The Northern Tier Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact: An Assessment

AUTHOR Major Ole Martin Hojem, Norwegian Army

CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: The Northern Tier Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact: An Assessment AUTHOR: Major Ole
Martin Hojem, Norwegian Army DESCRIPTION OF TASK: Conduct an evaluation of the non-
Soviet military forces in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact. What role would they play in an
open conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and how do the forces fit into the Warsaw
Pact/Soviet command system. Discuss further whether there can be reason to question the
reliability of these forces in a European conflict. SUMMARY: The three northern tier non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations are East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Their unique
backgrounds and characteristics, not easily discerned in the glare of the their larger partner, tend
to color the nature of their membership. Their differing developmental experiences reflect
political and economic processes in the East Bloc, still incomplete, which have influenced the
development of the alliance itself.
The birth of the Warsaw Pact (WP) in 1955 formalized a series of bilateral relationships
between the Soviet Union and the nations it had liberated as World War II ended. The
admittance of rearmed West Germany to NATO that same year, however, so concerned the
Soviets that they felt compelled to strengthen their western defenses by erecting an alliance under
their own control. Since that time, the WP structure has undergone many changes, some
enhancing Soviet control. others the result of vigorous NSWP lobbying. Throughout, the Soviets
have been careful to limit their allies capacity for independent military action, for the degree of
trust is not very high.
The issue of NSWP reliability is naturally of great concern to the Soviet Union, for the WP is,
at its basic level, a collection of ethnic groups with varying degrees of fondness for each other,
and the Russians are not highly regarded. The Pacts Main Political Directorate has the primary
responsibility for ensuring that the bottom line remains favorable for the USSR.
In the context of an offensive against NATO, the East Germans were thought to be both
competent and reasonably reliable, perhaps helped by the eighteen Russian divisions stationed
there. But growing contact with West German has probably changed that. Polands Solidarity
problem is quiet, but festering, so today East Germany and Poland could be graded as equal and
the Soviet armies could very easily end up fighting their way across Poland and East Germany
enroute to Bonn and Paris. Czechoslovakia is undoubtedly, still suffering, from the 1968 Soviet
invasion.
Todays picture looks very different from that of only nine months ago, so the future picture
could also look very different. The success or failure of perestroika and glasnost will be
decisive.

OUTLINE - MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH PAPER

THESIS: As a member of an alliance, the purpose of which is not so much to defend themselves as
it is to defend the Soviet Union, the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states approach their alliance
responsibility with varying degrees of enthusiasm and confidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
II. PURPOSE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
III. COMMAND STRUCTURE
IV.EVALUATION OF THE MEMBER NATIONS
 A. East Germany
B. Poland
C. Czechoslovakia
V. RELIABILITY
A. Definition and Components
B. Political Framework
C. Reliability Enhancing Measures
VI. MEMBER STATE RELIABILITY
A. East Germany
B. Poland
C. Czechoslovakia
VII. CONCLUSION
Introduction
Since its creation nearly thirty-five years ago, the Warsaw Pact (Pact or WP) has been the
subject of exhaustive research, conducted by dedicated political scientists who have attempted to
decipher its true form and purpose as a means of predicting its future behavior. The task has not
been easy, for behind the Warsaw Pacts obscuring curtain the dimly perceived movements of the
various actors reveal an unfolding drama centering on power, rivalry, and survival. It is a play
with a constantly changing script.

Too often, it is the star of the play who receives the

researchers attention and the supporting players are
ignored. While the Warsaw Pact in its organization and
doctrine is a reflection of the wishes of the Soviet Union, the other members bring to the alliance
their own strengths and weaknesses. They are very different political, social, and economic
organisms whose uniqueness defies generalization.
This paper will examine the northern tier Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries and their relationship to the
Pact. The study will examine the Pacts purpose, history,
and structure to provide the necessary framework and will
affects pact membership. The paper will discuss possible
employment scenarios, will discuss the bottom line
question of reliability, as affected by internal and
external factors, and will conclude by offering views of the future -- what the next act may bring.

Purpose and Historical Background

The contracting parties..mindful..of the situation
created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris
Agreements, which envisage the formation of a new
military alignment in the shape of a Western Euro-
pean Union, with the participation of a remilitarized
Western Germany and its integration in the North
Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another
war and constitutes a threat to the national security
of peaceable states..have decided to conclude the
present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
 Assistance.1
The above quote from the preamble of the Warsaw Treaty
indicates that at least from the Soviet view, the WP
organization was established purely as a response to what
the Soviets viewed as aggressive behavior by the West. It
has, after all, been termed the first multinational treaty
in human history aimed entirely at strengthening peace.2
It is generally accepted, however, that the Pact was not merely a response to NATO, but a
response to the entry of a re-armed West Germany into that organization in 1955. The Federal
Republics entry was a disturbing event for the Soviets who saw that action as a potential threat to
their post-war efforts to mold the nations of Eastern Europe into a protective buffer zone along
their vulnerable western frontier. The unopposed presence of a strong, democratic, capitalist state,
already proven to be a military threat to the Soviet Union, could easily cause that buffer to erode if
left unchallenged. The Soviet Union needed to construct a network of interlocking relationships,
joining the destiny of Eastern Europe to its own.
The early development of the WP reflects some of its originators uncertainty as to the
organizations true role. The period 1955 to 1960 was characterized by apparently contradictory
trends. On one hand, a measure of force modernization did occur as MIG-17 aircraft and T-54
tanks were introduced into the East European forces, but that was not followed up by the kind of
comprehensive exercise program required to form a cohesive military alliance period. The
Soviets primary concern was to devote the greater effort to increasing the technological
sophistication of the East European forces in recognition of NATOs advantage in that area.
(illegible text).... considerably more emphasis on the development of the WP institutions.
The Pact was increasingly used as a forum for the advancement of Soviet political programs
pertaining to issues outside as well as within Pact boundaries. The organization designed for this
purpose, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) saw far more activity than during its early
period and its meetings were often the scene of political debates as various Pact members,
particularly the Rumanians, attempted to define their intra-Pact relationships.
The renewal of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance took place on
April 26, 1985, marked by the signing of the Protocol of Prolongation. Extending the Treaty
another twenty years, with an additional ten year automatic extension, was not as easy as the
Soviet leadership would have preferred it to have been. The NSWP members made it plain that
they wanted a larger role in the decision making process.
Due to the uncertainties of the Pacts historical development and future course, it is difficult to
arrive at a description which accurately portrays the nature of the organization. It is perhaps right
to say that it is:
Primarily composed of armies of communist
status whose physical locus in Eastern
Europe, whose deployment as a froce in
action has only taken place in intra-systemic
conflict, and whose development and deploy-
ment has been generally in accordance with
the desires of the major actor of the alliance,
the Soviet Union.3

COMMAND STRUCTURE
The WP has gone through the kinds of evolutionary
changes common to all organizations, responding to
membership desires and new circumstances. With few
exceptions, these changes have tended to focus on the nearly adversarial nature of the relationship
between the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies.
The PCC is the highest policy-making body and provides overall direction. Composed of the
member nations top political leadership, the PCC allows the Pact to coordinate foreign policy
planning and, for the Soviets, constitutes a platform from which to enunciate allied support and,
at times, arms control initiatives. (Appendix D)
The WPs top military body is the joint command of the WP Forces, its highest positions
occupied by Soviet general officers. The NSWP countries are represented by their deputy
ministers of national defense. The staff of the Joint Armed Forces, next in the hierarchy, is
thought to be the Pacts first permanent joint staff. As such, it adds continuity and therefore
increases the Pacts warfighting capability.
Most observers tend to agree, however, that many of the structural changes that have occurred
are as a result of actions taken by the NSWP members to enlarge their role within the alliance.
Romania has been in the forefront of the agitation and receives informal support from other
members who cannot display such vociferousness themselves. Such activities have increased in
the atmosphere of greater economic independence promised by perestroika.

The Member Nations

The NSWP countries bring to the alliance uniquely different capabilities, backgrounds, and
problem areas, all of which must be examined in light of their impact on the whole organization.
This assessment will cover the Northern Tier countries of East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia.

East Germany
Its normal now to talk with one
another, to be a German from one
side or the other of the border and
yet feel a member of the German nation.4
The eastern half of the divided German nation continues
to defy analysis and prediction, a schizoid enigma with conflicting loyalties. Its people are
justifiably proud of having the highest living standard of the East Bloc nations, yet they envy those
who live on the other side of the inner-German border. It has, until today, been a key member of
the WP and its military reflects that fact.
The Soviets wasted little time after the war in
remolding the East German military. Disarmed by the treaty
provisions and purged by Stalin, the military virtually
disappeared, to be replaced by a police force which quickly
grew to resemble a modern army. The official re-
stablishment of the East German military, now known as the
Nationale Yolksarmee (NYA), occurred in January 1956; it
was, however, a well-equipped fighting force long before that.
The NVA is considered by most observers to be at the top of the WP league,5 and on a par
with the eighteen divisions of the Western Group of Forces Germany. It is a highly trained, well-
equipped army without a nation, and because of that lack of legitimacy, the NVA has developed an
unusually close relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it may have the unique distinction of
being the only army in the world constitutionally linked to the military of another state. According
to its constitution, the German Democratic Republic is ...forever irrevocably allied with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.6 So what has happened and the speculation about the future must
be very frustrating and demoralizing for the NVA.
The NVA is a multi-service organization, consisting of ground, air, and naval components and
is supplemented by various para-military organizations. The ground force components
120,000 soldiers are divided between two corps-sized army groups, each consisting of three
divisions, two motorized and one tank (Appendix A). The Air Force (which includes air defense
units) has air defense and ground support roles. All the aircraft operated by the 37,000 man
force are Soviet made and the air defense system is tightly interwoven into that of the Soviet
Union. The Navy has a strength of 15,000 and is primarily a coastal force with the wartime
mission of protecting the Baltic Coast in conjunction with Polish and Soviet vessels. The WP
role envisioned for the NVA was as a part of the strategic first echelon in an attack into West
Germany.

POLAND
The commitment of Polish military
professionals to their WP mission, and
the corresponding design of Polish
forces to serve it, is generally
Underestimated.7
For a non-front line, NSWP state, Poland occupies a
particularly crucial role in Soviet strategic thinking. Polands eight east west rail lines will be
vital to the support of WP advances into NATO territory and there is some concern that those
lines would require protection from, rather than by, Polish forces.
Perhaps in the recognition of Polands proud yet potentially dangerous military tradition, the
Soviet Union quickly and firmly put its stamp on the Polish military establishment it was
rebuilding after World War II. Some Polish forces had been fighting under Russian leadership
since 1943 and the Polish first army provided the foundation for what was to become the Polish
Peoples Army. The obligatory period of post-war Stalinization brought with it the imposition of
the commissar system which, at its height, saw the appointment of a Soviet General as Polands
minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces.
The workers riots in 1956 marked the beginning of the
re-professionalization of the Army following their refusal
to fire on their fellow citizehs. This was an act which
clearly signified to the civilian authorities that the
military could no longer be expected to serve as an
instrument of domestic repression. The opportunity again
presented itself in 1970 during the riots in Gdansk, and
again the military leaders resisted successfully. The
militarys desire for political non-involvement was
emphasized in General Jaruzilskis statement during the 1976
Warsaw riots that Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish
workers.8
The Polish Army was designed for a massive, rapid
offensive into NATO territory.9 Its ground forces, at
230,000 are by far the largest amount in the NSWP countries
(Appendix B). The Polish Navy, the largest of the NSWP
states, has been designed to provide a limited coastal
defense force. Its mission would be to support WP
operations in the Baltic by performing mine-sweeping and escort duties. The Navys 1,000 man
Marine force gives it a minor amphibious capability. The Polish Air Force, with 92,000
personnel, is also the largest of the NSWP elements. Its air defense assets, like those of its
allies, are incorporated into the Soviet system, which would provide command and control
functions dur,ing wartime.
The manner in which these forces could be employed against NATO is largely determined
by geographical considerations. Due to Polands distance from the likely battle area, it is
improbable that Polish forces would be used in a first echelon role. Whatever scenario is
envisioned, one could easily imagine a requirement to employ some portion of the Polish forces in
the role of rear area security. There is a credible partisan threat against Soviet lines of
communication and their situation will be worsened by an effective application of NATO
Follow-on Forces attack doctrine.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is Czechoslovakias misfortune to be stretched across central Europe, anchored to the
Soviet Union on one end and to West Germany on the other. As a land bridge between the two
opposing alliances, and as a member of one, Czechoslovakia has found itself under a wary Soviet
gaze for much of its brief national history. The events of 1968 continue to reverberate through
the national structure and the pressure of glasnost and perestroika are adding unneeded aftershocks
to a system already strained from twenty years of anti-reformist failure. The military was
particularly hard hit by the assistance rendered by the WP in 1968. The militarys near
disintegration, considered the most important development in post war Czechoslovakias military
(missing text (page 12)) beginning of the end of Alexander Dubceks experiment in socialism
with a human face. The memorandum proposed three possible choices for the countrys
national security:
Continued membership in the WP, to be re-examined after ten or fifteen years; collective security
without the USSR; or neutrality, secured by self defense. The principal thrust of the
memorandum was to guarantee Soviet interests in central Europe without the presence of Soviet
forces as in the case of Finland, but the message was too heretical and served only to confirm the
worst Soviet suspicions about the Dubcek regimes willingness to discuss alternatives to the
existing system. The invasion followed in August and the Gottwald Academy was dissolved in
1969.
The military establishment now found in Czechoslovakia, as modified by Dubceks successor
Gustav Husak, has not regained its former size, cohesion, or quality. Recent equipment
improvements have helped bring some areas back to normal NSWP levels, however. Numbering
145,000 the CPAs ground component is second in size only to Poland (Appendix C). The Air
Force is also among the largest in the Pact, reflecting the important role its air defense assets
must play in the Soviet system.
Training and personnel quality are potential problem areas. As is the case with their other
NSWP comrades, the CPA forces receive training closely patterned after the Soviets which
translates into a fair amount of realism and a heavy dose of political indoctrination.
The events of 1968 caused, not surprisingly, a reevaluation of the role the CPA would play
in a WP/NATO conflict. Pre-1968 strategy had apparently called for the CPA to provide two,
first echelon armies for a Czech front, supported by second echelon forces formed by remaining
Czech divisions and units from the USSRs Carpathian Military District. Now, however, the
most likely use would be against US and West German forces in Bavaria in an effort to prevent
their northward move to slow the main attack. One writer has put it more bluntly, saying that the
CPA would be used not as a component of the first echelon, but simply as cannon fodder in
tackling, American and West German formations.12 Some support for this view can be inferred
from the rather low levels of equipment which could be needed by a firstechelon attacker.
Artillery holdings are sixty percent of Soviet doctrinal norms.

RELIABILITY
...Polands volatile sociopolitical
conditions and economic malaise, East
Germanys anti-war sentiment and German
identity, Romanias non-participation in
joint maneuvers, the genuine lack of
military preparedness in Hungary and
Bulgaria, and an overarching
anti-Russian sentiment common to most
of Eastern Europe.13
The life of a Soviet strategic planner is not an easy
one and the above list of problems forms a major part of the reason why. The issue of reliability
represents the bottom line of any alliance system. If the day comes when the alliance is to be
tested in combat, will it hold together? Can its members all be counted on to perform their
assigned tasks so that there individual efforts will cause the alliances effort to be successful?
These are the kinds of questions the answers to which can only be guessed at, for it is hoped that
the true answer will never be known. Nonetheless, it is important to know as accurately as
possible what tide answers might be.
Warsaw Pact forces can potentially be employed in four different modes: internal offensive,
internal defensive, external defensive, and external offensive. The focus of this study will be only
on the last, as that is the one which most concerns NATO.

Definition and Components

There are several aspects of NSWP reliability which must be examined before proceeding
further. First, it is necessary to define the concept itself and its components. Second, the political
framework affecting the increase or decrease in reliability must be examined. Third, some of the
measures taken to ensure reliability require a closer look.
Analysts generally agree that the question of
reliability covers two main areas: The reliability of the
regime itself and the reliability of the military forces
under the control of that government. Regime reliability is
a function of the political, economic, and social
environment in which it operates- In this case, that refers
not only to domestic considerations, but also to the
relationships within the Pact, with the Soviet Union, and
with the West. Regarding the military forces, reliability
pertains to the conviction by the political leadership that
the armed forces will carry out the instructions given to
pertains to the conviction by the political leadership that
the armed forces will carry out the instructions given to
them as affected by the willingness of significant segments
of those forces to carry out those orders.
One way of viewing reliability is to look at people
rather than governments, believing that ethnic roots are far
deeper than those put down by political systems. If
traditional enemies were considered the relationship would be as follows:
Nation Traditional
Enemies
East Germany Poles, Russians, Hungarians
Poland Germans, Russians, Czechs
Czechoslovakia Germans, Russians, Poles,
Hungarians
Hungary Rumanians, Russians, Czechs
Romania Hungarians, Russians,
Bulgarians
Bulgaria Yugoslavians, Greeks, Turks,
Rumanians14
The traditional enmity felt by one WP ally towards another is particularly troubling to the
Soviets, who made nearly everyones hit list, and who must overcome this problem in all Pact
activities. Of course a similar chart could be drawn up for NATO but it would be far shorter.
(missing text (page 18)) the East European countries involved would have to identify their own
national interests closely with the Soviet Union.
Ironically, the new policies success could also bring trouble to the alliance. Increased
standards of living would result in less willingness to risk the status quo through rash military
action; similarly, increased exposure to the West should reduce the desire to take such action.

Reliability Enhancing Measures

The WP has developed several measures designed to combat threats to alliance cohesion. A
lack of political legitimacy has required the imposition of an artificial structure to support
adherence to Pact policy and doctrine.
Because the development of an independent military
capability among the NSWP states would threaten Pact
reliability, Pact doctrine has been formulated in such a way
as to decrease the likelihood of such a development. The
NSWP forces lack many of the elements necessary for
independent operations such as complete air defense systems
and adequate logistic capabilities. Further, the exclusive
use of Soviet weapons, whether produced in the USSR or a
NSWP country, ensures the continued reliance on the Soviet
Union for many end items and spare parts. Tactical or
operational doctrine is taught at the higher levels only in
the Soviet Union, ensuring educational dependency and the
development of a Soviet-dominated officer corp. Such an
agreement also effectively limits the opportunity to develop
a heretical territorial defense doctrine similar to
Rumanias.
The Warsaw Pacts exercise program provides an
effective means for reinforcing reliability. In addition to the normal training benefits derived from
exercising, WP joint maneuvers require NSWP troop leaders to become accustomed to
working for Soviet commanders while testing plans developed largely by Soviet staffs.
Member State Reliability
There might well be just too many problems
within the Soviet military for an invasion
of Western Europe to succeed. By the fourth
day Pact troops might begin to desert and
sabotage the Soviet invasion. Near the end
of the first week, a few NATO units could
and up pushing through Eastern Europe and
into parts of the Soviet Union.16
It is difficult to say, however, how the NSWP members
may respond when NATO forces begin to bomb airfields, bridges, troop concentrations, supply
areas, communication centers, and industrial areas in their home territories. The effect may be
heightened by fornal and informal contacts by NATO offering reduced damage in exchange for
pledges of neutrality. Current Soviet doctrine emphasizing the need for a quick, far reaching
strike into NATO territory indicates a desire to avoid giving its allies time to reconsider.

East Germany
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is thought to be one of the most reliable NSWP
members, although a good deal of credit for that has to go to the eighteen full strength divisions of
the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), on its soil, almost twice as many Soviet units as the
rest of Eastern Europe combined. Integration of the East German Army into the GSFG is
illustrated by the oath taken by NVA soldiers, who pledge to always be ready, side-by-side with
the Soviet Army and the armies of their socialist allies to protect socialism against all enemies.
The German question has always troubled the Soviet planners who realize that a WP attack
would not pit the NVA against a traditional enemy, but against friends and relatives. Currently
the consensus is that the East German military is essentially incapable of any action. Morale is
low and discipline is gone. Soldiers have quit and emigrated to West Germany. Recently,
one battalion refused to take part in a training exercise with Soviet troops.
The future of the NVA is uncertain. Since reunification with West Germany is now
certain, the role and structure of the military will undergo radical changes. Integration of the
armed forces will not be easy given the differences in equipment and training.
The victory of the conservative faction in the election of 18 March 1990 will likely
result in the acceleration of reunification. What the election will mean for the structure of the
military in the interim remains to be seen. However, small groups known as block parties have
been formed to discuss the possibilities of change in the GDR. These groups have a high
percentage of party membership and East German opposition remains more repressed than similar
movements in the WP.

Poland
Too much has happened to allow Poland to be considered a reliable participant in a WP
offensive action. As the threat from West Germany recedes, identification with Soviet goals has
declined significantly. This is particularly true in the case of the Polish military who, as
their professionalism increases, have less desire to be associated with the Soviet military. Instead
of standing guard for peace in fraternal alliance with the Soviet army, the soldiers prefer to
stand guard for the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation, its security, and peace.
Polish authorities have told Moscow that Poland will not participate in upgrading WP forces,
but their efforts to negotiate cutbacks of Soviet troops have met with no success.

Chechoslovakia
In 1968, the Soviet invasion struck a severe blow to Chechoslovakiaa military leaving the
Czech armys reliability doubtful at best. In an effort to repair some of the damage, Soviet
political officers worked with their Czech counterparts in trying to prevent a deformation of the
concept of the probable enemy but the identity of the probable enemy is still not clear. Soviet
troops have been stationed in Czechoslovakia since the 68 crackdown, but will be withdrawn by
June of 1991 at the request of the Czech government. In addition, the CPA is in the process of
restructuring its forces due, in part, to a commitment to reduce troop and equipment strength by
1991.
Many weapon systems, including tanks and ground combat vehicles have been removed from
active status either by being placed in storage or retired.
It is probable that troops will remain deployed along the western border although the number
will be lessened to create a zone of confidence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Conclusion
During the East-West seminar on military doctrine held in Vienna in January 1990, Geheral N.
Chervov, the chief arms control expert on the Soviet General Staff, stated that there will be a major
restructuring of the Eastern Blocs military command apparatus. Though he refused to go into
details, his statements suggest that in the future the WP would probably be governed by heads of
state or governments.
General Colin Powell, Chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, responded that he believed the Warsaw Pact alliance
is shifting in its character to a more political
institution, but based upon discussions with each of the
WPs military chiefs, they seem to making, in some cases,
unilateral judgements with respect to their production
activities, and their force structure, but they continue to
say that they are part of an alliance.
There is, indeed, a transformation taking place in the
Warsaw Pact. I believe the threat of deliberate aggression
directed against Europe and its extension to global conflict
is much reduced. Nevertheless, Soviet capabilities are
still formidable and the situation we face is very
unpredictable. The teeth are still there; whether the jaws are tired and can still chew is another
thing.
Given the recent sequence of events in Eastern Europe, the Soviets must factor politital changes
there into future military planning equations. I believe these changes in Eastern Europe reduce
the Soviet Unions confidence and capacity to wage coalition warfare. If Moscow judges its
allied forces to be unreliable, they would likely be forced now to adopt a defensive posture in the
event of a crisis that could lead to war. In light of these developments, I believe that the Soviets
would consider large scale theater operations against NATO with only their own forces as highly
risky, if not impractical. Whatever the Soviets needed a year ago to pull off a short warning
attack, they would need twice as much time now.
 The NSWP nations are very different collections of political, social, and economic
circumstances. Still, in the process of defining their national identities, they must work within the
constraints associated with membership in the Soviet-led alliance.
As members of an alliance, the purpose of which is not so much to defend themselves as it is to
defend the Soviet Union, the NSWP states approach their alliance responsibilities with
varying degrees of enthusiasm and competence, particularly as new governments in Berlin,
Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Sofia look away from Moscow and to the West for political
support and economic salvation. Some have reconciled themselves to their role adhering to a
script they had no part in writing; others have not, choosing instead to seek out roles in which
they can improvise. The result is a military alliance of dubious value about which it can be said
that, even after more than thirty years of Moscow supplied training and indoctrination, the East
European military is neither completely loyal to the USSR nor efficient.
The success or failure of the current Soviet political and economic initiatives, to the extent that
they are truly substantive, will be decisive for the success or failure of the Warsaw Pact and for
the fortunes of the NSWP nations. Pact reliability will be improved only if domestic
conditions are also made better and the Soviet Union is able to retain its leading role within an
atmosphere of cooperation.
The final curtain has not come down so the reviews must wait. There is always the chance that
the play might close before the run is over.

ENDNOTES
1. The Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Brussels: NATO Information Service. Undated. pp.
10 - 11.
2. Lyntov, Ivan. The Alliance For Peace. Soviet Military Review. No.5, (May 1987). p. 47.
3. Volgyes, Ivan. The Warsaw Pact: A Study of Vulnerabilities, Tension, and Reliability. In the
Future of European Alliance Systems. Edited by Arlene Broadhurst. (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1982). p. 152.
4. Painton, Frederick. The German Question. Time. (Sept.
1987). p. 9.
5. The East German ArmyAn Integral Part of the Conventional Threat to NATO. International
Defense Review. (4/1987). p. 401.
6. Baxter, William P. National Security. In East Germany: A Country Study. p. 219. Edited by
Eugene K. Keefe. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982
7. Johnson, A. Ross; Dean, Robert W.; and Alexier, Alexander R.
The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. Survival. (Jul-Aug 1981). p. 54.
8. Ehrenreich, Frederick. National Security. In Poland: A Country Study. p. 303. Edited by
Harold D. Nelson. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1983.
9. Johnson, A. Ross; Dean, Robert W.; and Alexier, Alexander R.
The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. Survival. (Jul-Aug 1981). p. 57.
10. Ibid, p. 56.
11. Whetten, Lawrence L. The Warsaw Pact As An Instrument for
Inducting Political and Military Integration and
Interdependence. In the Future of European Alliance Systems,
Edited by Arlene Broadhurst. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980). p. 254.
12. (illegible text)
13. Nelson Daniel N. Moscows Uncertain Allies. Armed Froces Journal International. (Feb
1987). p. 38.
14. Hersping, Dale R. and Volgyes, Ivan. How Reliable Are Eastern European Armies?
Survival. (Sep-Oct 1980). p. 211.
15. Kraus, Michael. Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe.
Current History. Vol. 86, No. 523 (November 1987). p. 391.
16. Scherer, John L. Soviet Military Deficiencies: An Update.
Soviet Armed Forces Review Edited by David R. Jones, (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic
International Press, 1985) p. 397.

Click here to view image

The Soviet Union stations 18 full-strength ground divisions in East germany although this
number is scheduled to be reduced by 1991.
Unilateral East German defense cuts were announced in late January 1989, following the Soviet
Unions similar annoucement in December 1988.
East Germany has a modern Air Force consisting of updated Soviet equipment. In August 1988
East Germany became the first WP nation outside of the Soviet Union to receive the MIG-29
Fulcrum fighter.
East Germany has indicated that some of the announced troop cuts may involve the Navy,
however, no reduction schedule has been confirmed.

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Poland is host to the Soviet Ncrthern Group of Forces. Both Polish and Soviet troops and
equipment in Poland are scheduled to undergo major reductions over the next few years. In early
1989, Poland introduced a plan for reorganization of its armed forces. The army is in the midst
of the reorganization, which will restructure all three military districts and the Naval Brigade.
In October 1989 Poland became the second NSWP member to recieve the modern MIG-29
Fulcrum fighter.
The Polish Navy provides a potent amphibious assault capability in the Baltic region as well
as a significant anti-ship missle attack force.

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Soviet troops will be withdrawn by 30 June 1991.
As part of a plan to cut defense spending 15% by 1992, Czechoslovakia plans to retire aircraft
and reduce the number of MIG-29s ...(illegible text)

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The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) has been the highest organ of the Warsaw Pact, and
consists of the Party First or General Secretary or Head of State of the member nations. It was
supplemented by two subcommitteesthe Council of Foreign Ministers and the Council of
Defense Ministers. The PCC has set general policy and guidance to the subcommittees, which
formulated policy between sessions of the PCC.
In January 1990 the Warsaw Pact disclosed that it was abandoning the PCC and replacing it
with a new group that would not require membership in Communist Party. The final from the
committee will take has not yet been finalized. (Notes: Military Council is the operational
command of the field forces during exercises and in wartime).

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