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SALIENT POINTS AND EN BANC DECISIONS1

ON POWERS AND STRUCTURE OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
(Articles VI, VII, VIII of 1987 Constitution)

ARTICLE VI

The Legislative Department

SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation,

GR No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008 (En Banc)- Congress has legislative and
oversight powers.

Puno, Separate Opinion, Macalintal vs. Comelec- the power of oversight is

intrinsic to the grant of legislative power. It embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted.

Santiago vs. Comelec, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (En Banc)- the provision
on the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
not self-executory. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.

Lambino vs Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 (En Banc)- In California
where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:
the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether
the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such
far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount

1
Prepared for the exclusive use of Barrister Law Review Center by Joan S. Largo, Professor, USC College of
Law, Cebu City
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to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a

proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from
the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from
a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution.

On the proposed amendment by initiative, that the proposed amendment must

be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people.

In view of the flaws in the Lambino petition, the Court did not revisit the Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. It declaredthat it must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on
some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled
doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the
case can be resolved on some other grounds.

SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be

elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

Art. IV, Section 2

In Re Aplication for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching petitioner, BM

No. 914, October 1, 1999 (En Banc)- Under Section 1 of CA No. 625, legitimate
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children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing

such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.

Bengson vs. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001 (En Banc)- Under the 1973
Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were
not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born
before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and
had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippine citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now considers those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born.
After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a
sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.

Altarejos vs. Comelec, GR No. 163256, November 10, 2004 (En Banc)- The law is
clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation
in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen. [But] The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's
application for repatriation subsists.

Valles vs. Comelec, GR No. 137000, August 9, 2000 (En Banc)- In order that
citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner's contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent
case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court
ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate
stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and
that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and
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COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as
an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was
holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a
certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus,
the mere fact that one was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be
express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for
an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one's citizenship. The application for an alien certificate of
registration, and the holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado
vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
citizenship — she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Mercado vs. Manzano, GR No. 135083, May 26, 1999 (En Banc)- Dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born
of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed
to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
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SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.

Mariano, Jr. vs Comelec, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (En Banc)- In the case
of Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, this Court ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable
situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Read RA 7941

Veterans Federation vs. Comelec, GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000 (En Banc)-
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution
and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters.
These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
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Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified"
to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party

is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

CIBAC vs. Comelec, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 (EN Banc)- The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided,
that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally,
that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable
parameters to determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election
mandated by the Constitution and R.A. 7941.

In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met
the 2% threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain
entitlement to extra seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement
to additional seats of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was
clearly explicated in Veterans.

Bantay Republic Act or BA- RA 7941 vs. Comelec, GR No. 177271, May 4, 2007
( En Banc)- Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names
of the nominees of the party-list groups.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.

Tobias vs. Abalos, GR No. 114783, December 8, 1994 (En Banc)-

reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly
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provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law.

SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is

a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election.

SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and
the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of
May.

SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a

special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term.

SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise
from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
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SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to
any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected.

Bitonio vs. COA, GR No. 147392, March 12, 2004 (En Banc)- Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to
receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly
provides. The presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. There was no separate or
special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited
from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such
prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf
of the Secretary of Labor.

SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally

appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government
for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July
for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
The President may call a special session at any time.

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
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or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1007 (En Banc)- Cases, both
here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation
of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.
Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’
Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.’

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 128055, April 18, 2001 (En Banc)- The
order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, supra. - The Journal is regarded as conclusive with

respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which
the two Houses shall be sitting.

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
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the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Guerrero vs. Comelec, GR No. 137004, July 26, 2000 (En Banc)- The contention
that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution was rejected. Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot
be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos
distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Moreover, the
argument that HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid proclamation of
the winning candidate is likewise without merit. In an electoral contest where
the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET.

Barbers vs. Comelec, GR No. 165691, June 22, 2005 (En Banc)- The alleged
invalidity of Biazon's proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the
election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such
dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.

Javier vs. Comelec, GR No. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986 (En Banc)- The
phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality
as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and
the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election
returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his delivery or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President

of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to
it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
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Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002 (En Banc)- An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The ad interim appointment remains effective until
such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be
withdrawn or revoked by the President. The Constitution imposes no condition
on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim
appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office
and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office.

SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the
call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.

SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and
be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to
and expenses incurred for each Member.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo
Sabio, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006 (En Banc)- The 1987 Constitution
recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of
its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms
which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
function are also available to the committees.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
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appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.

Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En Banc)- Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not
as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states
that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate
by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through
the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this
power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial
body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation
of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence
of the judiciary.
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Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 (En Banc) - May the
President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a
military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded
by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial
orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute. The refusal of the President to allow members of the military
to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislature's functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid
of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President's power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to conduct legislative
inquiries.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations, supra.- Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to
conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. This distinction gives birth to
another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in
Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 22.

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.

Gudani vs. Senga, supra.- Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy

over the military, the Constitution has allocated specific roles to the legislative
and executive branches of government in relation to military affairs. Military
appropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by Congress, as
is the power to declare the existence of a state of war. Congress is also
empowered to revoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. The approval of the Commission on Appointments is also
required before the President can promote military officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain. Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and
 Page 14 of 43

administration over the military, the Constitution is silent, except for the
commander-in-chief clause which is fertile in meaning and implication as to
whatever inherent martial authority the President may possess.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.

David vs. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (En Banc)- President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1)There must be a war or other
emergency; (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only; (3) The
delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe;
and (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Agan vs. PIATCO, GR No. 155001, May 5, 2003 (En Banc)- In the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the term "national emergency" was defined to
include threat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not
strikes "unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze government service."

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, September 1, 2005 (En Banc) - it is
not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute —
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would
 Page 15 of 43

be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power
of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.

SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill

unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994 (En Banc)- As the
Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation
therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,"
it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be
included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because
clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are
matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate
enactments.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow
the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and
shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or
to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law.
 Page 16 of 43

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for
the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect
until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
in the Journal.

Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, GR No. 115455, August 25, 1994 (En Banc)-
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, §
26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003 (En Banc)-
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The
Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by
the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006
must be resolved in its favor.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, supra.- the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated
in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other
house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a
way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it
would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress
would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
 Page 17 of 43

said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean
that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments
and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by
both houses of Congress is prohibited.

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise,
it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

Compare with pocket veto possessed by US Congress

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.

SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, supra.- Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected. The VAT is an antithesis of
progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of
progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT
paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is
the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same
portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in the income
earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher
the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that
is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin, the bigger
the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower
income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect
taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
 Page 18 of 43

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant

thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxation.

Lung Center vs. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004 (En Banc)- Under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to
the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal
proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
"Exclusive" is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a
manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively." If real property is used
for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted
purposes but is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or "principal use"
cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to
the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively. What is
meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes
is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the
income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is
used for tax-exempt purposes.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.

SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,

directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund
 Page 19 of 43

was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.

SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998 (En Banc)- Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.

SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed
by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof.
 Page 20 of 43

ARTICLE VII

Executive Department

SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989 (En Banc)- Although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. The President's residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people [is] founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and
term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003 (En
Banc)- If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court. The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the
House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.
Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates
on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to
that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in
the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated
or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment

requires no confirmation.
 Page 21 of 43

SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President
shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-
President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties
as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate
myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last
sentence will be omitted.)

SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the
President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased
during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
 Page 22 of 43

expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They
shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any
other source.

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152259, July 29, 2004 (En Banc)-
Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could
not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged
criminal acts done while sitting in office.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, supra- In In re: Sealed Case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of
executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and,
the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to
“communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential.” The latter includes ‘advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.”
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President
while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of
executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role; the second
on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the
presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-
deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the
presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny
than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential

communications privilege, In Re Sealed Case confines the privilege
only to White House Staff that has “operational proximity” to direct
presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass
only those functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving
what the court characterized as “quintessential and non-delegable
Presidential power,” such as commander-in-chief power, appointment
and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-
authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to
negotiate treaties etc.

For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of

privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over
 Page 23 of 43

the matter.” A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a

“precise and certain reason” for preserving their confidentiality.

Senate of the President vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En
Banc)- The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It
has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.
Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been
defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to
withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress."
Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public."
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has
encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while
it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more
accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to
furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds
of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success,
in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege
invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground
that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert
crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer's
privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged
with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal
deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to
the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to
the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in
maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military
and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive' domestic decisional and policy making functions,
that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in
intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
 Page 24 of 43

sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a

claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at the
beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until
the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or
shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become
President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified,
or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act
as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in
case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.

SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation

of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both
the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death,
permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to
the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
 Page 25 of 43

SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the
term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from
among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law
calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill
calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading
by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any
current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the
 Page 26 of 43

powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise,
the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of
the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and
foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not
be denied access to the President during such illness.

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896, February 22, 1991
(En Banc)- Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." We rule in the
negative. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed
to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when
such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. In order that such additional duties or
functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by
the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an
 Page 27 of 43

ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional

compensation therefor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that
these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to
his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance
attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is
actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is
not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.

SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective,

unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 139554, July 21, 2006 (En Banc)- Under Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
 Page 28 of 43

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers
to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-
ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to
the appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first
group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of
officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint
is declared unconstitutional.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers. In a department in the Executive branch, the head
is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such
Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In
an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be
preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the
chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of
the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers
other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-
ranked officers.

The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or

boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or
withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain
conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the
recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other
members of the commission or board.

This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing

power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative
limitations or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the
Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional
Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or
conditions.
 Page 29 of 43

The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked

officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person.
The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and
not to their members.

The 1987 Constitution has established three branches of government — the

Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In addition, there are the independent
constitutional bodies — like the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit,
Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman. Then there are the hybrid or
quasi-judicial agencies, exercising jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are under
the Executive branch for administrative supervision purposes, but whose
decisions are reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are the local government
units, which under the Constitution enjoy local autonomy subject only to
limitations Congress may impose by law. Local government units are subject to
general supervision by the President.

The Cultural Center of the Philippines does not fall under the Legislative or
Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent
constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local
government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order
creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the
President." Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the
CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of
control. By stating that the "President shall have control of all the executive . . .
offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but
even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is
far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 96409, February 14, 1992 (En Banc)- It is
a fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the President has
control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Equally well accepted,
as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some
of them to his Cabinet members, who in turn and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.

Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, GR No. 164171, February

20, 2006 (En Banc)- Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws,
 Page 30 of 43

within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of
a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President
and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal
levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-
legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-
making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended
to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. On the
propriety of challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding, in
Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, the Court
entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper
interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the
right of the party affected.

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, supra.- The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is

not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." His position
as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military."

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000
(En Banc)- When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. There is a clear textual commitment under
the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out
the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
 Page 31 of 43

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for
the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the
rest of Section 18, Article VII. Congress may revoke such proclamation or
suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there
must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it.
These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed
forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide
latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other
powers.

Sanlakas vs. Reyes, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (En Banc)- The above
provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling
out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the
Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
"[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The
only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the
Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive powers. The President's authority to declare a
 Page 32 of 43

state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a
call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able
to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

In Re: Ferdinand Arguelles, Jr. vs. Baladia, Jr., GR No. 167211, March 14, 2006
(En Banc)- A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to
relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a
petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
liberty.

Compare: Writ of Habeas Data (AM No.08-1-16-SC); Writ of Amparo (October

24, 2007)

SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
 Page 33 of 43

People vs. Salle, GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995 (En Banc)- The reason the
Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on
the pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to
prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the
judicial power. Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of
separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate
court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present
Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment" limitation, the President
could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend
executive clemency to any one whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to
merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the
1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power which did no
require conviction, the President had unimpeded power to grant pardon even
before the criminal case could be heard. And under the 1935 Constitution which
required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at any time after
conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there
could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the
system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of
the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the
Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a
presidential folly. Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision
consisting in the imposition of "convict ion by final judgment" requirement can
change the rule. The new Constitution did it. Hence, before an appellant may be
validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e.,
the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.

SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within
thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a
complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed
by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would
have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be
provided by law.

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Bayan vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 (En Banc)- Ratification is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of
the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of
the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the
 Page 34 of 43

process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a

treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such
ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that
ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the
treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty
subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was
expressed during the negotiation.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 158088, July 6, 2005 (En Banc)- The
power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should
not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This
Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of
mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel
the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the
President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.

SECTION 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the
opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a
budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures.

SECTION 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular
session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
 Page 35 of 43

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, supra.- The major difference between

the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is
not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.
 Page 36 of 43

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's
suit should be entertained. This Court opted to grant standing to most of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official

action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially

when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court
to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests
of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in
the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants,
this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
 Page 37 of 43

questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason being that respect for the doctrine of separation of powers
must be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, GR No. 118910, November 16, 1995 (En Banc)- The
difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been
noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of
its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring
that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to
the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken,
but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous
year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia against Justices Reynato Puno et al., AM No.
03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005 (En Banc)- There is only one Supreme Court from
whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. While most
of the Court's work is performed by its three divisions, the Court remains one
 Page 38 of 43

court — single, unitary, complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that,
while individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Court
states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the Court may be modified or reversed only by the Court en
banc.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at
least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except
by the court sitting en banc.

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

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(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

People vs. Mateo, GR No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 (En Banc)- Procedural
matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative
of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here
announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals,
a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court
on automatic review, is such a procedural matter. Pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10
of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,
dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases
similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND

MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS, A.C. No. 6052. December 11,
2003 (En Banc)- In his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted
earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP,
including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the
IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP.
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of
the IBP, including the election of its officers.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.
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SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof.

Maceda vs. Vasquez, GR No. 102781, April 22, 1993 (En Banc)- A judge who
falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court
for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act. However, in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. n
fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any
lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of
the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age and must have been for fifteen
years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,

probity, and independence.

SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.
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(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a
term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four
years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council
and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from
the submission of the list.

SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.

SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for
decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or
 Page 42 of 43

dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor.
The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Pedragoza vs. Comelec, GR No. 169885, July 25, 2006 (En Banc)- The lack of
certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to
observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official
responsible for the omission to account therefor [See I Record of the
Constitutional Commission 460]. Such absence of certification would not have
the effect of invalidating the decision.

Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or

resolution must state the reason therefor. By intent of the Constitution's
framers, as reflected in the language of the text, this requirement is mandatory.

SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia, supra.- The complainant likewise alleges that
the disposition of his various motions and pleadings through minute resolutions
amounted to a deprivation of due process. The Court is not duty-bound to issue
decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute
resolutions, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists.
When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the
Court) denies or dismisses a petition or a motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.

Partido ng Manggagawa vs. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006 (En
Banc)- Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion." A
ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to
govern other cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to
apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans
has been abandoned.

SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must
be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
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(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.

SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each
regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual
report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.