The Religious Element in Spinoza's Philosophy

Author(s): Walter Eckstein

Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jul., 1943), pp. 153-163
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION
Volume XXIII JULY 1943
THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
WALTER ECKSTEIN
I cant fact, well illustrating how great a
A EW years ago the late English
jurist and Spinoza scholar, Sir
Frederick Pollock, published a
short biography of Spinoza in which he
made the remark that Spinoza in the
course of the years had been called by
many and inconsistent bad names;
"only," he added, "the charge of athe-
ism, constantly flung at him in the eight-
eenth century, has gone out of fashion."
It seems, however, that in this last obser-
vation Pollock was too optimistic. For it
is this very charge of atheism which con-
stitutes the main content of a recently
republished book, Spinoza and Religion
by Elmer E. Powell.' The thesis of this
book is that Spinoza, an atheist at heart,
was dominated in all his actions by an ex-
cessive timidity and that it was this ti-
midity which caused him to cloak his
atheistic philosophy in the phraseology
of religion. It was this timidity which de-
termined him to publish his Theological-
Political Treatise anonymously and to ad-
jure his friends in his first delineation of
his own philosophy, in his Short Treatise
on God, Man and His Well-Being, to be
cautious in communicating his philosoph-
ical ideas to other people. Had not he
even engraved the word "Cautious" on
his seal ring? Powell calls this "a signifi-
I Boston, I941.
I53
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Number 3
role prudence played in his life." It was
this prudence and timidity, according to
Powell, that induced Spinoza to conceal
his real opinions when dealing with peo-
ple with religious interests and even to
express religious views though they were
diametrically opposed to his own.
Moreover, in Powell's opinion, Spinoza
was a person in whom sentiment found
little place. "The claims of the creative
imagination were allowed neither in his
life nor in his system." He had no inter-
est in art, and "the most beautiful crea-
tions of poetry such as Ariosto's 'Roland'
were for him mere trumpery (nugae)."
In quoting these latter remarks from
Freudenthal, Powell comes to the con-
clusion that evidently to expect to find
in Spinoza a strong religious interest
would be as unwarrantable as to look for
lilies at the North Pole. But-to take
this last point first-has anyone ever
come to a similar conclusion with regard
to Plato? And did not Plato speak of
Homer in a much more depreciative
way? And did he not also consider the
essence of all art to be imitation, which
to him meant something very base? Yet
who would deny that Platonism was one
of the constituents of Christian theology
from Augustine to modern times.
As to the charge of timidity, one must
I54 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

say that Powell's arguments are by no Thus the real meaning of the seal would
not indicate any timidity on Spinoza's
means convincing. It was really the rule
in Spinoza's time to publish books on po-
part but rather testify to his courage and
litical and religious subjects anonymous-
his willingness to fight for his convictions.
ly, particularly when they dealt with There is other evidence in Spinoza's
such controversial subjects as did the
life to support this interpretation of his
character. We hear that when the
Theological-Political Treatise. Moreover,
brothers De Witt, whose liberal politics
as J. G. Prat in the Preface to his French
translation of the Treatise suggests, hadit been the object of Spinoza's whole-
may be true that one of the reasons whichhearted approval and admiration, wer
induced Spinoza to publish the book brutally murdered by a frenzied mob
without his and the publisher's name on Spinoza's landlord had to lock the doo
the title-page was the intention to pro-of the house to keep Spinoza from pub
tect his publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz. licly protesting against the savage deed
On the other hand, the warning in the His biographer, Colerus, tells us that h
Short Treatise not to spread the doctrines
saw or rather possessed a book of draw
of this book indiscriminately among ings made by Spinoza; among them was
strangers was certainly an act of caution
a self-portrait of Spinoza, representing
which, as the general outburst against
him in the costume of Masaniello, th
the Theological-Political Treatise proved,
head of the rebels of Naples, who led hi
seems to have been entirely justified. people against the Spaniards and who, a
Even less conclusive is the argumentGebhardt once put it, represented to th
taken from the inscription on Spinoza's seventeenth century the genius of revolu-
tion.
signet ring. The Spinoza scholar, Carl
Gebhardt, has pointed out that the As a young man cut off from his family
meaning of this inscription is quite dif-
and from his religious community and
ferent from what Powell's interpretation
yet, through all his life, preserving hi
would suggest.2 The seal shows a rose
inner unperturbedness and steadfast
surrounded by the letters B.D.S.-forness, Spinoza came very close to tha
Benedictus de Spinoza-and the LatinStoic ideal of the sage which he himsel
word Caute. Upon closer inspection onehas renewed in his Ethics under the name
realizes that the rose has some extraordi- of the Free Man. He was in his later
narily long thorns. Thus the picture on years exposed to all kinds of dangers.
the seal must have reminded the Latin- The Theological-Political Treatise, with
speaking reader of Spinoza's own name,its very liberal views-liberal even for
as in Latin a thorny rose would be Rosa the Netherlands, the freest country of
spinosa. Moreover, it seems obvious that Europe-was forbidden by one church
the warning implied in the word Cautesynod after another and finally even by
was not intended for the writer of the let-the public authorities of Holland. Its au-
ter on which the seal was to be impressed thor, who had been very soon discovered,
but for the addressee. He read the seal: was menaced with personal persecution,
particularly after William III came to
"Beware of Spinoza; he is thorny."3
power.
2Carl Gebhardt in Chronicon Spinozanum, IV,
265 ff.
motto, Nemo me impune lacessit, which accompanies
31 am indebted to Professor John T. McNeill the representation of the thistle. Apparently this is
for having drawn my attention to the Scottish a similar "talking coat of arms."

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 THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY I55

Moreover, the shadow of illnessspirit

had of his philosophy, we would rather
hung over Spinoza's life a long timeside
be-with Carl Gebhardt, who considers
fore he died at the early age of forty-four
courage and virility the essential features
years. He had been suffering from tuber-
of Spinoza's character. And we are in-
culosis, an illness which his physician
clined to think that Sir Frederick Pollock
said, in a letter to Leibniz, Spinoza was
hadright when in his address at the ter-
inherited from his mother.4 He had been
centenary celebration of Spinoza's birth
in ill-health and suffering from occasion-
in I932 he quoted-referring to Spinoza's
ally recurring fever while still in Voor-
character-from Horace's famous ode
burg, and a year before his death he used
the two opening stanzas which end:
in a letter to Tschirnhaus the phrase "si
vita suppetit,"^ apparently doubting that .... si fractus inlabatur orbis
he would have many years to live. And inpavidum ferient ruinae.
though he must have known how serious
his illness was, as he had studied medi- II
cine quite thoroughly-his library con-
tained all the medical books necessary As
forto Spinoza's alleged irreligiosity, it
has been suggested above that in this
a practicing physician at that time-he
respect the general conception of Spino-
seems to have realized in his own life the
maxim of the Free Man, of whom he saysza's philosophy has greatly changed since
in his Ethics that he is never led by the fear the latter part of the eighteenth century.
of death: "A Free Man thinks of nothing Since the time when Goethe wrote to his
less than of death and his wisdom is a friend Jacobi that to him Spinozism and
meditation not on death but on life." atheism were two entirely different
We know that during his illness Spinozathings and that he would rather call Spi-
never complained of his suffering and noza Theissimum and Christianissimum,
that none of his friends, not even hiswhen Herder spoke of him as the "holy
landlord, to whom he spoke on the verySpinoza," and Novalis gave him that fa-
day of his death, was aware of the seri-mous epithet of "the God-intoxicated
ousness of his illness. man"-since that time innumerable
In view of all these facts and of the voices have been raised in a similar vein.

4 The physician, Schuller, in his letter of Febru-

It has been more and more recognized
that the very roots of Spinoza's philoso-
ary 6, I677. Schuller says there that the illness was
growing worse from day to day. Though modern phy lie in his ethical and religious inter-
medicine does not believe in the hereditability of
est. To find a position with regard to the
tuberculosis, it may well be that Spinoza had been
infected in early childhood by his mother. His moth-
course of the world and the fate of man
er, Hannah Deborah, died when Spinoza was only which at the same time would give us
six years old. Carl Gebhardt once remarked in per-
sonal conversation to the writer of this article that
strength and freedom from suffering-
it was unusual for a woman at the time to have a this, in the opinion of a recent philoso-
middle name. He thought that "Deborah" (mean- pher, was the real leitmotiv of Spinoza's
ing "bee," like the Greek "Melitta") had been the
thought.5 His philosophy has been called
real name and that during her illness the name
"Hannah" (meaning "grace") had been given to her a rationalized religion,6 and Spinozism
in order to make her unrecognizable for the angel of
s Robert Reiniger, Philosophie des Erkennens
death, a custom still practiced among Eastern
(Leipzig, 1911), p. 68.
Jews. Gebhardt concluded from this hypothesis
that Spinoza's mother had been seriously sick long 6Wilhelm Wundt, Ethik (Stuttgart, I912), II,
before she died. II3.

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I56 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

has been characterized as a doctrine of the summum bonum, which he began to

salvation.7 visualize while still a young man and
which, as he then discovered, was the
How far are such contentions justified?
There can be no question that the Short
only remedy against the threefold temp-
Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being
tation of wealth, pleasure, and fame. As
as well as the Tractatus de intellectus against the love of these things, which
emendatione start on a religious note. areInperishable, he praises the love toward
the Short Treatise, which may be con- a thing eternal and infinite-a love which
sidered the first draft of his own philoso-
alone feeds the mind with joy and there-
phy, Spinoza reveals the real object ofis free from all sadness and which is
fore
his philosophic system: it is the unionmuch to be desired and to be sought out
with God in which real beatitude lies. with all our power. And here again he
This union is based upon the right kind
hints at the essence of this supreme good,
of understanding which brings withnamely,
it the knowledge of the union
the love of God.8 which the mind has with the totality of
The right idea of God is the goal which nature.
in his Short Treatise Spinoza craves with In the Short Treatise Spinoza's lan-
a zeal characteristic of the religious mys- guage is in almost the same vein as the
tic: "However, I tell you this, that so writings of his Collegiant friends such as
long as we have not such a clear idea of Pieter Balling and Jarig Jelles." Bal-
God as shall unite us with him in such a ling, too, thinks that love toward perish-
way that it will not let us love anythingable things and union with them are like-
beside him, we cannot truly say that wely to rob man of his happiness and that
are united with God so as to depend im-salvation is to be found only in the union
mediately on him."9 And we find almostwith God. As Jelles does in his treatise,
exactly the same attitude in his Tractatusso Spinoza calls the intellect a son and
de intellectus emendatione. In the famous
immediate creature of God and charac-
introductory chapter which contains theterizes the union with God as a rebirth of
only passage in Spinoza's writings that
man. It is the language of the liberal
has a biographical and almost confession-
al tingelo he speaks of the supreme good,ested in gaining wealth. Particularly Lewis Robin-
son, in his Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik (Leipzig,
7 Gabriel Huan, Le Dieu de Spinoza (Arras, I913), 1928), pp. 48 f., propounds the theory that this
p. 7; cf. also David Bidney, The Psychology and whole passage is a variation of a scholastic theme;
Ethics of Spinoza (New Haven, 1940), p. 45. he refers to Heereboord, Exerc. ethicae, Vol. IV,
and Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 5. Cf. also the remarks
8 Tractatus brevis, II, 22 (Opera, I, Iooff.). All
about fame, pleasure, and wealth by Angelus Silesi-
the quotations refer to volumes and pages of Geb-
hardt's Heidelberg, 1926, edition of Spinoza Opera us, reprinted in Carl Gebhardt, Spinoza, Vom Wege
(4 vols.). The Ethics is quoted only by parts andder Erkenntnis mit Versen des Angelus Silesius
(Frankfurt, 1927).
propositions.

9 Tract. brev., I, 2, "Second Dialogue" (Opera, " Balling's Het Licht op den Kandeaar has been
I, 34). The translation is by A. Wolf of Spinoza'sreprinted by Carl Gebhardt in Chronicon Spinozan-
Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being um, Vol. IV. Cf. also Gebhardt, "Die Religion
(I9IO), p. 40. Spinozas," Archiv fir Geschichte der Philosophie,
XLI, 333 ff. which deals particularly with Spinoza's
o1 The genuine character of this confession has relation to the Collegiants. Both Balling and Jelles
been questioned, as it seems to follow certain tradi- seem to have been influenced by Spinoza; on the
tional patterns. It may be particularly noticed other hand, the Short Treatise was probably trans-
that Spinoza himself in one of his letters (Epist. lated into Dutch and revised by Balling and Jelles,
XLIII) emphasizes that he never had been inter- respectively.

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 THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY I57

protestant sects of his time which Spi-

the Improvement of the Understanding, he
noza uses. He speaks of the lovely bonds
expects the theologians to find fault with
of God's love which constitute real free- this work because he did not separate
dom for man, and he identifies God andGod and nature in the way all had done
truth in a way that reminds us of the re- of whom he knew. He therefore cannot
ligious tradition out of which Spinozahave been surprised when, many years
had come.'2 later, Hugo Boxel replied to a letter in
And yet even in these early writings we which Spinoza had explained the nature
cannot fail to recognize the intellectualist of God as he saw it with the famous
character of Spinoza's religion. "True words: "Tuum Deum ignoro."
belief," we read in the Short Treatise, "is
III
good only because it is the way to true
knowledge, and awakens us to things What in particular were these distinc-
which are really worthy of love." And, tive features of Spinoza's conception of
he adds: "The final end that we seek and God? In the first place, in all his writ-
the highest that we know is true knowl- ings, particularly however in his Ethics,
edge."'3 This brings us to the very coreSpinoza is anxious to remove from this
of Spinoza's religiosity. Already in hisconception all features of anthropomor-
Short Treatise knowledge and beatitude phism. He is opposed to the multitude,
are inseparable.14 It is true, Spinoza useswhich imagines God a mighty king and
theological language, but his God is en- identifies his might with the might or the
tirely different from the God of orthodoxright of rulers (Ethics, Part II, prop. 3,
theology. He probably means this whenschol.). In one of his letters (Epist.
at the end of the Short Treatise he warns XXIII) he says explicitly that theolo-
his friends not to dismiss his new teach- gians usually picture God as a perfect
ings and to be aware of the fact that a man and therefore attribute to him cer-
doctrine does not cease to be true for not tain wishes and think that he dislikes the
being accepted by many people. In a let- deeds of the bad ones and feels pleasure
ter to Oldenburg which was written while about the acts of the righteous; but phi-
Spinoza was working on his Treatise on losophy must not attribute to God those
12 The identification of God and truth as well as qualities which would constitute a per-
the evaluation of love according to its object occursfect human being. Neither must we im-
in talmudic writings as well as in Christian medieval
agine that God could change his decisions
mystic literature, in the latter particularly with
reference to John 14:6. or that he could arbitrarily prevent those
13 Tract. brev., II, 4 (Opera, I, 6i); Wolf, op. cit., things from happening which necessarily
p. 76. follow from his nature (Ethics, Part I,
14 Cf. St. Dunin Borkowski, Spinoza nach drei- prop. 33, and Schol. I and II; ibid., Part
hundert Jahren (Berlin, I932), p. I8: "Erkenntnis I, Appen.). In short, Spinoza's God "is
und Gluck fliessen hier bereits restlos ineinander."
Cf. also the same author's Spinoza, II (Miinster, not the God of psalmist or prophet or
I933), 352, where he stresses the importance of un-apostle, whose wisdom is full of mercy
derstanding the Ethics in the light of the Short Trea-and whose loving-kindness is better than
tise and refutes the insinuation that Spinoza "cau-
life."i5
tiously and cunningly cloaked a naked naturalism
and materialism in the garment of theism"-an Spinoza's God has no "personality."
opinion which was possible only as long as one didThere can be no doubt that those who
not know Spinoza's world well enough and tried to
explain the Ethics only by itself or to transpose it X5 Thus W. R. Sorley, "Spinoza," Proceedings of
by means of modern conceptions. the British Academy (London, 1917-18), p. 497.

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 I58 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

deny personality to Spinoza's God are Furthermore, the freedom wh

right.I6 Not only does Spinoza's God lack
noza attributes to God is far fr
everything that is essential to a humanidentical with the traditional th
person-he has neither will nor under-
concept. According to Spin
standing, he feels neither joy nor sorrow, may be called free because he i
and only in a figurative way may we say
termined by anything outside
that he loves or hates-but Spinoza also
God is beyond any determina
admits expressly that the word personali- "determinatio negatio est.""I I
tas as the theologians use it has no mean-the laws of his own nature by w
ing for him and that he is not able to form
acts are governed. In God freed
a clear and distinct concept of it.17 More-
necessity coincide in such a way
over, Spinoza's God has no "imagination- noza occasionally speaks of God
al qualities."'8 And, what is even more free because he exists and acts o
important, his actions are not directedthe necessity of his own nature.
toward the good. Both theses in a way in this sense is equivalent to "fr
follow from Spinoza's outright rejection sity" as opposed to "forced nece
of any anthropomorphism. Because we But is this not to say that eve
humans are determined by certain de-
is but. blind chance and conti
sires and our actions directed toward Not only E. E. Powell but many
certain goals and because we esteemopher
a before and after him h
man higher who strives after the good, claimed Spinoza's philosoph
we are inclined to picture God in a simi-"mere" naturalism or mechanis
lar way;19 we think of God as being de- jecting all happening, includin
termined by the good, as if in acting will,
he to a relentless necessity
Powell puts it, to "necessary, b
turned to it as to a model or a plan, some-
what as an architect looks at the models sation." Others have gone even
of houses, buildings, or towers.20 They found that Spinoza's univer
void of any trait that could evoke
I6 Huan (op. cit., p. 220) lists about twenty phi-
losophers as defenders of what he calls the "person- votion or reverence. Moreover,
alist thesis" and as many as its adversaries. To the Spinoza's philosophy seemed to
latter group might be added Paul L. Couchoud,
room for ethics. The right of the
H. A. Wolfson, H. H6ffding (Spinozas Ethica
[Heidelberg, 1924], p. 49), and Huan himself. is the law of nature. Small fish ar
Among the first group particularly outspoken is by the big ones. Man follows his
V. Brochard, who in his Le Dieu de Spinoza ("Etudes
of
self-preservation, his egoism;
de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne"
[Paris, I932]), says that "le Dieu de Spinoza est more he does so, the better he i
beaucoup moins different qu'on ne l'a cru quelque the law of nature, and there is n
fois du Dieu de la tradition judeo-chretienne."
from it. We have no choice. In
17 Cogitata metaphysica, Part II, cap. viii (Operashould not blame or deride or scorn hu-
I, 264).
man passions and misdeeds; we should
18 Epist. LVI: "We cannot imagine God, but
rather understand and study them as if
we can, indeed, perceive him." Cf. Leon Roth,
Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides (Oxford, I924), mudic idea that God, in creating and sustaining the
p. II9.
world, has before him the Torah, meaning the moral
I9 Cf. particularly Ethics, Part law.
I, Appen. (Opera,
II, 77 f.). 21 Epist. L.
20Ethics, Part I, prop. 33, Schol. II. This
2Epist. LVIII: com-
"libera necessitas .... coacta
parison may have been a reminiscence
necessitas."of the tal-

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 THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY I59

we were dealing with lines, planes,

aims orand ends and yet he seems to imply
bodies. Good and bad are only that
other ex-may be certain aims intrinsic
there
pressions for our likes and dislikes;
in God.24they In other words, what Spinoza
are, as our conceptions of orderrejects seems to be any kind of tran-
and dis-
order, beauty and ugliness, nothing
scendentbut teleology, not immanent teleol-
modes of thought. ogy.
These are some of the objections raisedit must be obvious to any
Moreover,
against what may be considered thewho
reader pre-attempts to rethink Spino-
suppositions of an ethical or religious at- that Spinoza's system is
za's philosophy25
titude on the part of Spinoza. basedIfuponSpi-
the idea of an eternal world
order. This aeternus
noza's system were really the negation of ordo totius naturae26
is the common
every ethical norm or rather every value order of nature to which
in general, then the charge ofman,fatalism
being a part of it, is subjected in
and amoralism would seem entirely
just thejus- same way as any other part.
tified.23 This conception is basic to Spinoza's phi-
IV losophy already in that first phase which
It is, however, by no means true that for us is represented by his Short Treatise.
Spinoza's conception of God or nature is McKeon says with reference to this work:
really deprived of every aspect of value. There is here a conception of the universe
It must be admitted that Spinoza repeat- which supposes an essential ordering of things.
edly rejects the idea of order or disorder, One of the fundamental convictions of Spi-
nozism is here in the First Part of the Short
of good or bad, as applied to nature. But
Treatise: there is never a hesitation or a doubt
his argument is mainly directed against
concerning the reality and the intelligibility of
a certain anthropocentrism which he a suprasensible order in nature; that order, in
found in theological and philosophical
speculations of his time. What Spinoza 24 Cogit. met., Part II, cap. x (Opera, I, 268 f.):
combats is the idea that the universe is ".... quia nempe si Deus aliquem finem sibi prae-
fixit, ille sane non fuit extra Deum; nihil enim extra
made for man's sake. Not only is there
Deum datur, a quo ipse incitetur ad agendum."
no reason to assume that nature should Cf. the famous passage against final causes in the
Appendix to Part I of the Ethics.
have a tendency to satisfy our needs, in-
25 H. F. Hallett, "Some Recent Criticisms of
cluding our desires for order and beauty,
Spinoza," Mind, 1942, p. I34, makes the following
but we have no right to think of God excellent
as remark, which might as well be directed
against a book such as Powell's: "Acquaintance
having certain ends outside himself. In
with the writings of a philosopher, however ex-
his Cogitata metaphysica Spinoza speaks
tensive and accurate it may be, does not seem to me
of the impossibility of God's having any
a sufficient basis to work upon: this must be sup-
plemented and corrected by a sympathetic rethink-
23 The writer of this article in two papers, pub-
ing and development of his speculation, and espe-
lished at the occasion of the three hundredth anni-
cially where its categories lie outside of current
versary of Spinoza's birth, has tried to show that
modes of philosophical thought."
the attacks directed against the possibility of a
normative ethics and a philosophy of law in Spi-26 De intellectus emendatione, II, 12 (Opera, II, 8);
noza's system are unjustified and that the idea cf. of Ethics, Part I, prop. 33, and dem.; ibid., Part II,
duty as well as that of law have their place in prop.
his 7, schol. About man's subjection under the
philosophy (cf. "Die rechtsphilosophischen Lehren common order of nature see Ethics, Part III, Preface;
Spinozas im Zusammenhang mit seiner allgemeinen Part IV, prop. 4, coroll.; Part IV, prop. 57, schol.;
Philosophie," Archiv f. Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphi-and, further, ibid., Part II, prop. 30, dem.; Part I,
losophie [I933], Vol. XXVI, and "Zur Lehre vom prop. i , Dem. II. Cf., Tractatus theologico-politicus,
cap. xvi (Opera, III, I9I), and ibid., II, 8 (Opera, III,
Staatsvertrag bei Spinoza," Zeitschriftf. iffentliches
Recht, Vol. XIII [I933]). 279).

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i6o THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

fact, is what constitutes Nature, not as it is Harald Hoffding has recognized that Spi-
evolved in things but rather as it is the source
and mover of all evolution.27
noza rejects the conception of value only
where it is applied to individual, special
The idea of a fixus et immutabilis ordophenomena of nature. But Spinoza him-
naturae is so essential to Spinoza's philos-self applies it to the innermost essence
ophy in all its phases that it may well beand the supreme law of nature by identi-
called one of the fundamental elements fying nature and God.29 It has not been
of his religious outlook. In the sixth sufficiently realized, as far as I can see,
chapter of his Theological-Political Trea- that, in rejecting value predicates in their
tise, where he repeatedly refers to this application to reality, Spinoza is most
immutable order of nature, he expressly anxious to refute any negative evaluation
states that any event which would de- of nature. To take only a few examples:
stroy or break this order would make In usthe Short Treatise30 he contends that
doubtful of God and of everything and there is no confusion (Verwarringe) in na-
our belief in the possibility of such an ture, since nobody knows all the causes
event would lead us into the arms of of things so as to be able to judge accord-
atheism. ingly. As he does here, Spinoza in other
It is true, Spinoza says that concepts writings also declares our lack of knowl-
such as order and confusion are relative edge the real reason why we think we find
to our power of imagination or thinking. imperfection in nature. But, he says
We speak of order or confusion, of beautyin his Theological-Political Treatise-and
or ugliness, in proportion as things areagain in the Political Treatise-whatever
seems ridiculous, bad, or absurd in na-
likely to delight or disgust our senses or
our imagination.28 However, upon closer ture seems so only because we know
things only in part. And he declares in
investigation, we realize that the kind of
order which Spinoza rejects is really anEpistola XXX to Oldenburg:
external or superimposed concept of or- I do not think it right for me to laugh at
der as of an aesthetically pleasant ar-
Nature, much less to weep over it, when I con-
sider that men, like the rest are only a part of
rangement that would delight our senses.
What he, however, admits is the regularNature and that I do not know how each part
of Nature is connected with the whole of it,
adaptation and coherence of the individ-
and how with the other parts. And I find that
ual things and happenings to each other,
it is from the mere want of this kind of knowl-
a cohaerentia partium, meaning, as Spi-edge that certain things in Nature were formerly
wont
noza explains to Oldenburg, that "the to appear to me vain, disorderly, and ab-
laws, or nature, of one part adapt them-surd, because I perceive them only in part and
mutilated and they do not agree with our philo-
selves to the laws, or nature, of another
sophic mind.
part in such a way as to produce the
least possible opposition." There are many passages in Spinoza's
Moreover, there can be no doubt that Ethics which express the same thought.
In the Preface to the third part of the
in Spinoza's mind a definite positive val-
ue was attached to this order of nature. Ethics Spinoza stresses the fact that
nothing happens in nature which could
27R. P. McKeon, The Philosophy of Spinoza
(New York, 1928), p. 69. 29 Hoffding, Spinozas Ethica, Analyse und Char-
akteristik (Heidelberg, I924), p. 30.
28Ethics, Part I, Appen.; Epist. XXX and
XXXII; Cog. met., I, 5. 30 Tract. brev., I, 6 (Opera, I, 4I).

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 THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY i6i

be attributed to a fault of hers.3I It is

he admits the validity of an objective
only because we have inadequate ideas perfection as he admits the existence of
that we form the conception of evil.32 order in the sense of an objective con-
It is in accordance with this rejection
catenation of all the parts of the uni-
of all the negative value qualities in their
verse. Perfection in this objective sense is
application to nature that Spinoza at-
equated by Spinoza with reality. How-
tributes the highest perfection to God orever, as Lewis Robinson has pointed
substance. It is not only the old theologi-
out,34 even in spite of this equation, Spi-
cal tradition which makes Spinoza call
noza has by no means succeeded in ex-
his God Ens summe perfectum. It follows
cluding every value tinge from the con-
from his identification of reality and per-
cept of perfection. Even if perfection
fection33 that God (or nature), represent-means to Spinoza nothing but reality or
ing the highest realitas because his po-being, argues Robinson, reality or be-
pentia is the highest, must necessarily be
ing is to him the highest, the only perfec-
the most perfect being. For as Spinoza tion, that which is valuable, worthy of
explains in the Appendix to the First love, and divine. And Robinson refers
to this passage in Epistola XIX: "quo
Part of his Ethics the perfection of things
is to be judged only by their nature or
enim res aliqua plus perfectionis habet,
power (potentia). eo etiam magis de Deitate participat,
It is clear that when Spinoza rejectsDeique perfectionem exprimit magis."
the concept of perfection or rather char-These few hints may suffice to show
acterizes it as a mere way of thinking
that Spinoza's universe is by no means
and as something relative which does not
devoid of values. It is not the blind chaos
explain nature in itself, he has in mind anit has been represented to be. In fact,
evaluation of nature from the human Spinoza again and again emphasizes that
point of view. In the passage just quoted
in the universe there is no place for
Spinoza continues by saying that thingschance. The irrational, the absolute con-
are not more or less perfect because they
tingent would be just the opposite of the
fixed and immutable order of nature in
delight or offend our senses, because they
agree with human nature or are repulsive
which Spinoza believes. Whoever reads
to it. As is true with regard to his con-
Spinoza's Ethics with the sympathetic
cept of order, so his concept of perfection
approach of which Hallett speaks cannot
is twofold. He rejects the human, subjec-help realizing the feeling of reverence and
tive concept of perfection and order, butawe shining through the sober mathemat-
ical language of this work whenever Spi-
3 Ethics, Part III, Preface: "Nihil in natura fit
noza mentions that eternal order of
quid ipsius vitio possit tribui .... ." Cf. also ibid.,
Part IV, Preface, and Part IV, prop. 73, schol. The
which we ourselves are parts.
translation of Spinoza's Epist. XXX is from The
Correspondence of Spinoza (I928), by A. Wolf.
32Ethics, Part IV, prop. 64, coroll.: "Hinc se- V
quitur, quod si mens humana non nisi adaequatas
haberet ideas, nullam mali formaret notionem";
The science of the Renaissance had
cf. ibid., Part IV, prop. 73, schol. discovered the infinity and the homoge-
neity of the universe. No longer was the
33Ethics, Part II, Def. VI: "Per realitatem et
perfectionem idem intelligo." God is called "Ens
earth the center of the world-the latter
summe perfectum" in Ethics, Part I, prop. I ,
Dem. II, and Epist. II. 34 Op. cit., p. 255.

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I62 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

itself limited within the Ptolemaic the way to ethical living and to that ulti-
spheres-and no longer was theremate
anysalvation for which he had been
separation between the sublunar andsearching
the in his earlier writings. To him
sidereal realm and their respectiveitlaws.
seems the supreme ethical law to sub-
Infinity, necessity, and unity-thesemit to that eternal order of which man
were the principles upon which the is new
but a part and to accept cheerfully
whatever it may have in store for us.
world of the just arising natural sciences
was based. This new world found its Thus only may we hope to find the true
highest philosophic expression in Spino-
happiness which, he already states in his
za's system. The peasant in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise, lies in vir-
Short Treatise who for the first time dis-
tue alone and in peace of mind.
covers that there are other fields beyond It has been said that Spinoza's way of
salvation, like Plato's, is the way of in-
the borders of his own may well be taken
tellect.37 The "amor Dei intellectualis"
as a symbol of the science of the Renais-
sance which had left behind the limits and the "vera animi acquiescentia," of
and restrictions of Scholasticism and which he speaks in those solemn words in
opened the road to wider or rather towhichin- his Ethics ends as in a magnificent
finite perspectives. Spinoza's philosophy
final chord, can be reached only through
presupposes this new scientific outlook the right kind of knowledge. There is no
and transforms it into the higher visionother way but reason. "What altar," Spi-
of a new faith. Not a faith in miracles noza exclaims in his Theological-Political
and not a faith in some paternal provi-Treatise, "could a man build himself who
dence-already in his Short Treatise ne-offends the majesty of reason!"
cessity and the tendency to preserve Some philosophers have characterized
one's own existence take the place of di-
Spinoza's position as a religion of reason38
vine foresight-but a faith in an ulti- or as a religio philosophica as opposed to
mate rationality of the world. Harald
a religio mythologica.39 The essential
Hoffding says that what Spinoza calls
point seems to us that Spinoza was the
"substance" is the principle of an inner first to accept the results of the natural
rational connection between all phenom- sciences of our modern time and to build
ena.35 It was this rationality that to Spi-
upon these fundaments the structure of
noza seemed to guarantee at the same a new faith which Santayana once quite
time the possibility of true knowledgeappropriately called a religion of science.40
and of man's beatitude. Man is able to
37 Thus W. G. de Burgh, "Spinoza," Philosophy,
understand God as he really is or to form
XI (I936), 274.
adequate ideas of him and of all things- 38 H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, II,
as far as they are understood sub quadam
325; cf. also Dunin Borkowski, Spinoza, IV (Miin-
ster, 1936), 75.
specie aeternitatis-because there is this
39 Carl Gebhardt, "Die Religion Spinoza,"
rational order in nature. It is the logical
outcome of this attitude for Spinoza Archiv
to fur Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. XLI
(1932); cf. his article, "Religio metaphysica," in
consider everything to be against reason
Septimana Spinozana (The Hague, I933), pp. 134 ff.;
which is against nature.36 cf. also J. Freudenthal, Spinoza, Leben und Lehre,
ed. C. Gebhardt (Heidelberg, 1927), II, 75: "....
It is reason which to Spinoza opens
seine Religion ist die Religion der Erkenntnis."
35 "Spinoza, 1677-1927," Chronicon Spinozanum, 40 G. Santayana, "The Ethical Doctrine of
V, 48. Spinoza," Harvard Monthly, II (I886), I45; cf. also
36 Tract. theol.-pol., cap. vi (Opera, III, 91). "Ultimate Religion," in Septimana Spinozana.

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 THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY I63

Yet Spinoza's aim was not toperturbedness

recon- which are so characteristic
cile religion to science but ratherofto draw
Spinozism. In one of his letters Spinoza
says that ethics are to be based upon
the metaphysical and ethical conclusions
from the scientific premises. metaphysics
Some of and physics. In his own
these conclusions have by no means Ethicsbe-
we see how from his conception of
come obsolete. Our present-day the necessity, unity, and infinity of na-
science
ture pos-
still implicitly presupposes certain follow the ethical laws which he
sometimes
tulates with regard to the rationality of calls divine because they seem
nature. Philosophers may speak, with from the necessity of nature:
to emanate
Helmholtz, of the conceivabilitythe ofideal
na- of the free man who not only
ture or simply of the principle of resigns
the pos- himself to his fate but actually
sibility of induction. The fact remains,
affirms it, whose wisdom is not a medita-
as Morris R. Cohen says, that "after
tion on all
death, but a meditation on life;
nature does behave in conformity the endeavor
with to understand human im-
logicaland mathematical principles."4" It and frailties and to forgive
perfections
was this fact which represents the them, to repay hatred, rage, and con-
basis
of Spinoza's faith. tempt with love and nobleness, for minds
One may doubt whether weare have a
conquered not by arms, but by love
and posi-
right to call Spinoza's philosophical magnanimity.
tion religious. If one considers theAnd there is also this other trait in
belief
in God as a personal being one ofSpinoza's
the es- philosophy which we might
sential prerequisites of religion,consider
as E. E.religious: the feeling of awe and
Powell does, then we certainly must ad- in the face of the infinity of
reverence
mit that Spinoza's philosophy naturewas not of which man is but a very small
religious. But it can hardly bepart, denied
coupled with the consciousness that
that both his philosophy andithis life man's mind that nature rec-
is through
show certain traits which we are accus- ognizes herself: "the mental intellectual
tomed to associate with the religious at-love towards God is the very love of God
titude. The peace of mind that flowswith which God loves Himself."
from true knowledge and that accompa- In the last analysis we may find it a
nies the Amor Dei intellectualis is un- matter of little importance whether we
doubtedly one of these traits. And there choose to call Spinoza's attitude religious
can be no question that Spinoza himself or not. There will always be many who
achieved that peace of mind42 and that tofeel that Ernest Renan was not so wrong
when on the occasion of the two hun-
this day the reader of his Ethics feels that
atmosphere of peace which Goethe once dredth anniversary of Spinoza's death
experienced while reading this work. and of the unveiling of the Spinoza mon-
ument
From this peace of mind, this acquies- in The Hague, he spoke these
memorable
centia animi, flow that courage and im- words: "He, from his granite
pedestal, will teach everybody the path
41 Reason and Nature (New York, I93I), p. 226.
to the beatitude he has found, and in cen-
42 Cf. A. E. Taylor, "Some Inconsistencies turies
in to come the civilized man who will
Spinozism," Mind, XLVI (I937), 289: "No one, I
pass through Paviljoensgracht will speak
take it, doubts that Spinoza's own contemplation
in
of the order of the universe brought him the serene his soul: It was perhaps from this
and solemn joy which he describes." place that God was seen most closely."

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