G.R. No.
6878 September 13, 1913 be reserved and that in such a case application could only be
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property
classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied
for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in
the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare
77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both
were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on
September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro,
who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death
inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902,
unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of
land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.
Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles
german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the
registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be
denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the
opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E.,
11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the
application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels
of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to
presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles
of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second
assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a
contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant
Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them
from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his
ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having
been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had
between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one
without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very
definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the
third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property
which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law
for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to
the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him
these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature
property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance
with the law.
1
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of
land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only
property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by
operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or
discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in
first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in
question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which
establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which
the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and
finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed
and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be
unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from
her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court
so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the
appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without
issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's
legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the
deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of
collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had
demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession
by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no
testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from
the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish.
The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land
was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of
the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the
provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal
heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by
law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as
the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted
by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children and
descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the
other half, with the exception of what is established in article
836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be
required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law
could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at
free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811
of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land
which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to
be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either
of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who
alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance
was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that
the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law
that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that
the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of
law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court
failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be
reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such
renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it
from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following
statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried,
his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were
mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them.
(p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92.
From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the
2
appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he
renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by
virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really
belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of
the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the
opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they
attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by
law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time
fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been
invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the
Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says
only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to
the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the
property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who
are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for
those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period
of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly,
ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not
exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the
property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for
guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by
law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed
for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the
Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by
law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed,
that property has not been divested of its character of property
required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of
article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine
in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only
went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from
December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of
the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by
operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which
did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that
although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since
July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the
Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting
the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved
by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a
guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is
not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal
obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the
accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth
allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it be
admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only
thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first
assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and
ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established
by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No.
496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather
inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of
the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is
the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies
and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended
Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into
effect, with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in
the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the
renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of
agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year,
1889, but on the eight day.
3
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are
distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof,
where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower
contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the
children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the
property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by
will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a
valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in
the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that
can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code,
for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear
merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the
right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or
mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the
supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on
appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil
Code that tend to secure the right required to be reserved in
the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be
applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because,
aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases,
such must be the construction from the important and
conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in
the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either
testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the
section that deals in general with property required by law to
be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811;
and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of
the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to
hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897,
that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that
the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to
the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special
right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and
because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in
which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from
December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such
right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who
must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property
registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the
personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is
validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July
14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence
which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in
article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for
the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of
said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article
199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by
article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the
relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they
are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who
should legally represent them. In either case the right of the
persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be
secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding
article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil
Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in
connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as
thus:
4
 Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code
refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon the
property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties
agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the
guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has
prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it
should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise
of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but
for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the
reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's
instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers,
the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying,
according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the
right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law
says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which
article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance
by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has
elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such
proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal
representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the
expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be reserved,
but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at
any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the
right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law,
the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end,
and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of
action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of
the right of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for she
explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity
for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action
cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with
reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act
No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is
sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the
registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents
for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the
registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to
the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro
Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use,
enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all
these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing;
otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the
usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery
the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the
right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then
he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal
and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires,
will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's
brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it
subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
5
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary,
the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the
reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property
could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it
must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not
seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June
18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat
subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points
the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the
arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence
of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the
person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what
he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can
now be maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the person
obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a
mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner;
such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the
latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue
of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of
the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment,
disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in
the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives
within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or
they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute
owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third
degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and
scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order
not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion
which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to
the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of
disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law,
as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been
expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has
married again. There is a marked difference between the case where
a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary
and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant
in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case,
there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property
resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it,
while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of
the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil
Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the
form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally
lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property
required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother
required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the
property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the
latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone
who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right
is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act
whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article
9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which
may be made by the surviving spouse after contracting a
second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no
legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether
effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be
reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as
executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could
transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to
subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of
the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
6
 The possessor of property subject to conditions
subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it,
provided always that he preserve the right of the parties
interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in
the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage
in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the
alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so
long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive,
because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the
right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved
and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that
they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the
right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation
would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to
be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the
alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become
definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to
circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the
reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that
the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve
to the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article
811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the
reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under
the heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the right
required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the
right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the
relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may
pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and
therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and
enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and form
already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring
to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though
conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose
of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code.
Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the
registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974
and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property
reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the
legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought
not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the
children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that
the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition
subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly
be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil
Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He
says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition
subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of
his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants
from whom they inherit in the line whence the property
proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the
property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist,
the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since
the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent
can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate
what he has and nothing more because no one can give what
does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the
third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the
property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot
be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the
third degree. After the person who is required by law to
reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the
alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they
7
 will complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition
and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304,
305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve
the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct.
He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has,
under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited
and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even
though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right
required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything
that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor
of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it
is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership
or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple,
and only then will they take their place in the succession of the
descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it
to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the
fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons
in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been
assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the
fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and
void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of
December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might
pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right,
because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to
be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as
may even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of
disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right
can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such
person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except
that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party
acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is
acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it
seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of
persons other than relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be
prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law:
"To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person
reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person
in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of
the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an
alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the
Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must
reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the
usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee
simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as
is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the
other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the
rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and
recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law
the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the
whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely
because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal,
himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited,
8
when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made
degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two
parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all
the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions.
(Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this
same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its
attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed
that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the
vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which
says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves
to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to
comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed
upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the
price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition
subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may
register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged
that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former
with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought
when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry
that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much
more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent
expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit
some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would
be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the
reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de
retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and
conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof
decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own
name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article
811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan
and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings
as to costs.
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and
VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary
to existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and
set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili,
Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners
liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00
and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by
Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San
Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus
No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated
by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido
and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal
case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-
judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the
bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated
(PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena
9
Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount
she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim"
in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging
them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident
which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle
which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an
affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of
interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the
petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the
date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents,
who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged
that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through
their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as
extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of
their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for
the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the
private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners,
however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled
their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The
Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be
ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death
of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle,
P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the
payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her
child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the
deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs
(herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the
defendants (petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the
judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release
executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the
liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the
private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs,
representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could
not have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private
respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages
arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court
said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants
(private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the tricycle
that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof
of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . .
. 11 Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were
likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This
was never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment
(for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement
must accrue in their favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners
to pay the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the
tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for
cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion
was denied. 15 Hence, this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred
in holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private
respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the
agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the
victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by
payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
10
 (4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation
petition arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979.
The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the
one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the
persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be
made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in
whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his
successor in interest, or any person authorized to
receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the
deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the
persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants with respect to their legitimate children and
decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children
by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they
exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of
collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only
when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other
hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has
been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they
begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest
of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners
therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the
widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child.
This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere
estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of
Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While
it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the
purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses
for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money
claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money
claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said,
had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement
they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's
widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-
heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor
of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
11
Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO
F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA,
TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.: 1wph1. t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition,
accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject
to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The
facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
[Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena
Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason
were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo
and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la
Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March
19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of
the following:
1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New
York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the
San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd.,
Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance
Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226,
80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of
the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164,
84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160
and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the
registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of
the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;
12
 1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles
described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of
deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San
Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the
Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the
Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199
and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and
Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of
tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de
Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de
mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la
Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los
hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote
de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en
Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu
solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno
de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.)
FILOMEN
A ROCES
LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and
her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the
one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y
De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878,
Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of
probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of
the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on
June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
13
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in
her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding
the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of
the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-
assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding
that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the
estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding
that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and
that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter.
This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents'
motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated
facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties
in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to
be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly
those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As
the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which
can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and
whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in
his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six
children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she
inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third
degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should
that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second
degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of
first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in
the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to
make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also
called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five
briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together
with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the
reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property
within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads
to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of
ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of
feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions
and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su
descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por
titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano,
se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido
por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que
14
 eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea
de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
who belong to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous
title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the
same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him
by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant
(prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property
came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or
sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant,
the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant,
brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where
one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her
son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be
inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to
the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree
relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas
a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203;
Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land
from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without
issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the
paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could
register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact
that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-
law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906.
Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
15
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their
six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable
property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death,
should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of
Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the
line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114
Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo,
41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil.
601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her
mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to
her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable
property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was
her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be
within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104
Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor
is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject
to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon
the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor
but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.
(Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944;
Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reserves.
16
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor
but he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the
reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he
may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349,
353). 1wph1.t the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed
no more than a than interest in the reservable property.
(J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios,
who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even
while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy
that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt
is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part
of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of
them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274,
310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino,
L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time
of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as
reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that
issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to
her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived
the reservor.
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As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees
inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was
ruled:1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by
the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his
own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as
said property continued to be reservable, the heir
receiving the same as an inheritance from his
ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the
heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother,
Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter
Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from
her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife
Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of
his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their
share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his
father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable
properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did
not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her
by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a
reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths
portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to
follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine
means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his
death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The
property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by
means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the common
descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who
would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the
light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question
are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third
degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs.
18
Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who
are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the
paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the
reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood
sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the
relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable
property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form
part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable
property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be
deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could
not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the
disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the
second degree from Filomena Legarda.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The
disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with
the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of
Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt
is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces
Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the
fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong
to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and
Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the

reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December
27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.

19