Week 6 -Land Tenure Improvement
As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely
LAND TENURE IMPROVEMENT the improvement of the
tenurial and socio-economic status of the farmers short of transferring
full ownership of the land.
SECTION 12. Determination of Lease Rentals. In order to protect
and improve the tenurial and economic status of the farmers in tenanted
lands under the retention limit and lands not yet acquired under this
Act, the DAR is mandated to determine and fix immediately the lease
rentals thereof in accordance with Section 34 of Republic Act No.
3844, as amended: Provided, That the DAR shall immediately and
periodically review and adjust the rental structure for different crops,
including rice and corn, or different regions in order to improve
progressively the conditions of the farmer, tenant or lessee.
What constitutes a leasehold relationship?
Caballes vs. DAR, GR No. 78214, December 5, 1988 (168 SCRA
247)
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security
of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. 10
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to
accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait
of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor
received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer
a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500,
square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an
industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the
primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this
case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker
who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to
live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its
southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion. cdphil
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the
arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant
of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA
of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private
respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Gelos vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA 608, 1992)
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important.
The petitioner's payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the
National Irrigation Administration on the said landholding is explained
by the fact that during the pendency of the CAR case, the Agrarian
Reform Office fixed a provisional leasehold rental after a preliminary
finding that Gelos was the tenant of the private respondent. As such, it
was he who had to pay the irrigation fees.
Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that the Secretary's
determination of the tenancy relationship is only preliminary and
cannot be conclusive on the lower court.
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a
person who himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee
relationship are: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2)
the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to
control the employee's conduct although the latter is the most
important element.
According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy
relationship is distinguished from farm employer-farm worker
relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the
lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his
services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy
relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the
lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm
employer and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of
whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant
derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.
The other issue raised by the petitioner, which is decidedly legal, is
easily resolved. There being no tenancy relationship, the contention
that the private respondent's complaint has prescribed under Section
38 of R.A. 3844 must also fail. That section is not applicable. It must
be noted that at the very outset, Alzona rejected the petitioner's claim
of agricultural tenancy and immediately instituted his action for
unlawful detainer in accordance with Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. As it happened, the said case was held not proper for trial by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. He then resorted to other remedies
just so he could recover possession of his land and, finally, in 1979, he
yielded to the jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations
by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The action,
which was commenced in 1979, was within the ten-year prescriptive
period provided under Article 1144 of the Civil Code for actions based
on a written contract.
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan (58 SCRA 590, 1974)
The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land;
that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to
attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the
1
civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased.
As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by
special laws. 3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act
may exist, the following requisites must concur:
1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together
with members of his immediate farm household;
3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household;
4. That the land belongs to another; and
5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both. 4
Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?
There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a
fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46 (c) of said Act
provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds,
saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already
ruled that "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural
land." 5 The mere fact, however, that a person works an agricultural
land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the
purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil
law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in
question has an area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares
of fishpond. The question of whether such a big parcel of land is
susceptible of being worked by the appellant's family or not has not
been raised, and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass
to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself personally or
with the aid of his immediate family worked the land.
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to
work the land. This Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under
the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant
to the person who furnishes the land and to the person who actually
works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his
immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires
for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate
farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists
when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to
cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his immediate farm household,
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the
aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land.
Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be
considered tenants; 8 and he who hires others whom he pays for doing
the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having
abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of
Republic Act No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
privileges of one.
We are, therefore, construed to agree with the court a quo that the
relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act
No. 1199.
Section 32 Production sharing
Administrative Order No. 2, s, 2006, Revised Rules and Procedures
Governing
Leasehold Implementation in Tenanted Agricultural Lands
Week 7 Conversion of Agricultural Lands
CONVERSION The actual change of the land use from agricultural,
to residential, industrial or commercial, of lands which could have
potentially been covered under the CARP.
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years
from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized
and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties,
and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: provided, that the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
Conversion of Agricultural Lands: What is the difference between
exemption, conversion and reclassification?
(Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 132477,
[August 31, 2005], 505 PHIL 558-572)
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though
reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction
over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already
reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted
from conversion. . . . The authority of the DAR to approve conversions
of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural
uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government
Code. The Code explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall
be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions
of Rep. Act No. 6657.
The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of
conversion despite having undergone reclassification was underscored
in the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that
reclassification of land does not suffice: "In the case at bar, there is no
final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely
reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion
is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how
2
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan,
subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.
Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the
ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion
before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the
DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial
and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This
Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De Villena, found occasion to
reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is
vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-
judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters;
and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional
trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all
agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision reads: "Section 50.
Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. "It shall not
be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall
proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most
expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits
of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure
to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding before it.
|| (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, [June 18, 2010],
635 PHIL 283-315)
Executive Order No. 129-A 37 vested upon the DAR the responsibility
of implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure
the successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5 (c) of the said
executive order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate
operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian
reform implementation. Section 4 (k) thereof authorized the DAR to
approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5 (1)
of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority
to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be
provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly
provides that "the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the
mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions
shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform . . . ."
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988" have been included in the definition of
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid
sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules
and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes
the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use
conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of
agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-
agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands
in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act
No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court,
clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June
1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land
conversion. 38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the
authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to
include "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of
agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of
Agrarian Reform, 39 this Court has enunciated that after the passage
of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have
to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is
vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands, which are already
reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is
15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion. 40 It bears stressing that
the said date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-
off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural
lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or
authority. 41 It necessarily follows that any reclassification made
thereafter can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority. Having
recognized the DAR's conversion authority over lands reclassified
after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to
include "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of
agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge
the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made clear what are the
lands that can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority, thus,
serving the very purpose of the land use conversion provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657.
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals 43 that reclassification
of lands does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from
each other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while
reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof,
a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes. 44.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still
undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the
purpose to which they are intended.
3
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR's
conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. 45 The said date served as
the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of
agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion
clearance or authority. 46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural
lands is already subject to DAR's conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for
other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of
reclassified agricultural lands.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR's
conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. 45 The said date served as
the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of
agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion
clearance or authority. 46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural
lands is already subject to DAR's conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for
other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of
reclassified agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was
done by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations because
either way they must still undergo conversion process. It bears
stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes. As
explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994, cited
in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and
the Department of Agrarian Reform, 47 reclassification of lands
denotes their allocation into some specific use and providing for the
manner of their utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan.
For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose
to which they are intended there is still a need to change the current
use thereof through the process of conversion. The authority to do so
is vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve and maintain
agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus, notwithstanding
the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, they
must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other
purposes.
Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential
Proclamations to non-agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs
conversion clearance from the DAR. We reiterate that reclassification
is different from conversion. Reclassification alone will not suffice and
does not automatically allow the landowner to change its use. It must
still undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such
agricultural lands for such purpose. 48 Reclassification of agricultural
lands is one thing, conversion is another. Agricultural lands that are
reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the
landowner thereof to use the same for such purpose. Stated differently,
despite having reclassified into school sites, the landowner of such
reclassified agricultural lands must apply for conversion before the
DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the
LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15
June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having
undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for
other purposes.
Land Reclassification per Sec. 20 of RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991)
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
Section 20. Reclassification of Lands.
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the
sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize
the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes
as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land
shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian
concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the
following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen
percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):
Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred
fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes
shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess
of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws,
continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans
enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and
dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided. That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial
expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such
plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification
within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as
approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending,
or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
The Hon. Carlos Fortich et. al. vs. The Hon. Renato Corona GR.
No. 131457, April 24, 1998 (Decision, Opinion and Resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration)
Decision of the Office of the President on the Sumilao Case (on the
Revocation of the Conversion Order)
Week 8 Mechanisms for Program Implementation
The Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (Secs. 41, 42, 43, 49)
ection 41. The Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. The
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall be composed of
the President of the Philippines as Chairman, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform as Vice-Chairman and the following as members; Secretaries
4
of the Departments of Agriculture; Environment and Natural
Resources; Budget and Management; Local Government: Public
Works and Highways; Trade and Industry; Finance; Labor and
Employment; Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority; President, Land Bank of the Philippines;
Administrator, National Irrigation Administration; and three (3)
representatives of affected landowners to represent Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao; six (6) representatives of agrarian reform beneficiaries,
two (2) each from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, provided that one of
them shall be from the cultural communities.
Section 42. Executive Committee. There shall be an Executive
Committee (EXCOM) of the PARC composed of the Secretary of the
DAR as Chairman, and such other members as the President may
designate, taking into account Article XIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution. Unless otherwise directed by PARC, the EXCOM may
meet and decide on any and all matters in between meetings of the
PARC: provided, however, that its decisions must be reported to the
PARC immediately and not later than the next meeting.
Section 43. Secretariat. A PARC Secretariat is hereby established
to provide general support and coordinative services such as inter-
agency linkages; program and project appraisal and evaluation and
general operations monitoring for the PARC.
The Secretariat shall be headed by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
who shall be assisted by an Undersecretary and supported by a staff
whose composition shall be determined by the PARC Executive
Committee and whose compensation shall be chargeable against the
Agrarian Reform Fund. All officers and employees of the Secretariat
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
X x x.
Section 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall
have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or
procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules
shall take effect ten (10) days after publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (Sec. 44-
45)
Section 44. Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM). A Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating
Committee (PARCCOM) is hereby created in each province,
composed of a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the EXCOM, the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer as Executive Officer, and one representative each from
the Departments of Agriculture, and of Environment and Natural
Resources and from the LBP, one representative each from existing
farmers organizations, agricultural cooperatives and non-
governmental organizations in the province; two representatives from
landowners, at least one of whom shall be a producer representing the
principal crop of the province, and two representatives from farmer
and farmworker-beneficiaries, at least one of whom shall be a farmer
or farmworker representing the principal crop of the province, as
members: provided, that in areas where there are cultural communities,
the latter shall likewise have one representative.
The PARCCOM shall coordinate and monitor the implementation of
the CARP in the province.t shall provide information on the provisions
of the CARP, guidelines issued by the PARC and on the progress of
the CARP in the province.
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
Section 45. Province-by-Province Implementation. The PARC shall
provide the guidelines for a province-by-province implementation of
the CARP. The ten-year program of distribution of public and private
lands in each province shall be adjusted from year by the provinces
PARCCOM in accordance with the level of operations previously
established by the PARC, in every case ensuring that support services
are available or have been programmed before actual distribution is
effected.
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Secs. 46 to 48 of RA
6657
Section 46. Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC). Unless
otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of Executive Order No.
229 regarding the organization of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) shall be in effect.
Section 47. Functions of the BARC. In addition to those provided
in Executive Order No. 229, the BARC shall have the following
functions:
(a) Mediate and conciliate between parties involved in an agrarian
dispute including matters related to tenurial and financial
arrangements;
(b) Assist in the identification of qualified beneficiaries and
landowners within the barangay;
(c) Attest to the accuracy of the initial parcellary mapping of the
beneficiarys tillage;
(d) Assist qualified beneficiaries in obtaining credit from lending
institutions;
(e) Assist in the initial determination of the value of the land;
(f) Assist the DAR representatives in the preparation of periodic
reports on the CARP implementation for submission to the DAR;
(g) Coordinate the delivery of support services to beneficiaries; and
(h) Perform such other functions as may be assigned by the DAR.
(2) The BARC shall endeavor to mediate, conciliate and settle agrarian
disputes lodged before it within thirty (30) days from its taking
cognizance thereof.f after the lapse of the thirty day period, it is unable
to settle the dispute, it shall issue a certificate of its proceedings and
shall furnish a copy thereof upon the parties within seven (7) days after
the expiration of the thirty-day period.
Section 48. Legal Assistance. The BARC or any member thereof
may, whenever necessary in the exercise of any of its functions
hereunder, seek the legal assistance of the DAR and the provincial,
city, or municipal government..
The Department of Agrarian Reform (Executive Order 129-A, dated
July 26, 1987)
The DAR Adjudication Board (Sec. 13, EO 129-A)
Financing the Program
Funding Source per Sec. 63 of RA 6657 and Financing under Secs. 20
and 21 of EO 229 (1987)
5
Funding Source Sec. 63 of RA 6657
Section 63. Funding Source. The initial amount needed to
implement this Act for the period of ten (10) years upon approval
hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No. 229.
Additional amounts are hereby authorized to be appropriated as and
when needed to augment the Agrarian Reform Fund in order to fully
implement the provisions of this Act.
Sources of funding or appropriations shall include the following:
(a) Proceeds of the sales of the Assets Privatization Trust;
(b) All receipts from assets recovered and from sales of ill-gotten
wealth recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government;
(c) Proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in
foreign countries;
(d) Portion of amounts accruing to the Philippines from all sources of
official foreign grants and concessional financing from all countries,
to be used for the specific purposes of financing production credits,
infrastructures, and other support services required by this Act;
(e) Other government funds not otherwise appropriated.
All funds appropriated to implement the provisions of this Act shall be
considered continuing appropriations during the period of its
implementation.
Financing Secs. 20 and 21 of EO 229 (1987)
CHAPTER V. FINANCING
Sec. 20. Agrarian Reform Fund. As provided in Proclamation No. 131
dated July 22, 1987, a special fund is created, known as The Agrarian
Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50
billion) to cover the estimated cost of the CARP from 1987 to 1992
which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth
recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The
amount collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered
automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Order.
Sec. 21. Supplemental Appropriations. The amount of TWO BILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P2.7 billion) is hereby
appropriated to cover the supplemental requirements of the CARP for
1987, to be sourced from the receipts of the sale of ill-gotten wealth
recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and the proceeds from the sale of assets by the APT. The amount
collected from these sources shall accrue to The Agrarian Reform Fund
and shall likewise be considered automatically appropriated for the
purpose authorized in this Order.
Republic Act No. 8532 February 23, 1998
AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), BY PROVIDING
AUGMENTATION FUND THEREFOR, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTION 63 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE CARP LAW OF 1988"
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Sec. 63 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 63. Funding source. The amount needed to implement this Act
until the year 2008 shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund.
"Additional amounts necessary for this purpose are hereby authorized
to be appropriated in excess of the initial funds, amounting to Fifty
billion pesos (P50,000,000,000.00) provided under Sections 20 and 21
of Executive Order No. 229.
"The additional amount hereby authorized to be appropriated shall in
no case exceed Fifty billion pesos (P50,000,000,000.00).
"Sources of funding or appropriations shall include the following:
"a) Proceeds of the sales of the Assets Privatization Trust;
"b) All receipts from assets recovered and from sales of ill-gotten
wealth recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government;
"c) Proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in
foreign countries, for the specific purposes of financing production
credits, infrastructure and other support services required by this Act;
"d) All income and collections arising from the agrarian reform
operations, projects and programs of CARP implementing agencies;
"e) Portion of amounts accruing to the Philippines from all sources of
official foreign aid grants and concessional financing from all
countries, to be used for the specific purposes of financing production,
credits, infrastructures, and other support services required by this Act;
"f) Yearly appropriations of no less than Three billion pesos
(P3,000,000,000.00) from the General Appropriations Act;
"g) Other government funds not otherwise appropriated."
Section 2. This Act shall take effect within fifteen (15) days following
the completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
CARPER (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with
Reforms) RA 9700
SECTION 21. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows: "SEC. 63. Funding Source.
The amount needed to further implement the CARP as provided in
this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under
Republic Act No. 8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from
the Agrarian Reform Fund and other funding sources in the amount of
at least One hundred fifty billion pesos (P150,000,000,000.00).
"Additional amounts are hereby authorized to be appropriated as and
when needed to augment the Agrarian Reform Fund in order to fully
implement the provisions of this Act during the five (5)-year extension
period. "Sources of funding or appropriations shall include the
following: "(a) Proceeds of the sales of the Privatization and
Management Office (PMO); "(b) All receipts from assets recovered
and from sales of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the PCGG
6
excluding the amount appropriated for compensation to victims of
human rights violations under the applicable law; ITCcAD "(c)
Proceeds of the disposition and development of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, for the specific purposes of financing
production credits, infrastructure and other support services required
by this Act; "(d) All income and collections of whatever form and
nature arising from the agrarian reform operations, projects and
programs of the DAR and other CARP implementing agencies; "(e)
Portion of amounts accruing to the Philippines from all sources of
official foreign aid grants and concessional financing from all
countries, to be used for the specific purposes of financing productions,
credits, infrastructures, and other support services required by this Act;
"(f) Yearly appropriations of no less than Five billion pesos
(P5,000,000,000.00) from the General Appropriations Act; "(g)
Gratuitous financial assistance from legitimate sources; and (h) Other
government funds not otherwise appropriated. "All funds appropriated
to implement the provisions of this Act shall be considered continuing
appropriations during the period of its implementation: Provided, That
if the need arises, specific amounts for bond redemptions, interest
payments and other existing obligations arising from the
implementation of the program shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act: Provided, further, That all just compensation
payments to landowners, including execution of judgments therefor,
shall only be sourced from the Agrarian Reform Fund: Provided,
however, That just compensation payments that cannot be covered
within the approved annual budget of the program shall be chargeable
against the debt service program of the national government, or any
unprogrammed item in the General Appropriations Act: Provided,
finally, That after the completion of the land acquisition and
distribution component of the CARP, the yearly appropriation shall be
allocated fully to support services, agrarian justice delivery and
operational requirements of the DAR and the other CARP
implementing agencies."
Week 9 Agrarian Justice or the Resolution of Agrarian Disputes
Quasi Judicial Powers of the DAR (Agrarian Justice) the
mechanisms to determine the status of the land, entitlements of
beneficiaries, and other agrarian matters and disputes which may
require mediation, conciliation, determination or adjudication. This
topic includes actions by the DAR, the DAR Adjudication Board and
the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court.
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is
hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). It shall not be bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide
all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward
this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination for every action or
proceeding before it. It shall have the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,
compel the production of books and documents and answers to
interrogatories and issue subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum, and
enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It
shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts
in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in
the Rules of Court. Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to
represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there
are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent
such party or group before any DAR proceedings. Notwithstanding an
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be
immediately executory.
SECTION 51. Finality of Determination. Any case or controversy
before it shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it is submitted
for resolution. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be
allowed. Any order, ruling or decision shall be final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
SECTION 52. Frivolous Appeals. To discourage frivolous or
dilatory appeals from the decisions or orders on the local or provincial
levels, the DAR may impose reasonable penalties, including but not
limited to fines or censures upon erring parties.
SECTION 53. Certification of the BARC. The DAR shall not take
cognizance of any agrarian dispute or controversy unless a certification
from the BARC that the dispute has been submitted to it for mediation
and conciliation without any success of settlement is presented:
Provided, however, That if no certification is issued by the BARC
within thirty (30) days after a matter or issue is submitted to it for
mediation or conciliation the case or dispute may be brought before the
PARC.
Distinction between Cases in the Administrative Implementation
of the Program (ALI) and Cases for Adjudication : DAR Adm.
Order No. 3, s. 2003 (2003 Rules on Agrarian Law Implementation
[ALI] Case
While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of CLOAs,
as in this case, its jurisdiction is, however, confined only to agrarian
disputes. As explained in the case of Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of
Cruz 16 and reiterated in the recent case of Bagongahasa v. Spouses
Cesar Caguin, 17 for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the
controversy must relate to an agrarian dispute between the landowners
and tenants in whose favor CLOAs have been issued by the DAR
Secretary, to wit: aETDIc
The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under Section
2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However,
for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to
an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs
have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the
administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and
regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are
within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not the DARAB. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is not sufficient that the controversy involves the cancellation
of a CLOA already registered with the Land Registration Authority.
What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian
dispute between the parties.
As defined in Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657, an agrarian dispute
relates to "any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
7
lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Based on the above-cited provision, however, petitioner posits that an
agrarian dispute can be dissected into purely tenurial (paragraph 1 of
Section 3 [d]) and non-tenurial arrangements (paragraph 2, Section 3
[d]). This theory deserves no credence. TIDcEH
Verily, an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial
arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. 18 Tenurial
arrangements pertain to agreements which set out the rights between a
landowner and a tenant, lessee, farm worker or other agrarian reform
beneficiary involving agricultural land. Traditionally, tenurial
arrangements are in the form of tenancy 19 or leasehold arrangements.
20 However, other forms such as a joint production agreement to effect
the implementation of CARP have been recognized as a valid tenurial
arrangement. 21
Accordingly, paragraph 2 of Section 3 (d), by its explicit reference to
controversies between landowners and farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries with respect to the compensation of lands
acquired under R.A. No. 6657 or other terms and conditions relating
to the transfer of such lands, undoubtedly implies the existence of a
tenurial arrangement. Also, the phrase "whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee" in paragraph 2 lists certain forms of
tenurial arrangements consistent with the phrase "whether leasehold,
tenancy or stewardship, or otherwise" stated in paragraph 1 of the same
section.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context
particularly, that every part of the statute must be interpreted together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. 22 Therefore, in line with the purpose of recognizing
the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners under the agrarian
reform program, both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 (d) of R.A. No.
6657 should be understood within the context of tenurial arrangements,
else the intent of the law be subverted.
||| (Sutton v. Lim, G.R. No. 191660, [December 3, 2012], 700 PHIL
67-78)
DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 03-03
SUBJECT : 2003 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases
Pursuant to Sections 49 and 50 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, or the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL), and in order
to foster a just, inexpensive, and expeditious determination of agrarian
cases, the following are the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
rules governing the adjudication of cases involving Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI):
SECTION 2. ALI cases. These Rules shall govern all cases
arising from or involving:
2.1. Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage
under the agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of
Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents (EPs), including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions
for lifting of such coverage;
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
2.2. Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion,
qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-
beneficiaries;
2.3. Subdivision surveys of land under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform (CARP);
2.4. Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates
of Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs)
in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816,
including the issuance, recall, or cancellation of Emancipation Patents
(EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet
registered with the Register of Deeds;
2.5. Exercise of the right of retention by landowner;
2.6. Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of
RA 6657;
2.7. Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice
(DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);
2.8. Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for
livestock, swine, and poultry raising;
2.9. Cases of exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms
from the coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
2.10. Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA)
found unsuitable for agricultural purposes;
2.11. Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non agricultural uses and purposes
including protests or oppositions thereto;
2.12. Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to
homelots;
2.13. Disposition of excess area of the tenant's/farmer-beneficiary's
landholdings;
2.14. Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
2.15. Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and
its predecessors; and
2.16. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred
to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
SECTION 3. DARAB cases. These Rules shall not apply to
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and its
Regional or Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARAD or
PARAD) which include:
3.1. The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or
juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all
agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 and other related agrarian laws;
3.2. The preliminary administrative determination of reasonable and
just compensation of lands acquired under PD 27 and the CARP;
8
3.3. The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of
sale or their amendments involving lands under the administration and
disposition of the DAR or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
3.4. Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of
tenants and/or leaseholders;
3.5. Those cases involving the sale, alienation, pre-emption, and
redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARL or
other agrarian laws;
3.6. Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of CLOAs and EPs which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority;
3.7. Those cases involving the review of leasehold rentals;
3.8. Those cases involving the collection of amortizations on
payments for lands awarded under PD 27 (as amended), RA 3844 (as
amended), and RA 6657 (as amended) and other related laws, decrees,
orders, instructions, rules, and regulations, as well as payment for
residential, commercial, and industrial lots within the settlement and
resettlement areas under the administration and disposition of the
DAR;
3.9. Those cases involving the annulment or rescission of lease
contracts and deeds of sale, and the cancellation or amendment of titles
pertaining to agricultural lands under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and LBP; as well as EPs issued under PD 266,
Homestead Patents, Free Patents, and miscellaneous sales patents to
settlers in settlement and re-settlement areas under the administration
and disposition of the DAR; ScHAIT
3.10. Those cases involving boundary disputes over lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR and the LBP, which are
transferred, distributed, and/or sold to tenant-beneficiaries and are
covered by deeds of sale, patents, and certificates of title;
3.11. Those cases involving the determination of title to agricultural
lands where this issue is raised in an agrarian dispute by any of the
parties or a third person in connection with the possession thereof for
the purpose of preserving the tenure of the agricultural lessee or actual
tenant-farmer or farmer-beneficiaries and effecting the ouster of the
interloper or intruder in one and the same proceeding;
3.12. Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section
12 of PD 946 except those cases falling under the proper courts or other
quasi-judicial bodies; and
3.13. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred
to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
"||| (Vda. De Tangub v. Court of Appeals, UDK No. 9864,
[December 3, 1990], 270 PHIL 88-98)
The jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform; (b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related
problems; and (c) approval or disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses, is evidently
quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court
by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and
obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land,
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
and other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees,
settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under
laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations
in relation to the agrarian reform program. Clearly, the latter must be
deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad
jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the
Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules
formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation
of the executive orders just quoted. (Rules of the DAR Adjudication
Board, which took effect on March 8, 1988) The rules included the
creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to
exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the
allocation to it of ". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes,
controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order
No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." The
implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction
shall extend over but not be limited to . . . (that theretofore vested in
the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and
obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws . . .
Republic Act No. 6657, was signed into law by President Aquino on
June 10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its "publication
in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation" on June 15,
1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the
effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More
particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential
Decree No. 229, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with
original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws,
although it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction
over two groups of cases. The Regional Trial Courts have not,
however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers
"special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Court," which are Regional
Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court at least one (1)
branch within each province to act as such. These Regional Trial
Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of
the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: 1) "all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and 2) "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . . (the) Act." In these cases,
"(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act.
It is relevant to mention in this connection that (1) appeals from
decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days
from receipt or notice of the decision, . . ." (Sec. 60) and (2) appeals
from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on
agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari
(This mode of appeal is sui generis. It is only instance when an appeal
by certiorari may be taken to the Court of Appeals. Heretofore, appeals
by certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court)
except as otherwise provided . . . within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR . . . (being) final
and conclusive if based on substantial evidence." (Sec. 54)
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation versus Juan Amante
et.al. (G.R. No. 112526, March 16, 2005)
9

whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR
Secretary. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
xxx xxx xxx
The DAR's jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is two-fold.
The first is essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and
administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance, while the second is judicial and
involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties. 87
Pursuant to its judicial mandate of achieving a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it, 88
the DAR adopted the DARAB Revised Rules, Rule II (Jurisdiction of
the Adjudication Board) of which provides:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-
A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to
the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and
payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar
disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions
of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of
sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of
the DAR and LBP;
d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation
in compact farms, farmers' cooperatives and other registered farmers'
associations or organizations, related to land covered by the CARP and
other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-
emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT),
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation
Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred
to it by the Secretary of the DAR. SaTAED
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations,
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary
of the DAR. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 06-00, 89 which provides
for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
Cases, govern the administrative function of the DAR. Under said
Rules of Procedure, the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over
classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the
CARP, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for
lifting of coverage. Section 2 of the said Rules specifically provides,
inter alia, that:
SECTION 2. Cases Covered. These Rules shall govern cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall
include the following:
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including
protests or oppositions thereto aid petitions for lifting of coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-
beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside
the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the
issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered
with the Register of Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the power to determine whether a property is agricultural and
subject to CARP coverage together with the identification,
qualification or disqualification of farmer-beneficiaries lies with the
DAR Secretary. 90
Significantly, the DAR had already determined that the properties are
subject to expropriation under the CARP and has distributed the same
to the farmer-beneficiaries.
nitially, the LBP forwarded the two Compulsory Acquisition Claim
Folders (CACF) covering the subject properties to the DARAB for
summary proceedings for the sole purpose of determining just
compensation. SRRDC then sent a letter to the LBP claiming that the
subject properties were exempt from CARP coverage and subject of a
pending petition for land conversion. As a consequence, the DARAB
asked the DAR Secretary to first resolve the issues raised by SRRDC
before it can proceed with the land valuation proceedings. In response,
the DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations and the Regional
Director of Region IV, submitted its report stating that: (1) the property
is subject to compulsory acquisition by virtue of the Notice of
Coverage issued on August 11, 1989, and Notice of Acquisition issued
on December 12, 1989, and that it was subject to CARP coverage per
Section IV D of DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990; and
(2) there was no pending petition for land conversion involving the
subject property. When SRRDC petitioned the DARAB to resolve the
10
issue of exemption from coverage, it was only then that the DARAB
took cognizance of said issue. 91
As the DARAB succinctly pointed out, it was SRRDC that initiated
and invoked the DARAB's jurisdiction to pass upon the question of
CARP coverage. As stated by the DARAB:
4.5.2.2. The ISSUE ON CARP COVERAGE was initiated and
incorporated in said proceeding, at the instance of petitioner itself, by
filing a petition dated March 18, 1991, . . . Prayed therein were that
DARAB:
1. Take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over the question of CARP
coverage of the subject parcels of land;
2. Defer or hold in abeyance the proceedings for administrative
valuation of the subject properties pending determination of the
question of CARP coverage;
3. Allow respondent SRRDC to adduce evidence in support of its
position that the subject parcels of land are not covered by the CARP
beginning on the scheduled hearing date of April 4, 1991" (p. 3;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Upon persistent request of petitioner SRRDC, it was accommodated
by DARAB and a counsel of SRRDC even took the witness stand. Its
lawyers were always in attendance during the scheduled hearings until
it was time for SRRDC to present its own evidence.
4.5.2.3. But, as earlier stated, despite the open session proddings by
DARAB for SRRDC to submit evidence and the rescheduling for,
allegedly, they are still collating the evidence, nay, the request that it
be allowed to adduce evidence, none was adduced and this constrained
public respondent to declare SRRDC as having waived its right to
present evidence. And, after the remaining parties were heard, the
hearing was formally terminated.
xxx xxx xxx
4.5.3. Needless to state, the jurisdictional objection (CARP coverage),
now being raised herein was not one of the original matters in issue.
Principally, DARAB was called upon under Section 16 of Republic
Act No. 6657 to resolve a land valuation case. But SRRDC itself
insisted that DARAB should take cognizance thereof in the same land
valuation proceeding. And, SRRDC, through its lawyers, actively
participated in the hearings conducted.
4.5.4. It was only when an adverse decision was rendered by DARAB
that the jurisdictional issue was raised in the petition for review it filed
with the Honorable Court of Appeals. It was also only then that
petitioner presented proof/evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
4.5.6. Public respondents (DAR/DARAB) are not unmindful of the
rule that matter of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. But for two serious considerations, the applicability
thereof in the case at bar should not be allowed.
4.5.6.1. The fact [part (municipal/industrial) and/or watershed] upon
which the jurisdictional issue interchangeably hinges were not
established during the hearing of the case. No proof was adduced. That
the matter of CARP coverage is strictly administrative implementation
of CARP and, therefore, beyond the competence of DARAB,
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
belonging, as it does, to the DAR Secretary, was not even alleged,
either before DARAB or the Honorable Court of Appeals, the
numerous petitions/incidents filed notwithstanding. Be it that as it
may, the records of the case show that initially DARAB refused to take
cognizance thereof and, in fact, forwarded the issue of CARP coverage
to the office of the DAR Secretary. It was only when it was returned to
DARAB by said office that proceedings thereon commenced pursuant
to Section 1(g) of Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
4.5.6.2. Petitioner is now estopped from assailing the ,jurisdiction of
DARAB. First, it expressly acknowledged the same, in fact invoked it,
when it filed its petition (Annex "4"); and, second, during the
scheduled hearings, SRRDC, through its counsel, actively participated,
one of its counsel (sic) even testifying. It may not now be allowed to
impugn the jurisdiction of public respondent . . . 92 (Emphasis
Supplied)
In CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, the CA likewise found that it was SRRDC
that called upon the DARAB to determine the issue and it, in fact,
actively participated in the proceedings before it. 93 It was SRRDC's
own act of summoning the DARAB's authority that cured whatever
jurisdictional defect it now raises. It is elementary that the active
participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court or
a quasi-judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that court's or
body's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's or
body's jurisdiction. 94
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction was raised by SRRDC only before
the CA. It was never presented or discussed before the DARAB for
obvious reasons, i.e., it was SRRDC itself that invoked the latter's
jurisdiction. As a rule, when a party adopts a certain theory, and the
case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will
not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. 95 Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. 96
To permit SRRDC to change its theory on appeal would not only be
unfair to Amante, et al. but would also be offensive to the basic scales
of fair play, justice and due process. 97
Finally, the Court notes that then DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong
issued a Memorandum on July 11, 1991, ordering the opening of a trust
account in favor of SRRDC. In Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative
Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, providing for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in
Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657. As a result, the DAR issued
Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust accounts
in the name of landowners into deposit accounts. 98 Thus, the trust
account opened by the LBP per instructions of DAR Secretary
Benjamin T. Leong should be converted to a deposit account, to be
retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the
DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the
benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the
ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals. The account shall earn a 12% interest per annum from the
time the LBP opened a trust account up to the time said account was
actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts.
Authority of the DAR Secretary to nullify titles under the CARP
(Sec. 24 of RA 6657 as amended by Sec. 9 of RA 9700)
Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
11

"SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of
the beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly registered
emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award and their
actual physical possession of the awarded land. Such award shall be
completed in not more than one hundred eighty (180) days from the
date of registration of the title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the emancipation patents, the certificates
of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian
reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1)
year from its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds,
subject to the conditions, limitations and qualifications of this Act, the
property registration decree, and other pertinent laws. The
emancipation patents or the certificates of land ownership award being
titles brought under the operation of the torrens system, are conferred
with the same indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under
the said system, as provided for by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6732.
"It is the ministerial duty of the Registry of Deeds to register the title
of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, after the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has certified that the necessary
deposit in the name of the landowner constituting full payment in cash
or in bond with due notice to the landowner and the registration of the
certificate of land ownership award issued to the beneficiaries, and to
cancel previous titles pertaining thereto.
"Identified and qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, based on
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, as, amended, shall have
usufructuary rights over the awarded land as soon as the DAR takes
possession of such land, and such right shall not be diminished even
pending the awarding of the emancipation patent or the certificate of
land ownership award.
"All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation
patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR."
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs.
ROBERTO J. CUENCA et. al, respondents. [G.R. No. 154112.
September 23, 2004.
hen came Executive Order No. 229. 17 Under Section 17 thereof, the
DAR shall exercise "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture [DA]." The DAR shall also have the
"powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces
tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions."
In Quismundo v. CA, 18 this provision was deemed to have repealed
Section 12(a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946, which vested the
then Courts of Agrarian Relations with "original exclusive jurisdiction
over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations
imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the
agrarian reform program."
Under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR was also
made "responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program." In accordance with Section 5 of the same EO, it
possessed the following powers and functions:
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for
contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writs of
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
execution of its decisions, and other legal processes to ensure
successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions of
the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial
Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such
appeal;
xxx xxx xxx
"(h) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and
resolve agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems as may be
provided for by law;
xxx xxx xxx
"(l) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other
land uses as may be provided . . ."
The above grant of jurisdiction to the DAR covers these areas:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems;
and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. cEaCAH
The foregoing provision was as broad as those "theretofore vested in
the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946," as the Court
ruled in Vda. de Tangub v. CA, 19 which we quote:
". . . The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the
Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules
formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation
of the executive orders just quoted. The rules included the creation of
the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the
adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of
'. . . [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested
upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive
Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations.'
"The implementing rules also declare that '(s)pecifically, such
jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to . . . (that theretofore
vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights
and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws . . ." 20
In the same case, the Court also held that the jurisdictional competence
of the DAR had further been clarified by RA 6657 thus:
". . . The Act [RA 6657] makes references to and explicitly recognizes
the effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More
particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential
Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform
with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian
laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the
Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases.
Section 50 reads as follows:
12

'SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR].
xxx xxx xxx
'It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of
books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through
sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the
power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and
subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.'" 21
Nonetheless, we have held that the RTCs have not been completely
divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA
6657 confers special jurisdiction on "Special Agrarian Courts," which
are actually RTCs designated as such by the Supreme Court. 22 Under
Section 57 of the same law, these Special Agrarian Courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:
"1) 'all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-
owners,' and
"2) 'the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . . [the] Act.'"
The above delineation of jurisdiction remains in place to this date.
Administrative Circular No. 29-2002 23 of this Court stresses the
distinction between the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR under
Sections 50 and 55 of RA 6657 and the jurisdiction of the Special
Agrarian Courts referred to by Sections 56 and 57 of the same law.
Allegations of the Complaint
A careful perusal of respondent's Complaint 24 shows that the
principal averments and reliefs prayed for refer not to the "pure
question of law" spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405
but to the annulment of the DAR's Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the
main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of
Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments, among
others:
"6. This implementation of CARP in the landholding of the
[respondent] is contrary to law and, therefore, violates [respondent's]
constitutional right not to be deprived of his property without due
process of law. The coverage of [respondent's] landholding under
CARP is NO longer with authority of law. If at all, the implementation
of CARP in the landholding of [respondent] should have commenced
and [been] completed between June 1988 to June 1992 as provided for
in CARL, to wit: . . .;
"7. Moreover, the placing of [respondent's] landholding under CARP
as of 21 September 1999 is without the imprimatur of the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as mandated and required by
law pursuant to R.A. 7905 . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
"9. Under the provisions of CARL, it is the PARC and/or the DAR,
and not . . . Land Bank, which is authorized to preliminarily determine
the value of the lands as compensation therefor, thus . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
"12. That the aforementioned NOTICE OF COVERAGE with
intendment and purpose of acquiring [respondent's] aforementioned
land is a gross violation of law (PD 399 dated 28 February 1974 which
is still effective up to now) inasmuch as [respondent's] land is traversed
by and a road frontage as admitted by the DAR's technician and
defendant FORTUNADO (MARO) . . .;"
"13. That as reflected in said Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, copy of
which is hereto attached as annex 'D' forming part hereof,
[respondent's] land is above eighteen percent (18%) slope and
therefore, automatically exempted and excluded from the operation of
Rep. Act 6657, . . . 25 (Italics supplied)
In contrast, the 14-page Complaint touches on the alleged
unconstitutionality of EO 405 by merely making these two allegations:
"10. Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 (issued by the then
President Corazon Aquino) is unconstitutional for it plainly amends,
modifies and/or repeals CARL. On 14 June 1990, then President
Corazon Aquino had no longer law-making powers as the Philippine
Congress was by then already organized, existing and operational
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. A copy of the said Executive Order
is hereto attached as Annex 'B' forming part hereof.
"11. Our constitutional system of separation of powers renders the said
Executive Order No. 405 unconstitutional and all valuations made, and
to be made, by the defendant Land Bank pursuant thereto are null and
void and without force and effect. Indispensably and ineludibly, all
related rules, regulations, orders and other issuances issued or
promulgated pursuant to said Executive Order No. 405 are also null
and void ab initio and without force and effect." 26
We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent
before the trial court was not the issue of compensation (the subject
matter of EO 405 27 ). Note that no amount had yet been determined
nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the
court's function of determining just compensation. 28
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage 29 constitutes the
first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the
CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the
implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial
jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its
authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly
constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
cSDHEC
In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points
pleaded by respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need
only to point that in case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts
to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand
the special competence of administrative agencies, "even if the
question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character," 30 as in this case.
Determination of an Agrarian Dispute for cases filed in courts and
prosecutors
7 office [Sec. 19, RA 9700]
SECTION 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is
hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:
13
"SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. No court
or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the
implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57
of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from
any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the
parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be
automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which
shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral
whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the
determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial
recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the
prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial
court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall
be to the Court of Appeals. "In cases where regular courts or quasi-
judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform
beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall
have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their
individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP. "The
fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or
any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to
deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed
before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies."
Sec 57, The role of the Special Agrarian Courts in land valuation
and penal provisions
||| (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767,
[January 18, 2000], 379 PHIL 141-149)
Four parcels of land owned by petitioner bank was placed under the
comprehensive agrarian reform program by the Department of
Agrarian Reform pursuant to RA No. 6657. Petitioner rejected the
valuation made by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and questioned the same with
the Regional Trial Court in a petition for determination of the just
compensation. The same was dismissed for being filed beyond the 15-
day reglementary period. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the
Court of Appeals. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied
petitioner resorted to this recourse claiming that DAR adjudicators
have no jurisdiction to determine the amount of just compensation the
same being lodged with the Regional Trial Courts and as such the
petition can be filed even beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The Department of Agrarian Reform, under Section 50 of R.A. No.
6657, has the jurisdiction to preliminary determine the value of the
lands placed under land reform and the amount of just compensation
to be paid for the taking, and that appeal, under Section 57 of the same
law, may be taken to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof. The
first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial actions. Thus, the power to decide just compensation cases is
vested in the courts provided that the same is filed within the
reglementary period. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
There is nothing contradictory between the provision of 50 granting
the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian
reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the provision of
57 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" over (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses
under R.A. No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings
while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested
in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such
determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive"
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.
For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is
final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be
foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality
of administrative action.
Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with
the preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land
reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking. It
initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the
landowner of the government's intention to acquire his land and the
valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days
from receipt of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the event the landowner rejects
the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the
provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, for
the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The
landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then
required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land.
The DAR adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is
submitted for decision. If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory,
he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court. Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was
filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules
of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the
case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ, respondent. [G.R. No. 169008.
August 14, 2007.
1) whether or not petitioner may file the instant appeal solely through
its legal department;
(2) whether or not petitioner has committed forum shopping; and
(3) whether or not the PARAD, in this case, gravely abused its
discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of
LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Teresita Panlilio-Luciano, 20 the
Court explained in one of its resolutions that nothing in the LBP charter
expressly authorizes the LBP Legal Department to appear in behalf of
LBP in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding and that the
Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OGCC, not the LBP Legal
Department, to act as the principal law office of the LBP, thus:
There is nothing in the LBP charter that expressly authorizes the said
Legal Department to appear in behalf of LBP in any court or quasi-
judicial proceeding. Attys. Beramo and Berbao insist that the creation
of the LBP Legal Department "necessarily entails conferment of the
power to represent [LBP] in any and all cases" and consequently
confers the power to "exercise such incidental powers or perform such
acts as are necessary to make the conferred power effective." At first
blush, this is not an unreasonable position; yet, we are precluded from
adopting the same, owing to the explicit proviso in Section 10, Book
14
IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
reads: STcADa
Section 10. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. The
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the
principal law office of all government-owned or controlled
corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and
government acquired asset corporations and shall exercise control and
supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained
separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter
be provided by law. In the exercise of such control and supervision,
the Government Corporate Counsel shall promulgate rules and
regulations to effectively implement the objectives of the Office.
The OGCC is authorized to receive the attorney's fees adjudged in
favor of their client government-owned or controlled corporations,
their subsidiaries/other corporate offsprings and government acquired
asset corporations. These attorney's fees shall accrue to a Special fund
of the OGCC, and shall be deposited in an authorized government
depository as trust liability and shall be made available for expenditure
without the need for a Cash Disbursement Ceiling, for purposes of
upgrading facilities and equipment, granting of employee's incentive
pay and other benefits, and defraying such other incentive expenses
not provided for in the General Appropriations Act as may be
determined by the Government Corporate Counsel. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above provision mandates the OGCC, and not the LBP Legal
Department, as the principal law office of the LBP. Moreover, it
establishes the proper hierarchical order in that the LBP Legal
Department remains under the control and supervision of the OGCC.
Indeed, if we were to accede to the position of Attys. Beramo and
Berbao that the mere constitution of an LBP Legal Department ipso
facto confers upon it the capacity to litigate cases in behalf of LBP in
any legal proceeding, then the role of the OGCC as the principal law
office of all GOCCs would be rendered nugatory in all GOCCs with
Legal Departments.
At the same time, the existence of the OGCC does not render the LBP
Legal Department a superfluity. We do not doubt that the LBP Legal
Department carries out vital legal services to LBP. However, the
performance of such functions cannot deprive the OGCC's role as
overseer of the LBP Legal Department and its mandate of exercising
control and supervision over all GOCC legal departments. For the
purpose of filing petitions and making submissions before this Court,
such control and supervision imply express participation by the OGCC
as principal legal counsel of LBP. Our succeeding disposition of the
OGCC's pending Manifestation would delve in detail the extent of the
OGCC's required participation. But suffice for now, Attys. Beramo
and Berbao are in error when they assert that the OGCC's
participation in the present petition is not required at all. DEcITS
It should also be noted that the aforementioned Section 10, Book IV,
Title III, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the
OGCC to receive the attorney's fees adjudged in favor of their client
GOCCs, such fees accruing to a special fund of the OGCC. Evidently,
the non-participation of the OGCC in litigations pursued by GOCCs
would deprive the former of its due funding as authorized by law.
Hence, this is another reason why we cannot sustain Attys. Beramo
and Berbao's position that the OGCC need not participate in
litigations pursued by LBP.
It may strike as disruptive to the flow of a GOCC's daily grind to
require the participation of the OGCC as its principal law office, or the
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
exercise of control and supervision by the OGCC over the acts of the
GOCC's legal departments. For reasons such as proximity and comfort,
the GOCC may find it convenient to rely instead on its in-house legal
departments, or more irregularly, on private practitioners. Yet the
statutory role of the OGCC as principal law office of GOCCs is one of
long-standing, and we have to recognize such function as part of public
policy. Since the jurisdiction of the OGCC includes all GOCCs, its
perspective is less myopic than that maintained by a particular legal
department of a GOCC. It is not inconceivable that left to its own
devices, the legal department of a given GOCC may adopt a legal
position inconsistent with or detrimental to other GOCCs. Since
GOCCs fall within the same governmental framework, it would be
detrimental to have GOCCs foisted into adversarial positions by their
respective legal departments. Hence, there is indubitable wisdom in
having one overseer over all these legal departments which would
ensure that the legal positions adopted by the GOCCs would not
conflict with each other or the government.
Attys. Beramo and Berbao claim that the LBP Legal Department had
handled some cases which had been decided by the Court and that the
OGCC has never been involved in the litigation and handling of LBP's
appellate cases involving specialized fields such as banking and
agrarian reform. These points should not be dismissed lightly, but then
again, years of wrong practice do not make a statutory right. The
Administrative Code of 1987, adopting a decades-old legal precept,
expressly provides that it is the OGCC that acts as the principal law
office of GOCCs and exercises control and supervision over the legal
departments of GOCCs. If the LBP Legal Department has long
operated as an independent fiefdom absent any control, supervision, or
even concern from the OGCC, then this practice must end now. As to
the pending litigations of LBP which are [handled] exclusively by the
LBP Legal Department, it shall be the individual courts with
jurisdiction over those cases that shall decide how to proceed next. We
shall not, by reason of this Resolution, interfere with the dispensation
of those cases. Certainly, Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 can be invoked by adverse parties or
by the courts in citing as deficient the exclusive representation of LBP
by its Legal Department. Then again, if neither the adverse parties nor
the courts of jurisdiction choose to contest this point, there would be
no impediment to the litigation to maintain. TEHIaD
Of course, if the principle that the OGCC is the principal law office of
GOCCs proves persistently inconvenient in practice, it would be up to
Congress to amend the Administrative Code, or for the OGCC itself to
promulgate rules and regulations that would alleviate the problems in
practice without abdicating its legal mandate. The succeeding
discussion on the OGCC's pending Manifestation involves a review of
the OGCC's current practices, including the present rules and
regulations. 21
In the present controversy, we find nothing in the record which shows
that the OGCC has entered its appearance as the principal legal counsel
of petitioner LBP or that it has expressly given its conformity to the
LBP Legal Department's filing of the instant petition
Finally and most importantly, we find petitioner not entitled to the
grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of
the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to
execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure, 26 which was then applicable, provides
that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and
Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
15
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any
party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals 27 and in Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, 28 we explained
the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's
decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day
period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the
SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its
receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the
reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The
PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO
CRUZ
G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008
in Paris v. Alfeche 25 the applicability of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No.
228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the payment of just
compensation. There the Court explained that while under P.D. No. 27
tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are
still required to pay the cost of the land before the title is transferred to
them and that pending the payment of just compensation, actual title
to the tenanted land remains with the landowner.
In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still
incomplete thus, the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A.
No. 6657 before its completion, the process should now be completed
under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 applying only
suppletorily. 26 IHCacT
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 27 the Court explained
why the guidelines under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 are no longer
applicable to the delayed payment of lands acquired under P.D. No.
27, to wit:
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the
DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with R.A. 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 28
The decisive backdrop of the instant case coincides with that in Paris,
that is, the amount of just compensation due to respondents had not yet
been settled by the time R.A. No. 6657 became effective. Following
the aforementioned pronouncement in Paris, the fixing of just
compensation should therefore be based on the parameters set out in
R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only
suppletory effect.
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 states:
SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation
by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by
government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation. DTISaH
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, 29 the Court ruled that the
factors enumerated under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been
translated into a basic formula by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No.
6657. Thus, the Court held in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR
A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 30 should be applied in computing just
compensation.
Likewise, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, 31 the Court
ruled that the applicable formula in fixing just compensation is DAR
A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, series of
1994, then the governing regulation applicable to compulsory
acquisition of lands, in recognition of the DAR's rule-making power to
carry out the object of R.A. No. 6657. Because the trial court therein
based its valuation upon a different formula and did not conduct any
hearing for the reception of evidence, the Court ordered a remand of
the case to the SAC for trial on the merits.
The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in
determining just compensation has been reiterated recently in Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, 32 where the Court also ordered the
remand of the case to the SAC for the determination of just
compensation strictly in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992, as amended.
A perusal of the PARAD's Decision dated 23 November 1999, which
mandated payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00
per hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula
prescribed in any of the aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR
or was at least silent on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR
regulations to the question of just compensation. The PARAD decision
also did not refer to any evidence in support of its finding.
The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as
amended, as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation.
Pertinently, to obtain the land value, the formula 33 under said
regulation requires that the values for the Capitalized Net Income,
Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax declaration must
be shown. Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR A.O.
No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for Capitalized Net
Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters
laid down in the prior regulation.
Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the
aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to
adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at
P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONILA P. CELADA G.R.
No.
164876. January 23, 2006
We do not agree with petitioner's submission that the SAC erred in
assuming jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of
just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative
proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of
just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARAB's
re-evaluation of the land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the
SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following reason: It
is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court,
16
has 'original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners.' This 'original and
exclusive' jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR
would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in
compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the
review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak
of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting
as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any
effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to
the SAC by private respondent is valid. It would be well to emphasize
that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not
with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took
cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just
compensation.
In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioner's contention that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly
filed the petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC
even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is now moot
considering that the valuation made by petitioner had long been
affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered
moot and academic, as in the instant case.
While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments
made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it
is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
49 of RA No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to
implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue
rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No.
5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No.
6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned
therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to
disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said
provision. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in
their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity
was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid,
courts have no option but to apply the same.
While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments
made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it
is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
49 of RA No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to
implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue
rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No.
5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No.
6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned
therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said
provision. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in
their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity
was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid,
courts have no option but to apply the same.
There is no basis for the SAC's award of 12% interest per annum in
favor of respondent. Although in some expropriation cases, the Court
allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of
damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on
the part of the government one of forbearance. In this case, there is no
delay that would justify the payment of interest since the just
compensation due to respondent has been promptly and validly
deposited in her name in cash and LBP bonds. Neither is there factual
or legal justification for the award of attorney's fees and costs of
litigation in favor of respondent.
||| (Land Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128557,
[December 29, 1999], 378 PHIL 1248-1266
Pursuant to a final decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
as the financing arm in the operation of the Land Reform Program of
the government, was ordered to pay private respondent. Petitioner,
however, adamantly refused to do so, thus prompting private
respondent to file an action for mandamus. The Court of Appeals
granted the writ. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner resorted to this action, arguing that the CA cannot issue the
writ of mandamus because it cannot be compelled to perform an act
which is beyond its legal duty. IcADSE
Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, which bears the approval of the landowner, it
becomes its legal duty to finance the transaction. In the instant case,
petitioner participated in the valuation proceedings held in the office
of the PARAD through its counsel. It did not appeal the decision of the
PARAD which became final and executory. The only thing that
hindered it from paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the
farmer-beneficiary. A perusal of Sec. 18 of RA 6657, however, showed
that the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not required in
establishing the vinculum juris for the proper compensation of the
landowner. Without such obstacle, petitioner can now be compelled to
perform its legal duty through the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
A perusal of the law shows that the consent of the farmer-beneficiary
is not required in establishing the vinculum juris for the proper
compensation of the landowner. Section 18 of RA 6657 states Sec.
18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and the LBP in accordance with the
criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as the
just compensation for the land. As may be gleaned from the
aforementioned section, the landowner, the DAR and the Land Bank
are the only parties involved. The law does not mention the
participation of the farmer-beneficiary.
We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and
corn lands under PD 27. Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the
17
provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect.
Section 7 of the Act also provides Sec. 7. Priorities. The DAR,
in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition
and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) years
from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed
as follows: Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or
abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners
for agrarian reform; . . . and all other lands owned by the government
devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and
distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the
implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four
(4) years. This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27
lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute
to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution
thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to. In
Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform this Court applied the provisions RA 6657 to rice and
corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the payment of just
compensation for PD 27 lands through the different modes stated in
Sec. 18.
Although it is true that Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special
Agrarian Courts shall have jurisdiction over the final determination of
just compensation cases, it must be noted that petitioner never
contested the valuation of the PARAD. Thus, the land valuation stated
in its decision became final and executory. There was therefore no
need for private respondent Pascual to file a case in the Special
Agrarian Court.
Although it is true that Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special
Agrarian Courts shall have jurisdiction over the final determination of
just compensation cases, it must be noted that petitioner never
contested the valuation of the PARAD. Thus, the land valuation stated
in its decision became final and executory. There was therefore no
need for private respondent Pascual to file a case in the Special
Agrarian Court.
At first glance it would seem that private respondent's lands are indeed
covered by Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. However,
Part IV shows that AO No. 13 provides a fixed formula for determining
the Land Value (LV) and the additional interests it would have earned.
The formula utilizes the Government Support Price (GSP) of 1972,
which is P35.00/cavan of palay and P31.00/cavan of corn. The formula
in AO No. 13 could no longer be applied since the PARAD already
used a higher GSP. The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the
landowners for unearned interests. Had they been paid in 1972 when
the GSP for rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00,
respectively, and such amounts were deposited in a bank, they would
have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the
PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35 or
P31) could be multiplied by (1.06)n to determine the value of the land
plus the additional 6% compounded interest it would have earned from
1972. However, since the PARAD already increased the GSP from
P35.00 to P300.00/cavan of palay and from P31.00 to P250.00/cavan
of corn, there is no more need to add any interest thereon, muchless
compound it. To the extent that it granted 6% compounded interest to
private respondent Jose Pascual, the Court of Appeals erred.
Modes of Appeal/Review from the DARAB
RULE 43
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies
to the Court of Appeals
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
Section 1.Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments
or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of
the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
Section 2.Cases not covered. This Rule shall not apply to judgments
or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. (n)
Section 3.Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken
to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. (n)
Section 4.Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution,
or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law
for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of
the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and
in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n)
Section 5.How appeal taken. Appeal shall be taken by filing a
verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court
of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party
and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition
intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the
petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of
court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth
valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the
petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for
costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (n)
Section 6.Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a)
state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the
court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies
of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other
supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The
petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the period fixed herein. (2a)
18

Section 7.Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure
of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit
for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. (n)
Section 8.Action on the petition. The Court of Appeals may require
the respondent to file a comment on the petition not a motion to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it
finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. (6a)
Section 9.Contents of comment. The comment shall be filed within
ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied
by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The
comment shall (a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in
petitioner's statement of facts and issues; and (b) state the reasons why
the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be
served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with
the Court of Appeals. (9a)
Section 10. Due course. If upon the filing of the comment
or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed
by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the
filing thereof, and on the records the Court of Appeals finds prima facie
that the court or agency concerned has committed errors of fact or law
that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course
to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact
of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial
evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. (n)
Section 11. Transmittal of record. Within fifteen (15) days
from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of
Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the
original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the
proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be
abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of
Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to
the record. (8a)
Section 12. Effect of appeal. The appeal shall not stay the
award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless
the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may
deem just. (10a)
Section 13. Submission for decision. If the petition is given
due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or
require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15)
days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision
upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these
Rules or by the court of Appeals. (n)
Certiorari Sec. 54 of RA 6657 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Certiorari Sec. 54 of RA 6657
Section 54. Certiorari. Any decision, order, award or ruling of the
DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act
and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy thereof.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based
on substantial evidence.
Certiorari Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46. (1a)
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)
Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
19
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar
Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998; A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition
filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner
shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public
respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such
private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own
behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected
by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor
of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not
against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition
is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer
or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is
elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall
be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise
specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate
in the proceedings therein. (5a)
Section 6. Order to comment. If the petition is sufficient in form
and substance to justify such process, the court shall issue an order
requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition
within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall
be served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct
together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, the provisions of section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before
giving due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file
their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter,
the court may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or
other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper. (6a)
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in
which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings,
and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case. (7a)
Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment
or other pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the
filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or submission of
memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the
court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.
The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be
patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
(8a)
Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A
certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last
preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such
manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be
punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or
costs awarded in accordance with section 1 of Rule 39. (9a)
Week 10 Support Services
Support Services for the Farmers and Landowners Secs. 36-39 RA
6657 as amended
SECTION 36. Funding for Support Services. In order to cover the
expenses and cost of support services, at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of all appropriations for agrarian reform shall be immediately
set aside and made available for this purpose. In addition, the DAR
shall be authorized to package proposals and receive grants, aid and
other forms of financial assistance from any source.
SECTION 37. Support Services to the Beneficiaries. The PARC
shall ensure that support services to farmers-beneficiaries are
provided, such as: (a) Land surveys and titling; (b) Liberalized terms
on credit facilities and production loans; (c) Extension services by way
of planting, cropping, production and postharvest technology transfer,
as well as marketing and management assistance and support to
cooperatives and farmers' organizations; (d) Infrastructure such as
access trails, mini-dams, public utilities, marketing and storage
facilities; and (e) Research, production and use of organic fertilizers
and other local substances necessary in farming and cultivation. The
PARC shall formulate policies to ensure that support services to
farmerbeneficiaries shall be provided at all stages of land reform. The
Bagong Kilusang Kabuhayan sa Kaunlaran (BKKK) Secretariat shall
be transferred and attached to the LBP, for its supervision including all
its applicable and existing funds, personnel, properties, equipment and
records. Misuse or diversion of the financial and support services
herein provided shall result in sanctions against the beneficiary guilty
thereof, including the forfeiture of the land transferred to him or lesser
sanctions as may be provided by the PARC, without prejudice to
criminal prosecution.
SECTION 38. Support Services to Landowners. The PARC with the
assistance of such other government agencies and instrumentalities as
it may direct, shall provide landowners affected by the CARP and prior
agrarian reform programs with the following services: (a) Investment
information financial and counseling assistance; (b) Facilities,
programs and schemes for the conversion or exchange of bonds issued
for payment of the lands acquired with stocks and bonds issued by the
National Government, the Central Bank and other government
institutions and instrumentalities; (c) Marketing of LBP bonds, as well
as promoting the marketability of said bonds in traditional and non-
traditional financial markets and stock exchanges; and (d) Other
services designed to utilize productively the proceeds of the sale of
such lands for rural industrialization. A landowner who invests in
rural-based industries shall be entitled to the incentives granted to a
registered enterprise engaged in a pioneer or preferred area of
20
investment as provided for in the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987,
or to such other incentives as the PARC, the LBP, or other government
financial institutions may provide. The LBP shall redeem a
landowner's LBP bonds at face value, provided that the proceeds
thereof shall be invested in a BOI-registered company or in any
agribusiness or agro-industrial enterprise in the region where the
landowner has previously made investments, to the extent of thirty
percent (30%) of the face value of said LBP bonds, subject to
guidelines that shall be issued by the LBP.
SECTION 39. Land Consolidation. The DAR shall carry out land
consolidation projects to promote equal distribution of landholdings,
to provide the needed infrastructures in agriculture, and to conserve
soil fertility and prevent erosion.
Prohibited Acts in the CARP Law Sec. 73, RA 6657 as amended
SECTION 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are
prohibited: (a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess
of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or
juridical, except those under collective ownership by farmer-
beneficiaries. (b) The forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who
are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail themselves of the
rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program. (c) The
conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any
nonagricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to
his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled
by them. (d) The willful prevention or obstruction by any person,
association or entity of the implementation of the CARP. (e) The sale,
transfer, conveyance or change of the nature of lands outside of urban
centers and city limits either in whole or in part after the effectivity of
this Act. The date of the registration of the deed of conveyance in the
Register of Deeds with respect to titled lands and the date of the
issuance of the tax declaration to the transferee of the property with
respect to unregistered lands, as the case may be, shall be conclusive
for the purpose of this Act. (f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a
beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the
land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
circumvent the provisions of this Act.
BAHA-TALIBAYOG: Tales of Injustices, Food Insecurity and
Environmental Danger
Silvino Cudiamat, a 67 year old farmer from Baha in Calatagan,
Batangas thought that he had already achieved his lifelong dream of
owning the piece of land that he had worked for since he was 16 years
old. Tatay Ben was a tenant for 11 years before he became a
beneficiary of the land reform program. He became one of the 323
beneficiaries of the land reform program under PD 27.
Today, Tatay Bens lifelong dream is about to be shattered into pieces.
He and his fellow agrarian reform beneficiaries of the land formerly
owned by Ceferino Ascue have been involved in a land controversy
since 1995. Biased government agencies and a legal system that favors
the rich have bended the law to favor the interests of the rich, leaving
the likes of Tatay Ben in danger of losing the land that they depend on
so much to live decent lives.
Social Justice
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
The land in this controversy was formerly owned by Ceferino Ascue.
The 507.87 hectare property was planted to rice and corn. The residents
of barangays Baha and Talibayog were tenants to the land.
In 1990, two years after the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, the property was distributed to the tenants. Being a
tenanted rice and corn land, the 507-hectare Ascue property was
distributed to 318 tenant farmers under the Operation Land Transfer of
the Marcos land reform law Presidential Decree No. 27. A total of
818 Emancipation Patents were distributed to the agrarian reform
beneficiaries.
For the next 10 years, the agrarian reform beneficiaries peacefully
tilled the land and, given a new lease to improve their lives, cultivated
the land according to their own plans and dreams. Some remained rice
and corn farmers, others preferred to grow vegetables and a variety of
other crops. Within those years they were able to fully pay the land
amortizations to the government.
Neither the ten long years of peaceful possession nor the fact that they
have fully paid the land amortizations kept the farmers safe from the
threat of losing what has become justly and rightfully theirs.
Seeds of Injustice
In 1995, the heirs of Ceferino Ascue sold the property to Asturias
Industries. They conveniently ignored the fact that the land was no
longer theirs and were aided by the fact that the Register of Deeds of
Batangas mysteriously failed to annotate the distribution of that the
land in the land title. The attack on the gains of social justice began as
soon as the questionable sale was consummated.
In July 1997, Asturias Industries was able to obtain from the DENR a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) and an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) covering 2,336.8
hectare including the land in question. This became their basis to claim
that the land was already classified as mineral land.
Asturias Industries began the intensification of legal maneuvers to
jeopardize the ownership of the farmers of the land by questioning the
distribution of the land under PD27. They claimed that it was
erroneously distributed since the land was never planted to rice and
corn and the former land owner did not recognize any tenancy
arrangements.
Bending the facts and the law against the farmers
In response to the protest of Asturias Industries, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) created Task Force Baha to verify the claims of mining
company. An ocular inspection was conducted and TF Baha reported
that (1) procedural lapses attended the OLT coverage; (2)significant
portions of the OLT-covered area were planted to sugar cane; and (3)
the landowner did not recognize tenancy relations with the ARBs.
A validating team was deployed by the DAR Region IV Office and
they reported that it cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt
that the property is planted to palay or corn and tenanted. The team
went on to recommend based on their findings the nullification of the
coverage of the land under OLT and 818 emancipation Patents the
DAR issued to the agrarian reform beneficiaries.
In August 4, 2000, the DAR through USEC for Operations Conrado S.
Navarro sustained the protest of ASTURIAS INDUSTRIES and
21
nullified the coverage of the land under OLT. Navarro cited that his
judgment was based on the premises that
(1) the landholding was not primarily devoted to the production of rice
or corn;
(2) the tenancy relations was not clearly established and
(3) the land long ceased to be agricultural as it is mineralized.
Just mere 10 years after the DAR distributed the land to the farmers, it
already danced to a different song the one that Asturias Industries is
playing. They did not even consider that their ocular inspection was 10
years too late and there have been changes in crops within the 10 year
period. They did not even consider that landowners when faced with
agrarian reform always deny having tenants. They even dug up a 1965
Bureau of Mines study to justify their claim that the land was
mineralized and therefore ceased to be agricultural a long time ago.
The Department of Agrarian Reform became instrumental in twisting
the facts and the law in laying the legal groundwork for undoing
agrarian reform that it is mandated to implement, promote and defend.
DARs arguments became the strongest legal arguments for
ASTURIAS INDUSTRIES when the case was brought to the Office of
the President, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court on appeal.
In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled against Tatay Ben and his fellow
Calatagan farmer beneficiaries and upheld the decision of the DAR
stating that: (1) the disputed land was erroneously covered by PD 27;
(2) the land was mineralized based on the DAR decision, the 1965
Bureau of Mines study and DENRs issuance of an MPSA and ECC to
Asturias Industries; and (the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents
issued to the farmers shall be a separate proceeding under the authority
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS
The decisions of the different government institutions in the Baha-
Talibayog case has serious implications to agrarian reform. These
decisions have far-reaching implications.
Based on the case, the development and promotion of the mining
industry has greater priority over social justice, agrarian reform and
agricultural development;
Lands can be classified as mineral by a mere study by the Bureau of
Mines previous to P.D. 27 and R.A. 6657, it is found that ample
reserves of mineral resources are found in the area even if there is no
positive act from the executive or the legislature;
Agricultural lands can now become mineral lands not by executive act
but through any mining agreement executed by the DENR and a
private person covering such agricultural land under the mining act;
Local government units within their territorial jurisdiction can change
the classification of an agricultural land to other uses by a mere passage
of a Zoning ordinance;
From Beneficiaries of Social Justice to Victims of Injustice
As agrarian reform beneficiaries, the Calatagan farmers were given
new hope to improve their lives and become productive members of
their community. They have developed the land that was distributed to
them and made them productive. They have faithfully paid their land
amortizations until it was fully paid. They are even faithful taxpayers
to their local government.
With the exception of the actual cancellation of the Emancipation
Patents issued to the Calatagan farmers in Baha and Talibayog, the
reversal of agrarian reform and the turnaround in social justice has
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
reached the highest level of our government system. All these favored
the rich despite the strength of the claim and ownership of the
Calatagan farmers of the land.
Where will the farmers turn when:
the Department of Agrarian Reform who is tasked to enforce the
implementation of agrarian reform, on the basis of a mere study of the
Bureau of Mines and an ocular inspection that is 10 years too late has
decided to nullify the coverage of the land that awarded them the lands
they now own?
the Department of the Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
who is tasked to protect the environment has prioritized mining over
food production and has given more weight to the claims of
ASTURIAS INDUSTRIES rather than the rights of agrarian reform
beneficiaries?
the Office of the President who holds the highest executive power of
the country has chosen to side uphold the convoluted and distorted
decision of the DAR?
the Supreme Court, the highest interpreter of laws of the land, has
chosen to interpret the laws according to the myopic, distorted and
biased view of the Department of Agrarian Reform?
Protest Walk: Lakbay-Kalampag para sa Lupang Sakahan, Hindi
Minahan
Last December 2007, the farmers of Calatagan walked in solidarity
with the Sumilao Farmers. From San Pedro in Laguna to the gates of
Malacaang, 36 Calatagan farmers walked side by side with the
Sumilao farmers.
On April 21, 2008, the agrarian reform beneficiaries from the
communities of Baha and Talibayog in Calatagan, will embark on a
journey on foot from their homes to the seat of power in Metro Manila
to make their voices heard. The government that gave them hope
through agrarian reform has betrayed them and they are making this
sacrifice to magnify the injustices committed against them.
Their 300-kilometer walk which will begin in the town Calatagan is
dedicated bare the injustices being committed against the farmers of
Calatagan in favor of the mining interests of Asturias Industries.
Through this walk, the farmers of Calatagan are calling for the
revocation of the Mineral Production Share Agreement (MPSA) issued
by the DENR to Asturias Industries. Their walk is their assertion of
their rights as owner-cultivators of the land.
Remembering the promise of San Miguel Corp. to the Sumilao farmers
By Atty. Arlene "Kaka" Bagao
Brief background
When the government began implementing the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in the late 1980s, the 144hectare
Higaonon ancestral land, which had come under the ownership of
Norberto Quisumbing thru the Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management
and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), was covered for
distribution to 137 Higaonon farmers. Bukidnon's provincial board,
allegedly influenced by Quisumbing, passed a resolution converting
the said agricultural land into agroindustrial, even though under the
law, conversion was unavailable because the land was prime
agricultural in character.
In 1997, the farmers staged a 28day hunger strike in Manila and
Cagayan de Oro to press their claim on the land. Then President Fidel
V. Ramos issued a "WinWin Resolution," awarding 100 hectares of
the contested land to the farmers and 44 hectares to Quisumbing. The
latter went to the Supreme Court, which invalidated the compromise
agreement on legal technicalities. But because the property remained
22
an agricultural land after five years, the farmers made another claim
and invoked the CARP provision stating that any property under land
conversion should be developed within 5 years.
The land was subsequently sold to San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
which began building a piggery complex on the property. Ostensibly
due to public pressure, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo revoked
the conversion order on the land, making it available once more for
agrarian reform. However, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
was slow to install the farmerbeneficiaries on the land.
In 2007, 55 Sumilao farmers walked 1,700 kilometers from Bukidnon
to Manila to enforce their rights over the land. Their twomonth walk,
called "Walk for Justice," attracted wide media attention and
overwhelming support from NGOs and different members of civil
society and forced SMC to negotiate with the farmers for a
compromise.
Updates on the compromise agreement
On March 29, 2008, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed
between the Sumilao farmers, SMC, DAR, and the Office of the
President. Representing the Church, which had been instrumental in
negotiating the compromise, was Manila Archbishop Gaudencio
Cardinal Rosales who served as witness to the agreement.
In the MOA, SMCrepresented by no less than its president Ramon
Angpledged to give a total of 144 hectares of land to the farmers.
SMC promised to release 50 hectares of its property and committed to
acquire the remaining 94 hectares outside the disputed estate for
distribution to the farmers.
After the signing of the MOA, the farmers returned home and began to
cultivate the 50 hectares of land covered in the agreement. Thereafter,
numerous meetings were held between the Sumilao farmers, SMC, and
DAR to discuss and follow up on the implementation of the MOA.
SMC and DAR promised several times to acquire the remaining 94
hectares and award the land titles to the farmers, however, these
deadlines were not met. The farmers complain that these delays are due
to the actions of SMC and DAR, which are not in accordance with the
agreement.
In September 2008, the farmers decided to accept DAR's offer of 94
hectares of land, even if said properties were located a considerable
distance, 10 to 15 kilometers away, from their home in San Vicente,
Sumilao. DAR had warned that if they did not accept the offer, the
lands would be conveyed to other farmerbeneficiaries. Hence, the
farmers felt they had no other option but to accept the offer.
On November 24, 2009, the farmers were once again disappointed
because although there was already a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) covering 15 of the 94 hectares to be awarded to them,
DAR said that the CLOA for the remaining 79 hectares could not yet
be processed because the department was still waiting for the
certification from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Manila
and that this process was taking a long time.
Frustrated by the slow pace of the MOA implementation, the farmers
decided to camp in front of the San Miguel Hog Farm on February 8,
2010 in order to protest the delays in the awarding and distribution of
the land. On that day, and in the presence of SMC legal counsel Atty.
Fred Peaflor, DAR Regional Director Felix Agujob promised the
farmers that they would be installed in their lands on or before March
29, 2010, the date of the second anniversary of the MOA signing.
March 29 came but the promised titles failed to materialize. A dialogue
was scheduled on that day between the parties concerned, however,
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law
Atty. Peaflor failed to appear. It was only on April 16, 2010, or more
than two years after the signing of the MOA, that the farmers received
the first batch of titles.
During the awarding ceremony held near the San Miguel Hog Farm in
Sumilao, Bukidnon, San Miguel Foods, Inc. President Francis Alejo
III turned over the title covering the 50 hectares within the 144hectare
contested property, while DAR Regional Director Aguhob awarded
the CLOA covering a total of 15 hectares outside the disputed land.
Bishop Honesto Pacana, Sumilao Mayor Mary Ann Baula, SMC legal
counsel Atty. Peaflor, and Sumilao legal counsel Atty. Arlene "Kaka"
Bagao witnessed the event.
Immediately afterwards, the farmers went to the 15hectare land in
Sitio Larok, Barangay Kisolon, Sumilao, which is more than 12
kilometers away from their homes in Barangay San Vicente. The
farmers, however, were shocked and dismayed to learn that their land
was not only leased to another corporation, Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), but was also planted with the latter's pineapples. Feeling
angry and cheated, the farmers uprooted the pineapples with the help
of a tractor. They tilled the land and began to plant cassava.
DMPI thru its legal counsel has threatened to file a case against the
farmers for destroying Del Monte's crops. Napoleon "Yoyong" Merida
Jr., Chairperson of the PANAWSumilao Mapalad Multipurpose
Cooperative (PANAWSumilao MPC) and paralegal for the Sumilao
farmers, has welcomed any legal action from DMPI, and he reiterated
the Sumilao farmers' position that they had the right to do what they
did because they owned the land.
Gross violation of the MOA
According to Merida, the implementation of the MOA is marred not
only by administrative delays, but also by gross violations on the part
of SMC and DAR.
The lands offered by San Miguel Corporation to the farmers are subject
of legal disputes. One such example is the 15 hectares covered by the
CLOA issued to the farmers. Said property was originally owned by
the family of Sumilao Mayor Baula and is currently leased to DMPI.
The Baula family then sold this land to SMC, which in turn gave the
properties to DAR for awarding and distribution to the farmers.
This constitutes gross violation of the MOA on the part of SMC, which
expressly guaranteed that all of the 144 hectares to be awarded to the
farmers would be clean and free from any encumbrance. SMC is
responsible and it cannot hide behind the excuse that it lacked
knowledge of the subsisting lease agreement because it is the buyer of
the property. Knowing that the land is being leased and is part of the
Del Monte plantation, SMC should not have offered this land to DAR
for distribution to the farmers.
More importantly, the MOA stipulated that the 94 hectares that will be
offered by San Miguel will be in the same condition as the original 94
hectares that the Sumilao farmers claimed. When the farmers walked
for more than 1,700 kilometers from Bukidnon to Malacanang in
Manila, they left the 144 hectares barren, without any crops planted
because they have been prevented since 1997 when they were
forcefully evicted from their ancestral land by Norberto Quisumbing.
It is only expected that the offered 94 hectares will be in the same
condition, no contests, no claimants, no encumbrances, not leased to
Del Monte and not planted with threemonth's old pineapple. After
two years since the signing of the agreement in 2008, San Miguel is
already liable for damages incurred by the Sumilao farmers for not
being able to cultivate the 94 hectares including loss of expected
income.
23
Together with the numerous delays which have plagued the
implementation of the MOA, this incident shows that SMC is not really
serious or sincere in fulfilling its commitments. SMC's actions betray
its claim of good faith and compliance. It cannot wash its hands and
point the finger at DAR or DMPI because its lack of diligence exhibits
bad faith in dealing with the farmers.

DAR is not without fault as well. It has promised many times that the
farmers would receive the titles to their lands. Administrative delays,
however, continue to hound the processing of the titles. To this date,
more than two years after the signing of the MOA, 79 of the 144
hectares promised to the farmers still remain without a CLOA.

DAR should also not have accepted SMC's offer to give the 15hectare
land to the farmers when said land is covered under a lease agreement.
As Merida put it, it would be a "fake" CLOA issued by DAR to the
farmers, if the latter cannot do what they, as rightful owners and
beneficiaries of the land, are entitled to under the law.

Sumilao farmers face suit

For asserting their right of ownership over the 15 hectares of land, the
Sumilao farmers are now facing a possible suit from yet another
corporation, Del Monte Philippines, Inc.

The CLOA covering the 15 hectares was registered on October 8,

2009; the title bore no indication of any encumbrance. During the
ocular inspection conducted in November 2009, there were no
pineapples on the subject property. DMPI planted the pineapples
sometime in January 2010, or after the CLOA was registered in favor
of the farmers.

The dispute could have been avoided and the farmers peaceably
installed in their land if only DMPI respected the farmer's rights and
desisted from planting the pineapples. DMPI is charged with
knowledge of the CLOA because its registration happened prior to the
planting of the pineapples. The Sumilao farmers have every right as
lawful owners to remove the said crops on their land and replace them
with their own.

Remembering Ka Rene
SMC and DAR have once more promised to install the Sumilao
farmers to their land by June 5, 2010, exactly one year after the death
of renowned leader and paralegal of the Sumilao farmers Ka Rene
Peas, who in 2007 led the group in their 1,700kilometer walk from
Bukidnon to Manila to demand the return of their ancestral land. Ka
Rene was assassinated on June 5, 2009, on his way home to his farm
in Sumilao, Bukidnon after the successful enactment of the CARP
Extension with Reforms (CARPER).

The Sumilao farmers have declared that if SMC and DAR fail to honor
their commitments under the MOA, the farmers will consider such
failure a denial of justice and an affront to the sacrifice of Ka Rene. If
their demand is not honored, the farmers would claim back their
original 144 hectares of land in regardless of SMC's promises.

24
By: Mary Rose G. Gimang
Agrarian Law