HeirsofAlbertoSuguitanvs.

CityofMandaluyong
Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners pray for the
1

reversaloftheOrderdatedJuly28,1998
1
AlbertoSuguitanpassedawayonOctober2,1998.OnNovember25,1998theCourtallowedtheheirs
ofAlbertoSuguitantosubstitutethelatteraspetitioner.

ItisundisputedbythepartiesthatonOctober13,1994,theSangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S
1994 authorizing then Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation
3

proceedingsoverthepropertyofAlbertoSuguitanlocatedatBoniAvenueandSto.

RosariostreetsinMandaluyongCitywithanareaof414squaremetersandmore
particularlydescribedunderTransferCertificateofTitleNo.56264oftheRegistry
ofDeedsofMetroManilaDistrictII.Theintendedpurposeoftheexpropriationwas
theexpansionoftheMandaluyongMedicalCenter.
MayorBenjaminAbaloswroteAlbertoSuguitanaletterdatedJanuary20,1995
offeringtobuyhisproperty,butSuguitanrefusedtosell. Consequently,onMarch
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13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the
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RegionalTrialCourtofPasig.ThecasewasdocketedasSCANo.875.
Suguitanfiledamotiontodismiss thecomplaintbasedonthefollowing
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grounds(1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in

accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant
expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to
expropriatethesaidpropertywithoutpaymentofjustcompensation;(4)
theCityofMandaluyonghasnobudgetandappropriationforthepayment
of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitans
propertyisbutaployofMayorBenjaminAbalostoacquirethesamefor
his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the
motion.OnOctober24,1995,thetrialcourtdeniedSuguitansmotionto
dismiss. 7

OnNovember14,1995,actinguponamotionfiledbytherespondent,thetrial
court issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate
possessionofSuguitans

Issue:
WON (1)thepowerofeminentdomainisnotbeingexercisedinaccordance
withlaw;(2)thereisnopublicnecessitytowarrantexpropriationof
subjectproperty;(3)theCityofMandaluyongseekstoexpropriatethesaid
propertywithoutpaymentofjustcompensation;(4)theCityof
Mandaluyonghasnobudgetandappropriationforthepaymentofthe
propertybeingexpropriated;and(5)expropriationofSuguitansproperty
isbutaployofMayorBenjaminAbalostoacquirethesameforhis
personaluse.

Held:
Inthepresentcase,theCityofMandaluyongseekstoexercisethepowerofeminent
domainoverpetitionerspropertybymeansofaresolution,incontraventionofthe
firstrequisite.Thelawinthiscaseisclearandfreefromambiguity.Section19of
theCoderequiresanordinance,notaresolution,fortheexerciseofthepowerof
eminent domain. We reiterate our ruling inMunicipality of Paraaque v. V.M.
Realty Corporation regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a
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resolution.Inthat1998caseweheldthat:
Wearenotconvincedbypetitionersinsistencethatthetermsresolutionandordinance
aresynonymous.Amunicipalordinanceisdifferentfromaresolution.Anordinanceisa
law,butaresolutionismerelyadeclarationofthesentimentoropinionofalawmaking
bodyonaspecificmatter.Anordinancepossessesageneralandpermanentcharacter,buta
resolutionistemporaryinnature.Additionally,thetwoareenacteddifferentlyathird
readingisnecessaryforanordinance,butnotforaresolution,unlessdecidedotherwiseby
amajorityofalltheSanggunianmembers.
We cannot uphold respondents contention that an ordinance is needed only to
appropriatefundsafterthecourthasdeterminedtheamountofjustcompensation.
Anexaminationoftheapplicablelawwillshowthatanordinanceisnecessaryto
authorizethefilingofacomplaintwiththepropercourtsince,beginningatthis
point,thepowerofeminentdomainisalreadybeingexercised.
Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation
proceedingsarecomprisedoftwostages:

1. (1)the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the

plaintifftoexercisethepowerofeminentdomainandtheproprietyofits
exerciseinthecontextofthefactsinvolvedinthesuit;itendswithanorder,
if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiffhasalawfulrighttotakethepropertysoughttobecondemned,for
thepublicuseorpurposedescribedinthecomplaint,uponthepaymentof
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint;

2. (2)thesecondphaseisconcernedwiththedeterminationbythecourtofthe
justcompensationforthepropertysoughttobetaken;thisisdonebythe
courtwiththeassistanceofnotmorethanthree(3)commissioners. 27
Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the
defendantisindispensabletothetransferofownershipinfavoroftheplaintiff,itis
but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at
withoutaninitialfindingbythecourtthattheplaintiffhasalawfulrighttotake
thepropertysoughttobeexpropriated,forthepublicuseorpurposedescribedin
thecomplaint.Anorderofcondemnationordismissalatthisstagewouldbefinal,
resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally
exerciseditspowerofeminentdomain.

Also,itisnotedthatassoonasthecomplaintisfiledtheplaintiffshallalreadyhave
therighttoenteruponthepossessionoftherealpropertyinvolvedupondepositing
withthecourtatleastfifteenpercent(15%)ofthefairmarketvalueoftheproperty
basedonthecurrenttaxdeclarationofthepropertytobeexpropriated. Therefore, 28

anordinancepromulgatedbythelocallegislativebodyauthorizingitslocalchief
executivetoexercisethepowerofeminentdomainisnecessarypriortothefilingby
thelatterofthecomplaintwiththepropercourt,andnotonlyafterthecourthas
determinedtheamountofjustcompensationtowhichthedefendantisentitled.
NeitherisrespondentspositionimprovedbyitsrelianceuponArticle36(a),Rule
VIoftheIRRwhichprovidesthat:
IftheLGUfailstoacquireaprivatepropertyforpublicuse,purpose,orwelfarethrough
purchase, LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian
authorizingitschiefexecutivetoinitiateexpropriationproceedings.
TheCourthasalreadydiscussedthisinconsistencybetweentheCodeandtheIRR,
which is more apparent than real, inMunicipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty
Corporation, whichwequotehereunder:
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PetitionerreliesonArticle36,RuleVIoftheImplementingRules,whichrequiresonlya
resolutiontoauthorizeanLGUtoexerciseeminentdomain.Thisisclearlymisplaced,
becauseSection19ofRA7160,thelawitself,surelyprevailsoversaidrulewhichmerely
seekstoimplementit.Itisaxiomaticthattheclearletterofthelawiscontrollingand
cannotbeamendedbyamereadministrativeruleissuedforitsimplementation.Besides,
whatthediscrepancyseemstoindicateisamereoversightinthewordingofthe
implementingrules,sinceArticle32,RuleVIthereof,alsorequiresthat,inexercisingthe
powerofeminentdomain,thechiefexecutiveoftheLGUmustactpursuanttoan
ordinance.
Therefore,whileweremainconsciousoftheconstitutionalpolicyofpromotinglocal
autonomy,wecannotgrantjudicialsanctiontoalocalgovernmentunitsexerciseof
itsdelegatedpowerofeminentdomainincontraventionoftheverylawgivingit
suchpower.
Itshouldbenoted,however,thatourrulinginthiscasewillnotprecludetheCityof
Mandaluyongfromenactingthenecessaryordinanceandthereafterreinstituting
expropriationproceedings,forsolongasithascompliedwithallotherlegal
requirements.