SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004]

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA)

Represented by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of
personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights
[1]
Employees Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the
[2]
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions dated 16 December 1999
and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the
upgrading and reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also
assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner.
The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the
appropriations of the CHR. These special provisions state:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of
their respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying
fiscal autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever
public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services itemization including, but not limited
to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and
employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement
gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended
balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized
under compensation standardization laws.

2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby
authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions,
resolutions, and training information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and
regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d)
necessary expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual employees; (e) payment of
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and transportation allowances, and
fringe benefits for their officials and employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes,
subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied)

On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P.
Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P.
Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998,
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission, to
wit:

WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided special provisions
applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on organizational structures
and authorizes the same to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices to
fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel and whenever public interest
so requires, make adjustments in the personnel services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer
of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees
whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpanded balance of, or
savings in the appropriations of their respective offices;

WHEREAS, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules
implementing the special provisions heretoforth mentioned;

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the
upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under Personal Services
to support the implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;

Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary Notice of Salary
[3]
Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement this resolution; . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely:
one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer
II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
[4]
Commissioners.
[5]
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or
raising of salary grades of the following positions in the Commission:
Position Salary Grade
Number of Total Salary
Positions Title Requirements
From To From To
12 Attorney VI (In Director IV 26 28 P229,104.00
the Regional
Field Offices)
4 Director III 27 28 38,928.00
Director IV
 1 Financial & Director IV 24 28 36,744.00
Management
Officer II
1 18 24 51,756.00
Budget Budget
Officer III Officer IV
1 18 24 51,756.00
Accountant III Chief
Accountant
1 18 24 51,756.00
Cashier III Cashier V
1 24 28 [6]
Information Director IV 36,744.00
Officer V

It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following positions:

A. Creation

Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Number of
Requirements
Positions
4 15 684,780.00
Security Officer II
(Coterminous)

B. Upgrading

Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Positions Requirements
From To From To
1 Attorney V Director IV 25 28 P28,092.00
2 Security 11 15 57,456.00
Security
Officer I
Officer II
------------------

Total 3 [7]
P 85,548.00

To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized
the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant
positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among
the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special
[8]
Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a
request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the
following justification:

Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it effectively involved the
elevation of the field units from divisions to services.

The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV,
SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one
previously denied.

The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and change the context from support to substantive
without actual change in functions.

In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of
divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we reiterate our previous stand denying
the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-
28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the
Central Office.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December
1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and Regional
Offices to implement the Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights
Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given
favorable recommendation.

Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation
Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer a
unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the
case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department
has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the
National Government.

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters
of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly
[9]
known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.
(Emphases supplied)

In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-
National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended to
the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of
the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees
of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate
authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as
well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999,
and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured. The decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George Q. Dumlao
[10]
[and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.

CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 09
June 2000.
Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-
Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the
CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The fallo of
the Court of Appeals decision provides:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil
Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9,
[11]
2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.

Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court contending that:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8522 (THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1998) DESPITE ITS BEING IN SHARP CONFLICT
WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE ITSELF.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NOS. 992800 AND 001354 AS WELL AS THAT
OF THE OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN STATING THAT THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT
THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES THE ACTION TAKEN BY IT IN COLLAPSING, UPGRADING
[12]
AND RECLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS THEREIN.

The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the Commission on
Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
 Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in
sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions
inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner
bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and
reclassification of positions therein.
Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there
exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization
of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez,
Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the
upgrading, reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM
because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous scrutiny of
the records in the case at bar, it is the Courts opinion that the present petition is imbued with merit.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party
is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
[13]
complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid,
potentially entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise
allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the
rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took
cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital
Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when
it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical
concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint
nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive
[14]
to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a condition
precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the CHR.
Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary
Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the
DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System. Thus:

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall
be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this purpose, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by
the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to all
positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

The term government refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional
Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards,
commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and
universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions shall include all corporations and financial institutions owned or
controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform
governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as defined above,
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the Court
of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or
superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
[15]
administer the government of the state.
The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but
in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L.
[16]
Buag, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation,
allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite
approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court

Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a compensation and benefits
scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the review of the Department of Budget and Management.
However, in view of the express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review authority
of the Department of Budget and Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of the Department of
Budget and Management is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or
entity concerned and determine if the same complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this
regard. The role of the Department of Budget and Management is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being
to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA officials and
employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws.

[17]
In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals, we held that the DBM has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the national
government.
[18] [19]
In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, the Court held that although the charter of the
Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its
employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation
and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system
established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned:

It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of
Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure
that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that
PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM
must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process,
achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and
evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. (Emphasis supplied.)

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification,
and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks
legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously
sought from the DBM is a superfluity.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that
[20]
the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the Court of Appeals Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR
belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no
uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit
shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:

Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are
granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on
the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police
commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and
planning agency. (Emphasis ours.)

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is
not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an
[21]
end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with
[22]
law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. In
[23]
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
[24]
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon, we explained:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of
the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.

...

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution
but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, [the] Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a
constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the
heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special
provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its
coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast,
the Special Provision Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations
Act of 1998 specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had
categorically authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement the
organizational structure of the Judiciary, to wit:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of
their respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to
formulate and implement organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries,
allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments
in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new
positions in the Judiciary; PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such
reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with
existing law, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with
salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. (Emphasis
supplied.)

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in
the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the
DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same,
kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters
of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly
[25]
known as the Compensation Standardization Law. (Emphasis supplied.)

The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act
No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and
[26]
other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.
Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly provided
that any form of adjustment in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of the
Salary Standardization Law.
The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic causes of
[27]
discontent of many civil servants. For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the
power to administer the Salary Standardization Law and to ensure that the spirit behind it is
observed. This power is part of the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our
government. The DBMs exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is
pursuant to the paramount law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative
Code.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of
providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM,
in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the
reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
 The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations
Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly
provides that no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided
by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the
creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs
proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions
of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this
would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified
compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency,
which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
[28]
construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, we echoed the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations coffers, the Secretary of
the DBM, as the Presidents alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front
seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in
particular and in the entire government in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-
National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-
047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No.
A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and
Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 36-50; Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 37.
[3]
Id. at 51-52.
[4]
Id. at 53-56.
[5]
Id. at 54.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 55.
[8]
Id. at 57.
[9]
Id. at 62-63.
[10]
Id. at 37.
[11]
Id. at 47.
[12]
Id. at 19-20.
[13]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law 243 (1996 ed.), citing Ex Parte Lewitt, 303 U.S. 633.
[14]
EASCO v. LTFRB, G.R. No. 149717, 07 October 2003, 413 SCRA 75.
[15]
Philippine Law Dictionary 21 (2nd ed.), citing Caw v. Benedicto, 63 OG 3393; 8 C.A.R. (2s) 814.
[16]
G.R. No. 143784, 05 February 2003, 397 SCRA 27, 35.
[17]
G.R. No. 119155, 30 January 1996, 252 SCRA599.
[18]
G.R. No. 131529, 30 April 1999, 306 SCRA 593, 609.
[19]
Rep. Act No. 7354 (1992).
[20]
Rollo, p. 46.
[21]
Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 388.
[22]
Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, 112056 and 119597, 11 September 1998, 295 SCRA 366.
[23]
Id.; Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Rollo, p. 63.
[26]
Article XXXIII, Rep. Act No. 8522, Special Provisions Applicable to all Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy.
[27]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 243 (1996 Ed).
[28]
G.R. No. 113079, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 30, citing Nestle v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738, 13 November 1991,
203 SCRA 504.