Republic of the Philippines Since ISRCs recruitment license had already expired on
SUPREME COURT September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April 12, 1994, an application
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4515 July 14, 2008
CECILIA A. AGNO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against
respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The record shows that respondent was the President of
International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a
corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for
overseas employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRCs recruitment
license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and
subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned from
participating in overseas recruitment.1
On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLEs
cancellation of ISRCs license with the Office of the President.
The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondents favor
in the Resolution dated March 30, 19932which set aside the order
of cancellation and directed both the DOLE and the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment
license of ISRC subject to the payment of a guarantee bond
which was double the amount required by law.
for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA.3
However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with
the Office of the President, particularly on August 9, 1992, the
respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement4 with a
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,5 the
husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno. The
Memorandum of Agreement is quoted in toto hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E.
national, and Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino citizen, have
entered into this Memorandum of Agreement this 9th day of
August 1992, at Manila, Philippines, concerning the joint
ownership and operation of INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND
RECRUITMENT CORPORATION (ISRC) and have mutually
agreed, in connection therewith, as follows:
1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties
on a 50-50 basis and accordingly, immediate steps shall
be taken to submit the necessary documents to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to legalize the
arrangement and to cause the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of stocks to Mr. Khalifa and his
group;
2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an
equal basis (50-50) after deducting all the pertinent
expenses that the officers of the corporation shall be:
Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. JOMA HUMED
KHALIFA, President and General Manager, Mr.
MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his designated
representative, Treasurer, Ms. Cecilia Agno all of whom
shall be members of the Board of Trustees together with
two others;
3. That for and in consideration of the above joint
ownership of the corporation, Mr. KHALIFA undertakes as
his contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the
following:
(a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (250,000.00) initially on or
before AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount to be
used to have the license of ISRC reinstated;
(b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the
additional amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (250,000.00) to start the
business operations of the corporation and to
liquidate pending government and other
obligations, if any;
4. The management of the corporation shall be handled
by Mr. KHALIFA and his group while the legal and
government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of Mr.
CAGATAN; mutual consideration with each other in the
course of the business operations shall be maintained in
order to avoid problem with the government, the workers
and the employers;
5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business
every month, with the assistance of a qualified accountant
and each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy
thereof; the share of the parties may be released to each
of them as often as the parties agree, however, advances
against the share of each may be agreed upon by the
parties;
6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC
before the signing of this agreement shall be the sole
responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or his
50% ownership shall be free from such claims.
Manila, August 9, 1992.
JOMA HUMED KHALIFA MARCIANO J.
CAGATAN
CECILIA AGNO
WITNESSES:
_______________ _________________
On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years
after the execution of the aforesaid agreement, a Complaint-
Affidavit6 for disbarment was filed with this Court by the
complainant against the respondent claiming that the latter used
fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband,
Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of
500,000.00 and that although the respondent received the
aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her inquiries with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA
that the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the
said Memorandum of Agreement could not be validated without
the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent
even had the complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was
then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as Treasurer
was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed
that the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of ISRC
remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did
not appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the
POEA, on the other hand, the complainant learned that ISRCs
recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own
personal benefit the 500,000.00 that she and her husband
invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return
the said sum of money, respondent issued a bank check dated
March 30, 19947 in favor of the complainant in the amount of
500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a
closed account. Despite repeated demands by complainant, the
respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his
dishonored check, prompting the complainant to file a case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent. An
information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta,
Rizal, charging the respondent with the said offense and a
warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter
failed several times to attend his arraignment. The complainant
prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a
bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and
her husband that the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to
install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced
them to invest in said corporation the amount of 500,000.00.
In his Comment,8 respondent denied the charges against him and
averred that while ISRCs recruitment license was cancelled by
the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by the Office of
the President on March 30, 1993, on appeal. During the
pendency of the said appeal, he and complainants husband
Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of Agreement because the
latter offered to buy shares of stock of ISRC in order to finance
the then pending appeal for the reinstatement of the ISRC license
and for Khalifa and the complainant to undertake the full
management and operation of the corporation. The respondent
further alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant,
paid on various dates the total amount of 500,000.00, which
respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of
money to pursue the appeal with the Office of the President.
According to the respondent, while there were still legal
procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to
non-stockholders, Khalifa and complainant were in a hurry to start
the business operation of ISRC. Consequently, respondent sold
and assigned his own shareholdings in ISRC for 500,000.00 to
Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment9 dated April 26,
1993. The respondent, in turn, issued a check in the amount of
500,000.00, which was not intended to be encashed but only to
guarantee the reimbursement of the money to Khalifa and the
complainant in case the appeal would be decided adversely
against ISRC. Conversely, the check would be returned to
respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The
respondent denied employing fraud or misrepresentation since
allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant decided to buy his shares
after being told, upon inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a
good case. The respondent averred that complainant was
motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating criminal
charges against him instead of seeking rescission of the Deed of
Assignment and refund of the consideration for the sale of the
shares of stock. The respondent surmised that they decided not
to proceed with the Memorandum of Agreement when
complainant had secured her own license after she had received
the Deed of Assignment and assumed the position of acting
treasurer of the ISRC. The respondent justified the non-
submission of copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of
Assignment and complainants appointment as Acting Treasurer
with the SEC because of the cancellation of ISRCs license to
recruit and the pendency of the appeal for reinstatement since
1989. Aside from a copy of the Deed of Assignment in favor of
the complainant and her husband Khalifa regarding the five
hundred shares of stock, respondent also presented in support of
his allegations copies of 1) his Letter10 dated April 12, 1994 to the
POEA requesting the renewal of ISRCs license, and 2) a
Letter11 dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and Regulation
Office of the POEA requiring him: (1) to submit an escrow
agreement with a reputable commercial banking corporation in
the amount of 400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal
claim of recruited workers; cash bond deposit of 200,000.00;
and surety bond of 100,000.00; and (2) to clear ISRCs pending
cases with said agency before respondents request for
reinstatement of ISRCs license as a land based agency.
In a Resolution12 dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held several hearings, the
last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those hearings,
the complainant presented her evidence. For his part, the
respondent, instead of presenting his defense before the CBD in
open court, opted to present a position paper which was allowed
by the Order dated April 20, 200413 of Commissioner San Juan.
However, in lieu of said position paper, the respondent submitted
a Memorandum14 after the complainant had filed her formal offer
of evidence. Eventually, on October 12, 2004, Commissioner San
Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation.15 Said the
Commissioner in her report:
There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement
between the parties was executed on 9 [August] 1992. In said
Memorandum, no mention was made of the assignment of shares
of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband. The
conditions stated therein was that the amount to be contributed
by the complainant shall be used for the reinstatement of the
license of the ISRC. No mention was made regarding the
assignment of shares in favor of the complainant and her
husband. Respondent presented a Deed of Assignment of shares
of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband worth
500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that there
is a super imposed date of 24 November 1994 in a notarial series
of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos, Notary Public, which raises doubt as
to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of Assignment
was executed when the complainant started her investigation
regarding the true condition of the corporation. Anent the
reinstatement of the license of the company there is no showing
that the respondent used the amount he received from the
complainant in compliance with the respondents undertakings in
the Memorandum of Agreement. The accusation of enticement
employed by respondent is supported by the fact that
complainant was made to appear that she will be appointed as
treasurer of the corporation, however there was no action on the
part of the respondent to change the composition of the Board of
Directors and the treasurer in the records of the corporation on
file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
respondent did not fully reveal the true condition of the
corporation regarding the reinstatement of the corporations
license to operate. Likewise the issuance of a check in favor of
the complainant on 30 March 1994 against a closed account
shows the respondent had no desire to return the money
entrusted to him for the reinstatement of the license of the
corporation. The letter of the POEA dated 24 May 1994 xxx
clearly show that the payment of surety bond will not suffice to
reinstate the license of the corporation in view of several cases of
violations of recruitment pending before the POEA against said
corporation. This fact was not disclosed to complainant when the
Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the parties.
Thus, the Commissioners recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested
lack of candor, when he knowingly failed to provide the
complainant with accurate and complete information due her
under the circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that
respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law in the
maximum period prescribed by law and to return the money
received from the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed
Resolution No. XVII-2005-10216 adopting and approving, with
modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding, the Recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents lack of candor when he knowingly
failed to provide complainant with the accurate and complete
information due her, Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Restitution of the money received from complainant.
Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court the Notice
of Resolution together with the records of Administrative Case
No. 4515.17
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 of the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. In
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-8319 dated January 28, 2006, the
IBP Board of Governors denied respondents motion on the
ground that it has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve a
matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June
28, 2006, a Motion for Reinvestigation20 was filed by the
respondent on September 12, 2006.
Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required
to manifest within ten (10) days from notice, if they were willing to
submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.21
In our Resolution22 dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action
respondents motion for reinvestigation in view of respondent
subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated December 27,
2006. In the same resolution, the Court noted (1) the said
respondents compliance and manifestation of December 27,
2006 relative to the aforementioned November 15, 2006
Resolution; (2) complainants Manifestation dated December 19,
2006, stating that she was willing to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors; (3) respondents Comment on Complainants
Manifestation dated January 4, 2007; and (4) complainants
Manifestation dated January 10, 2007.
At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondents challenge as to
complainants personality to file this complaint. In his Motion for
Reconsideration23 of the IBP Investigating Commissioners Report
and Recommendation of October 12, 2004, respondent contends
that complainant, not being a party-in-interest in the agreement
between respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal
standing to file the instant complaint.
Respondents argument lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 139-B24 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides
that proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. Accordingly,
we held in Navarro v. Meneses III,25 as reiterated in Ilusorio-
Bildner v. Lokin,26 that:
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal
personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients
nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury
from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the
proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted
by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed
to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Emphasis
ours)
The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos,27 viz:
[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice. (Word in brackets ours)
Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not
complainant herein was a party to the subject transaction. In any
event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto because
she is mentioned as the treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum of
Agreement;28 as well as one of the assignees in the Deed of
Assignment of shares of ISRC stocks which respondent alleged
to have executed;29 and as the payee in the bank check issued by
the respondent for the amount of 500,000.00.30
We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation when he entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and received from the
latter a sum of money in the amount of 500,000.00.
We rule in the affirmative.
The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she
gave the amount of P500,000.00 to the respondent to be used for
the reinstatement of ISRCs recruitment license as well as to start
the business operation of the corporation. The respondent,
however, claims that complainant misinterpreted their agreement
because the 500,000.00 the latter gave him was in payment of
his personal shares of ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of
Assignment.
We are constrained to give credence to the complainants
contention. The due execution and authenticity of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are
undisputed. Moreover, the terms thereof are clear and explicit
that for and in consideration of the joint ownership of ISRC, the
husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa Juma, would pay the
amount of 500,000.00, 250,000.00 of which would be used for
the reinstatement of ISRCs license, while the other 250,000.00
was for the start of the operation of the corporation and to
liquidate pending government and other obligations, if
any.31 Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged assignment of shares
mentioned. The testimony of the complainant32 on this score is
more credible than that of the respondent because it conforms
with the written stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the
respondents explanations with respect to the 500,000.00 in
question had been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his
Comment that the 500,000.00 was given to him initially for the
purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the President
and that he used the same to pay loans or to "reimburse
borrowed money" spent for the said purpose. However,
respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a hurry
to start the business operation of ISRC, the money was used to
buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for which he
executed a Deed of Assignment in complainants favor, which
respondent claimed he could validly do without the approval of
ISRCs Board of Directors. His subsequent
Memorandum33 submitted to the IBP contained new allegations
that aside from the 500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his
personal shares of ISRC stocks, an additional 500,000.00
should have been given to him as fresh capital of the corporation
and because of this failure of complainant to put up the alleged
fresh capital, ISRC was not able to put up the deposits required
by the POEA resulting in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC
up to the present.
Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the
respondent was seemingly evident right at the outset when he
entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and
operation of ISRC with the complainants husband, knowing fully
well that he could not do so without the consent of and/or
authority from the corporations Board of Directors. The unilateral
execution by respondent of the Deed of Assignment is a lame
excuse offered by the respondent. We agree with the observation
of Commissioner San Juan that the said deed, which was not at
all mentioned in the MOA, was executed by the respondent after
the complainant had conducted her investigation of the true
condition of the corporation. The so-called "guarantee check"
appears to have also been issued by respondent for the same
reason.
Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that
the complainant would be appointed treasurer and her husband
Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not complied
with the said undertaking as per the Certification34 dated October
13, 1995 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The
respondent could not justify his non-compliance with the terms of
the MOA by citing ISRCs inability to comply with other
governmental requirements for the reinstatement of its license for
various reasons, since the respondent failed to disclose the same
to the complainant and her husband.
Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as
to the true state of ISRCs affairs that the reinstatement of the
corporations recruitment license would require not only a
favorable action by the Office of the President on ISRCs appeal
and the payment of a surety bond, but also ISRCs clearance or
exoneration in its other cases for recruitment violations pending
with the POEA.35 The respondent could not pass the blame to the
complainant because of his belated excuse that complainant
failed to infuse an additional amount of 500,000.00. This new
defense is clearly an afterthought and not supported by evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as his
attorneys oath.
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates
the following :
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
1avv phi1
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty
and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the
legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. 36 A lawyer
must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior
should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.37 For, as
officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are
burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are
thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor. 38 Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with
others.39 Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct,
whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such
conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.40
Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP
Commissioner, as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors. What
is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross misconduct for
issuing a worthless check. 1avv phi 1
In Sanchez v. Somoso,41 the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid
another with a personal check from a bank account which he
knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard
to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers,
thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he
should hold in high esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, 42 we held that
the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,
as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large.
Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed
that it was only to guarantee the reimbursement of the
500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an
adverse decision in ISRCs appeal with the Office of the
President. We note, however, that said check was issued on
March 30, 1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to had
already been favorably acted upon on March 30, 1993. Hence,
our conclusion is that the check was issued only after the
complainant demanded the return of their 500,000.00
investment in ISRC. In any event, respondents act of issuing a
guarantee check for 500,000.00, when he was presumably
aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his bank account
against which the check was drawn was already closed, clearly
constitutes gross misconduct for which he should be penalized.
In sum, the amount of 500,000.00 was received by the
respondent for the reinstatement of the license, but there is no
showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent
failed to give any credible accounting or explanation as to the
disbursement of the said amount in accordance with the
stipulations in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose all the
existing hindrances to the renewal of ISRCs recruitment license,
which enticed complainant and her husband to part with the
aforesaid sum of money. He also admittedly issued a check
drawn against a closed account, which evinced his lack of
intention to return the money to the complainant pursuant to his
supposed guarantee. It is thus proper for the Court to order its
restitution as recommended by the IBP.
We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years by the IBP Board of Governors to
be too harsh considering that this is respondents first
administrative offense. It is settled that the appropriate penalty
which the Court may impose on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.43 Accordingly, for employing deceit and misrepresentation
in his personal dealings as well as for issuing a worthless check,
we rule and so hold that the penalty of suspension for one (1)
year and one (1) month from the practice of law is sufficient to be
meted out to respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is
SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) MONTH from
the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; and ordered to
RESTITUTE the amount of 500,000.00 to the complainant.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread
in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7747 July 14, 2008
CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu
filed a complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Antoniutti K. Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation, before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).2 Complainants attached therewith their
Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit3which they earlier filed before
the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, charging the respondent
and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).
The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:
Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony
U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of
Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth
Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading.4 Mr.
Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to
invest a minimum amount of 100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent
with said company. They were made to believe that the said
company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it
to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9%
of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand,
the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to
the investors the principal amount including the monthly
guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to
issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the
principal investments.5
It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketings promises were
false and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were
dishonored for the reason "account closed." The investors,
including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketings
office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already
ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named
Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the
rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to
Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth
Marketings Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent
assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the
obligations of the former company.6 To put a semblance of validity
to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement7 to that
effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further
deceive the investors.8 This prompted the complainants to send
demand letters to Wealth Marketings officers and directors which
remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint
for syndicated estafa against the respondent and his co-accused.9
Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into
hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date.
In an Order10 dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar
Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his
Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the
motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants.11 The
case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la
Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued
defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent
failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position
paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the
case was heard ex parte.
In his report,12 the Commissioner concluded that Wealth
Marketings executives (which included respondent herein)
conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by
engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors
to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no
such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly
licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that
Wealth Marketings financial status could not support the
investors demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears,
said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to
perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner
likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended
by this Court for committing similar acts of
defraudation.13 Considering the gravity of the acts committed, as
well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful
orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation
of the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid
down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and
said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the
land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that
respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa be disbarred and his name
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the
Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court.14
In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Commissioners report and
recommendation.15
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined whether in their professional or in their private
capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.16
In the present case, two corporations were created where the
respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketings
Chairman of the Board and Ur-Links representative. We quote
with approval the Commissioners findings, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutors Office of Makati,
it appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing
Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the
investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent
investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth
of the matter is that there was no actual foreign currency trading
since said corporation is not duly licensed or authorized by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing
and General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is
only 9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of
[in]corporation is (sic) only 605,000.00. Said corporation, as the
records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of
pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn
interests as promised. However, their company resources and
financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet
these demands if a situation such as this would arise.
xxxx
Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then
asking for the return of their investments, said respondent even
formed and made him part of a new company, Ur-Link
Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they met
the respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct
Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that respondent
is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
purpose of employing fraud.17
To be sure, respondents conduct falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving
the same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment.
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that
administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently
of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings.18 Besides, it is not
sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case
before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules
on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate.19 Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law.20 The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.21
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same
to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.
Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar.22
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is
facing an administrative case, for he had been previously
suspended from the practice of law in Samala v. Palaa23 and
Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa.24 In Samala,
respondent also played an important role in a corporation known
as First Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal
officer. As in this case, respondent committed the same offense
by making himself part of the money trading business when, in
fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI
was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of
suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.25 Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6)
months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.261avvphi1
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service
upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his
criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.27
Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted by
his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As in
Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office
not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his country.
conduct.28 The Court has emphatically stated that when the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that
he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him.29 Verily, respondents failure to comply
with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his
disrespect of judicial authorities.30 As a lawyer, he ought to know
that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by
this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against
lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross
and blatant disrespect of the Court.31 By his repeated cavalier
conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of
respect for the authority of the Court.32

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light

of his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was
penalized with a three-year suspension with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the
contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which
grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the
imposition of a much graver penalty --- disbarment.33 Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men
in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the
body politic.34

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby

DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be

A.C. No. 7280 November 16, 2006
DAHLIA S. GACIAS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment instituted by the
herein complainant Dahlia S. Gacias against Atty. Alexander
Bulauitan on grounds of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Herein respondent Atty. Alexander Bulauitan used to own a
parcel of land with an area of 1,242 square meters located at
Tuguegarao City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-79190. Sometime in February 1996, complainant and
respondent entered into an agreement for the purchase, on
installment basis, of a 92-square meter portion of the 1,242-
square meter lot at a unit price of 3,500.00 per square meter.
Out of the total consideration of 322,000.00, complainant initially
paid respondent, as down payment, US$3,100.00, or its
equivalent of 82,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt dated
February 28, 1996. Subsequent installment payments were
remitted, as mutually agreed upon, to the Bank of Philippine
Islands, Kamuning Branch, under the account of respondents
daughter, Joan Christine. All told, complainant had, as of
November 1996, paid the respondent, in cash and in kind, the
peso equivalent of US$6,950.00, which, per complainants
computation, using the $1:43 dollar-peso rate of exchange,
amounted to 300,000.00.
As complainant would also allege in her affidavit-complaint dated
April 23, 2001,1 as amended,2 she asked for the copy of the title
over the 92-square meter portion upon learning about the
mortgage the respondent constituted over his Tuguegarao
property. According to complainant, respondents inability to
produce the desired title impelled her not to complete payment
anymore and to request the return of the amount she had already
paid the respondent. Complainant further alleged that the
respondent agreed, but has not made good his undertaking, to
make reimbursement. Her request for assistance from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) proved futile, too.
Meanwhile, the mortgagee bank, China Bank, foreclosed the
mortgage constituted on the respondents property, then
consolidated the title over it in its name.
In his answer in compliance with an order from the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent admitted entering into
a land purchase agreement with the complainant, but stressed
the private nature of the transaction between them. He described
as premature the complainants demand for delivery of title
inasmuch as the aforementioned agreement was not
consummated for complainants failure to pay in full the purchase
price of the 92-square meter portion. Respondent admitted,
though, that he undertook to pay back the amount of 300,000.00
as a measure to avoid scandal, given what to him was
complainants penchant to make a scene whenever the
opportunity presented itself.
To the answer, complainant countered with a reply, to which
respondent filed a rejoinder.
In the meantime, complainant, upon the facts above narrated,
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondent before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan.
Following several failed preliminary conferences and hearings,
IBP Bar Discipline Hearing Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes
issued, on July 22, 2005, an order3 declaring the case as
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and position
papers submitted by the parties, with their attachments.
In its report dated November 8, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommends that respondent be adjudged guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
The recommendation to suspend and the findings holding it
together commend themselves for concurrence. 1wphi 1
The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.4The
complementing Rule 7.03 of the Code, on the other hand,
provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law." Another complementing
provision is found in the Rules of Court providing that a member
of the bar may be suspended or even removed from office as an
attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office.5 And
when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct,"
the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of the lawyers professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to
the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law invest him with. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza.6 "[T]he
grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court
are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct,
including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity."
Like Atty. Adaza in Orbe, respondent Atty. Bulauitan also refused
without justifiable reason to comply with his just obligation under
a contract he entered into with the complainant. There can be no
quibbling as to the complainant having paid respondent the
amount of 300,000.00 out of the total contract cost of
322,000.00. In other words, there had been substantial contract
compliance on the part of the complainant. A reciprocal effort
towards complying with his part of the bargain would have been
becoming of respondent, as a man of goodwill. It would appear,
however, that this kind of gesture was alas too much to hope for
from the respondent. For, instead of going through the motion of
delivering the portion of his property to its buyer after his receipt
of almost the entire purchase price therefor, the respondent
mortgaged the whole property without so much as informing the
complainant about it. Like the IBP investigating commissioner, the
Court finds the respondents act of giving the property in question
in mortgage bordering on the fraudulent and surely dishonest.
The Court, to be sure, takes stock of respondents attempt to
make amends by promising to return the amount of 300,000.00.
But this promise strikes the Court, as it did the IBP investigating
commissioner, as a mere ploy by the respondent to evade
criminal prosecution for estafa, what with the fact that he has yet
to make good his commitment to return.
Respondent had shown, through his dealing with the complainant
involving a tiny parcel of land, a want of professional honesty.
Such misdeed reflects on the moral stuff which he is made of. His
fitness to continue in the advocacy of law and manage the legal
affairs of others are thus put in serious doubt too. The private
nature of the transaction or the fact that the same was concluded
without the respondent taking advantage of his legal profession is
really of little moment. For, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him wanting in honesty, probity or
good demeanor.7
While the Court agrees with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline respecting the guilt of respondent and the propriety of a
suspension, it is not, however, inclined to impose the severe
recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, herein respondent, ATTY. ALEXANDER
BULAUITAN, is found guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty
and ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year effective upon his receipt hereof. Let copies of this
decision be spread on his record in the Bar Confidants Office and
furnished the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for
proper dissemination to all courts.
A.C. No. 7214 November 30, 2006
AILEEN A. FERANCULLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.
Tell the truth and shame the Devil
Shakespeare-Henry IV, Part I, III-1
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by Aileen Ferancullo (petitioner) against Atty. Sancho M.
Ferancullo, Jr. (respondent) grounded on his alleged commission
of estafa, bigamy and violation of the lawyers oath. Both parties
have starkly contrasting stories to tell. Hence, the necessity of
presenting both versions.
In a verified complaint dated December 17, 2004,1 complainant
narrated how respondent allegedly took advantage of their
attorney-client relationship to extort money from her in
consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases
and deceived her into marrying him by concealing his previous
marriage.
Her complaint-affidavit narrated that sometime in February 2004,
a certain SPO1 Lino Taytay referred her to respondent as she
was in need of legal aid concerning a string of complaints for
estafa filed against her. They allegedly agreed to a monthly
retainer fee of 10,000.00 in consideration for respondents legal
services; the first payment thereof made in the same month of
February at her residence in Central Park Condominium, Pasay
City. Respondent purportedly advised complainant to stay for the
meantime at his office located at GF-7, Elenel Apt., 2243 Luna
corner Mabolo Sts., Pasay City, to avoid arrest and to keep her
safe from the people suing and threatening her. He allegedly
went to the extent of sending his cousin, Felix Reyes, to fetch
complainant from her residence. At night, complainant and
respondent, together with the latters office staff, went out for
dining and relaxation.2
Complainant recounted further that respondent prodded her to
move into a more secure location, the Youth and Student Travel
Association of the Philippines in Paraaque.3 That allegedly
became the start of his courtship. Complainant averred that
respondent would send her breakfast and flowers. When asked
about his personal circumstances, respondent supposedly told
complainant that he was still single although he had a child out of
wedlock. Complainant also maintained that she saw no apparent
indications suggesting that respondent was married.4
As indicative of their romantic relationship, respondent and
complainant allegedly traveled to different places. According to
complainant, respondent took her to Antipolo to meet his relatives
and to Mindoro to attend the birthday celebration of his mother.
They also purportedly went to Cebu City to meet complainants
eldest child.5
Complainant claimed that in the beginning, respondent diligently
attended to her cases and advised her not to appear at the
hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor, assuring her that he
would attempt at a compromise agreement with the adverse
parties. For this purpose, between February and July 2004,
complainant purportedly entrusted to respondent varying amounts
of money totaling Four Hundred Thirty One Thousand Pesos
(431,000.00) based on his assurance that her cases merely
involved money claims which can be settled amicably.
Complainant claimed that she had to ask this amount from her
parents. Complainant did not ask from respondent for any receipt
evidencing the transaction.6
Complainant further alleged that she and respondent moved to a
unit at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City sometime in
April 2004, where they started living together as husband and
wife. The unit was purportedly owned by a client of respondent
who agreed to offset the amount of rental with the legal fees due
him.7
To corroborate her allegation that they lived together as husband
and wife, complainant annexed to her complaint-affidavit five (5)
photographs, three of which show intimate poses of complainant
and respondent.8 Complainant also recounted that during
respondents birthday celebration held on May 28, 2004 at the
rooftop of the Parrison Tower, he supposedly introduced
complainant as his wife to his guests.9 Complainant attached a
VCD copy documenting the event to her reply to respondents
answer.10 As averred, at the start of the video, complainant can
be seen entertaining the guests and overseeing the food
preparation. Early in the party, complainants three children
arrived. While respondent was walking around and entertaining
the guests, complainant stood behind the buffet table supervising
last minute preparation before the food was served. As the guests
started to get food from the buffet table, complainant approached
respondent. Respondent placed his hand on the hips of
complainant while the latter whispered at him. All throughout the
video, complainant was either standing behind the buffet table or
conversing with respondent and the guests.
Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June
2004. On August 4, 2004, complainant and respondent allegedly
wed in a rite solemnized in Kawit, Cavite.11 In support of this
averment, complainant annexed to the complaint a photocopy of
the marriage certificate.12
Two (2) months thereafter, in a casual conversation with a certain
Teresita Santos, another client of respondent, Santos told
complainant that respondent was already married to a certain
Marlin M. Maranan. Complainant then confronted respondent who
allegedly admitted that he was married but assured complainant
that he was ready to leave his wife so that they can be together.
The relationship between complainant and respondent turned
sour eventually leading to their separation.13
Complainant sought assistance from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). In a letter dated 14 October 2006, Atty.
Romarico Ayson sent a demand letter to respondent, urging the
latter to shoulder complainants hospitalization until her delivery
and provide monthly support for the child in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (30,000.00) thereafter.14
Complainant averred that since their separation, respondent and
his agents had been threatening her with arrest and lawsuits. She
also discovered that the criminal complaints remained pending
filed against her with the Office of the Prosecutor. She claimed
that respondent himself had been exerting efforts so that the
criminal complaints against her would proceed.15
In compliance with the IBP Order dated 6 January 2005,
respondent filed an answer,16 denying the allegations that he
committed estafa, maintained an illicit relationship and contracted
a bigamous marriage with complainant. While admitting that
complainant sought his legal services in connection with the
latters cases for estafa and illegal recruitment pending before the
Office of the Prosecutor, respondent insisted that his relationship
with complainant was purely professional. In particular, he
claimed that the purpose of his visits to complainants residence
was to show her court orders issued in relation to her cases. He
also averred that it was complainant who sought refuge in his
office and invited him and his legal staff for dinners to discuss her
cases.17
Respondent maintained that complainant insisted on skipping the
scheduled hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor. He also
denied receiving 431,000.00 from complainant, arguing that on
the alleged dates of payments, he was out for court
appearances.18 He admitted going to Cebu City upon the behest
of complainant who shouldered all his expenses, but the visit was
only for the purpose of discussing the cases with complainants
parents.19 Respondent denied meeting complainants eldest child
in Cebu City and all the other alleged trips they took together.20
Respondent likewise denied courting complainant asserting that
the latter had already known since February 2004 that he was
married.21 He claimed to be happily married to his legal wife. He
denied living in together with complainant or providing a
residence for complainant. According to him, complainant
vacated her residence at Central Park Condominium, Pasay City
because her lease application was denied.22 While he admitted
that the unit at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
belonged to his client, respondent insisted that his relatives had
been occupying the same since March 2004, thus making it
impossible for complainant to have transferred to said unit in April
2004.23
Respondent described as contrary to human experience the
allegation of complainant that he introduced her as his wife during
his birthday celebration on 28 May 2004, where his brothers and
sisters were also present. To support this claim, he submitted the
affidavits of fifteen guests in his party, stating that respondent did
not introduce complainant as his wife.24
Respondent also denied that a marriage celebration between him
and complainant took place on 4 August 2004 or that he signed
the marriage certificate and or that he got her pregnant. He had
already instituted corresponding criminal complaints against
complainant for the alleged falsification of his signature in the
marriage certificate. Respondent claimed that complainant was
extorting money from him, hence the filing of the administrative
complaint.25
Complainant submitted a Reply26 to respondents answer to rebut
his allegations. Annexed to her reply were receipts of payments
on utilities to prove that she actually lived at Parrison Tower and a
VCD copy showing the video clip of respondents birthday
celebration held on 28 May 2004. Complainant and respondent
also filed their respective position papers. In addition,
complainant filed a Manifestation and Reply with the following
annexes: (1) a blue polo barong and pants allegedly worn by
respondent during his birthday celebration on 28 May 2004; (2)
the original bank statement reciting the deposits made by
complainants parents of the amount of 431,000.00;27 (3) the
original passbook in the names of complainant
and respondent;28 and (4) the certified xerox copy from the
original of their marriage contract.29
In response thereto, respondent moved to expunge from the
records the annexes to complainants Manifestation and
Reply30 on the ground that he was not furnished a copy of said
annexes and that the Manifestation and Reply was an unsigned
pleading. Complainant filed an opposition thereto.31
On 20 January 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued its Report and
Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondent for
lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution32 dated 20
March 2006, finding the recommendation to be fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that the complaint lacked merit. The IBP believed that
the complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof to warrant the disbarment or suspension of
respondent. The IBP also ruled that the pictures and VCD not
having been duly authenticated could not be received in
evidence.
As is usual in cases of this nature, the adverse parties presented
conflicting versions. The duty to examine the claims and
counterclaims and the evidence to support them ideally lies with
the IBP, but in the instant case, its evaluation leaves much to be
desired.
Despite the numerous factual allegations presented by both
parties and the affidavits and documents to support them, the IBP
made only a general conclusion that complainant must be
motivated by greed in filing the instant administrative complaint.
Thus, the Court reviewed the records.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.33 For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.34
Contrary to the IBPs opinion, there is a preponderance of
evidence that respondent maintained an illicit relationship with
complainant who was not his legal wife. It also appears that
respondent contracted a second marriage with complainant as
evidenced by their marriage certificate.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract.35 Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of
its contents.36 The marriage certificate plainly indicates that a
marriage was celebrated between respondent and complainant
on 4 August 2004, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. The marriage certificate
should prevail over respondents claim that the marriage
certificate or his signature therein was falsified. The rule is that a
notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity.37
Respondent contends that the certified true copy of the marriage
contract should be expunged from the records because he was
not furnished a copy thereof and the Manifestation and Reply to
which it was annexed was an unsigned pleading. The records
show otherwise. A copy of said marriage certificate, denominated
as Annex "G," accompanied the initiatory complaint filed before
the IBP and furnished to respondent. In fact, respondent admitted
in paragraph 61 of his answer that he received a copy of the
marriage contract.38 A copy of complainants Manifestation and
Reply, to which a certified true copy of the questioned marriage
certificate was annexed, was also sent by registered mail to the
IBP.
The proscription against unsigned pleadings laid down in Section
3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the instant
case. In view of its nature, administrative proceedings against
lawyers are not strictly governed by the Rules of Court. As we
held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.39 Hence,
an administrative proceeding continues despite the desistance of
a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.40 Moreover, no defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in
the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as
substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the
whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in
a miscarriage of justice.41 That the copy of the Manifestation and
Reply furnished to respondent was not signed by either
complainant or her counsel is merely an innocuous error. In any
case, the copy thereof forming part of the IBP records was signed
by complainant.
All told, the Court finds that complainants version is more
credible, with the caveat that the Court is not accepting hook line
and sinker every allegation of complainant. There is substantial
evidence suggesting that more than a business or professional
relationship existed between complainant and respondent.
Complainant presented certain evidence either proving her claim
or demonstrating as incredible respondents defense that
complainant was merely extorting money from him. For instance,
to prove her allegation that she and respondent lived together,
complainant presented the original of the retainer agreement
between respondent and the owner of the condominium building
where they allegedly lived together. Complainant also attached to
her reply copies of receipts of payments on utilities and the
original passbook of an account in the names of both complainant
and respondent. These pieces of evidence were supposed to be
under the control or custody of respondent, but the latter offered
no explanation as to how complainant was able to produce them.
If respondents claim is to be believed, complainant must have
gone to great lengths just to fabricate or steal these pieces of
evidence, a theory that is not even suggested by respondent.
Incidentally, vis--vis complainants overwhelming allegations,
respondent offered only denials which are effectively self-serving
and weak under the law on evidence. Other than his general
claim that complainant only wanted money from him, respondent
did not even bother to create his own version of the supposed
extortion.
Moreover, the VCD documenting respondents birthday
celebration on 28 May 2004 belied respondents claim that he
acted as complainants legal counsel only and the concomitant
assumption that she was there herself as a guest only. In said
party, complainant entertained the guests and supervised the
food preparation. Obviously, these are not the usual actuations of
a client or a guest merely invited to a party.
Respondent would have this Court disregard the contents of the
VCD and of the intimate photos of respondent and complainant
on the ground that under the rules of evidence, the person who
took the pictures or videotaped the birthday party should identify
and authenticate the picture and VCD.
Respondents objection will be sustained in civil or criminal
litigation, but not in an administrative proceeding as in the instant
case. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.42
The Court, however, finds no sufficient evidence indicating that
respondent falsely promised the settlement of complainants
criminal cases in consideration of the amount of 431,000.00.
The bank statements showing the deposits made by
complainants parents are not conclusive of said claim because
they do not prove that said amounts were received by
respondent.
For what ethical breaches then may respondent be held liable?
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
On several occasions, the Court has held that an illicit relation is
considered disgraceful and immoral conduct which is subject to
disciplinary action.43 In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,44 it was held:
x x x x indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as
they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional
career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to
his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his
continued membership in, a great and noble profession.45
In Dantes v. Dantes,46 the Court ordered the disbarment of a
lawyer, describing as grossly immoral his conduct of engaging in
illicit relationships and abandoning his family. The Court exhorted
lawyers to refrain from scandalous behavior, thus:
In Barrientos vs. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in
its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character
has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public;
(ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect
prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.47
Respondents intimate relationship with a woman other than his
wife shows his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.48 It is a time-honored
rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.49 However, the
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in
a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a
member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where
any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired.50
The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be
suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances of
the case. In case of suspension, the period would range from one
year51 to indefinite suspension, as in the case of Cordova v.
Cordova,52 where the lawyer was found to have maintained an
adulterous relationship for two years and refused to support his
family.

In Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,53 disbarment was imposed as a penalty

on the lawyer who maintained illicit relationships with at least two
women during the subsistence of his marriage. And so was the
case in Toledo v. Toledo54 and Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,55 where
the lawyers subject of disciplinary actions were found to have
abandoned their legal wives and cohabited with other women.

The exacerbating circumstances present in the cited cases are

absent in this case. Moreover, complainant failed to prove that
respondent misappropriated her money. Thus, the Court finds
that suspension from the practice of law is adequate to penalize
respondent for his grossly immoral conduct.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found GUILTY

of gross immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof,
with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense
hereafter.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006
[CBD 05-1434]
JOHNNY NG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27,
2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents propensity to resort to undeserved
language and disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe
penalties will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again
committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose
Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by
Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor
case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is
the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a
Decision2 affirming the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit
(MRMI),3 pertinent portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under
consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of
respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. But we
cannot accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable
individuals, that the actual writer of the said decision is not at
all connected with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor
Arbiter in maintaining that the separation pay should be only
one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this
not clear enough, or is there another reason known only to
them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law
on the part of the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire
actually resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents
failed to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable
Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see
these glaring facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One
month per year of service and all of it to the affected
workers not to some people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent
practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners,
of the First Division do not know this, they are indeed
irrelevant to real life.
x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First
Division to see for themselves the evidence before them and
not merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of their
ponente. If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the
truth. Yes, honesty on the part of the Commissioners
concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor
practice stares them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact,
the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are
doubly so and with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed
committed an illegal strike, how come their only "penalty" is
removing their tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and
the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their small
hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the
finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis
to remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.
x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of
Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so
called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to
believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on
the tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open
wide passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the
ingress and egress of the premises, are blocked by
something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired
vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money
claims. Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of
money claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment.
Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name
we should call this new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But
only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this
rule and only when the money claims involved are
substantial. When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips
proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their
service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim
from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged
blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible
to the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs
more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration
(as ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his
co-commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown
great and irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion
and ignorance of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and
should not be allowed to have anything to do with the instant
case any more. Commissioner Go and Chairman Seeres, by
negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC
rules prohibit the inhibition of the entire division, Chairman
Seeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two (2)
other commissioners from another division to sit with him and
pass final judgment in the instant case.4 (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005,
respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends
to harass him and to influence the result of the cases between
complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are
pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the
NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X
of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions
against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases
before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC,
the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners
are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct
similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and
that the labor lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously
practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a contingent basis
are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get
cheated in their cases by reason of corruption and collusion by
the cheats from the other sectors who make their lives and the
lives of their constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers
for the employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have
no reason to feel aggrieved.5
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union
president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and
Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers
in several instances, such that while the labor case is pending
before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a new case
against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon
City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus splitting the
jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office
(CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03;
that although Ng signed the disbarment complaint against Alar,
respondents Parass and Cruzs office instigated the said
complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's company did not pay
income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to
fire and respondents consented to this act of the employer which
violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started,
there were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of
the employer and the respondents, the number of complainants
were reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01,
19-02 and 19-03.6
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14,
2005,7 respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time did they
file multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or
brook interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings;
the reliefs sought before the CEO has nothing to do with the case
pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and
illegal structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and
unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was
requested to investigate certain nuisance structures located
outside the employer's property, which consist of shanties, tents,
banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free
ingress to and egress out of the employer's property and present
clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer found
the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA
ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with the NLRC is
completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did
not validate or justify the construction of illegal nuisance
structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures
pursuant to its power to protect life, property and legal order; it
was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against
respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client on how to go
about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the
derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as an excuse
for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their
brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only
reason the number of complainants were reduced is because of
the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of
them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and
litigation cases; at no time were they consulted regarding the tax
concerns of their client and therefore were never privy to the
financial records of the latter; at no time did they give advice
regarding their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at
a disbarment case against them is unwarranted, unjustified and
obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by
the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez for investigation, report
and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using
improper and abusive language and recommended that
respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three
months with a stern warning that more severe penalty will be
imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find
any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and
therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint against them
be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of
Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the
Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that
respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC,
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence.
Respondent used improper and offensive language in his
pleadings that does not admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the
scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge
Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the
facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law
and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high
esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run
short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.10 A
lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession.11Submitting pleadings containing
countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and attacking
both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its
commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not
part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial
Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v.
Gordolla,12 the Court held that respondent became unmindful of
the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a
member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and
whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.13
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to
some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter
the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers
who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them
as members of the Bar.14
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and
again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying
degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or
irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower
courts. Resort by an attorney in a motion for reconsideration
to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way
to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the
motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." It is in this
context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought
best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case"
does not give him unbridled license in language. To be sure,
lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
effective, in calling the Courts attention to the issues involved.
The language vehicle does not run short of expressions,
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration, or which could have the effect of
"harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is
the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon
which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who
are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." Stability of judicial
institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result
of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when we say
that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the
one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right
direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of
propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our
system of government.16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics
perception of the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by
the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents
violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the
amount of 5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz,
the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved
by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position
paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to
do so.1wphi1
At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office
of the City Engineer really partakes of a different cause of action,
which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was
made by the city engineer. Respondents remedy should be to
question that decision, not bring it to this Commission which has
no jurisdiction over it. We can not substitute our judgment for the
proper courts who should determine the propriety or sagacity of
the city engineers action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves
of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed
the bounds of decency. In supporting the action against
respondents conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it
is the attorneys duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge
from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This
requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to
wild and groundless accusation but also to discourage other
people from so doing and to come to his defense when he is so
subjected. By the very nature of his position a judge lacks the
power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded
criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no other, who can
better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People
v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board
v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102
Phil. 152 (1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by
Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more
apropos would be the contents of the complaint and whether the
same is sufficient to consider disciplinary sanctions.
encourages compromise is no less the clients champion in
settlement out of court than he is the clients champion in the
battle in court." (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958);
cited in Agpalos Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore
respondent Alar[]s beef with the execution of these waivers if
these were executed freely by his clients?
All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against
Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the dismissal of the counter-
complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.17
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar
GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of 5,000.00
with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and
respondent lawyers have already stated that they were not Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
engaged as counsels to take care of their clients tax problems,
then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any
wrongdoing has been committed by complainant Ng, he should
answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for such
acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys
Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco. 1wphi1

Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly
diminished from about 100 claimants to less than half the number
is not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are duty bound
to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial
proceedings while a necessary part of the practice is not
encouraged, because it will save expenses and help unclogged
[sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is no reason
to prevent the same. There is nothing in the counter-complaint
which shows that the compromise agreement and waivers
executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to hold lawyers
liable for the same. Besides, a "compromise is as often the better
part of justice as prudence the part of valor and a lawyer who
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1234 October 16, 2000
ATTY. JESUS G. CHAVEZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PANCRACIO N. ESCAAN, respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
In a sworn-letter complaint, dated April 8, 1997, complainant
Jesus G. Chavez, who is one of the lawyers of the Public
Attorney's Office in Butuan City, charged respondent Pancracio
N. Escaan, Municipal Trial Court Judge of Buenavista, Agusan
del Norte, with Gross Ignorance of the Law allegedly committed
as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3128, entitled "People vs. Dexton
Umpad" for Homicide resulting to Reckless Imprudence,
respondent Judge allegedly issued several Orders (dated
August 12, 1996 and August 19, 1996) to implead the
owner of the vehicle as an accused in the aforesaid
criminal case;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7074, entitled "People vs. Ramil
Alcover, et. al." for Frustrated Homicide, respondent
Judge issued a warrant of arrest for Ramil Alcover based
on the lone hearsay testimony of the victim's wife during
the preliminary examination; and
3. In Civil Case No. 557 entitled "Umbelina dela Serna vs.
Mr. & Mrs. Josito Mahubay" for Recovery of Possession,
etc., respondent Judge denied in open court the motion to
dismiss filed by complainant on the very day the
Opposition was received despite complainant's Request
for Time to File a Reply.
Further, on the scheduled pre-trial on March 31, 1997, the
defendant was declared as in default because he and his counsel
(herein complainant) arrived almost one (1) hour late.
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration filed immediately
thereafter was denied by respondent judge on the very same day.
While on an earlier date, respondent refused to declare plaintiff
non-suited when his counsel failed to appear.
In his Comment dated August 20, 1997, respondent Judge
denied the accusation, explaining thus:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3128, entitled "People vs. Dexton
Umpad" for Homicide resulting to Reckless Imprudence, it
was the provincial prosecutor who manifested in open
court that he will file an Amended Complaint. It was
because of this manifestation that the court issued the
Omnibus Order dated August 19, 1996.
2. In Criminal Case No. 7074, entitled "People vs. Ramil
Alcover, et. al." for Frustrated Homicide, the records will
show that the case had already been forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office. Complainant was probably
not aware that "probable cause may be decided in the
light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the Judge conducting the examination - Ortiz
vs. Palaypayon, 234 SCRA 391." Moreover, he recalls
that the victim was hovering between life and death at that
time and he believed that there is necessity of placing the
accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.
3. In Civil Case No. 557, entitled "Umbelina dela Serna
vs. Mr. & Mrs. Josito Mahubay" for Recovery of
Possession, etc., it was actually complainant himself as
counsel for the defendant , who caused the delay due to
his numerous postponements. Respondent Judge admits
that he denied complainant's motion to dismiss and
 required him to answer the complaint instead. On March
31, 1997, defendant was declared in default for his and
his counsel's (herein complainant) failure to appear in
court despite notice. Complainant's motion for
reconsideration, filed on the same day, was denied for
lack of merit. The order of default was, however,
subsequently lifted on April 22, 1997 after the defendant
and the counsel for the plaintiff appeared before the court
asking for its lifting.
As regards complainant's request for investigation on respondent
Judge's legitimacy as a lawyer, the latter pointed out that he was
recommended to the Judicial and Bar Council by the IBP Manila II
Chapter which paved the way for his appointment.
In Reply, complainant admitted that respondent Judge unilaterally
recalled the order of default in Civil Case No. 557,
entitled "Umbelina dela Serna vs. Mahubay", but ordered the
inclusion of the owner of the vehicle as an accused in Criminal
Case No. 3180, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Nilo
Bermudez, et. al." for Homicide, Multiple Injuries and Damage to
Property through Reckless Imprudence despite the ruling in the
case cited1 by respondent Judge himself, that the liability of the
owner of the vehicle is purely civil in nature.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution, dated September 22,
1999, requiring respondent Judge to manifest whether he is
submitting the case for decision, the latter sent a letter dated
October 29, 1999, informing the Court that complainant is
notorious in their area for indiscriminately filing cases and for
threatening judges whenever a ruling appears not acceptable to
him. According to respondent Judge his actuations were not
motivated by fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
On October 12, 1999, complainant submitted a Supplemental
Comment, also accusing respondent Judge as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3342, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Restituto Mapute, Jr., et al.", for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition, respondent
Judge falsified the Order dated September 29, 1999,
making it appear that the case was reset upon request of
the public prosecutor when in truth and in fact, respondent
Judge failed to attend the hearing as he was in Nasipit
attending the town fiesta;
2. In Civil Case No. 572, entitled "Candida Vda. de
Sarsada vs. Concepcion Vda. de Maligmat", for Unlawful
Detainer, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint for
mere failure of plaintiff to move for setting of pre-trial
under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court;
3. In Criminal Case No. 3330, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Segundo Espina", for Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition, respondent Judge issued an
Order instead of Decision or Judgment and reduced the
penalty one (1) degree even if there was only one (1)
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty;
4. In "People of the Philippines vs. Sonia Palomado" for
Violation of B.P. 22 filed by the Rural Bank of Buenavista,
respondent Judge dismissed the cause after his wife tried
to borrow money from the said bank but failed to get the
proceeds therefrom on the same day;
5. In Criminal Case No. 3204 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. SPO4 Mario Hidalgo" for Unlawful Arrest,
respondent Judge dismissed the case outright on the
presumption that official duties were regularly performed;
6. In Civil Case No. 557, entitled "Dela Serna vs.
Mahubay", for Recovery of Possession, etc., respondent
Judge ruled that the court has no power or authority to
change or modify the official stenographer's notes nor
 correct her work. Further, he denied the Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground that the complaint clearly defined
plaintiff's right to a relief. Admittedly, however, said Order
was the subject of a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court (SP Civil Case No. 875) but the
same was denied. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied by the same Court.
As Comment to subject Supplemental Complaint, respondent
Judge pointed out that the complainant has a behavioral problem
and has even directed his ire to the wife of respondent, who is not
connected with the court and whose business activities he
(respondent Judge) does not interfere with. Respondent theorizes
that the complainant is determined to intrude into the exercise of
his (respondent's) judicial prerogative even though the parties
involved have not questioned his (respondent's) actuations.
Respondent Judge will be compulsorily retired on May 12, 2003,
at the age of seventy (70).
The Office of the Court Administrator, to whom the matter was
referred, found that most of the charges against the respondent
Judge are purely judicial matters, which involve the exercise of
judicial function. However, OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined Five Thousand (5,000.00) Pesos for gross
ignorance of the law, particularly concerning the liability of an
owner of a motor vehicle which figured in a vehicular accident,
which is purely civil in nature.
Pertinent portions of the Report of OCA dated February 14, 2000,
read:
"We agree with the contention of respondent Judge that most of
the charges being imputed against him are on matters involving
the exercise of his judicial function. In Criminal Case No. 7074, he
allegedly issued a warrant of arrest based on the lone hearsay
testimony of the victim's wife; in Civil Case No. 557, he allegedly
denied the motion to dismiss despite request for time to file a
reply and subsequently declared defendant in default when they
arrived late on a scheduled pre-trial; in Civil Case No. 572, he
allegedly dismissed the complaint for mere failure of plaintiff to
move for setting of pre-trial; in Criminal Case No. 3330, he
allegedly issued an Order instead of Decision or Judgment and
reduced the penalty to one (1) degree even if there was only one
(1) mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty; and in Criminal Case
No. 3204, he alleged dismissed the case outright on the
presumption that official duties were regularly performed.
Apparently, all the foregoing are purely judicial matters, and any
question on respondent's actuations should be raised before the
regular court of competent jurisdiction.
And even assuming that there was error on the part of
respondent in applying the law applicable to the case, he should
not be held administratively accountable for his ratiocination,
unless he acted in bad faith and knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment.
In Dizon vs. Borja, (37 SCRA 46, 52) the Supreme Court ruled:
'To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would
be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable.'
However, with respect to Criminal Case No. 3128, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Umpad" for Reckless Imprudence,
we cannot close our eyes to the fact that respondent issued
orders to implead the owner of the motor vehicle. Said orders are
hereinafter quoted, to wit:
On his part, respondent explains that said Orders were not
issued motu proprio but rather upon the manifestation of the
provincial prosecutor that he will file an amended complaint. Yet,
in a similar case, Criminal Case No. 3180, entitled 'People of the
Philippines vs. Nilo Bermudez and Sergio Pascual' for Reckless
Imprudence, respondent issued an Order dated June 26, 1996
finding both the driver Bermudez and the vehicle owner Pascual
'probably guilty' and ordered the arrest of both; xxx
It is quite elementary that in criminal cases for reckless
imprudence only the driver should be impleaded or charged as
the liability of the owner or operator of the vehicle, if any, is purely
civil in nature. As held in 'Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.',
160 SCRA 367:
'A criminal case based on the accused driver's violation of Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code is different from the complaint for
damages based on quasi-delict where both driver and bus owner
are defendants.'
Evidently, respondent Judge is ignorant of this very basic
principle. And although a judge may not always be subjected to
disciplinary action for an error of judgment or unawareness of
other appropriate legal rules, the error of respondent Judge in
including the owners of vehicle as accused in criminal cases for
reckless imprudence is so gross and patent as to warrant a
finding of Ignorance of the Law. xxx
Anent the charge that respondent Judge falsified the Order dated
September 29, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 3342, as well as the
charge that he dismissed the case filed by Rural Bank of
Buenavista against Sonia Palomado for Violation of B.P. 22 for
failure of said bank to award the loan applied for by his wife,
complainant failed to present even an iota of evidence to prove
the same.
Finally, relative to the insinuation in the complaint that respondent
is not a member of the Bar and, therefore, not qualified for the
office he holds, we consulted in the law list published by the
Supreme Court and it appears therein that respondent was
admitted to the Bar on February 13, 1961 (p. 299 of the Law List).
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Judge Pancracio N. Escaan,
MTC Buenavista, Agusan del Norte be FINED in the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) for Gross Ignorance of the
Law for including the owners of the vehicle in criminal cases for
reckless imprudence. "2
The Court finds the aforesaid Report of the Office of the Court
Administrator sustainable. 1w phi 1
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a judge cannot be
subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as he has
acted in good faith.3
However, despite the absence of any showing of bad faith in the
case under consideration, the facts indicate that respondent
Judge is ignorant of the law and jurisprudence that the owner of a
motor vehicle may not be impleaded as an accused in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence instituted as a result of a
vehicular accident involving the said motor vehicle.
A judge has the duty to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the laws and rules of procedure. The Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates that judges must be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. He must have the basic
rules on the palm of his hand and be proficient in the
interpretation of laws and procedural rules.4
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Pancracio N. Escaan is
hereby FINED FIVE THOUSAND (5,000.00) PESOS and
WARNED that a repetition of the same act or omission will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5098 April 11, 2012
JOSEFINA M. ANION, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio
Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1) violating the lawyers duty to
preserve confidential information received from his client;1 and (2)
violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.2
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that
she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in
the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over
a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido
Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence
when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the
legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty.
Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from
her in filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the
preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he
denied having received any confidential information. Atty.
Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was
instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the
disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty.
Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the
disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated
November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr.
found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing
conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a
case to nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up
inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Caete,
respondents present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not
initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of
complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by
complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the
said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline
his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of
the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent
conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all
parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the
present case, no such written consent was secured by
respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Caetes
counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondents present client, being contending
claimants to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously
present. There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on
behalf of one client, it is the attorneys duty to contend for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if
he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with which
we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to
nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale
between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)3
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.4
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be
fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws
and rules.5 The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP
Commissioners recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the
IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated
July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings
and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence.
This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote
a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation
from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for
his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyers
duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a
matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action."7 The
prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to
use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated."8 To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough
that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose
the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."9
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a
violation of the above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other
client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6
708.htm - _ftnThus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there
is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that
duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_67
08.htm - _ftn Still another test is whether the lawyer would be
called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous
employment.10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug20
05/ac_6708.htm - _ftn [emphasis ours]
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find
substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the
above rule, as established by the following circumstances on
record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the
complainant to protect her interest over a certain property.
The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty.
Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was
prepared and executed in the complainants favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss
the latters legal interest over the property subject of the
Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had
knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with
the complainants interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests
between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the
engagement from Zenaida Caete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting
interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his
own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant
in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded the
complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the
case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
that he had previously prepared and executed for the
complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one
client against another client in the same action; he also accepted
a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the
interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services
had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition.
However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty.
Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth
under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of
facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he
accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The records
likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the
complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to
the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle
the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the
complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by
Zenaida Caete.11 Moreover, the records show that Atty.
Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as
required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did
Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing
jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing
conflicting interests.12
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP
recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint
was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not
for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana,
finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due
process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights.
Although there was indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we
are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of
acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As stated in
paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of
ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from
Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr.
has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in
his answer.13 He also averred in his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No.
B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete
was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked
[the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which she granted) that he
would first write a letter (Annex "4") to the complainant proposing
to settle the case amicably between them but complainant
ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the
case in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is now invoking
in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the
complaint against her.14 1wphi1
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge against
oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.15 These opportunities were all afforded to Atty.
Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.
All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis.16 In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to
ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney.17 This is all that we did in
this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser
than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the
imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient
towards respondent lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to
ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of
his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the
reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169604 March 6, 2007
NELSON P. COLLANTES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
and DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.1
What would happen, however, if two separate decisions,
irreconcilably conflicting with each other, both attained finality?
Quite clearly, to hold that both decisions are immutable and
unalterable would cause not only confusion and uncertainty, but
utter bewilderment upon the persons tasked to execute these
judgments.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision2dated 10 March
2005 and the Resolution3 dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78092.
The undisputed facts of this case are summarized by the Court of
Appeals:
Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter, Collantes) was conferred
Career Executive Service Eligibility on 29 February 1996. Then
President Fidel V. Ramos accorded him the rank of Career
Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on 10 February 1997. More
than a year later, he was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace
and Order of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received
word from persons close to then President Ejercito Estrada to
give up his position so that the President could unreservedly
appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post
at the DILG.
Thereafter, on 1 July 1998, President Estrada appointed
Collantes to the controversial post Undersecretary for Civilian
Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND). As it
happened, his stint in the DND was short lived. Collantes was
supposedly ordered by then Secretary Orlando Mercado to
renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee,
General Orlando Soriano. In deference to the Presidents
prerogative, he resigned from office believing that he will soon be
given a new assignment.
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the
government, as in fact, he received a letter from President
Estrada terminating his services effective 8 February 1999.
Consequently, on 24 March 1999, Collantes requested the
assistance of the Career Executive Service Board relative to the
termination of his services as Undersecretary for Civilian
Relations of the DND invoking his right to security of tenure as a
CESO.
The termination of Collantes services, notwithstanding, President
Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the CES ranking
structure, CESO Rank I, on 17 July 1999. But then, despite this
promotion in rank, Collantes did not receive new appointment,
and worse, the President appointed Mr. Edgardo Batenga to the
much coveted position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of
the DND.
Taking definite action on the matter, Collantes instituted a Petition
for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before Us on 29 January 2001,
docketed as C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874. Collantes maintained that
he was constructively dismissed from work, without any cause
and due process of law, and thus, his position in the DND was
never vacated at all. Accordingly, he prayed that the appointment
of Mr. Edgardo Batenga be nullified, and that he be reinstated to
his former position with full back salaries. Notably, Collantes also
sought for appointment to a position of equivalent rank
commensurate to his CESO Rank I if reinstatement to his former
position is no longer legally feasible.
Meanwhile, on 13 August 2001, the CSC favorably acted on
Collantes letter-request issuing Resolution No. 011364, and
thereby holding that Collantes relief as Undersecretary of DND
amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not given another post
concomitant to his eligibility.
Then, on 30 August 2001, We rendered Our Decision in C.A.
G.R. SP No. 62874 dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and
Mandamus filed by Collantes. Significantly, We pronounced:
"By such actuations of the petitioner, the Court finds that he has
(sic) effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of
the DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to
reinstate him to his old position.
xxxx
"In this case, petitioner has undoubtedly shown his intention to
relinquish his public office, and has in fact surrendered such post
to the Chief Executive, who, on the other hand, has shown his
acceptance of the same by appointing a new person to the
position relinquished by the petitioner.
xxxx
Quo warranto, it must be pointed out, is unavailing in the instatnt
case, as the public office in question has not been usurped,
intruded into or unlawfully held by the present occupant. Nor does
the incumbent undersecretary appear to have done or suffered an
act which forfeits his assumption. (Section 1, Rule 66, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure). Furthermore, it appears that the action for
quo warranto, assuming it is available, has already lapsed by
prescription, pursuant to Section 11 of the pertinent Rule ...
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED."
The controversy reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No.
149883. Nevertheless, the case was considered closed and
terminated when Collantes manifested his desire not to pursue
his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Thereafter, Collantes moved for the execution of CSC Resolution
No. 011364, which was accordingly granted through CSC
Resolution No. 020084 dated 15 January 2002 "directing the
DND to give Collantes a position where his eligibility is
appropriate and to pay his backwages and other benefits from the
time of his termination up to his actual reinstatement."
In a Letter dated 7 February 2002, the Legal Affairs Division of
the DND, through Atty. Leticia A. Gloria, urged the CSC to revisit
its Resolutions which were entirely in conflict with Our 30 August
2001 Decision in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874, which has attained
finality pursuant to the Supreme Courts Resolution in G.R. No.
149883.
Consequently, in complete turnabout from its previous stance, the
CSC issued Resolution No. 021482 dated 12 November 2002
declaring that had it been properly informed that a Petition for
Quo Warranto and Mandamus was then pending before Us, it
would have refrained from ruling on Collantes quandary, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Assistant
Secretary for Legal Affairs Leticia A. Gloria of the department of
National Defense (DND) is hereby GRANTED and CSC
Resolutions Nos. 01-1364 dated August 13, 2001 and 02-0084
dated January 15, 2002 are reversed. Accordingly, pursuant to
the decision of the Court of Appeals, Nelson P. Collantes is
deemed effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary
of the DND."
Forthwith, Collantes moved for a reconsideration of this
Resolution, but was denied by the CSC in the second assailed
Resolution No. 030542 dated 5 May 2003.4
On 18 July 2003, herein petitioner Collantes then filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the reversal of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions No. 021482 and
No. 030542. Before the Court of Appeals can decide this case,
however, petitioner was appointed as General Manager of the
Philippine Retirement Authority on 5 August 2004. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in the assailed 10
March 2005 Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the Civil
Service Commission for rendering Resolution Nos. 021482 and
030542, dated 12 November 2002 and 5 May 2003, respectively.
No pronouncement as to costs.5
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in
the assailed 31 August 2005 Resolution.6
Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the
reversal of the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. In view of his 5 August 2004 appointment, however,
petitioners prayer is now limited to seeking the payment of
backwages and other benefits that may have been due him from
the time of his alleged dismissal on 8 February 1999 to his
appointment on 5 August 2004. Petitioner submits the following
issues for our consideration:
A.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
DECISION IN CA-G.R. NO. 62874 IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS A BAR TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION DATED AUGUST 14, 2001.
B.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS VERY OWN
DECISION WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH
HELD THAT PETITIONER MAY BE REMOVED FROM HIS
POSITION AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT THE CONCOMITANT
TRANSFER TO A POSITION EQUIVALENT IN RANK OR BE
REMOVED THEN, BE FLOATED PERPETUALLY, WHICH IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, IN
VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS A
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE ELIGIBLE.7
Both petitioner and herein respondents CSC and Department of
National Defense (DND) invoke the doctrine of immutability of
final judgments.
Petitioner claims that the 13 August 2001 Resolution of the CSC,
which held that petitioner "was illegally removed as
Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense and
therefore x x x should be given a position where his eligibility is
appropriate or sufficient," has attained finality. Petitioner adds
that, not only has there been no appeal or motion for
reconsideration filed within the allowable periods, the CSC even
granted the Motion for Execution filed by petitioner in its Order
dated 15 January 2002. Petitioner thereby invokes our ruling that,
before a writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a
final judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding.8 Petitioner also faults the CSC for ruling on a mere
letter filed by Atty. Leticia Gloria of the DND, which petitioner
claims is fatally defective for failure to comply with the procedural
due process clause of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and
the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
which require notice to adverse parties.9
Respondents, on the other hand, invoke the same doctrine of
immutability of final judgments, this time with respect to the 30
August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by petitioner. This
Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory when
petitioner withdrew the Motion for Extension to File a Petition for
Review on Certiorari he filed with this Court.10
Forum Shopping, Res Judicata, and Litis Pendentia
Our rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such
eventualities as conflicting final decisions as in the case at bar.
We have ruled that what is important in determining whether
forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts
and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.11
More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity
of parties or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.12
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is
also either litis pendentia or res judicata).13 If the forum shopping
is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases
shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds
mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice.14
Petitioner disputes respondents claim, and the CSCs
ruling,15 that he had lodged two separate actions. Petitioner
explains that he never filed a case before the CSC. He merely
sought the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) in a letter-request dated 24 March 1999. Said letter-
request, petitioner claims, did not ask for any ruling.
Petitioner claims that, considering that two years had already
lapsed without any response from the CESB, he filed on 23
January 2001 his Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner was surprised when he learned
through the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB that, on 29
November 2000, it referred petitioners request to the CSC for
appropriate action.16 Petitioner was not required to submit any
pleading in support of his request. Apparently, the CSC treated
the letter-request as a complaint or petition over which it could
exercise its adjudicative powers, as it issued its 13 August 2001
Resolution declaring petitioner to have been illegally removed as
Undersecretary of the DND, and should therefore be given a
position appropriate or sufficient for his eligibility.17 As stated
above, the Court of Appeals Decision dismissing the Petition for
Quo Warranto and Mandamus was rendered 17 days later, on 30
August 2001. Petitioner filed with this Court a motion for an
extension of time within which to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, but he later submitted a Manifestation for the
withdrawal of this motion as he decided not to pursue his
appeal.18 Instead, petitioner filed with the CSC on 25 October
2001 a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,19 which the
CSC granted on 15 January 2002.20
In repeatedly asserting that he did not file two separate actions,
petitioner is arguing, without stating it categorically, that he
cannot be held liable for forum shopping. However, what one
cannot do directly cannot be done indirectly. Petitioner had been
aware, through the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB, that his
request for assistance was referred to the CSC on 29 November
2000 for appropriate action. From that point on, he knew that two
government agencies the CSC and the Court of Appeals were
simultaneously in the process of reaching their respective
decisions on whether petitioner was entitled to reinstatement or to
a position appropriate to his eligibility. Therefore, it cannot be
denied that petitioner knew, from the moment of receipt of the 8
February 2001 letter of the CESB, that he had effectively
instituted two separate cases, and whatever original intention he
had for his letter-request is, by then, forgotten. Petitioner
subsequently proceeded to act like a true forum shopper he
abandoned the forum where he could not get a favorable
judgment, and moved to execute the Resolution of the forum
where he succeeded.
Petitioners above actuation is, in fact, a violation of his
certification against forum shopping with the Court of Appeals, a
ground for dismissal of actions distinct from forum shopping itself.
As petitioner knew from the receipt of the CESB letter that
another claim was pending in a quasi-judicial agency concerning
these issues, he was bound by his certification with the Court of
Appeals to report such fact within five days from his knowledge
thereof. This circumstance of being surprised by the discovery
of another pending claim with another court or quasi-judicial
agency is the very situation contemplated by letter (c) in the first
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same
or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
(Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner, however, further asserts that the issues brought in the
Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals on 18 July
2003 and the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed on
29 January 2001 are distinct, and that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in the latter cannot constitute res judicata with respect to
the former.21Petitioner claims that the issues, remedies and reliefs
in the two cases are different, citing as basis the textbook
definitions of quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner
further claims that:
There is a clear distinction between the right of petitioner to the
position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations and his right to
be re-appointed to another position of equivalent rank, in view of
his CESO I status. The former issue may have been resolved by
the Court of Appeals when it ruled that petitioner Collantes had
"effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the
DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to
reinstate him to his old position." The latter issue, or the right of
petitioner Collantes to be given a new assignment fitting to his
CESO I rank, arises from his right to security of tenure as a
Career Executive Service Eligible, and not from his appointment
to the DND.22
This allegedly clear distinction springs from petitioners claim that
he resigned from his position, but not from his rank as a Career
Executive Service Officer (CESO). Petitioner claims that, as a
CESO, there is a "great difference between (1) resigning from
ones position and (2) resigning or relinquishing ones rank, as
position is different from ones rank. POSITION refers to the
particular or specific office from which one may be appointed.
RANK, on the other hand, refers not to a particular position but to
the class to which one belongs in the hierarchy of authority in an
organization or bureaucracy."23 Petitioner cites Cuevas v. Bacal24:
[S]ecurity of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to
the particular positions to which they may be appointed --- a
concept which is applicable only to the first and second-level
employees in the civil service --- but to the rank to which they are
appointed by the President.
xxxx
Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better
to cope with the exigencies of public service, is thus the
distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. x x x.
and General v. Roco25:
In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of
employees in the career executive service (except first and
second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank
and not to the office or to the position to which they may be
appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be
transferred or reassigned from one position to another without
losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or
reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even
if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is
compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of
the position or office he occupies.
While there is indeed a distinction between position and rank,
such that a CESO may be transferred or reassigned from one
position to another without losing his rank, there can be no
distinction between resigning from a position and resigning from a
rank. The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation from
the government service, which includes the resignation of a
CESO from his position. The CESB has clarified this concept of
being in the inactive status in its Resolution No. 554, series of
2002:
Rule II
xxxx
7. CESO in Inactive Status - is a CESO who no longer occupies a
position in the CES as a result of any of the modes of separation
from the government service, provided that such separation is not
due to dismissal from the service for cause.
 Rule IV
Section 1. Modes of Deactivating a CES Rank. There are three
(3) modes by which the CES Rank of a CESO may be
deactivated from the CES:
1. Acceptance of a position by virtue of an appointment
outside the coverage of the CES;
2. Dropping from the rolls of government officials and
employees; and
3. Other modes of separation from the CES, provided that
separation from the CES resulting from dismissal from the
service for cause and after due process shall result in the
loss of CES rank and shall not be considered as a mode
of deactivation.
Sec. 2. Effect of Deactivation of CES Rank. A CESO whose
CES rank has been deactivated by the Board loses all the rights
and privileges accorded to him/her by law on account of his/her
CES rank.
Likewise, it would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who
resigns from his position can compel the President to appoint him
to another position. Such a ruling would effectively derogate the
discretion of the appointing authority,26 as it will give the CESO
the option to choose which position he or she wants, by the
simple expediency of resigning from the position he or she does
not want.
In sum, there is an identity of issues in the two cases which
resulted in the two conflicting final and executory decisions. But
while, as stated above, the second petition can be dismissed on
the ground of either res judicata or non-compliance with the
undertakings in petitioners certification against forum shopping,
these grounds can only be invoked when the case is still pending.
As petitioner points out, the Resolution of the CSC had already
become final and executory.
The 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals, however,
has also attained finality. Hence, we go back to the main issue in
this petition: which of the two final and executory decisions should
be given effect, the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision
dismissing the petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto, or the 13
August 2001 CSC Resolution declaring petitioner Collantes to be
illegally removed as Undersecretary of the DND?
Two Conflicting Final and Executory Decisions
Jurisprudence in the United States offers different solutions to this
problem:
Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or
demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has been decided
contrarily, the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an
estoppel, it "setteth the matter at large" has been applied by
some authorities, and in such case both parties may assert their
claims anew. Other authorities have held that, of two conflicting
judgments on the same rights of the same parties, the one which
is later in time will prevail, although it has also been held that the
judgment prior in time will prevail. It has been held that a decision
of a court of last resort is binding on the parties, although
afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared.27
There are thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving
the case at bar: the first is for the parties to assert their claims
anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and
the third is to determine which of the judgments had been
rendered by a court of last resort.
As there are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is
appropriate for this Court to adopt either the first or the third
solution. The first solution involves disregarding the finality of the
two previous judgments and allowing the parties to argue on the
basis of the merits of the case anew. The third solution merely
involves the determination of which judgment has been rendered
by this Court, the court of last resort in this jurisdiction.
Adopting the third solution will result in the denial of this Petition
for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the 13 August 2001 CSC
Resolution came about by the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal within the proper reglementary
periods, the finality of the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals
Decision was by virtue of the 12 November 2001 Resolution28 of
this Court which declared the case closed and terminated upon
the manifestation of petitioner that he decided not to pursue his
appeal and was thus withdrawing the motion for extension of time
to file a petition for review on certiorari.
The better solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits
of the case anew, and decide the case on the basis thereof. We
can do this either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by
resolving the issues in this disposition. The latter recourse is
more appropriate, for three reasons: (1) all the facts, arguments,
and pleadings in support of the parties contentions are now
before us, with the parties advancing the very same contentions
as those in this Petition; (2) a remand to the Court of Appeals
would entail asking the latter to resolve the very same issues it
had passed upon twice; and (3) a remand to the Court of Appeals
would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of
the case when the case is now ripe for adjudication before us.
The merits of the case are the focus of petitioners third
assignment of error in the present petition. Petitioner claims that
the Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible error
when it upheld the resolution of the CSC which allegedly
effectively held "that petitioner may be removed from his position
as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense without
the concomitant transfer to a position equivalent in rank or be
removed then, be floated perpetually, which is tantamount to a
constructive dismissal, in violation of his right to security of tenure
as a career executive service eligible."29
Petitioners arguments presuppose that he had been removed
from his position as Undersecretary of the DND. He, however, did
not present any evidence to that effect, whether in this Petition or
in his earlier Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the
Court of Appeals. If he is implying that he was removed from
office by virtue of his account that he was approached by persons
close to President Joseph Estrada who asked him to relinquish
his post, which he did, then this Petition must fail, for, by his own
deliberate deed, he resigned from his position.
There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a
courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the President, by himself
or through another, requested for someones resignation does not
give the President the obligation to appoint such person to
another position. A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any
other resignation. There can be no implied promises of another
position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy.
Any express promise of another position, on the other hand,
would be void, because there can be no derogation of the
discretion of the appointing power,30 and because its object is
outside the commerce of man.31 As held by the Court of Appeals
in its 30 August 2001 Decision:
In the first place, petitioner has not established by any quantum of
certainty the veracity of his claim that he was promised an
equivalent position in the government. Assuming, however, that
such promise was true, petitioner, as a ranking member of the
bureaucracy, ought to have known that such promise offers no
assurance in law that the same would be complied with. The
time-honored rule is that public office is a public trust, and as
such, the same is governed by law, and cannot be made the
subject of personal promises or negotiations by private persons.32
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED. No costs.
G.R. No. 190171 March 14, 2011
ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, Petitioners,
vs.
The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the
Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court filed by Alen Ross
Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan;
and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to annul and set aside
the October 13, 2009 Decision1 of respondent Judge Bienvenido
Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch
52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise
seeks to prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing the said
decision.
In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found
petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and
ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same
decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the
practice of law. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF
PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR
REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for
violation of their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer
of the Court, and hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to
pay a fine of 100,000.00.
Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the
Court for the above grave offenses and should they fail to do so
after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be
issued, and they will not be released unless they comply with the
order of this Court.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for
appropriate action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
The Facts
Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case
No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the
Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial
prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a
controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy
Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under
the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one
Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the
accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of
the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-
Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case
to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He
attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative
complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his
superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of
Palawan.
On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision
acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed
against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned
several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On
July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to
appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on
matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis filing of
the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint
against Awayan, among others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as
to the purpose of Judge Blancaflors continued inquiries
considering that the decision in the arson case had already been
promulgated.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the
petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct
contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of
Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.
As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners respective
position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13,
2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a
fine of 100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
but it was denied in the assailed November 6, 2009 Order.3
Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action
before this Court anchored on the following
GROUNDS
(A)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS
WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
(B)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY
VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.
(C)
SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE
VOID, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED
AGAINST RESPONDENT.4
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void
for contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim
that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses
and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge
Blancaflors disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of
discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner
of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt
proceedings against them.
Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in
the "direct contempt" proceeding is clearly oppressive and without
basis.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,5 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated that Judge Blancaflor committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
holding petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was
not based on law and evidence.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in
all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold
the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are
enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for
retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to
declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the
preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective,
not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.6 Such power, being drastic
and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.7
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflors order
penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of
Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near
a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer
as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so.8
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-
Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within
the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject
manifestation bore Tulalis voluntary withdrawal from the arson
case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the
accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the
decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt
the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be
held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and
without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had
no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing of
the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone
in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The
attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of
the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflors conclusion, that the subject
manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed
to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and
without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge
of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely
abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the
penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of
the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a
court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not
exceeding 2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10)
days, or both.
The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and
to pay a fine of 100,000.00 each with the additional order to
issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is
evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the
law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due
process in conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be
emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished
summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence,
hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely
unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners alleged "vilification campaign"
against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt.
At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly
concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper,
however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of
the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the
elementary procedure which requires written charge and due
hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was
there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact,
Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his
receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before
the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said
order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings
when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he
came in possession of the administrative complaint against
Awayan.
The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their
appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the proceedings ex-
parte to hear the witnesses testimonies had already been
completed.
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that
he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate.
He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the
questions propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:
a. Your [petitioner Rodriguezs] participation, if any, in the
filing of the ex-parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali
together with the attachment of your letter to Gov. Joel T.
Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the
Clerk of Court, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;
b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by
Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you know, and if so what was the
official action thereon;
c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30,
2009 was he allowed to answer the charges against him,
i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto
Fernandez, calling him "extortionist."
 Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other
evidentiary basis for your conclusion that Ernesto
Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a
bag man and facilitator;
What was your role in obtaining the release of accused
Rolly Ami from the City Jail without permission from the
Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0clock in the afternoon
and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly
Ami interviewed?
d. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or
write) but he was made to sign affidavits in the absence of
his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon, why?
e. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren
Guinto, a close associate of yours, and directly went to
the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch
and ring), why?
What is your participation in the media coverage Re:
VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-
Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009. Do you recognize that as a
member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to the
rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your
loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize
this duty and obligation?9
Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of
honesty and impartiality required of judges as mandated under
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in
accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that
God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be
moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the
power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise.10
Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be
separate and distinct. They have different objects and purposes
for which different procedures have been established. Judge
Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings. As held
in the case of People v. Godoy,11 thus:
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to
vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object
of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect
the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons
unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the
exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the
functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a
preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal
purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme
Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys
who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly
administration of justice.
x x x. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot
be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have
distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is
established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid
down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary
actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139
thereof.
Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his
July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice
required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners
from the practice of law.
1av vphi1
Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and
suspension proceedings is permitted, the suspension of
petitioners must still fail.
This Court is not unmindful of a judges power to suspend an
attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor, however,
must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be
complied with, as mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the
same Rules which specifically provides, viz:
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No
attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his
profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses
in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if
upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex
parte.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be
presumed. It must indicate the dubious character of the acts
done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred
lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.12
In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice
issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the
misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from
receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended
from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full
opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their
behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly,
the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void,
having violated their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflors suspension order is also void as the
basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant
disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates
the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar
from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3)
gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the
lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show
that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.
In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section
2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides:
SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail
himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution
of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court
which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide
by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately
executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a
reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt.
Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails
of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the
judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition
provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which
rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and
perform the judgment should the petition be decided against
him.13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009

Decision and November 6, 2009 Order are hereby annulled and
set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently
enjoined from implementing the said decision and order. This
injunctive order is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 149200 July 14, 2006
ABRAHAM ONG, petitioner,
vs.
CIBA GEIGY (PHILS.), INC.,* respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from a decision of the
Court of Appeals.1
This case began when respondent Ciba Geigy (Phils.), Inc. sued
petitioner Abraham Ong for a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132.2 On July 17, 1998,
the RTC rendered a decision3 against petitioner, ordering him to
pay P564,851.01 plus interest, the cost of collection, the cost of
suit and attorney's fees. On August 12, 1998, petitioner, through
counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in
an order dated December 3, 1998, a copy of which petitioner's
counsel received on December 17, 1998.4
On December 28, 1998, 10 days after the lapse of the
reglementary period, counsel for petitioner filed a notice of
appeal. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal for having been
filed out of time. On February 16, 1999, the RTC issued an order
denying the notice of appeal.5
On April 6, 1999, petitioner, with the assistance of new counsel,
filed a petition for relief6 from judgment before the court a quo,
alleging that he only learned of the December 3, 1998 order and
the entry of judgment on March 1, 1999 because his counsel
failed to inform him about them. On April 30, 1999, the trial court
issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment for
lack of merit.7
On August 24, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court a quo.8 On February 28, 2001, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision and on July 10, 2001,
denied reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The only issue in this case is whether or not the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioner was
bound by the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Patria
Generoso-Abella, to whom he attributes the loss of both his case
and his chance to appeal.
To prove his allegations of Atty. Abella's "gross and inexcusable"
negligence in the defense of his cause, petitioner cited two
principal omissions on her part: (1) she failed to file a notice of
appeal before the lapse of the reglementary period, thereby
preventing petitioner from taking an appeal and (2) her gross
negligence during the trial, which allowed incompetent evidence
to be adduced in favor of the respondent and which prevented the
trial court from appreciating material and relevant evidence in
petitioner's favor which could have altered the outcome of the
case.
Specific instances of Atty. Abella's negligence during the trial
included: (1) her failure to question the competence of
respondent's sole witness who, according to petitioner, was not
even an employee of respondent but of a different company
altogether; (2) her failure to raise petitioner's counterclaims in his
answer; (3) her failure to raise defenses and to present and
highlight evidence that would have proven that he had no
outstanding obligation to respondent and (4) her gross
carelessness in the handling of vital documentary evidence for
the petitioner, which resulted in the impairment of the probative
value of such evidence.
The general rule is that the client is bound by the actuation of his
counsel in the conduct of the case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might have been different
had his counsel proceeded differently. In criminal cases, as well
as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that
blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of
the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel does not constitute a
ground for new trial.9 The exception to this rule is when the
negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that
the client is deprived of his day in court.10
Having studied the records of this case and comparable
jurisprudence, we conclude that Atty. Abella's negligence, while
quite regrettable, was not so gross as to warrant a new trial. The
fact that she committed most of her mistakes in the course of her
presentation of petitioner's evidence instantly destroys the
parallelisms which petitioner is attempting to draw between the
instant case and the ones he cited.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,11 we relieved petitioner of his
lawyer's incompetence on the ground that, by filing a demurrer to
evidence even after the trial court had denied leave, counsel
deprived petitioner of his chance to present evidence that could
have exonerated him.
In Tan v. Court of Appeals,12 the issue was not even whether
respondent DPG Development & Management Corporation
(DPG) was entitled to relief from its lawyer's incompetence but
whether the rules on proper substitution of counsel were followed.
In pointing out that all the respondent had done was to secure
additional counsel, we explained that DPG was entitled to an
additional lawyer due to the negligence of the original one whose
failure to file an answer despite two extensions had resulted in
DPG being declared in default.
In Ginete v. Court of Appeals,13 counsel for petitioners therein
failed to file their appellant's brief within the period
given. Ginete is inapplicable because, in this case, the Court of
Appeals never even acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on
account of the failure to file a notice of appeal.
Clearly, none of the jurisprudence cited by petitioner supports his
position, given the wide disparity of facts by which we justified our
decisions in those cases. As grave as Atty. Abella's errors might
have been, they still boiled down to incompetence during the
proceedings in the trial court which, by itself, did not relieve
petitioner from the consequences of her negligence.
Finally, Atty. Abella's failure to file a timely notice of appeal was
not tantamount to depriving petitioner of his day in court.
In Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals14 where
counsel for petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal, we
found the lawyers concerned guilty of mere simple negligence as
opposed to gross negligence. We said:
Indeed, by failing to file its appeal within the reglementary
period, it could not be successfully argued that petitioner
was deprived of its day in court.
Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process, it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the
right to appeal is lost.
The foregoing considered, we affirm the Court of Appeals' finding
that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's petition for relief from judgment.
In Taada v. Angara,15 we defined grave abuse of discretion in
the following manner:
 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on
the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion
will result in the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

 have waived their right to present further witnesses and directed
them to file their formal offer of evidence within ten days from
Adm. Case No. 6266 November 16, 2006 notice. The trial court noted that respondent received its Order on
January 24, 2003, but respondent did not act on it within the ten-
ESTELA ANASTACIO-BRIONES, Complainant, day period. Instead of filing a formal offer of evidence, respondent
vs. filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003. On March 10,
ATTY. ALFREDO A. ZAPANTA, Respondent. 2003, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice.3

DECISION On May 5, 2003, complainant learned that the cases were

dismissed and that respondent did not attend the January 6, 2003
hearing and did not file a formal offer of evidence.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for abandoning
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Estela Anastacio-Briones
her case and withdrawing his appearance as counsel without her
against respondent Atty. Alfredo A. Zapanta for abandonment
knowledge.
and neglect of duties.
In his Comment4 dated June 10, 2004, respondent countered that
In her Complaint1 dated December 1, 2003, Estela Anastacio-
he was discharged as complainants counsel after the October
Briones stated that she engaged the services of respondent to file
25, 2002 hearing. Respondent added that he prepared a
three civil cases involving a parcel of land located in Antipolo City.
withdrawal of appearance on October 30, 2002 but complainant
The cases were then consolidated2 before the Regional Trial
ignored his several requests to sign it in his office. Nevertheless,
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73.
he claimed he filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003
without complainants conformity.
Complainant averred that on October 25, 2002, she showed
respondent a copy of "Discharge and Appearance of Counsels
Respondent denied promising complainant that he would attend
with Ex-parte Motion to Cancel the October 25, 2002 Hearing"
the January 6, 2003 hearing. According to him, complainant
she intended to file that day. She claimed that even prior to the
informed his secretary that her new lawyer would attend.
hearing, she informed respondent of her joint venture agreement
Respondent claimed further that complainants new lawyer should
with a real estate developer who offered the services of its own
be faulted for belatedly filing an entry of appearance and a motion
counsel. Complainant added that respondent requested her not to
for reconsideration. Respondent claimed that he was merely
file it and he would submit a withdrawal of appearance instead.
being used as a scapegoat for complainants own negligence in
Complainant also informed respondent that she could not attend
pursuing the cases.
the hearing on January 6, 2003 because of other commitments.
Respondent allegedly assured her that he would be present in the
hearing. In a Resolution5 dated September 20, 2004, the Court referred
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On January 6, 2003, both respondent and complainant failed to
appear in the hearing. As a result, the trial court declared them to
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005,
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found respondent liable for negligence in the
performance of his duties as counsel, and for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Funa
recommended respondents suspension for three months from
the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-104 dated October 22, 2005, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Funa. On November 15, 2005,
the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to this Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed with this Court a motion for
reconsideration. In its comment, the IBP, through Commissioner
Funa, recommended the denial of the motion.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent was remiss in
performing his duties as counsel of complainant. The Court finds
respondent liable for negligence and for violation of Canon
186 specifically Rules 18.037 and 18.048of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court9 provides the proper
procedure for a lawyers withdrawal as counsel in a case. Unless
the procedure prescribed in the abovementioned section is
complied with, the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel
who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders and
pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case.10 For
its part, the court could recognize no other representation on
behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal
substitution of attorney is effected.11
In Orcino v. Gaspar, we held that until a lawyers withdrawal
12
shall have been approved, he remains counsel of record and is
expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the
interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of
hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally
until there is a withdrawal of his appearance on record.
In this case, respondent admitted that he did not attend the
January 6, 2003 hearing despite being notified by the court. His 1w phi 1
claim that he was already discharged as counsel as early as
October 25, 2002 is negated by the record that he withdrew his
appearance only on March 5, 2003. Until his dismissal or
withdrawal was made of record, any judicial notice sent to him
was binding upon his client even though as between them the
professional relationship may have been terminated.13 Thus,
unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for the
conduct of the cases and his failure to attend the hearing and
comply with the trial courts directive to file a formal offer of
evidence constitute inexcusable negligence.
Moreover, respondents negligence is not excused by his claim
that he had prepared his withdrawal of appearance as early as
October 30, 2002 but complainant refused to sign it. In Macarilay
v. Seria,14 with similar facts, we rejected the counsels excuse for
failing to file the complaints, although the complaints were
finished, due to his clients refusal to sign them.
Certainly not to be overlooked is the duty of an attorney to inform
his client of the developments of the case.15 We note that it was
only on May 5, 2003 that complainant learned that she defaulted
in the case. As a lawyer mindful of the interest of his client,
respondent should have informed the complainant of the courts
order addressed to him, especially if he considered himself
discharged in order for complainant and her new counsel to be
guided accordingly.
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or other
pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension
and, in grave cases, disbarment.16 In this case, this Court
sustains the recommendation of the IBP for respondents
suspension of three months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo A. Zapanta is hereby

found GUILTY of negligence and is meted the penalty
of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for THREE
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in this country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7123 November 20, 2006 evasion charges should be filed against her for non-payment of
taxes on the transfer.4
MARIA DIVINA CRUZ-VILLANUEVA, Complainant,
vs. Respondent Rivera then convinced complainant to file an adverse
ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA and ATTY. ALEXANDER P. claim on the property and to file cases for estafa and violation of
SIMEON, JR., Respondents. Batas Pambansa No. 22 against Bautistas widow. Respondent
Rivera requested and received 13,000 as acceptance fee and
DECISION representation expenses.5

CARPIO, J.: After repeated verbal requests, complainant wrote a letter6 to

respondent Rivera to clarify the issue on the non-payment of
The Case taxes and the alleged Deed of Reconveyance, which complainant
claimed she did not execute. Complainant likewise inquired about
the adverse claim supposedly filed by respondent Rivera on her
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Maria Divina Cruz-
behalf. Complainant also directed respondent Rivera to pay
Villanueva ("complainant") against Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
immediately the necessary taxes to the BIR.
("respondent Rivera") and Atty. Alexander P. Simeon, Jr.
("respondent Simeon, Jr.") for grave misconduct and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). Complainant later learned that respondent Rivera had no notarial
commission for the years 2003 and 2004.7
The Facts
Complainant also charged respondent Simeon, Jr., Regional
Director, Registry of Deeds, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, of
Sometime in January 2004, complainant engaged the services of
conspiracy with respondent Rivera in registering the property
respondent Rivera to prepare the documents, and to pay all the
under Bautistas name based on the Deed of Reconveyance
necessary expenses, relating to the sale of complainants
without payment of the proper taxes. Complainant alleged that
property to Samson B. Bautista ("Bautista"). As shown by an
respondent Simeon, Jr. allowed the registration despite
acknowledgment receipt,1 respondent Rivera received 80,000
knowledge that there was a prior Deed of Sale8 and that
from complainant to cover expenses payable to the Bureau of
respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of the 80,000 to facilitate
Internal Revenue (BIR), the Register of Deeds, the City
the transfer.
Treasurers Office, and others.
In an Order dated 18 October 2004, the Integrated Bar of the
On Bautistas death in February 2004, complainant learned that
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline directed
the property had been transferred in Bautistas name based on a
respondents to answer the complaint. Respondent Rivera asked
Deed of Reconveyance2 executed by complainant. Bautistas
for an extension of ten days to file his answer.9 However,
widow also informed complainant that final payment for the
respondent Rivera did not file any answer.
property would be withheld pending payment of all the necessary
taxes.3 The BIR also directed complainant to explain why no tax
In his Answer10 dated 22 November 2004, respondent Simeon, Jr.
denied complainants allegations and prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint against him. On the registration in Bautistas name
without payment of the required taxes, respondent Simeon, Jr.
claimed that he "relied on the genuineness and authenticity of the
documents" presented by respondent Rivera. Respondent
Simeon, Jr. denied that he received money from respondent
Rivera to facilitate the transfer. Respondent Simeon, Jr. also
disavowed any knowledge of a prior Deed of Sale.
IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco ("Commissioner
Pacheco") set the case for mandatory conference on 11 March
2005. Only complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. appeared in
the 11 March 2005 hearing. The hearing was canceled and reset
for 15 April 2005. Only complainant appeared in the 15 April 2005
hearing. Despite receipt of notices of hearing, respondent Rivera
did not attend any of the hearings.
Commissioner Pacheco required all the parties to submit their
position papers and documentary evidence. Complainant and
respondent Simeon, Jr. both filed position papers. Respondent
Simeon, Jr. submitted a reply to complainants position paper.
Respondent Rivera did not submit any position paper, thus
waiving his right to comment and participate in the investigation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-07
dated 28 January 2006 adopting with
modification11 Commissioner Pachecos Report and
Recommendation finding respondent Rivera guilty of grave
misconduct and serious violation of the Code. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended the imposition on respondent Rivera of
a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. for lack of merit.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the
Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B12of the Rules
of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent Rivera liable for violation of the
lawyers oath and the Code.
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complaint against
respondent Simeon, Jr. should be dismissed.
Complaint Must be Supported by Substantial Evidence
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving with substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint.13 Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof.14
Aside from complainants bare allegations, complainant did not
present any evidence to prove that respondent Simeon, Jr.
conspired with respondent Rivera in registering the property in
Bautistas name based on the Deed of Reconveyance without
payment of taxes. Likewise, complainant did not present any
evidence to prove that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of
the 80,000 from respondent Rivera for the registration. Hence,
the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. should be
dismissed.
Respondent Rivera Not Commissioned as Notary Public
A member of the Bar who notarizes a document when he has no
authorization or commission to do so may be subjected to
disciplinary action. Notarization is not an empty act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.15
Respondent Rivera notarized the Deed of Sale and the Deed of
Reconveyance sometime in January 2004. However, the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, issued a certification that respondent Rivera had no
notarial commission for the years 2003 and 2004.16 Respondent
Rivera did not present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore,
when respondent Rivera notarized the two deeds, he had no
authority to do so.
In performing notarial work without a commission, respondent
Rivera violated the lawyers oath to obey the law, specifically the
Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. Respondent Rivera also
violated Rule 1.0117 of the Code because he deceived
complainant into believing that he was authorized to act as notary
public when he was not. Respondent Riveras conduct constitutes
malpractice and falsification of a public document.18
Respondent Rivera Failed to Account for the Money
He Received from Complainant
The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all funds
of his client that may come into his possession.19The Code further
states that a lawyer shall account for all money received from the
client.20
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer must render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose.21 Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.22
Respondent Rivera specifically received 80,000 from
complainant for expenses to the BIR, the Register of Deeds, the
City Treasurers Office and other related purposes. Respondent
Rivera also received 13,000 from complainant as acceptance
fee and representation expenses for the filing of the adverse
claim and criminal charges against Bautistas widow. However,
respondent Rivera did not pay the taxes to the BIR and did not
file an adverse claim. Hence, respondent Rivera should have
promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant.
Respondent Riveras failure to make an accounting or to return
the money to complainant is a violation of the trust reposed on
him. As a lawyer, respondent Rivera should be scrupulously
1wphi1
careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional
capacity because the Code exacts a high degree of fidelity and
trust from members of the bar.23
The Court also notes respondent Riveras lack of respect for the
IBP and its proceedings. After filing the Motion for Extension of
Time to File an Answer24 and despite receipt of the IBPs orders
and notices, respondent Rivera did not participate in the
investigation. Respondent Riveras actuation shows a high
degree of irresponsibility which stains the nobility of the legal
profession.25
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Rivera
Notaries public who notarize documents without the requisite
commission are penalized with revocation of their notarial
commission and are barred from being commissioned as notary
public.26 Thus, respondent Rivera should be barred from being
commissioned as notary public for one year and his notarial
commission, if any, revoked.
On the other hand, lawyers guilty of violation of Canon 16 and
Rule 16.01 of the Code are suspended from the practice of law
for six months to one year.27 Considering respondent Riveras
lack of prior administrative record, suspension from the practice
of law for one year and not disbarment, as prayed for by
complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the
public and the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos P.

Rivera GUILTY of violation of the lawyers oath, Rule 1.01, Canon
16, and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
decision. Further, respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is BARRED
from being commissioned as notary public for one year and his
present commission, if any, is REVOKED. Furthermore,
respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is ORDERED TO
ACCOUNT to complainant, within 20 days from notice of this
decision, for the 80,000 and the 13,000.

We DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. Alexander

P. Simeon, Jr.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as
attorneys. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-13057 February 27, 1963
DELFIN MONTANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE LIM ANG, ET AL., defendants.
ANGEL M. TINIO, third-party plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, third-party
defendant-appellant.
MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, fourth-party plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
AMADOR D. SANTOS, substituted by his wife DOLORES L.
SANTOS, fourth-party defendant-appellant.
AMADOR D. SANTOS, substituted by his wife DOLORES L.
SANTOS, fifth-party plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARCIANO VILLANUEVA and EUGENIO VILLANUEVA, fifth-
party defendants-appellees.
MARCIANO VILLANUEVA and EUGENIO VILLANUEVA, cross-
claimants-appellees,
vs.
JOSE LIM ANG, cross-defendant.
Roxas & Sarmiento for plaintiff-appellee Delfin Montano.
Arsenio R. Reyes for third-party plaintiff-appellant Angel M. Tinio.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda for third-party defendant-
appellant Manila Trading & Supply Company.
Vicente J. Francisco, for cross-claimants-appellees Marciano
Villanueva and Eugenio Villanueva.
Jose Lim Ang for and in his own-behalf as cross-defendant.
Delfin Montano brought to the Philippines from the United States
a Cadillac car which he registered in his name in the Motor
Vehicles Office and for which he obtained a certificate of
registration. On May 30, 1952, he sold the car to Jose Lim Ang
and his wife Teodora A. Gonzales for the sum of P28,000.00,
payable in installments, for which the latter executed a
promissory note. Having paid part of the price, said spouses
executed on the same date a chattel mortgage on the car in favor
of Montano to guarantee the payment of the balance. Because
Montano did not want to transfer the registration certificate to
Jose Lim Ang before the registration of the mortgage, the latter
was registered in the office of the register of deeds on June 4,
1952, but Montano failed to notify the Motor Vehicles Office of the
execution of the mortgage pursuant to the requirement of Section
5(e) of Act No. 3992, known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law.
On June 12, 1952, Jose Lim Ang transferred the registration
certificate to Eugenio Villanueva. On June 18, 1952, Villanueva
sold the car to Amador D. Santos for P25,000.00, transferring to
the latter the registration certificate. On the same date, Santos
sold the car to the Manila Trading & Supply Company for
P25,000.00, and on the same date this company sold the car to
Angel M. Tinio for P26,000.00. Tinio made a down payment of
P12,000.00 and for the balance he executed a promissory note
which he assumed to pay in monthly installments. He also
executed a chattel mortgage on the same car to secure the
payment of the promissory note. This mortgage was registered
both in the office of the register of deeds as well as in the Motor
Vehicles Office. After paying his obligation in full, the mortgage
executed by Tinio in favor of the Manila Trading & Supply
Company was cancelled, and as a consequence he secured the
transfer to his name of the certificate of registration from the
Motor Vehicles Office. None of the transferees took the trouble of
investigating from whom Jose Lim Ang had acquired the Cadillac
car, and neither did any of them investigate in the office of the
register of deeds if there was any encumbrance existing thereon.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Jose Lim Ang failed to pay the balance of the purchase price to
Montano in spite of the latter's demand and so on December 8,
1952 Montano requested the sheriff of Manila to sell the car in
accordance with the conditions agreed upon in the chattel
mortgage. Having found, however, that the car was no longer in
the possession of Lim Ang but in that of Angel M. Tinio who
claimed ownership thereof, on July 8, 1953 Montano commenced
the present action of replevin before the Court of First Instance of
Manila against spouses Jose Lim Ang and Teodora A. Gonzales
and Angel M. Tinio to recover the ownership and possession of
the car in question (Civil Case No. 1998).
In order to obtain possession of the car, Montano put up a bond
in the amount of P30,000.00 and, accordingly, on July 11, 1953
an order for the seizure of the car was issued by the trial court.
The sheriff hauled the car from Tinio's garage only to return the
same on the promise of Tinio to post a counterbond to enable him
to retain possession thereof. In effect, Tinio posted a counterbond
in the amount of P30,000.00, and forthwith filed a third-party
complaint in the same case against the Manila Trading & Supply
Company from which he bought the car in question. This
company in turn filed a fourth-party complaint against Amador D.
Santos, who in turn brought into the case as defendants Marciano
and Eugenio Villanueva. The Villanuevas filed a cross-claim
against Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A. Gonzales. On
March 29, 1954, these spouses were declared in default for their
failure to answer Montano's complaint within the reglementary
period.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the replevin case, it was
brought to the attention of the court a quo that on May 15, 1953,
at the instance of Montano, the aforesaid spouses were accused
of estafa under Article 319, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code for having sold the car in question without the consent of
Montano notwithstanding the existence thereon of the chattel
mortgage (Criminal Case No. 22627); that Atty. Abraham
Sarmiento, Montano's counsel in the replevin case, appeared as
private prosecutor in the criminal case; and that having been
awarded an indemnity in the amount of P7,875.00 which is the
same amount Montano seeks to recover in the civil case, said
award has the effect of a waiver on his part to further prosecute
the same.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
On September 24, 1955, the court a quo rendered decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
(a) The court orders defendants Jose Lim Ang, Teodora
A. Gonzales and Angel M. Tinio to deliver the car in
question to plaintiff Delfin Montano or to pay jointly and
severally to plaintiff Delfin Montano the sum of P6,000.00,
plus 12% interest per annum from August 15, 1952, until
the amount is fully paid, with costs;
(b) The court orders Manila Trading & Supply Co. to
reimburse defendant and third-party plaintiff Angel M.
Tinio the amount of P6,000.00, plus interest at the rate of
12% per annum from August 15, 1952, until the said
amount is fully paid, with costs. This amount of
reimbursement shall be made by Manila Trading & Supply
Co. even if defendant and third-party plaintiff Angel M.
Tinio delivers the car back to Delfin Montano. If Angel M.
Tinio elects to return the car to Delfin Montano instead of
paying him the sum of P6,000.00 plus 12% interest per
annum, the value of the car must have been reduced to
P6,000.00 only, or less, due to its use. Manila Trading &
Supply Co. as third-party defendant shall also pay to
defendant Angel M. Tinio as third-party plaintiff the sum of
P3,000.00 for damages actual and moral, expenses so far
incurred by him in defending himself in this case, and
attorney's fees;
 (c) The court orders fourth-party defendant Amador D.
Santos to reimburse to fourth-party plaintiff Manila
Trading & Supply Co. the sum of P6,000.00, plus 12%
interest per annum from August 15, 1952, until this sum is
paid by Manila Trading & Supply Co. to defendant and
third-party plaintiff Angel M. Tinio, plus costs. No
reimbursement for damages and attorney's fees is
ordered because Manila Trading & Supply Co. waived
damages and attorney's fees from Amador D. Santos;
(d) The court orders defendant spouses Jose Lim Ang
and Teodora A. Gonzales to pay jointly and severally to
Amador D. Santos, as reimbursement, all sums the said
Amador D. Santos shall have paid Manila Trading &
Supply Co. in compliance with this decision.
Fifth-party defendants Marciano Villanueva and Eugenio
Villanueva are absolved from the fifth-party complaint of
Amador D. Santos because the evidence is conclusive
that Eugenio Villanueva acted as dummy only of Jose Lim
Ang. Amador D. Santos himself testified expressly and
positively that he refused to buy the car in question unless
it was transferred to the Villanuevas. Fifth-party
defendants Eugenio Villanueva and Marciano Villanueva
conclusively proved that they received not a cent of the
price of the car in question from Amador D. Santos. The
sum of P11,228.50, for which Amador D. Santos
extended a promissory note and which was paid by him
the following day, was the price of Eugenio Villanueva's
Oldsmobile car. The Villanuevas conclusively established
that on June 18, 1953, when the car in question was sold
to Amador D. Santos, Eugenio Villanueva signed the
deed of sale in order to get the payment for his
Oldsmobile car.
Their motions for reconsideration having been denied, defendant
and third-party plaintiff Angel M. Tinio, third-party defendant and
fourth-party plaintiff Manila Trading & Supply Company, fourth-
party defendant and fifth-party plaintiff Amador D. Santos, fifth-
party defendants and cross-claimants Marciano Villanueva and
Eugenio Villanueva appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is
now before us upon certification of the Court of Appeals on the
ground that only questions of law are involved.
Amador D. Santos died during the pendency of this case and so
he was substituted by his wife Dolores L. Santos, special
administratrix of his estate.
The issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not the chattel
mortgage executed by Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A.
Gonzales on May 30, 1952 before the car was actually registered
in their name is valid and regular; (2) Whether or not the chattel
mortgage executed by Jose Lim Ang and Teodora A. Gonzales in
favor of Delfin Montano is binding against third persons even if
they failed to give notice thereof to the Motor Vehicles Office as
required by Section 5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law; and
(3) whether or not the intervention of Montano in the prosecution
of the criminal case against Jose Lim Ang and his wife for estafa
under Article 319, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code
wherein he was awarded an indemnity of P7,875.00 constitutes a
waiver of his right to foreclose the chattel mortgage executed by
said spouses on the car in question.
Anent the first issue, appellants maintain the negative. They aver
that since the chattel mortgage was executed on May 30, 1952
and the transfer of the registration certificate was made only on
June 7, 1952, said mortgage is invalid because the mortgagors
were not yet the owners of the car when the mortgage was
executed. They bolster up their claim by invoking the testimony of
Montano to the effect that on May 31, 1952, he still considered
himself owner of the car because he intended to transfer its
ownership to the mortgagors only after the registration of the
mortgage in the office of the register of deeds.
This contention is untenable. It is not disputed that Montano
agreed to sell and the spouses Ang agreed to buy the car for
P28,000.00 for which a promissory note was executed and that to
guarantee the same the spouses executed a chattel mortgage
and took possession of the car sold. It is therefore safe to
conclude that at the time of the sale wherein the parties agreed
over the car and the price, the contract became perfected, and
when part of the purchase price was paid and the car was
delivered upon the execution of the promissory note and the
mortgage, the same became consummated.1 The fact that the
registration certificate of the car has not as yet been transmitted
to the purchasers when the mortgage was constituted is of no
moment for, as this Court well said: "The registry of the transfer of
automobiles and of the certificates of license for their use in the
Bureau of Public Works (now Motor Vehicles Office) merely
constitutes an administrative proceeding which does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale entered into between the
parties."2 At any rate, this flaw, if any, is deemed to have been
cured when after the registration of the mortgage the registration
certificate was transferred to the purchasers on June 4, 1952.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it
unnecessary to discuss the third issue relative to Montano's
intervention in Criminal Case No. 22627.
With regard to the claim for damages of Angel M. Tinio, we find
no factual basis to grant the same it appearing that Montano filed
the present case merely to protect his interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as
it orders defendants Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A.
Gonzales to pay Delfin Montano the sum of P6,000.00, plus 12%
interest thereon per annum from August 15, 1952 until it is fully
paid.
The rest of the decision is reversed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

The second issue raised is not new. In a similar case3 decided by

this Court, we said: "A mortgage in order to affect third persons
should not only be registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry,
but the same should also be recorded in the Motor Vehicles
Office as required by section 5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law. And the failure of the respondent mortgagee to report the
mortgage executed in its favor had the effect of making said
mortgage ineffective against Borlough, who had his purchase
registered in the said Motor Vehicles Office."' Adopting this view
in our case the inevitable conclusion is that as between Montano
whose mortgage over the car was not recorded in the Motor
Vehicles Office and Angel M. Tinio who notified said office of his
purchase and registered the car in his name, the latter is entitled
to preference considering that the mere registration of the chattel
mortgage in the office of the register of deeds is in itself not
sufficient to hold it binding against third persons.
A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint
against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the
practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on confidential
information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).1
Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled
"Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their
marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This
annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the
dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.2
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of
complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent entered his
appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant.3
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been
appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty.
de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal
action against complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose
Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823,
for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public
document) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that
complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of
her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically,
complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth
that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that
their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth,
she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage
took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her.
She denied using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She
also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11,
1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against
respondent that are pending before or decided upon by other
tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and
violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the
then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3)
complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of
the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of one month suspension without
pay;8 and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for
falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed
confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for
annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel.
This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for
falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November
3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was
all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations
leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies.
Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not
grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent
until proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the
Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon
him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on
appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found
guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good
faith.11
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents against
complainant does not violate the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client because the bases of
the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are
public documents and in no way connected with the confidence
taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel.
According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then
counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case.
Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in
the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates
are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to
anyone.12
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing
but complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating
Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's
motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for
resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the
report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the
respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending
his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the
IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the
passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for
those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of
the various criminal and administrative cases filed against
respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are
pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal
of the complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of
complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon
respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client when he
filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against
his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between
attorney and client and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is
designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him
special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is
strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation
is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest.15 Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice.16 Thus, the
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client
to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of justice.17 One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an
attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and
not to abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the
attorney-client relationship,19 and continues even after the client's
death.20 It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its
client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a
lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights
in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue
is tied from ever disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of
the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal
representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of
rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore
cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the
privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.22
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment.23 The reason for this is to make
the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the
lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged
or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to
obtain information from the prospective client.24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to
a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive
is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,25 where the client and his wife
leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a
period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among
others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid
to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by
counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that
the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel
for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in
the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their
lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to
those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the
execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between
the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his
creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list
of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation
then existing between them, but on account of the lease
agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the
private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations.
a lawyer to his client. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
(2) The client made the communication in confidence. claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She
contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a communication when he instituted a criminal action against her
presumption of confidentiality.26 The client must intend the for falsification of public documents because the criminal
communication to be confidential.27 complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment
then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out
these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by
Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence
voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in
of facts which the complainant must prove.
confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.
the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.28 Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus,
was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of
instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,29 an
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client.
offer and counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a
It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,31 are not
privilege.37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies is
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not
placed upon the party asserting the privilege.38
being present.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
professional capacity.33
SO ORDERED.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be
intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.34

If the client seeks an accounting service,35 or business or

personal assistance,36 and not legal advice, the privilege does not
attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.