FACTS:

There are 3 causes of action filed in this case. One of which is the obstruction of the
dikes constructed by the defendants in 1937. Such dikes obstructed the natural flow
of excess water from the plaintiffs higher tenement. It was alleged that from time
immemorial before the partition of the Hacienda Esperanza, the water coming from
the portion of the estate assigned to plaintiffs had been flowing regularly and without
artificial obstruction towards the other areas of that same hacienda subsequently
assigned to the defendants, as a result of the partition in 1929.The CFI granted the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:

May the dikes be demolished?

RULING:

The SC affirmed the Order appealed from. Considering that the action was filed in
1951, the legal easement sought to be enforced had been extinguished by non-user
and the action is therefore barred by prescription.

Philipine Reports Citation: 101 Phil. 1196-1197 (Unreported Case)

Ponente: Justice J.B.L Reyes

CARIDAD ONGSIACO, ET. AL., plaintiffs appellants

vs.
EMILIA ONGSIACO, ET. AL., defendants appellees

GR. No. 7510, 30 March 1957

Appeal from an order of the Court of the First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case
No. 755), granting the motion to dismiss the complaint of Caridad Ongsiaco and her
husband against her sister Emilia and the latters husband. The complaint alleged
three (3) causes of action. In the motion to dismiss, it was alleged that all the causes
of action had become barred by extinctive prescription.
 1. First Cause of Action: Alleged Revocation of the Donation. The cause of
action for the revocation of the donation made by the donor, Gorgonia Vda. de
Ongsiaco, accrued from the time the donee, Emilia Ongsiaco, failed to pay the
yearly pension of PhP1,000 to the donor, and that was on 30 September 1930.
Hence, the action to revoke, being based on a written contract, prescribed ten
years thereafter, i.e., on 30 September 1940, under sec. 43 of Act 190, long
before the present case was instituted.

2. Second Cause of Action: Construction of the Dikes Interfering with

Appellants Easement of Drainage. The basis of this cause of action can only
be the legal servitude of drainage of rural estate regulated by Art. 552 of 1889
Civil Code (The Old Civil Code). Since the enjoyment of this servitude does
not depend upon acts of man because descent of rain water from the higher to
the lower estates is due to the force of gravity, this easement must be classed
among the continuous ones (Article 532, Old Civil Code; Article 615, New
Civil Code), and it is subject to extinction by non-user for the period required
by law (Article 546, Old Civil Code; Article 631, New Civil Code). The
original 20-year period of extinctive prescription by non-user under Article
546 of the Old Civil Code was reduced by sec. 41 of Act 190 to ten years from
their violation, servitudes being clearly interest in land (Soriano vs.
Sternberg, 41 Phil. 211-212). Since according to plaintiffs own evidence, the
dikes obstructing the overflow from their land were built in 1937 or 1938, and
the present action for their destruction was filed in 1951, the lower court
committed no error in holding that the easement sought to be enforced had
already been extinguished, and the plaintiffs action is barred by prescription.

3. Third Cause of Action: Fraudulent Reduction of Appellants Share and Its

Usurpation by the Defendants. It is alleged that through illegal manipulations
of defendant Alzate, husband of Emilia Ongsiaco, the share of the plaintiff
Caridad Ongsiaco was made to include public properties, thereby reducing its
area, while proportionately increasing that of the defendants. When the present
case was instituted in 1951, more than 20 years had run since the partition.
Hence, this cause of action is barred by prescription.

The order of Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija is AFFIRMED.

Enrique Ma. Barretto vs. City of Manila (G.R. No.

3148, February 6, 1907, 7 Phil 416)
FACTS:
Enrique Ma. Barretto donates his lot in front of Malacanang Palace to the City of Manila, on
the condition that "no structures shall be erected upon the land and that it will not be devoted
to any purpose other than the beautifying of the vicinity, and for this purpose the city should
acquire such of the adjoining land as may be necessary to form with mine a public square
with gardens and walks." The Ayuntamiento and the Corregimiento of the City declared its
acceptance over Barretto's offer, both requesting for its documents and necessary deeds of
conveyance. Barretto thereafter sent to the Ayuntamiento the necessary documents, and until
the month of February, 1903, appears to have had the idea that a formal transfer of the plot
had been executed by him; in fact, it had not been.

However, the city entered into possession of the land, building a railing separating it from the
adjoining property, and ever since that time the ground has been used as part of the public
street, increasing the width thereof opposite the exit from the Palace and substantially
improving the appearance of the locality. Barretto brought the action to recover possession of
the land on account of the failure of the city to comply with the conditions of the donation.

HELD:
Although a formal conveyance of the property appears to have never been made, yet the
taking possession of the land by the city upon the terms contained in the offer and
acceptance give effect to the latter.

The whole negotiation must be taken into consideration in order to determine what was in the
minds of the parties at the time. The plaintiff's proposition was unmistakable. If the city
designed to reject any part of it while accepting the rest, such rejection should have been in
express terms. Not only do we fail to find any such rejection, but in the letter of June 19 there
appears to be in its concluding words an express recognition of the terms imposed, when it is
provided that the deed of cession shall be drawn "with the restrictions indicated by you." This
is a reference to the restrictions in the letter of the plaintiff and operates of necessity as an
acceptance of them.