and biological weapons and to
assist in the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).30 In 1992, Aum
launched a medical mission to Zaire in an unsuccessful attempt to procure the Ebola
virus.31 Through the recruitment of specific sources of expertise, the group
successfully produced the nerve agents sarin, tabun, soman, and VX, and the
biological agents Botulism and Anthrax.32 The cult began full-scale production of
these agents by the end of 1993.33 Also through this production, Aum manufactured
the psychedelic drug Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (Lysergsure-dithylamid, LSD)
which they sold to Japanese crime organisations, collectively known as the
Yakuza.34
Aum Shinrikyo believed that following the nuclear Armageddon, the isolated
continent of Australia would be unaffected and would therefore constitute a valuable
area in which to set up a permanent facility.35 This contextual background begins in
early 1993, when Aum was beginning to advance its research and production of nerve
and biological agents.
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: BANJAWARN CELL

On April 22, 1993, Kiyohide Hayakawa and Yoshihiro Inoue flew into Perth on flight
QF70.36 These two individuals represented a section of the hierarchy of Aum
Shinrikyo. Kiyohide Hayakawa was the second in command of Aum and would in
1994, would hold the position of Construction Minister within the Aum Ministry.37
Hayakawa was fundamental in the expansion of Aum into Russia around 199238 and
was in charge of the groups pending operations into Australia. Hayakawa was
accompanied by the head of the Aum Intelligence Agency and Action Squads, and
karate expert Yoshihiro Inoue (who in 1994 became Intelligence Minister).39 iii
After
spending the night in Perth,40 the pair rendezvoused with Miki Webb, a Japanese Real
iii
These individuals were not known to Australian authorities as persons of interest or as dangerous
because they did not know of Aum Shinrikyo and received no intelligence from the Japanese
government.
201
Estate agent based in Perth,41 iv
who had been informed that the pair wanted to
purchase a large property with a known uranium deposit.42 Between April 23 and 26,
the group flew around the state of Western Australia inspecting remote properties,
claiming they were searching for properties to establish a religious facility where they
would conduct experiments that would benefit mankind.43 On arrival at each property,
the two Aum members would inspect it alone, sometimes for hours, using laptop
computers with attachments and electrodes that the members used to test the soil.44 It
is not known exactly what these tests were measuring or what results they were able
to achieve.45 The trio also examined properties in South Australia and spent a day
viewing locations in Tasmania.46
After viewing a number of these locations, Hayakawa decided to purchase the 190
000 hectare Banjawarn property approximately 600 kilometres north-west from the
Western Australian capital of Perth. On reaching this decision, the second-in-charge
of Aum attempted to purchase the sheep station for $450 000 in cash. This offer was
refused.47 Hayakawa and Inoue departed Perth on April 30 on flight QF21 from
Sydney to pursue the purchase through the appropriate channels.48
Following Hayakawa and Inoues return to Japan, and their successful identification
of a property on which to establish an Aum facility, Aum Shinrikyo formed
Mahaposya Australia Proprietary Limited in early May49 with Hayakawa, Asahara,
and Yasuko Shimada as the company directors.50 Yasuko Shimada was born in Japan,
but through her brief marriage to an Australian man in 1974, had attained Australian
citizenship.51 Yasuko Shimada left Perth on November 13, 199252 to join the Aum
Shinrikyo cult, paying her way into the group with 2.25 kilograms of gold.53 Shimada
was included as a director due to Western Australias strict foreign ownership
requirements regarding pastoral leases.54 On May 14, Mahaposya Australia applied
for mining exploration licences for the Banjawarn property through the Western
Australian Department of Mines mining registrars office at Leonora, Western
Australia. The acquisition of these licences would inhibit any surveyors from mining
companies entering the property.55 The following month, Clarity Investments
iv
While Miki Webb associated very strongly with Aum Shinrikyo and assisted them throughout their
operation in Australia, she was never a member of the cult, and her association was motivated by
monetary profit.
202
Proprietary Limited was formed as a subsidiary of Mahaposya Australia.56 Like
Mahaposya Australia, Clarity Investments proceeded to apply for further mining
exploration licences on June 8. The licences purchased by Aum Shinrikyo totalled
$150 000,57 and covered the entire 190 000 hectares of the Banjawarn property.58
After applying for visas at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo on August 24, Hayakawa
returned to Perth on flight SQ223 from Singapore with fellow Aum Shinrikyo
member Tsuyoshi Maki on September 3.59 Hayakawa, acting on behalf of Mahaposya
Australia, with real estate agent Miki Webb acting as the agent for the company,60
purchased the Banjawarn property lease for $540 000,61 of which Shimada held nine
tenths, and Asahara one tenth.62 On September 6, Miki Webb was appointed the co-
director of Mahaposya Australia with Asahara, and consequentially resided at the
Banjawarn residence for a number of months.63 Subsequent to the purchase of the
property, Hayakawa and Maki consulted a geologist regarding the acquisition of a
ship for the purpose of exporting uranium ore out of Australia in 44 gallon drums.64
2.1 MAIN GROUP ARRIVES

Following the purchase of the property, a large group consisting of Aums Ministry
and scientific personnel and experts arrived in Perth on September 9, 1992, on QF70
from Tokyo.65 This group consisted of 25 members of the sect and included seven
members of Aums hierarchy, general Aum members of varying rank, and seven
female school students.66 v
The flight manifesto included Shoko Asahara (the Aum
Shinrikyo leader,) and other high-ranking Aum members: Seiichi Endo, who held an
undergraduate degree in science and some post-graduate experience and would
become Minister of Health and Welfare in 1994; Tomomitsu Niimi who became the
Minister of Home Affairs; Hideo Muari, an astrophysicist who would hold the
position of the Minister of Science and Technology;67 medical doctor Tomomasa
Nakagawa who became the Aum Household Agency Director; and Yoshihiro Inoue
who would become the head of Aums Intelligence Agency.68 The Aum hierarchy
were accompanied by 19 other senior to low-ranking Aum members including: Aum
chemist and physics graduate69 Tooru Toyoda, who was undertaking his doctoral
studies, Yutaka Onaya, Yuki Kakinuma, Nobuki Ami, Satoru Go, Satoru Shinohara,
v
This took the total number of Aum cult members in Australia to 27 (including the seven female
students).
203
Masaharu Itonaga, Hideaki Tatsuta, Wakashio Togashi, Naruhito Noda, Takanori
Komiyama, Akira Hori, and physicist Kenichi Hirose. While the visa applications of
most of these individuals read office worker, most held advanced qualifications in
the fields of science and technology.70 Included in this group were seven 14-year-old
girls;71 Yukiko Kida, Yuki Kakinuma, Chikako Shimuzu, Chika Tanabe, Naoko
Yamamoto, Yasiko Maruhashi, and Asaharas daughter Miwa Matsumoto.72 The
group was met at the Perth Airport by Webb and Hayakawa.73
The group paid around $30 000 for the excess freight that included gas masks,
generators, ditch-diggers, protective clothing, respirators, and assorted tools74 under
the pretence that they were using the equipment for gold mining.75 This excess
baggage included two small tractors fitted with excavation gear.76 Due to the
excessive amount of surplus baggage, Australian Customs Service officers searched
the entire group and their luggage. This inspection revealed chemicals including
perchloric and hydrochloric acids, sodium sulphate, and ammonium water.77 The
hydrochloric acids were stored in glass bottles marked Hand Soap.78 Consequently,
Australian Customs officials seized two crates of chemicals and laboratory
equipment.79 Endo and Nakagawa were arrested and charged with Carrying
Dangerous Goods on an Aircraft under the (Australian) Civil Aviation Act. In the days
following their bail, the pair pleaded guilty in the Perth Court of Petty Sessions, and
were consequently fined $2 400 each. They were also ordered to pay the court costs of
$594 each.80 The group spent the night in the Ambassador Hotel in Perth and the next
day departed for the Banjawarn property.81 In preparation for the arrival of Asahara
and the rest of the group, Hayakawa and Maki had chartered three aircraft for the
group to travel the 600 kilometres from Perth to the station.82
2.2 OPERATION BEGINS

Following the main groups arrival at Banjawarn, the individuals at the property who
were not members of the cult, such as Webb, were asked to leave for the duration of
the main groups stay.83 Asahara established himself in the main house of Banjawarn
and the others lived in the various other quarters of the property.84 According to the
Australian Federal Police (AFP), on arrival, one of Aums chemists, Toyoda, quickly
established a laboratory in the kitchen of an abandoned house on the ranch, about 130
204
metres from the main homestead.85 The door to this lab was marked in Japanese
Toyoda Laboratory 86 and below it in English, Do Not Enter.87
In addition to the extensive scientific equipment the group had, such as laptop
computers, a spectrometer, beakers, Bunsen burners, and various digital apparatus,
Aum also imported electrical equipment such as transformers, static converters,
generators, coaxial cabling, batteries, meters, tools, and protective equipment into the
country through Mahaposya Australia.88 The chemicals used in this lab were
purchased by the group through a wholesaler in Perth and were either driven back to
the property by the members, or sent to the property addressed to Tsuyoshi Maki.89
The group purchased copious amounts of hydrochloric acid, ammonia solution,
perchloric acid, nitric acid, chloroform, sulphuric acid, and potassium dichromate.
The group also required the chemical Thioacetamide, which was unavailable from
their original wholesaler. Maki flew from Perth to Melbourne and back in the same
day, just to purchase the chemical worth $190.90
With the establishment of the laboratory, the chemicals available, and the
qualifications of the members present, Aum was capable of producing the toxic nerve
gas sarin and different types of mustard gases at Banjawarn.91 The cult members that
worked in the Toyoda laboratory manufactured sarin and conducted the first trials of
the chemical on 29 sheep on the property.92 The amount of sarin produced by the
group is unknown; however, only 5 millilitres of the agent would have been required
to kill the 29 sheep.93 The amount of agent produced is most likely to have been an
impure form of sarin.vi
In conjunction with the production and experimentation with sarin, the group
attempted to excavate uranium ore from the deposit located at Vickers Well on the
property.94 As well as the excavation equipment that the group had flown from Japan,
including two ditch diggers, for which they had paid $5 000 each to get to Australia,
the group hired a backhoe without an operator and purchased a grader from a nearby
property.95 The group strategically dug large test holes at particular points around the
area and as they dug acquired samples down to depths of between 12 and 14 feet.96
vi
In the subsequent Matsumoto and Tokyo attacks in 1994 and 1995, an impure form of sarin also was
used by the cult.
205
The scientists on the property conducted their own assay of the samples they
collected.97 As mentioned previously, Aum intended to export the uranium ore back to
Japan.98
While every member who was present on the property had some interaction with
every other member on the property, the communication and interaction was
concentrated within the various ranks and sections of the group. The group operated
as they did in Japan, in a very segregated, hierarchical manner. For example, the
ministry members had much higher levels of interaction with each other and Asahara
than with the lower-ranked members and scientists, while the lower-ranked members
and scientists associated more strongly with each other.99
2.3 OPERATION ENDS

On September 17, just over a week after arriving in Australia, Asahara left for Japan
on flight QF79 to Tokyo with Toyoda, Kida, Hori, Matsumoto, Niimi, Itonaga, Ami,
Onaya, Tatsuta, Tanabe, Go, Hirose, Kakinuma, Shimizu, Maruhashi, Yamamoto,
Muari, Togashi, Noda, and Inoue.100 Two days after the main groups departure, Endo
and Nakagawa departed to Tokyo on flight QF79, and Hayakawa and Maki departed
for Singapore on flight QF224.101 Itonaga followed, departing on September 27 on
flight QF7 to Singapore.102 This left just Komiyama, Shinohara and the recently
returned Webb on the property.103 The following day, Onaya applied for another
tourism visa to return to Perth.104 On October 4, Shinohara and Komiyama left Perth
for Singapore on flight QF7. Later that month, Asahara, Shinohara, and Komiyama
applied for visas to return to Australia at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. All were
rejected. Consequently, Shinohara and Komiyama changed their application from
working visas to tourist visas and lodged them at the Australian Consulate in
Osaka.105
In the following months another 12 applications were lodged and all were rejected by
the Australian Government.106 Asahara later appealed this decision in a letter to the
Federal Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in which he explained that he
required the assistance of two aides due to his vision disability and required the
protection of 17 bodyguards.107 Further applications by Aum members were also
submitted and later rejected.108
206
On October 30, Nobuhiro Okamoto and Tomohiro Kinouchi the only two Aum
members to receive visas from the Australian consulate, arrived in Perth from Hong
Kong on flight CX171 to act as caretakers for the property.109 Shimada then returned
to Australia for the first time since November 1992, now as a full member of the cult,
on December 18.110 After two months of Okamoto and Kinouchi mismanaging the
property, the Western Australian Pastoral Board informed the pair that they must
employ an experienced local manager for the property, and must cut sheep numbers
by 2 000 due to the degradation of the station. Webb, Shimada, and the new station
manager organised for shearing teams to travel to the property.111 On February 15,
1994, Shimada was ordered back to Tokyo by the Aum hierarchy, leaving Webb to
attempt to run the property. This situation worsened when Okamoto and Kinouchi
were also ordered to leave and departed to Bali and Hong Kong on April 28.112
Webbs only method of communicating with members of the organisation was by
telephone.113
Shimada returned on May 14 with Tsuyoshi Maki.114 Following their arrival, the
activities were quickly concluded at Banjawarn. By June the station manager left the
property and in July the mining applications for the property were withdrawn.115 In
late July,116 Shimada approached a Perth real estate agent claiming she wanted to sell
in five minutes the Banjawarn property.117 In August, the property was sold for $330
000,118 vii
and on October 4, Shimada departed Perth on flight SQ224 to Singapore.
Maki departed the same day on flight CX172 to Hong Kong.119 The departure of
Shimada and Maki left no Aum members on the Banjawarn property and most of the
technical and scientific equipment had been removed.120 Before they left, the
members on the property conducted a large burn of rubbish and remaining evidence
and scientific equipment that the group had not sold or given away. This included
various documentation of the experiments and assaying that was undertaken on the
property.121 At their departure, the cult members did leave behind 32.2 litres of
hydrochloric acid, 12.4 litres of ammonia solution, 5 litres of perchloric acid, 7.5 litres
of nitric acid, 7.2 litres of chloroform, and 0.5 litres of potassium dichromate.122
vii
The property was originally purchased by Aum for $450 000.
207
Drawing on the experience gained from the testing of sarin at the Banjawarn property,
Aum Shinrikyo dispersed the agent in Mastumoto, Japan, on the evening of June 27,
1994. This attack killed seven and injured hundreds of people.123 The following year,
on March 20, five Aum members on separate trains pierced plastic bags filled with
sarin while riding on the Tokyo subway. The attack killed 12 commuters and injured 5
500. 124
3. RELATIONAL DATA
For the purpose of analysis, the Aum Shinrikyo cell is considered to have been fully
operational and commenced the covert stage of its operations from the arrival of the
main group at the Banjawarn property on September 11, 1993 (when all non-Aum
members were ordered to leave the property and the chemical experts and scientists
began their experiments). The cell is considered to have ceased this activity on the
departure of Asahara and his cohort on September 17, 1993. This is due to the fact
that it was in this period that Aum conducted its most covert operations: the attempted
extraction of uranium ore and the production and testing of the nerve gas sarin. The
size of this network is 20, and includes:
1. Kiyohide Hayakawa 11. Hideaki Tatsuta
2. Tsuyoshi Maki 12. Wakashio Togashi
3. Yoshihiro Inoue 13. Tooru Toyoda
4. Nobuki Ami 14. Tomomitsu Niimi
5. Masaharu Itonaga 15. Naruhito Noda
6. Seiichi Endo 16. Kenichi Hirose
7. Yutaka Onaya 17. Akira Hori
8. Yuki Kakinuma 18. Shoko Asahara
9. Satoru Shinohara 19. Hideo Muari
10. Satoru Go 20. Tomomasa Nakagawa
From the contextual background presented above, Table 1 represents the binary
relationships between the members of the Banjawarn cell. It is clear from this table
that each node interacted with every other node due to their close proximity in living
together on the property. Because the contextual background was not able definitively
to identify the strengths of the various relationships and the levels of interaction
208
within these relationships, the interactional criteria will not be applied to this network.
This will not effect the calculations of the network and nodal criteria. This was done
because the individuals lived together on the Banjawarn property for the entire period
under examination and hence, the interactional scores would have been the maximum
for each link under the prescribed weightings. Specific confirmation of this was not
available through the contextual background, as this data is not known to the
Australian authorities (investigations were not conducted until after the group had
sold the property) and is only known to the cell members themselves. Figure 1 is a
graph of the Banjawarn cell, clearly demonstrating the binary relations of the
individuals in the cell.
209
TABLE 1: AUM SHINRIKYO BINARY RELATIONS
S
H K H N
A I A I T T A A
Y T K N A O T H S K
A I O O I O T G O N I A M A
K M N N E N N H S A Y I N R H H U G
A A O A A N A U A U S O I O O O A A A
W K U M G D Y M R G T H D M D S R R R W
A I E I A O A A A O A I A I A E I A I A
HAYAKAWA 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MAKI 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
INOUE 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AMI 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ITONAGA 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ENDO 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONAYA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
KAKINUMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SHINOHARA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TATSUTA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOGASHI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOYODA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NIIMI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
NODA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
HIROSE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
HORI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
ASAHARA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
MUARI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
NAKAGAWA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
210
211
4. ANALYSIS
TABLE 2: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA
CELL DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. COMMUNICATION
SIZE CONNEXION SPEED
Score 20 100 19 100

(Standardised)
HAYAKAWA 100.00
MAKI 100.00
INOUE 100.00
AMI 100.00
ITONAGA 100.00
ENDO 100.00
ONAYA 100.00
KAKINUMA 100.00
SHINOHARA 100.00
GO 100.00
TATSUTA 100.00
TOGASHI 100.00
TOYODA 100.00
NIIMI 100.00
NODA 100.00
HIROSE 100.00
HORI 100.00
ASAHARA 100.00
MUARI 100.00
NAKAGAWA 100.00
212
TABLE 4. CLOSENESS & BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY
(STANDARDISED)viii
(standardised) (standardised)
HAYAKAWA 0.00 100.00
MAKI 0.00 100.00
INOUE 0.00 100.00
AMI 0.00 100.00
ITONAGA 0.00 100.00
ENDO 0.00 100.00
ONAYA 0.00 100.00
KAKINUMA 0.00 100.00
SHINOHARA 0.00 100.00
GO 0.00 100.00
TATSUTA 0.00 100.00
TOGASHI 0.00 100.00
TOYODA 0.00 100.00
NIIMI 0.00 100.00
NODA 0.00 100.00
HIROSE 0.00 100.00
HORI 0.00 100.00
ASAHARA 0.00 100.00
MUARI 0.00 100.00
NAKAGAWA 0.00 100.00
TABLE 5: CLIQUE COUNT

CLIQUE
COUNT
HAYAKAWA 1
MAKI 1
INOUE 1
viii
A ranked table is not required in this chapter as all individuals have the same score.
213
AMI 1
ITONAGA 1
ENDO 1
ONAYA 1
KAKINUMA 1
SHINOHARA 1
GO 1
TATSUTA 1
TOGASHI 1
TOYODA 1
NIIMI 1
NODA 1
HIROSE 1
HORI 1
ASAHARA 1
MUARI 1
NAKAGAWA 1
The size of the Aum Shinrikyo cell was 20, a large cell, with individuals in the
network ranging from the leader of the cult, to scientists, to lower-ranked members.
Most significant of the network level results was the fact that the group operated with
100% density in a complete all-channel network (demonstrated in Figure 1). A
completely dense cell entails maximum possible efficiency and consequently the
minimum possible covertness available through structural and interactional measures.
The degree of connexion score of 19 merely confirms that each member of the
network interacted with every other member of the network during the covert period
of the operation. This is also why the clique count for each member was one. The
average communication speed was 1.00 (the maximum possible result), again
illustrating the efficiency of the cell. Aum Shinrikyo countered the low structural
covertness of their network through the remoteness of their base of operations
(Banjawarn) and through operating in a nation whose law enforcement and
intelligence agencies knew very little or nothing at all of the groups activities in
Japan and Russia. This allowed Aum to operate more overtly and achieve its mission
214
objectives quickly through maximum efficiency. This is best evidenced firstly by the
success of this stage of their operation and secondly by the fact that this was still
achieved despite charges and convictions against some of these members following
their arrival in Australia.
Due to the all-channel formation of the network (every node interacted with every
other node), each member of the network had an equal degree of centrality, indicating
that each individual had an equal amount of activity within the network. Likewise,
each individual had identical closeness scores of 100, in that each node had access to
each other node. Once again, each member received the same value for betweenness,
this value being zero, indicating that no individual had control over the flow of data
within the network due to each individuals maximum closeness.
From the social network analysis measures applied above, it is impossible to

determine the most important node or nodes within this network, as it is not feasible
to distinguish the relative importance of each individual to the network. Through this
social network analysis each individual is equally important to the network.
5. DESTABILISATION
Because it is not possible to identify the nodes of critical importance to the network
through sociometric measures, neither is it possible to use the traditional measures to
attempt to destabilise the cell. For example, Figure 2 shows the original Aum network
in Figure 1, but through the Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) program. As each of
the nodes in the network is of equal importance and centrality, it does not matter
which node is targeted, as the removal of each will have the same effect. Figure 3
shows the cell following the removal of Toyoda from the network. Following the
removal of Toyoda from the network, the formation remains the same (all-channel),
the communication speed remains the same (1.00), and all of the centrality scores
remain the same. The only effect the removal of Toyoda has on the structural
measures is the size (from 20 to 19) and degree of connexion (from 19 to 18). While
the Aum cell exhibits an extreme lack of covertness in its structural formation, the
100% density and the resulting effectiveness of the cell make it theoretically
extremely difficult to destabilise.
215
FIGURE 2: ORIGINAL AUM CELL
As has been demonstrated above, no nodes are of critical structural importance to the
network, which makes it impossible to significantly reduce the information and
communication flow within the network. Likewise, it is impossible to reduce the
decision-making capability and the effectiveness of the network. This density also
makes it impossible to separate critical sections of the network through the removal of
a small number of nodes. Because the ranking leaders within the network are clearly
and definitively identifiable through the contextual background, this allows attempts
at destabilisation through targeting the Aum leadership members in an effort to reduce
the decision-making capacity and effectiveness of the network. Those members to be
targeted are the members of the leadership and the supreme leader: Hayakawa, Endo,
Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, Muari, and Asahara.
216
FIGURE 3: TOYODA REMOVAL
Figure 4 shows a hierarchical model of the Aum network represented in Figure 1. This
model was determined by the ranks of the individuals and who their orders were given
to. This is basically a visual representation of the hierarchical structure synthesised
from the contextual background. This model clearly illustrates the command structure
of the Aum network and allows destabilisation techniques to be aimed at this
command structure. It must be noted that this model is not synthesised from social
network analysis and is not a mathematically defined graph, but is merely a model
used to visually demonstrate the effectiveness of targeting the highly ranked nodes of
the network in all-channel networks. This measure attempts to remove all command
members from the network, and leave the remaining cell members without any orders
or hierarchy. The high-ranking individuals within the network were signified by the
red nodes in Figure 1; however, the hierarchical model more clearly demonstrates the
217
hierarchical relations between the leaders and followers of the network. Figure 4
shows Asahara at the top of the network as the supreme leader, followed by
Hayakawa as his second-in-charge. Next are the members of the groups leaders who
received their orders from both Asahara and Hayakawa. Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa,
Niimi, Inoue, and Muari, all gave and passed down orders to the rest of the network.
Destabilisation measures that are employed against all-channel networks cannot aim
at reducing the information and communication flow or the isolation of components
of the network. The hierarchical destabilisation method proposed requires the
conclusive identification of every leader and his/her rank within the network through
the contextual background and then aims to reduce the decision-making capacity of
the network. This identification was possible in the case of the Aum Banjawarn cell.
This method may also require multiple steps to significantly reduce the decision-
making capacity of the cell, seven in the case of the Aum cell. Even after the complete
removal of the cell hierarchy, an all-channel network of 13 nodes still remains.
Despite the seeming robustness and resistance all-channel networks have against
traditional destabilisation methods, as discussed previously, all-channel networks
operate with minimum structural covertness due to their high density. This means that
the exposure of one node by counter-terrorism authorities could potentially lead to the
exposure of all the other nodes within the network. This is the case with the
Banjawarn cell. In practice, if counter-terrorism authorities targeted and exposed a
single individual within the network, this would potentially lead them to twenty other
individuals and the Banjawarn property, and hence the exposure of every other node
within the network.
218
219
6. SUMMARY
To sum, despite the extreme effectiveness of the Aum cell and its apparent resistance
to theoretical destabilisation methods, the exposure of one node within the network
has the potential to lead counter-terrorism authorities to every node in the network due
to the total lack of structural covertness. Thus, the best destabilisation method for an
all-channel network is to target the highest leadership nodes in the network that have
been identified through the contextual background and remove these nodes from the
network. The removal of these nodes ensures a reduction in effectiveness and the
decision-making process of the network (the effects of these processes are not
measurable through social network analysis due to the nature of all-channel
networks). The capture or discovery of every one of these high-ranking nodes
increases the ability to identify and neutralise the remaining network, due to its lack of
structural covertness. In short, it is very time-consuming to fully disrupt such a
network, but comparatively simple to identify each of the nodes in order to effectively
destabilise it (depending on the strength of the links). This chapter has mapped,
calculated the network and nodal measures, and proposed theoretical destabilisation
methods for the Aum Shinrikyo cell that operated in Australia in 1993. The following
chapter will conduct a social network analysis and provide theoretical methods of
destabilisation for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous, LET) cell that
operated in Sydney in 2003.
220

CHAPTER VII LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
This chapter will follow the methods employed in the previous two chapters by
conducting a social network analysis and examining the theoretical destabilisation
methods that could have been employed against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the
Pure/Righteous, LET) cell that operated in Sydney in 2003. The construction of the
contextual background for this group represents the first comprehensively detailed
account of this cell and its operation in Australia. As the first account of this cell and
due to the recent and secretive nature of the operation and the details surrounding it,
this background (as discussed in Chapter IV) has had to rely on many resources
within the media. A majority of these sources are media articles based on documents
released by la Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) to select media
outlets. The data is also derived from interviews with individuals with authoritative
knowledge on the group.
1. LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
LET was founded in 1989 and is also known as Paasban-e-Kashmir, Paasban-i-Ahle-
Hadith, and Jamaat-ad Dawa.i The group was formed following the assassination of
Abdullah Azzam Saeed in Peshawar, Pakistan. Saeed founded the Markaz-ud-Dawa-
wal-Irshad (MDI). MDI is a Sunni-based fundamentalist group opposed to United
States (US) missionaries in Pakistan, LET became the military wing of MDI in 1989.1
Like its founding group, LET espouses radical Sunni extremism, and chiefly operates
in the disputed Kashmir and Jammu regions. The primary goal of the group is the
creation of an Islamic state composed of Pakistan and the disputed regions of Jammu
and Kashmir. Its objectives also entail supporting terrorism against non-Islamic
states.2
The jihad in Afghanistan that followed the Soviet invasion in 1978 saw MDI
operational for the first time and it is here that its links with Pakistans Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) agency were forged. It is also in this theatre that LET developed
relations with the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (Afghan Services
Bureau, MAK),3 the organisation that would be absorbed into al-Qaeda.4 The links
i
In early 2002, LET officially changed its name to Jamaat-ad Dawa to counter an impending ban on
the group by the Pakistani Government.
222
between LET and the newly formed al-Qaeda continued after the defeat and
withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, these links becoming official in May
1998, with the formation of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and
Crusaders.5
The group first began operations in the disputed Kashmir and Jammu regions in 1993,
to conduct insurgency operations against the Indian military behind the Line of
Control. Since 1993 the group has continued these operations against the Indian
military in Kashmir and Jammu, as well as mounting attacks against targets in India.
The group is regarded as one of the largest, most brutal, and most highly trained
groups fighting in Kashmir.6 The group maintains a large arsenal of weaponry and
ordinance, most commonly operating through suicide attacks, mass murders, and hit
and run guerrilla style attacks, the targets of which (as demonstrated below) include
civilian, military, and political targets in Kashmir, Jammu, Pakistan, and India.7
Listed below are selected examples of LET operations between 2000 and 2003:
i. 22 December 2000 - attack on the military complex within the Red Fort in
New Delhi, killing three people;
ii. 16 January 2001 - attack on Srinagar airport, killing five;
iii. 14 April 2001 - attack against Indian border security personnel, killing
seven;
iv. 13 December 2001 - attack against the Indian Parliament, New Delhi,
killing nine;
v. 14 May 2002 - attack on Indian military base in Kaluchak, killing 36;
vi. 23 March 2003 - attack on Hindu Kashmiris, killing 24; and
vii. 22 July 2003 - attack on an Indian military base in Kashmir, killing seven.8
The group was also reported to have been planning an attack against the US Embassy
in Delhi in late 2003 and is currently active in post-war Iraq. The group maintains its
links (largely established in Afghanistan) to other Islamic extremist groups in fronts
such as Chechnya, the Philippines, and the Middle East.9 LET was responsible for the
simultaneous July 11 bombings of trains in Mumbai, India, killing 207 people.10
223
The funding behind LET originates from Islamic Non-Government Organisations
(NGO),11 donations from the Pakistani diasporas in the United Kingdom (UK) and the
Persian Gulf,12 and through the same set of commercial networks that al-Qaeda
employs. According to an Australian Parliament research note (by Nigel Brew of the
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Group) the primary source of LETs funding
comes from bin Laden himself, again illustrating the close ties between the two
extremist groups.13
Before 2001, LET trained members in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following the
US-led invasion of Afghanistan, LET now exclusively trains at camps in remote areas
of Pakistan, a quantity of which are mobile camps, allowing for significantly greater
security.14 The traditionally soft approach taken by the Pakistan Government in
dealing with LET has facilitated the groups promotion to coordinating the activities
of the World Islamic Front, given Osama bin Ladens inability to do so effectively
since the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.15 This situation has signified a
dramatic shift in LETs modus operandi and area of operations, as is evident in the
LET operation in Sydney in 2003.
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2003 SYDNEY CELL

As discussed in Chapter IV, certain members of the cell to be examined in this chapter
remain at large and to date have not been charged with any terrorism-related offence
by Australian authorities. For legal reasons, two of the individuals presented in this
social network analysis will be referred to through pseudonyms, so as not to identify
them. Minor details regarding other areas of the contextual background (such as
events and places) also have been altered to protect the identity of the individuals in
question. These changes have been made in such a manner so as not to affect the
descriptive accounts of the relations and network analysis of the communications and
interactions between the individuals.
2.1 WILLIE VIRGILE BRIGITTE

Willie Virgile Brigitte (Aliases: Abou Maimouna, Salahouddin, Jamal, Mohamad
Ibrahim Adberrahmane, Gibriel) was born on October 10, 1968 to the middle-class
Christian and Victoria Marinette in Pointe a Pitre on the Caribbean island of
224
Guadeloupe.16 Brigittes father was an engineer and his mother worked in a
pharmacy.17 Brigitte did not have an Islamic upbringing and he attended a school in
Pointe a Pitre all the way through to his final year of high school.18 Brigitte moved to
Paris for his final year of schooling in economic management where he joined the
Navy before he completed his final exams. Brigitte was in the Navy for a total of three
years, between late 1989 and early 1993.19 During this period he was twice convicted
of desertion.20
Following an unsuccessful career in the military, at 25, Brigitte undertook an similarly

failed career as a teacher at a Catholic high school,21 later working in a rehabilitation
centre for troubled children at the Puy de Dome, and then at a printery in the same
area.22 Around late 1997 and early 1998, Brigitte began his conversion to Islam after
studying the Bible, the Old Testament, and the Koran.23 In 1998 Brigitte adopted the
Islamic name Mohammed Abderrahman and was also known as Abderrahman the
West Indian.24 Following his conversion, Brigitte began attending the infamous
Omar mosque in the Muslim quarter of Pariss Belleville district25 as well as the Abou
Bakr mosque in the Paris suburb of Couronnes, where he deepened his religious
understanding and learned Arabic. The suburb of Couronnes is known for its high
number of migrants and for the relatively low socioeconomic status of this section of
French society.26 The mosques Brigitte began attending had been known for their
extremist sermons since the 1980s. The sermons delivered at these mosques espoused
a militant political discourse and jihadi teachings.27 Brigitte attended the lectures and
theology classes of Mohamed El Maghrebi and those of other mujahideen that
lectured at the Couronnes mosque.28
Brigitte left France for Yemen on December 16, 1998,29 where he attended the al-
Iman University headed by the radical Islamic scholar Sheik Abdul Majeed al-
Zindani. Al-Zindani was once the mentor of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.30 The
scholar lectured Brigitte at the university and deepened his understanding of both
Islam and Islamic extremism. While attending the al-Iman University, Brigitte and
other classmates attempted to kidnap a Western diplomat in Sanaa. Brigitte was jailed
for three weeks by the Yemeni government and was consequently released and
returned to France.31
225
Shortly after becoming radicalised through the extremist mosques in Paris and
Yemen, on his return to France, Brigitte joined the Algerian-based terrorist
organisation, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist
Group to Call and Combat).32 The GSPC split from its parent organisation, the
Islamic extremist group GIA, in 1996. By 1998, the GSPC was more powerful than its
parent organisation (at least within Algeria) and operated against military and
government targets primarily in the remote regions of Algeria. In 2003, the group
officially declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist
organisations.33 The relations between the GSPC and other Islamic extremist groups
were already in place when Brigitte became involved with the GSPC. Around this
time, Brigitte moved into a residence with Ibrahim Keita,34 a fellow member of the
GSPC.35 During the late 1990s, Brigitte and other individuals (including Keita) were
involved with the GSPC and aligned groups and undertook camping trips in the
Fontainebleau Forest 50 kilometres outside Paris, and physical training on the beaches
of Normandy.36 Brigitte is reported to have held a senior role within these camps,
which were essentially selection courses to discover which individuals should be sent
to camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan for further training.37
Following the profound lack of success with his previous career choices, Brigitte ran a
Halal butchery at Villiers-sur-Marne in the greater Paris area, living in an apartment
above the store.38 According to the other business owners in the area, Brigittes
butchery held strange hours, the customers who frequented the establishment
seemingly purchasing very little meat.39
In the days prior to the al-Qaeda attacks in Washington and New York in 2001, the
butchers shop was abandoned.40 Brigitte had travelled to Pakistan to meet up with
members of the GSPC camping group from France. On arrival in Pakistan following
the al-Qaeda September 11 attacks, Brigitte wanted to fight with the Taliban against
the Northern Alliance and the invading American forces. Despite the closure of the
Afghani-Pakistani border due to the impending war,41 Brigitte managed to travel into
Afghanistan and meet with members of al-Qaeda.42 Brigittes group of jihadis were
linked to a Tunisian extremist cell that assisted in the assassination of the US-backed
Northern Alliance military commander Ahmen Shah Massoud on 9 September,
2001.43 In the following months the other members of Brigittes GSPC camper group
226
were turning up in the same area: Djamel Loiseau was found frozen to death in the
Tora Bora mountains where he was engaging US troops; Samir Ferraga was killed
fighting US troops; and Brahim Yadel was captured and transported to the US
military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.44
Following his stay in Afghanistan, Brigitte travelled to a radical mosque in Lahore45

to meet with some of the contacts he had acquired through his camper training and
GSPC association and also through the contacts in Afghanistan.46 From here, Brigitte
was received into the inner circles of LET and admitted to the LET headquarters, the
Markaz campus at Muridke, Lahore.47 It was here that Brigitte met a senior Pakistani
LET contact named Sajid, who was responsible for the training and logistics of
foreigners48 and other senior members of the group. During the next few months,
Brigitte would again come into contact with the upper echelons of al-Qaeda.49 Brigitte
was quickly recruited by Sajid and, following his training in the Markaz campus,
travelled to one of LETs high altitude training camps in the mountains of Punjab near
Faisalabad, where he remained for four months.50 This camp could accommodate up
to 3000 members and was divided into two sections, one for Pakistanis and the other
for foreigners. Sajid was responsible for the foreigners section of the camp.51 Brigitte
received training in small arms, logistics, guerrilla tactics, and the advanced use of
Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket launchers.52
As well as this training, Brigitte was trained in the construction and detonation of
explosives. These lessons were conducted by Chechen explosives expert Abou
Salah.53 Salah was the commander of these camps and, according to a French
intelligence report, went back and forth between the camps explosives depot where
a laboratory had been installed and another sector reserved for the Pakistanis where he
was occupied with [chemical and biological weapons] experiments.54 The expertise
of Salah was almost demonstrated in its full capacity in April 2004, when a plot to
detonate five chemical trucks carrying sulphuric acid outside the US Embassy in
Amman, Jordan was foiled. Salah is suspected to have masterminded the attack.55
227
Following this training, Brigitte returned to Lahore with Sajid,56 and then re-entered
Afghanistan for another short stay before returning to France through Pakistan.57
Brigittes instructions were to return to France and assist in the passage of LET
brothers through France. Brigitte returned to Paris in January of 2002.58
2.2 FAHEEM KHALID LODHI THE QUARTERMASTER

Around the same time that Brigitte was training in Pakistan, October 2001, Pakistani
native and Australian citizen,59 Faheem Khalid Lodhi, had travelled from Australia to
meet with Sajid at a LET training camp in the Punjab region outside Lahore. At this
camp, Lodhi acted in an official capacity.60 His duties ranged from distributing
uniforms and weapons to receiving foreign mercenaries.61 This camp, like most of its
nature, specialised in urban warfare training and instruction.62 Following his duties in
the training camp, Lodhi received his orders from Sajid and returned to his family
home in the south-western Sydney suburb of Punchbowl63 where he and his family
had lived since moving from Pakistan in the late 1990s. 64 Lodhi worked in Australia
as an unregistered graduate architect.65
Lohdi, like any devout Muslim, attended prayers at his local mosque. He attended the
Al Sunnah Wal Jammaah Mosque on Haldon Street in Lakemba.66 The Imam of this
mosque was the Lebanese-born Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud.67 Zoud has been
speculatively linked to Abu Dahdah, the leader of a Spanish al-Qaeda cell and Ali
Timimi, who was linked to a Virginia-based terror cell in the US.68 Lodhi was a
member of LET prior to his departure to Lahore in October 2001. On his return to
Australia, Lodhi remained in contact with Sajid, calling him in Pakistan at least three
times from his home between his return from Pakistan and Brigittes arrival in
Australia in May of 2003.69 Lodhis orders were to recruit and make ready a small cell
and await further orders.70
2.3 RECRUITING
Izhar Ul-Haque arrived in Australia with his family from Pakistan in 1998. Three
years later the family purchased a home in Glenwood, north-eastern Sydney.71 Izhar
attended the Pennant Hills High School near the family home,72 and later (in year 11)
moved to the prestigious North Sydney Boys High, where he excelled, achieving
brilliant results, and was highly regarded as a hockey player on the school team.73 In
228
2000, Ul-Haque sat his Higher School Certificate74 and was accepted into Medicine at
the University of New South Wales (UNSW).75
During his time at the UNSW, Ul-Haque joined the UNSW Islamic Association,76 but
by his second year was failing his course. Ul-Haque had become frustrated through
negative experiences with Western patients, who he claimed look at me as though
Im a frog.77 Ul-Haque began attending the Al Sunnah Wal Jammaah Mosque in
Lakemba, a significant distance from his home in Glenwood.78
Ul-Haques family made regular trips to Pakistan and on one such occasion in January
of 2003, when the family travelled to Pakistan for one of Ul-Haques brothers
engagement celebrations,79 Izhar fell in with members of LET.80 Lodhi (who was also
in Pakistan at the time) recruited Ul-Haque in Karachi81 and sent him to a LET camp
at Aqsa near the town of Muzaffarabad.82 At this camp, because he was from
Australia, Ul-Haque trained under Sajid, who was a contact of both Lodhi and
Brigitte.83 While undertaking this training, Ul-Haque wrote a letter to his parents
indicating that he was training with LET and wanted to undertake training in weapons
and combat, to eventually die in Kashmir as a martyr.84 At the camp, Ul-Haque was
encouraged to participate in the jihad against the Indian Army over the disputed
regions of Kashmir and Jammu. Ul-Haque decided against participating.85 Once Ul-
Haques family received his letter, his father and brother went to the camp to convince
him to leave and continue his studies in Australia. This persuasion worked, and Ul-
Haque decided to return to his UNSW course in Sydney.86 On returning to Australia
from Pakistan, Ul-Haque had in his possession 30 books that detailed (with hand
written notes) the use of automatic weapons, rocket launchers, land mines, and other
assault weapons.87
Lodhi by this stage had formed a small cell of extremists who awaited the arrival of
Brigitte, these included Izhar Ul-Haque, Saghir Junaid,ii Abdul Rakib Hasan, and
Abbas Faaris.iii All of these individuals (with the exception of Ul-Haque) had trained
with LET in the advanced use of weapons, explosives and warfare tactics between
ii
A pseudonym.
iii
A pseudonym.
229
1999 and 2000 in camps in the Punjab mountains outside Faisalabad with up to 3000
other recruits.88
2.4 PREPARATIONS
Willie Brigitte returned to France from Pakistan in January of 2002.89 He re-
established himself in Paris, staying with his old camper contact Ibrahim Keita.90
While in France, Brigitte remained in contact with Sajid through email and made calls
to a satellite phone in Pakistan, known to be used by Sajid.91 Brigitte served as a
contact for members of LET and associated brothers who passed through France,92
which LET used as a country to rest up in before launching operations in other areas
of the world.93 Two such individuals who were passing through were Frenchmen
Christian Ganczarskiiv and Karim Mehdi who were later arrested for the bombing of a
synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia in April 2002.94
Sometime around early 2003, Brigitte received a phone call from one of Sajids
contacts in Australia who informed him that he would be the principal contact for
Brigitte in Australia, and hence responsible for his welcoming and supervision.95
Brigitte obtained a new passport with no evidence of travel to Pakistan96 and then met
with two of Sajids Pakistani contacts in Paris. In this meeting, Brigitte received 3 500
euros for his plane fare and travel expenses to Australia.97 On May 14, Brigitte left
Orly Airport in Paris bound for Sydney, Australia,98 with only his passport, a tourist
visa, a one way ticket, $2 000,99 and a cover story that detailed he was starting a
business, and chose to do so in Australia on one of his ex-wives advice. He wanted to
rebuild his life among the strong Muslim community in Sydney.100
The contact in Australia who called Brigitte was Faheem Khalid Lodhi.101 Lodhi was
busy preparing for the arrival of Brigitte and on May 6, purchased a Vodafone
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)-card under the alias Sam Praveen.102 Lodhi had
also organised for an apartment for Brigitte in the suburb of Lakemba.103 This flat,
located in Donald Street, was set up by Hasan through friends.104
iv
Christian Ganczarski was a guide/escort for JI member Jack Roche between Pakistan and
Afghanistan in 2000 (as discussed in Chapter II).
230
2.5 OPERATION UNDERWAY
In the early morning of May 16, Brigitte arrived in Sydney on the final leg of his
flight from Paris.105 Following his instructions, after his arrival at Sydney
International Airport, Brigitte travelled to the Sydney suburb of Fairfield, where he
called Lodhi from a payphone.106 In this conversation, Brigitte was directed southeast
to Lakemba by train,107 presumably to ensure he was not under any surveillance.
Lodhi only had a brief description of Brigitte, which was limited to black hair, goatee,
and glasses, which he had scribbled in his diary.108 On arrival in Lakemba, Brigitte (as
instructed) dropped a newspaper he had purchased on the platform and subsequently
heard someone tell him the date. This exchange was the predefined code between
Brigitte and Lodhi to confirm their identities. From here, Lodhi drove Brigitte to the
Al Sunnah Wal Jammah Mosque in Haldon Street, where Brigitte burned the notes he
had brought with him from France.109 The Al Sunnah Wal Jammah Mosque was run
by Imam Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud.110
Following their departure from the mosque, the pair then went to Donald Street,
where Lodhi gave Brigitte the keys to the apartment that Lodhi and Hasan had
arranged for him.111 This placed Brigitte just two train stations away from Lodhis
Punchbowl residence to the west, in the same suburb of the Haldon Street mosque,
and within the four kilometre radius in which the rest of the cell resided (with the
exception of Ul-Haque). After settling in, Brigitte moved out of his Donald Street
apartment and into another apartment close by in Boorea Avenue, Lakemba. Once
again, this residence was set up through friends of Hasan.112
Brigitte quickly established himself in Australia, gaining a job at the Island Dreams
Caf halal restaurant in the Central Business District of Sydney. Brigitte used the
CityRail system to get there.113 As with his previous career choices, Brigitte
(according to the caf owner) was a poor employee, both incredibly slow and
constantly giving patrons the incorrect amount of change.114
Just one stop on the train line from the Island Dreams Caf was the Redfern Gym at
which Brigitte trained. The gym, owned by former professional boxer Tony Mundine,
was frequented by Brigitte who spent a lot of time training with a former world
kickboxing champion and professional middleweight boxer.115 Mundine (later) made
231
the assessment that Brigitte could handle himself.116 Brigitte attended three
mosques while in Sydney; the principal destination was the Al Sunnah Wal Jamaah
Mosque which he attended on his first day in Australia with Lodhi. He also attended
either this or a mosque closer to his house every Friday for the Salat al-Jumuah.117 v
Nine phone calls were made between the mobile phones of Lodhi and Brigitte
between his arrival in Australia and his eventual arrest in October; both phones were
registered under false names.118 Both Brigitte and Lodhi kept in constant contact with
Sajid in Pakistan through the use of their mobile phones, public telephones, and
through internet chat rooms.119 At some stage after arriving in Australia, Brigitte
called Ibrahim Keita in France and informed him that an operation was underway.120
Brigitte also kept in frequent contact with Hasan, making 42 phone calls to the Halal
butchery where Hasan worked, asking (as Jamal)121 to speak with him. On 24 of these
occasions Hasan was working and on 23 occasions he took Brigittes call.122 The
group and their associates used code words such as Hanger, Black, Stone, and
Alice to conceal the subjects of their discussions.123 Brigitte and Lodhi both
possessed notes detailing how to behave in public and also rehearsed interrogatory
simulations.124
Brigitte and Lodhis initial orders were to prepare and execute a large-scale terrorist
attack in Australia.125 New orders were received from Sajid in Pakistan by Lodhi that
the cell was to prepare for the arrival of an explosives expert. Lodhi informed Brigitte
of the development and that Brigitte had to house the new cell member. Brigitte
correctly assumed that the explosives expert was Abu Salah, the Chechen who had
trained Brigitte in explosives.126 The Chechen was to travel to Sydney disguised as a
supporter of the Georgian Rugby Union team during the lead-up to the Rugby World
Cup.127 Abu Salahs first visa application was rejected, as was his second, effectively
leaving him stranded.128
v
Friday prayers.
232
2.5.1 TARGET SELECTION
The group continued planning the operation despite Salahs initial unsuccessful
attempts to enter the country.vi By July the operation began taking shape and the cell
began to select the targets for its mounting operation. Brigitte travelled to the Sydney
Harbour Bridge and Opera House, collecting postcards which he sent back to the
brothers.129 In the same month, Lodhi began working at the architectural firm
Thomson Adsett, where he was employed as an unregistered graduate architect. While
at work, Lodhi accessed a New South Wales (NSW) government website and gained
access to satellite images of areas like Sydneys Centrepoint, and various transport
systems, as well as the Parramatta Central Business District. He also purchased a map
that detailed Australias energy supply system which included details such as the
locations of power stations, substations and the routes of gas pipelines. Lodhi also
gained access to the NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning, and Natural
Resources website, in which he examined satellite images of the critical infrastructure
and transportation systems in and around Sydney.130 Lodhi had also ordered and
obtained maps of the NSW electricity infrastructure using the alias M. Ralus.131 In
the top drawer of his desk at Thompson Adsett, Lodhi had stored 1500 pages of notes
written in Urduvii on the construction of explosives, cyanide gas and other poisons and
lethal gases, detonators, and invisible ink. These notes also detailed methods of
intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence. These were in addition to the
documents Lodhi had at home, which ranged from US military training manuals on
warfare, to 600 odd files relating to Islamic extremism.132
In addition to the resources gained by Lodhi, Brigitte obtained maps of the Lucas
Heights Nuclear Reactor and maps of the Swanbourne Royal Australian Army
barracks that is home to the Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SASR).133
Brigitte also placed a poster of the Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor on his bedroom
wall.134
In late August, Brigitte moved again, this time to the suburb of Wiley Park, between
Lakemba and Punchbowl (as far as the CityRail-travelling Brigitte was concerned).
Once again, Hasan assisted in this move, signing the Ray White Real Estate lease with
vi
Brigitte was trained in the construction and detonation of explosives.
vii
The official language of Pakistan.
233
Brigitte.135 Brigittes Wiley Park residence was the site of many meetings between
Brigitte and Lodhi, who met at least ten times between Brigittes arrival in Australia
and his arrest on October 9.136 During these meetings Brigittes computer was used
frequently.137
2.5.2 MELANIE BROWN

On 13 September, 2003, Brigitte married Australian Muslim convert Melanie Brown
(known as Khadja Brown within Islamic circles) after their meeting was arranged
through mutual friends. Brown, who spoke fluent Arabic, had previously been a
member of the Royal Australian Army (RAA), where she specialised in electronic
warfare, encryptions and digital transmissions.138 Brown served in one of the RAAs
Signal Corps Squadrons and was deployed in East Timor after the Indonesian
Military-backed militia violence in the nation that followed the successful vote for
independence.139 viii
The pair were married at the Lakemba mosque by Imam Zoud
and Brown subsequently moved into Brigittes Wiley Park flat.140 Following the
honeymoon period, Brigitte was visited almost everyday by Lodhi, usually early in
the morning. Brown was excluded from these meetings and the two men often used
Brigittes computer. The meetings usually lasted around twenty minutes.141
In addition to excluding Brown from his meetings with Lodhi, Brigitte would leave
the room to take phone calls on his mobile phone, taking measures to ensure Brown
could not hear the conversation. Brigitte routinely burned documents in their kitchen
sink around once a week.142 Brigitte on several occasions quizzed Brown on her
previous military experience, pressing her on matters such as military equipment,
firearms, vehicles, communications devices, and the US military installation at Pine
Gap in the Northern Territory.143 In late September, Brigitte and Brown moved into a
two-bedroom flat on the ground floor on Shadforth Street, Wiley Park. Lodhi made
multiple night visits to the Shadforth Street apartment.144 The windows of the flat
were covered by blankets to prevent anyone from seeing inside.145
viii
The crisis in East Timor was explained in greater detail in Chapter II.
234
2.5.3 CHEMICALS
Following the identification of suitable targets, Brigitte and Lodhi began attempts to
acquire the explosives required to undertake their operation. Lodhi approached the
industrial chemical wholesaler Deltrex Chemicals through email146 regarding the bulk
purchase of chemicals such as nitric acid and urea, two chemicals which can be used
in the production of explosives.147 Lodhi then set up a company called Eagle Flyers
and faxed orders through to Deltrex, ordering the chemicals he had previously made
enquiries about.148 In addition to the chemicals ordered, Lodhi had stockpiled in his
family home, 100 rolls of toilet paper, from which the lightweight explosive
nitrocellulose can be derived.149 These were just a few of the ten chemicals the cell
needed to construct the explosives they required for the operation.150
2.6 CELL FAILS

In France, the DST had identified Mohamad Ibrahim Adberrahmane as Willie Virgil
Brigitte, after narrowly missing him before his departure to Afghanistan in 2001. The
DST traced Brigitte to Australia and alerted the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO) on September 19 via a communication that read:
Communication from the DST in Paris to ASIOCould you confirm Willie Brigitte
is in Australia? He left France in May with a one-way tickethad participated in a
selection course in France[and had] been twice in Afghanistan Pakistan zone where
he had undergone military training .151
Brigitte was located by ASIO and subsequently arrested on October 9, 2003, he was
later taken to the Villawood Detention Centre.152 Following interrogation, Brigitte
was deported for working in violation of his tourist visa on October 17. On arrival in
France, he was arrested and charged by the French authorities with conspiring to
commit acts of terrorism.153
Subsequent to the deportation of Brigitte, Australian authorities began investigating

Brigittes activities in Sydney and were consequentially led to Lodhi. On October 25,
Lodhi drove to the Garrison Point Recreation Park at Georges Hall and from there to
the car park of the Lake Gillawama Reserve. In this car park, Lodhi placed into a
rubbish bin an envelope containing detailed aerial photographs of the potential targets
of the operation, including the Holsworthy Army Base, Victoria Barracks, and Her
Majestys Australian Ship Penguin. Unbeknown to Lodhi, he was under the
235
surveillance of ASIO, who retrieved the envelope before a pick-up was made by
another LET member.154 ix
Lodhi was subsequently interviewed by ASIO155 and his office raided.156 The
intelligence collected through the Australian authorities subsequent activities led
them to other members of the cell. On April 15, 2004, Ul-Haque was arrested and
charged with training with a terrorist organisation.157 On April 22, authorities arrested
Lodhi at his work place - Bishop, Hitchcock & Irwin Architects - in Alexandria.
Lodhi was charged with nine offences ranging from acting in preparation for a
terrorist attack to recklessly collecting or making documents to facilitate terrorist
acts under the Criminal Code Act.158 In August, Hasan was charged with making
misleading statements under ASIO questioning during their investigations into
Brigittes presence in Australia under the same legislation.159
3. RELATIONAL DATA
Eight individuals were directly involved in the operation of this cell, which was
considered to be operational and covert between Brigittes arrival in Australia on May
16 and his arrest on October 9, 2003. The cell examined in this contextual background
had not reached full maturity. It was waiting on an explosives expert, had not selected
specific final targets, and had not yet acquired all the materials for explosives
construction. While this cell may have altered its structure closer to the
implementation of its operation, possibly with more members absorbed into the cell,
its organisation and communication for this period still gives significant insight into
the operation of an Islamic extremist cell. The individuals known to be involved in
this cell during the covert period were:x
1. Faheem Khalid Lodhi
2. Willie Virgile Brigitte
3. Sajid
4. Abdul Rikib Hasan
5. Saghir Junaid
6. Abbas Faaris
ix
It is assumed that Lodhi dropped the documents for pick up. Willie Brigitte burned all sensitive
documents that he disposed of, and it would be a safe assumption that Lodhi would do the same.
x
While Keita was informed of the operation by Brigitte, the data suggests that he was not involved in
the operation.
236
7. Izhar Ul-Haque
8. Abu Salah
The binary relations within the cell are shown in Table 1. As in the previous analysis
chapters, the binary tables simply indicate whether a relationship exists or not. Table
2 displays the cell with the interactional criteria applied. Again, as discussed in the
previous chapters a score of five indicates the maximum level of interaction and zero
indicates no interaction.
237
TABLE 1. LET BINARY RELATIONS
LODHI BRIGITTE SAJID HASAN JUNAID FAARIS UL-HAQUE SALAH
LODHI 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
BRIGITTE 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SAJID 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
HASAN 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
JUNAID 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FAARIS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
UL-HAQUE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SALAH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
238
TABLE 2. LET INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED
LODHI BRIGITTE SAJID HASAN JUNAID FARRIS UL-HAQUE SALAH
LODHI 5 3 4 1 1 1 0
BRIGITTE 5 3 4 0 0 0 0
SAJID 3 3 0 0 0 0 1
HASAN 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
JUNAID 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FARRIS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
UL-HAQUE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SALAH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
239
240
4. ANALYSIS
SPEED
SCORE 8 32.142% 2.250 .549

(Standardised)
LODHI 40.000
BRIGITTE 31.429
SAJID 20.000
HASAN 17.143
JUNAID 2.857
FARRIS 2.857
UL-HAQUE 2.857
SALAH 2.857

(STANDARDISED)
(Standardised) (Standardised)
LODHI 76.190 87.500
BRIGITTE 4.762 63.636
SAJID 28.571 63.636
HASAN 0.000 53.846
JUNAID 0.000 50.000
FARRIS 0.000 50.000
UL-HAQUE 0.000 50.000
SALAH 0.000 41.176
241
TABLE 6. RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES
LODHI 40.000 76.190 87.500
SAJID 20.000 28.571 63.636
BRIGITTE 31.429 4.762 63.636
HASAN 17.143 0.000 53.846
JUNAID 2.857 0.000 50.000
FARRIS 2.857 0.000 50.000
UL-HAQUE 2.857 0.000 50.000
SALAH 2.857 0.000 41.176

CLIQUE
COUNT
LODHI 2
SAJID 1
BRIGITTE 2
HASAN 1
JUNAID 0
FARRIS 0
UL-HAQUE 0
SALAH 0
As Table 3 indicates, the size of the Sydney LET cell was small, with just eight
members. Six of these members were in Australia during the period examined and a
majority of the interaction took place between three of the cell members. Figure 1
clearly shows the concentration of interaction between Lodhi, Brigitte, and Sajid who
formed the command cluster of the cell. Figure 1 also demonstrates that Hasan was
the only operation assistant to communicate with the command cluster. The rest of the
operation assistants were kept isolated from the command cluster, with Lodhi acting
as their link to the cell. The results of the clique count in Table 7 illustrate that the two
small cliques within the network (the Lodhi, Hasan, Brigitte clique and the Lodhi,
242
Sajid, Brigitte clique) formed the nucleus of the network, demonstrating the pivotal
role of Lodhi and Brigitte.
The isolation of the operation assistants served its purpose by ensuring the cell had a
high level of structural covertness. The figures in Table 3 further evidence this with a
density score of 32.142. The low density of the network is qualified by the degree of
connexion score, signifying that the average number of relations per node is 2.250.
Despite the low density of the network and hence an inherent low efficiency, the
average communication speed was .549. The relatively effective communication
speed (in relation to the low density) of the network is a result of its small size and the
fact that the network is based around a central command cluster. The network
formation resembles a star network based around Lodhi.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate that Lodhi is the most central node within the network.
Lodhis actor level degree of centrality score of 40.000 (while not a significantly high
level) shows that he had the highest level of activity within the network, followed by
Brigitte (31.429) and Sajid (20.00). The high centrality scores of this trio confirm
their roles within the command team. The betweenness centrality scores clearly
demonstrate Lodhis importance to the network, Lodhis score of 76.190 indicates that
Lodhi had by far the greatest control over the flow of information and interaction
within the network, with the next highest score being 28.571. This score is a result of
his links to the operation assistants who would have taken up roles such as mixing
chemicals and planting/detonating explosive devices when the operation was close to
fruition. Lodhis importance within the network is evidenced again through his
closeness score of 87.500, showing that he has a significantly high ability to access
others within the network. Salah was the only node within the network to whom
Lodhi was not directly linked.
The next most central node was Sajid. While Brigitte had a higher degree of centrality
than Sajid (shown in Table 6), Sajid had a betweenness score of 28.571, while Brigitte
only scored 4.762. This result indicates that Sajid had a significantly greater ability to
control the flow of communication within the network than Brigitte did. This result
was due to Sajids connection to explosives expert Salah.
243
The three operation assistants within the cell were kept very distant from the
command cluster of the network, with the exception of Hassan, who played a logistics
role by assisting Lodhi in setting Brigitte up in Australia. Hassan was more important
to the network than the other operation assistants, as demonstrated in his centrality
and closeness scores in Table 6. Despite this, Hassan was far less important to the cell
than Lodhi, Sajid, and Brigitte. The results in Table 6 indicate the distance the
operation assistants were kept from the cell through the lack of activity, access to
others, and control over the flow of information (of which they had none whatsoever,
with betweenness scores of 0.000).
5. DESTABILISATION
FIGURE 2. ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH
The discussions above and the results in Table 6 clearly demonstrate that Lodhi was
the most critical node within the network. Figure 2 is the original LET graph in Figure
1, but visualised through the Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) program. The first
step in the attempted destabilisation of the network is the removal of Lodhi from the
network. Figure 3 shows the removal of Lodhi from the network.
244
The removal of Lodhi has an obvious effect on the network. As Lodhi was the only
connection to the operation assistants Ul-Haque, Faaris, and Junaid, this connection is
lost and these members are isolated from the network. The removal of Lodhi clearly
reduces the information flow of the network by isolating three of the four operation
assistants. This isolation also significantly reduces the effectiveness of the network.
Because Lodhi was a key member of the command cluster within the network, his
removal seriously damages the networks decision-making capability.
FIGURE 3. LODHI REMOVAL
While the removal of Lodhi would have severely damaged the networks information
flow, effectiveness, and decision-making capacity, a line network would still exist
between Hasan, Brigitte, Sajid, and Salah. While Sajid was more central than Brigitte
in the network in Figures 1 and 2 (shown in Table 6), they have the same position in
the network in Figure 3 in that they are the middle nodes in a line network. As a result
the two have the same centrality scores and neither member is more critical to the
network from a network analysis stance.
245
FIGURE 4. SAJID REMOVAL
The second destabilisation stage is the removal of Sajid from the network. This was
done for three reasons. The first was because in the initial network, Sajid was the
second most critical node. The second was that the removal of Sajid ensured the
isolation of explosives expert Salah. The final reason was Sajids rank and importance
to the overall LET and associated Islamic extremist network. The removal of Sajid
also ensures that the link from LET headquarters is severed, leaving the remaining
Australian members with the inability to access an explosives expert and other
reinforcements.xi Figure 4 shows the effects of the removal of both Lodhi and Sajid
from the network. It is clear that the removal of the two most critical members of the
network has reduced the information flow, decision-making capacity, and
effectiveness of the network to the point where it is inoperable.
xi
Obviously, this stage would be very difficult, with Sajid being based in LET headquarters in
Pakistan.
246
6. SUMMARY
This chapter has conducted a social network analysis of the LET cell that operated in
Sydney between May 16 and October 9, 2003. The contextual background that was
constructed as the first stage of this network analysis established a comprehensive and
detailed account of the cell (which had previously not been undertaken). Through this
research, the chapter continued its analysis and mapped the cell through the relational
data, then calculating the nodal and network measures. This analysis allowed a
significant understanding of the internal dynamics of the cell and identified the critical
nodes (leaders) within this network. The chapter then applied theoretical
destabilisation techniques by removing the two most critical nodes within the cell.
These measures resulted in the cells near complete loss of information flow,
decision-making capacity, and effectiveness. The following chapter will examine the
Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) cell responsible for the 2002 Bali
bombings.
247
248

In this, the fourth of four chapters examining terrorist cells through social network
analysis, the methodology will be applied to the Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic
Community, JI) cell that undertook the 2002 Bali bombings. This chapter will then
examine the theoretical techniques for destabilising these cells.
1. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH
JI formed from the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia that was created in 1942.
Darul Islam was a militant separatist movement with the goal of the creation of an
Indonesian Islamic state governed under Shariah law. The movement was responsible
for several uprisings through the 1950s and 60s in Indonesia.1 During the period Darul
Islam was suppressed by the Indonesian government and forced to operate
underground during the mid 1960s, several armed militant organisations formed from
the group in the 1980s. One of these groups was JI, which was led by Abdullah
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. JI established radical Islamic boarding schools
(madrasah or pesantren) and training camps in Indonesia, shortly after expanding their
influence into Malaysia and throughout Southeast Asia.2
In the mid-1980s, the Suharto Indonesian Government enforced a crackdown on

Islamic militancy. Following the overturning of a lower court verdict by the
Indonesian Supreme Court that had previously protected both Sungkar and Bashir in
1985, the pair fled to Malaysia to avoid their impending arrest.3 That year saw the first
JI recruits funnelled through to the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab
(Afghan Services Bureau, MAK) in Afghanistan, to assist in the muhajidin campaign
against the invading Soviet forces. This initial group numbered less than a dozen
members. The following year, 1986, the number was almost five times that size. The
JI mujahideen established themselves at Camp Saddah (which was then separated into
ethnic divisions) where the three-year training course consisted of weapons, tactics,
and explosives instruction combined with strict Salafist indoctrination.4 More
specifically, the Saddah recruits learned (in the words of one such recruit):
the nature of explosives and their chemical compositionthendetonators,
including how to blow up different types of targets. Second was mines: land mines
and anti-tank mines. We studied how to take them apart, how to plant them, and how
to repair them. Of course we also learned how to shoot and how to drive tanks. Third
250
was map readingtopography lessonshow to use a compass, and how to draw
contour lines. This is important because if you are going to use artillery weapons, you
have to know how to read maps. Fourth was infantry tactics or war tactics. We
studied urban guerrilla warfare, guerrilla fighting in the mountains, attacks, ambushes
and the like.5
Following this training, the recruits fought on the frontlines against the Soviet forces.6
The sending of JI recruits to Afghanistan continued until the last class arrived in 1991
following the Soviet withdrawal.7 The subsequent year, following a disagreement
between Sungkar and another senior Darul Islam leader, Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar
established JI as an organisation completely independent from Darul Islam.8 JI now
had the distinct goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.9 Sungkar,
as the amir, headed the organisation and directly oversaw the four councils of JI:
i. Majelis Qiyadah (Governing Council)
ii. Majelis Syuro (Religious Council)
iii. Majelis Fatwa (Fatwa Council)
iv. Majelis Hisbah (Disciplinary Council)10
The governing council was run by the Qiyadah Markaziyah (Central Command)
which specifically directs the mantiqis of JI. These mantiqis separated JIs operations
into four divisions:
i. Mantiqi I: Covered the areas of Singapore and Malaysia and provided the
primary role of economic management for the group.
ii. Mantiqi II: Covered the Indonesian theatre of operations and was focused on
jihad and military operations.
iii. Mantiqi III: Covered the Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi regions and was
responsible for the training of JI.
iv. Mantiqi IV: Covered Australia, Papua and the Maldives, and was established
as a further fund-raising division.11
By the late 1990s, JI had established militant training camps around Southeast Asia,
mirroring those in Afghanistan. 12 These camps were also attended and facilitated by
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and al-Qaeda (as discussed in Chapter II).
When Abdullah Sungkar died of natural causes in 1999, Abu Bakar Bashir became
the amir of JI.13 JIs operations advanced rapidly following this leadership change. On
August 1, 2000, the residence of the Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia was
251
bombed, killing two people.14 On Christmas Eve of that year eleven teams of bombers
across the Indonesian archipelago planted 38 bombs in churches and the homes of
Catholic priests, detonating between 8.30pm and 10.00pm (with the exception of
those that were defused or failed to detonate), killing 19 people and injuring 120.15
On August 1, 2001, JI attempted to assassinate Indonesian President Megawati

Sukarnoputri at the Atrium Mall in Jakarta. The attempt failed when the would-be
assassin blew his leg off in a premature detonation.16
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2002 BALI OPERATION

2.1 TENGGULUN
Tenggulun is a small religious village about 200 kilometres from Surabaya, in the
Indonesian province of East Java.17 Tenggulun is the birthplace of the brothers
Muklas (real name: Ali Ghufron), Ali Imron (alias: Alik; Huda bin Abdul Haq), and
Amrozi, born to their father Nur Hasyim and mother Tariyem (the first of Nur
Hasyims two wives).18
The eldest of the three, Muklas, was born in 1960, followed by Amrozi in 1962, and
Ali Imron in 1968.19 Muklas was the most devout of the brothers and was sent to the
al-Mukmin Ngruki Islamic boarding school near Solo in Central Java in 1979.20 This
school was established by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir in 1971 and
espoused radical Islamic preaching, praise of the revolution in Iran (in 1979), and the
resistance of the mujahideen in Afghanistan.21 Muklas graduated from Ngruki and
lectured there for four years until gaining permission to follow Sungkar and Bakar
Bashir (who were in exile) to Malaysia.22 In late 1985 Muklas travelled to
Afghanistan via Pakistan with his fellow Darul Islam members to take part in the
jihad against the Soviets with individuals who by the turn of the 21st Century would
constitute the upper echelons of JI. During Muklass time in Afghanistan, Ali Imron
was allowed to attend the Ngruki school, a stint which lasted only one month.23
Amrozi also left home for a short stint in 1985, travelling to Malaysia to work, and
returning six months later.24
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Muklas left Afghanistan around 1988 following the defeat and withdrawal of the
Soviets. From here he travelled to Malaysia to work before planning to return home to
Tenggulun.25 Muklas married the sister of a Malaysian mujahideen whom he fought
with in Afghanistan. They settled in Ulu Tiram, Johor, where he was instructed by
Darul Islam commanders (before the separation between the organisations) to
establish a madrasah modelled on the Ngruki School in Central Java. Muklas called
this school the Luqmanul al-Hakiem Islamic boarding school.26 Around 1990, Amrozi
travelled to Malaysia in search of his older brother, studying in the al-Hakiem
Madrasah.27 Ali Imron joined Muklas and Amrozi in Malaysia in 1990, where he also
studied at Muklas newly established madrasah.28 In 1991, Muklas took Idris to meet
the JI amir Abu Bakar Bashir, where Idris was sworn into JI.29
Idris (alias: Gembrot, Jhoni Hendrawan), an ethnic Malay, was born in Sumatra
around 197030 and was a graduate of the Ngruki Madrasah in Solo.31 Idris later
established himself as a businessman in Medan, Sumatra.32 During this time, however,
Idris studied at the Luqmanul al-Hakiem Islamic school in Johor that was established
by Muklas and at which Samudra and Ali Imron taught.33 Idris involvement in JI
escalated in 2000, when he participated in the Christmas Eve bombings in his
hometown of Medan.
Around 1995 Ali Imron travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan for a year, where he
attended radical madrasahs and mujahideen training camps, becoming quickly adept
in the construction and detonation of all manner of explosives and demolition
techniques.34 On his return, Ali Imron went back to Muklass madrasah in Ulu Tiram.
By the mid 1990s, this Islamic school had become a meeting place for the upper
echelons of JI leaders and veterans of the Afghanistan jihad.35
Ali Imron left his two brothers in Malaysia, returning to his home village in 1998 with
his experience of the Afghanistan conflict, to teach at the Pondok al-Islam school that
his family had established.36 In 1999 Amrozi returned to Tenggulun and, by June, the
two brothers, as well as Muklas, had become involved in their first jihadist act in
Indonesia. Following the fall of Indonesian President Suharto and the return to
Indonesia of Bashir and Sungkar, Amrozi was selected to purchase the chemicals to
253
be used in the construction of bombs to be sent for operations in Ambon.37 i After this
operation, Amrozi became the supply man for JI operations, procuring potassium
chlorate, aluminium powder, vehicles, phones, weapons, and ammunition. During this
time Ali Imron travelled to Ambon to impart his experience and knowledge gained in
Afghanistan to the militants there.38 Amrozi and Ali Imron were involved in more JI
operations together before the Bali bombings of 2002.
In July 2000, Amrozi purchased a mini-van and fertiliser that were to be used in the
attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia which killed two
people (the Ambassador survived the attack).39 The pair worked together in the
Christmas Eve operation in 2000, operating out of Amrozis house in Tenggulun. The
brothers were involved in the acquisition, construction, and detonation of the bombs.40
2.2 OPERATION BEGINS

By 2002, Muklas had risen to the highest ranks of JI. In April, after returning to
Tenggulun, he contacted Imam Samudra regarding the approval and funding for a
bombing following a proposal by Samudra. Imam Samudra (alias: Abdul Aziz;
Kudama) was born in Serang, Baten, West Java, in 1971.41 Samudra graduated with
the highest honours at the Madrasah Aliyah Negeri in Serang in 1990, where he was
radicalised by former Darul Islam leader Kyai Saleh Asad.42 Following the
completion of high school, Samudra was recruited by a Darul Islam member and sent
to Afghanistan where over the next two years in the mountains of Khost in the east of
the country, Samudra was trained by mujahideen in the Sayyaf camp on weaponry
such as various models of Kalashnikovs, the M16 assault rifle, hand guns, anti-tank
weaponry, and bomb construction and detonation.43 Samudra was in Afghanistan at
the same time as Ali Imron.44 Around 1993 Samudra returned to West Java where he
was married, later moving to Malaysia with the exiled JI members. Although living in
Sungai Manggis, south of Kula Lumpur, Samudra began attending the Luqmanul
Hakiem School in Ulu Tiram. It is here that he met Muklas and Amrozi.45
i
The Christian-Muslim conflict in Ambon was seen as a new front for jihad by JI.
254
Samudra also met the hierarchy of JI, including Bashir and Hambali,46 and was
quickly incorporated into these ranks. Along with Muklas, Samudra also accelerated
into the very upper echelons of JI through the early and mid-1990s.47 By 2000,
Samudra was coordinating and planning JI operations. He was part of the planning
team for the Christmas Eve bombings, the bombing of the Huria Kristen Batak
Protestan and Santa Arna Churches in July,48 and the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in
August 2001.49
In July of 2002, Amrozi, who was working in the repair shop he had opened the
previous year in Tenggulun,50 received a Short Message Service (SMS) from Imam
Samudra. This message was to the effect that an operation was ready and a meeting
had been arranged in the regional city of Solo.51 Amrozi left his workshop and headed
to Solo for the meeting on JIs next operation in his white Toyoda sedan. On his
arrival in Solo, he picked up Samudra, as well as JI members Dulmatin and Idris.52
Dulmatin (real name: Djoko Pitono, alias: Ahamad Noval) was born in Petarukan,
Pemalang, Central Java in 1970.53 Dulmatin studied at the Pemalang Islamic school54
where he excelled at mathematics until it interfered with his prayers.55 After leaving
school, he became a frequent visitor to the Pondok Ngruki School in Solo56 and, like
many Indonesian Islamic extremists, moved to Malaysia where the JI leaders were in
exile.57 Following his recruitment by JI in Malaysia, Dulmatin was sent to camp
Sayyaf in Afghanistan in 1991, where he excelled at bomb-making - so much so that
he stayed in Afghanistan to lecture the new Indonesian arrivals to the camp on bomb
construction and detonation.58 On his return from Afghanistan, Dulmatin was
involved in the construction of the explosive devices that were used in the Christmas
Eve bombings and the attack on the residence of the Philippine Ambassador.59 It was
Dulmatin who received the mini-van from Amrozi for the operation against the
Ambassador.60
After Amrozi had picked up Samudra, Dulmatin, and Idris, Samudra informed the
other three that they had the permission and the finances for an attack against the
United States (US).61 In the following weeks, Samudra and Amrozi scouted targets
around Java, with their sights set on the US Embassy in Jakarta.62 In this period
255
(between July and mid-August) there were at least two meetings between Muklas,
Samudra, Amrozi and Zulkarnaen at a rented house in Saggrahan outside Solo.63
Zulkarnaen (real name: Aris Sumarsono, alias: Arif Sunarso), born around 1963, was
among JIs most experienced members. After graduating from the Ngruki School,64
Zulkarnaen fought with the first Indonesians in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s and by
1987 was in charge of the training of the Indonesian section of camp Saddah.65 Eight
years after arriving in Indonesia, Zulkarnaen travelled to Malaysia and ran a pesantren
in Pahang there for a year.66 Following these experiences, Zulkarnaen became a
member of JI central command, holding the position of Head of Training for
Southeast Asia, and coordinated JI military operations in Ambon.67 Zulkarnaen was
also the chief of the Al Aman Foundation, a charity that distributed aid and clothing
from Arab counties.68
2.3 SOLO MEETING

Following the preliminary meetings and surveillance of potential targets, a major
meeting was set for the evening of August 14 in Solo.69 This meeting was set to
finalise the specifics of the operation and to delegate the roles that each member of the
team would play. Amrozi and Muklas left Tenggulun, stopping at the familys Al
Islam School to ask Ali Imron if he was interested in the operation. He was. A family
friend, Murbarok (real name: Utomo Pamungkas), who worked at the madrasah with
Imron and lived next door to Amrozi, also joined the operation at this point.70
Mubarok was born in Kulonprogo, Yugyakarta,71 around 1967,72 and was a seasoned
member of JI. Mubarok smuggled firearms, ammunitions, and explosives from the
Philippines to JI members in Indonesia. Many of these weapons were distributed for
operations in Ambon and Poso.ii Mubarok was involved in the Christmas Eve
bombings in Mojokerto in 2000.73 By 2002, Mubarok resided in Lamongan, living
next door to Amrozi, and was teaching at the al-Islam school with Ali Imron.74
ii
Another area of Christian-Muslim conflict on the island of Sulawesi.
256
Following the addition of the two new members to the budding operation, Amrozi
made a final stop on his way to the meeting in Solo, picking up Dulmatin.75 The
meeting was set at the residence of Herniato, who was the secretary of the al Aman
Foundation run by Zulkarnaen. Herniato did not play any part in the meeting, as
Zulkarnaen would not allow it.76 The meeting began around 6.30pm and lasted until
around 11.00pm.77 In addition to the four who arrived with Amrozi, the attendees at
this meeting were: Imam Samudra, Zulkarnaen, Idris, and Suranto Abdul Ghoni
(alias: Umar Besar; Wayan).78
Abdul Ghoni was born and raised on the island of Flores, east of Bali,79 around
1970.80 After joining JI, Ghoni travelled to Afghanistan in 1991 with what has been
termed the class of 91. This class included JI elite such as Samudra, Dulmatin,
Imron, and Mubarok. In Afghanistan, Ghoni developed his bomb-making skills
through the use of potassium chlorate, sulphur, and aluminium powder.81 Like the
others from the class of 1991, Abdul Ghoni used his acquired skills in the Christmas
Eve operation in 2000, specifically in Mojokerto with Murbarok.82
Once the meeting was underway, Muklas (the most senior JI member) preached to the
small party about the despotic traditions of western nations against Muslims all over
the world. Samudra then took over and began to discuss the operation. It was to be a
car bombing on the holiday island of Bali, the specific target not yet finalised.83 The
designated roles for the operation were then discussed: Muklas was the overall
commander; Samudra was appointed the field commander; Ali Imron was to assist
Samudra; Idris was charged with organising the logistics; Amrozi was to purchase the
vehicle and chemicals; Dulmatin was in charge of the construction of the bomb;
Abdul Ghoni was assigned to assisting Dulmatin and mixing the chemicals, and;
Mubarok was assigned to assist in the driving.84
2.4 TEAM LIMA

As field commander, Samudra proceeded to establish a second cell for the Bali
operation. This cell was made up of five young Islamic extremists selected from high
schools in West Java. Samudra had selected and groomed these young boys through a
religious study group he had formed in Banten.85 In addition, Samudra provided
military and firearms training to the youths.86 These individuals were Arnasan (alias:
257
Iqbal; Acong; Jimmy), Abdul Rauf (alias: Syam), Andi Octavia (alias: Yudi), Hidayat
(alias: Agus), and Junaedi (alias: Dedi Amin). Abdul Rauf was born in Cipodoh,
Tangerang, West Java, in 1981 and attended the Pondok Ngruki Madrasah between
1992 and 1997.87 Octavia was born in the village of Sukamanah, Malimping in 1980,
and attended the Pondok Ngruki at the same time as Abdul Rauf. The two also
attended the Aliyah Darul Ilmi Madrasah together. Following Samudras recruitment
of Rauf, he convinced his classmate to follow Samudras teachings.88 In 1982,
Arnasan was born in the same village as Octavia and also attended the Ngruki School,
his parents were poor rice farmers and could not afford to send him to a madrasah.89
Argus Hidayat was also from the region of Malimping, and was recruited by Samudra
following his graduation from the Aliyah Negeri Madrasah in Serang, Baten.90
Samudra called this group Team Lima.
Following the August meeting, Samudra called the five youths to his home in Solo to
discuss their commitment to Islam and jihad. Samudra interrogated the five as to their
preparedness for jihad in Ambon and Poso, discovering that they were all prepared.
This question was followed by Samudra asking who would be a martyr, to which
silence was the reply. After further individual interrogation, Arnasan indicated that he
was ready to be a martyr.91
On August 22, 2002, Samudra tested Team Lima. The group was tasked to rob the
Serang Gold Store. The operation and logistics were arranged by Samudra and the
plan implemented by Team Lima. Rauf detonated a small diversionary device just 100
metres from the shop. Andi Octavia and Arnasan entered the store, Octavia armed
with a gun. Hidayta and Junaedi stood guard outside the store with motorbikes at the
ready.92 The group took five million rupiah and two and a half kilograms of gold
(later sold for 400 million rupiah ($56 000)). These funds were forwarded to Idris for
the purpose of the operation in Bali.93 iii
iii
It is generally agreed upon that the money was not required for the operation, but that the operation
was designed to test the resolve and skills of Team Lima.
258
Following the Serang robbery, Hidayat and Samudra conducted surveillance of
potential targets in Bali. By this stage, Team Lima had recruited three offsiders, who
had no contact with Samudra: Aprianto, Pujata, and Ikhwan Fauzi who were all from
the Serang area of Banten and all associated with the Persatuan Islam Madrasah.94
2.5 PREPARATIONS: BUILDING THE BOMB

Following the Solo meeting, in mid-September the operation progressed into the
surveillance phase: Samudra, Idris, Dulmatin, Amrozi, Mubarok, and Imron were
driven around the Indonesian tourist capital, Kuta, by JI recruit and Bali local
Masykur Abdul Kadir. That night, Maskyur arranged accommodation for the group at
the Hotel Harum in Denpasar (the capital city of the Bali province) before the group
returned to their allotted tasks.95
In late September Amrozi began the preparations for the car bomb that would be used
in the operation. Amrozi visited the Tidar Kimia shop in Surabaya several times in
this month, posing as a chemical salesman.96 On one visit, Amrozi had to hire a pick -
up truck to collect the tonne of potassium chlorate he purchased in the form of forty
25 kilogram bags. A few days after this visit, Amrozi returned to purchase 50
kilogram of aluminium power and two bags of sulphur.97 For these purchases, Amrozi
asked the salesman to issue him with a receipt for benzoate, an aromatic carboxylic
acid normally used as a food additive.98 Once the purchases were complete, around
September 18,99 Amrozi sent Samudra an SMS message signalling his completion of
the set task.100
The bomb construction phase of the operation was firmly established in the village of
Tenggulun. In late September Doctor Azahari Husin (alias: Adam) and Noor Din
Mohammed Top arrived in Tenggulun.101
Doctor Azahari Husin was born in Malaysia on September 14, 1957.102 Azahari
attended his final years of high school in Australia in 1975 at the Norwood High
School in Adelaide, followed by enrolling in mechanical engineering at the University
of Adelaide. The results Azahari produced at the University of Adelaide were poor
due to a hectic social life. Following these poor results, Azahari transferred to the
University of Technology, Malaysia (UTM) in 1979 and topped his class. He then
259
traveled to the University of Reading, in the United Kingdom (UK) to undertake his
PhD.103 Following the completion of his PhD, Azahari returned to UTM in 1991 to
lecture and was promoted to the position of associate professor.104
The UTM campus at which Azahari was based was in close proximity to Muklass
Luqman al-Hakiem Islamic boarding school, which by the 1990s had become the
meeting place for the senior JI members. Following Azaharis interest in Islam, it did
not take long for him to fall in with members of JI. A lecturer from UTM, Wan Min
bin Wan Mat who had attended the sermons delivered at Luqman al-Hakiem, invited
Muklas to speak at his home. Azahari attended one of these lectures.105 Azahari
became obsessed with the jihadist preaching of JI and was later appointed as a board
member of the Lukmanul Hakiem Madrasah in Johor.106 In 2000, between April and
August, Azahari received the most senior special explosives training in
Afghanistan.107 Later that year, Azahari took part first in the assassination attempt on
the Philippine Ambassador in Jakarta and then the Christmas Eve bombings in which
he built 13 explosive devices.108 Azahari quickly became JIs chief explosives expert,
writing the JI bomb manual109 and conducting bomb construction lectures at his
home.110
The Malaysian Noor Din Mohammed Top, born August 11, 1968,111 joined JI in the
same way that Azahari had. Noor Din attended UTM and after completing his science
degree he went on to do his masers degree.112 During this period, he attended some of
Muklass lectures at the home of Wan Min bin Wan Mat and quickly fell in with
members of the Luqman al-Hakiem Madrasah and JI. Noor Din lectured at the Johor
Madrasah on mathematics and geology and replaced Muklas as the director of the
school when Muklas was promoted to head of Mantiqi 1.113
On their arrival in Tenggulun, Azahari and Noor Din visited their former mentor
Muklas in his home, staying there the night. Dulmatin arrived the following day,
taking them back to his residence in Solo for lengthy discussions on the bomb that
would be used in the operation. Azahari and Noor Din returned to Jakarta the
following day.114 While the experts were discussing the specifics of the explosive
device to be used in the operation, the chemicals were being crushed at the residence
of Amrozi with the assistance of Idris and Ghoni.115 The trio packed the crushed
260
chemicals into twenty large cigarette cartons and then into sacks which were stitched
up.116 Amrozi and Idris escorted Ghoni to the bus terminal in Surabaya along with the
sacks of potassium chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulphur. Ghoni, with the sacks of
chemicals, boarded the bus bound for Denpasar, Bali.117
While the bomb preparations were taking place in Tenggulun, Samudra had contacted
Team Lima by email, summoning them to Solo. Idris collected Arnasan, Rauf,
Octavia, Hidayat, and Junaedi from the bus station, driving them to Samudras house
in Solo where they stayed for a week. In this week, Arnasan once more volunteered to
become a martyr in this operation and all five were sent to Bali.118
On September 25, Abdul Ghoni arrived in Bali with the chemicals purchased by
Amrozi. Umar Patek,119 an instructor from the JI military academy,120 and Sarijio
(alias: Sawad), an experienced operative who took part in the Christmas Eve and
Philippine Ambassador operations, also arrived on September 25.121 Sarijio and Patek
were tasked to assist Ghoni in the mixing of the chemicals.122
Samudra had leased a house in the Denpasar suburb of Jalan Pulau Majangan. The
two-story house with high surrounding fences had had one years rent paid in full. The
house had five bedrooms, two bathrooms, and a large lock-up garage.123 In this
garage, Ghoni, Patek, and Saijio mixed the chemicals to prepare for the arrival of the
construction experts.124 By the October 1, the mixing of the chemicals had been
completed.125
On September 29, a second house was leased, this time by the logistics coordinator
Idris under his alias Jhoni Hendrawan.126 This station was a small unit in a communal
compound at 10 Jalan Marlboro, on the outskirts of Denpasar.127 Three of the Team
Lima members were housed here and given a new Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
card by Idris that would be used to contact them or vice versa.128 The other two Team
Lima members were situated at a different location.129
The day after the mixing of the chemicals was complete, Amrozi travelled to Solo to
meet Samudra to obtain funds to purchase the vehicle needed for transporting the
bomb. Following this meeting, Amrozi purchased a white 1983 model Mitsubishi
261
L300 minivan in a village 50 kilometres from Tenggulun.130 On October 3, Amrozi
received a message from Samudra to the effect of: the chemicals are ready, bring
whitey (the minivan) as soon as possible to the place (Bali).131 On October 5,
Azahari arrived in Tenggulun and assembled at Amrozis residence with Dulmatin,
Ali Imron, and Mubarok ready to depart for Bali. Operation commander Muklas also
attended to wish his brothers and friends well.132 The group set out in two vehicles,
the Mitsubishi L300 containing Mubarok and Amrozi, and a green Suzuki carrying
Ali Imron, Azahari, and Dulmatin.133
2.6 BALI: CELL ESTABLISHMENT

In the late evening of October 6, the convoy stopped at a service station outside
Denpasar and Imron took over the driving responsibilities for the L300, taking it to
store in the garage of the Jalan Pulau Majangan house that Samudra had rented. After
Amrozi and Mubarok got into the Suzuki, the remaining group left for the Harim
Hotel. On their arrival they were met by Samudra, Idris, Abdul Ghoni, and Umar
Patek. A brief meeting ensued that recapped the specifics of everyones operational
tasks.134 From this point on, every member of the operation used a Balinese alias, and
was addressed and addressed others by that alias. They communicated using code
words, referring to the bomb as dodol kudus, a type of Indonesian fruit cake. The
main form of communication between each of the groups and Samudra and Idris was
SMS.135 They changed their numbers frequently through SIM cards Idris purchased at
the Intikom phone shop in Denpasar.136 If a call was received from an unknown caller
on a certain number, it would be changed immediately.137 Following this meeting, the
group split up. The bomb-makers, Azahari and Dulmatin left for the large house on
Pulau Menjangan Street, accompanied by Ali Imron. Amrozi and Mubarok left for a
fifth residence Idris had established in Denpasar.138
The targets for the operation had been selected during surveillance operations that had
been underway since Samudras arrival in Bali. The principal target of the operation
was the Sari Club, which offered exclusive entry to tourists, denying entry to
Indonesians. The secondary target of the operation was to be Paddys Bar, similarly
popular with tourists, but allowing Indonesians as patrons (hence the use of a smaller
device). The final stage of the operation was to use yet a smaller device placed in the
262
grounds of the US Consulate in Denpasar to ensure the intended target of the
operation (the US) was clear. 139
By this stage, the house at 18 Pulau Menjangan Street was a hive of activity. Abdul
Ghoni, Umar Patek, and Sarijo had finished mixing the chemicals and the high-
ranking bomb experts, Azahari and Dulmatin, had arrived to begin the construction of
the bomb. Imron was also at the residence to assist in the construction process. The
security was tight in this house, Patek and Sarijo did not know exactly who Azahari
was, calling him Alan or Lan. The six men never left the house, and constantly had
someone on guard.140 iv
The mixed chemicals were packed into the plastic filing
cabinet shelves that Mubarok and Amrozi had brought in the L300 from Tenggulun.
This process was primarily undertaken by Imron, Patek, and Sarijo. The four drawers
of each of the twelve filing cabinets were filled with the explosive mixture and
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) chargers connected by around 150 metres of Pentaerythritol
Tetranitrate filled detonation cord. There were 94 cyclotrimethylene trinitramine
electric detonators attached to the TNT.141
During the several days it took to construct the bomb, Samudra was staying in the
Muslim quarter of Denpasar, behind the Banyuwangi cafe and food stall in Jalan
Pulau Pinang, where he had been staying intermittently since the cell had started
surveilling the targets in Bali. Idris also stayed there and, as logistics coordinator,
would move between the five houses around Denpasar. The two of them together
visited Amrozi and Mubarok in Jalan Gatot Subroto, on several occasions taking food
to the pair.142 Samudra also visited the bomb-building house on a couple of occasions
to check the status of the operation.143
Following the completion of the construction of the bomb, Abdul Ghoni returned to
Java. Shortly after his departure, the group that remained in the Pulau Menjangan
Street house discovered that the chemicals they had packed into the filing cabinet
drawers had expanded, meaning they would have to be repacked. Ghoni received an
SMS telling him to return to Denpasar ask quickly as possible.144
iv
Apart from the one incident where a small amount of the explosives accidentally detonated, and the
group left to demonstrate to inquisitive neighbours that the noise was of no significance.
263
At some point during the operation, Muklas alerted Idris via SMS that he was going to
travel to Bali to visit the group for a period of three days. During this visit, he was
subjected to the same security procedures as the rest of the cell, often kept in a room
on his own and isolated from the other individuals. Idris picked Muklas up from the
bus station in Denpasar, taking him to a small house where he later returned with food
and Amrozi. The following night, October 9, Muklas was taken on a surveillance run
of the intended targets.145 Idris then took Muklas to visit the bomb construction team
on Pulau Menjangan Street. 146 Before his departure by bus, Muklas very briefly spoke
to Ali Imron and Samudra.147
October 10 was a busy day. The bomb (after the re-packing) was being loaded into the
L300, and the devices for the Paddys Bar and the US Consulate bombings were being
constructed by Dulmatin and Azahari. The Paddys Bar device was a vest loaded with
about one kilogram of TNT. The consulate device was only half that. Each device was
wired to a mobile phone to allow for the detonation by Idris from a distance, should
the other detonation methods fail.148 Samudra met with Team Lima who, with the
exception of Arnasan, were instructed to return to their homes in Java. October 10 also
saw the arrival of Feri, a friend of Ali Imrons from the Al-Islam school in Tenggulun
and recruited by Samudra to wear and detonate the vest to be used in the Paddys Bar
diversionary explosion.149 Amrozi assisted Ali Imron and Idris in the purchase of a
motorbike to make their get-away following the completion of the operation in Kuta.
By the evening of October 10, all of the devices were ready, as were all elements of
the operation. The JI members began to leave Bali that night, and by the afternoon of
the following day, only Samudra, Ali Imron, Idris, Arnasan, and Feri remained in
Bali.150
2.7 IMPLEMENTATION
On the evening of October 12, Ali Imron, while pretending to fix something on the
motorbike they had bought, dropped the small 500 gram device outside the US
Consulate in the Renon suburb of Denpasar, and returned to the Palau Menjangan
residence around 10.30pm, where Idris, Arnasan, and Feri awaited him.151 Neither of
the selected suicide bombers could proficiently drive, so Imron, Arnasan, and Feri
piled into the L300 and left for Kuta, followed by Idris on the motorcycle. Imron
stopped at an intersection on Legian Road, about half a kilometre north of Paddys
264
Bar and the Sari Club. Arnasan only had to drive the vehicle in a straight line towards
the target, so Imron joined Idris on the motorbike. During this stage of the
implementation, the diversionary US Consulate device detonated, causing minor
damage. 152
Arnasan stopped the L300 directly outside the Sari club, where Feri got out of the
L300 and walked towards Paddys Bar. At 11.07pm Feri detonated the TNT in his
vest, instantly killing himself and eight patrons inside the bar.153 The explosion and
resulting devastation caused people to flood out of the bigger pubs and clubs to
investigate the explosion. At 11.08:31pm the L300 minivan outside the Sari Club was
detonated. The resulting explosion ripped through the Sari Club and surrounding
buildings. The shrapnel from the L300 was found up to 350 metres away.154 The
operation resulted in 202 people dead, of which 88 victims were Australian.155
3. RELATIONAL DATA
17 individuals were involved in the operational JI Bali cell between October 6 and
October 11, 2002. The covert stage of this operation begins with the last major
meeting the cell had before dispersing into the houses around Denpasar on October 6
and ended on October 11, after a majority of the cell dispersed and just the detonation
team remained. The members included in the cell for the covert period of the
operation were:
1. Muklas 10. Arnasan
2. Amrozi 11. Abdul Rauf
3. Ali Imron 12. Andi Octavia
4. Samudra 13. Hidayat
5. Dulmatin 14. Junaedi
6. Idris 15. Patek
7. Mubarok 16. Feri
8. Azahari Husin 17. Sarijo
9. Abdul Ghoni
From the contextual background, the following tables illustrate the relationships and
levels of interactions of the cell members. Table 1. Jemaah Islamiyah: Binary
Relations, shows the binary relationship of the 17 cell members, displaying which
265
members interacted together. Table 2: Jemaah Islamiyah Interactional Criteria
Applied, shows the codified strengths of these links through interactional criteria.
266
TABLE 1. JI BINARY RELATIONS
D
S U M A A O H J
M A A L U Z R C I U S
U M I M M I B A G N T D N P A
K R M U A D A H H A R A A A A F R
L O R D T R R A O S A V Y E T E I
A Z O R I I O R N A U I A D E R J
S I N A N S K I I N F A T I K I O
MUKLAS 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
AMROZI 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IMRON 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
SAMUDRA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
DULMATIN 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
IDRIS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
MUBAROK 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AZAHARI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
GHONI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
ARNASAN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
RAUF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
OCTAVIA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
HIDAYAT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
JUNAEDI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
PATEK 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
FERI 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SARIJO 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
267
TABLE 2. JI INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED
D
S U M A A O H J
M A A L U Z R C I U S
U M I M M I B A G N T D N P A
K R M U A D A H H A R A A A A F R
L O R D T R R A O S A V Y E T E I
A Z O R I I O R N A U I A D E R J
S I N A N S K I I N F A T I K I O
MUKLAS 2 2 1 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
AMROZI 2 0 2 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IMRON 2 0 3 3 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3
SAMUDRA 1 2 3 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2
DULMATIN 1 0 3 2 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3
IDRIS 5 4 3 5 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
MUBAROK 0 5 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AZAHARI 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2
GHONI 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3
ARNASAN 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
RAUF 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
OCTAVIA 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
HIDAYAT 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
JUNAEDI 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
PATEK 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
FERI 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SARIJO 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
268
269
4. ANALYSIS

CELL DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. COMMUNICATION
SIZE CONNEXION SPEED
SCORE 18 43.382% 6.941 0.6296

(Standardised)
MUKLAS 56.250
AMROZI 25.000
ALI IMRON 56.250
SAMUDRA 93.750
DULMATIN 56.250
IDRIS 62.500
MUBAROK 18.750
AZAHARI 56.250
ABDUL GHONI 56.250
ARNASAN 31.250
ABDUL RAUF 31.250
ANDI OCTAVIA 31.250
HIDAYAT 31.250
JUNAEDI 31.250
PATEK 56.250
FERI 37.500
SARIJO 56.250

(STANDARDISED)
(standardised) (standardised)
MUKLAS 1.944 69.565
270
AMROZI 0.278 55.172
ALI IMRON 1.389 69.565
SAMUDRA 50.972 94.118
DULMATIN 1.389 69.565
IDRIS 5.139 72.727
MUBAROK 0.000 53.333
AZAHARI HUSIN 1.389 69.565
ABDUL GHONI 1.389 69.565
ARNASAN 0.000 57.143
ABDUL RAUF 0.000 57.143
ANDI OCTAVIA 0.000 57.143
HIDAYAT 0.000 57.143
JUNAEDI 0.000 57.143
PATEK 1.389 69.565
FERI 0.000 48.485
SARIJO 1.389 69.565
TABLE 6: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES

(standardised) (standardised) (standardised)
SAMUDRA 93.750 50.972 94.118
IDRIS 62.500 5.139 72.727
MUKLAS 56.250 1.944 69.565
ALI IMRON 56.250 1.389 69.565
DULMATIN 56.250 1.389 69.565
AZAHARI 56.250 1.389 69.565
PATEK 56.250 1.389 69.565
GHONI 56.250 1.389 69.565
SARIJO 56.250 1.389 69.565
FERI 37.500 0.000 48.485
ARNASAN 31.250 0.000 57.143
JUNAEDI 31.250 0.000 57.143
271
ABDUL 31.250 0.000 57.143
RAUF
OCTAVIA 31.250 0.000 57.143
HIDAYAT 31.250 0.000 57.153
AMROZI 25.000 0.278 55.172
MUBAROK 18.750 0.000 53.333

CLIQUE
COUNT
SAMUDRA 4
IDRIS 3
MUKLAS 2
ALI IMRON 2
DULMATIN 2
AZAHARI 2
PATEK 2
GHONI 2
SARIJO 2
FERI 1
ARNASAN 1
JUNAEDI 1
ABDUL RAUF 1
OCTAVIA 1
HIDAYAT 1
AMROZI 2
MUBAROK 1
The size of the JI Bali cell was 17, a large cell, perhaps unnecessarily so, with at least
four individuals not playing any role in the operation. Figure 1 shows that through the
size of the cell and the roles that each of the members played, contingency plans were
272
available were the cell to be disrupted. These contingency roles were taken up by
Team Lima (excluding Arnasan) and Amrozi and Mubarok. These individuals were in
place to take over any unskilled roles (mixing/packing chemicals, driving,
surveillance, making purchases, or suicide bombingv) that were vacated through other
members being compromised, falling ill, or backing out of the operation. As the graph
in Figure 1 demonstrates, these operation assistants were kept significantly isolated
from the rest of the group.
The density of the cell was 43.382, which indicates a mix between structural
efficiency and covertness. The relatively high density score of the network is largely
due to the two all-channel clusters of Team Lima (Octavia, Arnasan, Junaedi,
Hidayat, Rauf, and Samudra) and the bomb construction team at the Jalau Manjangan
Street house (Patek, Imron, Azahari, Dulmatin, Ghoni, and Feri). These all-channel
(maximum density) highly efficient clusters were vital to the success of the operation,
at least in the case of the Manjangan house, as the precise and time-efficient
construction of the explosive devices required heavy coordination and efficiency.
Measures were taken within this cluster to (attempt to) counter the low levels of
structural covertness that this density created. All individuals were operating under
aliases, using mobile phones to communicate with individuals outside the cluster, and
above all, these members never left the house (with the one exception following the
explosion inside the garage).
The 43.328 density score of the cell indicates that the network was established as a
compromise between structural efficiency and covertness. The focus on efficiency in
sections of the network (and the overall network) leads to a reduced structural
covertness. This observation is supported by the high degree of connexion score of
the cell, 6.941, indicating that the exposure of one node within the cell could
potentially lead to almost seven other nodes. From these nodes it is possible that the
entire cell would be exposed. The higher density score also resulted in a high average
speed of communication, 0.6296, which again contributes to the overall effectiveness
and efficiency of the group. While the cells network formation appears very dense,
its structural covertness was increased by the isolation of the all-channel clusters.
v
This last role would largely be reserved for the members of Team Lima.
273
From Table 3 it is clear that Samudra had the highest centrality scores of the cell.
Samudra was the most active within the network, with an actor-level degree centrality
score of 93.750. Samudra had the highest ability to access others with an actor-level
closeness centrality score of 94.118 and he had the greatest control over the flow of
information in the network with an actor level betweenness centrality score of 50.972.
The most significant aspect of this finding is that by a considerable margin, Samudra
had the highest control over the communication within the network (betweenness).
This result was exclusively due to his connection to Team Lima and the suicide
bomber Arnasan. While this cluster did not have a major role to play in the operation
(Arnasan excluded), they were the reinforcements for the operation had anything gone
wrong. Samudras centrality scores are further evidenced by the graph in Figure 1, in
which Samudra resembles the hub in a star network. Table 7 demonstrates Samudras
position further in that he is the only node connected to four cliques within the
network.
Idris, in his role as logistics commander, yielded high centrality scores also. However,
these were not as significant as those of Samudra. The cell was quite centralised
overall, with the members of the Pulau Menjangan residence (bomb construction
team) seemingly the centre of the operation. The lowest centrality scores were
reserved for the contingency members, who were kept to the periphery except when
called upon for assistance. Mubarok had the lowest scores as he was kept very
isolated and did not play any significant part in this stage of the operation.
5. DESTABILISATION
From Figure 1, it is clear that the JI Bali cell was organised into clear components or
cliques. The Team Lima clique, the bombing construction clique, and the smaller
operation assistants clique, with the commanders linking the sections while attempting
to remain on the periphery. The social network analysis of the JI cell identified
Samudra as the most important node within the network due to his high activity, his
ability to access others within the network, and his significantly high ability to control
the flow of communication and information within the network. This identifies
Samudra as the critical node within the network. Consequently, Samudra is the first
node targeted in theoretical attempts to destabilise the cell. Figure 2 shows the
274
Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) image of the cell before the destabilisation
attempts are made. Figure 3 shows the network following the removal of Samudra.
FIGURE 2: ORA ORIGINAL GRAPH
Figure 3 shows that the removal of Samudra completely reduces the information flow
between Team Lima and the rest of the cell. The removal of Samudra has isolated the
suicide bomber Arnasan and the contingency members who were intended to absorb
the loss of a suicide bomber. As the ranked centrality measures show, Idris is the next
most important individual within the network. Figure 4 shows the network following
the removal of Idris.
275
FIGURE 3: SAMUDRA REMOVAL
FIGURE 4: IDRIS REMOVAL
276
The removal of Idris further reduces the decision-making capacity and the
effectiveness of the network, as two-thirds of the command team has been neutralised.
Muklas, Imron, Ghoni, Husin, Patek, Dulmatin, Sarijo, will all have the same level of
activity within the network due to this connection, while Muklas will have the highest
amount of control over the flow in the network, and a greater ability to control others.
Muklas would be the most important (and highest ranking) individual remaining in
the network, and as Figure 5 demonstrates, his removal will further isolate members
of the network.
FIGURE 5: MUKLAS REMOVAL
The removal of Muklas completes the neutralisation of the command team in the
network and leaves three isolated, all-channel clusters, the most dangerous of which is
the bomb-makers in the Jalan Manjangan Street house, due to the explosives the
group possesses and the suicide bomber who is in the clique.
277
The destabilisation methods used against the JI Bali cell have successfully reduced the
information flow, reduced the decision-making capacity, and the effectiveness of the
overall cell. These measures also separated and isolated the cell into three smaller,
high density clusters. While these measures have successfully destabilised the cell to a
large degree by reducing the information flow, decision-making capacity, and
effectiveness through this three-step destabilisation process, the all-channel cluster of
the bomb construction team still represents a threat with explosives and one suicide
bomber in place. Further action would have to be taken to neutralise this cluster if the
arrest or neutralisation of Samudra, Idris or Muklas did not lead authorities to the
Palau Manjangan house.
6. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the final terrorist cell of the thesis through social network
analysis and examined the theoretical destabilisation techniques that aim to disrupt the
network. As in the previous chapters, the social network analysis of the JI cell was
able to distinguish and understand the internal dynamics of the network, identify the
leaders, and understand each members relative position within the network. Using
these results, theoretical destabilisation techniques were able to theoretically establish
the most effective method by which to disrupt the cell from a counter-terrorism
perspective, by targeting the vulnerabilities in the network formation. The following
chapter will examine the results of the analysis, conduct a comparative analysis of the
cells and the results, discuss the possibility of contributions to a predictive capacity
within terrorism studies, and examine the destabilisation results.
278
ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT.

The previous four chapters have examined terrorist cells from the groups the Hrvatsko
Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), Aum
Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET), and Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) through social network analysis and have
attempted to model disruption techniques for each of these networks through
theoretical destabilisation methods. In doing so, these chapters have attempted to
resolve and satisfy the research questions and objectives of the project by attempting
to discover how terrorist cells have operated in Australia by describing,
understanding, and explaining the organisation and communication of these cells. In
this chapter, this understanding will be deepened through a comparative analysis of
the cells and the social network analysis results. The chapter also will attempt to
provide insight into how a JI cell might attempt to operate effectively in Australia and
then examine the effectiveness and applicability of the destabilisation methods
employed.
1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CELLS

The application of social network analysis to the cells examined in each of the four
chapters measured both the network and node level criteria of the terrorist cells. While
these results were discussed in previous chapters, the following discussion will serve
as a comparative analysis of the contextual background and the network and nodal
level criteria of each of the different cells. This analysis has the potential to
distinguish which of the cells was the most successful, structurally covert, efficient,
and effective, as well as make generalisations about how terrorist cells operate
(despite the small sample). Such an analysis will also distinguish where the potential
lies for these cells to become more structurally covert or efficient in their operations,
and identify these threats for potential intelligence and counter-terrorism applications.
1.1 CONTEXTUAL OBSERVATIONS

The first observation made from the contextual backgrounds was that each cell used
local operatives or localised command structures in its operation. The HRB incursion
cell was armed, housed, and trained by the European command of the group in Italy
280
and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Aum Shinrikyo used Yasuko Shimada,
an Australian citizen, in its operation. The use of Shimada was firstly to ensure the
purchase of the Banjawarn property through Western Australias strict foreign
ownership legislation and secondly for a level of local expertise. The cult also
involved local real estate agent Miki Webb in a majority of its financial activities,
although she was not officially part of the cult and did not take part in any of the
covert activities of the group. The LET cell was predominantly made up of
individuals already based in Australia, using only Brigitte, Sajid, and Salah as the
overseas/outside members. While all of the JI cell members were from outside the
province of Bali, the group employed the expertise and local knowledge of JI member
Masykuri to assist in the logistics and surveillance.
Although local knowledge and intelligence appear vital in the operations of terrorist
cells, it is important to note that these individuals were kept significantly isolated
from the rest of the cell. To illustrate, Tolic was meant to keep in contact with the
HRB area command via radio contact, Shimada was not on the property while the cell
was in its covert stage, the Australian members of the LET contingent were kept to
the periphery (excluding command members Lodhi and Hasan), and it was difficult to
assess Masykurs level of interaction within the JI cell (short of the fact that he
conducted and assisted in the surveillance). This finding makes it clear that terrorist
cells use local contacts in order to either establish themselves logistically or assist in
the operation (although seemingly only for their limited expertise).
1.2 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES

Table 1 represents the comparative network level criteria results of each of the
networks examined within the project. The first observation to make is that the cell
size of each of the networks differed significantly, with the dataset sizes ranging from
eight to 20, the LET cell being the smallest, followed by the HRB cell with nine, and
the remaining two cells, JI with 18, and Aum with 20. Three of the cells yielded
reasonably low to medium density scores, with the HRB cell scoring 30.555, the LET
cell scoring 32.142, and the JI cell with a significantly higher score of 43.382. This
result contrasted sharply with the Aum cell which yielded a 100 density score due to
i
Masykur was not included in the cell as it was impossible to determine the levels and directions of his
interaction with the rest of the cell.
281
its all-channel formation. From these results, it can be (tentatively) concluded that
terrorist networks of a small size will generally be more structurally covert. This
assertion is made due to the JI cell with a network size of 18 scoring a significantly
higher density value.
As discussed in the previous chapters, the JI cell attempted to maintain high levels of
structural covertness through its network structure by separating and isolating
different sections of the network, whereas the Aum cell was established through a
focus on efficiency (other measures were taken to ensure levels of structural
covertness). This assertion is further supported by the degree of connexion scores of
the cells. In smaller cells it is much easier to yield a small degree of connexion and
hence a smaller density and greater level of structural covertness. The two cells in this
project that generated the lowest levels of structural covertness (highest density) were
the only two cells that successfully completed their objectives. This result illustrates
the significance and effectiveness of efficiency within terrorist operations. JI
(although not operating in Australia) and Aum (whose mission was focused on
experimenting and training) met their mission objectives by countering their high
density through alternative features in their methods of operating. For example, the
Aum cell operated in an extremely remote area of Australia with no individuals from
outside the group or authorities within a significant distance. The JI cell used code
names, alternating mobile phones, and discreet methods of operating to undertake
their mission successfully.
TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE NETWORK LEVEL RESULTS

SPEED
HRB 9 30.555% 2.444 .444
AUM 20 100.000% 19.000 1.000
LET 8 32.142% 2.250 .549
JI 18 43.382% 6.941 .6296
282
The results in Table 1 indicate that despite having lower levels of structural
covertness, large efficient cells are more effective.ii These results are indicated by
both the density and average speed of communication scores. The JI and Aum
Shinrikyo cells, while more dense, enjoyed the highest average communication speeds
and efficiency, due to efficiency being the inverse of structural covertness with
regards to density. This again assisted the successful completion of their missions.
This finding is further substantiated by the time frames of each of the operations, with
the efficient cells completing the covert stage of their operation with considerable
pace.iii
The graphs generated from the relational and interactional stages of the social network
analyses of the cells clearly demonstrated the network formation of the cells.
Although they varied significantly in their formation, there is one distinction that can
be drawn from these graphs. Each cell employed high density clusters within the
network in order to facilitate maximum efficiency for the specific objectives that were
required. The HRB cell employed all-channel networks in each of its troikas.
Although each cluster consisted of only three nodes, the maximum efficiency of this
section of the network facilitated the effectiveness of the activities of that troika. The
LET cell had a high density cluster that was made up of the command section of the
cell. JI had two all-channel sections within the network, the first being Team Lima,
which was awaiting orders (although they were kept in two groups for most of the
operation) and the bomb construction team at the Menjangan house in Denpasar. The
operations success rested on the completion of this task and therefore the cluster was
orientated around maximum efficiency to complete this objective in the shortest
possible period of time.
1.3 NODE LEVEL MEASURES

When comparing the nodal level measures, the first observation to be made is that the
operational/field commanders of the cells (identified through the contextual
backgrounds) were the critical nodes in each of the cells (excluding the Aum cell, due
ii
And hence more dangerous.
iii
The HRB cell was intended to be in the SFRY for a lengthy period of time in order to achieve its
objectives.
283
to its all-channel formation).iv While there were higher-ranking members within the
network, such as Muklas within the JI cell, and Sajid within the LET cell, the
individuals who were allocated the position of operation/field commander received
the highest degree of centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality
within their respective networks, consequently constituting the critical nodes within
the networks. These results are demonstrated in Table 2.
TABLE 2. CRITICAL NODE CENTRALITY RESULTS

TOLIC 30.000 75.000 66.667
LODHI 40.00 76.190 87.500
SAMUDRA 93.750 50.972 94.118
The second finding that can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the node level
results is that while the commanders of the cells had slightly higher levels of degree
centrality and closeness, every cell commander (with the exception of Aum) had a
significantly higher level of betweenness (ability to control the flow of
communication) than the rest of the network. These results are demonstrated in Table
3, which illustrates the ranked betweenness scores of the members of each cell (Aum
excluded). This finding appears to indicate that the leader of a terrorist cell, while
having close to normal or slightly higher levels of activity and ability to access others
within the network, must monopolise control over the flow of information within the
network.
The exclusivity of betweenness is further supported when examining the levels of

betweenness of the lower ranked members. Only three of the eight nodes within the
LET network registered a betweenness score, as was the case in the HRB network,
with only three of nine. This is also the case in the JI network, with only two of the 18
scoring above two percent betweenness levels. This result indicates that betweenness
(the ability to control the flow of data and interaction within a network) is an
essential quality for a cell commander and command team to have. Additionally, this
iv
This observation illustrates a clear role of social network analysis in identifying operational
commanders within cells where such positions are unknown.
284
result indicates that the control over the flow of information in a terrorist cell is
strictly regulated by the command team, specifically the cell commander.
Additionally, any member with a substantial level of betweenness has significance
and influence over the network.
TABLE 3. RANKED BETWEENNESS LEVELS FOR HRB, JI, & LET

HRB LET JI
BETWEENNESS BETWEENNESS BETWEENNESS
MEMBER 1 75.000 76.190 50.972
MEMBER 2 42.857 28.571 5.139
MEMBER 3 42.857 4.762 1.944
MEMBER 4 0.000 0.000 1.389
MEMBER 5 0.000 0.000 1.389
MEMBER 6 0.000 0.000 1.389
MEMBER 7 0.000 0.000 1.389
MEMBER 8 0.000 0.000 1.389
MEMBER 9 0.000 - 1.389
MEMBER 10 - - 0.278
MEMBER 11 - - 0.000
MEMBER 12 - - 0.000
MEMBER 13 - - 0.000
MEMBER 14 - - 0.000
MEMBER 15 - - 0.000
MEMBER 16 - - 0.000
MEMBER 17 - - 0.000
The closeness scores indicated that access to others within a network is not a criterion
exclusive to critical or important nodes within a network. While in all cases the
critical node held the highest closeness score, all of the nodes within each of the
networks had a relatively high ability to access others within the network.
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2. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA: A MODEL FOR INSIGHT
Although groups such as LET and other al-Qaeda affiliated extremist groups present
more of a threat to Australias national security, it is important not to overlook the
potential threat of JI to Australia. The groups proximity to Australia, its operations
against Australian interests in Southeast Asia, its strong operational and financial ties
to al-Qaedas leadership, and its previous intentions to attack facilities on Australian
soilv indicate that the groups potential for attacks inside Australia should not be
underestimated. Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that the arrests,
fracturing, and factionalism that have been endured by JI since the 2002 bombings
have severely weakened the organisation as a whole. This section of the chapter aims
to answer the second research question of the thesis: How might a JI cell operate in
Australia? In order to answer this question, the results of the contextual background
and social network analysis of JI will be examined and analysed in an attempt to offer
insight into how such a cell might operate in Australia.
From the results of the social network analysis conducted in Chapter VIII several
inferences were made about how a JI cell might operate in Australia. The first is that
the cell would make preparations outside Australia or in a remote area of Australia
and then form as a reasonably dense cell, while isolating sections of the network to
provide a level of structural covertness. In attempting this structural covertness, the
formation would also promote efficiency through all-channel clusters within the
network. These high density sections would complete the preparations for the
operation as quickly as possible and then disperse before the implementation of the
operation. Because the cell would be structurally less covert, once it moved into the
target area, the cell members would ensure other facets of the modus operandi were
focused on covertness (such as code names and covert communications). This
supports the assertion that the JI cell would be established in either an Islamic or
Southeast Asian community or diaspora where the members could remain
inconspicuous from members outside that community.
v
Evidenced by the existence of Mantiqi 4 and the intentions of the Ayub brothers and Jack Roche,
discussed in Chapter II.
286
This cell would have a high ranking field commander, who would (be perceived to)
not have a prominent profile with Australian authorities (to allow his passage into the
country), and who would most likely have the highest level of activity and ability to
access others. This commander almost certainly would have the highest level of
control over the network (most probably by a significant margin). Due to the high
betweenness, closeness, and degree centrality levels, this field commander would be
the critical node of the network. In the 2002 Bali cell, JI used high-ranking members
such as Muklas, Azahari, and Samudra. It can be assumed that individuals of this
stature would not be deployed to operations in Australia, as they would be flagged on
either on arrival to or departure from Australia or would attract unnecessary attention.
High ranking members of any Islamic extremist organisation are highly valued by
such organisations (due to their experience) following the commencement of the War
on Terror and hence would not be risked. Muklas involvement in the 2002 Bali cell,
which consisted of visiting the group in Bali, unnecessarily involved one of the
groups highest ranking commanders. The involvement may have served unification
and motivational purposes (following disagreements and arguments within the cell),
but was operationally unsound. Were the group to operate in Australia, it can be
speculated that it would be considerably smaller than the Bali cell and would use local
contacts to assist members in the initial stages of the operation, and possibly as
suicide bombers. These individuals would be used for local knowledge and the
acquisition of resources locally.
3. DESTABILISATION DISCUSSION
The destabilisation techniques employed in the previous four chapters aimed at
answering the research question What are the most effective methods of destabilising
[terrorist] cells? The destabilisation techniques in these chapters targeted the critical
nodes within the networks. The critical nodes (nodes most vital to the network) were
those identified through the node level criteria of social network analysis, specifically,
those which had the highest levels of activity, the highest ability to control the flow of
information within the network, and the highest access to others within the network.
The critical node was the first node to be targeted and the next most critical nodes
were removed until the network was satisfactorily disrupted. Although a satisfactory
level of disruption was not mathematically quantified in any sense, the network was
considered disrupted when the information flow, decision-making capacity, and
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effectiveness were reduced to a level that rendered the network incapable of
operating. This method ensures the maximum destabilisation effect of traditional
disruption techniques through the removal of the methodologically identified critical
nodes.
3.1 CRITICAL NODES

The social network analysis of the four networks in this project calculated the node
level criteria for each of the nodes within each of the networks. From these
calculations, the nodes critical to the network were identified. The theoretical
destabilisation of dynamic networks through social network analysis requires the
removal of the most critical node/s within the network to cause the maximum
disruption. As discussed previously, the nodes identified as the operational/field
commanders through the contextual background were also discovered to be the
critical nodes within the networks. These nodes were Tolic within the HRB cell,
Lodhi within the LET cell, and Samudra within the JI cell.
Each of the case studies discovered that the removal of the critical node in each
network caused significant disruption. The removal of Tolic from the HRB cell
instantly isolated all three troikas from each other and left Tolics troika without a
commander. Lodhis removal from the LET cell would have significantly disrupted
the network and isolated the operation assistants from the rest of the cell. The removal
of Samudra from the JI cell would have isolated Team Lima, which included one of
the operations suicide bombers and the replacement/backup members. All of these
measures successfully reduced the information flow, decision-making capacity, and
effectiveness of the network, in addition to isolating sections of the network.
Despite the effectiveness of the theoretical techniques, the cells still maintained
differing levels of operational effectiveness and functionality (reduced
communication, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness) following the removal
of the most critical node. Therefore, subsequent stages of destabilisation were
employed. While the HRB cell had little effectiveness left and no information flow
between the troikas, the subsequent two destabilisation stages aimed at the removal of
Zdrilic and Tapsanji as the next most critical nodes and troika leaders. These stages
aimed to further reduce the decision-making capacity and effectiveness of the
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remaining troikas. The subsequent stage within the LET cell removed Sajid, due to his
higher level of betweennessvi than Brigitte (despite Brigitte having a higher level of
centrality). Following these two stages, the LET cells communication flow, decision-
making processes, and effectiveness were all critically reduced. The JI cell, as the
second largest network (after the Aum cell), typically required more stages of
destabilisation than the HRB and LET cell. The second most critical node within the
JI cell was Idris, whose removal further reduced the decision-making capacity and
effectiveness of the network. The final removal within the process was Muklas (the
third most critical node of the network), which left the network in three non-
connected networks, two of which were all-channel.
3.2 ALL-CHANNEL NETWORKS

As discussed previously, the Aum cell was the deviant case within the sample of this
thesis. This cell consisted of an all-channel network with a density of 100%, causing
each node within the network to be ranked equally, due to each node holding an
identical position within the network. These results entailed maximum centrality and
closeness, and minimum betweenness. From these results, it was impossible to
determine a critical node through social network analysis and thus impossible to
employ theoretical destabilisation measures against the network. As a consequence,
the chapter employed hierarchical methods of destabilising the network as the leaders
of the network were identifiable through the contextual background. In essence, the
destabilisation methods attempted to remove the leaders from the network. Although
an all-channel network remained following the removal of these seven nodes, the
decision-making capacity of the network was judged to have been dramatically
reduced.
The destabilisation attempts on the Aum Shinrikyo cell generated discussions on the
disruption of all-channel networks, which initially appeared resistant to destabilisation
methods. As a node was removed from the network, the only criteria within the
network that would change were the size and degree of connexion, with the network
formation remaining as an all-channel network. This entailed that any effective
destabilisation measure would have to remove every node from the network.
vi
As established, betweenness is a powerful indicator of leadership within covert networks.
289
Inversely, if a node is removed from or discovered within the network, this node has
the potential to identify or lead to every other node within the network due to the total
lack of structural covertness. As the Aum cell demonstrated, the blatant lack of
structural covertness within the network formation of a cell can be countered through
other elements of a cells modus operandi. Such networks have significant potential to
pose problems for counter-terrorism measures. For example, internationally dispersed
all-channel networks that have very weak levels of interaction could prove very
difficult to disrupt effectively.
As covered in the network formation discussions above, the JI cell also employed all-
channel clusters within its cell. These were the bomb construction team based at the
Menjangan house in Denpasar and Team Lima. The destabilisation measures for the JI
cell would leave two all-channel networks following the three destabilisation
attempts, leaving a potentially problematic situation regarding the efficiency of the
clusters and the potential continued operation. This would leave authorities with the
dilemma of destabilising an all-channel network. Due to the more dangerous of the
two networks being based at the one residence, the tasks difficulty is reduced
dramatically.
3.3 DESTABILISATION APPLICATIONS

The subsequent discussions will examine the potential applications of the results of
the social network analysis and destabilisation applications to counter-terrorism
operations aimed at the disruption of these cells and their operations.
3.3.1 HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO

It is difficult to analyse the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavias (SFRY)
operation against the HRB cell as the members were all captured within four days of
each other and did not complete their mission, although it is pertinent to note that the
group was attempting to return to the Italian border when apprehended. The difficulty
in this analysis is increased by the lack of information about the particulars of the
SFRY operation. When examining the application of the theoretical destabilisation
techniques to real world applications against the HRB network, it is clear that the
removal of Tolic would have been the most effective strategy, as he controlled the
information between the three troikas. It would depend on the stage of the operation at
290
which the techniques were implemented. Obviously, Tolic had ordered the three
troikas within his cell back to the Italian border and was abandoning the operation,
making it difficult to gauge how effective the methods employed by the SFRY were,
as the group may not have been operating under its normal covertness or methods of
operation.
3.3.2 AUM SHINRIKYO
In the case of the Aum cell, all of the nodes within the network were living on the one
property for the entire period that the cell was considered operational, and so, were a
node to be discovered at the Banjawarn property, the entire cell was likely to be
disrupted. Despite this tentative assumption, Chapter VI examined a hierarchical
method of destabilisation which aimed at removing the leadership from the cell. This
method would have been successful at disrupting the network, as the cult members
would not have continued the operation without the Supreme Leader (Asahara) and
his hierarchy (Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, and Muari). The most
concerning fact regarding this cell is that despite convictions of carrying dangerous
goods on an aircraft and the confiscation of chemicals and laboratory equipment by
the Australian Customs Service, the group undertook and successfully completed its
mission. It must be noted again, however, that the Australian authorities knew little, if
anything, of the religious cult and once they did learn of their backgrounds, refused to
grant the visas they required to return to the country. Despite their lack of knowledge
of the group, the identification of one of the individuals who was charged by the
Australian Customs Service as a member of Aum Shinrikyo would have most likely
have lead to the identification of the entire group as an Aum cell (again) through the
lack of structural covertness. This would have led to the surveillance or withdrawal of
visas from the cell, which although unlikely, may have delayed or hindered the cults
1994 attack in Matsumoto and 1995 Sarin attacks in Tokyo.
3.3.3 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
The potential effectiveness of the measures employed against the LET cell can be
demonstrated by examining the arrest of Brigitte in October 2003. Despite the
removal of Brigitte (the third most critical node) from the network by Australian
authorities, the cell continued to operate. Following Brigittes arrest, Lodhi attempted
to purchase chemicals through a wholesaler and attempted to pass on detailed
information of potential targets to another member of the cell. It is theoretically sound
291
to say that through the destabilisation measures, if Lodhi (as the critical node) was
targeted instead of Brigitte (although he may not have been known to authorities) then
the cell would have been significantly more disrupted and would not have been able
to continue with the operation. The removal of Brigitte and the continued activities of
Lodhi could have had potentially catastrophic results if the cell had been close to the
implementation of its operation. This potential situation is akin to the arrest of
Zacarias Moussaoui prior to the al-Qaeda attacks of 2001. Despite his arrest and
removal from the network (although not suspected of terrorism at the time), the
operation continued through to fruition in the form of the September 11 attacks. This
was possible because Moussaoui was not a critical node within the network and the
cell was structurally established as a covert network capable of accommodating the
loss of Moussaoui. This assertion supports the need for the surveillance of identified
nodes in order to appropriately map the cell and identify the critical nodes for counter-
terrorism operations through social network analysis.
The social network analysis results of the LET cell found that Sajid was the second
most critical node and that his removal as the second stage of the destabilisation
process would have effectively destabilised and disrupted the network. This stage
would be practically unfeasible for Australian authorities to implement as Sajid was
based in Pakistan. While international intelligence and counter-terrorism coordination
may have produced the removal of Sajid, Brigitte would be a far more suitable and
feasible target for the Australian authorities.
One of the weaknesses of the methodology, which is best demonstrated in the case of
the LET cell, is the criteria by which the relational data was collected. This stage of
the methodology aimed to record the interactions of the nodes but only such
interaction that was for or assisted in the terrorist operation. In a close community
such as the Islamic community in Lakemba (around which the LET cell was based), it
is quite possible that all of the nodes within the network knew each other and knew
they were involved in the cell. Despite this, these links could not be included in the
relational data because their interaction did not relate to the terrorist cell or the
operation. If this was the case, it may not have been difficult to re-establish the links
that were lost through the proposed destabilisation measures. This weakness is
292
synthesised for all of the cells examined and adds further evidence to Sparrows
discussions of difficulties in examining covert networks.1
It is important to note that the LET cell did not develop into its final formation, which
would have come about when the cell became slightly more dense in the bomb-
construction process. In this process Salah may have been integrated into the
command cell (or a bomb construction clique may have formed) and the operation
assistants who were kept isolated of the command members may also have been
integrated or kept in an isolated all-channel cluster as was used in the JI cell. It can
eventually be assumed that one or more of the operation assistants would have the
task of either placing or detonating the explosives.
It is important to note at this stage the way in which the cell was disrupted in reality.
The French intelligence agency La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire
(Directorate for Territorial Surveillance, DST) tracked Brigitte to Australia and
warned Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) of the LET members
presence in Australia. It has been acknowledged by ASIO that without the warning
from DST, Brigitte would still be in Australia.2 This illustrates the necessity of
international intelligence and counter-terrorism networks and cooperation.
3.3.4 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

Because the JI cell achieved its objective in Bali and was not disrupted, it is difficult
to predict the effects of the proposed destabilisation methods. The theoretical removal
of Samudra from the network would have resulted in the isolation of Team Lima.
However, due to the nature of covert networks, there is a good chance that Idris, as the
logistics coordinator, would have been able to communicate and re-establish the link
to the group. This is possible despite the fact that Idris did not interact with Team
Lima during the covert stage of the operation. The removal of both of Samudra and
Idris would have isolated Team Lima and removed two-thirds of the command team
from the cell.
As discussed previously, following the three stages of the theoretical destabilisation

process, two all-channel networks would remain. The first would have been Team
Lima, which would have not posed a significant threat. However, the second larger
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network was based at the house in Manjangan Street and had both a suicide bomber
and a large quantity of explosives in a Vehicle Based Explosive Device (VBED).
Despite the removal of the leaders of the cell, it is possible that the operation would
have gone ahead, albeit on a lesser scale. Again, parallels can be drawn with the
Zacarias Moussaoui case. Within structurally covert networks, if the node within the
network does not lead to further nodes (even if they are critical nodes), then
operations can still continue.
4. SUMMARY
This chapter has conducted a further analysis of the results and analysis of the
previous four chapters. This further analysis has aimed at answering the research
questions of this thesis. Specifically, these questions aimed to discover how terrorist
cells have operated in Australia, how JI might operate in Australia, and the most
effective methods for destabilising these terrorist cells. This chapter conducted a
comparative analysis of the contextual backgrounds and the network and node level
social network analysis results. The focus then shifted to examine how a JI cell would
operate in Australia in light of the results of the social network analysis of the cell.
Finally, the chapter examined the effectiveness of the destabilisation techniques,
followed by the potential real world applications of the destabilisation techniques. The
following chapter will conclude by reviewing the development of the thesis through
its chapters, and offering an examination of the research objectives and questions. The
chapter will discuss the findings of the analysis and the applications and implications
of the project to the terrorism studies, intelligence, and counter-terrorism industries.
294
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION
This, final chapter in the thesis will examine specifically what this thesis has
accomplished over the preceding nine chapters and discuss the major findings, the
applications of these findings, the contribution to knowledge, and the importance of
terrorism studies in the contemporary international political and social environment.
1. REVIEW
From the outset, this thesis has attempted to firmly establish the importance of a full
and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, its history, the
groups that employ the tactic, and the way in which it is employed. Championing this
line of inquiry, the central research question of this thesis has attempted to answer the
question How have terrorist cells in Australia operated? As established in Chapter
III, this level of understanding of terrorism in Australia has rarely been approached.
This thesis, guided by the central research question, has applied the analytical
framework of social network analysis to four terrorist cells that have operated in or
against Australia between 1963 and 2003. These cells were from the groups Hrvatsko
Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), Aum
Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET), and Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI). In addition to understanding how terrorist groups
in Australia have operated, the thesis attempted to contribute to a predictive capability
within terrorism studies (synthesised from the criticisms of the field) by posing the
question How might a JI cell operate in Australia? The final research question of the
thesis, What are the most effective methods for destabilising these cells, employed
the use of theoretical destabilisation techniques to provide specific counter-terrorism
applications to each of the terrorist cells.
In employing social network analysis and the designed methodology presented in

Chapter IV to examine the way in which terrorist cells have operated in Australia, the
thesis has met the research objectives proposed in Chapter III. This thesis has
described, understood, and explained the way in which three terrorist cells have
operated in Australia through their cell structure, communication, and interaction. The
thesis has also provided a methodology that has largely satisfied the traditional
296
criticisms of terrorism studies. Finally, the thesis has contributed to a predictive
capability within terrorism studies, although this contribution is limited. The results of
the analysis of how JI would operate in Australia provided a strong insight into this
issue, but it would be pretentious to assume that this constitutes a complete and
effective predictive ability.
2. MAJOR FINDINGS
This thesis has generated two major findings that can be synthesised from the
previous chapter. The first is the conclusion that efficiency is more conducive to the
success of a terrorist cell than structural covertness (with regard to a cells level of
density). The second major finding is that betweenness is a critical indicator of the
importance of a node to a terrorist network. These findings are discussed along with
their applications to both the academic and counter-terrorism fields.
2.1 EFFICIENCY OVER COVERTNESS

The first major finding of this doctoral thesis was that the larger and denser cells
within the sample were the cells that were successful in meeting their objectives. This
finding provides evidence that small covert cells are not the most effective way in
which terrorist cells can operate, as is widely thought. This finding challenges the
importance of structural covertness as the critical property for terrorist cells. Having a
higher density allowed the cells to complete their objectives quickly through their
consequential high levels of efficiency. This finding indicates that higher density cells
with a focus on efficiency may be more effective than cells operating with a high level
of structural covertness.
This major finding was underpinned by further generalisations regarding the utility of
efficiency within networks. The first of these generalisations was that the level of
efficiency (density) generally increases with the size of the dataset. The second
generalisation was that the cells within this sample employed higher density areas
within sections of the network to facilitate and increase efficiency within those areas
of the network. The final generalisation that again supports the effectiveness of higher
density cells is that cells of a larger size and with a higher density are more resistant to
destabilisation tactics. It is necessary to qualify again, however, that operating with a
297
higher density can result in a much more rapid identification and destabilisation of the
network despite the greater number of stages required.
2.1.1 APPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS

This first major finding has significant applications that apply to terrorism studies,
social network analysis, counter-terrorism, and intelligence fields in challenging the
concept that terrorist cells need to operate as low density covert cells in order to
complete their objectives. This finding has the most relevant applications to the
counter-terrorism and intelligence fields examining covert cells through social
network analysis. The finding indicates that perhaps the most threatening type of
terrorist cell is one with a reasonably high density that forms, then efficiently and
rapidly completes its required preparations, subsequently disperses, and then
implements its attack. These types of cells appear within this project to be more
dangerous than cells that are less efficient (but more structurally covert) and take a
significantly longer period of time to complete their objectives. The concept of this
type of efficient cell directly challenges the danger of the sleeper cell so often
portrayed by the media as well as governments, and suggests that a far more
dangerous possibility exists to threaten the internal security of Australia and other
foreign governments.
2.2 BETWEENNESS AS CRITICAL

The second major finding of this thesis was the critical importance of betweenness,
that is, the amount of control over the interaction and communication within terrorist
cells. This result has indicated that the most important criteria for determining the
importance or criticality of a node is the ability to control interaction and
communication within the network and that any individual with a reasonable level of
betweenness should be considered a major player within the network. The node with
the highest level of betweenness will almost certainly be the critical node within the
network.

This finding provides useful applications to the social network analysis field in
evaluating the critical importance of betweenness to leaders within covert networks,
particularly in the identification of leaders and critical nodes. Naturally, these
298
applications can be extended to the counter-terrorism and intelligence fields. In the
assessment or surveillance of terrorist or suspected terrorist cells, individuals who are
identified with a significant level of betweenness are likely to be high-ranking
individuals or to hold a position within the command cluster of the network. As will
be discussed later when examining applications to the intelligence and counter-
terrorism fields, this assists in identifying targets for further surveillance or the
principle targets for counter-terrorism operations.
2.3 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA

While this thesis cannot claim to have fulfilled its third objective through its
examination of how a JI cell would operate in Australia, it did provide significant
insight and analysis into how such a cell might operate. The findings of this analysis
suggested that a JI cell in Australia would:
i. Make preparations outside or in a remote area of Australia;i
ii. Form as a reasonably dense cell, isolating sections of the network to contribute
to structural covertness, while maintaining all-channel clusters to complete
selected tasks efficiently;
iii. Disperse before the implementation of the operation;
iv. Attempt to counter their higher density (low structural covertness) through
measures such as concealing themselves within an Islamic or Southeast Asian
diaspora in addition to other covert measures;ii and
v. Have a reasonably high-ranking commander who is not widely known within
intelligence spheres.

The findings that were synthesised from the analysis of the JI cell in this project, as
mentioned previously, while providing some insight into how a JI cell may operate in
Australia, do not provide a predictive model of how the group might conduct its
operations in Australia. Such a model would require in-depth comparative analysis of
other social network analyses of other JI cells (avenues for further research will be
discussed subsequently), leading to a much higher degree of reliability and validity in
i
Although this is increasingly difficult with ever-increasing security in a post-September 11
environment.
ii
This point echoes the above footnote, as intelligence resources are well established within these
communities.
299
predicting how the group would operate in Australia. The most significant application
of this analysis to Australian counter-terrorism authorities is the continued or
initialising of surveillance of individuals with known and suspected links (training,
financial, family, and religious) to JI and its associated groups.iii The second
application of these results is the reiteration of the critical and vital importance of
international intelligence cooperation with Indonesian, Philippines, and other
Southeast Asian governments. This particularly applies to individuals who trained as
JI members in Afghanistan between 1985 and 2001, as well as individuals who have
received training or fought in Ambon, Poso, or Mindanao.
3. FURTHER APPLICATIONS
In addition to the counter-terrorism and intelligence applications that have been made
from the two major findings and the results and conclusions of the thesis, a further
two observations were distinguished for their applications to the intelligence and
counter-terrorism fields.
3.1 LOCAL CONTACTS

As discussed in the previous chapter, all of the groups examined within this thesis
used local contacts in either the establishment or operation of the terrorist cell. This
finding (as discussed in the case of JI) leads to the recommendation of surveillance of
individuals within Australia who have any links to known terrorists or terrorist
groups, or individuals who are known sympathisers of such groups. This includes
individuals who trained or fought in Afghanistan during the conflict with the Soviets
and those who have fought or received training in areas such as Ambon, Poso,
Chechnya, Kashmir, and Jammu. Local contacts are almost essential for terrorist
operations to take place in a foreign country and the removal of this support base or
the identification of potential terrorists through the surveillance of these individuals
could disrupt the formation of a cell before it even begins. Although the profiling of
Southeastern Asians, South Asians, Arabs, and Muslims is generally considered
iii
While within this thesis such links are considered dormant during the covert period of an operation,
the aim should be to discover them before the covert stage of the operation is implemented.
300
controversial, it is extremely likely that a terrorist cell would hide within such a
diaspora or an Islamic community to increase its covertness.iv
3.2 INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

The final application of the results to the counter-terrorism field is the observation of
the importance of international counter-terrorism cooperation. Due to international
terrorisms influence on Australia between the 1960s and 1990s and the lack of
conflicts that originated in Australia, a vast majority of the terrorist events in Australia
involved an international element or foreign nationals. Despite the threat from
domestic Islamic extremists, as was seen in the case of the LET cell in this project,
foreign nationals will generally still be involved in such cells due to their vastly
superior experience in areas such as combat, counter-surveillance, and explosive
construction and detonation. Likewise, international cooperation between
governments and national intelligence agencies is necessary in monitoring Australians
travelling to areas such as Mindanao, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, and
other areas throughout South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East for the purpose
of joining groups, undertaking training, and combat experience. The three cells in this
project that operated within Australian borders could have been disrupted through
international counter-terrorism cooperation.
4. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This thesis aimed from the outset to contribute to the field of terrorism studies through
a variety of avenues. The thesis firstly aimed to contribute to the field by attempting
to design a methodology that satisfied the traditional and endemic criticisms of
terrorism studies. The second avenue intended to provide research into terrorism in
Australia, aiming to understand and explain events and groups that were previously
largely unexamined. The final area in which this thesis hoped to contribute was the
counter-terrorism and intelligence arenas; thus counter-terrorism recommendations
regarding each of the cells were made and the method proposed as a useful
intelligence tool.
iv
This is not to say that JI would not use operatives of Caucasian or other appearance, as in the case of
Jack Roche.
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4.1 TERRORISM STUDIES
The three research objectives of this thesis introduced in Chapter III were specifically
designed to counter the criticisms of terrorism studies that were considered to be both
widespread within the field and inhibiting the progress and maturation of the field. In
meeting these objectives, this thesis has provided a methodology and piece of
literature that has specifically attempted to describe, understand, and explain the
organisation and communication of terrorist groups in Australia through its
application of social network analysis to the cells from the groups HRB, Aum
Shinrikyo, and LET. This contribution consists of a descriptive, contextual
background and an applied academic analysis of terrorist cells, where none had been
undertaken previously.v
4.1.1 ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS

The thesis provided a methodology that largely satisfied the criticisms of terrorism
studies by meeting the objectivity, abstraction, level of research, and level of analysis
criticisms. The objectivity criticism of terrorism studies was met through a focus on
the value-neutrality approach to the research, data collection, and analysis. This
methodology had the specific intention of ascertaining a neutral view of terrorism, the
groups, and the individuals within the groups.
The use of the firmly applied methodology of social network analysis ensured that the
abstraction criticisms of the field were not applicable to the thesis, as the project
specifically dealt with terrorists, examining their interaction and communication with
other terrorists. The thesis specifically sought to discover and understand the internal
dynamics and human characteristics of its subject,1 and in doing so, explicitly
attempted to understand the phenomenon.
The third criticism of terrorism studies concerned the levels of research that occur
within the field. The methodology met this criticism through a specifically research-
based and empirically-grounded research project. The principal solution to this
criticism is the generation of primary sources. Interviews with members of the HRB
were sought to gain primary data relating to the 1963 incursion into the Socialist
v
As was established in the review of literature on terrorism in Australia.
302
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). However these interviews could not be
conducted. Other primary sources were accumulated through National Archives of
Australia (NAA) archives, such as the diaries, notebooks, letters, and meeting minutes
of the HRB. One of the other major sources of data in the thesis were police and
government reports which provided a level of research that is grounded, reliable, and
achieved a high level of value-neutrality.
The final criticism of terrorism studies, levels of analysis, was resolved through the
adoption of social network analysis as the thesis framework for analysis. This method
specifically aimed to explain and understand the subject which is being studied and,
as discussed in Chapter IV, can even be utilised for predictive purposes. The use of
social network analysis allowed for both the qualitative and quantitative analysis of
the networks examined within the scope of this project. This methodology provided a
concrete and focused analysis of the data collected, providing the level of analysis
desired by the critics of terrorism studies. While the use of strong methodologies and
analytical frameworks can subdue many of the criticisms of terrorism studies, some of
these criticisms stem from negative appraisals of academia in general and are endemic
and unavoidable within various approaches and methodologies.
4.1.2 FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis attempts to provide an exploratory approach in its examination of terrorist
cells in Australia. The HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, and LET contextual backgrounds
provide either the first or the most comprehensive descriptive examinations of these
cells and their operation in Australia. From the four contextual backgrounds that have
been presented, any amount of work can be synthesised and any number of analyses
can be applied to this research, which would aim to contribute further to
understanding and explaining terrorism in Australia.
The findings and applications within this project have been made from a small data
set, which detracts from the authority of these results, but opens the door for research
that would seek to qualify or challenge these results. Such research, employing a
comparative analysis of the cells in this thesis and others, would result in more
definitive generalisations about the way in which different cells operate, particularly
the effectiveness and success of efficient cells over structurally covert cells.
303
As discussed previously, further social network analysis needs to take place into other
JI cells that have operated against Australian targets in Indonesia. This endeavour
would certainly provide a more authoritive insight (through an increase in reliability
and validity) into the way JI cells operate and further contribute to predicting how a
cell would operate were one deployed to Australia. If this research were to yield
consistent and accurate results on the way in which JI cells operate, these results
would be profoundly useful in counter-terrorism operations. If it is found that a group
uses a consistent networking modus operandi when deploying cells, this could
potentially provide a strong predictive capacity to the field, particularly if it is found
that other groups have a consistent cell formation or template. This consistency is
most prevalent within groups that undertake identical or similar training, for example
al-Qaedas use of the al-Qaeda manual, or JIs use of the same training camps that are
instructed by the same individuals. It is clear that the HRB would have consistently
used troikas and it is also apparent that Aum Shinrikyo would operate in an all-
channel formation.
4.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AS AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

TOOL
Chapter IV of this thesis discussed the usefulness and importance of social network
analysis and its applications to the study and analysis of terrorist and covert networks.
The use of social network analysis as the framework for analysis in this methodology
has further demonstrated the substantial application that the method has to the
intelligence and counter-terrorism fields.
The first use of social network analysis as a tool for intelligence analysis is that it can
accurately identify the leader of a cell or leader within a clique that is a part of a wider
network. In addition, the method can identify how this individual is the leader or
critical node through its measurement of level of activity, control over the flow of
information and interaction, and ability to access others. The method can also identify
the subsequent most critical nodes. In addition to allowing a greater understanding of
the dynamic of the leadership structure within the cell (including leadership
struggles), this allows for the identification of the primary targets for counter-
terrorism operations, or which individuals should be the focus of greater intelligence
and counter-terrorism resources. To draw upon the argument in the previous chapter,
304
the LET cell provides a perfect example of how the method would be effective within
the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields. The method would have identified Lodhi
(following surveillance) as the critical node following a social network analysis and
the cell would have been significantly more disrupted following Lodhis removal.
Theoretically, it would have been very difficult for the cell to continue its operation
following Lodhis removal.
While the nodal level measures can distinguish the leadership levels and amount of
activity a node is involved in, the network level measures allow the analyst an
understanding of the type of network they are dealing with. These measures permit an
analyst to distinguish the cells orientation towards either structural covertness or
efficiency, allowing insight into the timeframes that the cells may be operating within.
For example, a very dense efficient cell has the ability to implement or execute tasks
at very short notice and hence may potentially pose more danger. Alternatively, less
dense, structurally covert cells will take an extended period of time to do the same
task due to a lower level of efficiency. The network level measures also give insight
into the best methods of destabilising the cell.
The social network analysis software utilised within this thesis is clearly more
accurate and effective than second phasevi software discussed by Klerks2 in Chapter
IV regarding the visualisation of covert cells and their behaviour. Social network
analysis and its various software can clearly visualise a covert cell so that the lines
and levels of interaction and communication are clear. This third phase visualisation
of the cell through social network analysis is a mathematically defined graph and is
hence more accurate than a link diagram used within second phase methods of
visualisation.vii
vi
Klerks discusses three phases of network visualisation: the first being hand-drawn charts and maps
using different coloured pins; the second phase using computer software; and the third phase
employing social network analysis, which has a focus on the content of the contacts, the context, and
the analysis of such information.
vii
As discussed, social network analysis offers the ability to identify critical nodes/vulnerabilities
within networks as well as allowing an understanding of the internal dynamics and relationships within
the network.
305
Yet again, it is important to refer to Sparrows concerns of examining covert
networks. The appropriate application of social network analysis to identify the
leaders and the type and characteristics of cells requires the surveillance of the cell to
ensure that all nodes have been included within the cell. On the inclusion of each new
link or node, the network and nodal criteria must be recalculated and the results re-
examined. Social network analysis allows intelligence agencies to understand the
structural covertness or efficiency of the network, how it operates and interacts, who
the leaders are within the networks, and consequently identify the points of weakness
within this network or the most effective method to destabilise the network. In the
words of Sun Tzu: A clever strategist or tactician can turn the enemys strength into
a decisive weakness.3
4.2.1 FURTHER RESEARCH

This aspect of the thesis has opened up areas for research to further demonstrate the
critical applications that social network analysis can offer to the intelligence and
counter-terrorism fields. The first of these is research that conducts case studies of
previous counter-terrorism operations and evaluates the success of these operations in
contrast to the success of the operation if social network analysis was employed to
identify and destabilise the critical nodes within the cell, such as the example of LET
within this thesis. The second application echoes previous recommendations that aim
to conduct comparative analyses of social network analyses of different types of cells.
Furthermore, a similar analysis could examine the types of cells that individual groups
have employed with a view to identifying similarities and patterns to assist in
predicting, preventing, and preparing for terrorist operations in Australia.
5. TERRORISM STUDIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism, particularly since the (as yet) unparalleled
attacks on September 11, 2001, has captivated the world. The war on terror has
become the driving force behind US foreign policy, resulting in the invasions of
Afghanistan and arguably Iraq. The global nature of the threat has forced rapid
changes in security procedures and policy, some of them preventative and others
reactionary. The figurehead of al-Qaeda and the 21st Century Islamic extremist
movement, Osama bin Laden, has not been apprehended through the coalitions
306
campaign in Afghanistan or through the cooperation of the Pakistani Government and
its intelligence agencies. The struggling occupation of Iraq is facilitating the combat
training and radicalisation of a new breed of mujahideen, who, like the Afghan Arabs
and mujahideen of the 1980s, will disperse to their home countries with a desire to
continue the global struggle. 21st Century Islamic extremism, as the current phase of
terrorism and potentially the most threatening and violent stage thus far, is today and
will remain a dire and significant international issue that could continue to shape
international politics and security for many years to come. This scenario requires the
continued championing, advancement, and improvement of the field of terrorism
studies.
This thesis has provided a response to the major criticisms of the terrorism studies
field, made important additions to the research and analysis of terrorism in Australia,
and produced specific applications from the study to both terrorism studies and the
counter-terrorism and intelligence fields. With terrorism arguably more profuse,
intense, and inventive today than at any previous stage within its history, it is
absolutely vital that the field aims to facilitate the description, understanding,
explanation, and prediction of terrorism. The unprecedented increase in the frequency,
severity, and media attention of terrorism and the dynamic growth of terrorism studies
since 2001, has produced many studies that have advanced past many of the
traditional criticisms of the field and provided concrete analysis into terrorists and
terrorist groups, as well as the other foci of the field, particularly the counter-terrorism
focus. In addition to the advance in the levels of analysis and the methodologies
employed by the traditional disciplines, other disciplines such as engineering,
business, and the natural sciences are contributing to research focusing on terrorism.
These research areas, in addition to those that currently make up the field, must focus
on the integration of these approaches into a framework that will facilitate the
development of the terrorism studies discipline, a feat that has eluded the research
area since its inception.
307
308
ENDNOTES
1
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism: Terrorism Knowledge Base (2006)
Retrieved: May 11, 2006, from http://www.tkb.org/IncidentDateModule.jsp.
2
Ibid.
3
Jennings, P. (2005) National Security Check: How far have we come?, Paper presented at Security
2005 Conference, Sydney, August 31 to September 1.
4
Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
5
Krebs, V. (2002) Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, pp. 43-52.
6
Carley, K. (2005) Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
310
CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM
1
Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirch-Hoefler, S. (2004) The Challenges of Conceptualising
Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 4, p. 777.
2
Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,
Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, pp. 8-9.
3
Shafritz, J., Gibbons, E., & Scott, G. (1991) Almanac of Modern Terrorism, Oxford: Facts on File, p.
ix.
4
Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003.
5
Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 5.
6
Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 18.
7
Aristotle, Quoted in Laqueur, W. (1978) The Terrorism Reader, Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, pp. 12-13.
8
Cicero, Quoted in Laqueur, W. (1978) The Terrorism Reader, Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
p. 6.
9
Griset, P. & Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in Perspective, London: Sage Publications, p. 2.
10
Ibid.
11
Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 7-8.
12
Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups,
Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 13.
13
Ibid, p. 14.
14
Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
15
16
Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 112-124.
17
Ibid.
18
Griset, P. & Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in Perspective, London: Sage Publications, pp. 3-4.
19
Proundhorn, P. (1994) What is Property? Or an Inquiry into the Principle Right of Government,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20
Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz, p. 17.
21
Most, J. (1885) Action as Propaganda, Freiheit, July 25.
22
Pisacane, C. Quoted in Woodcock, G (ed.). (1977) The Anarchist Reader, Glasgow: Fontana, pp. 43-
44.
23
24
Heinzen, K. Quoted in Laqueur, W. (1978) The Terrorism Reader, Philidelphia: Temple University
Press, p.26.
25
Ibid, p. 53.
26
Griset, P. & Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in Perspective, London: Sage Publications.
27
Most, J. (1884) Advice for Terrorists, Freiheit, September 13.
28
29
30
Ibid.
31
Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press.
32
33
Ibid.
34
Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press, p. 63.
35
Ibid, p. 64.
36
37
Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 64-67.
38
Katusky, K. (1920) Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the Natural History of the
Revolution, London: National Labour Press, p. 2.
39
Ibid, p. 220.
40
Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 264-265.
41
Dadrian, V. (1995) The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to
Anatolia to the Caucasus, Oxford: Berghahn Books.
311
42
Duffy, M. (2004) Whos Who: Mehmed Talaat Pasha, Retrieved: August 3, 2004, from
http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/talaat.htm.
43
Duffy, M. (2004a) Whos Who: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, Retrieved: August 3, 2004, from
http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/djemal.htm.
44
45
46
Dadrian, V. (1995) The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to
Anatolia to the Caucasus, Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 50-51.
47
Poulton, H. (2000) Who are the Macedonians? , London: Hurst & Company.
48
Hennessy, T. (1997) A History of Northern Ireland: 1920 1996, Hampshire: Macmillan.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Bew, P., Gibbon, P., & Patterson, H. (1995) Northern Ireland 1921-1996: Political Forces and
Social Classes, London: Serif.
53
54
Payne, S. (1995) A History of Fascism, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
55
Radu, I. (1990) The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, New York: Columbia
University Press.
56
Metz, H. (1988) Israel: A Country Study, Washington: Government Printing Office.
57
58
Ibid.
59
60
Ibid.
61
62
Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, pp. 1-2.
63
Holocaust Encyclopaedia (2004) Retrieved: August 6, 2004, from
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005449.
64
65
Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, pp.
81-89.
66
Spears, J. (2002) Muslim Brotherhood, Retrieved June 9, 2004, from
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mb.htm.
67
68
69
Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, p. 50.
70
Metz, H. (1993) Algeria: A Country Study, Washington: Government Printing Office.
71
Ibid.
72
Kushner, H. (2003) The Encyclopaedia of Terrorism, London: Sage Publications.
73
Hacker, F. (1976) Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror & Terrorism in Our Time, New York:
Norton & Company Inc, p. 35.
74
75
Coogan, P. (1996) The Troubles: Irelands Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace, London:
Arrow Books.
76
Taylor, T. (2002) United Kingdom, in Y. Alexander (ed), Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten
Countries, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
77
Coogan, P. (1996) The Troubles: Irelands Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace, London:
Arrow Books, pp. 57-59.
78
Ibid, p. 182.
79
United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington.
80
The Belfast Agreement (1998)
81
82
Sydney: New Holland Publishers, pp. 168-169.
83
Oglaigh na hEireann (2005) IRA Statement, July 28.
312
84
Spears, J. (2002) Muslim Brotherhood, Retrieved: June 9, 2004, from
85
86
Information Division (1993) HAMAS: The Islamic Resistance Movement, Israel Foreign Ministry,
Jerusalem, Retrieved July 21, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/930100.htm.
87
Pike, J. (1998) Palestine Liberation Organisation, Retrieved: June 18, 2004, from
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/plo.htm.
88
89
90
91
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, p. 131.
92
93
94
Pike, J. (1998) 15 May Organisation, Retrieved: July 26, 2004, from
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/15_may.htm.
95
Pike, J. (1998) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Special Command, Retrieved: August
6, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pflp-sc.htm.
96
A Hijack on the High Seas Part One, (2002) Retrieved: August 6, 2004, from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A730900.
97
Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, p. 32.
98
Ibid, p. 34.
99
Pike, J. (1998) Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Retrieved: August 4, 2004,
from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/asala.htm.
100
Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, p. 32.
101
102
Pike, J. (2004) Red Army Faction, Retrieved: August 10, 2004, from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/raf.htm.
103
Rote Armee Fraktion (1998) Communiqu: The Urban Guerrilla is History, April 20.
104
Varon, J. (2004) Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and
Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies, Berkley: University of California Press, p. 2.
105
Ibid, pp. 2-3.
106
Meade, R. (1990) Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism, New York: St. Martins Press, pp.
219-220.
107
108
Meade, R. (1990) Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism, New York: St. Martins Press, pp.
183-184.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid, p. 206.
111
112
113
Rauger, X. (1993) The Red Brigades: Farewel to Arms, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.
16, 1, pp. 315-325.
114
115
Farrell, W. (1990) Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army, Lexington: Lexington
Books.
116
Ibid.
117
313
118
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, pp. 121-122.
119
Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University
Press, p. 147.
120
Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 363-
364.
121
St John, P. (1996) Insurgency, Legitimacy, and Intervention in Algeria, Commentary: A Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Publication, no. 65, January.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
125
Central Intelligence Agency (2004) The World Factbook 2004, Dulles: Brasseys Inc.
126
127
United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995),
Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United
States Congress, Washington.
128
Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles: University of California Press,
pp. 102-103.
129
Nojumi, N. (2002) The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilisation, Civil War, and the
Future of the Region, New York: Palgrave, pp. 84-88
130
Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, p.
xiv.
131
Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, p. 64.
132
Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, pp.
2-3.
133
Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis
Group: Jakarta, pp. 1-5.
134
Ibid.
135
Press, pp. 3-4.
136
Azzam, A. (1979) Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman, Saudi Arabia.
137
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, p. 25.
138
Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, p. 9.
139
Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Phoenix,
pp. 76-78.
140
Ibid, pp. 51-63.
141
Azzam, A. Quoted in Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin
Books, p. 73.
142
Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, pp. 87-100.
143
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, p. 22.
144
Press, pp. 5-23.
145
146
Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Pheonix,
pp. 90-91.
147
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 Commission
Report, Washington: Government Printing Office, p. 60.
148
Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, p. 34.
149
Al-Qaeda (nd) The al-Qaeda Manual.
150
Bin Laden, O. (1996) Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two
Holy Places, Statement.
151
Ibid.
152
Bin Laden, O., Hamzah, M., Rahman, F., Taha, A., & al-Zawahiri, A. (1998) Jihad Against
Crusaders and Jews: World Islamic Front Statement, Statement.
314
153
Ibid.
154
Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Pheonix,
pp. 108-116.
155
Ibid, pp. 171-172.
156
Report, Washington: Government Printing Office.
157
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, pp.48.
158
Ibid, pp. 43-45.
159
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 105.
160
Ibid, p. 117.
161
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2001) East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An
Australian Policy Challenge, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, pp. 119-139.
162
Ibid, 145-146.
163
164
Ibid, pp. 224-226.
165
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, pp. 123-124.
166
Soetjipto, T. & Sukarsono, A. (2004) Jakarta Embassy Blast Kills Eight, Retrieved: September 14,
2004, from
http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=580370&section=ne
ws.
167
Elegant, S. (2005) To Kill a Bombmaker, Time, Vol. 166, 21, p. 22.
168
Myers, S. (2003) Suicide Bombing on Russian Train Near Chechnya Kills 42, The New York
Times, December 6, p. 3.
169
Dolgov, A. & Filipov, D. (2004) Moscow Bombing Kills 39 Blast Wounds 130; Putin Blames
Attack on Chechen Rebels, Boston Globe, February 7, p. 4.
170
Myers, S. (2003) Suicide Bombing on Russian Train Near Chechnya Kills 42, The New York
Times, December 6, p. 3.
171
United States Department of State (2004) Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, Office of the
172
Cooper, C. & Higgins, A. (2003) Moroccan Authorities Suspect International Link in Bombings,
The Wall Street Journal, May 19, p. 4.
173
Ibid, p. 4.
174
International: After Madrid; Morocco and al-Qaeda;, (2004) The Economist, Vol. 370, 8368, p. 67.
175
Warning of More Attacks in Turkey. (2003) Retrieved: August 5, 2004, from
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/11/20/turkey.blast/index.html.
176
Conte, A. (2005) Security in the 21st Century: The United Nations, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 139.
177
Reid, T. (2003) Bush Finally Admits War is not Over, The Times, August 23, p. 18.
178
UN Iraq Security Dysfunctional. (2003) Retrieved: August 5, 2004, from
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/10/22/sprj.irq.un.security/index.html.
179
Six More Hostages Kidnapped (2004) The Daily Telegraph, July 23, p. 37.
180
Fahmy, M. (2004) Terrorist Threat to Behead Marine Iraqs New Dawn, The Daily Telegraph,
June 29, p. 5.
181
Rebels Release Camp Blast Video (2004) The Australian, December 28, p. 9.
182
Cradle of War, School of Jihad (2005) The Economist, Vol. 376, 8435, pp. 41-42.
183
Ibid.
184
Forbes, M. (2004) Nations Anger at Downer, The Age, July 27, p. 1.
185
Pincus, W. (2004) Zarqawi Is Said to Swear Allegiance to Bin Laden, Washington Post, October
19, p. 16.
186
Crumley, B. (2005) The New Bin Laden?, Time, Vol. 166, 10, p. 21.
187
Powell, B. & MacLeod, S. (2006) How they Killed Him, Time, Vol. 167, 25, p. 33.
188
Norland, R. & Hirsh, M. (2006) Fighting Zarqawis Legacy; He was a Monster, and now hes
Dead. But his Savage Influence will outlive him. A Look at the Battles Ahead, Newsweek, Vol. 147,
26, p. 32.
189
al-Hawali, S., al-Awdah, S., & al-Qarni, A. (2004) An Open Address to the Struggling Iraqi People,
November 5, Statement, Saudi Arabia.
190
Cradle of War, School of Jihad (2005) The Economist, July 16, pp. 41-42.
315
191
Crawford, L. & Parker, G. (2004) Anzar Government Ignored Evidence Madrid Bombings, The
Financial Times, March 26, p. 7.
192
Osamas Boast Chilling Tape Confession to Spanish Blast (2004), The Daily Telegraph, March
15, p.1.
193
Nur al-Iman (2005) Statement: The Secret Organisation Group of Al-Qaeda in Europe, July 7.
194
Shaw, A. (1968) Violent Protest in Australian History, Historical Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 35-39.
195
Pinto, S. & Wardlaw, G. (1989) No. 9: Political Violence, in National Committee on Violence
(ed.), Violence Today, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, pp. 2-3.
196
Evans, R. (1986) The Battles of Brisbane: The Conscription Struggle 1916-17, World Review, Vol.
25, 3, p. 21.
197
198
Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 176-
177.
199
Shaw, I. (2006) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 25.
200
Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood:
Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October.
201
Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, A Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals
Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 412
202
Murphy, L. (1973) Croatian Terrorism, Senate Hansard, March 27, 1973, p. 537.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid, p. 533.
205
Suljack, J. (1971) Croatian Call, November-December Issue.
206
207
Ibid, p. 530.
208
Today the River Murray , Tomorrow the Drina (1963) Spremnost, January-February.
209
Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges, The Sydney Morning Herald,
September 6, 1963, p. 3.
210
211
212
Attorney-Generals Department (1972) Croatian Nationalist Activities in Australia - Annexure
D:Signficant Incidents Within the Yugoslav Community in Australia 1964-1972, Attorney-Generals
Department: Canberra, 5 July.
213
Hocking, J. (2004) Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy, Sydney:
University of NSW Press, pp. 127-129.
214
Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic, pp. 38-41.
215
Ibid.
216
217
Ibid, p. 535.
218
Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, p. 7.
219
Attorney-Generals Department (1972) Croatian Nationalist Activities in Australia - Annexure D:
Significant Incidents Within the Yugoslav Community in Australia 1964-1972, Attorney-Generals
Department: Canberra, 5 July.
220
Mooney, R. in Hocking, J. (1993) Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security
State, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
221
Senate Hansard (1973) Croatian Terrorism, March 27, p. 529.
222
Ibid, p. 535.
223
Wright, T. (2005) Playing Catch up: When Terrorism First Struck Australia, ASIO was Looking
the Other Way, The Bulletin, Vol. 123, 6483, pp. 21-25.
224
Reeve, S. (2001) One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and
Israeli Revenge Operation Wrath of God, New York: Arcade Publishing.
225
Greenwood, I. (1972) Terrorism and Violence in Australia, Cabinet Submission 896, September 29,
1972, p. 3.
226
Hulme, A. (1972) Israeli Bomb Mail Found in Australia, Statement delivered September 25,
1972.
227
1972.
228
Williams, C. (2001) Terror Trails on the Home Front, in The Canberra Times, 25 September.
229
Ibid.
316
230
University of NSW Press, p. 83.
231
Hocking, J. (1993) Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State, St.
Leonards: Allen & Unwin, p. 98.
232
Molomby, T. (1986) Spies, Bombs, and the Path of Bliss, Sydney: Potoroo Press, p. 14.
233
Terrorist Group Profile: Ananda Marga (2005) Retrieved: July 20, 2005, from:
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=252.
234
235
Ibid.
236
237
Van Beima, D. (1995) Prophet of Poison, Time Australia, 13, pp. 25-31.
238
239
Ibid.
240
241
1972, p. 4.
242
Ibid, pp. 3-8.
243
Mooney, T. (1986) Australia and Terrorism, Paper presented at the First Pacific International
Congress of the American Society for Industrial Security, 29 April, 1986.
244
Ibid.
245
McGlade, H. (2000) The International Prohibition of Racist Organisations: An Australian
Perspective, Murdock University Electronic Journal of Law, Vol. 7, 1.
246
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 135-145.
247
Ibid, p. 146.
248
Ibid, pp. 181-192.
249
Ibid, pp. 197-205.
250
Ibid, pp. 205-216.
251
Greenland, H (2005) Operation Terror, The Bulletin, March 9, 2005, pp. 18-24.
252
Virginia, M. (2000) Nuclear Scare for Australia in run-up to Olympic Games, Financial Times,
August 28, p. 8.
253
Fickling, D. (2003) Al-Qaeda Threat to Olympics, The Guardian, May 31.
254
Press, pp. 204-205.
255
Four Corners (2004) The Australian Connections, Retrieved: July 26, 2004, from
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s878332.htm.
256
Stevenson, A. (2003) Let me Defend Myself Pleads Islamic Youth Leader, Sydney Morning
Herald, September 14.
257
258
The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8.
259
ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigittes Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004)
Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp.
260
Chulov, M. (2004) Student Doctor on Terror Charge, The Australian, April 16, p. 1.
261
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four
Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm.
262
Miranda, C. (2004) Blueprint for Attack Revealed: The Daily Telegraph Outlines for the First
Time Allegations of a Frightening Terror Plot in Sydney, The Daily Telegraph, June 11, p. 7.
263
Connolly, E., Creagh, S., & Kennedy, L. (2004) Terror Suspect Used Government Website, The
Sydney Morning Herald, April 24.
264
Chulov, M. & Stapleton, J. (2004) Cleric Named as Terror Recruiter, The Australian, March 22, p.
1.
265
266
317
267
Chulov, M. & Crawford, B. (2004) A Nice, Intelligent Guy with Friends in Deadly Places, The
Australian, April 17, p. 2.
268
King, D. (2006) Terror Plotter gets 20 Years, The Australian, August 24, p. 1.
269
OBrien, N. (2007) Plotters Jail Term Stuns His Ex-Boss, The Australian, March 17, p. 4.
270
Chulov, M (2005) Aussie Wanted to be Bomber, The Australian, July 20, p. 1.
271
Butcher, S. (2005) I was Tortured in Pakistan, says Terrorism Suspect, The Australian, February
15.
272
273
Milne, G. (2005) PM Hints at More Train Security, The Sunday Telegraph, July 10, p. 3.
274
Baird, J. (2005) With the Accent, New Emphasis, The Sydney Morning Herald, August 13, p. 37.
275
Munro, I. & Nicholson, B. (2005) Jihad Threat in a Familiar Aussie Twang, The Age, August 11,
p. 1.
276
Gadahn, A. (2005) in Ross, B. (2005) Tape Released: American Al-Qaeda Member Warns of
Attacks, Retrieved: September 13, 2005, from
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Investigation/story?id=1115448&page=1.
277
Stewart, C. (2005) Terrorist Threat to Aussie Embassy, The Australian, May 23, p. 3.
278
Daley, P. (2006) The Terror Trail, The Bulletin, Vol. 123, 64792.
279
Stewart, C. & Leys, N. (2005) Terror Plot Foiled After 17 Arrested, The Australian, November 9,
p. 1.
280
Ibid.
281
318
CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES
1
Gordon, A. (1999) Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta-
Information, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, p. 143.
2
Gurr, T. (1970) Why Men Rebel, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
3
Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) Talking to Terrorists: Towards an Independent
Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, pp. 4-6.
4
5
6
Ibid, pp. 9-20.
7
Ibid, pp. 29-30.
8
Ibid, pp. 32-34.
9
Ibid, pp. 108-155.
10
Ibid, p. 125.
11
Sobel, L. (ed.) (1975) Political Terrorism, New York: Facts on File, Inc.
12
Ibid, p. 125.
13
Alexander, Y. (ed.) (1976) International Terrorism: National, Regional, & Global Perspectives,
New York: Praeger Publishers.
14
Freedman, R. (1976) Soviet Policy Toward International Terrorism, in Y. Alexander (ed.)
International Terrorism National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, New York: Praeger
Publishers, pp. 115-143.
15
Wesiband, E. & Roguly, D. (1976) Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy, and
Legitimacy, in Y. Alexander (ed.) International Terrorism National, Regional, and Global
Perspectives, New York: Praeger Publishers, pp. 258-311.
16
Hacker, F. (1976) Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror & Terrorism in Our Time, New York:
Norton & Company Inc.
17
Ibid.
18
Alexander, Y. & Finger, S. (eds.) (1977) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John
Jay Press.
19
Ibid, pp. 5-61.
20
Friedlander, R. (1977) The Origins of International Terrorism, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.)
Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, p. 30.
21
Miller, J. (1977) Political Terrorism and Insurgency: An Interrogative Approach, in Y. Alexander,
& S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 18-29.
22
Mallin, J. (1977) Terrorism as a Military Weapon, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 92-105.
23
Evans, E. (1977) American Policy Response to International Terrorism: Problems of Deterrence, in
Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay
Press, pp. 106-210.
24
Rubin, A. (1977) International Terrorism and International Law, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger,
(eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 121-127.
25
Evans, A. (1977) The Realities of Extradition and Prosecution, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.)
Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 128-140.
26
Cooper, H. (1977) Terrorism and the Media, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 141-156.
27
Johnpoll, B. (1977) Terrorism and the Media in the United States, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger,
28
Alexander, Y. (1977) Terrorism and the Media in the Middle East, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger,
29
Alexander, Y. & Finger, S. (eds.) (1977) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John
Jay Press, pp. 65-117.
30
Mickolus, E. (1977) Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism, in Y. Alexander, & S.
Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 209-269.
31
Ibid, p. 211.
32
Ibid, p. 246.
33
Margolin, J. (1977) Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.)
Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, p. 271.
319
34
Ibid.
35
36
Ibid, pp. 43-49.
37
Ibid, p. 143.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
41
Information, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, pp. 141-146.
42
Ibid.
43
44
Ibid, 66-68.
45
Ibid, pp. 69-71.
46
47
Schimid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,
Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing.
48
Ibid, pp. 5-31.
49
Ibid, p. 62.
50
Ibid, p. 129.
51
Ibid, p. 178.
52
Ibid, pp. 177-179.
53
Ibid, p. 185.
54
Ibid.
55
Gordon, A. (1995) Terrorism and Computerized Databases: An Examination of Multidisciplinary
Coverage, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7, 4, p. 176.
56
Gordon, A (1996) Terrorism and Science, Technology, and Medicine Databases: New Concepts and
Terminology, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8, 1, p. 170.
57
Gordon, A. (2005) Terrorism as an Academic Subject after 9/11: Searching the Internet Reveals a
Stockholm Syndrome Trend, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 1, pp. 45-59.
58
Silke, A. (2001) The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 5.
59
Schmid, A. (2004) Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence,
Vol. 16, 2, pp. 197-221.
60
Ibid, p. 214.
61
Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirch-Hoefler, S. (2004) The Challenges of Conceptualising
Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 4, pp. 777-794.
62
Ibid, p. 786.
63
Sedgwick, M. (2004) Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism, Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 16, 4, pp. 795-814.
64
Schbley, A. (2004) Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, 2, pp. 105-134.
65
Ibid, p. 120.
66
Abuza, Z. (2005) The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution, Studies in
67
Wrighte, M. (2002) The Real Mexican Terrorists: A Group Profile of the Popular evolutionary
Army (EPR), Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 25, 4, pp. 207-225.
68
Reinares, F. (2004) Who are the Terrorists? Analysing Changes in Sociological Profile Among
Members of ETA, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 6, pp. 465-488.
69
Alam, A. (2003) The Sociology and Political Economy of Islamic Terrorism in Egypt, Terrorism
and Political Violence, Vol. 15, 4, pp. 114-142.
70
Ibid, p. 139.
71
Rabbie, M. (1991) A Behavioural Interaction Model: Toward a Social-Psychological Framework for
Studying Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, 4, pp. 134-163.
72
Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (2001) The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic
Fundamentalism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, pp. 37-71.
73
Ibid, p. 68.
320
74
Ranstorp, M. (1998) Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of bin Ladens Fatwa, Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 21, 4, pp. 321-332.
75
Ibid, p. 327.
76
Piazza, J. (2006) Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social
Cleavages, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 18, 1, pp. 159-177.
77
Ibid, p. 159.
78
Drake, C. (1998) The Role of Ideology in Terrorists Target Selection, Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 10, 2, pp. 53-87.
79
Ibid, 55.
80
Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Canetti-Nisim, D. (2003) The Social and Religious Characteristics of
Suicide Bombers and their Victims, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15, 3, pp. 139-153.
81
Bunker, R. (2000) Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence,
Vol. 12, 1, pp. 37-48.
82
Ibid.
83
Gressang, D. (2001) Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential, Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 13, 3, pp. 83-106.
84
Moghadam, A. (2003) Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and
Organisational Aspects, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, 2, pp. 65-92.
85
Silke, A. (2006) The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political
86
Weimann, G. (2005) Cyberterrorism: The Sum of all Fears?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 28, 2, pp. 129-149.
87
Ibid, p. 130.
88
Valeri, L., & Knights, M (2000) Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet, and Offensive Information
Warfare, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 12, 1, pp. 15-36.
89
Ibid, p. 17.
90
Valeri, L., & Knights, M (2000) Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet, and Offensive Information
Warfare, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 12, 1, p. 30.
91
John, P. (1998) The Politics of Aviation Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, 3,
pp. 27-49.
92
Ibid, p. 29.
93
Foxell, J. (2001) Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil
Bioagricultural Terrorism) and their Impact on Food Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 24, 2, pp. 107-129.
94
Ibid, p, 107.
95
Pedahzur, A. & Ranstorp, M. (2001) A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal
Democracies: The Case of Israel, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 2, pp. 1-26.
96
Bamford, B. (2004) The United Kingdoms War Against Terrorism, Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 16, 4, pp. 737-756.
97
Bures, O. (2006) EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger, Terrorism and Political Violence,
Vol. 18, 1, pp. 57-78.
98
Benasahel, N. (2006) A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 1, pp. 35-49.
99
Dhanapala, J. (2005) The United Nations Response to 9/11, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.
17, 1-2, pp. 17-23.
100
ONeil, P. (2005) Complexity and Counter-Terrorism: Thinking About Biometrics, Studies in
101
Ibid, p. 548.
102
Veness, D. (2001) Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An International Perspective, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, pp. 407-416.
103
Ibid, p. 407.
104
Ibid, p. 408-416.
105
The Geli-Men: The Ustasha and Australia, (1972) Brisbane: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
(Queensland Branch).
106
Ibid, p. 8.
107
Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia.
108
Ibid, p. 12.
109
Shaw, L. (1973) Trial by Slander: A Background into the Independent State of Croatia and an
Account of the Anti-Croatian Campaign in Australia, Canberra: Harp Books.
321
110
Ibid, p. 109.
111
Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic.
112
Ibid, p. 61.
113
Alister, P. (1997) Bombs, Bliss, & Baba: The Spiritual Autobiography Behind the Hilton Bombing
Frame-Up, Maleny: Better World Books.
114
Anderson, T. (1985) Free Alister, Dunn, and Anderson: The Ananda Marga Conspiracy Case,
Glebe: Wild & Woolley.
115
Clifford, W. (1981) Terrorism: Australias Quiet War, The Readers Digest, October, pp. 39-43.
116
Ibid, p. 39.
117
Ibid, pp. 40-41.
118
Ibid, p. 41.
119
Ibid, pp. 41-42.
120
Ibid, p. 42.
121
Ibid, pp. 42-43.
122
Wardlaw, G. (1986) Terrorism and Public Disorder: The Australian Context, in D Chappell & P
Wilson (eds.), The Australian Criminal Justice System: The Mid 1980s, Sydney: Butterworths, pp.
150-164.
123
Ibid, pp. 150-151.
124
Ibid, pp. 152-158.
125
Ibid, pp. 158-160.
126
Ibid, pp. 160-163.
127
Ibid, pp. 163-164.
128
Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books.
129
Clifford, W. (1981) Terrorism: Australias Quiet War, The Readers Digest, October, pp. 39-43.
130
Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, pp. 1-12.
131
Wardlaw, G. (1986) Terrorism and Public Disorder: The Australian Context, in D Chappell & P
Wilson (eds.), The Australian Criminal Justice System: The Mid 1980s, Sydney: Butterworths, pp.
150-164.
132
Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, pp. 1-12.
133
Ibid, pp. 108-119.
134
Ibid, p. 144.
135
MacKenzie-Orr, M. (1991) Terror Australis, Security Management, Vol. 35, 8, pp. 87-90.
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid.
138
Taylor, T. (1992) Australian Terrorism: Traditions of Violence and the Family Court Bombings,
Australian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 8, pp. 1-24.
139
Ibid, pp. 1-7.
140
Ibid, pp. 8-13.
141
Ibid, p. 24.
142
Hocking, J. (1993) Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State, St.
Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
143
Ibid, pp. 5.
144
Ibid, p. 7-11.
145
Ibid, p. 16.
146
Ibid, pp. 35-39.
147
Ibid, pp. 41-44.
148
Ibid, pp. 44-53.
149
Ibid, pp. 65-91.
150
Ibid, pp, 99-109.
151
Ibid, pp. 126-140.
152
Ibid, pp. 142-159.
153
Ibid, p. 196.
154
155
Ibid.
156
University of NSW Press.
157
Ibid, p. 194.
158
Ibid, p. 195.
159
Ibid, pp. 197-205.
322
160
Ibid, pp. 212-225.
161
Ibid, p. 243.
162
Ibid, pp. 248-249.
163
Chulov, M. (2006) Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism from Within and Without,
Sydney: Macmillan.
164
Borgu, A. (2004) Combating Terrorism in East Asia A Framework for Regional Cooperation,
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 11, 2, pp. 48-59.
165
Ungerer, C. & Rogers, D. (2006) The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia: A Preliminary
Assessment, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2, pp. 147-163.
166
Williams, C. (2002) Australian Security Policy, Post 11 September, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 56, 1, p. 13.
167
Hocking, J. (2003) Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australias New Security
Powers of Detention, Proscription and Control, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 49,
3, pp. 355-371.
168
Michaelsen, C. (2005) Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the
Terrorist Threat?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 4, p. 321.
169
Gordon, A. (2001) Terrorism and the Scholarly Communication System, Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 116.
170
171
Ibid.
172
Merari, A. (1991) Academic Research and Government Policy on Terrorism, Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 3, 1, p. 88.
173
Ibid, p. 89.
174
Information, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, pp. 141-142.
175
Silke, A. (1996) Terrorism and the Blind Mens Elephant, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.
8, 3, p. 27.
176
Poland, J. (1988) Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall.
177
Gibbons, E., Scott, G. & Shafritz, J. (1991) Almanac of Modern Terrorism, Oxford: Facts on File.
178
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, pp.1-14.
179
Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, p. 10.
180
181
Ibid, p. 2.
182
Hoffman, B. (1992) Current Research on Terrorism and Low-Intensity Conflict, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 15, 1, p. 28.
183
184
Ibid, p. 10.
185
Jongman, A. & Schmid, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,
Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, pp. 179-180.
186
187
Gurr, T. (1988) Emperical Research on Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it Might be
Improved, in R. Slater & M. Stohl (eds.), Current Perspectives on International Terrorism, New
York: St Martins Press, pp. 116.
188
Merari, A. (1991) Academic Research and Government Policy on Terrorism, Terrorism and
189
190
Jongman, A. & Schmid, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,
Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, p. 138.
323
191
192
Ibid, pp. 9-11.
193
194
Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Phoenix.
195
Bergen, P. (2006) The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qaedas Leader, New York:
Free Press.
196
Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books.
197
Press.
198
Corbin, J. (2002) The Base: In Search of al-Qaeda The Terror Network that Shook the World,
London: Simon & Schuster.
199
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers.
200
Testas, A. (2004) Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional
Analysis, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 2, pp. 253-274.
201
Krueger, A. & Maleckova, J. (2003) Education, Poverty, and Terrorism, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 17, 4, pp. 119-144.
202
Testas, A. (2004) Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional
Analysis, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 2, pp. 254-255.
203
Ibid, pp. 269-270.
204
Gentry, C. (2004) The Relationship Between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies:
The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology, and Gender, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.
16, 2, pp. 274-293.
205
Ibid, p. 275.
206
Ibid, pp. 280-289.
207
Denny, L., Post, J., & Sprinzak, E. (2003) The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35
Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15, 1, pp. 171-184.
208
Ibid, pp. 177-183.
209
Stern, J. (2003) Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, New York: HarperCollins.
210
Lester, D., Lindsay, M. & Yang, B. (2004) Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles
Possible?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 4, pp. 283-295.
211
Ibid, p. 283.
212
Ibid, p. 292.
213
Ibid, pp. 292-293.
214
215
Ibid, p. 2.
324
CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
1
Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, pp. 7-38.
2
3
Krebs, V. (2004) Connecting the Dots: Tracking Two Identified Terrorists, Retrieved: May 1, 2004,
from http://www.orgnet.com/tnet.html.
4
Freeman, L. (nd) The Study of Social Networks, The International Network for Social Network
Analysis, Retrieved: May 5, 2005, from http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/INSNA/na_inf.html.
5
Deckro, R. & Renfro, R. (2001) A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government, paper
presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12-14 June, 2001, p. 4.
6
Ibid, p. 5.
7
Aftergood, S. (2004) Secrecy News: Social Network Analysis and Intelligence, Federation of
American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, Vol. 2004, 15, Retrieved: May 17, 2004, from
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/02/020904.html.
8
Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 7.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Almack, J. (1922) The Influence of Intelligence on the Selection of Associates, School and Society,
Vol. 16, pp. 529-530.
12
Wellman, B. (1926) The School Childs Choice of Companions, Journal of Education Research,
Vol. 14, pp. 126-132.
13
Chevaleva-Janovskaja, E. (1927) Groupements Spontanes d Enfants a l Age Prescolaire, Archives
de Psychologie, Vol. 20, pp. 219-223.
14
Bott, H. (1928) Observations of Play Activities in a Nursery School, Genetic Psychology
Monographs, Vol. 4, pp. 44-88.
15
Hubbard, R. (1929) A Method for Studying Spontaneous Group Formation, in D. Thomas, (ed.)
Some New Techniques for Studying Social Behaviour, New York: Columbia University, Child
Development Monographs, pp. 76-85.
16
Hagman, E. (1933) The Companionships of Preschool Children, University of Iowa Studies in
Child Welfare, Vol. 7, pp. 10-69.
17
Kohler, W. (1925) The Mentality of Apes, Mitcham: Penguin Books.
18
Bergson, H. (1907) LEvolution Creatrice, Paris.
19
Freud, S. (1910) Three Contributions to Sexual Theory, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,
January 1.
20
Bernheim, H. (1884) De la Suggestion dans l'tat Hypnotique et dans l'tat de Veille, Paris.
21
Comte, A. (1830) Positive Philosophy, Paris.
22
Marx, K. (1977) The Civil War in France, Moscow: Progress.
23
Galton, F. (1892) Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences, London:
Macmillan.
24
Moreno, J. (1934) Who Shall Survive?: A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations,
Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co, p. 10.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid, p. 11.
27
Ibid, pp. 12-20.
28
Ibid, pp. 23-27.
29
Ibid, pp. 58-56.
30
Moreno, J. (1937) Sociometry in Relation to Other Social Sciences, Sociometry, Vol. 1, 1/2, p. 206.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid, p. 211.
33
Lewin, K. (1951) Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers, D. Cartwright (ed.),
New York: Harper Torch Books.
34
Cartwright, D. & Harrary, F. (1956) A Generalisation of Heiders Theory, Psychological Review,
Vol. 63, pp. 277-292.
35
36
37
Cartwright, D. & Harary, F. (1956) Structural Balance: A Generalisation of Heiders Theory,
Psychological Review, Vol. 63, pp. 277-292.
325
38
39
Lunt, P. & Warner, W. (1941) The Social Life of a Modern Community, New Haven: Yale University
Press, p. 110.
40
41
Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1922) The Andaman Islanders, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42
Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1930) The Social Organisation of Australian Tribes, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
43
Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, pp. 4-5.
44
White, H. (1963) Anatomy of Kinship, Englewood Cliff: Pretence Hall.
45
Boyd, J (1969) The Algebra of Group Kinship, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 6, pp.
139-167.
46
Lorraine, F. & White, H. (1971) Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks, Journal
of Mathematical Sociology, Vol.1, 4 pp. 9-80.
47
Freeman, L. (2004) The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of
Science, Vancouver: Booksurge Publishing.
48
49
Barnes, J. (1954) Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish, Human Relations, Vol. 7,
pp. 39-58.
50
Bott, E. (1957) Family and Social Network: Roles, Norms, and External Relationships in Ordinary
Urban Families, London: Tavistock.
51
Mitchell, J. (ed.). 1969. Social Networks in Urban Situations, Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
52
Boissevain, J. (1969) Hal-Farrug: A Village in Malta, New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston.
53
Boissevain, J. & Mitchell, J. (1973) Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction, The Hague:
Mouton.
54
Sparrow, M. (1991) The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment
of the Prospects, Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 251-252.
55
Ibid, p. 253.
56
Ibid, p. 262-263.
57
Ibid, p. 263-272.
58
Baker, W. & Faulkner, R. (1993) The Social Organisation of Conspriacy: Illegal Networks in the
Heavy Electrical Equiptment Industry, American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, 6, pp. 837-860.
59
Klerks, P. (2001) The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking
or a Relevant Doctrine for Investigators? Recent Developments in the Netherlands, Connections,
Vol. 24, 3, p. 57.
60
Ibid, p. 60.
61
62
Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2001) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy, RAND Publications, p. 315.
63
Ibid, p. 323.
64
Krebs, V. (2002) Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, First Monday, Vol. 7, 4, Retrieved: May 5, 2004,
from http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/krebs/index.html.
65
Krebs, V. (2002) Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, pp. 43-52.
66
Vos Fellman, P. & Wright, R. (2001) Modelling Terrorist Networks: Complex Systems at Mid-
Range, A Dual International Conference on Ethics, Complexity, and Organisations, available at
http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Conference/FellmanWright.pdf, p. 3.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid, pp. 4-5.
69
Ibid, p. 10.
70
Ibid, p. 13.
71
Ibid, p. 14.
72
Ibid.
73
Farley, J. (2003) Breaking al-Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations
(A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making), Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 26, 6,
p. 403.
74
Ibid, p. 405-407.
326
75
Carley, K., Reminga, J. & Kamneva, N. (2003) Destabilising Terrorist Networks, NAACSOS
Conference Proceedings, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
76
Farley, J. (2003) Breaking al-Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations
(A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making), Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 26, 6,
p. 404.
77
Ibid.
78
Sageman, M (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
79
Ibid, pp. 107-120.
80
Ibid, pp.137-174.
81
Carley, K., Dombroski, M., Tsvetovat, M., Reminga, J., & Kamenva, N. (2003) Destabilising
Dynamic Covert Networks, Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research
and Technology Symposium, National Defence War College: Washington DC.
82
83
Carley, K., Diesner, J., Reminga, J., & Tsvetovat, M. (2005) Toward an Interoperable Dynamic
Network Analysis Toolkit, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
84
85
86
Ibid.
87
Bromley, D. (1986) The Case Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines, Chichester:
Wiley.
88
Yin, R. Quoted in Robson, C. (2002) Real World Research, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
89
Bromley, D. (1986) The Case Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines, Chichester:
Wiley, p. ix.
90
Yin, R. (1989) Case Study Research: Design & Method, Newbury Park: Sage, pp. 15-16.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid, pp. 21-22.
93
Ibid, p. 21.
94
95
Crothers, R., Boyle, M., Dickerson, T., & Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia Issues and
Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect
Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from:
http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html.
96
United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States
Congress, Washington, Appendix A: Aum Shinrikyo Members
97
CI-CE-CT Mission Statement (2006) Retrieved: April 17, 2006, from http://www.ci-ce-
ct.com/frameset.asp.
98
Yin, R. (1989) Case Study Research: Design & Method, Newbury Park: Sage, pp. 21-22.
99
Ibid, p. 21.
100
Ibid.
101
102
Ibid, p. 3.
103
Sparrow, M. (1991) The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An
Assessment of the Prospects, Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 262-263.
104
Boissevain (1974) Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, p. 28.
105
Ibid, p. 33.
106
Ibid.
107
108
Borgatti, S, Everett, M, & Freeman, L. (2002) Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network
Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.
109
Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 180-182.
110
Beauchamp, A. (1965) An Improved Index of Centrality, Behavioural Science, 10, pp. 161-163.
111
Sabidussi, G. (1966) The Centrality Index of a Graph, Psychometrika, 31, pp. 581-603.
327
112
Blackwell.
113
Freeman, L. (1977) A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness, Sociometry, 40, pp.
35-41.
114
Carley, K. (2002) Summary of Key Network Measures for Characterizing Organizational
Architectures, Unpublished Document: CMU 2002.
115
Cambridge University Press, pp. 187-189.
116
Militancy, RAND Publications.
117
118
Blackwell, p. 35.
119
120
Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1952) Structure and Function in Primitive Society, London: Cohen and West,
p. 11.
121
122
Beauchamp, M. (1965) An Improved Index of Centrality, Behavioural Science, 10, 161-163.
123
Blackwell, p. 40.
124
Ibid.
125
Carley, K. (2002) Summary of Key Network Measures for Characterizing Organizational
Architectures, Unpublished Document: CMU 2002.
126
127
128
Militancy, RAND Publications, p. 316.
129
Blackwell, p. 40.
130
Cambridge University Press, pp. 178-179.
131
Ibid, p. 179.
132
Ibid, p. 184.
133
Sabidussi, G. (1966) The Centrality Index of a Graph, Psychometrika, 31, pp. 581-603.
134
135
Ibid, pp. 187-189.
136
Freeman, L. (1977) A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness, Sociometry, 40, pp.
35-41.
137
Carley, K., Diesner, J., Reminga, J., & Tsvetovat, M. (2004) An Integrated Approach to the
Collection and Analysis of Network Data, North American Association for Computational Social
and Organisational Science Annual Conference, available at
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/events/conferences/2004/2004_proceedings/Carley_Diesner_Reminga.
pdf.
138
Carley, K. (2006) ORA, the Organizational Risk Analyser, Pittsburgh, PA: Centre for
Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems.
139
Carley, K., Lee, S. & Krackhardt, D. (2002) Destabilising Networks, Connections, Vol. 23, 3, pp.
79-92.
140
Ibid, p. 84.
141
Ibid.
142
Ibid.
143
Ibid, p. 80.
144
Ibid.
145
328
146
Carley, K., Schneider, M., Schofield, D., & Reminga, J. (2005) ORA: The Organisational Risk
Analyser V. 1.5.5, Carnegie Mellon University: Sun Microsystems.
147
148
Ibid, p. 5.
329
330
1
Tanner, M. (1997) Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, New Haven: Yale University Press.
2
Criminal Investigations Branch: Special Branch (1964) Brief History of Ustashi Movement till end
of War in 1945, Victoria Police: Melbourne.
3
4
5
Tanner, M. (1997) Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, Yale University Press: New Haven.
6
Lampe, J. (1996) Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge.
7
Prime Ministers Department (1967) Briefing Notes for Prime Minister, The Yugoslav Community in
Australia, Prime Minsiters Department: Canberra, 13 December.
8
Victoria Police (1964) Victorian Police Report On Croatian Movements in Australia, Victoria Police:
Melbourne.
9
Attorney Generals Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney Generals
Department: Canberra.
10
Ibid.
11
Department of Immigration (1963) Meeting at the Department of Immigration on the 25th November,
1963 Concerning Activities of Croatian Migrants, Department of Immigration: Canberra.
12
British Embassy (1964) Memorandum to Department of External Affairs, Trial of Yugoslav
Emigrants in Rijeka, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 22 April.
13
Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals
Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 407.
14
Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Attorney Generals Department, Croatian Revolutionary
Brotherhood, Commonwealth Police: Kingston, 25 January.
15
16
No Terror Training in Australia, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 1.
17
Croatian Australian Association (1960) Meeting Minutes, No. 38 Emergency Closed Meeting of the
Executive of the Croatian Austrlaian Association, Croatian Australian Association: Wollongong, 8
April.
18
Jure de Francetic Croatian Association (1959) Meeting Minutes, Committee Meeting No. 1, Jure de
Francetic Croatian Association: Warrawong, 26 January.
19
Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka, Politika, April 16, p. 7.
20
Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka, Politika, April 17, p. 8.
21
22
Ibid, p. 413.
23
Ibid, p. 412.
24
Ibid, p. 420.
25
Ibid, p. 397.
26
27
Ibid.
28
29
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Senic, J. (1966) Letter to Jure Maric, 21 July.
33
34
Attorney Generals Department (1964) Disturbances in the Yugoslav Communities, Attorney
Generals Department: Canberra, 29 July.
35
36
Ibid.
331
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Commonwealth Police (1972) Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation, Commonwealth Police
Force: Canberra.
40
Attorney-Generals Department (1967) Minute Paper, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Issue of
Search Warrants, Attorney-Generals Department: Canberra, 13 February.
41
42
43
Maric, J. & Pasti, G. (nd) Duplicate Handout, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Maintenance of
Security Fundamental Duty of Revolutionaries Principle of Secret Operation.
44
Kletva, quoted in The Geli Men: The Ustasha & Australia, Bertrand Peace Foundation, p. 3.
45
Ibid.
46
Kletva, quoted in Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic.
47
The Geli Men: The Ustasha & Australia, Bertrand Peace Foundation.
48
Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic, p. 41
49
Ibid, p. 39.
50
Ibid, p. 41
51
52
Department of External Affairs (1964) Memorandum to Prime Ministers Department, Activities of
the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 27 May.
53
54
No Terror Training in Australia, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 1.
55
56
57
Ibid.
58
Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs,
Unclassified: Terrorist Trail, Australian High Commission: London, 15 April.
59
Attorney-Generals Department (1964) Briefing Sheet, Questions for the Attorney General,
Attorney-Generals Department: Canberra, 7 August.
60
Restricted: Terrorist Trial, Australian High Commission: London, 22 April.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
64
Attorney-Generals Department (1964) Draft Statement, Yugoslav Immigrant Organisations,
Attorney-Generals Department: Canberra.
65
Prime Ministers Department (1964) Briefing Sheet, Questions for the Prime Minister, Prime
Ministers Department: Canberra, 7 August.
66
Attorney-Generals Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney-Generals
67
68
69
70
Ibid, p. 418.
71
Ibid, p. 409.
72
Ibid, p. 417.
73
Ibid, p. 417.
74
75
9 Migrants Seized on Terrorist Charge: Govt says Plot Made in Sydney, The Sydney Daily Mirror,
332
76
77
Crime Intelligence (1967) Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, New South Wales Police: Sydney,
17 March.
78
Commonwealth Police (1967) Draft of Report to Attorney-General, Croatian Brotherhood:
Documents Seized from Adolf Andric of Geelong, Commonwealth Police: Kingston, October.
79
Commonwealth Police (1966) Report to the Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood:
Seizure of Documents from Adolf Andric, 133 Victoria Street, North Geelong, Victoria,
Commonwealth Police: Kingston, 25 July.
80
Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic, p. 39.
81
82
House of Representatives (1964) Question No. 280, 27 August.
83
84
Today the River Murray, Tomorrow the Drina (1963) Spremnost, January-February.
85
86
87
88
Ibid.
89
90
Emigrants in Rijeka, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, April 22.
91
Maric, J. (1964) Address Book, Exhibit 215, Commonwealth Police.
92
93
94
95
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (1967) Communique to Departemnt of External
Affairs, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation:
Canberra, 17 November.
96
97
98
99
100
101
Ibid.
102
103
104
105
106
Ibid.
107
108
Ibid.
109
110
333
111
112
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
117
118
Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges (1963), The Sydney Morning Herald,
September 6, p. 3.
119
120
121
122
Ibid.
123
124
125
126
127
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (1964) Memorandum to Prime Ministers Department,
9728, Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation: Melbourne, August.
128
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Rijeka Circuit Court Passes Sentence on Ustashi Terrorists (1964) Politika, April 19, p. 10.
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid.
134
Senic, J. & Turk, F. (nd) Open Letter to Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood Command Post No. 4.
135
136
Rijeka Circuit Court Passes Sentence on Ustashi Terrorists (1964) Politika, April 19, p. 10.
334
1
Congress, Washington.
2
Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyos Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS, pp.
20-21.
3
.Ibid.
4
Ibid, p. 21.
5
6
Penrose, J. (2004) Aum Supreme Truth: The Cult at the End of the World, Presentation, Retrieved:
September 22, 2004.
7
8
12-34.
9
Ibid, p. 17.
10
11
12
13
Penrose, J. (2004) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] September 1.
14
30-34.
15
16
Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyos Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS, p.
31.
17
Bellamy, P. (2005) False Prophet: The Aum Cult of Terror; Aftermath, Retrieved: July 11, 2005,
from: http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/prophet/10.html?sect=22.
18
19
Ibid.
20
21
Bellamy, P. (2005) False Prophet: The Aum Cult of Terror; Aftermath, Retrieved: July 11, 2005,
from: http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/prophet/10.html?sect=22.
22
September 22, 2004.
23
Reader, I. (2000) Religious Violence in Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo, Surrey: Curzon Press.
24
September 22, 2004.
25
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
September 22, 2004.
32
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
335
35
Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia Issues and
36
Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime
Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra.
37
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo - Appendix A:
Aum Shinrikyo Members, United States Congress, Washington.
38
39
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo - Appendix A:
Aum Shinrikyo Members, United States Congress, Washington.
40
McGeough, P. (1995) Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing, The Sydney Morning
Herald, May 20, p. 1.
41
42
Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King; Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific
Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra.
51
52
53
54
Ibid.
55
Department of Minerals and Energy (1995) Statement to Australian Federal Police, Background to
Subject Mining Tenements, Australian Federal Police: Canberra.
56
57
58
59
Ibid.
60
336
61
62
Tickner, L. (1995) Member of Cult had Local Passport, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 13, p. 3.
63
64
65
66
Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King: Attachment A, Asia/Pacific Crime
67
68
69
70
71
Ibid.
72
73
74
75
76
Ibid.
77
78
79
Ibid.
80
Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King: Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific
81
82
83
Ibid.
84
85
86
337
87
88
89
90
Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch,
Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra.
91
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
95
96
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
101
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
107
Ibid..
108
109
110
111
112
Australian Federal Police (1995) Australian Federal Police Minute: Operation Sea King,
Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra.
113
114
115
Department of Minerals and Energy (1995) Statement to Australian Federal Police, Background to
Subject Mining Tenements, Australian Federal Police: Canberra.
116
117
118
119
Ibid.
338
120
121
122
123
Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyos Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS.
124
Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles: University of California Press,
pp. 102-103.
339
340
1
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (2005) Retrieved: March 14, 2005, from
http://nationalsecurity.ag.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/0/F8712E53751DBCA9CA256DD
A00824828?OpenDocument.
2
Brew, N. (2004) Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Threat to Australia, Research Note: 36 2003-04,
Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra.
3
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: Listed Entities, Retrieved: March 15, 2005,
from http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-terrorism/Entities_e.asp#30.
4
Report, Washington: Government Printing Office.
5
International Islamic Front (2001) Retrieved: March 15, 2005, from
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/IIF.htm.
6
7
8
9
10
Girigharadas, A. (2006) Indias Police Say Pakistan Helped Plot July Train Bombings, New York
Times, October 1, p. 1.12.
11
12
Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups,
Sydney: New Holland Publishers, pp. 159-160.
13
14
15
Raman, B. (2004) Paper 890: Thailand and International Islamic Front, Retrieved: March 14, 2005,
from http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper890.html.
16
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie
Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from
17
18
19
Ibid.
20
21
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Hooper, B. (2003)
Dreadlocked Terrorists Three Wives and a Butchery, The Daily Telegraph, November 11, p. 4.
22
23
Ibid.
24
25
341
26
Ibid.
27
28
29
30
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Miranda, C. (2003) Radical
Cleric Trained Brigitte, The Daily Telegraph, November 10, p. 4.
31
Ibid.
32
33
Aftergood, S. (2004) Salafist Group for Call and Combat, Retrieved: March 23, 2005, from
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/salaf.htm.
34
35
Willie Brigitte Planned Australian Attack: Informer (2003) The Sydney Morning Herald, November
22.
36
37
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004)
Connections to Four Corners of Evils Extremes Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier, The Daily
Telegraph, March 22, p. 4.
38
39
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005.
43
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) A
Serpent Planning to Strike at Sydney, The Daily Telegraph, March 24, p. 25.
44
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm
45
46
The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8
47
South Asia Terrorism Portal (2001) Lashka-e-Toiba: Army of the Pure, Retrieved: March 24, 2005,
from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.
48
49
50
51
52
Miranda, C. (2004) Bringing Brigitte to Court, The Daily Telegraph, July 19, p. 17.
342
53
54
55
Chulov, M. & Higgins, E. (2004) Chechen Bomber in Link to Brigitte Plot, The Australian,
September 6, p. 1.
56
57
58
59
Accused Had Maps, Photos (2004) Retrieved: December 14, 2004, from
http://www.news.com.au/common/printpage/0,6093,11687423,00.html.
60
Ibid.
61
Chulov, M (2004) Architect Acted as Terrorist Official, The Australian, December 15.
62
63
Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) How net around Suspects was Tightened, The Australian, April
23, p. 4.
64
Easterly, T. (2005) Sydney Man Charged with Terrorism-Related Offences, Retrieved: June 17, 2005,
from http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1093299.htm.
65
66
Harris, T. (2004) On the Line after Years in Obscurity, The Australian, March 23, p. 2.
67
Ibid.
68
1.
69
70
Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) Plot to Bomb Power Grid Sydney Man Charged with Preparing
for Terrorist Attack, The Australian, April 23, p. 1.
71
72
Ibid.
73
74
Ibid.
75
76
Ibid.
77
Harris, T. (2004) Ul-Haque saw the West as Animals, The Australian, April 30, p. 4.
78
Dowling, J. (2004) Terrorism Suspects Linked to Prayer Hall, The Age, May 30, p. 2.
79
Crawford, B. (2004) Jailing of Student A Stunt, The Australian, April 19, p. 4.
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
Ibid..
88
89
343
90
91
Koschade, S. (2005) Interview with Martin Chulov, Sydney [Telephone], June 3.
92
93
94
Goodsir, D. (2003) French Stymie Jail Access to Brigitte, The Sydney Morning Herald, November
22.
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005,
from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm.
102
23, p. 4.
103
Chulov, M. (2005) Butcher in Brigittes Circle: AFP, The Australian, August 6, p. 9.
104
Chulov, M. (2005) Butcher Helped House Terrorism Planner, The Australian, August 17, p. 6.
105
106
Ibid.
107
108
Connolly, E. (2004) Documents Link Suspect to Brigitte, The Age, June 11, p. 5.
109
110
111
Ibid.
112
113
114
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Chulov, M. (2004) Architect Acted as Terrorist Official, The Australian, December 15, p. 5.
119
120
Willie Brigitte Planned Australian Attack: Informer (2003) The Sydney Morning Herald,
November 22.
121
Man Lied to Spies, Says AFP (2005) The Herald Sun, August 17, p. 10.
122
123
124
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) Suspect
Names Seven Brigitte Dossier, The Daily Telegraph, March 25, p. 8.
344
125
126
127
Suspect Planned Australia Attack (2004), Retrieved: February 28, 2005, from
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/21/australia.terror.
128
1.
129
130
131
Chulov, M (2004) ASIO Monitored Suspects Web Use, April 24-25, p. 6.
132
133
134
Williams, E. (2004) Interview with Harry Durimel, Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from
135
136
137
138
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) Why I
Married the Terrorist Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier, The Daily Telegraph, March 23, p. 4.
139
140
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) Why I
Married the Terrorist Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier, The Daily Telegraph, March 23, p. 4.
141
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Testimony: Melanie Brown
(2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from
142
Ibid.
143
Ibid.
144
145
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Testimony: Melanie Brown
(2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from
146
Chulov, M. (2004) Hunt Closes on Terror Cell, The Australian, April 17, p. 1.
147
23, p. 4.
148
149
Chulov, M. (2004) Architect Acted as Terrorist Official, The Australian, December 15, p. 5.
150
151
152
153
La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) Suspect
Names Seven Brigitte Dossier, The Daily Telegraph, March 25, p. 8.
154
155
23, p. 4.
345
156
157
158
159
346
1
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra.
2
Ibid
3
4
Ibid.
5
International Crisis Group interview (2003) March, in Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia:
Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 5.
6
7
Group: Jakarta, p. 6.
8
Ibid.
9
Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates (2002)
International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 3.
10
11
Ibid.
12
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra.
13
14
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, p. 56
15
16
Ibid, p. 166.
17
Elegant, S. (2002) The Family Behind the Bombings, Time Asia, November 19.
18
19
Ibid, p. 18.
20
Ibid, p. 24.
21
Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, pp. 43-44.
22
23
Ibid., pp. 42-61.
24
The Bali Confessions Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm.
25
26
Ibid, p 58.
27
28
29
Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah
Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California.
30
31
32
Ibid.
33
34
35
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p 126.
36
37
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p 159.
38
Ibid., pp. 217-218.
39
Ibid., pp. 219-220.
347
40
41
Ibid, p. 41.
42
Ibid, pp. 41-42.
43
44
Ibid, p. 85.
45
Ibid, pp. 88-89.
46
47
48
49
50
51
The Bali Confessions (2003) Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 10
February.
52
53
54
Ibid.
55
56
57
58
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid, pp. 219-220.
61
62
Ibid.
63
64
65
66
67
Ibid.
68
Bali Bombings Fund Manager Sentenced to Life in Prison (2003) Antara, October 16, p. 1.
69
Witness in Amrozis Trial Tells About Solo Meeting (2003) Antara, June 4.
70
71
72
Wockner, C. (2003) Mubarok Spared Death Sentence, Daily Telegraph, October 17, 2003, p. 5.
73
74
75
Ibid.
76
Bali Bombings Planned in Solo, Witness Says (2003) Antara, June 12.
77
Witness in Amrozis Trial Tells About Solo Meeting (2003) Antara, June 4..
78
Ibid.
79
80
Life for the Bali Helper (2004) The Australian, February 10, p. 7.
81
82
83
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid, p. 276.
348
86
International Crisis Group: Jakarta, pp. 24-26.
87
Ibid, p. 24.
88
Ibid, p. 25.
89
Suriadi, K. & Wockner, C. (2003) Suicide Bombers Message of Hate: Killers Will Urges More
Bloody Attacks, Herald Sun, July 31, p. 3.
90
Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International
Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 24-25.
91
Goodsir, D. (2003) Ruthless Enforcer Pulled the Strings, The Sydney Morning Herald, September
11, 2003, p. 9.
92
Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 25.
93
94
95
Australian Federal Police (n.d.) Retrieved: March 9, 2005, from
http://www.afp.gov.au/afp/raw/Bali/SummaryBaliPOIs.pdf.
96
Miller, W. (2003) Chemical Salesman Sorry, and Forgetful, About Dealings with Amrozi, The
Sydney Morning Herald, June 10, p. 6.
97
98
Miller, W. (2003) Chemical Salesman Sorry, and Forgetful, About Dealings with Amrozi, The
Sydney Morning Herald, June 10, p. 6.
99
100
101
Ibid, p. 281.
102
Debelle, P. (2004) After the Fruits of the Good Life, an Adelaide Student Turns to Bombs, The
Age, September 11, p. 6.
103
104
105
106
107
108
Ibid, p. 33.
109
Perrin, A. (2003) Hambalis Heir Apparent, Time Asia, August 25.
110
111
United States Department of the Treasury (2003) Office of Foreign Assets Control: Recent OFAC
Actions, Retrieved: May 5, 2005, from
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20030905.html.
112
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid, p. 281.
115
Life for Bali Bomb Helper (2004) The Australian, February 10, p. 7.
116
117
Life for Bali Bomb Helper (2004) The Australian, February 10, p. 7.
118
119
120
121
122
123
349
124
125
Ibid.
126
Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2002) Amrozi Lied to Escape Firing Squad, The Sydney Morning
Herald, November 15, p. 9.
127
Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered How
the Terror Unfolded, The Age, October 4, p. 2.
128
Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2002) Amrozi Lied to Escape Firing Squad, The Sydney Morning
Herald, November 15, p. 9.
129
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 289.
130
Ibid, p. 277.
131
February.
132
133
February.
134
135
Ibid, p. 286.
136
137
138
the Terror Unfolded, The Age, October 4, p. 2, and
139
140
Ibid, pp. 285-287.
141
The Bali Bombers Song (2003) Jakarta Tempo, February 18.
142
143
144
Ibid, p. 289.
145
February.
146
Chua, E. (2003) Ex-UTM Don and Samudra Charged, The Business Times, June 3, p. 20.
147
148
149
150
Ibid, p. 293.
151
152
Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 298
153
154
Ibid.
155
Australian Federal Police (2003) 2002-2003 AFP Annual Report, Canberra: Australian Federal
Police.
350
1
2
351
352
1
2
Klerks, P. (2001) The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking
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3
Collins, L. & Reed, W. (2005) Plunging Point: Intelligence Failures, Cover-Ups, and Consequences,
Melbourne: HarperCollins.
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405

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST

CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF

TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN

Bachelor of Arts (First Class Honours)

Centre for Social Change Research

Queensland University of Technology

Thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy qualification

CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 11

CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 71

CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 121

CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO 169

CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO 197

CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 221

CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 249

CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION 295

CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO

CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO

CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS

ABC: Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or

referenced except where due reference is made.

Additionally, quotations (unless presented as a blocked quote) will use double

Finally, unless otherwise indicated, all monies referred to are represented as

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

3.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM

Following this definitional establishment, the chapter moves on to examine the

3.2 THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES

3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

3.4 DATA, ANALYSIS, & CONCLUSIONS

Following the completion of the data chapters, Chapter IX provides a comparative

The application of any methodology in an attempt to understand aspects of the

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF

As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, an overwhelming majority of the

1.1. ANCIENT TERROR & ASSASSINATION: C4 BC C1 AD

Essentially, Aristotle was promoting assassinations against tyrants. Assassination is

Assassinations justified through tyrannicide and regicidev became commonplace from

1.2. ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: CIRCA C1 C13

1.2.1 PERIOD SUMMARY

1.3.1 THE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT

Such statements provided an impetus for Anarchist terrorists and philosophers to

In 1881 the Anarchist International organisation was formed in London and

1.3.3 ANTI-OTTOMAN TERRORISM

1.3.4 IRISH TERRORISM

1.3.5 PERIOD SUMMARY

1.4.1 THE IRON GUARD

1.4.3 THE USTASHA

1.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

1.4.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM

1.4.6 PERIOD SUMMARY

1.5. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CIRCA 1960 TODAY

1.5.1 CONTINUING GROUPS

1.5.1.1 THE IRA(s)

It is important to note the response from the Protestant community in Northern

According to the United States Department of States Patterns of Global Terrorism

1.5.1.2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

1.5.2 NEW GROUPS

1.5.2.1 PALESTINIAN GROUPS

1.5.2.2 ARMENIAN GROUPS

1.5.2.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM