TUASON VS Reg.

of Deeds CALOOCAN, 157 SCRA 513

Facts:

Petitioner-spouses, the Tuasons, purchased a piece of land from Carmel Farms, Inc. (Carmel) in 1965. In
virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title was cancelled and the Tuasons were issued a new title. In 1973,
the Tuasons were given notice that they no longer own the property and it has been declared open for
disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Assoc. This is in accordance with
PD 293 declaring that all sale contracts between the government and original purchasers (including
Carmel) are cancelled and sale contracts between the latter and transferees and any other transfers are
declared invalid, null and void ab initio. The spouses filed this petition assailing the constitutionality of
the decree and that such decree is in violation of the Land Registration Act.

Issue: Whether or not PD 293 is valid

Held:

No. PD 293 reveals that President Marcos exercised a judicial function when he made determination of
facts and applied the law to those facts. It was shown that the acts were done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction - exercising judicial power not vested to him by
the Constitution. The petitioners were also deprived of their rights to due process in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Thus, the acts were not only unconstitutional becuase of th also in violation
of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor
Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant
to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way
amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st
Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative
functions are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to
any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987
Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating
in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving
the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
& affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery
and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations,
and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government
effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial
or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor
exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their
implementation.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC73 SCRA 333

Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 991
calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.20 days after or
on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031
, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisi
o n s o f Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed
inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.On the same date of 22 September 1976, the
President issued
Presidential Decree 1033,
stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16
October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on Elections
was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito
V.Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutionst h e r e i s n o g r a n t t o t h e i n c u m b e n t P r e s i d e n t t o e x e r c i s e t
h e c o n s t i t u e n t p o w e r t o p r o p o s e amendments to the new Constitution. As
a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional
or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman,
a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention,a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p o w e r t o p r o p o s e a m e n d m e n t s t o , o r r e v i s i o n
o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d u r i n g t h e transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still
another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October 1976 by Raul
M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714,

to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to

the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the
1 9 7 3 C o n s t i t u t i o n o n A m e n d m e n t s o r d a i n s t h a t " ( 1 ) A n y amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may by
a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of
all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section
15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon by special call the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of
normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of a l l i t s m e m b e r s ; o r ( 2 ) b y a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
C o n v e n t i o n c a l l e d b y a v o t e o f t w o - t h i r d s o f a l l t h e Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to
the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the
National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote
of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister. The Court i n A q u i n o v . C O M E L E C , h a d a l r e a d y s e t t l e d t h a t t h e
i n c u m b e n t P r e s i d e n t i s v e s t e d w i t h t h a t prerogative of discretion as to when he
shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions
of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted
on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly
soon found support from the peoplet h e m s e l v e s . In the plebiscite of January 10-
15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim N a t i o n a l Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim
National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,
because some of the members of Congress and delegates of
theC o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n , w h o w e r e d e e m e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y m e m b e r s o f
the interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the
people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm
of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the
usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending
process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business
of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of
theC o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t l e g i s l a t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r . I n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e a d i s t i n
c t i o n i s m a d e b e t w e e n constitutional content of an organic character and that of a
legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being
the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative
of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The
President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section
18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent
Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments

HELD:

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members.

The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution.

Disclaimer: I just copy pasted this from the actual paragraph from the case in
toto, if youre going to make a case digest from this, please make the necessary adjustments.