JURISPRUDENCE ON THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS: (People vs.

Leonor
Canay)

I. That when a client is represented by a law firm, any lawyer from

the same firm may appear without need of making a separate entry of
appearance; and

Note: Sir, I havent found any jurisprudence regarding this matter. But the
following jurisprudence cited herein might be helpful.

(1) Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., vs. Honorable Judge Jose R.

Ramolete et. al., G.R. No. L-56627 August 17, 1981

While the context of the above-quoted provision of the Rules that the formal
appearance of an attorney shall be filed with the court and served upon the
parties affected thereby clearly indicate that the appearance of such an
attorney shall be in writing, the underlying reason for such requirement is that
to enable the officers concerned to effectively serve processes on the attorney of
record. Accordingly, the fact that no formal written entry of appearance has
been filed by a new collaborating counsel or that the same was filed only after
he had filed certain pleadings could not seriously affect, much less nullify the
validity of the acts and the pleadings filed by the appearing attorney - as
wrongly held by respondent judge. (At most, the judge could compel the
attorney to file a formal written notice of appearance, in addition to his
appearance through the pleadings filed by him.)

It has thus been categorically ruled in Ong Ching vs. Ramolete, etc. et al. that
"while it may be desirable in the in interest of an orderly conduct of judicial
proceedings that a counsel for a party should file with the court his formal
written appearance in the case, before filing a pleading therein, or mention in
said pleading that he is submitting the same in collaboration with the counsel
of record, the mere circumstance that such acts were not done does not
warrant the conclusion that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal
effect whatsoever. "

As to Atty. Malilong's authority to appear as collaborating counsel, the

following provision of section 21 of Rule 138 reads:

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear.-An attorney is

presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require an attorney who assumes the right
 to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which
he appears, and to disclose whenever pertinent to any issue, the
name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make
such order as justice requires. ... .

It has been held that as a logical corollary of the presumption that a lawyer is
authorized to appear for the party he represents, it is also presumed that the
lawyer is authorized by, and has conferred with, his client regarding the case
before he files an important responsive pleading for and on behalf of the latter.

If respondent judge entertained any serious doubt on the authority of Atty.

Malilong even after the latter had formally entered his appearance in writing as
collaborating counsel for the therein petitioner, nine days after the perfection of
the appeal, respondent judge should have required the said attorney to
produce or prove his authority, in accordance with the above-quoted Rule.

Respondent judge in ruling that the appeal seasonably perfected by Atty.

Malilong on behalf of petitioner was "of no force and effect" notwithstanding
that petitioner indubitably proved at the reconsideration hearing that Atty.
Malilong had been duly employed as petitioner's legal counsel since February
16, 1980 at P2,500.00 per month, and in dismissing the appeal, manifestly
erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Respondent judge clearly ignored the oft-repeated principles laid down by the
Court that "(A) rigid adherence to the technical rules of procedure disregards
the fundamental aim of procedure to serve as an aid to justice, not as a means
for its frustration, and the objective of the Rules of Court to afford litigants
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their controversy. Thus,
excusable imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure or lapses in the
literal or rigid observance of a procedural rule or non- jurisdictional deadline
provided therein should be overlooked and brushed aside as trivial and
indecisive in the interest of fair play and justice when public policy is not
involved, no prejudice has been caused the adverse party and the court has not
been deprived of its authority or jurisdiction." 4

The Court does not look with favor on such disregard of basic rules and
principles by the lower courts which needlessly compel the aggrieved parties to
resort to the higher courts for redress and take up the time which they could
well devote to more meritorious cases, and it will administratively call judges to
account therefor i appropriate cases which manifest gross ignorance of the law
or incompetence. While the Court has held that it would not hold judges
administratively liable for honest errors of judgment, this case can hardly be
said to fall within such a category.

(2) Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., vs. Atty. Isidro L. Caracol A.C.
No. 7325 January 21, 2015
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a
lawyers appearance on behalf of his client, hence:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be

properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney isrequired to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, butthe presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable
grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to
appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears,
and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An
attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contemptas an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. (Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co., this Court said that
while a lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a
court requires that he show such authorization, it is imperative that he show
his authority to act. Thus:

A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client.
In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate
the acts performed by the counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on
its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to
adduce authorization from the client.

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a
person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a clients behalf
without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he
purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his
assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transaction.

II. That the power of contempt should be used lightly and with
caution by the courts

(1) Hon. Medel Arnaldo B. Belen vs. Josef Alberts Comilang G.R. No.
184487 February 27, 2013

x x x Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court

constitutes contempt, x x x. However, the Court finds that his conviction for
indirect contempt was procedurally defective because he was not afforded an
opportunity to rebut the contempt charges against him.

Under Sections 39 and 41 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the following

procedural requisites must be satisfied before the accused may be punished for
indirect contempt: (1) there must be an order requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt; (2) the respondent must be
given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him; and (3) there
must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider
respondents answer. Of these requisites, the law accords utmost importance to
the third as it embodies ones right to due process. Hence, it is essential that
the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against
him and to be heard in his defenses.11

The conclusive declaration in A.M. RTJ-1 0-2216 that Judge Belen's

disobedience to the CA's injunctive writ constitutes indirect contempt of court
cannot serve as a basis for the Court to be indifferent to or ignore the obvious
violation of his right to be heard, state his defenses and explain his side. The
power to punish for contempt is not limitless; it must be used sparingly with
caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions
of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.

All told, based on the circumstances disclosed in the records, the CA failed to
dutifully afford Judge Belen his right to be heard. Such failure consists of a
serious procedural defect that effectively nullifies the indirect contempt
proceedings.

(2) Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado vs. Antonio S. Go G.R. No. 167988

February 6, 2007

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court;

such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or
in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.
Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of public
interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel
the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the
Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the
Court.

In our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely
direct contempt and indirect contempt.

Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to

obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn
or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so.

On the other hand, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates

particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1
of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as

such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in
custody pending such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for indirect
contempt should be commenced, thus:

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may

be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a

verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)

As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect
contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by
the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined
must be complied with.

It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must
be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due
regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the
individual.

The limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are
delineated by the procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with such procedural guidelines is
mandatory considering that proceedings against person alleged to be guilty of
contempt are commonly treated as criminal in nature.

(3) Pedro Gamboa vs. Hon. Jose Teodoro G.R. No. L-4893 May 13, 1952

Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance with their orders.
Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised. A bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of the order of the
procedural rules should not immediately cause the institution of contempt
proceedings. "The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally
should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail." Such power
being "drastic and extra ordinary in its nature . . . should not be restored to . . .
unless necessary in the interest of justice."

(4) Jose S. Santos vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu G.R. Nos. 57190-
91 May 18, 1990

Although we agree with respondent judge that such acts are contumacious,
nevertheless the same cannot be summarily punished with abuse of discretion
and without due process of law. X x x

Contempt proceedings being also criminal in nature, any doubt should be

resolved in favor of the person against whom proceedings therefor have been
brought. 21 This Court has been and continues to be committed to the
authoritative doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should be
sparingly used and should be exercised on the preservative, and not on the
vindictive, principle. It should be used sparingly, with caution, deliberation
and due regard to constitutional rights. It should be exercised only when
necessary to prevent actual, direct obstruction of, or interference with the
administration of justice.

(5) Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120654
September 11, 1996

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is indispensable

to their right of self-preservation, to the execution of their powers, and to the
maintenance of their authority, and consequently to the due administration of
justice. It is an essential element, or is possessed as part, of judicial authority
vested by the Constitution in the courts. Put a little differently, the power is an
"implied constitutional power."

The power, however, is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution,
restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the
law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, it should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice. For, as observed in People vs. Estenzo: 19

There is a compelling and exigent need therefore for judges to take

utmost care lest prejudice, innate or covert hostility to personality
of counsel, or previous incidents lead them to characterize conduct
susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the dignity of the
court. It is ever timely to remember how easy it is to overstep the
dividing line that should separate the prosecutor from the judge,
 when both roles are merged in the same person. The infusion of
personal element may go unnoticed. Even if such were not the
case, objectively viewed, such an impression may be difficult to
avoid by laymen. That is a consideration that cannot be
overlooked.

Indeed, the contempt power could easily tempt a judge to make its exercise
nothing more than a camouflage for a wounded pride, a burning prejudice,
revenge, a misplaced passion, or selfish motives.