BELGICA v EXEC SEC. OCHOA an entire decade.
an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
SUMMARY Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional. YES Whether or not the phrases
(a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
PD 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar
as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power. YES Congressional Pork Barrel. Separation
of Powers. Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Non-
delegability of Legislative Power. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." Presidential Pork Barrel. The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority
of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same
fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: "Experience is the oracle of truth." -James Madison Pork Barrel: General Concept. In a more
technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. Some scholars
on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations. In the Philippines,
"Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds
of the Executive. Controversies in the Philippines. It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." He said that "the kickbacks
were SOP (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a
high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings." "The publication of the stories, including
those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage." 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of
the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. Recently, or
in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations
that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects." The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for
whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles private accounts. Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Commission
on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators'
PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The
purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) by the DBM, the application of these funds and the
implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-
owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs). The total releases covered by the audit amounted to
P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the
total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.
Accordingly, the CoAs findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),"
were made public. As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process
of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional. (Deleted this part, just talks abt the 3 cases filed.) ISSUES: Procedural
Issues. Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy - YES (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy
not subject to judicial review - NO (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue - YES (d) the Courts
Decision in "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez" (Philconsa) and in "Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management" (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the
issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis. - NO Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel." Whether or not the 2013 PDAF
Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering
that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers - YES (b) non-
delegability of legislative power - YES (c) checks and balances YES (d) accountability YES (e)
political dynasties NO (f) local autonomy NO Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power. YES
RATIO I. Procedural Issues. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis. Philconsa and LAMP, respectively
involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the
cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits. II. Substantive Issues. A. Definition of Terms. Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel
which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
the funds utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular,
petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel
since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective
power; and Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For
reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel. 1.
Separation of Powers. a. Statement of Principle. The enforcement of the national budget, as
primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from
there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive." Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress role must be confined to mere oversight. b. Application. As may be observed from its
legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed
from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.1
From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects. Aside from the area of project
identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special
Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be" Clearly, these post-
enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by
virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as
Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation
of the separation of powers principle. Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated
to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment. Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through
formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized 1 Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual
legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program
listed in the said menu. Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90
days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design
prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice.
The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as
long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Special Provision 3 clarifies
that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" and thereunder provides the
allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Paragraph 2 of Special
Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted
to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." in government agencies,
else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own. 2. Non-
delegability of Legislative Power. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF
Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates
the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress. That the power The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional
to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court,
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation
involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional. 3. Checks and Balances. a. Statement
of Principle; Item-Veto Power. A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
Presidents power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him
by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." As stated in Abakada, the
final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication. For the President to exercise his
item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows: An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill. On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of
money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation. b.
Application. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would
then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President
to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and
(b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto. In fact, on the
accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently
auditing the utilization of said Funds." Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line
budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency." That
such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies
cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of
the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. c. Accountability.
Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The
fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect,
be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation a matter before another office of government renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office. 4. Political Dynasties. The Court finds the above-stated
argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties. 5. Local Autonomy. Philconsa
described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition
that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues,
are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be
given each project." Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent
defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on
the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even
Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. With PDAF, a
Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and
even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification
has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to
"further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government." Thus, insofar
as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional. C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel. 1.
Validity of Appropriation. Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of
PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and
specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners
submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific purpose of
PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto. In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a
valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the
"primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of
PAGCOR. In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any
valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The Court disagrees. "An appropriation made by law under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a)
sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular
use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be made by law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific"
purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular
public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution. Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides: Section 8. Appropriations. x x x All fees,
revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts
and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations,
fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration,
development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. Whereas Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads: Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting
five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it
may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all
fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a
determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the
aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be
properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because,
as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant
for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur
outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF
Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the postenactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
2. Undue Delegation. On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what
purpose the funds will be used." The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the
parties submissions on the same. Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily
examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality. Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while
the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure
project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority
infrastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting. WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY
GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past
and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether individually or collectively
organized into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment
stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,
modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to
the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power. Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction
dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release
of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the
funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2)
the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not,
are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the
funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional. On the other
hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules
or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to
these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodians reasonable
regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate
petition. The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these
cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the
political branches of government. Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the
government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular,
improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System. This
Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
ARAULLO vs. AQUINO
FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said
funds will then be re-allotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the
DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:
Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement Allocation
Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget
Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability.
The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from the various
departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased
appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the savings and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support other priority
PAPs.
Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget
Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs,
Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1),
Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the
savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation
in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested
in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of
appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for
only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.
Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer to portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance
which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and
deliver the required or planned targets.
The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of savings in order to
have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated
allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing
appropriations under the GAAs.
The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to revert to the General
Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year. The
Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a
condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient,
to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an
appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources,
is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded
by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held that the savings
pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in
the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive
was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the
GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of
the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the
Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to
undo the principle of separation of powers.
Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any
item in the GAA for their respective offices, Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds
cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of
Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under Section 25(5).
JOKER P. ARROYO, ET. AL. vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998
FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
HELD: That after considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is therefore
dismissed.
RATIO: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself.
The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential:
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by
a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite numbers of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks
is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a
case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules:
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such
as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in re-passing a bill over the veto of the
President.
In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-
fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
(In view of justifiability according to PUNO, J)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justifiable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case
at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure
by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just.
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government. It has refused to look into charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. [42]In other cases,[43] this Court has denied
claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses
of Congress.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of
the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198,
which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by
the Constitution
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA
FACTS:
In this case, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 or the RVAT Law (Revitalized Value Added Tax
Law) was put into issue. It was alleged, among others, that said law was not duly enacted.
R.A. 9337 originated as House Bill No. 3705. After 3rd reading in the lower house, it was transmitted
to the Senate where it was lodged as Senate Bill No. 1950. In the Senate, several provisions, which
were not found in the H.B. 3705, were inserted.
After 3rd reading in the Senate, the lower house found that the House version and the Senate version
have disagreeing provisions. And pursuant to Congress Rules, both Houses agreed to form a
Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) where representatives from both Houses were sent to settle
the disagreeing provisions.
Apparently however, the BCC further inserted several provisions to S.B. 1950, i.e., stand by power
was granted to the President to raise the valued-added tax rate. Further still, the No pass provision
was deleted this provision prohibited the passing of value-added tax to consumers.
Nevertheless, said version was passed into law hence the promulgation of R.A. No. 9337.
In 2005, ABAKADA GURO Party List, headed by its officers Attys. Samson Alcantara and Ed Vincent
Albano, as well as co-petitioner [then] Congressman Francis Escudero, questioned the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
Respondents in this case invoked the ruling in the case of Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance or the
Enrolled Bill Doctrine. Said case relied upon by respondents state that the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. As such, R.A. No. 9337
enjoys the conclusive presumption of constitutionality and that the courts cannot go behind the
enrolled bill.
ABAKADA GURO et al insists that the Tolentino ruling should be abandoned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case.
HELD:
Yes. There is no reason to abandon the ruling in Tolentino. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Supreme Court is not the proper venue to raise concerns regarding parliamentary
procedures. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in
the most orderly manner.
If a change is desired in the practice of the Bicameral Conference Committee it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule
of each house. To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court.
It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be
very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment.
COURTS GENERALLY DENIED THE POWER TO INQUIRE INTO CONGRESS FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH ITS OWN RULES
The cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body."
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege
irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in
the House and Senate bills. One of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power
to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of
how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the
sole concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it
believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress.
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (BCC)
All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to
subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said
conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an
amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several
provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not
final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative
chamber is thus without any basis.
NO AMENDEMENT RULE NOT VIOLATED BY BCC
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
in the Journal.
There is no reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone
three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation
since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
EXTENT OF NO AMENDMENT RULE
The No Amendment Rule must be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR. VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND REP. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001]
FACTS: This involves two separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating
The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor. Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a
plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as
having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right
as a resident and taxpayer, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319)
seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the
approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
On January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition for prohibition (G.R. No. 146342), seeking to
enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that
only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the
(b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill
rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
During the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-
created Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials; and has been regularly discharging its
corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
ISSUE: Is the creation of the City of Sorsorgon violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (the Code), thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis ours)
RULING: No. The phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture,
allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply
with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such
division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the
income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current
income classification prior to such division.
Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from
the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon
was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it
be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title
of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
For the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of
Sorsogon City. The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E.
Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late
from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having
expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and
approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct. In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:Section 10. Plebiscite
Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date.
Petitions are dismissed.
LIBAN vs. GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15 2009
FACTS: In 1947, President Roxas signed R.A. 95, otherwise known as the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Charter. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,
established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Red
Cross Convention.
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to
bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC
provides 6 major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community
Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
Liban et al. are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. In 2006,
during Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors.
Liban et al.s position: In Camporedondo v. NLRC, it was held that the PNRC is a GOCC. In
accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. Incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
upon their appointment to another government office.
Gordons position:
(1) He has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. He was already Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected
Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
(2) PNRC is not a GOCC
(3) The prohibition under Art. 6, 13 of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since
volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment
ISSUE: Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC.
HELD: NO. PNRC is a private organization performing public functions.
The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (Movement). The Fundamental Principles of the Movement provide a universal standard
of reference for all its members. The PNRC, as a member, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental
Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC
has to be autonomous. The reason for this autonomy is fundamental.
To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed
conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. The
PNRC cannot be seen as a GOCC, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as
government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies. Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also
be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent.
The following are proof that the PNRC is not a GOCC:
(1) The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by private contributions.
(2) The PNRC is not controlled by the government. Under its Charter, only 6 of the 30 members of the
Board of Governors are appointed by the President (of the 24 remaining, 18 are elected by the
chapter delegates of the PNRC and the other 6 are elected by the 24 members already chosen). The
PNRC Board of Governors elects the Chairman and all its other officers. Gordon was elected, as all
PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board
(3) The PNRC Chairman is neither appointed by the President nor by the head of any department,
agency, commission or board of the Executive, Judicial or Legislative branches. Hence, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official
or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.
(4) The PNRC boards decisions or actions are not reviewable by the President. Neither can the
President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the Chairman, it is the Board that can review,
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the Chairman. This proves again that the office of the
Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
In the Camporedondo ruling, the test used was whether the corporation was created by its own
special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation
law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government
corporation. However, it failed to consider the definition of a GOCC in the Administrative Code.
A GOCC must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a
majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation,
by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership
by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the
government does not own or control PNRC.
Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established
by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation
would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation
is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Under existing laws, the general law is the
Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The
Constitution authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters. Since private
corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with
special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.
Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a GOCC in the
absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC
as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional
prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even
for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the provisions of the PNRC Charter, insofar
as it creates a private corporation and grants it corporate powers is void for being unconstitutional.
LIBAN VS GORDON (2011)
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J.
Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency
as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited the case
of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is
a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec.
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of
Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover,
the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are
private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he
was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and
1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of
the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create
the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The
PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They
basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature
of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
ISSUE: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
RULING: [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the
very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if
the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a
party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize
and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this
country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953,
August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373,
P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs
corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of
private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is
in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and
effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory
laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before
the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the
unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the
force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality as
well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a
GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation
of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-
case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all
of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded
to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the
countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its
existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the
PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
SENATE vs. ERMITA
FACTS: Multiple scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project, the Garci
tapes (wiretapping controversy), and the fertilizer scam surfaced on 2005. These prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the North Rail Project. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain
department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot
attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Senate President Franklin Drilon denied the requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, then
President Gloria Arroyo issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to exempt themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only
2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
ISSUE: Whether EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
HELD: (YES, in part) The Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the Legislature to
determine the constitutionality of EO 464: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the
power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour: The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section
22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it had issued, the department heads appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of
department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
In aid of Legislation: The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly
recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power
of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may
be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be
present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a
head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive
privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls
under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that
in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The
letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive
privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head
of office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls
for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor
the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of
the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to
compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void.
Section 1(a) however is valid.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
FACTS: The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project approximately P16 Billion Pesos. The Project was to be
financed by the People's Republic of China.. The investigation was claimed to be relevant to the
consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. However, he
attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates.
Businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the
Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, the NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese
Government.
Petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,6 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,7 and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear
and testify
However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible
invocation of executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged
bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege
Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her
executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of
her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of
all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have
a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.
This Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-
hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing
questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony ZTE / NBN project be
dispensed with. Petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees, the latter issued the show
cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations unsatisfactory
citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office
of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. He emphasized his willingness to testify
on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice
of questions. Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt
Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore
options in making policy decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country's diplomatic relations and economic
and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines."
He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within
the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita and United States v. Reynolds.11 Lastly, he argues that
he is precluded from disclosing communications made Respondent Committees assert the contrary.
They argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in
aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is
no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with
clean hands.
President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151. She advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation
ISSUE: Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD: We grant the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes imperative. Senate
draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as
embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other,
they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.19 Simply stated,
while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are
different.
The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under section 21 and the lack
of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct
thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be
valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a
valid claim of executive privilege. This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a
recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464 Senate v.
Ermita, have comprehensively discussed the concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to
explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to clearly define the communications covered
by executive privilege.
In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As may
be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is
the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy
decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases
are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.45 Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President.
Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority
For the third element, United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to
balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely
protected by the Constitution. Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does
not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing.
In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is
made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita
categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in
relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality
turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but,
instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material
was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task
requires and our decision implies no judgment whatever concerning possible presidential involvement
in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend
solely on whether the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of
the Committee's functions.
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on
whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all.
But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. The distinction between
such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For
one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does
the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information. Constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate
interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by
numerous decided cases.
The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that
an allegation be made "whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets,
closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is
not even intended to be comprehensive."58 The following statement of grounds satisfies the
requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must not require the executive to state
the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and
detention, is hereby nullified.
QUARTO V. OMBUDSMAN
GR 169042, 5 October 2011
FACTS: Quarto is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division (CESPD), Bureau of
Equipment (BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As
CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH. The
respondents are members of the SIT.
On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate
alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH
service vehicles in 2001. On January 17, 2002, the committee designated the DPWH Internal Audit
Service (IAS) as its Technical Working Group to conduct the actual investigation.
DPWH-IAS learned that the emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service
vehicles basically undergo the following documentary process:
I. Determination of repairs and/or spare parts needed
a. The end-user requesting repair brings the service vehicle to the Motorpool Section, CESPD for
initial inspection and preparation of Job Order; and
b. Based on the Job Order, the SIT conducts a pre-repair inspection (to determine the necessity of
repair and whether the repair is emergency in nature) and prepares a Pre-Repair Inspection Report,
with a recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief.
II. Preparation and Approval of Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment with accompanying
documents (Job Order and Pre-Inspection Report)
a. The Procurement Section, Administrative Manpower Management Service (AMMS) prepares the
Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE), the Canvass Quotation of three Suppliers, the
Certificate of Emergency Purchase, and the Certificate of Fair Wear and Tear;
b. The end-user signs the RSE with the recommending approval of the concerned head of office; and
c. The AMMS Director approves the RSE.
III. Repair of Vehicles
a. The end-user selects the repair shop/auto supply from accredited establishments;
b. The selected repair shop/auto supply repairs the service vehicle and issues the corresponding
sales invoice and/or official receipt;
c. The end-user accepts the repair and executes a Certificate of Acceptance;
d. The SIT conducts a post-repair inspection (to check if the vehicle was repaired and whether the
repair conformed to specifications) and prepares a Post-Repair Inspection Report, with a
recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief. The Motorpool and the end-user would
prepare the Report of Waste Materials also for the signature of the CESPD Chief; and
e. The Assets and Supply Management and Control Division recommends payment of the expense/s
incurred.
DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the
government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million
for this ten-month period alone.
Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-
Affidavit and a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and
employees including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly
benefited from the anomalous transactions with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and
violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations charging a number of DPWH
officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and
violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents
request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the
cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the
Ombudsmans grant of immunity in the respondents favour.
SANDIGANBAYAN: DISMISSED.
ISSUES:
Whether the Ombudsman under RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) expressly grants him
the power to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses.
Nature of the power to grant immunity.
RULING: Yes.
Quartos contention: While conceding that the Ombudsman has the power and the discretion to grant
immunity to the respondents, the petitioner asserts that this power must be exercised within the
confines of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which requires, inter alia, that the proposed
witness must not appear to be the "most guilty." By ignoring this provision and extending immunity to
the respondents whose false reports ultimately led to the payment for supposed repairs, and who are,
thus, the "real culprits," the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion a fatal defect correctible by
certiorari.
Yes. It is within the context of the Courts policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise
of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant of
immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
The respondents exclusion in the informations is grounded on the Ombudsmans grant of immunity
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law
upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may
only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or
the particular way discretion is to be exercised.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no
different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same
latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in court) and the degree of
participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are
not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, i.e., when
his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some
individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a
rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.
RA 6770, Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be
necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional
functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
Nature of the power to grant immunity.
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative. The exclusive
power of Congress to define crimes and their nature and to provide for their punishment
concomitantly carries the power to immunize certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the
attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of crimes with high political,
social and economic impact. In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses broad discretion and
can lay down the conditions and the extent of the immunity to be granted.
The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the
process and is essentially an executive function. RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory
prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such terms and
conditions" as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the
need to take "into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court," i.e., Section 17, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court
BAGABUYO vs. COMELEC
MOTION: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction
FACTS: On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." 3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.4 It
increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376 implementing R.A.
No. 9371. Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC. In asking for
the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner
argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or
conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No.
7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative
district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No.
9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city,
involve the division and conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite.
RULING: NO. Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court upheld respondents arguments saying that such law only increased the representation of
CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger,
abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a
plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There
was also no change in CDOs territory, population, income and classification.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is he
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the
other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371
does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units
and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is
merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in
Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of
congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of
congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of
two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional
improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress
RATIO/DOCTRINE: Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X
Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or
reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. They are related but are different from each other.
Both provisions mentioned above are within the vested authority of the legislature. The Legislature
undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local
government units by setting standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering
their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the
two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.
In the case at bar, no division of CDO city takes place or is mandated. CDO city politically remains a
single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial line. Its territory remains completely
whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city
into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to
validly apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit
because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of
the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of
government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may
or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit.
Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in
their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a
mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief
executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the
district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate
unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no
capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other
similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state.35 They possess legal personality on the authority of
the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that
Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on
standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local government unit's
corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of
the members of its Sanggunian.
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the
functions of government."38 As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from
the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of
the community in the administration of local affairs"39 and the mediums through which the people act
in their corporate capacity on local concerns.40 In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to
expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a
legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government
unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division
of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to
and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
ALDABA vs. COMELEC
GR NO. 188078 | 25 Jan. 2010
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, Bulacan filed this
petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Sec. 5(3), Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in
2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986,
the population of Malolos City was 223,069.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region
III of the NSO as authority that the population of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010.
The Certification states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9591 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have a population of at least 250,000. The question here is whether the City of Malolos has a
population of at least 250,000 for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in
time for the 10 May 2010 elections.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification
is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos
will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010 elections.
The 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 Aug 2007. Based on growth
rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 Aug 2010. Even if the
growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 Aug 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of 1 Aug 2010.
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter,
in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no
showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of
250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because
the aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts.
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS: This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking
any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000)
for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
HELD: NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to
be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities
only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a
city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a
province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations
on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on
the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to
the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an
additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints
against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the
recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that
resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured
District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two.
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population
of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse of discretion, that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
The ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the
exact issue presented by this petition.
BANAT vs. COMELEC
FACTS: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.
BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the
Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUE:
WON Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
WON The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seat remains a valid limitation.
HELD:
A.
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives. The first
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans
interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the
first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold
in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the
100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats
to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number
of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941,
the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
B.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that participates
in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation
of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines
for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read
and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough
that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of
Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being
filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available to Number of seats available to
legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220 x .20 = 55
.80
Banat formula
he groups will be ranked from highest to lowest depending on the number of votes they received in
the elections.
There are two rounds of seat allocation. In the first round, the groups receiving at least two percent of
the votes cast for the party-list are guaranteed one House seat.
For the second round, the additional seats - or the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed
seats - will be distributed to the groups, including those that received less than two percent of the total
votes.
V. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all
party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one
seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a
total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the
full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number
of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted
for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the
total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in
rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are
even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not
proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said
party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the
two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is
by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined
political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners
deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno
emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of
the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to
is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates
in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for
sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but
are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list
organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS).
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organizations incumbent
representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the
Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organizations erstwhile third
nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group.
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list
organization. SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the
organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. Thereafter, SENIOR
CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC. In accordance with
the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system,
SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first
nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. On May
5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the
party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was
occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David
L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the Datol
Groups petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27,
2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents." Further, a
new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected
during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was
supposedly elected as the organizations Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an
opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that
were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both
groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr. that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which
was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume
the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the third nominee,
Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The petition prayed that the "confirmation and approval of the replacement of Congressman David L.
Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third
nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of her assumption
into the office." But the same was dismissed.
Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name
of SENIOR CITIZENS.
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution ordering the cancellation of the
registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition that
involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned
PartyList Nominee" and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said
case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho
and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement.
Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010
and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section
7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Khos term
starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Khos resignation.
By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives
is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half of the three-year term. This is totally
opposed to the prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of
Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR
CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement
must be rejected.
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for
cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941.
ISSUE: WON THE CANCELLATION OF SENIOR CITIZENS REGISTRATION IS PROPER DUE TO
VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION ON TERM-SHARING
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under Section
7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012.
Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as
nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in
2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground
for the cancellation of the organizations registration and accreditation because the nominees never
actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were
made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented,
the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7
of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to
the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can
be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS
at it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,50 "the general rule is that statutes
are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also
reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by
necessary implication because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks
forward, not backward). (Citations omitted.)
RULING: True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR
CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections teaches that "a public office is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a Public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the
COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions
already registered in order to ensure the latters continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed
by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate
in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive
application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration
and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition
for confirmation and approval of Rep. Khos replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27,
2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy
was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication
that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in
implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group
insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep.
Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-
040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR
CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was
no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to
stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify
the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down
the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by the
petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an
issue raised here, should be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be
proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013
elections.
YES
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-
judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations:
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. This right pertain to the
substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings.The essence of this aspect of due
process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the
requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or
denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of
the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of
decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must
all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the
conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial
body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in
substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts
and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process,
this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness
has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to
ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24,
2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group
and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing
compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation.
Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that
the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a
material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the
May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this
issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side
regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their
position.
It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the
existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing
was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group asking for the
confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on
December 31, 2011.
More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed
by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw
its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of
SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by
their term-sharing agreement.
However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS
as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for
disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantess remonstration was
not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as
a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and accreditation
ABANG LINGKOD vs. COMELEC
FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers
and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to
obtain the number of votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9, 2012
resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD
registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered
photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated
with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or
who were denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG
LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from the court.
The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including
that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system
pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to
participate in the May 20
13 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed the
cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued
the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the
May 13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's Resolution dated
May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for
reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this Court,
alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its motion
for reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed and
consolidated by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?
HELD: ABANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: Administrative due process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the
absolute lack of notice or hearing.
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that
the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence
establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its
registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its
Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate
dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess
the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation
of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are
already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing
for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system
pursuant to Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the
COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the
qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.
POLITICAL LAW: Cancellation of party-list registration
Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation
as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally
altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on
the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof
of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong
Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking
registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia, track record that they truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may
register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented.
For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations
need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the
sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized
and underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are
no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they
have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is
sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of
the sector/s, which they represent.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations intending to register
under the party-list system are still required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's
pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would have to be presented would only
differ as to the nature of their group/organization. He opines that sectoral organizations must prove
their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional parties or
organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization.
PIMENTEL v SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
FACTS: On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege
speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called
attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200
million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from
Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and
another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW.
Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and
that the second appropriation covers the same stretch from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat
Road in Paraaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about
the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator
Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to
Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics
Committee. On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate
President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as
Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as
members for the Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was
ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the members of
the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in
the Ethics Committee.6 On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to
nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand
of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to
convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final.8 Thereafter, the
Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules)
which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.9
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10 where he stated that he would answer
the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009,
Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech11 where he stated that the Ethics Committee was
not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was
approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven
Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009,
petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14
May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary
Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary
Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May
2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the
adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint
filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and
of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution
when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own
provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication.13
In its Comment, respondent argues that:
1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the
alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party
has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the
doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively
pertains to Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted [,] allow the
adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14
ISSUES: Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
prior resort; and Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to equal
protection;
RULING:
ISSUE:
1. Whether Sen Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Sen Villar, is an indispensable party in this
petition- NO
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction- NO
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Sen Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Sen Villars right to equal protection- NO
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole is a violative of Sen Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution- NO (for adoption); YES (for quorum reqt)
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity- YES
HELD/RATIO: The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate
Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole
1. Indispensable Party
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
A person who is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or
injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them
In this case, Sen Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court.
The issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee
of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Sen Madrigals interest.
2. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply; that the primary
recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches.
o SC: No! The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case w/ch involves matters judicial in character. If the
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before
a remedy will be supplied by the courts
o The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge
of respondent for their resolution. The issues here are purely legal questions within the exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court
o The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government did not prescribe for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
of the governmental power
o The Court is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation
by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Sen Villar to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection that it was constituted
solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Sen Villar.
o SC: No! It was upon the election of Sen Enrile as Senate President (17 Nov 2008) that the
Ethics Committee was reorganized. Sen Lacson, was elected as Chairperson. No one from the
Minority became members of the Ethics Committee because it was their stand not to nominate any.
Sen Pimentel promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is
final but the records did not show that a caucus was convened.
o It was because of the accusation of Sen Villar (that he would answer the accusations
against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee) that Sen Lacson moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as a Committee of the
Whole.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights,
privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges."
o In this case, the Minority prevented the Ethics Committee from pursuing the investigation
when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee that Sen Villar declared that
he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee.
o Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole
was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee
4. Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Sen Villars right to due process.
o SC: No! The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings
has been recognized and affirmed by this Court.
o Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states "Each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings." This provision has been construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the House of Congress in the promulgation of its own rule. This is generally exempt from
judicial supervision except on a clear showing of a denial of due process.
o The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance
of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with,
the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
5. Prior Publication
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole
merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette
o SC: Yes! (dito lang nag-agree si SC)
o x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the
sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure.
o It should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted
pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
o The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate.
Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or
Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication
before the rules can take effect.
o In this case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides: These
Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if
the rights of its own members are affected.
6. Quorum requirement
SC notes that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is an
exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to
the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate.
 Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is an exact
reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges
which states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to
respondents allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole
shall constitute a quorum.
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the
Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to
comply with requirements of quorum. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
REYES vs. COMELEC
GR 207264
FACTS: Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on
Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed
with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of Regina Ongsiako Reyes ,the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations.
On March 27,2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed
an MR on April 8, 2013.On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5,
2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day,
petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was
duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative of Marinduque.
HELD: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
these requisites;
valid proclamation;
proper oath, and
assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet.
Also, the 2ndrequirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session
and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved
to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross.
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, ET. AL. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the seemingly elementary matter of
the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list
representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list organization, the Adhikaing
Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the
Lico Group), who represents the organization in the House of Representatives, and the other group
by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
FACTS: Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November
2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as
second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.
Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it introduced
amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the
Central Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming
from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation). The amendments likewise
mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the
Second National Convention.In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the
incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central
Committee. The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him
from Ating Koop for disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the
Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
The Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition against petitioner
Lico which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to
vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second
nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the House.
The COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared
Mascarina as the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group.
The Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second Division's Resolution, which the
COMELEC En Banc denied
COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of
Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as
member of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC had a jurisdiction over the issue?
HELD: NO. Comelec had no jurisdiction over the issue. The court find that while the COMELEC
correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being
beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating
Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list
group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.35
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
What we find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding the
validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has
jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification
requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be
represented.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do
not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any
matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.
The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona fide
membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
VELASCO vs. BELMONTE
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016
FACTS:
Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections
in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
[this] Honorable Court;" thus, he seeks the following reliefs:
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. be
issued ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay
Q. Velasco for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner
to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives of
said position of Marinduque representative;
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN] BARUA-YAP be
issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco,
herein petitioner, in her stead; and
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and PROHIBIT
respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY
VACATE said position.
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not
mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the
installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of
office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title
to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases.28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the
Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that numerous
jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance
of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her
proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over
quo warranto cases30 filed against Reyes by several individuals.
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her]
proclamation. "31 But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that
the proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x
x" as he was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped
from asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an
Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET.
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the
Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that numerous
jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance
of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her
proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over
quo warranto cases30 filed against Reyes by several individuals.
It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo warranto,
considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the same vis-a-vis the
Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that "after due
proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the
Province of Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow
the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the outright dismissal
of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part,
respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of
evidence by the contending parties.
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is
echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House
of Representatives."
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of
her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the
present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2)
a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution
the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives
when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?
rom the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office x x x.
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first essential
element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives over which
the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as
Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the
Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the
present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without
the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of
office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office."
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo
party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They
claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since
it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal
concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R.189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that
won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the
others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once
the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
TY-DELGADO vs. HRET
FACTS: Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9 October 2012, Pichay
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.
Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification under Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections on the ground
that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay
paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.
Pichay claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He contended that he did not
personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed
responsibility as president of the publishing company.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Sur. Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that
Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was
convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two
years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed
on him.
HRET held that Pichay did not participated the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in
line with his duty as the president of the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET
concluded that Pichays conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE: W/N the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude
RULING: YES. A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the
Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are
libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another
libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of
malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. He committed an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes
his fellow men, or society in general, and an act which is contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the
libelous articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and
entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to
cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he
was individually concerned in the publication or not.
Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five years
from his service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec, we held that the five-year period of disqualification
would end only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he
was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. In this case, since Pichay served his sentence
when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016.
Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June
2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of
candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12 is a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he
knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his
representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material representation
as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section
78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of candidacy is considered
void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. In
both Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Aratea v. Commission on Elections, we proclaimed
the second placer, the only qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for
the position of Mayor. We found that since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the
highest number of votes was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were
considered stray votes.
Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude. Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and
he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes
cast for him were considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013
elections who received the highest number of valid votes shall be declared the winner. Based on the
Provincial Canvass Report, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who
received the highest number of valid votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET
has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the Court maintains
jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly
disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits grave abuse of
discretion.37
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 18 March
2015 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in
HRET Case No. 13-022. Respondent Philip A. Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the office of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner
Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is DECLARED the winner for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections.
Considering that the term of the present House of Representatives will end on 30 June 2016, this
Decision is immediately executory.
POBRE VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
FACTS: Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiagos speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court. I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x
According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be
disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.
Respondent
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as a member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those
comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for
the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11which states that: A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
ISSUE: Whether Miriam Defesor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary
HELD: No. The court ruled in favor of Sen. Miriam in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the
dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good
conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The
court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse
from her.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Issue: Does the disbarment proceeding and other disciplinary actions should be taken against the
senator? Ruling: NO, because the delivery of speech was conducted while the Congress is in session
and therefore she is covered with the state immunity provided in our Constitution Art. VI Sec.11 of the
Constitution. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. The disciplinary actions falls under
the Congress provided in The Rules of the Senate contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language
against another Senator or against any public institution. Senate President had not apparently called
her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary
action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of
her own chamber. Therefore the disbarment case proceeding was DISMISSED.