Railway Group Standards PDF

Uncontrolled When Printed
GN
Combined Manual for AWS and TPWS Trainborne Equipment

Railway Group Guidance Note
Issue One: April 2007
GM/GN2169
Published by
Rail Safety and Standards Board

Evergreen House
160 Euston Road
London NW1 2DX
Copyright 2007
Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited
PP204_L5D
Issue Record
Issue Date Comments
One 7 April 2007 Original document
Replaces MT/169 Automatic Warning System
Manual and Instructions
Superseded documents
This Railway Group Guidance Note does not supersede any other Railway Group
document. However, it replaces MT/169 Automatic Warning System Manual and
Instructions, originally published by British Rail in November 1980.
Supply
Controlled and uncontrolled copies of this Railway Group Guidance Note may be obtained
from the Corporate Communications Department, Rail Safety and Standards Board,
Evergreen House, 160 Euston Road, London NW1 2DX, telephone 020 7904 7518 or
e-mail enquiries@rssb.co.uk. Railway Group Standards and associated documents can
also be viewed at www.rgsonline.co.uk.
Page 2 of 179 RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD

GM/GN2169 Issue One: April 2007
Contents
Section Description Page
Part 1 Introduction 6
1.1 Purpose of this document 6
1.2 Background 6
1.3 Copyright 6
1.4 Approval and authorisation of this document 7
Part 2 Overview of AWS and TPWS systems 8

2.1 Overview of AWS system 8
2.2 General operation of AWS trainborne equipment 12
2.3 Overview of TPWS system 14
2.4 General operation of TPWS trainborne equipment 19
2.5 Trainborne equipment general description 21
2.6 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (Howells) 30
2.7 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (STS Signals Ltd) 33
2.8 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (Thales) 34
2.9 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (Unipart Rail) 43
2.10 Data recording requirements 49
2.11 Configuration management and equipment compatibility 51
Part 3 Guidance on maintenance and fault finding 70

3.1 Maintenance requirements 70
3.2 AWS depot test equipments 72
3.3 AWS test equipment 75
3.4 TPWS test equipment 78
3.5 Fault and failure management 80
Appendices 97
Appendix A Useful contacts 97
Appendix B Typical AWS/TPWS electrical installation on single cab vehicle 98
Appendix C Typical AWS/TPWS electrical installation on dual cab vehicle 99
Appendix D STS AWS/TPWS vehicle interface details 100
Appendix E Thales AWS/TPWS vehicle interface details 101
Appendix F Unipart Rail AWS/TPWS vehicle interface details 109
Appendix G Optimum overhaul periodicities for AWS/TPWS equipment 122
Appendix H Form RT3185 reporting AWS/TPWS failure or irregularity 127
Appendix I Form RT3188 activation of TPWS 129
Appendix J Component tracking application form 130
Appendix K Component tracking information sheet 131
Appendix L Typical locomotive fault diagnosis procedure 132
Appendix M AWS testing using a hand-held permanent magnet 136
Appendix N AWS testing using STS TY287 test equipment 138
Appendix O AWS testing using Unipart Rail test equipment 146
Appendix P Fore and aft positions for AWS receivers 149
Appendix Q AWS/TPWS testing using Thales depot test unit (DTU) 156
Appendix R TPWS testing using Unipart Rail hand-held signal generator 160
Appendix S TPWS testing using Thales train test unit 165
Appendix T Typical AWS/TPWS fault finding test sheet 173
Appendix U Typical AWS/TPWS wrong-side failure report form 174
Appendix V Typical labels for defective AWS/TPWS equipment 175
Definitions 176
References 179
RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD Page 3 of 179

Tables
Table 1 Functions of the control panel indicators and pushbutton 38
Table 2 Thales control unit train data recorder outputs 50
Table 3 Unipart Rail control unit train data recorder outputs 50
Table 4 Howells Railway Products Ltd 53
Table 5 STS Signals Ltd 55
Table 6 Thales UK Limited, Land and Joint Systems 56
Table 7 Unipart Rail 64
Table 8 AWS track magnet scenarios 76
Table 9 AWS/TPWS fault codes 83
Table 10 Common human error type faults 93
Table 11 Common system faults 94
Table 12 Common trainborne equipment faults 96
Figures
Figure 1 Typical track-mounted AWS magnet 9
Figure 2 Layout of track-mounted AWS magnet 10
Figure 3 AWS trainborne equipment state diagram 12
Figure 4 Typical TPWS trackside sub-system layout 16
Figure 5 TPWS train stop system 16
Figure 6 TPWS overspeed sensor system 16
Figure 7 TPWS buffer stop mini-loop 17
Figure 8 TPWS trainborne sub-system state diagram 19
Figure 9 Typical AWS/TPWS trainborne sub-system 22
Figure 10 Typical TPWS control unit 23
Figure 11 Typical AWS receiver 23
Figure 12 Typical AWS receiver mounted on bogie 24
Figure 13 Typical AWS twin-lightweight receiver 24
Figure 14 Typical AWS and alarm and indicator unit 25
Figure 15 Typical AWS sunflower 25
Figure 16 Typical TPWS aerial 26
Figure 17 Typical TPWS drivers control panel 26
Figure 18 Typical reset/acknowledge button 27
Figure 19 Typical PSU 28
Figure 20 Typical full isolation switch 29
Figure 21 Typical TPWS temporary isolation switch 30
Figure 22 Howells Relay unit and relay junction box 30
Figure 23 Howells AWS receiver and junction box 31
Figure 24 Howells EP valve 31
Figure 25 Howells electric trembler AWS bell 31
Figure 26 Howells bulkhead mounting and flush mounting AWS indicators 32
Figure 27 Howells traditional desk-mounted dome AWS reset pushbutton 32
Figure 28 Howells AWS isolation switch 33
Figure 29 STS twin-lightweight AWS receiver 34
Figure 30 Thales control unit 36
Figure 31 Thales AWS/TPWS PSU 36
Figure 32 Thales Mark II and III control unit terminal boxes 37
Figure 33 Thales AWS alarm and indicator unit 38
Figure 34 Thales TPWS drivers control panel 39
Figure 35 Thales combined AWS/TPWS reset/acknowledgement pushbutton 39
Figure 36 Thales electronic solid-state AWS receiver 40
Figure 37 Thales composite TPWS aerial and harness 41
Figure 38 Thales aerial deflector in the shape of a dome 41
Figure 39 Thales combined TPWS aerial with electronic AWS receiver 42
Figure 40 Thales underframe mounted junction boxes 42
Figure 41 Thales TPWS temporary isolation switch 43
Figure 42 Unipart Rail combined AWS and TPWS control unit 44
Figure 43 Unipart Rail PSU 45
Figure 44 Unipart Rail electronic solid-state AWS receiver 45


Figure 45 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial 46
Figure 46 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial cable 46
Figure 47 Unipart Rail drivers control panel 47
Figure 48 Unipart Rail harsh environment drivers control panel 47
Figure 49 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial switching unit 48
Figure 50 Unipart Rail full isolation switch 48
Figure 51 Unipart Rail TPWS temporary isolation switch 49
Figure 52 Unipart Rail hand-held AWS permanent test magnet 70
Figure 53 Unipart Rail AWS depot track-mounted permanent test magnet 70
Figure 54 Vortok standard strength depot test magnet on fixed mount 71
Figure 55 Vortok extra strength depot test magnet on moveable mount 71
Figure 56 Checking the height of magnet 71
Figure 57 STS TY287 AWS tester 76
Figure 58 STS flux generator positioned under a vehicles AWS receiver 76
Figure 59 Thales DTU 77
Figure 60 Unipart Rail hand-held combined AWS/TPWS test equipment 78
Figure 61 Thales DTU 78
Figure 62 Thales TTU unit kit 79
Figure 63 Thales TTU 79
Figure 64 Thales TTU track-mounted transmitter loop 80
Figure 65 Unipart Rail hand-held combined AWS/TPWS test box 80
Figure 66 AWS/TPWS right side failure investigation process 85
Figure 67 AWS wrong side failure investigation process 86
Figure 68 Example train data recorder output 90
Figure 69 Combined AWS/TPWS fault finding guide 91
Figure 70 Combined AWS/TPWS system fault finding flowchart 92
Figure 71 Thales Depot Test Unit (DTU) front panel 153
Figure 72 Typical trainborne equipment set-up for Thales TTU operation 162

Part 1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of this document
1.1.1 This document sets out to provide good practice information on the maintenance,
testing and fault finding procedures associated with the Automatic Warning
System (AWS) and Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) trainborne
equipment. It is intended to assist in maintaining the reliability of these essential
safety systems at an appropriate level.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 AWS was initially introduced to the railway on the London Tilbury and Southend
Railway and the Great Western Railway before being implemented as the
national warning system throughout the mainline passenger railway network
during the 1950s and onwards. AWS has since been the main safety system for
drivers to aid avoiding serious incidents and accidents and is a vital part of the
safety of the rail network. The original concept of AWS was to provide the driver
with an audible and visual indication reflecting whether the approaching caution
signal aspect was clear or not. Since then, its use has been broadened to
include an alert to drivers of approaching hazards, for example speed restrictions,
for appropriate action to be taken.
1.2.2 Following the decision taken in 1994 not to fit an automatic train protection
system to the national network, the railway authorities agreed to apply an
alternative train protection system. The TPWS was therefore conceived as such
a system, being an overlay to the existing AWS system functionality rather than a
replacement. In 1999, the Government mandated, by Regulation, the fitment of
an advanced system of train control to the network and rolling stock, of which
TPWS met the basic requirements. The concept of TPWS is to apply the brake
to mitigate a signal passed at danger (SPAD) rather than to prevent a SPAD. By
doing this at, or as the train approaches the signal at danger, the distance
travelled will be reduced as will any collision speed. A few SPADs may be
prevented.
1.2.3 In order to facilitate a rapid and more efficient roll-out of TPWS on rolling stock,
electronic control units have been developed combining the logic functions of the
existing AWS system and the new TPWS system. The new control unit replaces
the old AWS relay unit, using the existing AWS peripheral equipment wherever
practicable. Thus, whilst the two systems are functionally separate, they may
share a common control unit and common inputs and outputs, such as the power
supply, isolation switch and brake demand relays.
1.2.4 The introduction of TPWS incurred a number of operating and equipment

reliability problems which are gradually being addressed. This document has
been developed to aid maintenance personnel in improving the overall reliability
of the AWS and TPWS trainborne sub-system, by sharing good practice and
experience that has emerged from the reliability growth process.
1.3 Copyright
1.3.1 Copyright in the Railway Group documents is owned by Rail Safety and
Standards Board Limited. All rights are hereby reserved. No Railway Group
document (in whole or in part) may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted, in any form or means, without the prior written permission of Rail
Safety and Standards Board Limited, or as expressly permitted by law.
1.3.2 Rail Safety and Standards Board members are granted copyright licence in
accordance with the Constitution Agreement relating to Rail Safety and
Standards Board Limited.


1.3.3 In circumstances where Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited has granted a
particular person or organisation permission to copy extracts from Railway Group
documents, Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited accepts no responsibility
for, and excludes all liability in connection with, the use of such extracts, or any
claims arising therefrom. This disclaimer applies to all forms of media in which
extracts from Railway Group Standards may be reproduced.
1.3.4 Copyright restrictions apply to the use of certain elements of this document,
where information from the suppliers acknowledged below is concerned and
permission should be sought from RSSB when the arrangements set out in 1.3.2
do not apply.
1.3.5 RSSB would like to formally acknowledge the contribution of the following
suppliers when compiling this document:
Howells Railway Products Ltd

STS Signals Ltd
Thales UK Limited, Land and Joint Systems (herein referred to as Thales)
Unipart Rail
1.4 Approval and authorisation of this document

The content of this document was approved by:
Rolling Stock Standards Committee on 24 November 2006.
This document was authorised by RSSB on 15 February 2007

Part 2 Overview of AWS and TPWS systems

2.1 Overview of the AWS system
2.1.1 Background
2.1.1.1 British Rail implemented a standard AWS system nationally to aid the driver in
determining whether an approaching signal was clear or not. It has also been
used to warn the driver of other potentially hazardous situations, such as severe
reductions in speed, the approach to open level crossings and temporary or
emergency speed restrictions.
2.1.1.2 The purpose of AWS is to give drivers an in-cab warning of the approach to a
potentially hazardous situation such that the driver may take appropriate action to
stop or slow the train down. Should the driver fail to acknowledge the AWS
warning, then the AWS system will intervene and apply the train brakes to stop
the train. The system is designed to provide the warning, and consequent brake
application, at a suitable braking distance from the stop signal or other hazard. It
should be noted that the addition of AWS does not relieve the driver of his/her
duty to observe and obey lineside signals.
2.1.1.3 The AWS system comprises a trackside sub-system and a trainborne sub-
system. These are described in outline below. The mandatory requirements for
the AWS system are contained in GE/RT8035.
2.1.2 General system operation

2.1.2.1 In the case of signals, as the train approaches an AWS fitted signal it passes over
track-mounted magnets normally located approximately 180 m before the signal.
The trainborne receiver at the front of the train senses the south pole from the
permanent magnet and the north pole from the electromagnet, if energised. The
receiver sends this information to the control unit which processes the magnet
states and controls the AWS peripheral equipment and brake demand in
response.
2.1.2.2 If the signal is displaying a clear aspect (green aspect or semaphore distant at
off) then the electromagnet will be energised and the logic unit will be presented
with a south pole detected immediately followed by a north pole. The logic unit
will command the AWS clear audible tone to be sounded in the cab (bell or
electronic chime) and the AWS visual sunflower indicator to show all black. The
driver does not have to take any specific action as a result other than to note that
the AWS indications given correspond with the signal aspect (in case of AWS
wrong side failure). The sunflower indicator will retain this indication as a
reminder for the driver that the last signal was displaying a clear aspect.
2.1.2.3 If the signal is displaying a caution aspect (two yellows or one yellow on a colour
light signal or a semaphore distant signal at on) or a stop aspect (red aspect on
a colour light signal or semaphore home signal at on) then the electromagnet will
not be energised and the control unit will be presented with only a south pole
detected (note this configuration also provides fail safe operation should the
trackside power supply or the electromagnet fail). The control unit will command
the AWS caution audible tone to be sounded in the cab (horn or electronic tone)
and the AWS visual indicator initially to show all black. The driver must respond
to the caution indication within a prescribed short time period to prevent an
automatic brake application ensuing. The driver does this by pressing and
releasing the AWS reset pushbutton (sometimes known as the AWS
acknowledge pushbutton) at which point the AWS visual indicator shows a
yellow/black sunflower indication reminding the driver that they have
acknowledged the caution indication and prevented AWS from taking control of
the train. The sunflower indicator will retain this indication as a reminder that the
driver has taken control of the train brake.


2.1.2.4 If the driver does not respond to the AWS caution indication within the prescribed
time period then the AWS will apply the train brakes and bring the train to a
stand. On the former British Rail AWS equipment types, the driver was able to
release the automatic brake application at any time by pressing and releasing the
reset button, but on the modern electronic control units the brake application will
be maintained for at least 59 seconds after the brake application has been made.
2.1.2.5 In the case of AWS provided for speed restrictions and at open level crossings
locally monitored by the driver, only the AWS permanent magnet is provided
(south pole) therefore the trainborne AWS will always receive a cautionary
indication which will require acknowledging by the driver in the same manner as
at a signal not showing a clear aspect. The AWS magnet is located 180 m on the
approach to the speed restriction advanced warning indicator, which itself is
located at a suitable braking distance from the speed restriction commencement
point.
2.1.2.6 An AWS permanent magnet is also located on the exit(s) from maintenance
depots. In this case the driver is required not to acknowledge the AWS caution
indication and to allow the AWS to apply the brakes to test that the system
functions from end-to-end. Various equipment types conduct self-tests at the
start and/or during the journey to monitor the correct functionality of the AWS
trainborne sub-system.
2.1.2.7 Procedures exist, as set out in the Rule Book Module TW5 for the driver to
respond to AWS failures. The driver can isolate a defective AWS system by
operating the AWS isolation switch in the driving cab and will be required to follow
the Rule Book requirements accordingly. It should be noted that isolating the
AWS will also normally isolate the TPWS equipment where a combined electronic
control unit is used.
2.1.3 Trackside sub-system

2.1.3.1 The trackside AWS sub-system comprises equipment mounted on the track
centre line and trackside mounted control equipment connected to the signalling
system.
2.1.3.2 The track-mounted equipment comprises a permanent magnet with its axis
mounted in the vertical plane with its south pole facing uppermost, and an
electromagnet with its axis mounted in the vertical plane with its north pole facing
uppermost (Figures 1 and 2). The south pole is always arranged to be the first
magnet seen by the train and the electromagnet is mounted immediately adjacent
to the permanent magnet along the track centre line.
Figure 1 Typical track-mounted AWS magnet

Figure 2 Layout of track-mounted AWS magnet
2.1.3.3 The south pole of the permanent magnet when presented alone provides the
AWS warning given to the driver, hence at situations where only a warning has to
be provided, for example approaching a severe speed restriction, temporary or
emergency speed restriction or open level crossing, then only a permanent
magnet is required and no electromagnet or connections to a power supply or the
signalling system are necessary. The north pole of the electromagnet when
presented after the south pole, provides the driver with the clear indication at
green signals, and is switched on and off via the signal control circuitry. There is
no designed state that requires application of the electromagnet north pole alone.
2.1.3.4 The top surface of the magnet is nominally mounted at rail level (+/- 12 mm) and
is protected by a running on ramp in the normal direction of travel to minimise
the likelihood of damage from items hanging or dragged by passing vehicles.
2.1.3.5 GE/RT8035, GK/RT0038 and GI/RT7011 describe the situations where AWS is to
be provided, and the configuration of magnets and their control. Fundamentally,
AWS is applied at all semaphore distant signals and to colour light running
signals capable of displaying one yellow, two yellows or a red aspect. AWS
permanent magnets are also fitted to the exits of maintenance depots; the
approach to reductions in permissible speed where the reduction in speed is at
least 33%; the approach to temporary and emergency reductions in speed; and
the approach to open crossings locally monitored by the driver. There are gaps
in trackside sub-system coverage such as in complex junction areas, and these
are indicated by lineside signs.
2.1.3.6 In addition, AWS has been applied at some signals as a SPAD mitigation to
sound the AWS warning to the driver if the train passes certain high risk signals
at danger (known as a SPAD magnet).
2.1.3.7 The permanent and electromagnets are provided in two strengths:
a) Standard strength magnets used in all areas except dc electrified line

areas (traditionally painted yellow).
b) Extra strength magnets for use on dc electrified line areas (traditionally

painted green).
2.1.3.8 Other forms of track magnets are available in these two strengths, including
permanently installed depot exit test magnets, portable permanent magnets used
for temporary and emergency speed reductions and suppressor electromagnets
used to suppress permanent magnets when they are not required to apply to a
train movement (for example on a bi-directionally signalled line).


2.1.3.9 The track-mounted magnets are mounted an appropriate distance on the
approach side of the signal (or speed reduction indicator) such that the in-cab
indications are provided to the driver in time to see the signal aspect or lineside
sign that the magnet(s) applies to.
2.1.4 Trainborne sub-system

2.1.4.1 The AWS trainborne sub-system comprises a number of AWS components and a
number of variations depending on the type of vehicle and the equipment
supplier. Most current installations of AWS are combined with TPWS and share
a number of common components (TPWS function, operation and equipment are
detailed further in sections 2.3 and 2.4. AWS and TPWS equipment are
described in section 2.5).
2.1.4.2 In conjunction with the basic AWS equipment, additional equipment is required to
integrate AWS with the vehicle brake and control systems. There are two main
variations in the additional equipment fitted to the majority of traction and rolling
stock, energise-to-release electric brakes and locomotive systems. Appendices
B and C illustrate a typical AWS/TPWS electrical installation on a single cab and
dual cab vehicles.

2.2 General operation of AWS trainborne equipment

2.2.1 This section of the guidance note provides an overview of the general operation
of the trainborne element of AWS. It describes the operation of the trainborne
sub-system from the receiver detecting the magnets, the response of the control
equipment and drivers interface, through to the brake interface. Understanding
the exact nature of these states and the entry and exit conditions may help during
fault finding particularly when analysing the outputs of train data recorders.
2.2.2 Figure 3 is extracted from GE/RT8035 and shows the normal system response
states (note GE/RT8035 section B12 describes each functional state and the
entry and exit criteria in detail):
OPERATIONAL READY STATE
South pole of track magnet detected
PRIMED STATE
North pole of
electromagnet
No RESTRICTIVE RESPONSE STATE
detected within
initial delay period?
Yes Driver operates

caution
acknowledgement
CLEAR SIGNAL RESPONSE STATE device within caution
Yes acknowledgement
period?
RESTRICTIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT STATE
No
Brake demand cancelled RESTRICTIVE NON-ACKNOWLEDGEMENT STATE
AWS brake demand
Driver operates caution

Yes acknowledgement
device ?
No
AWS brake demand continues

and brings the vehicle to a stop
Figure 3 AWS trainborne equipment state diagram
2.2.3 It should be noted that the cancellation of an AWS brake demand, following the
activation of the acknowledgement device by the driver, is subject to a time delay
of at least 59 seconds.


2.2.4 Power to the AWS trainborne sub-system is normally controlled by the cab
master switch, such that the control unit only receives power when a master key
has been inserted into the master controller and the neutral/engine only position
has been selected. On dual cab vehicles such as locomotives fitted with a
change end switch in the cab, the change end switch must be put to on to allow
the control unit to power up.
2.2.5 When power is applied to the AWS trainborne sub-system, the control unit cycles
through an interactive self-test process to determine whether it is able to function
correctly. Different trainborne manufacturers systems approach this in a slightly
different way but the end result is to provide confidence that the system is fit to
enter service. GE/RT8035 requires that the AWS trainborne equipment have a
built-in self-test routine, which tests that the audible and visual indications operate
when required and that an AWS brake demand can be requested when required.
(Note that it is not mandatory that the test routine proves that the receiver is
capable of detecting magnetic fields from test magnets or that the brakes are
actually applied following an AWS brake demand. However both of these will be
accomplished using the trackside equipment mounted on the exit roads from
maintenance depots.
2.2.6 During the self-test routine the control unit will drive the indicator first to
yellow/black, then to the all black state and sound the audible warning tone
proving that it can output these indications. The driver is required to note that the
brakes are applied (in practice the brakes will be applied before TPWS system
power up) after which the driver can silence the audible warning tone and release
the brake demand by pressing and releasing the reset pushbutton. This action
not only tests the reset function but should also result in the in-cab AWS indicator
displaying a yellow/black visual indication.
2.2.7 When initialising a cab, including when changing ends on a dual cab vehicle, the
above self-test is required to be initiated (normally automatically). Once, the self-
test routine has been successfully concluded then the AWS trainborne sub-
system moves to the operational ready state. If the self-test fails then the AWS
system is required to annunciate this to the driver. This will normally be achieved
by AWS holding a brake application and/or sounding the warning continuously,
depending on the manufacturers design.
2.2.8 In the operational ready state the AWS trainborne sub-system is set to detect
AWS track magnets and to respond accordingly. The sunflower indicator will
remain showing yellow/black as its last state following the self-test routine.
2.2.9 As soon as the receiver detects the south pole of an AWS permanent magnet,
the system enters the primed state. Immediately on entry to this state, the
sunflower indicator will change to all black and the control unit will wait a pre-
defined short period (the initial delay period) of 1 second (+0.0/-0.1 seconds) in
order to allow the AWS receiver to detect the north pole of the electromagnet if
the associated signal is clear. The spacing of the track magnets and the nominal
1 second delay period will allow trains travelling at approximately 4 mph and
above to respond to a valid green signal, below this speed the receiver will not
pass over the magnets within the nominal 1 second period and a caution
response may follow despite the signal displaying a green aspect.
2.2.10 If the south pole is immediately followed by a north pole within the initial delay
period, then the AWS trainborne sub-system will enter the clear signal response
state. In this state, the alarm and indicator unit will sound the clear indication for
between 0.5 and 1.5 seconds and retain the sunflower indicator in the all black
state. The AWS trainborne sub-system then returns to the operational ready
state.


2.2.11 If only a south pole is detected within the initial delay period, for example the
signal is not displaying a clear (green) aspect or the AWS trackside sub-system is
associated with a speed reduction, then the system enters the restrictive
response state. In this state, the alarm and indicator unit sounds the audible
warning tone. If the driver presses and releases the reset pushbutton within a
period of 2 seconds (+/-0.25 seconds)1, then the AWS trainborne sub-system
enters the restrictive acknowledge state. If the driver does not press and release
the reset pushbutton within this time then the AWS trainborne sub-system enters
the restrictive non-acknowledge state.
2.2.12 Note: unlike the older relay based systems, pressing the reset pushbutton before
the new electronic trainborne equipment enters the restrictive response state will
not allow the caution indication to be acknowledged, thus avoiding drivers
anticipating the caution indication before it is actually received. In practice this
has led to a number of unwarranted brake demands as drivers adjust to this
difference with the new electronic AWS control units.
2.2.13 In the restrictive acknowledge state, the sunflower indicator will change to
yellow/black and the audible warning tone will be silenced. The sub-system then
returns to the operational ready state.
2.2.14 In the restrictive non-acknowledge state the sunflower indicator is maintained at

all black and the audible warning tone is continuously sounded. In addition, the
control unit demands a brake application. Normally this will be an emergency
brake application, but in some vehicles, for example some locomotives, this may
be a full service brake application. The sub-system will remain in this state until
the driver presses the reset pushbutton, when it will move to the restrictive
acknowledge state (where the visual indicator will change to yellow/black, the
warning tone will be silenced and the brake demand will be cancelled after at
least 59 seconds have elapsed from when the brakes were applied2).
2.2.15 One further state exists, that of system isolation. In this state, entered by
operating the isolation switch, any existing brake demand is cancelled, the
audible indications are silenced and power is removed from the AWS control unit.
2.3 Overview of TPWS system

2.3.1 Introduction
2.3.1.1 AWS is unable to prevent all SPADs or over-speeding related accidents as it can
be overridden by the driver. Therefore, TPWS was developed to enhance train
protection under these circumstances by applying the train brakes automatically if
a train passes a signal at danger or if the train approaches a signal at danger
such that a SPAD is highly likely. In addition, TPWS has been applied to other
locations where a potentially hazardous over-speeding risks a derailment or
collision, such as at certain speed reductions and on the approach to terminal
passenger platform buffer stops.
2.3.1.2 The TPWS system comprises a trackside sub-system and a trainborne sub-
system. These are described in outline below.
2.3.1.3 The mandatory requirements for the TPWS system are contained in GE/RT8030.
2.3.2 Basic system operation

2.3.2.1 In the case of signals, the track-mounted TPWS transmitter loops are only active
when the associated signal is displaying a stop aspect (red aspect on a colour
light signal or semaphore signal at on). In the case of TPWS fitted at other
1
Where the maximum speed that the train is capable of is less than 100 mph then the caution
acknowledgement period may be up to a maximum of 2.7 seconds (+/-50 ms).
2
The older BR generation of AWS equipment did not retain the brake application after the
acknowledgement push button had been pressed.


locations, for example speed restrictions and buffer stops, the transmitter loops
are always energised as the train passes over them.
2.3.2.2 Every signal selected for TPWS fitment will have a train stop system (TSS)
located at the foot of the signal, and most, but not all, will also have an overspeed
sensor system (OSS). Some signals may have more than one OSS depending
on how many routes there are approaching the signal, and whether it qualifies for
TPWS+.
2.3.2.3 As the train approaches a TPWS fitted signal at danger, or other specified
locations fitted with TPWS, it passes over the track-mounted OSS transmitter
loops. An OSS has a set speed which is dependent on the spacing between the
first loop (arming loop) and the second loop (trigger loop). The trainborne
receiver (TPWS aerial) at the front of the train senses the arming loop frequency
and sends this information to the control unit. The control unit then starts a timer
which is set to one of two settings, 974 ms for trains with passenger brake
performance and 1218 ms for trains with goods brake performance3. A TPWS
brake demand (automatic emergency brake) will occur if the timer is still running
when the control unit detects the trigger loop frequency. This means that the
train is travelling at or above the set speed. If the train is travelling below the set
speed then the trigger loop will be detected by the control unit after the OSS timer
elapses and no brake demand will ensue.
2.3.2.4 If the train passes a TPWS fitted signal at danger then it will encounter the TSS
which will immediately demand an automatic emergency brake application.
2.3.2.5 Whenever a TPWS brake demand is made, the drivers display/control panel will
indicate this by a flashing illuminated lamp, which must be acknowledged by the
driver pressing the TPWS acknowledge pushbutton (normally the AWS reset
pushbutton) before the brake can be released. A brake application is normally
made for one minute provided it has been acknowledged, thus there are no
speed inputs to the TPWS trainborne sub-system. When the acknowledge
pushbutton has been pressed, the brake demand flashing indicator changes to a
steady state until the time-out period elapses.
2.3.2.6 Provision is made for the driver to pass a TPWS fitted signal at danger with
authority, without invoking a TPWS brake demand. In this case, the driver can
press the train stop override (TSO) function on the display/control panel which will
invoke a timed period in which to pass the active TSS. The time period is
configurable at installation, being either 20 seconds (generally for passenger
trains) or 60 seconds (generally for slower accelerating freight trains). The TSO
allows the train to pass one signal only without a brake demand occurring.
2.3.2.7 If a series of signals are to be passed at danger, for example in an engineering

possession, then the temporary isolation switch can be used to isolate the
trainborne sub-system to avoid repetitive applications of the TSO.
2.3.2.8 Various procedures exist, as set out in Rule Book Module TW5, for the driver to
respond to TPWS failures. The driver can isolate a defective TPWS system by
operating the TPWS temporary isolation switch in the driving cab and will be
required to follow the Rule Book requirements accordingly. If operating this
switch does not release the brakes and allows the train to continue, the driver can
operate the full isolation switch noting that this will isolate the AWS trainborne
sub-system as well.
3
For locomotives fitted with both passenger and goods brake timing systems, the correct TPWS timer
is normally selected automatically when the passenger/goods brake changeover switch is operated.


2.3.3 Trackside sub-system equipment
2.3.3.1 The track-mounted TPWS equipment consists of pairs of track-mounted
transmitter loops forming either a TSS or OSS. Each pair of loops is fed from a
pair of trackside TPWS control modules, connected by lineside cabling, which
itself is interfaced to the signalling system to derive power supplies and control
commands. The TPWS control equipment is mounted at the trackside. Figure 4
shows diagrammatically a typical trackside TPWS system layout, Figure 5 a
typical TSS and Figure 6 a typical OSS.
Figure 4 Typical TPWS trackside sub-system layout
Figure 5 Typical TPWS TSS
Figure 6 Typical TPWS OSS


2.3.3.2 Each set of transmitter loops emits a defined pair of frequencies to passing trains
when switched on. A TSS or OSS is configured to operate in one direction of
travel only, and separate pairs of frequencies are employed for each direction on
a bi-directionally signalled or single line. However, the frequencies nominally
selected for the normal direction of travel are permitted to be used on lines for
the opposite direction of travel, particularly in complex areas.
2.3.3.3 Each signal selected for TPWS fitment (generally signals protecting a point of
conflict) will have a TSS and may have an OSS depending on the speed of
approaching trains. The TSS (and OSS if fitted) will be switched on only when
the signal is displaying a stop aspect (red aspect on a colour light signal and
semaphore home signal on). However, some signals with subsidiary aspects
may be arranged to suppress only the TSS (and maintain the OSS in an active
state) when the subsidiary signal aspect clears.
2.3.3.4 Normally a train will only pass over a maximum of one OSS for each signal,
although there may be more than one OSS if there is more than one approach to
the signal. However, an additional OSS may also be located in rear of the
standard signal OSS for signals which are approached at very high speed to
provide two checks of approaching speed where braking distances are longer.
This is known as TPWS+ (TPWS plus).
2.3.3.5 OSS at buffer stops and speed restrictions are permanently switched on
(although some remote installations might contain a battery power supply which
is switched on by an approaching train). The transmitter loops at buffer stops are
of a smaller design than for signals and speed restrictions due to adverse
interactions with standard loops with trains travelling at low speeds (Figure 7).
Figure 7 Typical TPWS buffer stop mini-loop
2.3.4 Trainborne equipment

2.3.4.1 The trainborne TPWS sub-system comprises a number of TPWS components
and there are a few variations in TPWS components depending on the type of
vehicle and the equipment manufacturer. These are described further in section
2.5. Most current installations of TPWS are combined with the automatic warning
system and share a number of common components. AWS function, operation
and equipment are detailed in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.5.
2.3.4.2 In conjunction with the basic TPWS equipment described in later sections,
additional equipment is required to integrate TPWS with the vehicle brake and
control systems.
2.3.4.3 Certain vehicle types are exempt from having TPWS. These are detailed in
GE/RT8030 as:
a) Vehicles that operate solely within engineering possessions.
b) Locomotives used exclusively for shunting purposes.


c) Where an alternative train protection system is fitted to both trains and
infrastructure.
2.3.4.4 There are also circumstances where TPWS need not be active, however the sub-
system is still required to be fitted to enable the vehicles to work under normal
circumstances.
2.3.4.5 GE/RT8026 permits the suppression of the TPWS trainborne sub-system from
operation once an alternative train control/signalling/protection system is in
operation. For example, it is permitted to suppress TPWS where a train is fitted
with an operational Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system when running on an
ATP fitted line.
2.3.4.6 At the time this issue of the Guidance Note is published, operational suppression
arrangements will not exist for the Great Western or Chiltern Lines ATP systems,
or for trip cock fitted trains in mechanical train stop fitted areas. However,
operational suppression of TPWS does occur with the Tilt Authority and Speed
Supervision (TASS) system which is able to override TPWS brake interventions
at other locations where tilting trains are permitted to run at a higher speed than
conventional non-tilting trains.


2.4 General operation of TPWS trainborne equipment
2.4.1 This section provides an overview of the basic operation of the TPWS trainborne
sub-system. It describes the operation of the sub-system from the TPWS aerial
detecting the transmitter loops, the response of the control equipment and
drivers interface, through to the brake interface. Understanding the exact nature
of these states and the entry and exit conditions may help during fault finding
particularly when analysing the outputs of train data recorders.
2.4.2 Figure 8 shows the normal system response states of the TPWS trainborne sub-
system.
OPERATIONAL READY STATE
ARMING TRANSMITTER LOOP DETECTED
YES NO
f1 DETECTED f3 DETECTED f4 DETECTED f6 DETECTED
NORMAL DIRECTION OSS OPPOSITE DIRECTION OSS

NORMAL DIRECTION OPPOSITE DIRECTION
PRIMED STATE PRIMED STATE
TSS PRIMED STATE TSS PRIMED STATE
(OSS ND TIMER STARTED) (OSS OD TIMER STARTED)
NO
YES
TRIGGER TRANSMITTER LOOP DETECTED
f2 DETECTED f2 DETECTED f5 DETECTED f5 DETECTED
HAS OSS ND IS f3 STILL HAS OSS OD IS f6 STILL

TIMER EXPIRED? PRESENT? TIMER EXPIRED? PRESENT?
YES NO
NO TPWS BRAKE DEMAND YES
BRAKE DEMAND
START BRAKE TIMER
INDICATOR FLASHING
DRIVER PRESSES
BRAKE DEMAND
ACKNOWLEDGE PUSH-
INDICATOR STEADY
BUTTON
NO
HAS BRAKE
DEMAND TIMER
EXPIRED?
YES
TPWS BRAKE DEMAND BRAKE DEMAND

RELEASED INDICATOR OFF
Figure 8 TPWS trainborne sub-system state diagram


2.4.3 Power to the TPWS trainborne sub-system is normally controlled by the cab
master switch such that the control unit only receives power when a master key
has been inserted into the master controller and the neutral/engine only position
has been selected. On dual-cab vehicles such as locomotives, the dual cab
switching unit/change end switch must be operated to allow the TPWS aerial and
drivers display/control panel to be in circuit.
2.4.4 When power is applied to the TPWS trainborne sub-system, the control unit
cycles through a self-test process to determine whether the sub-system is able to
function correctly. The different trainborne manufacturers systems approach this
in a slightly different way but the end result is to provide confidence that the
system is fit to enter service.
2.4.5 When initialising a cab, including when changing ends on a dual cab vehicle, the
self-test is initiated automatically. Once, the self-test routine has been
successfully concluded then the sub-system moves to the operational ready
state.
2.4.6 If the self-test fails then the TPWS system annunciates this to the driver by
flashing the temporary isolation/fault indicator on the drivers display/control panel
and it will be necessary for the driver to operate the temporary isolation facility.
Under these circumstances the sub-system will release the brake demand unless
the AWS self-test has also failed.
2.4.7 Following successful self-testing, the equipment enters the operational ready
state where it is set to detect the TPWS track-mounted transmitter loops and to
respond accordingly. The TPWS visual indicators are all unlit.
2.4.8 It is important to understand that the normal direction functionality is independent

of the opposite direction functionality such that normal direction and opposite
direction transmitter loops may be detected and acted upon independently. This
allows normal direction and opposite direction overspeed and/or trainstop
transmitter loops to be applied to the same track for the same direction of travel if
required.
2.4.9 A number of suppliers systems conduct aerial integrity tests when in the
operating ready state by testing the aerial in a similar manner as during the power
up test, but only when an AWS clear signal has been detected from the track-
mounted magnets. It is only in this circumstance that the requirement for the
TPWS system to function is unlikely to be required.
2.4.10 If the TPWS aerial detects an OSS arming transmitter loop frequency (f1 or f4),
the trainborne sub-system enters the OSS primed state whereupon it starts the
normal direction or opposite direction OSS timer as appropriate (the OSS timers
are set to either 974 ms for passenger brake timed trains or 1218 ms for freight
brake timed trains). Thus on detecting an f1 frequency the normal direction OSS
timer will start, and the opposite direction OSS timer will start detecting an f4
frequency. These timers will operate in parallel should the track-mounted layout
of transmitter loops require this.
2.4.11 If the OSS timer expires before the paired OSS trigger loop is detected, then the
trainborne sub-system returns to the operational ready state. If the paired OSS
trigger loop is detected before the OSS timer has expired then the control unit
logic will command a brake demand but only if the OSS trigger loop detected is a
frequency associated with a valid pair, for example f1 followed by f2 or f4 followed
by f5. Any other combinations of OSS frequencies are rejected and the sub-
system returns to the operational ready state.


2.4.12 If the TPWS aerial detects one of the TSS arming transmitter loop frequencies (f3
or f6), the system enters the normal direction or opposite direction TSS primed
state. If the aerial then immediately detects the paired TSS trigger loop
frequency, whilst still detecting the arming loop frequency, then it will command a
brake demand. The control unit has separate and independent functionality for
the normal direction TSS (f3 followed by f2 and f3 together) and opposite
direction TSS (f6 followed by f5 and f6 together), such that the two can function in
parallel on a bi-directionally signalled track. Any other combinations of TSS
frequencies will not invoke a brake demand.
2.4.13 The requirement to detect the arming loop frequency first and then detect the
trigger loop frequency provides the TSS with the ability to stop trains in one
direction only. The requirement to detect both frequencies at the same time
allows the TSS to operate with no lower speed limit.
2.4.14 Once a brake demand is commanded, the TPWS brake demand timer is started
(nominally one minute) and the brake demand indicator flashes. The control unit
awaits an input from the TPWS acknowledge pushbutton which sets the brake
demand indicator to the steady state. Once the TPWS acknowledge pushbutton
has been pressed and the brake demand timer has expired, the TPWS brake
demand is released and the brake demand indicator extinguishes.
2.4.15 Three further states exist:
a) Full isolation - entered by operating the full isolation switch. Any existing
TPWS brake demand is cancelled and power is removed from the control
unit.
b) Temporary isolation - entered by operating the temporary isolation switch.

This will not cancel an existing TPWS brake demand with the exception of
the case where the train has stopped with the TPWS aerial directly above
an active TSS and the >59 seconds has expired. The control unit remains
active but does not respond to detected transmitter loops.
c) TSO entered by pressing the TSO pushbutton. In this state a timer is

started (preset either to 20 seconds generally for passenger trains or 60
seconds normally for freight trains) and the trainborne sub-system will
return to the operational ready state once the timer expires or once an
active train stop has been detected. The OSS facility remains active
throughout.
2.5 Trainborne equipment general description

2.5.1 General
2.5.1.1 This section provides an outline description of the components of the AWS and
TPWS trainborne sub-system. Details of the various manufacturers equipment
currently in use are included in sections 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.
2.5.1.2 As most manufacturers have included the functionality of AWS and TPWS in a
combined control unit, both AWS and TPWS equipment are described together to
enable an understanding of the most commonly installed configurations.
However, it is important to note that either system (AWS or TPWS) can be
applied on its own, and in some cases, for example certain Class 08 shunting
locomotives, only TPWS has been implemented.
2.5.1.3 Specific part numbers and British Rail Catalogue numbers are detailed in section
2.11.3 together with details of equipment compatibility.


2.5.2 Trainborne sub-system components
2.5.2.1 Figure 9 depicts a typical trainborne sub-system including both AWS and TPWS
using a combined AWS and TPWS electronic control unit.
Figure 9 Typical AWS/TPWS trainborne sub-system
2.5.2.2 Note that the boxes shown dotted are only necessary for a dual-cab single control
unit configuration such as on a locomotive.
2.5.3 Combined electronic control unit

2.5.3.1 The combined AWS and TPWS control unit (Figure 10) performs the logical
functions, receiving various inputs and driving the external control and indication
equipment. Most control units in use are electronic replacing the earlier British
Rail relay logic types.
2.5.3.2 The control unit may also provide specific outputs to reset the vigilance system
(where a multi-re-settable vigilance device is used) and outputs to train data
recorders to enable recording of the detection of track magnets together with the
response of the trainborne sub-systems.

Figure 10 Typical TPWS control unit
2.5.4 AWS receiver

2.5.4.1 The AWS receiver (Figure 11) detects the presence of the south and north poles
from the track-mounted magnets and provides a signal to the control unit that one
or both of the magnets have been detected. Several different types of receiver
exist (although not all types may still be in use), including pivoted permanent
magnet, standard and high strength bi-stable reed relay type, twin lightweight
bi-stable reed relay, and electronic/solid state.
Figure 11 Typical AWS receiver
2.5.4.2 Some fleets may be fitted with two receivers, one to detect standard strength
track magnets and one to detect extra strength track magnets (the twin-
lightweight receiver and electronic versions are designed to detect either magnet
types within a single housing). Where both receiver types are fitted, the vehicle
control circuitry is arranged to select the correct receiver depending on the
traction current collection system in use. Locomotives and other dual-cab
vehicles are normally only fitted with one receiver unless they have two
independent AWS trainborne sub-systems, one for each cab.
2.5.4.3 The receiver is mounted underneath the driving vehicle (Figure 12) (either on the
bogie or suspended from the vehicle underside) nominally on the centre line of
the vehicle, and within a height range that keeps the equipment both within
kinematic gauge and able to respond to the minimum trackside magnet field
strength specified in GE/RT8035 under all dynamic conditions. The receiver
cable is connected to a junction box which forms a coupling and test point.

Figure 12 Typical AWS receiver mounted on bogie
2.5.4.4 The pivoted permanent magnet type receiver was the original type developed but
was not reliable at speeds over 100 mph. This type of receiver is no longer in
use, being replaced by more reliable receivers described below.
2.5.4.5 The bi-stable reed relay type of receiver is available as a standard strength unit
(for vehicles not operating on dc electrified lines) and as an extra strength unit
(for vehicles operating on dc electrified lines). The receiver incorporates a single
bi-stable reed relay and two power relays, one north and one south. The
assembly used for operating on dc electrified lines also includes shielding to
reduce the magnetic field experienced by the receiver from strong magnetic fields
produced by the third/fourth rail electrification systems.
2.5.4.6 The twin light-weight receiver (Figure 13) incorporates both a standard strength
and a high strength bi-stable reed switch into one housing. This has the space
advantages of being a single unit where traditionally a separate standard and
extra strength receiver would be required.
Figure 13 Typical AWS twin-lightweight receiver
2.5.4.7 Due to the reliability and obsolescence factors, the bi-stable reed switch is
gradually being replaced by electronic solid-state receivers. These operate on
the Hall Effect principle of sensing magnetic fields and incorporate a magnetic
switch. As for the twin-lightweight, a single electronic receiver is able to detect
both standard and high strength magnets, thus reducing space and weight
requirements. There are also no moving parts in the electronic receiver which
should increase reliability. A further advantage is that there may be no
requirement to adjust the height of the receiver as the wheels wear or tyres are
turned, depending on manufacturer and specific installations.


2.5.5 AWS alarm and indicator unit
2.5.5.1 The alarm and indicator unit (Figure 14) provides the main interface with the
driver. The unit contains the electronic tone generator for the caution
(approximately 800 Hz continuous tone) and clear (approximately 1200 Hz
chime) tones, and contains the yellow/black visual indicator (also known as the
sunflower indicator) to remind the driver of the previous aspect/actions taken.
The unit is mounted in a position where the driver may readily see it from the
normal driving position. Several versions of this equipment exist, including those
with a mechanical sunflower and those with LED arrays to provide the yellow
element of the sunflower.
Figure 14 Typical AWS alarm and indicator unit
2.5.5.2 Older installations, on locomotives for example, have separate audible (bell and
horn) and visual indicators (sunflower). Most have conventional electric trembler
bells, which ring for 0.5 seconds for a clear signal, and pneumatic horns. The
horn may be of the Yodalarm electric type.
2.5.5.3 The visual sunflower indicator (Figure 15) is normally of a mechanical operation
type and is much larger than the combined alarm and indicator unit type. It
contains a bi-stable electro-mechanical device with a magnetic circuit
incorporating two coils, and is magnetically latched in either of its two positions.
The first coil receives a 12V dc pulse every time the receiver detects a south
pole, driving the indicator to all black. The second coil receives a 12V dc pulse
when the driver presses the AWS acknowledge pushbutton after the caution
indication horn has begun to sound, driving the indicator to the black and yellow
condition. In the latter state a proving contact is made, permitting a 40V dc pulse
to pass to the receiver reset coil when the driver releases the AWS acknowledge
pushbutton. Luminous paint is applied to the inner part of the yellow segments,
so that the black and yellow indication can be seen in the dark.
Figure 15 Typical AWS sunflower


2.5.6 TPWS aerial
2.5.6.1 The TPWS aerial (Figure 16) receives the 6 TPWS frequencies transmitted from
the track-mounted transmitter loops. The aerial, in conjunction with the control
unit, may be capable of undertaking an integrity test as part of its in-built self-
testing routines.
Figure 16 Typical TPWS aerial
2.5.6.2 The aerial is mounted underneath the leading vehicle (either on the bogie or
suspended from the vehicle underside) nominally on the centre line of the vehicle,
and within a height range that keeps the aerial both within kinematic gauge and
able to respond to the minimum trackside transmitter loop field strength under all
dynamic conditions.
2.5.6.3 For dual-cab vehicles, for example locomotives, two TPWS aerials are required,
one at each end, to prevent detection of signal self-reversion. Self-reversion is
an unwanted reaction to the signal returning to danger (red aspect) due to the
natural passage of the train restoring the signal. If the TPWS aerial has not
passed clear of the (now) active transmitter loops at the signal then the brakes
would be applied by TPWS as an unwarranted application. Self-reversion can
also occur on a single-cab vehicle if the aerial is mounted more than 2.3 m
behind the leading wheelset.
2.5.7 Drivers panel

2.5.7.1 The drivers control panel (also known as the drivers display unit or drivers
display panel) consists of TPWS status indicators and a TSO pushbutton
(Figure 17).
Figure 17 Typical TPWS drivers control panel


2.5.7.2 A brake demand indicator indicates one of three TPWS brake demand states:
a) Unlit no demand requested.
b) Flashing brake demand requested by TPWS but not acknowledged by

driver.
c) Steady - brake demand requested by TPWS and acknowledged by driver.
2.5.7.3 The drivers control panel also contains a temporary isolation/fault indicator which
also indicates three states:
a) Unlit TPWS operational.
b) Flashing TPWS fault detected.
c) Steady - TPWS temporarily isolated.
2.5.7.4 The TSO pushbutton is pressed by the driver when it is necessary to pass a
signal at danger with the authority of the signaller. In this case, the TSS on the
track would still be transmitting and hence the train would be tripped on a
legitimate movement past the stop signal. However, the driver can operate the
TSO which will prevent a brake demand from the first TSS the system encounters
within a time period. After the time period (preset to 20 seconds for a passenger
train or 60 seconds for a freight train), or on detecting the first TSS, the TSO will
be reset to normal. When the TSO function is in operation, the TSO pushbutton
illuminates steady yellow.
2.5.8 AWS reset pushbutton/TPWS acknowledgement

2.5.8.1 The AWS reset pushbutton (sometimes referred to as the AWS
acknowledgement pushbutton) is also part of the drivers interface and is
mounted on or built into the drivers desk such that it can be readily operated from
the driving position. The pushbutton (Figure 18) contains a changeover contact
which allows the AWS receiver to reset, the audible indication to be silenced and
the visual indication to be set to yellow/black.
2.5.8.2 The same pushbutton is also normally used to acknowledge a TPWS brake
demand. When pressed after a TPWS brake demand, the control unit receives
an acknowledge input which will enable the release of the TPWS brake demand
in combination with a preset timer.
Figure 18 Typical reset/acknowledge button
2.5.9 Power supply unit (PSU)

2.5.9.1 UK traction and rolling stock operates with various battery/control supply
voltages, ranging from a nominal 24V dc to 110V dc. Various types of PSU are
available (Figure 19). The PSU (also known as the voltage converter) isolates
the vehicle battery/control supplies from the AWS and TPWS circuits and
converts the vehicle battery/control supply to the AWS and TPWS operating
voltages, nominally 12.5V dc for the control unit and the alarm and indicator unit


(or separate indicator/bell and horn) and 40V dc for the reset coil in the AWS
receivers. Older style voltage converters are bolted into a base unit which makes
the electrical connection through a jacking strip. The PSU will normally be
protected by a device such as a miniature circuit breaker which will isolate the
AWS system if operated either through a fault or manually.
Figure 19 Typical PSU
2.5.10 Brake demand relay

2.5.10.1 The AWS/TPWS control unit interfaces with the trains brake system via a brake
relay/valve in order to implement an emergency brake application. Several types
exist depending on the nature of the brake system installed. This is part of the
trains brake system.
2.5.11 Electro pneumatic valve

2.5.11.1 An electro pneumatic (EP) valve is used to control the AWS or TPWS brake
application on locomotives. Two types are used, air or vacuum. The EP valve
sits on a base unit through which the pneumatic and electrical connections are
made.
2.5.12 Change end/isolation switch

2.5.12.1 The change end/isolation switch is used where there are two driving cabs on the
same vehicle utilising just one control unit, for example locomotives. The switch
is operated by the driver to select which cab is in use. On more modern
locomotives this may be achieved through the master controller acting on a dual-
cab switching unit rather than a separate switch.
2.5.12.2 A change end/isolation switch is normally mounted at ceiling height inside each
cab, and when operated in one cab (provided it is off in the other cab) connects
or disconnects the AWS reset pushbutton, alarm and indicator unit and EP valve
to/from the control unit to ensure the AWS is operative in the driving cab and
inoperative in the non-driving cab. The existing change end/isolation switch may
also be used to determine which TPWS aerial and controls should be in circuit,
but normally a separate device is used.
2.5.12.3 The switches are colour coded and are not interchangeable.
2.5.12.4 The switch also incorporates a sealed open AWS/TPWS full isolation switch.
2.5.13 Full isolation switch and indicator

2.5.13.1 A full isolation switch (Figure 20) is provided for the driver to isolate the AWS and
TPWS trainborne sub-system in the case of faults where the brakes will not
release, the AWS audible indications will not silence or a succession of incorrect
or spurious responses are given by the AWS or TPWS systems. Various types
exist, the older types being retained in the normal position with a seal or locking
wire to deter abuse, or more modern installations arranged such that the switch
cannot be reset by the driver. The change end/isolation switch on older
locomotives may also include the full isolation switch as described above.


2.5.13.2 Full isolation of AWS will also render the TPWS system isolated (and vice versa)
as the control unit also includes TPWS functionality. A TPWS temporary isolation
switch is provided to overcome this limitation when only TPWS may be at fault.
2.5.13.3 Full isolation is required to be indicated to the driver by a discrete indication or as

part of a general safety system isolation indication. This is achieved on older
vehicles by the visible position of the isolation switch and on modern vehicles by
an illuminated indicator. The full isolation switch is required to:
a) Ensure that the power supply is isolated from the AWS trainborne sub-
system.
b) Ensure that no AWS or TPWS brake demand is or can be actioned.
c) Ensure that all indications except the isolation status indicator are
inoperative.
d) Provide a clearly visible indication that enables a trainborne sub-system

isolation to be detected in all relevant driving positions.
e) Provide an output to the trains data recorder, where fitted, to indicate that
the complete system is isolated.
Figure 20 Typical full isolation switch
2.5.14 TPWS temporary isolation switch

2.5.14.1 A TPWS temporary isolation switch (Figure 21) is provided to allow the TPWS
trainborne sub-system to be isolated either for operational reasons or to
overcome a fault in the sub-system which does not affect the AWS functions, for
example a faulty TPWS antenna.
2.5.14.2 The switch is centre-biased to the off position so that when the equipment is
powered down and on again, any existing temporary isolation will be removed.
2.5.14.3 The switch is mounted out of reach from the normal driving position.
2.5.14.4 On dual-cab vehicles only one temporary isolation switch is provided.

Figure 21 Typical TPWS temporary isolation switch
2.6 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (Howells)

2.6.1 Howells railway products
2.6.1.1 Rolling stock designed and built prior to 2001 would have been fitted with the
traditional British Rail AWS trainborne sub-system largely manufactured by
Howells Railway Products Ltd (herein referred to as Howells). Howells do not
manufacture a TPWS system or components, but Howells AWS components
continue in use today.
2.6.2 Relay unit and relay junction box

2.6.2.1 The AWS logical functions are performed by relay logic (in the relay unit) to
provide the various states described in section 2.2. With the introduction of the
TPWS, the AWS relay unit has predominantly been replaced by a modern
electronic equivalent. The relay unit attaches to the vehicle by plugging into a
base unit (the relay junction box) through which the electrical connections are
made using jacking strips (see Figure 22).
Figure 22 Howells relay unit and relay junction box
2.6.3 AWS receiver and junction box

2.6.3.1 Howells manufacture reed relay AWS receivers are still in use on many fleets
fitted with AWS and TPWS. An underframe mounted receiver junction box is also
available (Figure 23).

Figure 23 Howells AWS receiver and junction box
2.6.4 EP valve
2.6.4.1 Howells also manufacture an EP valve used to apply the train brakes when
demanded by the relay unit or modern electronic control unit (Figure 24).
Figure 24 Howells EP valve
2.6.5 EP repeat and horn relay unit

2.6.5.1 This equipment will have been removed when vehicles were fitted with TPWS.
2.6.6 Brake and horn relay unit

2.6.7 Vacuum horn and air horn

2.6.8 AWS bell

2.6.8.1 The electric trembler AWS bell manufactured by Howells (Figure 25) is connected
to the relay unit junction box by plug and socket or wired directly into a modern
electronic AWS/TPWS control unit.
Figure 25 Howells electric trembler AWS bell


2.6.9 AWS indicator
2.6.9.1 Howells manufacture two variants of the traditional AWS sunflower indicator
(Figure 26). One is a bulkhead mounting version, the other a flush mounting
version for mounting in a panel or direct onto the driving desk. Both types plug
into a base unit which terminates the vehicle wiring.
Figure 26 Howells bulkhead mounting and flush mounting AWS indicators
2.6.10 Voltage converters

2.6.10.1 Howells voltage converters were predominantly removed when vehicles were
fitted with TPWS.
2.6.11 AWS reset pushbutton

2.6.11.1 Howells manufacture the traditional desk-mounted dome AWS reset pushbutton
(Figure 27).
2.6.11.2 The pushbutton dome may be mounted directly on the driving desk or may be
suspended below it such that only the chromed plunger is protruding above the
drivers desk panel.
Figure 27 Howells traditional desk-mounted dome AWS reset pushbutton
2.6.12 AWS isolation switch

2.6.12.1 The Howells AWS isolating switch (Figure 28) is used on older vehicles to
perform full isolation of AWS (and TPWS where fitted). On vehicles where AWS
cannot be switched by the drivers master key controller, this form of switch may
be used to perform the change end functions of a change end switch.

Figure 28 Howells AWS isolation switch
2.6.13 Change end switch

2.6.13.1 Howells manufacture two types of change end switch, one for use with air
systems and the other with vacuum systems.
2.7 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (STS Signals Ltd)

2.7.1 STS Signals Ltd
2.7.1.1 STS Signals Ltd (herein referred to as STS) have manufactured and supplied
electronic TPWS control units for Class 373 and Class 92 locomotives as an add-
on to their AWS equipment. Trainborne sub-system components and technical
descriptions are given below. Electrical specification/connection details are given
in Appendix D.
2.7.2 AWS receiver

2.7.2.1 STS manufacture a twin-lightweight AWS receiver (Figure 29). This was
originally designed for use on Eurostar Class 373 and Class 92 locomotives, but
has since been supplied on many new build sets and allows the trainborne AWS
system to be used with a single AWS receiver over both ac and dc electrified
lines.
2.7.2.2 The twin-lightweight AWS receiver is a robust integrated unit housing two sets of
magnetic sensing elements. One element (Rx1) operates with standard strength
track magnets that are used on non-electrified and ac electrified lines. The
second element (Rx2) operates with extra strength magnets found on dc
electrified lines. The unit is designed to survive at operating speeds of up to
300 kmh, but is designed to operate at up to at least 200 kmh. Selection of the
two detector relays is determined from the Rx2 select line via the receiver
selection relay unit in the PSU.
2.7.2.3 The twin-lightweight AWS receiver in-line entry unit incorporates an integral
flexible conduit and connector. A side-entry version is also available for
installations where it is not possible to fit the in-line version. Removable spacers
are provided as part of the installation which are designed to be moved to below
the receiver to accommodate wheel-wear as the unit becomes closer to the track-
mounted magnets.

Figure 29 STS twin-lightweight AWS receiver
2.7.3 Alarm and indicator unit

2.7.3.1 STS manufacture an AWS alarm and indicator unit.
2.8 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (Thales)

2.8.1 Thales
2.8.1.1 Thales UK Limited, Land and Joint Systems (herein referred to as Thales)
manufacture a combined electronic AWS and TPWS control unit. Details of
trainborne sub-system components and technical descriptions are given below
and vehicle interface details are given in Appendix D. Note that some very early
Thales TPWS equipment was manufactured under the Redifon MEL name.
2.8.2 Control unit

2.8.2.1 The Thales control unit (Figure 30) has been designed to easily replace the older
British Rail relay unit and junction box during retrospective fitment by using an
interfacing terminal box. The terminal box is not necessary for new builds as its
only function is to make use of the older British Rail junction box footprint and
wiring looms for ease of installation.
2.8.2.2 Whilst the control unit can be used for AWS functionality alone, it is invariably
used for TPWS functionality as well and hence performs a dual role with separate
inputs and outputs as required to drive the different system equipment. Elements
of the control unit are used for both AWS and TPWS functionality, such as the
input from the reset/acknowledgement pushbutton, the full isolation facility and
the output to the brake application relay. If the control unit is used for AWS only,
then a link is required to be made in the control unit connector to prevent a fault
being indicated due to there being no TPWS antenna present. It should be noted
that the Unipart Rail (formerly known as National Railway Supplies Limited)
control unit uses the same electrical connector types as the Thales control unit
but the two control units are not interchangeable.
2.8.2.3 The control unit logic is implemented in two Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs), one performing the AWS control function and the other performing the
TPWS control functions. In addition to the main control functions, the FPGAs
incorporate a comprehensive power up self-test function and a limited amount of
continuous fault monitoring for AWS functions.
2.8.2.4 The control unit is powered by a 12.5V dc (+/-0.5V) supply obtained from the
PSU.
2.8.2.5 The control unit contains two selectable AWS caution acknowledgement periods,
the standard setting of 2.0 seconds and an alternative setting of 2.7 seconds for
vehicles with a maximum operating speed of 100 mph or less. This is configured
within the control unit terminal box or within the connector mating with control unit
PL1 for installations not using a terminal box.


2.8.2.6 The control unit also contains a selectable timer to select the time for which the
TSO function will remain active unless it is reset by an active TSS transmitter
loop. The timer is configured in the terminal box or mating connector and has two
settings:
a) 20 seconds standard setting for passenger trains.
b) 60 seconds - extended setting for heavy freight trains.
2.8.2.7 The control unit also contains a pre-selectable timer to select the OSS timer. The
timer is configured in the terminal box or mating connector and has two settings:
a) 974 ms standard setting for passenger trains.
b) 1218 ms - extended setting for freight trains.
2.8.2.8 The control unit also provides a contact closure for 200 ms each time the AWS
reset pushbutton is pressed as an input to a multi-resettable vigilance system.
The vigilance equipment reset contact (RL9) is a voltage-free relay contact.
2.8.2.9 The control unit also provides 11 outputs to interface to the train data recorder.
These contacts (RL1 to RL8 and RL10 to RL12) are voltage-free and close and
then open during the power up sequence.
2.8.2.10 The indicator drives are solid-state outputs which switch to +12V in the active
state. The two outputs to the AWS sunflower (set to yellow/black and set to all
black) are 250 ms pulses.
2.8.2.11 The brake interface provides a contact (RL13) which opens to demand a brake
application. The relay is normally energised to hold the contact closed so that
loss of power to the control unit will automatically cause a brake demand. In the
case of full isolation of the control unit (which removes the control unit power) the
full isolation switch provides an external short circuit across the brake control
output. The relay has a mechanically linked monitor contact which is checked as
part of the power up test.
2.8.2.12 When a train cab is powered up, the brake relay is held open whilst the control
unit carries out a series of self-tests to check the integrity of the trainborne sub-
system. Immediately after powering up the following sequence occurs:
a) The control panel indicators (mainly a TPWS function but the brake
demand indicator is shared with AWS) illuminate.
b) The sunflower indicator changes to yellow/black (if not already in this

state) and then to all black.
c) Approximately 1.5 seconds later the audible AWS caution tone sounds to
indicate that the initial AWS tests have been passed. The driver must
respond to this by pressing and releasing the AWS reset pushbutton.
2.8.2.13 If the remainder of the AWS tests are successful the audible caution tone will be
silenced, the control panel indicators will extinguish, the brake relay will close and
the AWS clear audible tone may sound momentarily. It is the responsibility of the
driver to check the correct control panel, sunflower indications and audible tones.
2.8.2.14 Operation of the AWS reset pushbutton, and the way in which it resets the AWS
receivers to north pole condition, is identical to the relay-based AWS unit except
that the control logic will not respond to the reset pushbutton if it is pressed
before the AWS caution audible tone sounds. The AWS reset input acts as both
an input for the reset pushbutton and a voltage source output for both the ac and
dc AWS receiver reset coils which are connected in parallel.

Figure 30 Thales control unit
2.8.3 PSU
2.8.3.1 The AWS/TPWS PSU provides a 12.5V dc (+/-0.5V) supply to the control unit.
The PSU (Figure 31) also supplies 40V dc for the AWS receiver reset circuit. The
PSU is situated near to the control unit which it supplies, and is supplied from the
trains dc control supply via the full isolation switch.
2.8.3.2 Thales supply two PSU variants, a nominal 24V dc (16 to 40V dc) input and a
nominal 72/96V dc (50 to 121V dc) input.
2.8.3.3 Connection to the sealed PSU is via two military style circular bayonet
connectors, one for the inputs (PL1) and one for the outputs (SK2). For
retrospective fitment in place of older style converters, the PSU is mounted in a
power supply assembly which includes ring terminal connections to enable a
straight replacement for the older style converters.
2.8.3.4 The PSU is protected by an internal fuse which is not accessible to the user. The
outputs are isolated from each other, the case and the input. The unit is
protected from and will recover from short circuits. LEDs indicate the presence of
the 12V dc output (U1) and 40V dc output (U2).
2.8.3.5 The PSU also incorporates a receiver selection relay which is used in conjunction
with the twin lightweight AWS receiver to select either the ac lines (Rx1) or dc
lines (Rx2) reed switch; the default reed switch is Rx1. The coil of this relay
operates over the full input voltage range of supply.
2.8.3.6 It should be noted that Thales do not warrant that all other available AWS PSUs
(voltage converters) will operate successfully with their electronic control unit due
to EMC compatibility issues. Other approved voltage converters are detailed in
section 2.11.
Figure 31 Thales AWS/TPWS PSU


2.8.4 Control unit terminal box
2.8.4.1 Two variants of the terminal box are available from Thales for retrospective
fitment, the Mark II on which the control unit is externally mounted and connected
via external plugs, and the Mark III in which the control unit is internally mounted
with terminals for all connections (Figure 32). The Mark III is designed for
locations where public access may be possible and where two cab equipments
are interfaced to one control unit. The control unit is mounted within the terminal
box. The Mark I terminal box is obsolete and should be replaced for a Mark II or
Mark III unit if found in service.
2.8.4.2 The Mark II control unit terminal box also contains the link necessary to set the
AWS acknowledge period, or within the connector mating with control unit PL1 for
installations not using a terminal box.
2.8.4.3 The Mark III control unit terminal box contains the links necessary to set the
TPWS TSO timer period to 20 seconds or 60 seconds. For Mark II terminal
boxes and installations not using a terminal box, this is configured within the
connector mating with control unit SK2.
2.8.4.4 Similarly, the Mark III control unit terminal box contains the links necessary to set
the TPWS OSS timer period to 974 ms or 1218 ms. For Mark II terminal boxes
and installations not using a terminal box, this is configured within the connector
mating with control unit SK2.
Figure 32 Thales Mark II and Mark III control unit terminal boxes
2.8.5 AWS alarm and indicator unit

2.8.5.1 Thales have developed an electronic AWS alarm and indicator unit which
provides the audible and visual indications required (Figure 33). The unit uses an
LED array for the yellow elements on the sunflower in place of the traditional
electro-mechanical versions.
2.8.5.2 The unit incorporates an electronic brightness adjustment to cater for the range of
ambient lighting conditions present in driving cabs. The audible tones have
3 volume levels to cater for different ambient noise levels, which are preset at
installation.
2.8.5.3 The unit is a direct replacement for other alarm and indicator units having
identical connections and mounting arrangements.

Figure 33 Thales AWS alarm and indicator unit
2.8.6 Drivers panel

2.8.6.1 The Thales TPWS drivers control panel is provided with two flush-mounted,
tamper-resistant LED indicators and an illuminated pushbutton, with a horizontal
or vertical orientation available (Figure 34).
2.8.6.2 The functions of the control panel indicators and pushbutton are as follows:
Temporary isolation/fault indicator

Off No fault detected during power up test, and temporary isolation not
selected
Flashing yellow4 PUT has detected a fault with the OSS/TSS facility
Steady yellow4 The TSS/OSS trainborne functions are isolated
Brake demand indicator

Off No TPWS brake demand exists
Flashing red5 TPWS (or AWS) brake demand exists but has not been
acknowledge
Steady red5 Brake demand exists and has been acknowledged
TSO switch/indicator
Off TSO is not active
On TSO is active
Table 1 Functions of the control panel indicators and pushbutton
2.8.6.3 Pressing the TSO switch will activate the TSO function.
2.8.6.4 During the power up test, all three indicators will illuminate for the driver to check
correct operation of the control panel before reverting to the normal state
described above.
4
On certain fleets, for example Class 357 this indicator is red
5
On certain fleets, for example Class 357 this indicator is yellow

Figure 34 Thales TPWS drivers control panel
2.8.7 AWS/TPWS reset/acknowledge pushbutton

2.8.7.1 Thales supply a combined AWS/TPWS reset/acknowledge pushbutton (Figure
35).
2.8.7.2 The pushbutton is a momentary action switch with two forced action contact
blocks. Each block comprises one normally open and one normally closed
contact set. One contact block is used for the AWS reset and TPWS
acknowledge function and is wired as a single pole changeover contact set. The
other contact set is available for monitoring purposes such as a connection to the
train data recorder.
Figure 35 Thales combined AWS/TPWS reset/acknowledgement pushbutton
2.8.8 AWS receiver

2.8.8.1 Thales manufacture an electronic solid-state AWS receiver which operates on the
Hall Effect principle (Figure 36). The receiver houses a latching magnetic switch
which responds to the AWS track magnets.
2.8.8.2 The Thales Electronic AWS receiver (E-AWS receiver) can be used as a direct
replacement for either a standard AWS receiver or the twin-lightweight AWS
receiver.
2.8.8.3 The E-AWS receiver is mounted on one of two alternative adaptor plates: type A
for replacing a standard single electro-mechanical receiver and type B for new
build vehicles or for replacing a twin-lightweight receiver. A mounting plate is
also available for a TPWS aerial if this is currently mounted on the standard AWS
receiver flux plate.
2.8.8.4 A range of installation kits is available both to suit existing AWS installations and
to suit combined AWS and TPWS installations. The connecting cable is available
in varying lengths, and is protected by a robust flexible conduit. A junction box is
normally mounted on the vehicle underframe to separate the vehicle wiring from
the flexible aerial connections.


2.8.8.5 As a replacement for a standard single AWS receiver, the conduit is terminated in
the standard straight 5-pin AWS connector. For new build vehicles, or where
replacing a twin-lightweight receiver, the unit is terminated in a 19-way Litton type
bayonet connector.
2.8.8.6 An alternate power supply input is available, which, if selected, will de-sensitise
the receiver specifically for dc operation (Rx2 mode) with extra strength track
magnets. The purpose is to reduce the risk of false operation due to spurious
magnetic fields from track-mounted traction supply cables and the like. If the Rx2
mode is not selected then the receiver will default to Rx1 mode for standard
strength track magnets. However, this type of receiver has been fitted in
unswitched (single sensitivity Rx1) mode on trains operating over both standard
and extra strength magnets, and although this is non-compliant with issue one of
GE/RT8035, a non-compliance has been authorised and issued against the
standard (03/163/NC).
2.8.8.7 Depending on the installation design criteria (see Thales document

TPWS/TIP/018), it is generally not necessary to adjust the E-AWS receiver for
height following wheel-wear or tyre turning. Experience with this receiver has
shown that it can operate reliably at static heights up to 210 mm ARL and can
accommodate 30-40 mm of wheel-wear without the need for height
compensation. However, Thales recommend that the maximum static height
should not normally exceed 185 mm ARL to accommodate variations in track
magnet outputs and the effects on the flux field from bogie characteristics (the
exception to this might be where a vehicle has the E-AWS receiver set to
standard strength position but works also over dc electrification areas where the
height may be raised to reduce the risk of spurious operations by track cables
carrying high traction currents). The lowest height limit is governed by track
gauging requirements (100 mm ARL).
2.8.8.8 The electronic receiver also has an analogue output which is capable of being
connected to a data logger to measure the magnet field strength of track magnets
as the unit passes over them.
Figure 36 Thales electronic solid-state AWS receiver
2.8.9 TPWS aerial

2.8.9.1 The Thales composite TPWS aerial and harness (Figure 37) comprises a small
printed electronic circuit embedded in a strong nylon tube with an integral cable
harness for the electrical connections to the vehicle. Note that on early
installations of Thales TPWS equipment, the TPWS aerial is separate from the
flexible cable and connected using an Amphenol connector. This arrangement
has suffered from reliability problems.
2.8.9.2 The aerial PEC contains a tuned coil which responds to the electromagnetic field
emitted from the transmitter loops. The PEC also contains a test coil which is
driven from the control unit during the power up test sequence in order to prove
the integrity of the aerial.


2.8.9.3 The aerial is mounted on a metal mounting bracket which provides protection
against flying ballast to the upper part of the aerial. The lower part is protected by
a reinforced nylon aerial deflector in the shape of a dome (Figure 38).
2.8.9.4 The aerial is connected via a strong flexible conduit containing twin-twisted pair
signal wires within an overall screened cable which plugs into the aerial terminal
box (or train ducting) mounted on the underside of the vehicle body. Fixed twin-
twisted pair overall screened wiring connects the terminal box to the control unit.
2.8.9.5 The TPWS aerial harness assembly is terminated in either an Amphenol or Litton
bayonet-lock type connector or may be terminated in crimped ring terminals. The
harness is available in various lengths with straight or right-angle connectors.
Figure 37 Thales composite TPWS aerial and harness
Figure 38 Thales TPWS aerial bracket and deflector
2.8.10 Combined electronic AWS receiver and TPWS antenna

2.8.10.1 Thales also supply a combined TPWS aerial with electronic AWS receiver
mounted in a single housing (Figure 39). The combined unit has a single
connecting cable thus reducing the space and equipment requirements. The
combined unit also has a range of installation kits with varying cable lengths to
suit specific applications.
2.8.10.2 The combined AWS receiver element of the combined unit is identical to the
standard electronic receiver and can be used as a replacement for all existing
receiver types described in this document.

Figure 39 Thales combined TPWS aerial with electronic AWS receiver
2.8.11 AWS/TPWS underframe junction box

2.8.11.1 Thales supply a range of underframe mounted junction boxes to connect to their
range of AWS receivers and TPWS aerials (Figure 40).
Figure 40 Thales underframe mounted junction boxes
2.8.12 Dual-cab switching unit

2.8.12.1 The dual-cab switching unit switches the various AWS and TPWS components
from one cab to the other. The Thales dual cab switching unit comprises a
printed electronic circuit mounted vertically on the side of the control unit terminal
box (this installation requires the Mark III terminal box to be used although
another suitable enclosure could be used if no terminal box is otherwise
required). Connections are made using Faston crimped spade terminations to
edge connectors T1 to T37 and to additional connectors on T38 to T47.
2.8.12.2 Slave relays are provided on the unit to enable two such indicators to be driven in
parallel on vehicles with separate sunflower units. A facility to switch inputs from
2 AWS reset pushbuttons is also provided.
2.8.12.3 The control input from the vehicle change end switch can be of either polarity and
different unit configurations are provided.
2.8.13 Full isolation switch

2.8.13.1 Thales do not supply a specific AWS isolation switch. This is normally a standard
switch as supplied by the vehicle manufacturer or already existing on the vehicle
where a retrospective application of their electronic control unit has been made.
2.8.14 TPWS temporary isolation switch

2.8.14.1 Thales supply a temporary isolation switch to allow the driver to temporarily
isolate TPWS in compliance with rules (Figure 41). The temporary isolation
switch is a three position switch mounted on a stand-alone panel in the driving
cab out of reach of the driver when seated at the driving position. Turning the
switch clockwise selects temporary isolation and anti-clockwise deselects
temporary isolation. The switch is centre biased so when it is released it returns
to the centre position. The switch can also be supplied with a wired seal to
prevent misuse or a hinged cover to prevent accidental operation.


2.8.14.2 It should be noted that on some vehicles, for example Class 313, temporary
isolation switches have had an extra switch block added to input to the train data
recorder when the switch has been operated.
Figure 41 Thales temporary isolation switch
2.9 Trainborne equipment manufacturers products (Unipart Rail)

2.9.1 Unipart Rail products
2.9.1.1 Unipart Rail manufacture an electronic combined AWS and TPWS control unit.
Unipart Rail also produce a ruggedised version of their equipment for use in
harsh environments such as to be found on steam locomotives.
2.9.1.2 Details of trainborne sub-system components and technical descriptions are

given below and vehicle interface details are given in Appendix F.
2.9.2 AWS/TPWS Specific Transmission Module

2.9.2.1 In addition to their standard control unit described below, Unipart Rail are jointly
developing an AWS/TPWS Specific Transmission Module (STM) with Siemens
Transportation Systems. This unit, when available, will provide both full
standalone AWS/TPWS functionality, and will act as an AWS/TPWS STM for the
European Train Control System (ETCS) trainborne equipment.
2.9.3 Control unit

2.9.3.1 The Unipart Rail combined AWS and TPWS control unit (Figure 42) has been
designed to easily replace the standard British Rail AWS relay units during
retrospective fitment by using an interfacing junction box.
2.9.3.2 Whilst this control unit can be used for AWS functionality alone, it is invariably
used for TPWS functionality as well and hence performs a dual role with separate
inputs and outputs as required to drive the different system equipment. Note that
the control unit has been applied to some shunting locomotives in TPWS only
mode. If the control unit is used for AWS only, then a link is required to be made
between the TPWS aerial test and aerial input terminals.
2.9.3.3 The Unipart Rail control unit is based on FPGA logic processing and a combined
FPGA circuit is provided for AWS and TPWS functionality. Elements of the
control unit are used for both AWS and TPWS functionality, such as the input
from the AWS reset/TPWS acknowledgement pushbutton, the full isolation facility
and the output to the brake application relay.
2.9.3.4 The control unit outputs are interfaced via volt-free relay contacts to preserve
galvanic isolation. Volt-free contact outputs are provided for a train data recorder
and vigilance system reset. The control supply for these outputs is sourced from
the vehicle control circuits and is protected by a fuse/circuit breaker.
2.9.3.5 All timings necessary within the AWS and TPWS brake demand functions are
performed by the control unit so there is no requirement for the external time
delay features of the old British Rail systems. The brake control output electrical
ratings are detailed in Appendix F.


2.9.3.6 The control unit contains two selectable AWS caution acknowledgement periods,
the standard setting of 2.0 seconds, and an alternative setting of 2.7 seconds for
vehicles with a maximum operating speed of 100 mph or less. This is configured
within the control unit junction box wiring.
2.9.3.7 The control unit performs a test of the TPWS aerial integrity whenever an AWS
clear signal is detected. If the test is successful then no feedback is given to the
driver, but if it is not successful then the temporary isolation/fault indicator on the
drivers control panel will flash continuously until a successful test is completed
(this may occur at the next clear signal or the next TPWS power up sequence).
2.9.3.8 The control unit is fitted with two 37-way MIL-C-5015 electrical connectors, one
male fixed plug and the other a female fixed socket. The electrical interface
details for the fixed socket and fixed plug are detailed in Appendix F. It should be
noted that the Unipart Rail control unit uses the same electrical connector types
as the Thales control unit but the two control units are not interchangeable.
Figure 42 Unipart Rail combined AWS and TPWS control unit
2.9.4 Control unit junction box

2.9.4.1 Several types of control unit junction box are available from Unipart Rail
depending on whether the installation is protected in the vehicle or exposed to
the public or atmosphere. The junction box interfaces the control unit to the
vehicle wiring.
2.9.4.2 Junction box types 1 and 2 are designed to replace the older style AWS relay unit
junction boxes and permit the existing vehicle wiring to be terminated in the same
relative position. The control unit sits on top of these junction box types and the
installation is aimed at typical multiple unit installations where the equipment is
located in the cab roof or other similarly protected location. Type 1 includes
additional terminals to connect the peripheral equipment to whereas with type 2
the peripheral equipment is connected directly into the control unit.
2.9.4.3 Junction box types 3 and 4 are designed to completely enclose the control unit for
mounting in less well protected areas (type 3) or where the equipment would be
exposed to a harsh atmosphere (type 4) for example on a steam locomotive. The
junction box space envelope is similar to that of an older style AWS relay unit.
Type 3 is capable of being fitted with a dual cab switching unit.
2.9.4.4 Electrical interface details for these junction boxes are detailed in Appendix F.
2.9.5 PSU
2.9.5.1 Unipart Rail manufacture a range of PSUs for this application to suit the range of
vehicle battery/control voltages (Figure 43). The Unipart Rail control unit and
peripherals are also compatible with white square modified British Rail
Specification 36 voltage converters.

Figure 43 Unipart Rail PSU
2.9.6 AWS receiver

2.9.6.1 Unipart Rail manufacture an electronic solid state AWS receiver as a direct
replacement for existing reed receivers (Figure 44). The electronic receiver is
available with a range of cable lengths and connector types.
Figure 44 Unipart Rail electronic solid-state AWS receiver
2.9.7 AWS reset/TPWS acknowledge pushbutton

2.9.7.1 Unipart Rail manufacture a combined AWS reset and TPWS acknowledge
pushbutton for desk mounting.
2.9.8 TPWS aerial, junction box and cable assemblies

2.9.8.1 The Unipart Rail TPWS aerial is a solid state TPWS receiver and is normally
mounted on the bogie (Figure 45).
2.9.8.2 The TPWS aerial is self-tested regularly to assure system integrity. The test
takes place every time the control unit detects an AWS clear indication (implying
the corresponding signal is at green when TPWS will not be required for use for
SPAD mitigation). If the aerial test is successful then there is no feedback to the
driver, but if it fails then the temporary isolation/fault indicator will flash until a
successful integrity test has been achieved either at the next AWS clear or at the
next power up sequence test.
2.9.8.3 The TPWS aerial junction box is the interface between the vehicle wiring and the
flexible TPWS aerial cable to the bogie mounted TPWS aerial. The junction box
contains a 6-way MIL-C-5015 bayonet-lock electrical connector on one face that
is wired to 4 M4 terminals located inside the junction box. Electrical connection
details are provided in Appendix D.

Figure 45 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial
2.9.8.4 The TPWS aerial cable is a flexible cable assembly that connects the underframe
mounted junction box to the bogie mounted aerial (Figure 46). The cable
consists of a length of flexible conduit fitted with a 6-way MIL-C-5015 electrical
connector on both ends. There are 3 variants available in different lengths:
a) Straight connector type - a straight connector is fitted on both ends.
b) Angled connector type a 90 connector is fitted to both ends.
c) Mixed connector type a straight connector is fitted on one end and a 90

angled connector on the other.
Figure 46 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial cable and junction box
2.9.9 Drivers panel

2.9.9.1 The Unipart Rail drivers control panel (Figure 47) is one of the system interfaces
with the driver. The panel has 3 visual indicators and a pushbutton, which is
integral with one of the visual indicators on some variants of this equipment. All
of the drivers control panels use the same LED indicators. The functions of the
indicators and pushbutton are as follows:
a) A red LED indicator (labelled brake demand) to advise the driver that the
TPWS system (or AWS system) has demanded a brake application
(flashing) and that the brake demand has been acknowledged by the driver
(steady).
b) A yellow LED indicator (labelled temporary isolation/fault) with 3 distinct

functions:


i) When the system is first powered up, this indicator will flash to
advise the driver of the TPWS aerial integrity test that is performed
during system power up (see below).
ii) When the system is in the normal operating mode this indicator will
illuminate steadily to advise the driver that the TPWS functionality
has been isolated by the use of the TPWS temporary isolation
switch.
iii) This indicator will flash to advise the driver of the failure of the TPWS
aerial integrity test that is detected when the system detects an AWS
clear signal.
c) A yellow LED indicator (labelled TSO) that may be combined with the
pushbutton, that is used by the driver to instigate the TSS override function
to pass signal at danger with authority.
Figure 47 Unipart Rail drivers control panel
2.9.9.2 A harsh environment drivers control panel (Figure 48) is available which has
been designed for installations where the operating environment requires
additional mechanical integrity, for example on steam locomotives. This version
has a separate TSO pushbutton and indicator.
Figure 48 Unipart Rail harsh environment drivers control panel
2.9.9.3 Where AWS is not employed and the equipment is used for TPWS only, a
specific drivers control panel is used. The unit includes a TPWS acknowledge
pushbutton in place of the normal AWS reset pushbutton used to acknowledge a
TPWS brake demand. The unit also has a separate yellow power up LED
indicator which illuminates instead of the AWS horn sounding on power up
testing. In this case, the TPWS acknowledge pushbutton is used to complete the
power up testing instead of the AWS reset pushbutton.
2.9.9.4 The drivers control panel is available with a range of horizontal and vertical
orientations with 6-way bayonet-lock MIL-C-5015 electrical connector or with M4
terminals. The electrical interface details for the drivers control panel are
detailed in Appendix F.


2.9.10 Dual cab switching unit
2.9.10.1 Installation on single vehicles with two driving cabs requires a dual cab switching
unit to control the AWS and TPWS components in each cab. The dual cab
switching unit can be arranged to select the appropriate TPWS OSS timer setting
for either passenger brake performance or goods brake performance, and switch
the correct TPWS aerial and driver man machine interface.
2.9.10.2 Electrical interface connections for the dual cab switching unit are detailed in
Appendix F.
2.9.10.3 Electrical connections are made using M4 terminals and the electrical interface
connections for the dual cab switching unit are detailed in Appendix F.
2.9.11 TPWS aerial switching unit

2.9.11.1 The TPWS aerial switching unit is generally used where there is only one driving
position on a vehicle but 2 TPWS aerials are required to avoid self-reversion
because the vehicle may be controlled for movements in both directions for
example steam locomotives and Class 20 locomotives. Selection of the correct
aerial is made using the vehicle direction controller. Electrical interface
connections for the dual cab switching unit are detailed in Appendix F.
Figure 49 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial switching unit
2.9.12 Full isolation switch

2.9.12.1 Unipart Rail manufacture a specific AWS full isolation switch.
2.9.12.2 In addition, Unipart Rail manufacture an isolation unit combining the functions of
the TPWS temporary isolation switch and the AWS/TPWS full isolation facility.
This has been designed particularly for use on shunting locomotives (Class
08/09).
2.9.12.3 When the full isolation switch is in the normal position, a power supply is
switched to the TPWS PSU. When the full isolation switch is in the isolate
position, the full isolation indicator is illuminated and a false feed is provided to
the brake relay and the PSU feed is isolated. The electrical specification of the
isolation unit is contained in Appendix F.
Figure 50 Unipart Rail full isolation switch


2.9.13 TPWS isolation switches
2.9.13.1 Various forms of temporary isolation switch (Figure 51) are available from Unipart
Rail including standard Faston or screw type terminal variants, and enclosed
version and a version for harsh environments such as with steam locomotives.
The electrical specification of the temporary isolation switch is contained in
Appendix F.
Figure 51 Unipart Rail TPWS temporary isolation switch
2.10 Data recording requirements

2.10.1 General requirements
2.10.1.1 GM/RT2472 requires the following AWS and TPWS related functions to be
recorded:
a) Train brake demand by AWS or TPWS.
b) Operation of AWS and the drivers response.
c) Isolation of AWS.
d) Operation of TPWS and the drivers response.
e) Isolation and override of TPWS.
2.10.1.2 The precise application is vehicle specific but is likely to include the following:
a) Energisation of the AWS B coil (the coil that sets the AWS indicator to all
black for example when the AWS receiver passes over the south magnet).
b) Operation by the driver of the AWS reset pushbutton.
c) Sounding of the audible AWS caution indication (horn or electronic tone).
d) Sounding of the audible AWS clear indication (bell or electronic chime).
e) Brake demand requested by AWS or TPWS.
f) Isolation of the AWS/TPWS control unit.
g) Operation by the driver of the TPWS acknowledge pushbutton.
h) Normal direction transmitter loop detected.
i) Opposite direction transmitter loop detected.
j) TSO pushbutton operated.
k) Fault and/or temporary isolation of the TPWS control unit.
l) Full isolation of the TPWS control unit.


2.10.1.3 AWS and TPWS data will be used for driver performance monitoring, post
incident investigation and may aid fault finding.
2.10.1.4 Reference should be made to the vehicle wiring diagrams to determine which
inputs are configured on each vehicle type.
2.10.1.5 These functions may be output to the train data recorder either from the volt-free
contacts within the control unit, or, on some vehicles for example Class 315,
directly from some AWS functions.
2.10.3 STS
2.10.3.1 For details of the STS control unit train data recorder outputs contact the
manufacturer.
2.10.4 Thales
2.10.4.1 The Thales control unit provides 11 outputs to a train data recorder in the form of
voltage-free contacts, as shown in Table 2 below:
Train data recorder output Condition for closed contact

Brake demand requested Brake relay de-energised
AWS clear signal annunciated Bell control output true
AWS restrictive signal annunciated Horn control output true
AWS sunflower set to all black Set to all black output pulse present
AWS sunflower set to yellow/black Set to yellow/black output pulse present
AWS reset pushbutton pressed AWS reset pushbutton pressed
AWS isolated/TPWS fully isolated Control unit powered down
TPWS temporary isolation/fault TPWS temporary isolation/fault indicator lit
(pulses while indicator is flashing)
TPWS normal direction loop detected F1, F2 or F3 loop detected
TPWS opposite direction loop detected F4, F5 or F6 loop detected
TPWS TSO operated TSO indicator lit
Table 2 Thales control unit train data recorder outputs
2.10.2 Unipart Rail Limited

2.10.2.1 The Unipart Rail control unit provides 12 outputs to a train data recorder in the
form of voltage-free contacts, as detailed in Table 3 below:
AWS train data recorder outputs TPWS train data recorder outputs
Clear signal annunciated Normal direction loop detected
Restrictive signal annunciated Opposite direction loop detected
Sunflower set to all black TSO activated
Sunflower set to yellow/black Temporarily isolated
Reset pushbutton pressed Temporary isolation/fault indicator lit
Brake demand requested Brake demand requested
Table 3 Unipart Rail control unit train outputs


2.11 Configuration management and equipment compatibility
2.11.1 General
2.11.1.1 Configuration management of AWS and TPWS equipment is a vital process as
the AWS and TPWS systems provide vital safety functions. Railway
undertakings (train operators), suppliers and manufacturers are required to
operate a reliable system of configuration management to ensure that equipment
in use accords with, for example, the latest modification status and that
incompatible equipment is not connected together.
2.11.1.2 AWS and TPWS Railway Group Standards (GE/RT8035 and GE/RT8030
respectively) require that where vehicles are being modified in the area covered
by the scope of the standard, the design must be reviewed and, where
reasonably practicable, brought into line with the requirements of the standard.
Where it is not reasonably practicable to do so, the situation must be regularised
by means of a deviation in accordance with the Railway Group Standards Code.
However, there is no mandatory requirement to bring existing vehicles into
compliance with the AWS standard (GE/RT8035) when AWS equipment is
replaced on a like-for-like basis.
2.11.2 New and modified components

2.11.2.1 From time to time new AWS and TPWS products will come to the market as
replacements for existing equipment, either to replace obsolete items, improve
reliability or reduce costs. It is incumbent on the manufacturer/supplier to follow
industry processes to gain approval of the product for use in service. Railway
undertakings (train operators) should only use approved items of equipment.
2.11.2.2 Where existing AWS or TPWS equipment requires modification, then the
manufacturer/supplier is required to follow recognised industry processes for
approval of the modification where it impacts on form, fit or function. Again,
railway undertakings (train operators) should only use approved items of
equipment.
2.11.2.3 New and modified AWS and TPWS components should be assessed for
compliance to GE/RT8035 and GE/RT8030 respectively.
2.11.3 Compatibility
2.11.3.1 AWS and TPWS components are supplied by a number of different
manufacturers as identified in this document, there are no mandatory technical
specifications for the interfaces between individual components creating a
manufacturers trainborne sub-system. Therefore, there are no guarantees
that one component supplied by manufacturer A is compatible (under all
foreseeable conditions) with a similar component from manufacturer B,
unless this is declared by the manufacturers. Where it is proposed to use a
component from one supplier to replace anothers which has not previously been
interfaced to that equipment, then guidance should be sought from the
manufacturers involved.
2.11.3.2 However, certain components in the trainborne sub-system have been developed
over many years to be compatible with each other, and certain declarations have
been made by manufacturers. The following tables (arranged by manufacturer)
identify the equipment build status and the known compatibility declarations for
the main AWS and TPWS equipment manufacturers as at the time of publication
of this document:
a) Table 4 Howells Railway Products Ltd
b) Table 5- - STS Signals Ltd
c) Table 6 Thales UK Limited, Land and Joint Systems


d) Table 7 Unipart Rail
2.11.3.3 Entries in these matrices not known will be populated with data when provided
by the equipment manufacturers at a subsequent re-issue of this document.
2.11.3.4 Readers should refer to their company documentation, or to the equipment

manufacturer, to check for any updates to equipment build status and
compatibility.

Howells item Description/ Catalogue Compatibility Comments

Howells part no. no.
AWS relay unit Not known 062/500006 n/a No longer in main line use
superseded by TPWS
Not known 062/500038 n/a No longer in main line use
superseded by TPWS
Relay unit Not known 062/500016 Howells and Unipart Rail No longer in main line use
junction box relay units superseded by TPWS
PSU Voltage converter Howells AWS relay unit Coloured green with
24V dc white square modification
only
Voltage converter 062/014631 Howells AWS relay unit Coloured yellow with
70/90V dc and all Thales electronic white square modification
control units only.
Voltage converter Howells AWS relay unit Coloured grey with

110V dc white square modification
only
AWS receiver With carrier Unipart Rail and Thales Reed relay type for use
standard (orange) electronic control units on vehicles not operating
in dc electrified areas
Without carrier Unipart Rail and Thales Reed relay type for use
standard (orange) electronic control units on vehicles not operating
in dc electrified areas
High speed Unipart Rail and Thales Reed relay type extra
(yellow) electronic control units strength for dc electrified
lines
AWS receiver Not known 062/500017 All AWS receivers fitted
junction box 5 with a 5 pin plug
pin type
AWS alarm and Not known 098/006925 Thales electronic control
indicator unit units
AWS indicator Bulkhead 062/500028 Some Thales electronic Not compatible with
(sunflower) mounting control units Thales control unit
606108-00
Flush mounting 062/500029 Some Thales electronic Not compatible with
control units Thales control unit
606108-00
AWS horn Yodalarm type 062/017967 Unipart Rail and Thales
electronic control units
Yodalarm type 062/015985 Unipart Rail and Thales May also be used on
electronic control units steam locomotives with
Unipart Rail equipment
Air horn 062/500027 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
Vacuum horn 062/500044 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted

Howells item Description/ Catalogue Compatibility Comments

Howells part no. no.
AWS bell Not known 062/500015 All electronic control units
AWS brake Not known 062/500035 Not known
demand EP valve
Not known 062/500040 Not known
Not known 062/500041 Not known
EP repeat relay Not known 062/500036 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
Not known 062/500037 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
Brake and horn Not known 062/500007 n/a Removed when TPWS
relay unit fitted
AWS reset Not known 062/500031 Unipart Rail and Thales May also be used on
pushbutton electronic control units steam locomotives using
AWS isolation Not known 062/500034 Unipart Rail and Thales
switch electronic control units
Cab change end Not known 062/500032 Unipart Rail and Thales
Not known 062/500033 Unipart Rail and Thales
Table 4 Howells Railway Products Limited

STS item Description/ Catalogue Compatibility Comments

STS part no. no.
AWS/TPWS control STS PSUs only
unit STS, Unipart Rail and Thales
AWS receivers listed in this
document
STS, Unipart Rail and Thales
alarm and indicator units
listed in this document
All AWS/TPWS reset/
acknowledge push buttons
listed in this document
PSU 72V/96V dc STS control unit6
nominal
110V dc nominal STS control unit6
AWS alarm and 062/014454 STS, Unipart Rail and Thales LED variant
indicator unit electronic control units
098/006925 STS, Unipart Rail and Thales
098/007628 STS, Unipart Rail and Thales Former Field and Grant
electronic control units design
AWS Twin- 062/010900 STS , Unipart Rail and
lightweight receiver Thales electronic control
units
AWS twin STS twin lightweight AWS
lightweight receiver receiver only
junction box
TPWS drivers STS electronic control units
control panel only
TPWS temporary STS, Unipart Rail and Thales
isolation switch electronic control units
TPWS aerial STS electronic control units
assembly only
TPWS aerial STS TPWS aerials only
junction box
TPWS aerial STS TPWS aerials only
mounting plate and
cover
TPWS aerial - - STS electronic control units
switching unit only
Table 5 STS
6
Will function with other manufacturers AWS and TPWS equipment but not warranted as compatibility
has not been tested.

Thales item Description/ Catalogue Compatibility Comments

Thales part no. no.
AWS/TPWS control 606108-00 Not for new supply - any found First production unit.
unit in service should be replaced compatible only with
with the latest modification AWS alarm and
state and returned to Thales indicator unit (cannot
drive separate sunflower
indicator)
606108-00 Not for new supply - any found As 606108-00 but fitted
modification 1 in service should be replaced with modified logic chip
CN36970 with the latest modification to prevent spurious
state and returned to Thales lobe trips
606108-01 098/017819 Not for new supply - any found Increased drive
in service should be replaced capability for separate
with the latest modification sunflower indicator
state and returned to Thales
606108-01 098/017819 Not for new supply - any found As 606108-01 but fitted
CN36970 with the latest modification to prevent spurious
state and returned to Thales lobe trips
606108-01 098/017819 Not for new supply it is To identify control units
modification 2 recommended that this tested to TP604415
modification level is returned to issue 9 using test
Thales for upgrade to latest software version 4.0
modification status, especially
if the serial number is listed in
TIP003
606108-01 098/017819 Not for new supply a user of To identify control units
modification 3 this product may return it for with new build process
free upgrade to modification relay. Will also have
level 4 if they are experiencing blue serial number label
AWS reset failures and white stripe
606108-01 098/017819 Not for new supply this is the To identify control units
modification 4 current (at issue of this with new AWS reset
Guidance Note) highest build relay
standard for this variant and is
valid for use on vehicle
designs specified for the -01
variant
606108-02 098/016430 Not for new supply - any found As 606108-01 but with
in service should be replaced additional power output
with the latest modification pins on SK2 for control
state and returned to Thales panel and TI switch
(TPWS functions)
606108-02 098/016430 Not for new supply - any found As 606108-02 but fitted
CN36970 with the latest modification
state and returned to Thales


Thales part no. no.
AWS/TPWS control 606108-02 098/016430 Not for new supply - it is To identify control units
unit modification 2 recommended that this tested to TP604415 issue
CN37507 modification level is returned 9 using test software
to Thales for upgrade to version 4.0
latest modification status,
especially if the serial
number is listed in TIP003
606108-02 098/016430 Not for new supply - a user To identify control units
modification 3 of this product may return it with new build process
for a free upgrade to relay. Will also have blue
modification level 4 if they serial number label and
are experiencing AWS reset white stripe
failures
606108-02 098/016430 All AWS receivers listed in Current supply (at time of
modification 4 this document with the publication of this
exception of the Unipart Rail document)
electronic receiver7
All alarm and indicator unit
types listed in this document
All Thales PSU only
Howells PSU Catalogue No
062/0146318
All acknowledgement
pushbuttons listed in this
document
Control unit Mark I Not for new supply Used for trial purposes
terminal box only
Mark 2 606279-00 Thales control units only Control unit mounted
externally on terminal box.
Terminals for AWS
functions only (TPWS
functions wired direct to
control unit).
Links fitted between
terminals 9 and 10 and 12
and 16 but not between
terminals 4 and 8 to be
used for AWS receiver
switching.
7
Will function with this item but not tested for compatibility.
8
Control units will function with other non-Thales PSUs, however not warranted as tests for
compatibility have not been conducted.


Thales part no. no.
Control unit Mark II 606840-00 Thales control units only As 606279-00 but with
terminal box links fitted between
terminals 4 and 5, 7 and 8,
9 and 10 and 12 and 16 to
emulate original AWS
standard wiring.
Mark II 606840-01 098/016425 Thales control units only As 606804-00 but with no
internal links between
terminals.
Any internal links required
are to be fitted on
installation.
Mark II 606840-02 098/016816 Thales control units only Cable gland for SK1
repositioned to fit Classes
465/2 and 456.
Mark III 072/009710 Thales control units only Control unit mounted
606308-00 internally in terminal box.
A deeper box than the
Mark II with cable entry
glands at the same height
above base as on AWS
junction box/relay unit.
Fitted with terminals for all
functions.
Switching unit card for
dual cab operation can be
mounted to one side
inside the terminal box.
Used where public have
access or where original
installation uses fixed
conduit cable entry.
PSU 24V nominal 015/011902 Thales control units only9 Stand-alone PSU for
421128 24Vdc vehicle control
systems
72V/96V nominal 098/016429 Thales control units only9 Stand-alone PSU for
421124 72V dc or 96V dc vehicle
control systems
9
PSU will function with non-Thales control units, however not warranted as tests for compatibility have
not been conducted.


Thales part no. no.
Electronic AWS 608901-xx type Various Compatible with Thales xx denote wide range
receiver EA control unit. Not tested with available with various
any other manufacturers lengths of cable/conduit.
control unit. In-line entry with straight
Howells type connector.
608902-xx type Various Compatible with Thales xx denote wide range
EB control unit. Not tested with available with various
control unit. In-line entry with straight
Litton type connector.
608904-xx type Various Compatible with Thales xx denote wide range
EC control unit. Not tested with available with various
control unit. In-line angled entry with
straight Howells type
connector specifically for
Class 158 and 159 vehicles.
AWS Yodalarm 100168 Compatible with all Item not manufactured by
electronic control units Thales
Sound level 85 90 dB
100398 098/017304 All electronic control units Item not manufactured by

Thales
Sound level 90 95 dB
AWS reset Panel mounted 098/017166 All electronic control units,
pushbutton/ 386314 AWS receivers and
TPWS sunflower indicators/ alarm
acknowledge and indicator units
pushbutton
Combined AWS 632186-xx type Various Thales control units only Incorporates electronic
receiver and TPWS TD AWS receiver and TPWS
aerial aerial. In line entry, various
lengths of cable/conduit.
Original AWS receiver
mounting. Straight Litton
connector.


Thales part no. no.
Combined AWS 632357-xx type Various Thales control units only Incorporates electronic
receiver and TPWS TE AWS receiver and TPWS
aerial aerial. In line entry,
various lengths of
cable/conduit. Twin
lightweight AWS receiver
type mounting. Straight
Litton connector.
TPWS control 606245-00 098/016410 Thales control unit only Horizontal orientation with
panel connector on right.
608536-00 064/007231 Thales control unit only Horizontal orientation with
connector at rear.
608450-00 Thales control unit only Horizontal orientation with
900mm flying lead.
608450-01 Thales control unit only Vertical orientation with
900mm flying lead.
606245-01 098/016498 Thales control unit only Vertical orientation with
connector at bottom.
608536-01 015/010957 Thales control unit only Vertical orientation with
connector at rear.
TPWS temporary 606493-00 098/016412 All electronic control units Standard version with
isolation switch provision for lead seal.
608617-00 All electronic control units Fitted with hinged slotted
cover to prevent switch
operation.
TPWS aerial 604428-00 (black) Obsolete Any black aerials in
service should be replaced
by a new yellow one.
604428-01 098/016413 No longer supplied. Various aerial connector
(yellow) Thales control units only. cables available. New
aerials now come
complete with hard-wired
connector cable to
improve reliability of
previous connectors (see
composite aerial harness
TPWS assemblies 632140
etc.)


Thales part no. no.
TPWS composite 632140-xx Various Thales control units only. Straight termination with
aerial harness termination rings at
assembly junction box.
Various cable/conduit
lengths available.
632141-xx Various Thales control units only. Straight Amphenol
connector at junction box.
lengths available.
632142-xx Various Thales control units only. Right-angle Amphenol
connector at junction box.
lengths available.
632143-xx Various Thales control units only. Straight Litton connector
at junction box. Various
cable/conduit lengths
available.
632144-xx Various Thales control units only. Right-angle termination
with terminal rings at
junction box. Various
cable/conduit lengths
available.
TPWS aerial cable Amphenol to Various Thales control units only. Straight Amphenol
Amphenol Available as spares only. connector at terminal box
connector end, right-angle Amphenol
604431-xx connector at aerial end.
Various lengths according
to suffix xx
Amphenol to Various Thales control units only - Litton connector at
Litton connector available as spares only. terminal box end, right-
606693-xx angle Amphenol connector
at aerial end. Various
lengths according to suffix
xx
TPWS aerial 803429-00 098/016419 Thales TPWS aerial only. Replacement protection
deflector dome only.
TPWS aerial 604444-00 098/016420 Thales TPWS aerial only. Standard junction box with
junction box Amphenol connector. No
drain hole. Should not be
used undrilled on
underframe installations.
Used also when an
additional junction box is
needed inside the train.


Thales part no. no.
Dual-cab switching 608423-12 Thales control unit only - Includes PEC 608121-12 -
unit kit 12V positive switching. not for new supply.
608423-01 098/017958 Thales control unit only - Includes PEC 608121-01 -
12V negative switching. not for new supply
12V positive switching. not for new supply
12V negative switching not for new supply
608423-21 098/017958 Thales control unit only Includes PEC 608121-21
12V negative switching
608423-22 098/017958 Thales control unit only Includes PEC 608121-22
12V positive switching
Dual-cab switching 608121-12 062/015137 Thales control unit only Additional relays for
card 12V positive switching parallel sunflowers -
replacement card only -
not for new supply
608121-01 - Thales control unit only Replacement card only -
12V negative switching not for new supply
608121-02 090/014865 Thales control unit only Replacement card only -
12V positive switching not for new supply
608121-11 090/014865 Thales control unit only Additional relays for
12V negative switching parallel sunflowers - not
for new supply
608121-21 090/014865 Thales control unit only Picking relays for
12V negative switching improved performance -
current production
standard at date of issue
of this document
608121-22 090/014865 Thales control unit only Picking relays for
12V positive switching improved performance -
current production
standard at date of issue
of this document
Depot test unit 606401-00 Thales control unit only
(DTU)
Train test unit 604617-00 Mark 1 Thales control unit only - Uses adaptor attached to
(TTU) Mark I no longer available trainborne aerial - no
facility for TPWS
sensitivity test


Thales part no. no.
Train test unit 608576-00 - All TPWS installations on Kit includes TTU (608527-
(TTU) kit Mark II standard UK gauge 00) and track-mounted
TPWS transmitter loop
(608577-00) to transmit to
train. Includes output
level adjustment for
sensitivity test
608756-01 - Broad gauge (1.6m) Beam for track-mounted
installations only transmitter loop to fit 1.6m
gauge track
608756-02 - All TPWS installations on As 608576-00 but with
standard UK gauge rechargeable batteries in
TTU
Table 6 Thales

Unipart item Description/Unip Catalogue Compatibility Comments

art part no. no.
AWS relay unit Not known 062/14607 n/a No longer in main line
use superseded by
TPWS
Not known 062/14612 n/a No longer in main line
use superseded by
TPWS
Relay unit junction Not known 062/000739 n/a No longer in main line
box use superseded by
TPWS
Not known 062/000741 n/a No longer in main line
use superseded by
TPWS
AWS/TPWS Unipart drawing 062/014440 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial only
control unit number All AWS receivers listed in this
NRSTPWS0100 document
All alarm and indicator unit
types listed in this document
Unipart Rail PSUs and PSU
conforming to British Rail
Specification 3610
All reset/acknowledgement
pushbuttons listed in this
document
All isolation switches listed in
the document
Control unit Type 1 062/014441 Unipart Rail control unit only For use in typical
junction box Unipart drawing multiple unit vehicles in
number place of older AWS
NRSTPWS0200 installation in the vehicle
roof or other enclosed
location. Has terminals
for all peripheral
equipment
Type 2 062/014449 Unipart Rail control unit only For use in typical
Unipart drawing multiple unit vehicles in
number place of older AWS
NRSTPWS0212 installations in the
vehicle roof or other
enclosed location. Does
not have terminals for all
peripheral equipment
(which are wired direct
to the control unit)
10
Control units will function with Thales PSU however Unipart Rail do not warrant resultant
performance as tests for compatibility have not necessarily been conducted.

Unipart item Description/ Catalogue Compatibility Comments

Unipart part no. no.
Control unit junction Type 3 062/014450 Unipart Rail control unit only Designed so that the
box Unipart drawing control unit is completely
number enclosed within the
NRSTPWS1006 junction box.
If used on a dual cab
vehicle then dual cab
switching unit 062/014450
required.
Type 4 062/015993 Unipart Rail control unit only Designed so that the
Unipart drawing control unit is completely
number enclosed within the
NRSTPWS0860 junction box. For use
where control unit is
062/015941 Unipart Rail control unit only exposed to the atmosphere
Mounting plate and for use on steam
Unipart drawing locomotives.
number
Type 4 mounting plate
NRSTPWS0932
enables junction box to be
mounted on existing AWS
relay unit mounting
footprint.
PSU 24V dc nominal 062/014453 Unipart Rail and Thales PSU not manufactured by
electronic control units Unipart Rail
72V/96V dc 062/015999 Unipart Rail and Thales
nominal electronic control units
110V dc nominal 062/015998 Unipart Rail and Thales
24V dc nominal 062/014620 Unipart Rail and Thales Coloured green with
electronic control units white square modification
only
72V/96V dc 062/014623 Unipart Rail and Thales Coloured yellow with
nominal electronic control units white square modification
only
110V dc nominal 062/014626 Unipart Rail and Thales Coloured grey with white
electronic control units square modification only


AWS receiver Electronic AWS 062/010003 Unipart Rail and Thales
receiver electronic control units
Electronic AWS 062/010002 Unipart Rail and Thales
receiver with electronic control units
TPWS aerial
fixing
Electronic AWS 062/010006 Unipart Rail and Thales Various products
receiver complete to electronic control units available with different
with flexible 062/010032 lengths and types of
conduit flexible conduit, and with
different connector types
including conventional
AWS connector, MIL-C-
5015 connector and
hard-wired options.
Reed receiver 062/010222 Unipart Rail and Thales
to 228 electronic control units
AWS receiver Not known 062/000744 All AWS receivers fitted with a Coloured green with
junction box 5 pin plug white square
- 5 pin type modification only
AWS EP valve Baldwin valve 062/014733 Unipart Rail and Thales Used on locomotives -
electronic control units colour coded green
Baldwin valve 062/014737 Unipart Rail and Thales Used on EMU colour
electronic control units coded blue
EP repeat relay unit Not known 062/014609 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
Not known 062/014611 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
Brake and horn Not known 062/014603 n/a Removed when TPWS
relay unit fitted
AWS isolation Not known 062/014177 Unipart Rail and Thales

AWS/TPWS reset/ Dome type 062/014171 Unipart Rail and Thales

acknowledge electronic control units
pushbutton


AWS Indicator Bulkhead 062/006580 Unipart Rail and some Thales Not compatible with
mounting electronic control units Thales electronic control
unit 606108-00
May also be used on
steam locomotives using
Flush mounting 062/006610 Unipart Rail and some Thales Not compatible with
electronic control units Thales electronic control
unit 606108-00
AWS alarm and Not known 062/00100 Unipart Rail and Thales
indicator unit electronic control units
Not known 062/006601 Unipart Rail and Thales
Solid state device 062/014454 Unipart Rail and Thales
AWS bell Not known 062/000280 Unipart Rail and Thales
AWS horn Air horn 070/020843 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
Vacuum horn 062/006106 n/a Removed when TPWS
fitted
TPWS drivers Horizontal 062/014457 Unipart Rail control unit only The horizontal and
control panel orientation vertical versions are
(Mil-C-5015 identical in design and
Connector) construction, the
Drawing number difference being the
NRSTPWS0267 orientation of the screen-
printing on the front
panel.
Vertical 062/014458 Unipart Rail control unit only
orientation (Mil-C-
5015 Connector
Drawing number
NRSTPWS0270
Horizontal 062/015928 Unipart Rail control unit only The horizontal and
orientation vertical versions are
(enclosed M4 identical in design and
terminals) construction, the
Drawing number difference being the
NRSTPWS1118 orientation of the screen-
printing on the front
panel.
Variant available with
retaining plate and with
rear connector.


Unipart Rail part no.
no.
TPWS drivers Vertical 062/015958 Unipart Rail control unit only
control panel orientation
(enclosed M4
terminals)
Drawing number
NRSTPWS1113
Harsh 062/015995 Unipart Rail control unit only May be used on steam
environment locomotives
Drawing number
NRSTPWS0851
Non-AWS fitted 062/015942 Unipart Rail control unit only Variant for shunting
vehicles Drawing locomotives only (vehicles
number which do not have AWS
NRSTPWS1000 fitted)
Spare red LED 062/015947 Unipart Rail control unit only
Spare yellow LED 062/015948 Unipart Rail control unit only
TPWS temporary Open with Faston 062/014443 Unipart Rail control unit only
isolation switch connections
Drawing number
NRSTPWS0300
Open with screw 062/014439 Unipart Rail control unit only
connections
Drawing number
NRSTPWS0308
Harsh 062/015989 Unipart Rail control unit only For use on steam
environment type locomotives
Drawing number
NRSTPWS0857
Complete with 092/015957 Unipart Rail control unit only Uses part 062/014443
enclosure Faston connections
Drawing number
NRSTPWS1104
TPWS isolation 062/015943 Unipart Rail control unit only Special for shunting
unit vehicles
Drawing. number
NRSTPWS1030
TPWS aerial Drawing. number 062/014444 Unipart Rail control unit only
assembly NRSTPWS0506
TPWS aerial cable 0.8 metres 062/015929 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial Flexible cable
Drawing. number only
NRSTPWS0746
36 inches 062/015932 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial Flexible cable
Drawing number only
NRSTPWS0746


Unipart Rail part no.
no.
Drawing number only
NRSTPWS0746
48 inches 062/015963 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial Flexible cable
Drawing number only
NRSTPWS0746
1.85 metres 062/015951 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial Flexible cable
Drawing number only
NRSTPWS0746
Drawing number only
NRSTPWS0746
2.7 metres 062/015955 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial Flexible cable
Drawing number only
NRSTPWS0746
TPWS aerial Drawing. number 062/015992 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial Various aerial connector
junction box NRSTPWS0906 only cables available.
May be used on steam
locomotives.
With integral 062/015937 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial For use with shunting
aerial cable only locomotives only
Drawing number
NRSTPWS1017
TPWS aerial Drawing number 062/015962 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial
mounting plate NRSTPWS0502 only
TPWS aerial Drawing number 062/015961 Unipart Rail TPWS aerial
hood/cover NRSTPWS05014 only
Change Air type 062/014173 Unipart Rail and Thales Colour coded grey
end/isolation switch electronic control unit only
Air type 062/014174 Unipart Rail and Thales Colour coded grey
electronic control unit only Operating handle with
violet end cover
TPWS dual cab Drawing number 062/015983 Unipart Rail control unit only 110Vdc variant for use
switching unit NRSTPWS1150 with control unit junction
box type 4
PC board 062/014451 Unipart Rail control unit only For use with control unit
junction box type 4
TPWS aerial Drawing number 062/015991 Unipart Rail control unit only
switching unit NRSTPWS0898
Table 7 Unipart Rail

Part 3 Guidance on maintenance and fault finding

3.1 Maintenance requirements
3.1.1 General
3.1.1.1 Adhering to the specified maintenance procedures will assure AWS system
reliability. Maintenance is a combination of equipment self-testing, routine test
and inspection, and, where required, replacement and/or overhaul. Maintenance
of AWS and TPWS is specified in the appropriate vehicle maintenance
instructions. Vehicle maintenance instructions should always be followed by the
maintainer.
3.1.1.2 Maintenance of AWS and TPWS equipment serves the following objectives:
a) To ensure equipment continues to function as required.
b) To ensure equipment operates within specified limits.
c) To ensure equipment is not damaged and remains securely attached to the

vehicle.
d) To ensure height critical equipment (for example AWS receiver and TPWS
aerial) remains within permitted height range.
3.1.1.3 Specific AWS test equipment is now available for maintenance activities to
supplement the traditional hand-held magnet testing. The test equipment (see
section 3.2) enables a more comprehensive set of tests to be conducted to aid
maintenance as well as fault finding.
3.1.2 Manufacturers recommended maintenance requirements

3.1.2.1 The various manufacturers of AWS equipment provide a minimum recommended
maintenance requirement for their equipment. These requirements will have
been considered in the production of vehicle maintenance instructions (the
manufacturers recommended maintenance requirements are mainly of use to
those tasked with creating vehicle maintenance instructions). It should be noted
that the manufacturers maintenance instructions do not always reflect the
operating duty cycle of equipment, which varies depending on the vehicles it is
fitted to, or service experience, and hence the vehicle maintenance instructions
may differ from the manufacturers recommended maintenance regime and the
vehicle maintenance instructions should always be complied with.
a) Details of Howells Railway Products recommended AWS maintenance

requirements are not available at the time of publication of this document.
b) Details of STS recommended AWS and TPWS maintenance requirements

are not available at the time of publication of this document.
c) Thales recommended AWS and TPWS maintenance requirements are

documented in Thales Handbook Number 1395-1-G. Equipment testing is
detailed in Thales document PTP604412-00.
d) Unipart Rails recommended AWS and TPWS maintenance requirements

are documented in NRSSPECXSA003/11.


3.1.3 Component tracking application
3.1.3.1 The component tracking application is a web-based computer application
operated by the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) and designed
to enable the rail industry to accurately track AWS and TPWS inter-vehicle
component fitment and defect histories. The system performs a key role in
enabling the industry to manage AWS and TPWS performance and operators are
encouraged to make full use of it for recording defects and tracking components
and vehicle fitment. The more it is used then the better the data will be.
3.1.3.2 The system is available for use by railway undertakings (train operators), train
maintainers, component suppliers and component overhaulers/repairers. The
application can be found on the ATOC engineering portal at www.clyx.net/atoc
and will require a login and password. Further details and instructions on use of
the application are contained in ATOC Approved Code of Practice
ACOP/EC/01001.
3.1.3.3 To ensure that useful data is generated by the component tracking application, all
component defects, changes or other reasons for repair should be entered into
the application. All serial numbered items of AWS equipment should be returned
to their overhauler/repairer with a printed copy of the defect report that is
generated by the component tracking application (a blank printed example of a
defect report form is attached as Appendix J).
3.1.3.4 Whenever an AWS component is found to be defective, the maintainer

undertaking the fault finding and repair should record the information shown in
Appendix K. This can then be entered into the component tracker application. It
is important that the maintainer records whether the AWS test equipment has
been used and what the findings are.
3.1.3.5 The application also enables warranty claims to be generated and submitted to
the component overhauler/repairer in an agreed format.
3.1.4 Component life expectancy

3.1.4.1 Reliability of AWS and TPWS in service can be improved if the equipment
maintenance includes pre-emptive replacement/overhaul on a specified
periodicity. The optimum periodicity for AWS and TPWS component overhaul
has been developed from engineering assessments (formerly published by ATOC
as Code of Practice ACOP/EC/01001). These can be found in Appendix G.
3.1.4.2 In order to benchmark AWS and TPWS failure data, it is recommended that the
overhaul/renewal of AWS/TPWS equipment is carried out against the periodicities
specified in Appendix G. For the majority of equipment this will result in a
renewal at C4. It may be practicable to carry out this renewal at C6 for certain
components but there is currently insufficient data to justify any extension of
periodicities. Also, certain new items (such as solid-state control units and AWS
receivers) do not yet have adequate performance data, so these are currently
specified as renew on failure.
3.1.4.3 For those AWS items where the recommended overhaul periodicity is set at C4,
once there has been a campaign change of AWS equipment individual operators
may choose to change certain items on multiples of C4 (for example every
second C4). Note that the campaign change out only applies to existing AWS
components. New AWS components do not require a campaign change. Prior to
campaign change/scrapping of components, it is essential that railway
undertakings (train operators) and members of the AWS supply chain ensure that
an adequate float of new components exists.


3.1.4.4 Following completion of the TPWS national fitment programme, certain items of
AWS equipment have been removed from some classes of train and new TPWS
components installed in their place. The components that will have been
removed are retained in Appendix G as they may remain on a small number of
vehicles. In addition, Appendix G contains specific components with overhaul
periodicities yet to be determined. These are included for completeness and
because several are intended to be included in an ATOC/RIA (Railway Industry
Association suppliers) traceability programme.
3.1.4.5 The components listed and their recommended overhaul periodicities will be
reviewed in the future as better performance data becomes available via the
component tracking application. If a new AWS or TPWS component is developed
for service it is essential that railway undertakings (train operators) and/or
members of the supply chain inform Rail Safety and Standards Board and the
ATOC engineering director. This will ensure the accuracy of information within
this document and that the component tracking application is maintained up to
date.
3.1.4.6 It is recommended that target service life and similar markings be removed from
each item of AWS equipment that is presently date coded. The removal of date
coding information should be carried out by the overhauler. Each component
already displays a manufacturers serial number which is normally in the form of a
six digit number.
3.1.5 Maintenance of test equipment

3.1.5.1 Railway undertakings (train operators) are responsible for the maintenance of
depot test equipment required to ensure that AWS and TPWS equipment
functions as required. Available depot test equipment and their maintenance
requirements are detailed in section 3.2 below.
3.2 AWS depot test equipments

3.2.1 A number of AWS equipment manufacturers and suppliers have developed
specific AWS test equipment for use during routine maintenance and when
diagnosing faults at maintenance depots. Test equipment includes track-
mounted and hand-held permanent test magnets to check the functionality of the
equipment, and specific AWS test equipment to exercise individual components
and check wiring as well as check the functionality of the trainborne equipment.
The test equipment may or may not be combined with TPWS test equipment.
3.2.2 Depot hand-held AWS permanent test magnets

3.2.2.1 Unipart Rail supply a hand-held AWS permanent test magnet for use in depot
testing (Figure 52). The hand-held magnet (British Rail Catalogue number
062/008833) is simply waved under the AWS receiver to simulate the receiver
passing over track-mounted magnets. Waving the south pole (blue) of the test
magnet simulates a caution/stop signal and waving the south pole (blue) followed
by the north pole (red) simulates a clear signal aspect.
3.2.2.2 Testing using the hand-held magnet is mainly used for functional testing at
maintenance exams or following equipment replacement. If there is any doubt
about the receiver sensitivity, then the recently developed STS test equipment
should be used (see 3.3.3).
3.2.2.3 No specific maintenance is required on the hand-held AWS depot test magnet.

Figure 52 Unipart Rail hand-held AWS permanent test magnet
3.2.3 Depot track-mounted AWS permanent test magnets

3.2.3.1 Railway undertakings (train operators) are responsible for ensuring that trains
leaving maintenance locations have a fully operative AWS system. To help meet
this requirement, GE/RT8035 requires certain maintenance locations to have an
AWS permanent test magnet(s) mounted in the track which the train preparer or
train driver will use to test that the AWS operates and applies the train brakes
before a train goes into service. Currently, two manufacturers provide depot test
magnets in both standard and extra strength versions.
3.2.3.2 Unipart Rail supply AWS depot track-mounted permanent test magnets (Figure
53). Two magnetic field strength variants are available, a standard strength
magnet (coloured yellow) and an extra strength magnet (coloured green). These
magnets can be attached to timber sleepers or concrete sleepers.
Figure 53 Unipart Rail AWS depot track-mounted permanent test magnet
3.2.3.3 Vortok International supply AWS depot track-mounted permanent test magnets.
They are made from rare-earth metal providing an extremely consistent,
calibrated magnetic field. Two variants are available, a standard strength magnet
(Figure 54 coloured yellow) and an extra strength magnet (Figure 55 coloured
green).
3.2.3.4 These magnets can be attached to timber sleepers or concrete sleepers, or

suspended from the foot of the rail using GRP beams supplied by Vortok, but are
not suitable for fitting on steel sleepers. The magnets are designed to provide the
minimum field strength required by GE/RT8035. They should be installed such
that the top of the magnet surface is in line with the rail heads. Each magnet
should be supplied with a certificate of conformity which should be retained on
the asset file.
3.2.3.5 The standard strength magnets are calibrated by the manufacturer to provide a
magnetic field strength of 3.1 - 3.5 mT at 115 mm ARL for the standard strength
magnet, and 4.7 - 5.1 mT at 193 mm ARL for the extra strength magnet. These
values are specified in GE/RT8035 which should be referred to in case of future
change.

Figure 54 Vortok standard strength depot test magnet on fixed mount
Figure 55 Vortok extra strength depot test magnet on moveable mount
3.2.3.6 Maintenance of the Vortok depot test magnet should consist of an annual
inspection to ensure that there is no physical damage or looseness to the magnet
or its fixings, removal of any ferrous material collected by the magnet, and a
check that the top of the magnet is at rail head height using a non-conducting
straightedge laid across both rails (Figure 56). If at the correct height, the top
surface of the magnet will just touch the straightedge. If the magnet is too high or
too low, then it can be adjusted by unlocking the locknut and rotating the magnet
to raise or lower it to the correct height, tightening the locknut afterwards.
Figure 56 Checking the height of magnet
3.2.3.7 Although not a requirement of the manufacturer, the magnetic field strength of the
magnets may be measured to ensure they are still within the permitted range
specified in GE/RT8035. A suitable magnetic flux density meter is a calibrated
Cermag Gaussmeter type GMET H001, which can be sourced direct from
Cermag or from Vortok. This must be used with a non-metallic spacer and the
flux pattern should be checked within a 50 mm circle from the centre of the
magnet.


3.2.3.8 The depot test magnet should be replaced with a re-calibrated unit in accordance
with the manufacturers recommendations. Old magnets should be returned to
Vortok to be re-calibrated.
3.2.3.9 As both types of magnet are of a high strength, certain safety precautions are
recommended before approaching or handling them. Watches, credit cards and
any other magnetically sensitive materials should not be brought near the
magnets. Staff with pacemakers or other medical aids should not approach or
handle the magnets.
3.3 AWS test equipment

3.3.1 Former British Rail AWS test units
3.3.1 Level 1 (on train AWS test unit British Rail Catalogue number 870/024901) and
Level 2 (off train alarm and indicator test unit British Rail Catalogue number
870/025001) purpose built test equipment have been supplied in the past for
testing AWS systems and equipment. This test equipment is likely to be
superseded by the later test equipment detailed below.
3.3.2 STS - TY287 AWS tester

3.3.2.1 STS manufacture a portable AWS tester known as the TY287 AWS tester, under
licence from Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited. This equipment can be
used for routine maintenance testing and for fault diagnosis purposes.
3.3.2.2 The TY287 AWS tester is designed to be used as a diagnostic tool to test AWS
receivers from the cab of the vehicle. It can identify the sensitivity of the receiver
and confirm its correct operation. Use of this equipment will help to significantly
increase the reliability of testing and hence reduce the costs associated with no
fault found on AWS equipment returns.
3.3.2.3 Unlike the hand-held magnet that it replaces, it is capable of providing repeatable
testing of the trainborne AWS system, using test criteria determined by the
operator. It can be used in a maintenance depot, with a vehicle standing over a
pit or on a ballasted track, without the vehicle actually moving. It will, as far as is
practical, accurately simulate service conditions of track-mounted AWS magnets.
3.3.2.4 The tester accommodates the simulation of the vehicle travelling at a range of
pre-selected speeds over a sequence of magnetic fields, the fields simulating the
appropriate distance/time spacing present on the rail network.
3.3.2.5 It is recognised that the AWS system does have tolerance from both an
infrastructure sub-system and trainborne sub-system perspective, with the
trackside equipment generally providing higher fields than the minimum required
by the specification or simulated by the AWS tester. Therefore, under normal
circumstances, the trainborne equipment could be less sensitive and still appear
to operate satisfactorily in service.
3.3.2.6 The AWS tester can be used for proactively investigating reported AWS receiver
faults. It can also be used as a maintenance tool where permitted by the vehicle
maintenance instructions.
3.3.2.7 The AWS tester produces a magnetic field equal to the minimum strength
specified in GE/RT8035 for the AWS permanent and electro-magnetic track
magnets, with due allowance for the maximum distance of the receiver from the
track magnet position when correctly installed in the track.
3.3.2.8 The AWS tester is self-powered, can be used with all types of AWS receivers, is
suitable for one man operation and is capable of maintenance calibration by the
user.


3.3.2.9 Principal components:
a) Handset (Figure 57) a rugged hand-held unit with an LED alphanumeric

display and control pushbuttons connected to the equipment housing such
that it can be operated from within the vehicles cab.
b) Flux generator (Figure 58) mounted on a lightweight frame which enables

easy positioning under the vehicles AWS receiver.
c) Equipment case a robust enclosure which facilitates ease of handling

and is suitable for use in outdoor and indoor locations. Along with the
handset and connecting cables, it houses the rechargeable sealed lead
acid battery and the electronics which generate the appropriate flux.
Figure 57 STS TY287 AWS tester
Figure 58 STS flux generator positioned under a vehicles AWS receiver
3.3.2.10 Technical specification:
a) Either standard or extra strength AWS track magnets can be selected and
the equipment can replicate the following AWS track magnet scenarios in
Table 8:
Separate south Approaching a signal at caution giving a horn signal

Separate north New AWS track equipment laid in, but not in use and
traction cables, which can result in fields comparable
with legitimate fields.
Separate south north Approaching a clear signal giving a bell signal
Separate north south Occurring in bi-directional sites where the train is
proceeding towards a signal at caution. The train
equipment should respond with a horn plus brake. It
will also occur on simplified bi-directional lines, when
there is a line side AWS cancelling indicator provided
Separate north south north Track fault on bi-directional sites
Table 8 AWS track magnet scenarios


3.3.2.11 It is possible to carry out tests at higher or lower magnetic field strengths for
comparative testing. Power levels are based on GE/RT8035 minimum values at
100%. The selectable power levels are:
a) For standard magnets: 50%, 70% to 150% in 10% steps and 200%
b) for extra strength magnets: 70%, 80%, 90%, 95%, 100%, 105%, 110%
3.3.2.12 The available speed selections are:
a) For standard magnets: 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 100, 110, 125 mph
b) For extra strength magnets; 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 100 mph
3.3.2.13 All four parameters can be changed independently using the handset buttons.
3.3.2.14 Operation of the STS AWS test box is described in Appendix O.
3.3.2.15 Maintenance of the AWS tester is limited to visual inspection for any obvious
damage or mal-operation of the equipment, which should be investigated.
3.3.3 AWS receiver characterisation unit

3.3.3.1 In addition to the TY287 AWS tester, STS are developing an AWS receiver
characterisation test equipment for use in benchmarking the as installed
performance of an AWS receiver on any particular fleet type. The equipment will
be available for use to undertake a first of class test against which routine
maintenance or fault finding tests can be compared. At the time of publication of
this issue of this document, the equipment is still in the development stage.
Further details of this equipment and procedures will be included when available.
3.3.4 Thales
3.3.4.1 Thales manufacture a combined AWS and TPWS test box, known as the Thales
depot test unit (DTU). The Thales DTU (Figure 59) is a portable unit powered
from the vehicle under test for verifying the correct functioning of circuits external
to the AWS/TPWS control unit. The DTU is capable of exercising and confirming
the correct operation of the PSU, AWS receiver, AWS alarm and indicator unit,
reset pushbutton and of simulating a brake demand.
3.3.4.2 The DTU switches, on demand, signals to operate the AWS visual and audible
indications and has LED indicators to confirm the operation of the AWS controls.
The correct PSU operation is also indicated by visual indicators on the DTU.
3.3.4.3 Operation of the DTU is described in Appendix Q.
3.3.4.4 Maintenance of the DTU consists of visual inspection for any obvious damage or
mal-operation of the equipment, which should be investigated, and calibration in
accordance with the manufacturers recommendations.
Figure 59 Thales DTU


3.3.5 Unipart Rail
3.3.5.1 Unipart Rail manufacture a hand-held combined AWS and TPWS test equipment
(Unipart Rail hand-held TPWS signal generator, test coil and lead, Catalogue
number 062/005298). The test equipment (Figure 60), known as the Unipart Rail
depot test unit (DTU) enables the maintainer to exercise the TPWS equipment to
simulate the receipt of signals from track-mounted TPWS transmitter loops.
3.3.5.2 Operation of the DTU is detailed in Appendix O.
3.3.5.3 Maintenance of the DTU consists of visual inspection for any obvious damage or
Figure 60 Unipart Rail hand-held combined AWS/TPWS test equipment
3.4 TPWS test equipment

3.4.1 TPWS test equipment manufacturers
3.4.1.1 A number of TPWS equipment manufacturers have developed specific TPWS
test equipment for use during routine maintenance and when diagnosing faults at
maintenance depots. Some of the test equipment is combined with AWS test
equipment.
3.4.3 Thales depot test unit (DTU)

3.4.3.1 Thales manufacture a combined AWS and TPWS test box, known as the Thales
depot test unit (DTU) (Figure 61). The DTU is a portable unit powered from the
vehicle under test for verifying the correct functioning of circuits external to the
AWS/TPWS control unit. The DTU is capable of exercising and confirming the
correct operation of the PSU, TPWS aerial, TPWS drivers control panel, TPWS
acknowledge pushbutton, TPWS temporary isolation switch and of simulating a
brake demand.
3.4.3.2 Operation of the DTU is described in Appendix Q.
Figure 61 Thales DTU


3.4.4 Thales train test unit (TTU)
3.4.4.1 Thales also manufacture a train test unit (TTU) kit for testing the trainborne
TPWS functions (Figure 62). The Mark II TTU is a portable, battery-operated unit
for functional testing of the OSS/TSS functions using a standard TPWS track-
mounted transmitter loop mounted at track level below the vehicle. The
equipment can be operated by one person from the driving cab.
3.4.4.2 The TTU generates (Figure 63), on demand, sequences of TPWS transmissions
to simulate the movement of the train over TPWS transmitter loops under various
conditions.
3.4.4.3 The track-mounted transmitter loop (Figure 64) is energised from the TTU and
generates an electromagnetic field strength at the TPWS frequencies, that can be
varied from that equivalent to an operating level of 300 mT at 300 mm ARL to a
value below the minimum detectable level for a typical TPWS control unit.
3.4.4.4 The response of the trainborne TPWS equipment can be checked by the
indicators on the vehicle under test.
3.4.4.5 Operation of the TTU is detailed in Appendix S.
3.4.4.6 Maintenance of the TTU consists of visual inspection for any obvious damage or
3.3.4.7 Certain of the TTU versions are fitted with rechargeable batteries, indicated by a
suitable label. If there is no label present indicating this then the batteries are not
of the rechargeable type.
Figure 62 Thales TTU unit kit
Figure 63 Thales TTU

Figure 64 Thales TTU track-mounted transmitter loop
3.4.2 Unipart Rail

3.4.2.1 Unipart Rail manufacture a hand-held combined AWS and TPWS test box
(Unipart Rail hand-held TPWS signal generator, test coil and lead, Catalogue
number 062/005298). The test box (Figure 65), known as the Unipart Rail depot
test unit (DTU) enables the maintainer to exercise the TPWS equipment to
simulate the receipt of signals from track-mounted TPWS transmitter loops.
3.4.2.2 Operation of the DTU is detailed in Appendix R.
3.4.2.3 Maintenance of the DTU is limited to visual inspection for any obvious damage or
mal-operation of the equipment, which should be investigated. The test
equipment should be returned to Unipart Rail for calibration in accordance with
the manufacturers recommendations.
Figure 65 Unipart Rail hand-held combined AWS/TPWS test box
3.5 Fault and failure management

3.5.1 General
3.5.1.1 The AWS and TPWS systems are mandatory safety systems and form a primary
safety system aimed at preventing and mitigating signals passed at danger
(SPADs). Hence, failed AWS or TPWS trainborne equipment is liable to import
safety risk to the railway. It is vital that this risk is managed properly both on the
operating railway, and by taking appropriate management steps to assure system
configuration, reliability and availability. There are a number of mandatory
Railway Group Standards that apply to managing trainborne equipment failures
and these are outlined below. However, it is the railway undertakings (train
operators) responsibility to ensure that they operate an overall safety
management system that complies with these minimum mandatory requirements.
3.5.2 Requirements of the Rule Book

3.5.2.1 The Rule Book Module TW5, mandates the conditions for managing trainborne
AWS or TPWS sub-system failures for trains entering service or when AWS or
TPWS fails on a train already in service.
3.5.2.2 Trains are not permitted to enter service if AWS or TPWS is isolated (or the
isolation device seal is broken) in any cab required to be used.


3.5.2.3 Trains with AWS or TPWS that fails in service and are managed in accordance
with the railway undertakings (train operators) contingency plan (see section
3.3.3). If there is a competent person available to accompany the driver then the
train may proceed at normal speed, otherwise the train may only proceed at a
maximum speed of 40 mph.
3.5.3 Requirements of other standards

3.5.3.1 GO/RT3437 requires that railway undertakings (train operators) have a
contingency plan in place to manage trains operating in service which suffer a
failure of train safety systems including AWS and/or TPWS. The contingency
plan should set out the responses the train operator will take should AWS or
TPWS fail in service. This will include the locations where passengers will be
detrained, the train re-marshalled or taken out of service, or other appropriate
action taken.
3.5.3.2 GE/RT8250 describes arrangements:
a) Monitor safety performance of rail vehicles.
b) Report, record and analyse all defects in rail vehicles that may affect safety
or safe inter-working between operators, and take the necessary corrective
action.
c) Formally report and share information relating to high-risk (safety related)

defects, including those requiring urgent action, and take the necessary
corrective action.
3.5.3.3 In addition, GK/RT0106 sets out specific requirements for managing safety
related failures of signalling systems which includes the AWS and TPWS
trainborne sub-system. Similar to GE/RT8250, this standard requires processes
to be in place for:
a) Recording and investigating safety related failures.
b) Monitoring failure rates.
c) Improving safety performance.
3.5.3.4 GK/RT0106 requires an appropriate response depending on the level of risk, and
categorises AWS failure modes by risk as shown in Table 9.
3.5.3.5 It should be noted that an AWS fault code 3 has traditionally been considered as
a right side failure. However, potential failure mechanisms that could lead to this
state include failure of the trainborne AWS receiver to detect the track permanent
magnet and if the signal was at caution or danger then this would be a Code 7
wrong side failure. Hence, it is recommended that AWS code 3 failures are
considered as dormant wrong side failures and investigated in a similar manner.
3.5.4 Railway undertakings (train operator) processes

3.5.4.1 Railway undertakings (train operators) should operate a system of defect
reporting, recording and monitoring in order that the safety performance of their
vehicles can be monitored and corrective action taken if faults and adverse safety
trends develop. AWS and TPWS faults and failures should be included within
such a system to permit the adequacy of AWS and TPWS equipment design,
manufacture and maintenance arrangements to be determined. The system
should differentiate the response based on the risk from the defect, for example a
right-side failure or wrong-side failure, as indicated in Table 9.
3.5.4.2 Performance monitoring is also required to enable compliance with the AWS and
TPWS minimum performance targets quoted in GE/RT8035 and GE/RT8030.


a) GE/RT8035 requires the AWS trainborne sub-system to achieve the
following availability level:
Trainborne AWS equipment shall have an availability of not less than

99.9%. This target shall be met on a per fleet, per year basis, not on a
per train, per failure basis (for example the total time or mileage that
trains are in service when diagnosed as having faulty AWS equipment, but
before being taken out of service in accordance with GO/RT3437, shall
amount to not more than 0.1% of the total in-service time or mileage). A
fleet for the purposes of this document constitutes all the AWS-fitted trains
that a train operator owns or leases.
b) GE/RT8030 requires the TPWS trainborne sub-system to achieve the

following availability level:
The trainborne sub-system shall have an availability of not less than

99.9%. This target shall be met on a per fleet, per year basis, not on a
per train, per failure basis (for example the total time or mileage that trains
are in service when diagnosed as having faulty TPWS equipment, but
before being taken out of service in accordance with GO/RT3437, shall
amount to not more than 0.1% of the total in-service time or mileage). A
fleet for the purposes of this document constitutes all the TPWS-fitted
trains that a train operator owns or leases.
3.5.4.3 Railway undertakings (train operators) should also endeavour to provide

feedback to the fault originator in order to more closely involve drivers with fault
reporting and rectification. By providing such feedback, drivers will be more likely
to report faults in future and may provide an enhanced level of detail if their
understanding of the cause and effect is improved.
RT3185 Cab audible/visual Signal/warning Failure classification

fault indication condition
code Safety Safety Negligible
related related direct risk
(high risk) (low risk)
1 Horn and bell when Clear signal
clear indication
expected
2 Horn instead of bell Clear signal
when clear indication
expected
3 No Horn or bell when Clear signal Possible
clear indication dormant
expected wrong side
failure
4 Bell and horn when Adverse signal or
warning indication warning
expected
5 Bell instead of horn Adverse signal or
when warning indication warning Wrong side
expected failure
6 Brake without horn Adverse signal or
when warning indication warning
expected
7 No indication or brake Adverse signal or
when warning indication warning Wrong side
expected failure

RT3185 Cab audible/visual Signal/warning Failure classification

fault code indication condition
Safety Safety Negligible
related related direct risk
(high risk) (low risk)
7a Audible warning Adverse signal or
received but indicator warning Wrong side
did not change to yellow failure
and black
8 Horn when no indication Not at signal or
expected warning
9 Bell when no indication Not at signal or
expected warning
10 Unable to cancel At any time
11 Indicator not changing to Any signal or
all black warning
12 AWS failed to arm At any time
Wrong side
failure
13 AWS failed to disarm At any time
14 ATP/TVM failed to arm NOT AWS/TPWS NOT AWS TPWS
15 ATP/TVM failed to arm NOT AWS/TPWS NOT AWS TPWS
16 TPWS failed to activate Signal at danger
or OSS at speed Wrong side
restriction or failure
buffer stops
17 TPWS operated when At any time
not required
Table 9 AWS/TPWS fault codes
3.5.5 Urgent high risk defects

3.5.5.1 The recently introduced IT application NIR-Online (www.nir-online.net) provides a
process of showing urgent high-risk defects in accordance with the requirements
of GE/RT8250.
3.5.5.2 If a railway undertaking discovers an urgent high risk defect in an AWS or TPWS
component that warrants an urgent campaign check, then it is likely that other
railway undertakings (train operators) are affected as the equipment is common
across many users. Hence, the GE/RT8250 process should be enacted for such
AWS and TPWS defects discovered.
3.5.6 Initial fault reporting

3.5.6.1 AWS and TPWS faults are most likely to be detected by drivers who will report
this to the signaller who will allocate a fault code as required by the Rule Book.
The nature of the fault will be reported using form RT3185 (see Appendix H).
Form RT3185 will also be used by signallers if the AWS or TPWS fault is a wrong
side fault in order that the trainborne and trackside equipment will be tested.
3.5.6.2 Form RT3185 may be supplemented with an entry in the vehicle defect log book
and/or via the train management system depending on the railway undertakings
(train operators) policy and the type of vehicle involved.


3.5.6.3 Additionally, faults may be detected by analysis of train data recorders.
3.5.6.4 The fault code is dependent upon the cab audible/visual indication and/or the
signal/warning condition in operation at the time that the fault occurred.
3.5.6.5 AWS and TPWS faults are further classified as either 'wrong side failures' or 'right
side failures'. AWS fault codes 5 and 7 are categorised as AWS wrong side
failures, for example the system failed to caution the driver when it should have
done so. AWS fault code 12 is also a wrong side failure but will only be
applicable to systems that are suppressed when another train protection system
is in operation. It is also recommended that the wrong side failure procedure is
invoked for fault code 3 (no horn or bell when clear indication expected) which is
considered to present a dormant wrong side failure.
3.5.6.6 TPWS fault code 16 is categorised as a TPWS wrong side failure, for example
the train brakes were not applied by TPWS when required to do so.
3.5.6.7 All other fault codes are considered to be right side failures, for example the fault
gave the driver a spurious caution indication or spurious brake demand, and are
not considered a significant risk.
3.5.6.8 Specific procedures are required to be followed for wrong side failures which
must be treated with the utmost importance.
3.5.7 Process for investigating reported right side failures

3.5.7.1 The process depicted in Figure 66 is recommended to reduce the incidence of no
fault found due to external influences following a right side failure report, and is
recommended in light of the new technologies that have been produced for fault
diagnosis.
3.5.7.2 Various equipments exist to conduct a full AWS and/or TPWS test as described
in section 3.2 and Appendices N to T.
3.5.7.3 Depot test procedures as laid down in vehicle maintenance instructions should be
followed. If any item is identified as the cause of the fault then it should be
removed (and sent for repair) and a new item refitted. If the reported fault can be
repeated but changing the suspected faulty item does not cure the fault, then the
fault is likely to be in the vehicle wiring which may need to be insulation tested if
no obvious faults can be identified (see 3.3.11).
3.5.7.4 After removing and/or changing any equipment, a full AWS and/or TPWS test
should be conducted before releasing vehicles back into service.

Figure 66 AWS/TPWS right side failure investigation process


3.5.8 Process for investigating reported wrong side failures
3.5.8.1 The process depicted in Figure 67 below is recommended to reduce the
incidence of wrongly diagnosed faulty equipment due to external influences, and
is recommended in light of the new technologies that have been produced for
fault diagnosis. This process relies on use of approved test equipment such as
the STS TY287 AWS tester.
Figure 67 AWS wrong side failure investigation process


3.5.8.2 It has become common practice to send the control unit and AWS receiver to an
approved technical investigation centre following a reported AWS code 5 or 7
failure as the equipment is often assumed to have suffered a wrong side failure.
However, in many cases the technical investigation centres are unable to find any
faults with equipment under investigation. In some cases, reported AWS code 5
or 7 failures have been caused by the trackside AWS equipment or by traincrew
errors.
3.5.8.3 Similarly for TPWS, alleged wrong side failures may be due to track-mounted
equipment faults, driver error or operational circumstances as identified in the
common causes sections.
3.5.9 Managing defective components

3.5.9.1 Defective AWS and TPWS components should be managed in accordance with
the railway undertakings (train operators) quality procedures in order that
defective components are segregated, stored, labelled, packaged and
despatched for repair or scrap as appropriate. Specific packaging should be
used where provided for high value, fragile and/or repairable items, for example,
control units, voltage converters and alarm and indicator units.
3.5.9.2 As an example, faulty items of AWS and TPWS equipment which have been
involved in a right side failure should be treated as follows:
a) The equipment must be adequately packed, using special packaging

where available and have the correct label attached prior to dispatch (see
Appendix V for an example label). The correct label for equipment other
than that changed as a result of a 'wrong side failure is coloured yellow
and has the wording 'AWS/TPWS equipment for repair'.
b) Equipment changed as a result of a 'right side failure should be sent to the

appropriate repair agent for repair.
3.5.9.3 Faulty items of AWS and TPWS equipment which have been involved in a wrong
side failure should be treated as follows:
a) The equipment must be adequately packed, using special packaging

where available and have an appropriate label identifying the urgent nature
of the package attached prior to dispatch (see Appendix V for an example
wrong-side failure label). A 'wrong side failure report form' (see Appendix
U for an example) should also be enclosed in the package. A copy of the
form should also be faxed to the investigation centre in advance of the
package being despatched.
b) Equipment changed as a result of a wrong side failure should be sent for

technical investigation to an approved, competent body. It is expected that
a competent technical investigation body will provide detailed feedback to
the railway undertaking (train operator) on the nature of the defects found,
as this may require further action on behalf of the railway undertaking (train
operator) on his fleet and urgent advice being given to other operators
(see Appendix U for an example feedback form).
c) It is essential that equipment being sent for technical investigation

and/or repair should be properly labelled and accompanied by
sufficient information to enable the investigators or repairers to
properly diagnose and rectify faults.


3.5.10 Component history
3.5.10.1 As part of the railway undertakings (train operators) monitoring system it is very
important that the nature of the defect and the fault found are accurately and
comprehensively recorded in order that subsequent data analyses are meaningful
and useful. Railway undertakings (train operators) are recommended to operate
a vehicle and/or AWS/TPWS component history system such that the recent
vehicle history with regards to AWS or TPWS faults can be tracked, and trends in
AWS/TPWS performance can be monitored. ATOC manages a computerised
component tracking application system on behalf of railway undertakings (train
operators), which allows details of AWS and TPWS equipment to be recorded,
component fault histories to be generated and supports analysis of equipment
performance. This application is available for use by railway undertakings (train
operators) from the ATOC website engineering portal.
3.5.11 Fault finding techniques

3.5.11.1 Traditionally, AWS faults have been diagnosed using an AWS hand-held test
magnet waved under the receiver to simulate the train passing over the AWS
track magnets and hence function the system (see Appendix M). Functioning the
AWS system with a hand-held test magnet has the advantage of easily and
quickly testing the AWS trainborne sub-system. Replacement of key components
is undertaken to remedy the fault having tracked down the likely faulty component
using a systematic process, in part using test equipment. This overall approach
is still valid today but more sophisticated test equipment is now available (see
section 3.2) to supplement the basic functional test, thus allowing faults to be
detected and healthy equipment to be identified more reliably.
3.5.11.2 For all fault finding techniques, some basic checks should be undertaken first:
a) Check the vehicle records and component tracker system to determine

whether the vehicle has been involved in any AWS related incident within
the last 12 months.
b) Measure and record the height of the bottom of the AWS receiver above
rail level. This should be within the limits applicable to the vehicle
concerned (as specified in the vehicle maintenance instruction). Note that
standard electro-mechanical AWS receivers are mounted within the range
133 mm to 171 mm above rail level, Thales electronic AWS receiver height
range is 100 mm above rail level minimum, to 210 mm above rail level
maximum (refer to section 2.6.8). Adjust as necessary (on vehicles where
adjustment is provided).
It should be noted that standard strength AWS receivers running over high
strength track magnets are normally set to the top of the permitted height
range to avoid spurious right side failures by detecting high magnetic fields
generated by cross-track traction cables, but if set too high can result in
wrong side failures.
Further, the TY287 characterisation unit may be used to adjust the

generic receiver height tolerance for particular vehicles.
c) Examine items of equipment for possible causes of intermittent fault, for

example external damage, loose connectors, water ingress to connectors.
3.5.11.3 The fault diagnosis procedures should enable faulty equipment to be reliably
diagnosed. If a fault persists, for example 2 repeat failures in 3 months, but
cannot be traced by functional testing or use of the various test equipment, or an
earth fault is suspected, then wiring checks should be carried out to trace any
possible wiring faults:


a) Visually examine as far as is possible all items of the AWS/TPWS
trainborne sub-system carefully for possible causes of an intermittent fault,
for example external damage, loose connectors, water ingress or defective
wiring.
b) Disconnect wiring connectors from components likely to be affected by

insulation testing, for example the AWS receiver, TPWS aerial, AWS alarm
and indicator units (if fitted) and bells(s)/Yodalarm/horn (if fitted),
AWS/TPWS control unit, TPWS drivers control panel, EP repeat relay (if
fitted), EP valves (if fitted) and voltage converter (refer to relevant vehicle
instructions).
c) Using an insulation tester (500 or 1000 volt), check that the cable insulation
resistance between AWS/TPWS cables and all other cables running with
them (refer to vehicle wiring diagrams) is not less than 10M (wire to wire
and wire to earth).
d) Using an insulation tester, check that the cable insulation resistance

between each AWS/TPWS cable and the vehicle chassis is not less than
10M.
3.5.11.3 Section 3.5.12 provides further guidance on possible fault causes and guidance
is provided on the application of various fault finding techniques and system
testing in Appendices M to T:
a) Fault diagnosis during power up sequence and during service operation.
b) Functional testing using AWS hand-held test magnet.
c) Testing using AWS and TPWS depot test equipment.
3.5.11.4 Appendix T contains a typical fault finding test sheet on which the results of a
fault finding test can be recorded.
3.5.11.5 In addition, data from train data recorders and train management systems may
both offer data related to the operation and performance of both the AWS system
and the train control systems at the time of the fault. When fault finding,
consideration should be given to downloading data and analysing the data to
assist in fault finding. These systems may also directly log the nature of the fault
depending on the complexity of the installation.
3.5.11.6 Data from a train data recorder (Figure 68) may also enable determination of any
driver errors that may have led to an unintended (spurious) automatic brake
application by AWS. For example, a reported spurious brake demand could be
due to late operation of the AWS reset pushbutton, or holding down the AWS
reset pushbutton before the system detects the track magnet south pole. The
sequence and timing of these actions could be identified from train data recorder.
See overleaf for an example train data recorder output.
3.5.11.7 Further, it may not always be apparent that a reported AWS or TPWS trainborne
fault could be the symptom of an infrastructure fault. For example, an AWS fault
code 8 (horn when no indication expected) could be due to the AWS receiver on
the train detecting a magnetic flux from a cross-track cable during a cable fault.
3.5.11.8 Data from train management systems may also provide a precise location (for
example Ordnance Survey Grid Reference) to be provided to the infrastructure
manager to investigate.

TPWS performing Clear signal Caution Signal AWS/TPWS full

self-test when indications (pink Indications (red isolation switch
cab desk opened line) line) operated (gold
line)
Figure 68 Example train data recorder output
3.5.12 Guide to possible fault causes

3.5.12.1 A guide to possible causes and remedies for AWS/TPWS failures associated with
combined electronic AWS/TPWS control unit AWS system is given in Figures 69
and 70 below. These flowcharts are based on the power up and self-test routine,
follows a sequence from power up of the system through the equipment
automatic self-test routine. These flowcharts have been published for information
purposes only and do not take precedence over approved vehicle maintenance
and fault finding procedures.
3.5.12.2 Appendix L provides an example of applying these guides to create fleet specific
guidance (the example in Appendix L is an AWS and TPWS fault finding guide for
freight locomotives).


POSSIBLE CAUSE SOLUTION
AWS Code 1 SPURIOUS SWITCHING OF CHANGE: AWS RECEIVER
HORN & BELL AWS RECEIVER & CABLE
RANDOM FAULTS: CHECK: AWS RECEIVER

POSSIBLE CAUSE INDICATE AWS Rx SOLUTION HEIGHT IS CORRECT, test
AWS Code 2 FAILURES AT SAME CHANGE: AWS RECEIVER
HORN INSTEAD OF BELL
LOCATION: INDICATES & CABLE (TPWS PUT would
WEAK AWS MAGNETS show if it is a 12v PSU fault)
WRONG SIDE FAILURE POSSIBLE CAUSE SOLUTION

IF NO CODE 7 OBSERVED, IF PUT OK THEN CHANGE
AWS Code 3 THEN BELL FAULT ALARM & INDICATOR/BELL
NO INDICATION INSTEAD OF BELL
POSSIBLY CAUSED BY AN CHECK AWS RECEIVER

AWS Code 4 OLD AWS RECEIVER USED HEIGHT IS CORRECT, IF
BELL & HORN IN AREAS WITH STRONG CORRECT CHANGE
AWS TRACK MAGNETS RECEIVER
WRONG SIDE FAILURE POSSIBLE CAUSE SOLUTION CHECK: ACK BUTTON FOR
PERMANENT RESET
AWS Code 5 VOLTAGE ON AWS Rx
SHORT CIRCUIT. IF OK
BELL INSTEAD OF HORN CHANGE CONTROL UNIT
POSSIBLE CAUSE SOLUTION CHANGE ALARM &

AWS Code 6 HORN FAILURE (should be INDICATOR UNIT/HORN, IF
BRAKE WITHOUT HORN noticed during PUT) NOT FIXED THEN CHANGE
CONTROL UNIT
CHECK: AWS Rx HEIGHT,

WRONG SIDE FAILURE POSSIBLE CAUSE AWS RECEIVER HAS SOLUTION IF CORRECT THEN
AWS Code 7 FAILED TO DETECT CHANGE AWS RECEIVER
NO HORN OR BRAKE PERMANENT MAGNET (AWS cable fault would
cause a Code 2)
CHANGE: ALARM &

WRONG SIDE FAILURE POSSIBLE CAUSE SUNFLOWER FAILURE SOLUTION INDICATOR UNIT/
AWS Code 7a (should be noticed during SUNFLOWER, THEN
SUNFLOWER NOT YELLOW/BLACK PUT) CONTROL UNIT IF
PROBLEM NOT FIXED

AWS Code 8 CHANGE: AWS RECEIVER
AWS RECEIVER FAILURE
HORN INSTEAD OF NO INDICATION & CABLE
POSSIBLE CAUSE SPURIOUS AWS RECEIVER SOLUTION

AWS Code 9 TRAINBORNE EQUIPMENT
OPERATION eg. Response
BELL INSTEAD OF NO INDICATION NOT AT FAULT
to a trackside traction cable
CHANGE: AWS RECEIVER

POSSIBLE CAUSE MANY POSSIBLE CAUSES SOLUTION & CABLE, test CONTROL
AWS Code 10 POSSIBLE DRIVER ERROR UNIT, test ACK BUTTON,
UNABLE TO CANCEL
WHEN ACK. (CHECK TDR) TEST ALARM & INDICATOR
UNIT/SUNFLOWER
CHANGE ALARM &

AWS Code 11 SUNFLOWER FAILURE INDICATOR/SUNFLOWER,
SUNFLOWER NOT ALL BLACK (should show up during PUT) IF NOT FIXED THEN
CHANGE CONTROL UNIT
CHECK: AERIAL
WRONG SIDE FAILURE POSSIBLE CAUSE AERIAL POSITION COULD SOLUTION
LOCATION, PERFORM TTU
AWS Code 16 BE INCORRECT, OR
TEST, IF OK, CHECK
TPWS FAILED TO ACTIVATE TRACKSIDE FAULT
TRACKSIDE LOCATION
CAUSED BY ACK BUTTON CHECK: BRAKE WIRING,

AWS Code 17 PRESSED LATE, OR CHANGE CONTROL UNIT
UNREQUIRED TPWS OPERATION TRACK INTERFERENCE IN IF BRAKES DO NOT
TRIP LOCATION RELEASE
Figure 69 Combined AWS/TPWS fault finding guide

START
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
Figure 70 Combined AWS/TPWS system fault finding flowchart


3.5.13 Common AWS and TPWS failure mechanisms
3.5.13.1 Some common AWS and TPWS failure mechanisms are described below. These
have been identified from system performance monitoring and are categorised
into human error (Table 10), system faults (Table 11) and trainborne sub-system
equipment faults (Table 12).
3.5.13.2 Human Error

Drivers may report AWS or TPWS faults (or the equipment may be found
isolated) due to external events that are not specific faults of the trainborne
equipment. Examples of this are shown in Table 10.
Initial fault report Possible human error cause

Unwarranted AWS brake application Driver error in not resetting AWS within the
specified caution acknowledgement period
AWS fault code 10 (unable to cancel) Driver error by holding down the AWS reset
pushbutton before the AWS caution audible tone
is sounded
TPWS fault code 17 (TPWS operated Over-speeding on OSS for signal or PSR
when not required) TPWS not temporarily isolated when required
TPWS TSO not operated or timed out before
passing signal at danger with authority
Table 10 Common human error type faults
3.5.13.3 System faults

Experience of operating with AWS and TPWS has highlighted a number of
system issues that result in an apparent AWS or TPWS fault as perceived by the
driver. These should be read in conjunction with the trainborne sub-system
faults, as shown in Table 11.
3.5.13.4 Trainborne sub-system faults

With respect to trainborne sub-system faults, as the significant majority of
vehicles are fitted with Thales TPWS equipment (95%), most known failure
mechanisms identified below only affect this system. However, as the Unipart
Rail and STS equipment has accumulated a much lower comparative mileage, it
is considered that there is insufficient data available to be certain that such faults,
or other faults, will not arise in these systems. Common trainborne sub-system
faults are identified in Table 12.

Type of fault Possible system cause

AWS fault code 2 (horn instead of Faulty track magnet (for example electromagnet
bell when clear indication expected) fault or field strength out of specification)
AWS receiver on the train marginal sensitivity or
mounted too high or passing over magnet at
extreme of suspension movement
AWS fault code 7 (no indication or Faulty track magnet (for example permanent
brake when warning indication magnet field strength out of specification)
expected) WRONG SIDE FAILURE
AWS fault code 8 (horn when no Trainborne equipment detecting a strong
indication expected) magnetic field from non-AWS trackside
infrastructure, for example high currents, passing
AWS Fault Code 9 (Bell when no
through cross-track traction cables
indication expected)
AWS fault code 10 (unable to cancel) A cab is opened up with the AWS receiver directly
over an AWS magnet
AWS failed system power up test A cab is opened up with the AWS receiver directly
over an AWS magnet
TPWS failed system power up test A cab is opened up with the TPWS aerial directly
over an active TPWS transmitter loop
TPWS fault code 16 (TPWS failed to Faulty TPWS transmitter loop
activate) WRONG SIDE FAILURE
TPWS fault code 17 (TPWS Brake demand due to trainborne equipment
activated when not required) detecting valid sequence of signals when
(symptom is flashing fault light) travelling reverse direction over TSS (applies to
Thales modification 0 control units only)
Trainborne equipment detecting TPWS
frequencies from trackside infrastructure,
specifically the harmonics of certain TI-21 track
circuit transmitters (higher risk if TPWS aerial is
ahead of the leading axle)
TPWS OSS still active for main aspect when
movement controlled by subsidiary signal
(solution suppress OSS when subsidiary signal
off)
TPWS self-reversion due to TPWS TSS re-
activated before TPWS aerial clear of transmitter
loops
Trainborne equipment wrongly interpreting OSS
transmitter loop lobes as main field at low speed
at terminal stations (solution implemented buffer
stops mini-loops)
Table 11 Common system faults

Type of fault Possible trainborne equipment cause

AWS fault code 1 (horn and bell Spurious switching of AWS receiver - solution
when clear indication expected) renew AWS receiver and cable.
AWS fault code 2 (horn instead of AWS receiver faults - solution check AWS
bell when clear indication expected) receiver height is correct, if ok renew AWS
receiver and cable.
AWS fault code 3 (no indication AWS alarm and indicator or bell fault - solution
instead of bell) change alarm and indicator unit or bell.
AWS fault code 4 (bell and horn Reed AWS receivers operating over extra-
when warning indication expected) strength magnets are believed to have operated
for years with old relay based logic units masking
a timing error. The introduction of electronic
AWS/TPWS control units has revealed this timing
error with a resultant increase in AWS code 4
failures - solution check AWS receiver height is
correct. Consider replacing reed AWS receiver
with an electronic solid state AWS receiver.
AWS fault code 5 (bell instead of Permanent reset voltage on AWS receiver due to
horn) WRONG SIDE FAILURE short circuit on AWS reset pushbutton or faulty
control unit - solution change reset pushbutton if
faulty, if not change control unit.
AWS fault code 6 (brake without AWS alarm and indicator or horn fault - solution
horn) change alarm and indicator unit or horn, if not
fixed change control unit.
AWS fault code 7 (no indication or AWS receiver failed to detect track magnet -
brake when warning indication solution check AWS receiver height and renew
expected) WRONG SIDE FAILURE receiver if height correct.
AWS fault code 8 (horn when no AWS receiver failure - solution renew AWS
indication expected) receiver and cable.
AWS fault code 10 (unable to cancel) If Thales control unit then check modification
status. If not modified strike 4 or above then
replace and return to Thales.
AWS fault code 11 (indicator not AWS alarm and indicator or sunflower fault -
changing to all black) solution change alarm and indicator unit or
sunflower, if not fixed change control unit.
TPWS fault code 16 (TPWS failed to TPWS aerial not correctly located (movement due
activate) WRONG SIDE FAILURE to poor application of Loctite on aerial retention
assembly) but electrically still connected to
control unit recommended solution is to install a
composite aerial harness which has a mechanical
location.
Failure of TDR to record AWS/TPWS Failure of control unit TDR output relay volt-free
outputs contacts soft--sticking due to inrush current
damage. Change control unit.

Type of fault Possible trainborne equipment cause

AWS/TPWS brake application delay If Thales control unit then internal brake demand
POSSIBLE CAUSE OF WRONG relay failure (sticking armature) check
SIDE FAILURE modification strike 2 or above, replace and return
to Thales if not
Flashing fault lights on drivers control Intermittent connection problem between TPWS
panel aerial and connecting cable (solutions are to
replace the aerial/cable connector arrangement
with a hard wired aerial or improve the securing
mechanism for the aerial/cable interface)
Check the aerial for continuity. For Thales
equipment, check between pins 2 and 5
(110 - 130 typical) and between pins 3 and 4
(15 21 typical). Replace aerial if an open
circuit is found or the DMM reading falls outside
the typical range.
Table 12 Common trainborne equipment faults

Appendix A Useful contacts

Company Address Website Telephone Comment
No
Association of Floor 3 www.atoc.org 0207 Train operator
Train Operating 40 Bernard Street 8418000 representative body
Companies London WC1N 1BY
(ATOC)
Cermag Ltd 92/94 Holywell Road www.cermag.co.uk 0114 Suppliers of Gaussmeters
Sheffield S4 8AS 2446136
Howells Railway Longley Lane www.howells- 0161 Manufacturer and supplier
Products Ltd Sharston Industrial Estate railway.co.uk 9455567 of AWS trainborne
Wythenshawe equipment
Manchester M22 4SS
Railpart UK Ltd PO Box 159 www.railpart.co.uk 01302 AWS/TPWS component
Denison House 342414 stock manager
Doncaster DN4 0DB
Siemens www.siemens.com Manufacturer of
Transportation AWS/TPWS specific
Systems transmission module
STS Signals Ltd Doulton Road www.sts-signals.com 01384 Manufacturer and supplier
Cradley Heath 858521 of TPWS and AWS
West Midlands B64 5QB products and services
(including former Field and
Grant products)
Thales UK Manor Royal A Building www.thalesgroup.com General: Manufacturer and supplier
Limited, Land Crawley www.TPWS.co.uk 01293 of TPWS and AWS
and Joint West Sussex RH10 9PZ 528787 products and services
Systems Helpline:
07977
241602
Unipart Rail Gresty Road www.natrail.com 01270 Manufacturer and suppliers
Crewe 533000 of TPWS and AWS
Cheshire W2 6EH products and services
Vehicle Train Rail Safety and Standards www.rssb.co.uk/sysic. 0207 904 Industry body to determine
Control System Board asp 7518 solutions to AWS issues
Interface Evergreen House based on sound technical
Committee AWS 160 Euston Road and economical evaluation
Working Group London NW1 2DX
Vortok 6 8 Haxter Close www.vortok.co.uk 01752 Suppliers of AWS depot
International Ltd Belliver Industrial Estate 700601 test magnets
Roborough
Plymouth
Devon PL6 7DD

Appendix B Typical AWS/TPWS electrical installation on single

cab vehicle
This schematic is shown as a typical example of a TPWS/AWS installation and should not be used for
any purpose other than for general information. Reference should be made to the approved electrical
schematics for each vehicle type for use in maintenance, fault finding and repair activities.
PRINT ON A3

Appendix C Typical AWS/TPWS electrical installation on a dual

cab vehicle
This schematic is shown as a typical example of a TPWS/AWS installation and should not be used for
any purpose other than for general information. Reference should be made to the approved electrical
schematics for each vehicle type for use in maintenance, fault finding and repair activities.
PRINT ON A3

Appendix D STS AWS/TPWS vehicle interface details

This appendix details the electrical interface specification for the STS TPWS/AWS equipment as
known at the publication date of this document. Reference should be made to approved vehicle
diagrams and manufacturers data when undertaking maintenance, fault finding and repair activities.
Twin-lightweight AWS receiver identifies the multiple connector pin identification letter.
Connections
Detector Connector indication pin
No. Contact
1 South R
1 North S
1 Common N
2 South R
2 North S
1 Common P
1 and 2 Reset circuit: positive T
0V U
AWS LED alarm and indicator unit identifies the multiple connector pin identification letter.
Note all screens are connected together within the indictor unit. Pin G provides, when
required, an auxiliary input to control the display to all black (derived from the +12.5V dc
output on pin J).
Connections
Pin Wire/screen Circuit
A Wire Black control signal
N Screen For pin A
B Wire Supply +12.5V dc
C Wire Supply 0V dc
D Wire Black/yellow control signal
F Wire Input +40V dc reset control
R Screen For pin F
G Wire Black control signal (auxiliary)
S Screen For pin G
H Wire Output +40V dc reset signal
T Screen For pin H
J Wire Output +12.5V dc
M Wire Output power off/fault detector
V Screen For pin M

Appendix E Thales AWS/TPWS vehicle interface details

This appendix provides details of connector types, the electrical interface specification and the timer
link settings for the Thales TPWS/AWS equipment as known at the publication date of this document.
Reference should be made to approved vehicle diagrams and manufacturers data when undertaking
maintenance, fault finding and repair activities.
The connectors used on the AWS/TPWS system mating with supplied equipment are
shown in the Table below. (Note that connectors are Litton unless otherwise stated):
Equipment Ref. Description Part no.

Control unit PL1 Free socket FRCIR08F28-21S F80T12-15
ABCIRHSE06T2821SCNF80
Control unit SK2 Free plug FRCIR08F28-21P F80T12-15
ABCIRHSE06T2821PCNF80
PSU PL1 Free socket FRCIR06F18-12S F80T12-15
ABCIRHSE06T1812SCNF80
PSU SK2 Free plug FRCIR06F22-14P F80T12-15
ABCIRHSE06T2214PCNF80
Alarm and indicator Free socket FRCIR06F22-14S F80T12-15
unit ABCIRHSE06T2214SCNF80
Twin lightweight or Fixed socket FRCIR030CFZ22-14S F80T12-15
electronic receiver or ABCIRH03T22-14SCNF80
ducting
TPWS control panel PL1 Free socket Amphenol T3105-501 (R/A T3105-581)
(straight)
All Litton or AB connectors to the control unit should be fitted with an radio frequency
interference grounding system. A suitable connector for clamping multiple cable screens to
the shell body is the Litton FRCRG08RED28-21P F80T12-15. Alternatively the screened
backshell, POLAMCO series 70 EMI/RFI backshell, POLAMCO part number
70Q3-28-16-I-2B can be used with the usual Litton or AB connector.
The following table defines the function and interface specification of each connection on
all Thales AWS/TPWS equipment:
Connector pin Function Signal type/remarks

Combined AWS and TPWS control unit
PL1/L 12V + Power +12V
PL1/K 12V - Power 0V
PL1/R 40V + Power +40V
PL1/J 40V - Power 0V
PL1/N Rx north 12V signal
PL1/M Rx south 12V signal
PL1/V Set sunflower to yellow/black 12V signal


PL1/W Set sunflower to all black 12V signal
PL1/X Bell 12V signal
PL1/Z Horn 12V signal
PL1/P AWS acknowledge/reset 40V signal
PL1/A Brake out Volt-free contact (RL13)
PL1/C Brake in Volt-free contact (RL13)
PL1/b TDR clear annunciated a Volt-free contact (RL11)
PL1/c TDR clear annunciated b Volt-free contact (RL11)
PL1/d TDR restrictive annunciated a Volt-free contact (RL12)
PL1/e TDR restrictive annunciated b Volt-free contact (RL12)
PL1/f TDR set to all black a Volt-free contact (RL5)
PL1/m TDR set to all black b Volt-free contact (RL5)
PL1/j TDR set to yellow/black a Volt-free contact (RL4)
PL1/k TDR set to yellow/black b Volt-free contact (RL4)
PL1/g TDR AWS acknowledge pressed a Volt-free contact (RL1)
PL1/h TDR AWS acknowledge pressed b Volt-free contact (RL1)
PL1/n TDR brake demand a Volt-free contact (RL8)
PL1/p TDR brake demand b Volt-free contact (RL8)
PL1/r TDR TPWS isolated a Volt-free contact (RL7)
PL1/s TDR TPWS isolated b Volt-free contact (RL7)
PL1/T Vigilance reset a Volt-free contact (RL9)
PL1/U Vigilance reset b Volt-free contact (RL9)
PL1/a Acknowledge timer link Pulled up to +12V
PL1/S Acknowledge timer link 0V return
SK2/A Aerial + Analogue signal
SK2/B Aerial - Analogue signal
SK2/C Aerial test + Analogue signal
SK2/D Aerial test - Analogue signal
SK2/H RF Mon output + Analogue signal
SK2/J RF Mon output - Analogue signal
SK2/a TI OFF SW input 12V signal
SK2/b TI ON SW input 12V signal


SK2/b TI ON SW input 12V signal
SK2/d TSO LED 6V signal
SK2/e Brake demand LED 6V signal
SK2/f TI/fault LED 6V signal
SK2/g TSO SW input 12V signal
SK2/h TDR wrong direction loop a Volt-free contact (RL3)
SK2/j TDR wrong direction loop b Volt-free contact (RL3)
SK2/k TDR normal direction loop a Volt-free contact (RL2)
SK2/m TDR normal direction loop b Volt-free contact (RL2)
SK2/n TDR TSO active a Volt-free contact (RL6)
SK2/p TDR TSO active b Volt-free contact (RL6)
SK2/r TDR temporary isolation fault Volt-free contact (RL10)
indicator a
SK2/s TDR temporary isolation fault Volt-free contact (RL10)
indicator b
SK2/K OS timer bit 2 link Pulled up to +12V
SK2/L OS timer bit 2 link 0V return
SK2/M OS timer bit 1 link Pulled up to +12V
SK2/N OS timer bit 1 link 0V return
SK2/P OS timer bit 0 link Pulled up to +12V
SK2/R OS timer bit 0 link 0V return
SK2/S TSO timer link Pulled up to +12V
SK2/T TSO timer link 0V return
AWS alarm and indicator unit
PL1/B 12V + Power +12V
PL1/C 12V - Power 0V
PL1/J 12V - Power 0V
PL1/D Set to yellow/black 12V signal
PL1/A Set to all black 12V signal
PL1/L Bell 12V signal
PL1/V Horn 12V signal
PL1/F Proving contact 40V signal
PL1/H Proving contact 40V signal


TPWS PSU
PL1/A Supply in +ve Train supply
PL1/B Supply in +ve Train supply
PL1/C Supply in ve (72/96V) Train supply
PL1/D Supply in ve(48V) Train supply
PL1/E Rx2 select Train supply voltage
PL1/F Supply in ve (24V) Train supply
SK2/A 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/B 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/C 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/D 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/E 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/N 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/P 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/R 12V+ Power +12V
SK2/K 12V- Power 0V
SK2/L 12V- Power 0V
SK2/M 12V- Power 0V
SK2/U 12V- Power 0V
SK2/F 40V+ Power +40V
SK2/G 40V+ Power +40V
SK2/H 40V- Power 0V
SK2/S 40V- Power 0V
SK2/J Rx1 output To AC receiver
SK2/T Rx2 output To DC receiver
SK2/V Receiver supply in Power +12V
Standard AWS receiver
Pin 1 12V+ Power +12V
Pin 2 Rx north 12V signal
Pin 3 Rx south 12V signal
Pin 4 Reset 40V signal
Pin 5 40V- Power 0V


Twin lightweight AWS receiver
Pin N Rx1 (ac lines) Power +12V
Pin P Rx2 (dc lines) Power +12V
Pin U 40V- Power 0V
Pin T Reset 40V signal
Pin S Rx north 12V signal
Pin R Rx south 12V signal
Combined electronic AWS receiver and TPWS aerial
Pin N Rx1 (ac lines) Power +12V
Pin P Rx2 (dc lines) Power +12V
Pin U 40V- Power 0V
Pin T Reset 40V signal
Pin S Rx north 12V signal
Pin R Rx south 12V signal
Pin L Analogue output high 0.4V/mT approx. into 20 K
Pin M Analogue output low 0.4V/mT approx. into 20 K
Pin V Cable screen
Pin A Aerial + Analogue signal
Pin B Aerial - Analogue signal
Pin C Aerial test + Analogue signal
Pin D Aerial test - Analogue signal
Pin E Cable screen
TPWS aerial
Pin 1 Aerial screen Screen (train chassis)
Pin 2 Aerial + Analogue signal
Pin 5 Aerial - Analogue signal
Pin 3 Aerial test + Analogue signal
Pin 4 Aerial test - Analogue signal
Drivers panel
PL1/1 TSO LED 6V signal
PL1/2 Brake demand LED 6V signal
PL1/3 TI/fault LED 6V signal
PL1/4 LED return (12V-) Power 0V
PL1/5 TSO SW input 12V signal
PL1/6 Switch return (12V+) Power +12V


Temporary isolation switch
Pin 23 TI OFF SW input 12V signal
Pin 13 TI ON SW input 12V signal
Depot test unit
PL6/A Brake control
PL6/C Brake control
PL6/J PSU 40V-
PL6/K PSU 12V-
PL6/L PSU 12V-
PL6/M AWS south
PL6/N AWS north
PL6/P Reset pushbutton
PL6/R PSU 40+
PL6/V Set yellow/black
PL6/W Set all black
PL6/X Bell
PL6/Z Horn
PL6/a ACK link
PL6/S ACK link return
SK6/A Aerial +
SK6/B Aerial -
SK6/C Aerial test +
SK6/D Aerial test -
SK6/a TI switch OFF
SK6/b TI switch ON
SK6/d TSO lamp
SK6/e Brake lamp
SK6/f TI/fault Ind. lamp
SK6/g TSO switch
SK6/K ST2 link
SK6/L ST2 link return


Depot test unit
SK6/M ST1 link
SK6/N ST1 link return
SK6/P ST0 link
SK6/R ST0 link return
SK6/S TSO link
SK6/T TSO link return
SK6/U 12V -
SK6/X 12V +
SK6/W 12V +
SK6/Z 12V +
SK6/V 12V -
Timer link settings

The control unit contains three timers which can be set to different values by inserting a
combination of five links across pairs of pins in the control unit mating connectors (SK1 and
PL2) or across the appropriate terminals in the control unit terminal box. The location, link
settings and pin outs for each timer on both Mark II and Mark III and no terminal box
installation types are given in Tables F.3, F.4, F.5 and F.6 ( indicates a fitted link). Note
that for installations that have a Mark II and Mark III terminal box fitted, multiple links are
achieved by daisy chaining links between pin numbers shown and 12V- (terminal 33).
Installation type Acknowledge TSO OSS
TB SK1 TB PL2 TB PL2
No terminal box
Mark II terminal box
Mark III terminal box
Timer setting (s) No terminal box link Mark II/III terminal box -
between CU SK1/a and S terminal 35 linked to 33
2.7
2.0

Timer setting (s) No terminal box or Mark II Mark III terminal box -
terminal box link between terminal 34 linked to 33
CU PL2/S and T
60
20
Timer setting (ms) No terminal box or Mark II Mark III terminal box -
terminal box link fitted terminals shown linked to
between PL2 pins shown terminal 3
P and R M and N K and L 38 37 36
(ST0) (ST1) (ST2) (ST0) (ST1) (ST2)
974 (passenger)
1218 (goods)
Note that the link combinations have been chosen such that, for any timer setting, failure of
a link will increase the time, thereby reducing the OSS set speed.
Electronic AWS receiver sensitivity settings

The 5-way connector version is factory wired for a particular sensitivity setting specified
when ordering (H1 suffix for standard and H2 suffix for de-sensitised). For the 19-way
Litton connector version, the sensitivity is determined by the train wiring to pins N and P
and may be switched between the two settings if required as indicated in the table below.
Fixed sensitivity Switch sensitivity
Pin Standard mode Desensitised Standard mode Desensitised mode

mode
N 12V+ N/C 12V+ 12V+ (see note)
P N/C 12V+ N/C 12V+
Note: It is not recommended that pin N is disconnected for desensitised mode as this could
give spurious warnings on change-over.

Appendix F Unipart Rail AWS/TPWS vehicle interface details

This appendix details the connector types and electrical interface specification for the Unipart Rail
TPWS/AWS equipment as known at the publication date of this document. Reference should be
made to approved vehicle diagrams and manufacturers data when undertaking maintenance, fault
finding and repair activities.
The tables below contain details on:
Electrical load details for the brake control output.
Electrical interface details for the fixed socket.
Electrical interface details for the plug.
Electrical wiring details for the control unit junction boxes types 1, 3 and 4.
Electrical wiring details for the control unit junction box type 2.
Electrical interface details for the drivers control panel.
Electrical interface specification for the TPWS temporary isolation switch.
Electrical interface specification for the TPWS isolation unit.
Electrical connection details for the TPWS aerial junction box.
Electrical connection details for the TPWS aerial cable assembly.
Electrical connection details for the TPWS aerial switching unit.
Electrical connection details for the dual cab switching unit.
The correct mating half-connectors for the AWS/TPWS control unit are manufactured by AB
connectors with the part number:
Plug - ABCIRHSE06T-28-21PCN-F80-V0
Socket ABBCIRHSE06T-28-21SCN-F80-V0
Voltage (V dc) Current (A dc) Load

12 10 Resistive
12 10 Inductive, L/R = 7 ms
24 10 Resistive
24 5 Inductive, L/R = 7 ms
70 1.8 Resistive
70 1.1 Inductive, L/R = 7 ms
110 0.6 Resistive
110 0.4 Inductive, L/R = 7 ms

Socket connector Function Type Electrical interface

reference specification
SK1 - A TPWS aerial input +ve Input Aerial signal
SK1 B TPWS aerial input ve Input Aerial signal
SK1 - C TPWS aerial output +ve Output Aerial test signal
SK1 D TPWS aerial output ve Output Aerial test signal
SK1 - E
SK1 F
SK1 G
SK1 H
SK1 J
SK1 K Must not be used
SK1 - L 0 volts output for link Output PSU zero volts 100mA max.
SK1 - M Must not be used
SK1 N 0 volts output for link Output PSU zero volts 100mA max.
SK1 P OSS timer control Input
SK1 R 0 volts output for link Output PSU zero volts 100mA max.
SK1 S TSO timer control Input
SK1 T 0 volts output for link Output PSU zero volts 100mA max.
SK1 U 0 volts for DCP Output PSU zero volts 250mA max.
SK1 V
SK1 W 12 volt output to DCP Output 12 volts 100mA max.
SK1 X 12 volt output to TIS Output 12 volts 100mA max.
SK1 Z 12 volt output to TIS Output 12 volts 100mA max.
SK1 - a TI normal input from TIS Input 12 volts 100mA max.
SK1 b TI isolate input from TIS Input 12 volts 100mA max.
SK1 c
SK1 d TSO output to DCP Output 6 volts at 45mA
SK1 e Brake demand to DCP Output 6 volts at 45mA
SK1 - f TI/Fault to DCP Output 6 volts at 45mA


SK1 g TSO input from DCP Input 12 volts 100mA max.
SK1 h TDR (wrong direction VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
loop)
SK1 j TDR (wrong direction VFC
loop)
SK1 k TDR (correct direction VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
loop)
SK1 m TDR (correct direction VFC
loop)
SK1 n TDR (TSO on) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
SK1 p TDR (TSO off) VFC
SK1 r TDR (TI/fault indicated) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
SK1 - s TDR (TI/fault indicated) VFC

PL1 - A Brake output relay VFC
PL1 B
PL1 - C Brake output relay VFC
PL1 D
PL1 - E
PL1 F
PL1 G
PL1 H
PL1 J 40 volt dc input -ve Input PSU 40 volts negative
PL1 K 12 volt dc input -ve Input PSU 12 volts negative
PL1 - L 12 volt dc input +ve Input PSU 12 volts positive
PL1 - M Receiver input south Input
PL1 N Receiver input north Input
PL1 P Input from reset button Input
PL1 R 40 volt dc input +ve Input PSU 40 volts positive
PL1 S 0 volt brake delay timer Output
PL1 T Vigilance reset relay VFC 110 volts10mA maximum


PL1 U Vigilance reset relay VFC
PL1 V Indicator to yellow/black Output 12 volts
PL1 W Indicator to all black Output 12 volts
PL1 X Chime (bell) output Output 12 volts
PL1 Z Horn output Output 12 volts
PL1 - a Brake delay timer input Input
PL1 b TDR (AWS clear) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
PL1 c TDR (AWS clear) VFC
PL1 d TDR (AWS caution) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
PL1 e TDR (AWS caution) VFC
PL1 f TDR (indicator to all VFC 110 volts 10mA max. (with
black) PL1 m)
PL1 g TDR (AWS acknowledge) VFC 110 volts 10mA max. (with
PL1 m)
PL1 h TDR (AWS acknowledge) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
PL1 j TDR (indicator to VFC
yellow/black)
PL1 k TDR (indicator to VFC 110 volts 10mA max. (with
yellow/black) PL1 f)
PL1 m TDR (indicator to all VFC
black)
PL1 n TDR (brake demand) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
PL1 p TDR (brake demand) VFC
PL1 r TDR (TI) VFC 110 volts 10mA max.
PL1 s TDR (TI) VFC

Terminal Function Connector

no. detail
1 AWS bell output SK1/X
2 North input from AWS receiver SK1/N
3 South input from AWS receiver SK1/M
4
5
6 40 volt power supply 0V SK1/J
7 40 volt power supply +40V SK1/R
8
9 12 volt power supply 0V (link to terminal 33) SK1/K
10
11 12 volt power supply +12V (link to terminal 32) SK1/L
12 AWS horn output (link to terminal 16) SK1/Z
13 AWS indicator to all black SK1/W
14 AWS indicator to yellow/black SK1/V
15 AWS reset pushbutton input SK1/F
16 (Link to terminal 12)
17 Brake output relay SK1/A
18 Brake output relay SK1/C
19
20 TPWS aerial input +ve PL1/A
21 TPWS aerial input -ve PL1/B
22 TPWS aerial test output +ve PL1/C
23 TPWS aerial test output -ve PL1/D
24
25
26 Input from TSO switch in DCP PL1/g
27 Output to TSO indicator in DCP PL1/d
28 Output to brake demand indicator in DCP PL1/e
29 Output to TI/fault indicator in DCP PL1/f
30 Temporary isolation normal input from TIS PL1/a
31 Temporary isolation isolate input from TIS PL1/b
32 +12V output (link to terminal 11) N/A
33 0 Volt for DCP and timers (link to terminal 9) N/A
34 TSO timer input (optional link to terminal 33 0V) PL1/S


no. detail
35 AWS brake delay timer (optional link to terminal 33 0V) SK1/a
36
37
38 OSS timer input (optional link to terminal 33 0V) PL1/F
39 Vigilance reset output SK1/T
40 Vigilance reset output SK1/U
41 TDR output AWS clear received SK1/b
42 TDR output AWS clear received SK1/c
43 TDR output AWS caution received SK1/d
44 TDR output AWS caution received SK1/e
45 TDR output AWS indicator to all black SK1/f
46 TDR output AWS indicator to all black SK1/m
47 TDR output AWS indicator to yellow/black SK1/j
48 TDR output AWS indicator to yellow/black SK1/k
49 TDR output wrong direction loop detected PL1/h
50 TDR output wrong direction loop detected PL1/j
51 TDR output correct direction loop detected PL1/k
52 TDR output correct direction loop detected PL1/m
53 TDR output TSO activated PL1/n
54 TDR output TSO activated PL1/p
55 TDR output TI/fault indicator enabled PL1/r
56 TDR output TI/fault indicator enabled PL1/s
57 TDR output TPWS acknowledge button pressed SK1/g
58 TDR output TPWS acknowledge button pressed SK1/h
59 TDR output TPWS isolated SK1/r
60 TDR output TPWS isolated SK1/s
61 TDR output brake demand request SK1/n
62 TDR output brake demand request SK1/p


no. detail
1 AWS bell output SK1/X
2 North input from AWS receiver SK1/N
3 South input from AWS receiver SK1/M
4
5
6 40 volt power supply 0V SK1/J
7 40 volt power supply +40V SK1/R
8
9 12 volt power supply 0V (link to terminal 33) SK1/K
10
11 12 volt power supply +12V (link to terminal 32) SK1/L
12 AWS horn output SK1/Z
13 AWS indicator to all black SK1/W
14 AWS indicator to yellow/black SK1/V
15 AWS reset pushbutton input SK1/F
16
17 Brake output relay SK1/A
18 Brake output relay SK1/C
19 Not fitted
20 Not fitted
21 Not fitted
22 Not fitted
23 Not fitted
24 Not fitted
25 Not fitted
26 Not fitted
27 Not fitted
28 Not fitted
29 Not fitted
30 Not fitted
31 Not fitted
32 Not fitted
33 0 volt for DCP and timers (link to terminal 9) N/A
34 Not fitted


no. detail
35 AWS brake delay timer (optional link to terminal 33 0V) SK1/a
36 Not fitted
37 Not fitted
38 Not fitted
39 Vigilance reset output SK1/T
40 Vigilance reset output SK1/U
41 TDR output AWS clear received SK1/b
42 TDR output AWS clear received SK1/c
43 TDR output AWS caution received SK1/d
44 TDR output AWS caution received SK1/e
45 TDR output AWS indicator to all black SK1/f
46 TDR output AWS indicator to all black SK1/m
47 TDR output AWS indicator to yellow/black SK1/j
48 TDR output AWS indicator to yellow/black SK1/k
49 Not fitted
50 Not fitted
51 Not fitted
52 Not fitted
53 Not fitted
54 Not fitted
55 Not fitted
56 Not fitted
57 TDR output AWS reset pushbutton pressed SK1/g
58 TDR output AWS reset pushbutton pressed SK1/h
59 TDR output TPWS isolated SK1/r
60 TDR output TPWS isolated SK1/s
61 TDR output brake demand request SK1/n
62 TDR output brake demand request SK1/p

Terminal Function Electrical interface specification

reference
A TSO indicator input 6 volts dc at 45mA
B Brake demand indicator input 6 volts dc at 45mA
C Temporary isolation indicator input 6 volts dc at 45mA
D Return for all indicators Power supply zero volts
E TSO switch output 12 volt output 100mA max.
F TSO switch input Power supply 12 - volts
G Not used
DCP Function Electrical interface specification

connector
reference
1 TSO indicator input 6 volts dc at 45mA
2 Brake demand indicator input 6 volts dc at 45mA
3 Temporary isolation indicator input 6 volts dc at 45mA
4 Return for all indicators Power supply zero volts
5 TSO switch output 12 volt output 100mA max.
6 TSO switch input Power supply 12 - volts

terminal
reference
6 TSO switch input Power supply 12 - volts


terminal
reference
6 TSO switch input Power supply 12 volts
7 Power up indicator 12 volts dc at 45mA
8 TPWS acknowledge switch 40 volts dc at 100mA
TIS Function Electrical interface specification

connector
reference
13 Temporary isolation isolate output 12 volt at 100mA max.
14 +12 volt isolate switch input 12 volt supply 100mA max.
23 Temporary isolation normal output 12 volts at 100mA max.
24 +12 volt normal switch input 12 volt supply 100mA max.
Isolation Function Electrical interface specification

unit
terminal
1 Vehicle battery supply 110 volts 5 amps maximum
2 Vehicle system supply 110 volts 1 amp maximum
3 Output to voltage converter 110 volts 1 amp maximum
4 Output to brake equipment 110 volts 5 amps maximum
5 Vehicle 0-volts 6 amps maximum.
6 Temporary isolation switch common 12 volts 100mA max.
7 Temporary isolation switch (isolate) 12 volts 100mA max.
8 Temporary isolation switch (normal) 12 volts 100mA max.

Connector Function Terminal no.

reference
A Received aerial signal +ve 1
B Received aerial signal -ve 2
C Cable screen Grounded
D Aerial test signal +ve 4
E Aerial test signal -ve 5
F Cable screen Grounded
Connector Cable description Function Connector

reference reference
A Cable 1, core 1 Received aerial signal +ve A
B Cable 1, core 2 Received aerial signal -ve B
C Cable 1 screen Cable screen C
D Cable 2, core 1 Aerial test signal +ve D
E Cable 2, core 2 Aerial test signal -ve E
F Cable 2 screen Cable screen F
Terminal Function Destination

no.
1 Reverse input Vehicle direction selector
2 Forward input Vehicle direction selector
3 +12 volt supply input Junction box terminal 11
4 0-volt supply input Junction box terminal 9
5 Locomotive aerial input +ve Aerial junction box terminal 1
6 Locomotive aerial input ve Aerial junction box terminal 2
7 Tender aerial input +ve Aerial junction box terminal 1
8 Tender aerial input -ve Aerial junction box terminal 2
9 Aerial test +ve to tender Aerial junction box terminal 4
10 Aerial test +ve to locomotive Aerial junction box terminal 4
11 Aerial test ve common Common terminal
12 Aerial test +ve to control unit Junction box terminal 22


no.
1 12- volt supply input (+ve) Junction box terminal 11
2 12- volt supply output (+ve) Alarm and indicator unit (end 2) pin B
3 12- volt supply output (+ve) DCP (end 2) pin 6
4 12- volt supply output (+ve) Alarm and indicator unit (end 1) pin B
5 12- volt supply output (+ve) DCP (end 1) pin 6
6 12- volt supply output (-ve) DCP (end 2) pin 4
7 12- volt supply output (-ve) DCP (end 1) pin 4
8 12- volt supply input (-ve) Junction box terminal 9
9 AWS acknowledge input (end 2) ACK P/B terminal 1
10 AWS acknowledge input (end 1) ACK P/B terminal 1
11 AWS acknowledge output Junction box terminal 15
12 Aerial +ve input (end 2) TPWS aerial pin 2
13 Aerial +ve input (end 1) TPWS aerial pin 2
14 Aerial +ve output Junction box terminal 20
15 Aerial -ve input (end 2) TPWS aerial pin 5
16 Aerial -ve input (end 1) TPWS aerial pin 5
17 Aerial -ve output Junction box terminal 21
18 Aerial test +ve input (end 2) TPWS aerial pin 3
19 Aerial test +ve input (end 1) TPWS aerial pin 3
20 Aerial test +ve output Junction box terminal 22
21 OSS timer bit 0 output Junction box terminal 38
22 Overspeed sensor timer bit 0 (freight Link to 23 (if required)
vehicle link) (if required)
23 Link to 22 (if required)
24 Overspeed sensor timer bit 0 Link to 25 (if required)
(passenger vehicle link) (if required)
26 Passenger/freight input 110-volts Pass/freight switch
27 Spare output 1
28 Input for spare output 1 Link to 29 (if required)


no.
36 Spare output 2
37 Vehicle end select input 12-volts Change end switch
38 110-volt input supply negative Vehicle 110-volt supply
39 Spare available for cab 1 select
40 Test aerial negative TPWS aerial and control unit
junction box

Appendix G Optimum overhaul periodicities for AWS/TPWS

equipment
The following two tables detail the optimum overhaul periodicities for AWS and TPWS equipment.
The tables represent those components that are being tracked by the ATOC component tracking
application and those that are not but are included for completeness. This appendix is sourced from
ATOC Code of Practice ACOP/EC/01001.
Table G1: Recommended overhaul periodicity for AWS/TPWS components that ARE being tracked
by the ATOC component tracking application.
Description Component Catalogue no./OEM part Recommended overhaul

type code no. periodicity
Standard reed RR 062/010222 (Unipart Rail) C4
receivers 062/010223 (Unipart Rail)
062/010224 (Unipart Rail)
062/500000 (Howells)
062/500001 (Howells)
062/500002 (Howells)
062/500003 (Howells)
062/500004 (Howells)
062/500005 (Howells)
062/500056 (Howells)
062/500057 (Howells)
062/500059 (Howells)
062/500061 (Howells)
062/500062 (Howells)
062/500063 (Howells)
062/500065 (Railpart)
062/500067 (Howells)
062/500068 (Howells)
062/500069 (Howells)
062/500070 (Howells)
104044 (Thales)
Solid state RS 062/010002 (Unipart Rail) Renew on failure or after
receivers 062/010003 (Unipart Rail) visible detection of damage/
deterioration of receiver or
cable


Solid state RS 062/010012 (Unipart Rail) Renew on failure or after
receivers 062/010013 (Unipart Rail) visible detection of damage/
deterioration of receiver or
cable
608901-XX (Thales)
608902-XX (Thales)
608904-XX (Thales)
Indicator IN 062/006580 (Unipart Rail) C4
062/500028 (Howells)
062/500029 (Howells)
Alarm and indicator IU 098/006925 (Howells) C4*
unit 098/007628 (STS)
062/500042 (Howells)
062/500043 (Howells)
334/030100 (STS)
* It may be more appropriate to maintain the alarm and indicator unit at C6 given the expected level of
reliability. However, it may be more practicable to carry out its renewal at C4 when items in a similar
location will be renewed.

Description Component Catalogue no./OEM part no. Recommended overhaul

type code periodicity
Solid state alarm IS 062/014454 (Unipart Rail) Renew on failure
and indicator unit
Combined receiver RM 632186-01 (Thales) Overhaul policy not
module 632186-02 (Thales) determined at time of
publication
632357-XX (Thales)
TPWS control unit CU 098/017819 (Thales) Renew on failure
098/016430 (Thales)
TPWS PSU PS 098/016429 (Thales) Renew on failure
015/011902 (Thales)
Control panel CP 098/016410 (Thales) Overhaul periodicity not
098/016498 (Thales) determined at time of
publication
064/007231 (Thales)
015/010957 (Thales)
608450-03 (Thales)
608450-00 (Thales)
Temporary isolation TI 098/016412 (Thales) Overhaul periodicity to be
switch 062/014443 (Unipart Rail) determined
TPWS aerial AN 062/014444 (Unipart Rail) Overhaul periodicity to be
090/014241 (Thales) determined
098/016413 (Thales)
098/017888 (Thales)
098/017897 (Thales)
098/017898 (Thales)
098/017899 (Thales)
098/017900 (Thales)
098/017901 (Thales)
604428-02 (Thales)


Dual cab switching DS 090/014865 (Thales) Renew on failure
PEC 062/015137 (Thales)
608121-01 (Thales)
608121-11 (Thales)
Table G1
Table G2: Components that ARE NOT being tracked by the ATOC component tracking application.
Description Catalogue no./OEM part Recommended overhaul

no. periodicity
AWS/TPWS lightweight receiver 015/011837 (STS) Overhaul periodicity to be
determined
Relay unit 062/014607 (Unipart Rail) C4
(removed with TPWS) 062/014612 (Unipart Rail)
062/500006 (Howells)
062/500038 (Howells)
EP repeat relay unit 062/014609 (Unipart Rail) C4
(removed with TPWS) 062/014611 (Unipart Rail)
062/500036 (Howells)
062/500037 (Howells)
Brake and horn relay unit 062/014603 (Unipart Rail) C4
(removed with TPWS) 062/500007 (Howells)
EP valve 062/014602 (Unipart Rail) C4

062/500035 (Howells)
062/500040 (Howells)
062/500041 (Howells)
Bell 062/000280 (Unipart Rail) C4
062/500015 (Howells)
Voltage converters (removed 062/014620 (Unipart Rail) Renew on failure
with TPWS) 062/014623 (Unipart Rail)
062/500008 (Howells)
062/500009 (Howells)
062/500010 (Howells)
062/500011 (Howells)
062/500012 (Howells)

Description Catalogue no./OEM part Recommended overhaul

no. periodicity
AWS reset pushbutton C4
062/500031 (Howells)
AWS isolating switch Renew on failure
062/500034 (Howells)
062/014173 (Unipart Rail) Renew on failure
Change end switch
062/500032 (Howells)
062/500033 (Howells)
Vacuum horn (removed with Renew on failure
062/500027 (Howells)
TPWS)
Air horn (removed with TPWS) Renew on failure
062/500044 (Howells)
062/000739 (Unipart Rail) Renew on failure
Relay unit junction box
(removed with TPWS)
062/500016 (Howells)
Receiver junction box Renew on failure
062/500017 (Howells)
Cable: 062/001360 (Unipart Rail) C4
30" LH Entry 062/001361 (Unipart Rail)
30" RH Entry 062/001362 (Unipart Rail)
30" Top Entry 062/001363 (Unipart Rail)
48" Top Entry 062/001364 (Unipart Rail)
2.8m RH Entry 062/001365 (Unipart Rail)
48" LH Entry 062/001369 (Unipart Rail)
72" LH Entry
Cable: 062/500018 (Howells) C4
30" LH Entry 062/500019 (Howells)
30" RH Entry 062/500020 (Howells)
30" Top Entry 062/500021 (Howells)
48" Top Entry 062/500022 (Howells)
2.8m RH Entry 062/500023 (Howells)
48" LH Entry 062/500025 (Howells)
72" LH Entry
New pushbutton 098/017166 (Thales) C4
098/016425 (Thales)
Mark II terminal box Renew on failure
098/016816 (Thales)
Mark III terminal box 072/009710 (Thales) Renew on failure
TPWS aerial harness Various (Thales) Overhaul periodicity to be
determined
TPWS aerial terminal box 098/016420 (Thales) Renew on failure
Table G2

Appendix H Form RT3185 reporting of AWS failure or

irregularity


Appendix I Form RT3188 activation of TPWS

Appendix J Component tracking application form

Appendix K Component tracking information sheet

AWS/TPWS component tracking information
Vehicle no: (Not unit number!)
British Rail Equipment description Serial no. out Serial no. in
Catalogue no.
Date
Originating depot
Receiver height
(to be measured on the vehicle for example Trust
Defect reference Incident No.)
Defect code Please tick (Please see Thales fault guide card)
1 (Horn and bell)
2 (Horn instead of bell)
3 (No indication instead of bell)
4 (Bell and horn)
5 (Wrong side failure bell instead of horn)
6 (Brake without horn)
7 (Wrong side failure no horn or brake)
7a (Wrong side failure sunflower not yellow/black)
8 (Horn instead of indication)
9 (Bell instead of indication)
10 (Unable to cancel)
11 (Sunflower not all black)
16 (TPWS failed to activate)
16a * (TPWS failed in overspeed)
17 (Unrequired TPWS activation)
17a * (Spurious brake application)
0* (Other defect not defined)
Findings on test at depot: (Did you use the AWS test equipment?)
Fault diagnosed by depot: (What do you think is wrong?)
Action taken by depot: (What did you do with the part?)
* It should be noted that fault codes 16a, 17a and 0 are codes only used for the component tracker
application and will not be found in any other AWS/TPWS documentation.

Appendix L Typical locomotive fault diagnosis procedure

The following fault finding charts have been provided by English Welsh and Scottish Railway (EWS)
and generally reflects locomotive installations with either Thales or Unipart Rail combined AWS/TPWS
electronic control units. The following table covers faults that may arise during the power up test.
Fault description Fault diagnosis and additional tests

Complete power up self-test failure Probable causes: loss of input supply to voltage converter;
(both cabs on a dual-cab internal failure of voltage converter; loss of 12V supply to
locomotive) AWS/TPWS terminal box; or internal failure of AWS/TPWS
No indications from TPWS cab control unit.
control panel. Additional tests: (DMM set to 0-200V dc range)
No indications from AWS Vehicle control voltage is present at the voltage
indicator, no audible caution converter inputs. No voltage, check for circuit continuity
tone. to supply source (refer to vehicle schematics); (note on
Class 66 locomotives there have been problems with the
cab direction controller stick micro-switch failing to
operate, this micro-switch operates the CRR relays.
Voltage converter output voltages are correct, replace if
voltages are outside of specified range.
12V supply is present between the AWS terminal box
terminals 11 (+12V) and 9 (-12V). If no 12V supply
check for circuit continuity to voltage converter (refer to
vehicle schematics). If 12V supply present, change
control unit if fault is still present.
Complete power up self-test failure Probable causes: defective change end relay; defective
(one cab only on a dual-cab change end card; loss of supply to change end relay; or loss
locomotive) of 12V supply to change end card.
Power up test cannot be Additional tests: (DMM set to 0-200V dc range)
performed at no. 2 end cab Change end relay picks up when cab no. 2 is activated
(no. 1 end Class 66 and 67). (no. 1 cab Class 66 and 67). Relay fails to operate,
Power up test correctly check for locomotive control voltage across relay coil
performed at no.1 end cab terminals, replace relay if defective.
(no. 2 end Class 66 and 67). Change end switching card, 12V should be detected
between Faston terminals T37 and T6 on the change
end card only when no. 2 cab is active (no. 1 on Class 66
and 67). No voltage when cab is active, check continuity
of 12V supply from the change end relay. If 12V supply
present, check switching card relays operate by
removing/reconnecting wire from T37 (operation is an
audible check). Replace defective change end card.


Partial power up self-test failure Probable causes: defective AWS receiver, receiver wiring
(AWS indicator fails to set to all connections; defective AWS indicator, wiring connections;
black). defective AWS/TPWS control unit; earth fault on 12V supply;
AWS indicator fails to set to defective change end switching card.
all black. Additional tests: (DMM set to 0-200V dc range, high voltage
All 3 TPWS control panel tester set to 250V, Unipart Rail test box fitted)
indicator lamps illuminated. Check continuity of AWS receiver wiring and security of
No audible AWS caution terminations from the AWS/TPWS terminal box to the
indication. AWS receiver junction box. Check the AWS receiver
harness for condition and correct insertion of connector.
No response to AWS reset Repair any defects and/or replace harness.
pushbutton.
Temporarily connect a new AWS receiver and
commission a new power up test. Power up test is now
successful, renew old AWS receiver. Power up test is
not successful, reconnect old AWS receiver.
Check AWS indicator (all black) and continuity of wiring
using Unipart Rail test box. Indicator fails to respond,
replace indicator/alarm and indicator unit (where a
change end card is used check switching card continuity
T38 to T42 or T43, 12V should be detected at
AWS/TPWS terminal box terminal 8, replace switching
card if defective.
Temporarily connect a new AWS/TPWS control unit and
successful, renew old control unit. Power up test is not
successful reconnect old control unit.
Disconnect AWS/TPWS control unit and Unipart Rail test
box and check for earth faults using a high voltage tester.
Partial power up self-test failure Probable causes: defective AWS reset pushbutton; earth
(AWS audible caution indication fault on 40V supply; defective AWS/TPWS control unit;
horn - will not cancel). defective AWS receiver; defective alarm/alarm and indicator
AWS indicator set to all unit; defective change end switching card.
black. Additional Tests: (DMM set to 0-200V dc range, high voltage
All 3 TPWS control panel tester set to 250V, Unipart Rail test box fitted).
indicator lamps illuminated. Check 40V supply is present at the reset pushbutton. No
Audible AWS caution 40V supply, check continuity of 40V supply from the
indication sounds reset pushbutton to AWS/TPWS terminal box terminal 7.
continuously. 40V supply present check reset pushbutton operation.
No response to AWS reset Check 40V supply remains within range (35V to 80V)
pushbutton. when AWS reset pushbutton is pressed. Voltage below
35V check for earth faults using a high voltage tester.


AWS indicator does not set to Check 40V supply is retained on AWS/TPWS terminal
black and yellow. box terminal 15 after AWS reset pushbutton is pressed.
AWS indicator set to all black. No 40V supply change AWS/TPWS control unit.
Three TPWS control panel Check AWS indicator (black and yellow) and continuity
indicator lamps illuminated. of wiring using Unipart Rail test box. Indicator fails to
respond, replace indicator/alarm and indicator unit; check
AWS audible caution indication switching card (where fitted) continuity T39 to T40 or T41
sounds continuously. and 12V should be detected at AWS/TPWS terminal box
No response to AWS reset terminal 16, replace switching card if defective.
pushbutton. Check continuity of AWS receiver wiring and security of
Power up test completes when terminations from the AWS/TPWS terminal box to the
AWS reset pushbutton pressed. AWS receiver junction box. Check the AWS receiver
harness for condition and correct insertion of connectors.
Repair any defects and/or replace the harness.
Temporarily connect a new AWS receiver and
successful, renew old AWS receiver. Power up test is
not successful, reconnect old AWS receiver.
Partial power up self-test failure Probable causes: defective AWS horn/alarm and indicator
(AWS audible caution indication unit/Yodalarm; horn wiring 12V supply; defective cab repeat
does not sound). relay.
AWS indicator set to all black. Additional Tests: (DMM set to 0-200V dc range)
All 3 TPWS control panel Check AWS horn and continuity of wiring using Unipart
indicator lamps illuminated. Rail test box. Horn fails to sound, check 12V supply is
Audible AWS caution indication present at terminal box terminal 12.
does not sound. 12V supply present at terminal 12. Check 12V present
Power up test completes when between alarm indicator pins V and C in harness,
AWS reset pushbutton pressed Yodalarm +ve to ve terminals, replace alarm and
and released. indicator Unit/Yodalarm if 12V is present.
No 12V supply present across alarm units. Check wiring
continuity from terminal box (note on alarm and indicator
units fitted to dual-cab locomotives the 12V horn supply
is switched to the active cab (for example by the CRR
relays on the Class 66 locomotive). Classes 66 and 67
have a no. of connection points in the circuit which
should also be inspected.
Partial power up self-test failure Probable causes: defective TPWS aerial, loose or broken
(temporary isolation/fault lamp wiring connections from aerial to AWS/TPWS terminal box;
flashes at end of test). defective change end switching card (where fitted). Note this
AWS indicator set to all black. fault will occur in service if a power-up test is carried out with
the TPWS aerial positioned over an active TPWS loop.
All 3 TPWS control panel
indicator lamps illuminated. Additional Tests: (DMM set to 20k range).
Audible AWS caution indication Disconnect the TPWS aerial (both ends on a dual-cab
sounds continuously. locomotive) and check for damage and dirt ingress at the
pins and mating harness socket. Replace the
aerial/harness if damages, for dirt ingress flush with
WD40 and dry with a paper towel. Note the aerial to
harness connector should be finger/hand tight and
nipped up with pipe grips to ensure a good connection.
Over-tightening of the connector will cause damage to
the aerial or plug.

Audible indication cancels Check the aerial for continuity between pins 2 and 5
with AWS reset pushbutton. (110-130 typical) and between pins 3 and 4 (15-21
Indicator sets to black and typical). Replace aerial if an open circuit is found or the
yellow. DMM reading falls outside the typical range.
Brake demand and TSO With the aerials connected check for circuit continuity at
indicators are extinguished. the AWS/TPWS terminal box as follows: terminals 20 to
21 (aerial) and 22 to 23 (aerial test), disconnect the no. 1
Temporary isolation/fault end aerial (dual-cab locomotives) and re-test with no. 2
indicator flashes. cab open. Check terminal box to aerial wiring for
damage or loose connections and operation of the
change end switching card (where fitted see below) if
an open circuit is found.
On dual-cab locomotives, check for correct operation of
the change end switching card, T14 to T13 n/c / T12 n/o,
T17 to T16 n/c / T15 n/o and (T20 to T19 n/c /T18 n/o.
Note the n/c contact is made with no. 1 cab open and the
n/o contact is made with the no. 2 cab open. Replace
switching card if found to be defective.
Partial power up self-test failure Probable causes: defective TPWS control panel, loose or
(control panel lamps fail to broken wiring connections from AWS/TPWS terminal box to
illuminate). control panel.
AWS indicator set to all Additional tests:
black. Check terminal box to control panel wiring for damage or
One or more TPWS control loose connections.
panel indicator lamps fail to Check continuity between AWS/TPWS terminal box
illuminate. terminals and change end switching card as follows:
Audible AWS caution no. 1 end (27 to T7, 28 to T7 and 29 to T7), no. 2 end (27
indication sounds to T6, 28 to T6 and 29 to T6). Replace cab control panel
continuously. if defective.
Audible AWS caution
indication cancels with AWS
reset pushbutton.
Indicator sets to black and
yellow.
Lit indicators are
extinguished.

Appendix M AWS testing using a hand-held permanent magnet

The AWS hand-held test magnet can be used to check the functioning of the AWS trainborne sub-
system to detect where, within the basic sequence of events, a fault occurs. Testing the AWS
trainborne sub-system with a hand-held test magnet has the advantage of rapidly repeating the failure.
Dual-cab vehicles should be tested from both ends, as failure at one end only will indicate that the
control unit, PSU and AWS receiver are healthy.
MA - Test after a 'right side failure reported
MA1 Before any equipment or connections are disturbed, perform the tests described in items
MA2 to MA8.
MA2 With the air system fully charged, energise the AWS in the cab in which the failure is
reported to have occurred.
MA3 Check that the horn sounds. Press and release the 'AWS acknowledge' pushbutton to
silence the horn.
MA4 Carry out a caution signal test cancelling the AWS as follows:
simulate a caution indication by passing the south pole (blue) end of the magnet
under the AWS receiver
the indicator should change to or remain 'all black', and after 1 second the horn
should sound
within 2 seconds, press and release the 'AWS acknowledge' pushbutton to silence
the horn - the indicator should change to 'yellow and black' and there should be no
brake application
MA5 Carry out a caution signal test allowing a full brake application and then cancelling the
AWS, as follows:
the indicator should change to or remain 'all black', the horn should sound after
1 second and, after a further time delay (2.0 seconds or 2.7 seconds) appropriate to
the vehicle concerned, a full brake application should occur
press and release the 'AWS acknowledge' pushbutton -the horn should be silenced
and the indicator should change to 'yellow and black' - after a time delay appropriate
to the vehicle concerned, the brake should release at least 59 seconds after the
brake application
MA6 Carry out a caution signal test allowing a partial brake application and then cancelling
the AWS, as follows:
the horn should sound after 1 second. As soon as the brake starts to apply, press
and release the 'AWS acknowledge' pushbutton to silence the horn - the brake
should continue to apply and should not release until after a time delay appropriate
to the vehicle concerned
MA7 Carry out a clear signal test as follows:
simulate a clear indication by passing the south pole (blue) end of the magnet under
the AWS receiver and then passing the north pole (red) end of the magnet, taking
less than 1 second between the two operations
the indicator should change to 'all black and the bell ring for approximately 0.5
seconds (or a single chime is emitted on vehicles fitted with an alarm and indicator
unit)

MA8 Carry out a test with the AWS equipment isolated, as follows:
isolate the AWS in the cab concerned
operate the AWS receiver with the south pole (blue) end and then the north pole
(red) end of the magnet, taking less than 1 second between the two operations -
follow this by operating the AWS receiver with the south pole (blue) end only - there
should be no effect on the AWS equipment
de-isolate the AWS in the cab concerned
MA9 If any item of AWS equipment is suspected of being faulty it must be changed. After the
replacement has been fitted repeat items MA4 to MA8 three times. If either:
the reported fault can be reproduced, but changing the item indicated during the
above tests does not cure it, or
the fault cannot be reproduced but the vehicle has a history of related faults
Check the system using an AWS test unit, if available, then visually examine the wiring
and connectors as far as possible. If the fault is still not revealed then detailed wiring
tests must be carried out.
MA10 After any equipment change, wiring repair or renewal has been carried out then items
MA4 to MA8 should be repeated.
MB - Test after a 'wrong side failure reported

The AWS hand-held test magnet can be used to check the functioning of the AWS trainborne sub-
system as part of a wrong side failure investigation before any equipment/connections are disturbed.
This should be as part of an overall inspection and test procedure using more sophisticated AWS test
equipment.
MB1 Carry out items MA2 to MA8, repeating items MA4 to MA8 a total of three times.
MB2 If any item of AWS equipment is suspected of being faulty it must be changed. If the
AWS operates correctly or does not reproduce the reported fault, then follow procedures
for full system test. After replacements have been fitted, items MA2 to MA8 should be
repeated. If either:
the reported fault can be reproduced, but changing the item indicated during the
above tests does not cure it, or
the fault cannot be reproduced but the vehicle has a history of related faults
Check the system using an AWS test unit, then visually examine the wiring and
connectors as far as possible. If the fault is still not revealed then detailed wiring tests
must be carried out.
MB3 After any equipment change, wiring repair or renewal has been carried out, then items
MA4 to MA8 should be repeated.

Appendix N AWS testing using STS TY287 tester

The following pages reproduce the STS TY287 AWS fault tester operating manual (V1 Draft7). Users
should consult the manufacturer for any later issues of this instruction manual.
AWS fault tester
TY287
Instruction manual
Draft 7

Contents
Purpose
Scope
Introduction
Description of parts
a) Flux generator
b) Equipment case
c) Handset
d) Power cable
e) Handset cable
f) Battery charger
g) Testing equipment maintenance
Operation of the equipment
a) Setting of magnet type
b) Setting of flux polarity
c) Setting of power level
d) Setting of simulated train speed
e) Conducting the test
Interpretation of results
a) Test failure
b) System confirmation
c) Depot maintenance obligations
d) Suspected wrong side failure
e) Class benchmarking
Fore and aft positions for various AWS receiver designs
Specification
Example of AWS receiver sensitivity table
Description of fault codes
Illustration of parts and connection details


Purpose
The purpose of the AWS fault test equipment is to test AWS receivers in situ. It can
identify the sensitivity of the receiver and also confirm its correct operation.
The tester also supports repeatable testing in a controlled manner.
Scope
The AWS fault tester can be used either as a diagnostic tool to establish faults or as a
means of confirming the sensitivity of fitted receivers.
It must be recognized that the AWS system does have tolerance from both an
infrastructure and train borne perspective, with the trackside equipment generally providing
higher fields than the minimum required by the specification or simulated by the AWS fault
tester. Therefore, under normal circumstances, the trainborne equipment could be less
sensitive and still appear to operate.
Under normal circumstances the AWS fault tester would be used for investigating reported
AWS receiver faults. It may be used as a maintenance tool but this is at the discretion of
the maintenance authority.
The AWS fault tester should be used in accordance with this instruction manual.
Note: users shall ensure the AWS fault tester shall not compromise, or be used as a
substitute for, current maintenance and defect repair practices.
Introduction
The AWS receiver depot test unit has been designed to provide a means of simulating the
effect of an AWS receiver passing over AWS track equipment. The test unit enables the
depot engineer to simulate a number of practical situations encountered on the track.
The equipment consists of the following parts:
a) flux generator
b) equipment case to provide the power for the flux generator
c) handset on which various tests can be set
d) power cables to connect items a) and b)
e) handset cable to connect items b) and c)
f) battery charger
g) testing equipment maintenance.
The test unit must only be used with the power cable provided. The power cable must not
be modified in any way.
WARNING: the operator shall comply with local depot instructions and observe ac and dc
3rd rail electrification requirements at all times.
Description of parts
a) Flux generator
The flux generator comprises of an air-cored inductor mounted on a
lightweight framework with detachable handle for positioning the inductor in
the correct position for testing AWS receivers.


b) Equipment case
The equipment case is powered by an internal chargeable sealed lead acid
battery. It also contains the electronics which generates the appropriate
flux to the flux generator. T he range of signals which can be produced is
pre-coded into the control program but the user can select a particular test
using the associated handset.
The battery capacity is sufficiently large to provide several days use

without charging. The number and type of tests conducted determines the
rate at which the batteries are drained.
The equipment case is connected to the flux generator unit by a power

cable as described in section d) below and to the handset by a handset
cable as described in section e) below.
To charge the battery, the power cable must be removed and the Battery
Charger fitted to this same connector.
c) Handset
This is a hand-held unit provided with an LED alphanumeric display and
control pushbuttons.
The display gives the user simple prompts to allow the required test to be
easily selected by the pushbuttons.
The handset is connected to the equipment case by a handset cable as

described in section e) below.
The programming options are described in section O.5 below.
d) Power cable
The cable connects the flux generator to the equipment case and is
terminated by bayonet connectors at either end. It is important that the
power cable is not modified in any way, as this will invalidate the testing.
e) Handset cable
The standard cable is 10 metres in length and terminated in an XLS
connector with locking latch at either end. If required the connection can
be extended to
20 metres by use of a second cable.
f) Battery charger
This is a freestanding charger, which is connected, via an integral lead, to
the flux generator/charger connection.
The status of the charging process is revealed by a three-state indicator.

Initially a red LED is displayed indicating a low level of charge to protect
the cells. After this stage the LED displays a yellow aspect indicating bulk
charge is taking place. Finally the LED displays a green aspect to indicate
that charging is complete.
g) Testing equipment maintenance

TBD.
Operation of the equipment

Before operating the equipment for the first time ensure that the internal battery is fully
charged. Connect the equipment as shown in Annex P.


The flux generator has to be accurately positioned beneath the vehicle to be tested. The
framework must be located on the running rails with the flux generator on the centre line of
the track to ensure the correct lateral and vertical position. The framework has two locating
points that when correctly positioned sit within the rails. It must then be aligned fore-and-
aft so as to place the centre of the flux field directly underneath the AWS receiver being
tested. The correct fore and aft positions for various AWS receiver designs are detailed in
Annex P. The flux generator is connected to the equipment case by a power cable
terminated in a bayonet connector at either end.
Position the flux generator beneath the AWS receiver fitted to the vehicle according to the
AWS receiver type fitted as shown in Annex P1.
The on/off switch is located on the panel inside the equipment case. When switched on a
start-up message is displayed for approximately 2 seconds, the display will then show the
default test setting.
S t a n d a R d S - N
1 0 0 % 1 2 5 m p h
The four sections of the display show the four parameters that can be changed to enable
the tester to carry out a test.
Parameters may be changed by pressing the select pushbutton to select the parameter to
be changed. The selected section of the display will flash to show that it can be changed.
Repeatedly pressing the select pushbutton will scroll through the setting options. The
and pushbuttons can then be used to select the required value.
a) Setting of magnet type

Two settings are available: standard strength and extra strength (most dc
electrified lines). The default setting is standard strength.
b) Setting of flux polarity and sequence

Depending on the polarity of the dc current through the flux generator
either an AWS permanent magnet south or electromagnet north is
simulated. To select a test sequence, scroll down the list which after
completion will return to the first item. The screen display and a
description of the tests are listed below:
Display indication Test set Simulated condition

S-N South followed by north polarity Clear
S South polarity AWS warning
N North polarity No valid simulated condition
N-S North followed by south polarity AWS warning (reverse direction
running on unsuppressed
magnets)
N-S-N North followed by south then by Clear
north polarity
The default setting is south followed by north polarity.


c) Setting of power level
When setting up the test it is possible to adjust the energy transmitted into
the coil. The following power levels are available and can be set by
scrolling down the list. The values simulate the percentage of flux required
to meet the Railway Group Standard (GE/RT8035) minimum at the
specified height for the selected magnet type (standard or extra strength).
Standard strength magnets (ac and non electrified lines)

Power level Flux density
50% of full power 1.50mT Shall not detect
70% of full power 2.17mT
100% of full power 3.10mT Shall detect
The minimum pass criteria for power level and flux density is indicated in bold
Extra strength magnets (most dc electrified lines)

Power level Flux density
70% of full power 3.5mT Shall not detect
The minimum pass criteria for power level and flux density is indicated in bold
d) Setting of simulated train speed

The train speed is selected by scrolling up and down the list and should be
set to the level equal or greater than the maximum speed of the vehicle
under test. The following tests are available.

Standard strength Extra strength

20 mph 20 mph
40 mph 40 mph
60 mph 60 mph
80 mph 80 mph
90 mph 90 mph
100 mph 100 mph
110 mph Not available
e) Conducting the test

When the test has been set to the operators requirement, pressing the
test pushbutton will execute the test. When the test has been
successfully completed the message test completed will be displayed.
After 2 seconds the display reverts to the current test setting. It is possible
to execute a test by pressing the test pushbutton at any time, even when
part of the display is flashing.
See Annex Q.5 for an example of an AWS receiver sensitivity table.
If the equipment is unable to complete the test, the display will show the
message error followed by one of the following:
Over temperature
Data
Battery low
For further information on fault codes refer to Annex Q.2.
If the handset is not used for 15 minutes the display will enter a standby
mode. This is shown by a slowly scrolling start-up message. Press any
key to reactivate the handset.
Interpretation of results
a) Test failure
If all tests fail, check the condition of the AWS fault tester and peripheral
wiring.
b) System confirmation
If any of the flux polarity and magnet sequence (for example S-N) passes
then this demonstrates that the vehicle AWS equipment is functional but
not necessarily within specification.
If the test fails at the minimum flux density of 100% but passes at higher-
level settings a check should be made of the receiver height, to ensure the
receiver height is within specified limits.
If the test passes the shall not detect flux density a check should be made
of the receiver height, to ensure the receiver height is within specified
limits.


c) Depot maintenance obligations
The AWS fault tester shall not negate the Railway Group Standard
(GE/RT8035) requirements for the AWS system to be tested before
entering service on an AWS test magnet, normally positioned in advance of
the Network Rail controlled infrastructure.
d) Suspected wrong side failure

If a vehicle has been involved in a suspected wrong side failure and all
required tests have been passed in a situation fully investigated it may not
be necessary to change any train borne equipment.
e) Class benchmarking
In addition to fault diagnostic and rectification at the discretion of the
vehicles maintenance authority, the AWS fault tester can be used to
benchmark the sensitivity on the AWS receiver. When used for this
purpose consideration shall be given to marginal failure results, due to
variations in the AWS system tolerance.
At the users discretion a benchmarked vehicle with a marginal failure

condition and no history of AWS receiver related failures could be deemed
acceptable to continue in service providing it passes the Railway Group
Standard depot test requirement, for example passes the AWS
track- mounted depot test magnet test.

Appendix O AWS testing using Unipart Rail test equipment

O1 Isolate the AWS/TPWS control unit, for example by placing the battery switch to isolate.
O2 Disconnect the terminal box plug and socket harnesses from the AWS/TPWS control
unit and connect the Unipart Rail test box between the harnesses and the control unit.
O3 Apply power to the control unit and carry out the tests in N4 to N13 recording the results
on a fault finding test sheet (see Appendix T for a typical fault finding test sheet).
O4 Activate the cab to energise the AWS system and observe the LEDs on the Unipart Rail
test box. The 12V, 40V, HORN, RECEIVER NORTH, the three CONTROL PANEL
LEDs should illuminate and the INDICATOR BLACK should illuminate and then
extinguish.
O5 Check that the voltage converter 12V and 40V supply LEDs are lit. If either LEDs are
not illuminated the output voltage is outside of specified limits, exact voltages can be
measured at the test box jack plugs using a volt meter and should be within the range
11.5V to 14.5V (nominal 12V supply) and 35V to 80V no load (nominal 40V supply)
O6 Press and release the TEST RESET pushbutton adjacent to the 12V supply LED, all the
red TEST button LEDs should be extinguished. The amber indicator LEDs, green
TPWS button LEDs and the three CONTROL PANEL LEDs should illuminate and
extinguish.
O7 Press and release the AWS reset pushbutton in the cab, check that the RESET LED
illuminates and extinguishes on the diagnostics handset.
O8 Check the control unit brake relay:
press and release the red BRAKE TEST pushbutton, which should illuminate
Press and release the red RECEIVER TEST pushbutton, which should illuminate
Press and hold the black SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton to simulate an AWS
caution - the RECEIVER NORTH LED should extinguish, the INDICATOR BLACK
LED should momentarily illuminate, the RECEIVER SOUTH and HORN LEDs
should illuminate - the AWS caution (horn/alarm) should sound and the AWS
Indicator should change to all black in the cab
Release the SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton - the BRAKE LED should extinguish
2.5 to 3.0 seconds after the audible caution indication starts to sound indicating a
brake demand application has been made and the red CONTROL PANEL BRAKE
red LED should flash - the vehicle brakes should apply and the control panel/drivers
display brake demand lamp should flash
Press and release the black AWS RESET pushbutton - the RECEIVER SOUTH and
HORN LEDs should extinguish, the INDICATOR YELLOW LED should momentarily
illuminate, the RECEIVER NORTH LED should illuminate and the CONTROL
PANEL red BRAKE LED should change to a steady state - the BRAKE LED should
remain extinguished for a further 60 seconds after which the vehicle brakes can be
released, the CONTROL PANEL red BRAKE LED should extinguish and the BRAKE
LED illuminate
Press and release the black RESET/LAMP TEST pushbutton
O9 Caution test (horn/alarm tone):
Press and release the red HORN TEST pushbutton - the HORN LED should
extinguish and the AWS caution tone should sound continuously in the cab
Press and release the green HORN TPWS pushbutton - the HORN LED should
extinguish and the AWS caution tone should silence

O10 Indicator display test:

Press and release the red INDICATOR BLACK TEST pushbutton - the INDICATOR
BLACK LED should illuminate and the AWS indicator should show all black in the
cab (in both cabs of a dual cab vehicle fitted with a single AWS/TPWS control unit)
Press and release the red INDICATOR YELLOW TEST pushbutton - the
INDICATOR BLACK LED should extinguish, the INDICATOR YELLOW LED should
illuminate and the AWS indicator should show black and yellow in the cab (in both
cabs of a dual cab vehicle fitted with a single AWS/TPWS control unit)
Press and release the red INDICATOR BLACK TEST pushbutton - the INDICATOR
YELLOW LED should extinguish, the INDICATOR BLACK LED should illuminate
and the AWS indicator should show all black in the cab (in both cabs of a dual cab
vehicle fitted with a single AWS/TPWS control unit)
Press and release the green INDICATOR BLACK TPWS pushbutton - the
INDICATOR BLACK LED should extinguish and the AWS indicator in the cab should
show all black (in both cabs of a dual cab vehicle fitted with a single AWS/TPWS
control unit)
O11 Simulated AWS clear signal:
Press and release the red RECEIVER TEST pushbutton - the NORTH LED should
illuminate and the SOUTH LED should remain unlit
Press and then immediately release the black SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton to
simulate an AWS clear signal
Check that the NORTH LED extinguishes and the SOUTH LED illuminates, the
INDICATOR BLACK LED momentarily illuminates and the AWS indicator is set to
all black in the cab (in both cabs of a dual cab vehicle fitted with a single
AWS/TPWS control unit)
Check that the NORTH LED then illuminates and the SOUTH LED extinguishes, and
the audible AWS clear indication (bell/chime) sounds in the cab
Press and release the green RECEIVER TPWS pushbutton
O12 Simulated AWS caution signal and AWS reset:
Press and hold the black SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton until the audible AWS
caution tone (horn/alarm) is heard in order to simulate an AWS caution signal.
Immediately release the black SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton after the caution
indication sounds
Press and immediately release the black AWS RESET pushbutton within 2.5
seconds of the horn sounding to cancel the audible caution indication and reset the
AWS system
Check the HORN LED illuminates and the audible AWS caution indication sounds in
the cab, and the NORTH LED then illuminates and the SOUTH LED extinguishes
Check the HORN LED extinguishes, the audible AWS caution indication silences in
the cab and the YELLOW LED momentarily illuminates and the AWS indicator is set
to yellow and black in the cab (in both cabs of a dual cab vehicle fitted with a single

O13 Simulated AWS caution signal and AWS brake application:

Press and hold the black SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton until the audible AWS
caution tone (horn/alarm) is heard in order to simulate an AWS caution signal.
Immediately release the black SIMULATE RECEIVER pushbutton after the caution
indication sounds
Allow a vehicle brake application to occur, this should take place approximately 3
seconds after the audible caution indication commences - the red CONTROL
PANEL BRAKE LED should flash to signify that a brake application has occurred
Press and immediately release the black AWS RESET pushbutton to cancel the
audible caution indication and reset the AWS system - the red CONTROL PANEL
BRAKE LED should change to a steadily illuminated state and extinguish after 60
seconds (timed from the start of the brake application)
Check the HORN LED illuminates and the audible AWS caution indication sounds in
the cab, and the NORTH LED then illuminates and the SOUTH LED extinguishes
Check the red TPWS CONTROL PANEL BRAKE LED flashes and the YELLOW
LED momentarily illuminates, and that the cab mounted control panel brake demand
indicator flashes and the AWS Indicator is set to yellow and black in the cab (in
both cabs of a dual cab vehicle fitted with a single AWS/TPWS control unit)
Check the HORN LED extinguishes, the red TPWS CONTROL PANEL BRAKE LED
becomes illuminated steady state, the TPWS cab mounted control panel brake
demand indicator becomes steady state and the audible AWS caution indicator
silences in the cab

Appendix P Fore and aft positions for AWS receivers

Fore and aft positions for various AWS receiver designs


Fore and aft positions for Thales AWS receiver designs


Fore and aft positions for Unipart Rail electronic AWS receivers


Description of fault codes
Handset display Meaning Recommended action
Over The equipment case thermal If the tester has had very
temperature device has overheated caused frequent use switch the
either by very frequent use at high equipment off for 15 minutes
energy levels (for example extra and retest. If the fault report
strength magnet at 20 mph) or a persists return to the
fault in the output drive circuits. manufacturer for repair.
Data There is a fault in either the data The equipment should be

line, the handset or the supply to returned to the manufacturer for
the handset. repair.
Battery low The battery voltage is too low for Fully charge the battery and
the test to be accurately then retest.
completed.
Examples of AWS receiver sensitivity table
Class:
Vehicle no.:
Maximum speed of vehicle:
Receiver height range receiver height:
Test mode standard strength magnets:
Receiver type:
Speed
125 F P P P P P P P P
50 70 80 90 100 105 110 120 130 140 150 200
Flux density percentage
All green shaded tests must pass up to the next speed above the vehicles maximum
speed and all red shaded tests must fail for the standard strength magnet test.

Class:
Vehicle no.:
Maximum speed of vehicle:
Receiver height range receiver height:
Test mode standard strength magnets:
Receiver type:
Speed
100 F P P P
90 F P P P
80 F P P P
60 F P P P
40 F P P P
20 F P P P
70 80 90 95 100 105 110
Flux density percentage
All green shaded tests must pass up to the next speed above the vehicles maximum speed
and all red shaded tests must fail for the extra strength magnet test.


Specification
Power Internal sealed lead acid 24 volt battery

requirements 240v ac input for battery charger
Display
legends
Magnet setting Default setting standard

Standard Standard magnet
Extra Extra strength magnet
Test sequence Default setting: S-N

S South polarity
N North polarity
S-N South followed by north polarity
N-S North followed by south polarity
N-S-N North followed by south followed by north polarity
Flux Default setting: 100% of standard strength flux

Power level Standard strength Extra strength
50% of full power 1.50mT Not available
70% of full power 2.17mT 3.5mT
95% of full power Not available 4.75mT
105% of full power Not available 5.25mT
Speed setting Default setting: 125 mph

Standard strength Extra strength
20 mph 20 mph
40 mph 40 mph
60 mph 60 mph
80 mph 80 mph
90 mph 90 mph
100 mph 100 mph


Illustration of parts and connection details
100%
S-N
AWS FAULT TESTER

STS SIGNALS LTD
TEST
SELECT
STANDARD
125mph

Appendix Q AWS/TPWS testing using Thales depot test unit

The following information has been extracted from Thales document OP606401 issue D dated
8/9/2000. Readers should consult Thales for any updated versions of this document.
The Thales DTU is a portable unit powered from the vehicle under test for verifying the correct
functioning of circuits external to the AWS/TPWS control unit. The DTU is capable of exercising and
confirming the correct operation of the PSU, AWS receiver, AWS alarm and indicator unit,
reset/acknowledge pushbutton, TPWS drivers control panel, temporary isolation switch, timer link
settings, TPWS aerial and of simulating a brake demand.
The DTU is plugged into the train installation in place of the combined AWS/TPWS control unit. The
DTU will switch, on demand, signals to operate visual indicators and audible sounders in the drivers
cab and has on its front panel LED indicators to confirm operation of the drivers AWS/TPWS control
panel switches. Correct power supply operation is confirmed by visual indicators. The DTU will also
indicate short circuits existing in the TPWS aerial.
The Figure below shows the layout of the front panel of the Thales DTU, which comprises groups of
lamps and switches, each group for testing one item of equipment.
Figure 71 Thales Depot Test Unit (DTU) front panel
Controls and indictors

Power supply 2 pairs of green/red indicators to give an OK/HIGH indication for the
12V dc and 40V dc supplies. The thresholds are set to upper and
lower limits of the permitted voltage ranges.
AWS alarm and indicator 4 momentary operation switches are used to operate the AWS visual
indicator and sound the clear and caution indications.
The sunflower switches are interlocked so that both outputs cannot

be energised simultaneously. In the event of a fault on any one of
these external loads resulting in an overload current above 1.2A will
cause the FAULT indicator to illuminate.
AWS receiver 2 lamps to indicate the state of the AWS receiver and a momentary
switch to provide a reset (via the acknowledge switch and sunflower
proving contact). The receiver operation can be checked with a
standard hand-held AWS test magnet.
AWS reset A single lamp is provided to verify operation of the AWS reset
pushbutton.

Controls and indictors

TPWS drivers control panel 3 switches to operate each of the drivers control panel indicators and
one lamp to verify operation of the TSO pushbutton.
TPWS temporary isolation 2 lamps to verify operation of both actions of the temporary isolation
switch.
TPWS timer setting links 5 lamps to indicate the presence of wired links for TSO, ACK, ST0,
ST1 and ST2 when specified and fitted.
TPWS aerial A momentary action switch and 2 lamps to indicate OK (correct load),
short circuit or open circuit. Additionally, a single lamp to indicate an
open circuit test loop.
Brake control A momentary action switch will open the brake circuit causing a brake
demand.
Equipment set-up The DTU is plugged into the train installation in place of the combined
AWS/TPWS control unit. Remove the plug and socket connected to
the control unit and attach the socket and plug on the DTU extension
lead. An earth connection can be made to the TPWS equipment earth
stud on the control unit terminal box.
Trainborne power supplies Check that:

Power supply 12V OK LED is lit on the DTU.
Power supply 40V OK LED is lit on the DTU when the AWS
Rx RESET switch is operated (note that the sunflower must be
set to Yellow/Black prior to this test.
(It is permissible for the 40V HIGH LED to be lit when the AWS Rx
RESET switch is not operated).
If the 12V HIGH LED is lit or the 40V HIGH LED remains on when the
AWS Rx RESET switch is operated, cease testing as the AWS Power
Supply Unit is outside its normal operating limits and should be
replaced.
Alarm and indicator unit/bell Note that if the FAULT LED is lit when the SET BLACK, SET
and horn test YELLOW/BLACK, BELL or HORN switches are operated, then
disconnect PL1 connector since one or more of these circuits is likely
to be short circuit to 0V. The threshold current is approximately 1.25A.
Indicator unit Operation Check

Sunflower SET YELLOW/BLACK switch on the the sunflower changes to the
DTU yellow/black display
SET BLACK switch on the DTU the sunflower changes to the all
black display
Leave in the all black state in the alarm and indicator unit chime (or
readiness for the AWS receiver reset the AWS bell) sounds according to
test, and operate the BELL switch on the particular cab installation
the DTU
Operate the HORN switch on the the alarm and indicator unit warning tone
DTU (or the AWS horn) sounds according to
the particular cab installation


AWS receiver test If these indications are reversed, the AWS Rx NORTH LED is lit
pass the AWS test magnet north pole the AWS Rx SOUTH LED is not lit
(red) under the AWS receiver
Pass the AWS test magnet south the AWS Rx SOUTH LED is lit
pole (blue) under the AWS receiver the AWS Rx NORTH LED is not lit
Pass the AWS test magnet north the indication changes accordingly
pole (red) and then the south pole
(blue) under the AWS receiver
Operate the AWS Rx RESET switch the AWS Rx SOUTH LED remains lit
(ensure the sunflower is showing all the AWS Rx NORTH LED remains
black) not lit
Operate sunflower SET the AWS Rx NORTH LED is now lit
YELLOW/BLACK switch on DTU. the AWS Rx SOUTH LED is not lit
With sunflower now showing
yellow/black operate the AWS Rx
RESET switch
AWS reset/TPWS Press and hold the AWS reset The ACKNOWLEDGE LED is lit on
acknowledge test pushbutton in the cab the DTU and release the AWS reset
pushbutton
TPWS aerial circuit Operate TPWS AERIAL TEST switch the AERIAL OK LED is lit
tests on DTU the TEST LOOP OPEN and AERIAL
SHORT LEDs are extinguished
If the AERIAL OK and SHORT LEDs
are both extinguished then the aerial
circuit is probably open circuit
If the AERIAL OK LED is
extinguished and the AERIAL
SHORT LED is lit then the aerial
circuit is probably short circuit and
indicated if the dc resistance through
the aerial is less than 50 Ohms
approximately. If the TEST LOOP
OPEN LED is lit, then only the test
circuit is open circuit
TPWS temporary With the trainborne temporary the TEMPORARY ISOLATION
isolation switch test isolation switch held in the NORMAL SWITCH OFF LED is lit on the DTU
position
Hold the trainborne temporary the TEMPORARY ISOLATION
isolation switch held in the ISOLATE SWITCH ON LED is lit on the DTU
position
Release the trainborne temporary neither TEMPORARY ISOLATION
isolation switch back to the central SWITCH LED is lit on the DTU
position
TPWS drivers Press the trainborne TSO switch the trainborne Brake Demand LED is
control panel tests lit
Operate the TSO LAMP switch on the trainborne TSO LED is lit
the DTU
Operate the TEMPORARY the TSO LED on the DTU is lit

ISOLATION/FAULT LAMP switch on
the DTU


Operate the BRAKE LAMP switch on the trainborne temporary
the DTU isolation/Fault LED is lit
TPWS timer links appropriate LEDs are lit depending on
the timer links fitted to this vehicle (if
all links are fitted the ST0, ST1, ST2,
ACK and TSO LEDs should be lit
Brake demand test Operate the BRAKE CONTROL the train emergency brakes are
switch on the DTU applied whilst the switch is operated
Note that on some vehicles the emergency brakes may be latched on by this momentary breaking of the
emergency brake circuit.

Appendix R TPWS testing unit Unipart Rail hand-held signal

generator
The Unipart Rail hand-held TPWS signal generator is a portable, battery-operated unit designed for
functional testing of the TPWS equipment overspeed sensor and train stop functions. It uses a
standard TPWS track-mounted transmitter loop to transmit the TPWS frequencies and signal strength,
and can be operated by one person from the driving cab. The following is extracted from section 5 of
Unipart Rail document reference NRSSPECXSA003/11 issue D dated October 2003. It is
recommended that users check with the manufacturer for any future updates of the instruction manual.
Connect the TPWS signal generator test equipment to the vehicle as detailed in the operating manual.
Test type Operation Check

Power up sequence Open up the cab or follow the necessary if the AWS visual indicator
test procedure to activate TPWS (sunflower) starts at all black then
it changes to yellow/black then to
all black. If the AWS visual
indicator (sunflower) starts at
yellow/black then it changes to all
black
the 3 LED indicators on the TPWS
drivers control panel all illuminate
(not flashing)
the AWS audible warning sounds
after approximately 3 seconds
Once the above events have been checked, the AWS audible warning changes
cancel the AWS warning by pressing and to a bell/chime tone and then stops
release the AWS reset pushbutton all 3 TPWS LED indicators on the
TPWS drivers control panel
extinguish
the AWS visual indicator
(sunflower) changes to
yellow/black and the brakes
release
TPWS train stop If fitted, set the vehicle brake selector switch or
tests passenger passenger/goods switch to the passenger
timings setting
Turn the signal generator
PASSENGER/FREIGHT switch to
PASSENGER
Train stop tests Normal direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator on
FORWARD Press and hold the TRAIN STOP NORMAL the drivers control panel starts
DIRECTION pushbutton on the hand-held flashing
signal generator until the SEQUENCE an emergency brake application is
COMPLETE LED illuminates made
Within approximately 20 seconds of the brake the BRAKE DEMAND indicator on
demand, press and release the TPWS the drivers control panel changes
acknowledge pushbutton to a steady illuminated state
the BRAKE DEMAND indicator on
the drivers control panel
extinguishes after approximately 1
minute after starting to flash, and
the brakes release


Train stop tests Wrong direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
FORWARD Press and hold the TRAIN STOP WRONG on the drivers control panel
DIRECTION pushbutton on the hand-held starts flashing
signal generator until the SEQUENCE an emergency brake
COMPLETE LED illuminates application is made
Within approximately 20 seconds of the the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
brake demand, press and release the on the drivers control panel
TPWS acknowledge pushbutton changes to a steady illuminated
state
the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
on the drivers control panel
extinguishes after
approximately 1 minute after
starting to flash, and the brakes
release
Train stop tests - Normal direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
reverse While pressing the OPPOSITE DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
pushbutton on the hand-held signal remains unlit
generator, press and hold the NORMAL a brake application is not made
DIRECTION TRAIN STOP pushbutton until
the SEQUENCE COMPLETE LED on the
signal generator illuminates
Wrong direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
While pressing the OPPOSITE DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
generator, press and hold the WRONG a brake application is not made
DIRECTION TRAIN STOP pushbutton until
TPWS overspeed High speed, forward - normal direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
sensor tests Press and hold the NORMAL DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
passenger timings OSS FAST pushbutton on the hand-held starts flashing
Within approximately 20 seconds of the the BRAKE DEMAND indicator

brake demand, press and release the on the drivers control panel
TPWS acknowledge pushbutton changes to a steady illuminated
state
extinguishes after
release
Press and hold the WRONG DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
OSS FAST pushbutton on the hand-held starts flashing


TPWS overspeed Within approximately 20 seconds of the the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
sensor tests brake demand, press and release the on the drivers control panel
passenger timings TPWS acknowledge pushbutton changes to a steady illuminated
state
extinguishes after
release
High speed, reverse normal direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
While pressing the OPPOSITE DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
generator, press and hold the NORMAL a brake application is not made
DIRECTION OSS FAST pushbutton until
While pressing the OPPOSITE DIRECTION the BRAKE DEMAND indicator

pushbutton on the hand-held signal on the drivers control panel
generator, press and hold the WRONG remains unlit
DIRECTION OSS FAST pushbutton until a brake application is not made
Low speed, forward normal direction: the BRAKE DEMAND indicator
Press and hold the NORMAL DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
OSS SLOW pushbutton on the hand-held remains unlit
signal generator until the SEQUENCE a brake application is not made
COMPLETE LED on the signal generator
illuminates
Press and hold the WRONG DIRECTION on the drivers control panel
OSS SLOW pushbutton until the remains unlit
SEQUENCE COMPLETE LED on the a brake application is not made
TSO passenger Time-out: the TSO LED on the drivers
timings Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers control panel illuminates
control panel immediately and then
extinguishes after 20 seconds
(+/-1s) or 60 seconds (+/-1s)
dependent on the link
arrangement within the control
unit junction box


TSO passenger Train stop: the TSO LED on the drivers
timings Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers control panel extinguishes
control panel and check that the TSO LED the BRAKE DEMAND LED on
on the drivers control panel illuminates. the drivers control panel
Within approximately 10 seconds press the remains unlit
NORMAL DIRECTION TRAIN STOP
a brake application is not made
pushbutton on the hand-held signal
generator until the SEQUENCE
COMPLETE LED illuminates
Overspeed sensor: the BRAKE DEMAND LED on
Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers the drivers control panel starts
control panel and check that the TSO LED flashing
on the drivers control panel illuminates. the TSO LED on the drivers
Within approximately 5 seconds press the control panel remains
NORMAL DIRECTION OSS FAST illuminated
pushbutton on the hand-held signal
a brake application is made
generator until the SEQUENCE
COMPLETE LED illuminates
Within approximately 5 seconds press and the BRAKE DEMAND LED on
release the desk mounted TPWS the drivers control panel
acknowledge pushbutton changes to steady state
the TSO LED on the drivers
control panel extinguishes after
20 seconds (+/-1s) or 60
seconds (+/-1s) as appropriate
after the TSO pushbutton was
pressed
the BRAKE DEMAND LED on
the drivers control panel
changes extinguishes after
starting to flash and the brakes
release
Train stop tests If fitted, set the vehicle brake selector
freight timings switch or passenger/freight cock to
freight/goods timings
Turn the TPWS signal generator

PASSENGER/FREIGHT switch to
FREIGHT and repeat operation for TPWS
train stop tests - passenger timings
Overspeed sensor Repeat operation for TPWS overspeed
tests freight/goods sensor tests passenger timings
timings
TSO tests Repeat operation for TSO passenger
freight/goods timings timings


Temporary isolation Temporarily isolate the TPWS by turning the TEMPORARY
the cab mounted temporary isolation switch ISOLATE/FAULT LED on the
to ISOLATE and then release the switch. drivers control panel
illuminates
Train stop: the BRAKE DEMAND LED on
Press and hold the NORMAL DIRECTION the drivers control panel
TRAIN STOP pushbutton on the hand-held remains unlit and no brake
signal generator until the SEQUENCE demand is initiated
COMPLETE LED illuminates the TEMPORARY ISOLATION
LED on the drivers control
panel remains lit
Overspeed sensor: the BRAKE DEMAND LED on
Press and hold the NORMAL DIRECTION the drivers control panel
OSS FAST pushbutton on the hand-held remains unlit and no brake
signal generator until the SEQUENCE demand is initiated
COMPLETE LED illuminates the TEMPORARY ISOLATION
LED on the drivers control
panel remains lit
Put the TPWS to normal by turning the the TEMPORARY ISOLATION
temporary isolation switch to NORMAL and LED on the drivers control
release it. panel extinguishes
Additional testing There are additional testing requirements
requirements for for single cab vehicles that are fitted with
single cab vehicles two TPWS aerials, for example steam
fitted with two TPWS locomotives.
aerials On single cab vehicles that are fitted with
two TPWS aerials, the aerial integrity test
performed during power up testing at
system switch on will only test the integrity
of the selected aerial. To confirm the
integrity of both aerials, it is necessary to
follow the following process:
Ensure that the TPWS system is switched the power up test completes
off correctly
Select forward aerial (this will normally be
selected by selecting forward gear)
Switch the TPWS system on
Select the reverse aerial (this will normally the power up test completes
be selected by selecting reverse gear) correctly
Switch the TPWS system off
Wait approximately 5 seconds, switch the
TPWS system on

Appendix S TPWS testing using Thales train test unit

The Thales train test unit (TTU) is a portable, battery operated unit designed for functional testing of
the TPWS equipment overspeed sensor and train stop functions. It uses a standard TPWS track-
mounted transmitter loop to transmit the TPWS frequencies and signal strength, and can be operated
by one person from the driving cab. The following is extracted from section 3 of Thales document
reference OP608527 Issue D dated 21 October 2005 . It is recommended that users check with the
manufacturers for future updates.
Figure 72 shows the typical set up of the TTU system.
Warning: The separate items of the TTU are classified and calibrated as a single item of test
equipment. It is not permissible to separate and mix items from different test equipments. This will
render the calibration void.
Test equipment setup The TTU should be positioned in the driving cab where the active TPWS
drivers display unit can be observed. Connect the connection cable to the
coupling link and the transmitter loop.
It is important that the centre of the transmitter loop is located directly below
the trainborne TPWS aerial although the train aerial may be laterally displaced
from the longitudinal track centreline.
It is also important that the Transmitter Loop remains horizontal across the rails
and undisturbed for the series of tests. For a track location or in an inspection
pit, it is preferable to connect all cables and links before locating the track loop
so as not to subsequently disturb it from its position on the rails.
Figure 72 Typical Thales trainborne equipment set-up for TTU operation

Test procedures Action Result

Trainborne Switch on the Trainborne TPWS all 3 LED indicators on the
equipment power up equipment, wait 3 seconds and press the drivers control panel are unlit
acknowledge pushbutton to silence the
AWS horn and brake demand.
Set the overspeed sensor timer link
switches on the TTU to match those of the
vehicle under test.
Refer to overspeed sensor timer settings.
If the vehicle is fitted with a
passenger/goods changeover switch, the
overspeed sensor tests should be carried
out on both settings.
Set both attenuator switches on TTU to the FAULT lamp will
0dB and press any of the pushbutton illuminate if the load or cable
function switches. is disconnected or faulty and
the BATTERY OK lamp will
illuminate if the TTU battery
state is satisfactory
Note that the FAULT indicator should the BATTERY OK indicator
remain unlit for all of the following tests. If should remain illuminated
it lights during any operation then it during the 3 second test
indicates a fault on the output of the TTU duration only
due to the connection cable, coupling link
or transmitter loop. This could include a
short circuit between a cable screen and
either line.
Any faults must be rectified before
proceeding with the tests.
Vehicle sensitivity test: This is a special test only. Normally set the attenuator to the value specified in
the vehicle maintenance instructions and leave at this setting for the remainder of the tests.
Set ATTENUATOR switches to the the TRAIN STOP NORMAL
maximum (39dB) DIRECTION LED on TTU
lights for approximately 3
seconds
Press TRAIN STOP NORMAL the BRAKE DEMAND LED
DIRECTION and progressively reduce the on drivers control panel
attenuation until a brake demand occurs starts flashing
(typically between 13 and 23dB)
Press and release the acknowledgement the BRAKE DEMAND LED
pushbutton on the drivers desk within 20 on drivers control panel
seconds of the brake demand changes to illuminated
steady
Wait for the one minute brake demand to the BRAKE DEMAND LED
time-out on drivers control panel
extinguishes approximately
one minute after starting to
flash and brakes released
Record attenuator settings as vehicle
sensitivity'


Train stop tests Set train direction controller to FORWARD
(forward) Set TRAIN SPEED on TTU to LOW (this
setting does not affect the test)
Normal direction Press TRAIN STOP NORMAL the TRAIN STOP NORMAL
(forward) DIRECTION DIRECTION LED on TTU
seconds
the BRAKE DEMAND LED
on drivers control panel
starts flashing and
emergency brakes are
applied
steady
Wrong direction Press TRAIN STOP WRONG the TRAIN STOP WRONG
(forward) DIRECTION DIRECTION LED on TTU
seconds
starts flashing and
applied
steady
Train stop tests Set the ATTENUATOR on 0dB
(reverse) Set train direction controller to REVERSE
Set TRAIN SPEED on TTU to LOW (this
setting goes not affect the test)
Train stop normal Press TRAIN STOP NORMAL the TRAIN STOP NORMAL
direction (reverse) DIRECTION DIRECTION LED on TTU
seconds
remains unlit
the Emergency brakes are
not applied


Train stop wrong Press TRAIN STOP WRONG the TRAIN STOP WRONG
direction (reverse) DIRECTION DIRECTION LED on TTU
seconds
remains unlit
not applied
Overspeed sensor Set train direction controller to
tests (high speed, FORWARD
forward) Set TRAIN SPEED on TTU to HIGH
Normal direction Press OVERSPEED SENSOR NORMAL the OVERSPEED SENSOR
(forward) DIRECTION NORMAL DIRECTION LED
on TTU lights for
approximately 3 seconds
starts flashing and
applied
steady
Wrong direction Press OVERSPEED SENSOR WRONG the OVERSPEED SENSOR
(forward) DIRECTION WRONG DIRECTION LED
on TTU lights for
starts flashing and
applied
steady
Overspeed sensor Set train direction controller to REVERSE
tests (high speed,
reverse) Set TRAIN SPEED on TTU to HIGH


Overspeed sensor Press OVERSPEED SENSOR NORMAL the OVERSPEED SENSOR
normal direction (high DIRECTION NORMAL DIRECTION LED
speed, reverse) on TTU lights for
remains unlit
not applied
Overspeed sensor Press OVERSPEED SENSOR WRONG the OVERSPEED SENSOR
wrong direction (high DIRECTION WRONG DIRECTION LED
speed, reverse) on TTU lights for
remains unlit
not applied
Overspeed sensor Set train direction controller to
tests (low speed, FORWARD
forward)
Set TRAIN SPEED on TTU to LOW
Overspeed sensor Press OVERSPEED SENSOR NORMAL the OVERSPEED SENSOR
normal direction (low DIRECTION NORMAL DIRECTION LED
speed, forward) on TTU lights for
remains unlit
not applied
Overspeed sensor Press OVERSPEED SENSOR WRONG the OVERSPEED SENSOR
wrong direction (low DIRECTION WRONG DIRECTION LED
speed, forward) on TTU lights for
remains unlit
not applied
TSO tests: TSO time- If the TSO timer for the vehicle is set to 20 the TSO LED on drivers
out seconds then: control panel illuminates
Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers immediately and
If the TSO timer for the vehicle is set to 60 the TSO LED on drivers
seconds then: control panel illuminates
Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers immediately and

Test procedure Action Result

TSO train stop Set the train direction controller to
FORWARD
Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers the TSO LED illuminates on
control panel drivers control panel
Press TRAIN STOP NORMAL the TRAIN STOP NORMAL
DIRECTION on TTU within 10 seconds DIRECTION LED on TTU
illuminates for approximately
3 seconds
the TSO LED on drivers
control panel extinguishes
immediately
remains unlit
not applied
TSO overspeed Set the TRAIN DIRECTION switch on the
sensor TTU to FORWARD
Set the TRAIN SPEED switch on the TTU
to HIGH
Press the TSO pushbutton on the drivers the TSO LED illuminates on
control panel drivers control panel
Press OVERSPEED SENSOR NORMAL the OVERSPEED SENSOR
DIRECTION on TTU within 10 seconds NORMAL DIRECTION LED
on TTU illuminates for
starts flashing and
applied
pushbutton on the drivers desk within 20 changes to illuminated
seconds of the brake demand steady on drivers control
panel
the TSO LED on drivers
control panel remains lit for
20 or 60 seconds according
to vehicle timer setting
flash and emergency brakes
are released


Temporary isolation Cut the security seal (if fitted) on the cab
tests selection mounted TPWS temporary isolation
switch to allow it to be operated
Select TEMPORARY ISOLATION by the TEMPORARY
turning the switch to the isolate position ISOLATION/FAULT LED on
and releasing the drivers control panel
illuminates
Train stop Set TRAIN DIRECTION on the TTU to
FORWARD
Press TRAIN STOP NORMAL the TRAIN STOP NORMAL
DIRECTION on the TTU DIRECTION LED on TTU
seconds
remains unlit
the TEMPORARY
ISOLATION LED on the
drivers control panel
remains illuminated
Overspeed sensor Set TRAIN DIRECTION on the TTU to
FORWARD
Set TRAIN SPEED switch on TTU to
HIGH
Press OVERSPEED SENSOR NORMAL the OVERSPEED SENSOR
DIRECTION on the TTU NORMAL DIRECTION LED
on TTU lights for
remains unlit
the TEMPORARY
ISOLATION LED on the
drivers control panel
remains illuminated
De-selection Deselect TEMPORARY ISOLATION by
turning the cab mounted temporary
isolation switch to the NORMAL position
and releasing.
Check that the TEMPORARY
ISOLATION/FAULT LED on the drivers
control panel extinguishes
If required, fit a new security seal to the
temporary isolation switch

Test procedure Action

Test completion On completion of the tests disconnect the connection cable from the TTU
and transmitter loop
Remove the transmitter loop and support beams from the rails and clear of
the vehicle
Gather up the connection cable and store in the TTU lid
Shut down the driving cab and make safe before leaving the vehicle
Overspeed sensor The nominal time between a pair of OSS frequency pulses is set by the three
timer settings OVERSPEED TIMER LINK switches on the TTU. These must be set to
match the setting of the overspeed sensor timer links on the vehicle being
tested. The actual time between pulses will be either slightly above or below
the nominal according to the setting of the TRAIN SPEED switch on the TTU
as part of the test.
The nominal timer settings are shown below:
State Link Link Link Nominal timer
switch 0 switch 1 switch 2 setting
Passenger Out Out In 974ms
Goods In Out In 1218ms

Appendix T Typical AWS/TPWS fault finding test sheet

The following is an example of an AWS/TPWS fault finding test sheet. The sheet is based on the use
of the Unipart Rail AWS/TPWS test box as applied to a typical dual-cab locomotive.
Vehicle No.
Reported AWS/TPWS fault code Fault present at:
no. 1 end/no. 2 end/both ends
Functional tests: No. 1 end No. 2 end
TPWS energised and brakes released in cab where failure Pass/fail Pass/fail
occurred
Caution aspect test south pole (blue) horn and brakes Pass/fail Pass/fail
Clear aspect test south pole (blue)/north pole (red) bell only Pass/fail Pass/fail
Diagnostic test box results No. 1 end No. 2 end
12V LED illuminated Pass/fail Pass/fail
40V LED illuminated Pass/fail Pass/fail
Correct operation of AWS reset Pass/fail Pass/fail
Correct operation of brake relay function Pass/fail Pass/fail
Correct operation of caution tone (horn/alarm) Pass/fail Pass/fail
Correct operation of black and yellow indicator Pass/fail Pass/fail
Correct operation of all black indicator Pass/fail Pass/fail
Correct operation of clear tone (bell/chime) Pass/fail Pass/fail
Simulate AWS clear signal Pass/fail Pass/fail
Simulate AWS caution signal and reset Pass/fail Pass/fail
Simulate AWS caution signal and brake application Pass/fail Pass/fail
TPWS temporary isolation switch operation Pass/fail Pass/fail
TPWS overspeed sensor tests Pass/fail Pass/fail
TPWS train stop sensor tests Pass/fail Pass/fail
TPWS wrong direction sensor tests Pass/fail Pass/fail
TPWS train stop sensor override tests Pass/fail Pass/fail
Comments/observations
Signature: __________________________________________________
Name: _____________________________________________________
Date: ______________________________________________________
TEST SHEETS ARE TO BE RETAINED ON THE VEHICLE FILE FOR TWO YEARS

Appendix U Typical AWS/TPWS wrong side failure report form

Appendix V Typical labels for defective AWS/TPWS equipment

The following is an example of a label that could be used to be attached to defective AWS/TPWS
equipment requiring wrong side failure investigation:
AWS/TPWS EQUIPMENT FOR WRONG-SIDE FAILURE INVESTIGATION
FORWARD IMMEDIATELY TO ____________________________________

TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION CENTRE
ITEM: .. CAT NO: ..

VEHICLE NO: ... FAULT CODE: ......
DATE OF FAULT: .DATE OF REMOVAL: ......
TRAIN OPERATOR: ...
DEPOT NAME:
The following is an example of a label that could be used to be attached to defective AWS/TPWS
equipment requiring repair following a right side failure investigation:
AWS/TPWS EQUIPMENT FOR REPAIR
FORWARD TO _______________________________ REPAIR CENTRE
ITEM: .. CAT NO: ..

VEHICLE NO: ... FAULT CODE: ......
NATURE OF DEFECT........
TRAIN OPERATOR: ...
DEPOT NAME:

Definitions
Above rail level
This relates to a measurement to the top of the head of the running rail as a reference
point.
ATOC
Association of Train Operating Companies.
ATP
Automatic Train Protection.
AWS
Automatic Warning System.
C4
The basic running gear overhaul, generally at intervals of up to 500,000 -1,000,000 miles
(2 to 7 years). It includes below sole bar work (for example running gear overhaul) and
may include door-gear overhaul. For those fleets which do not have a C4 this term has
been used to mean the equivalent mileage-driven running gear exam for example a
locomotive F exam.
C6
The basic time-driven passenger environment overhaul. Generally includes above sole bar
work, and interior overhaul. C6 may be coupled to exterior painting. Typically 6 to 10
years.
Component tracking application

The component tracking application is a web-based computer application operated by
ATOC and designed to enable the rail industry to accurately track AWS and TPWS
component fitment histories and defects.
DCP
Drivers control panel
DMM
Digital multi-meter.
DTU
Depot test unit.
E-AWS
Electronic AWS (receiver).
EP
Electro pneumatic.
FPGA
Field Programmable Gate Array.
Maintenance depot
A location identified within the railway undertakings (train operators) contingency plan with
the facilities to maintain, repair or replace items of trainborne AWS equipment.
National Incident .Report (NIR)

A report of an urgent safety-related defect relating to rail vehicles, equipment or plant and
machinery using NIR-Online.


NIR-Online
A web-based application used to initiate, disseminate and manage reports (known as
national incident reports) or urgent safety-related defects relating to rail vehicles,
equipment and plant and machinery. The web address of NIR-Online is http://www.nir-
online.net/.
OSS
Abbreviation for the TPWS OSS (overspeed sensor system).
An OSS is a facility whose function is to initiate a brake application on a train that

approaches a signal showing a danger aspect, or an other location at excessive speed.
PSU
Power supply unit.
SPAD
Signal passed at danger.
STM
Abbreviation for Specific Transmission Module an STM is a device that enables the
European Train Control System to communicate with existing national train protection
systems. The European Train Control System is a pan-European standard in-cab
signalling system incorporating Automatic Train Protection.
TASS
Abbreviation for Tilt Authority and Speed Supervision System. TASS is employed on lines
and on tilting vehicles where tilting trains are permitted to traverse curves at higher speeds
than conventional non-tilting trains. TASS provides a signal to permit tilt to take place and
controls maximum train speed, overriding TPWS installed for speed restrictions.
TI
Temporary isolation.
TIS
Temporary isolation switch.
Train data recorder (TDR)

For the purpose of this document, equipment provided on a train to record data about the
operation of its controls and performance in response to those controls and other train
control systems.
A data recorder is also referred to elsewhere as a data logger, event recorder, on-train
monitoring and recording (OTMR) equipment and juridical recorder (JRU).
TPWS
Train Protection and Warning System.
TPWS+
An arrangement of TPWS at certain high speed signal approaches which includes a
second OSS in rear of the standard OSS, to protect against higher speed over-speeding
within the standard overlap, generally up to around 100mph.
TSO
TPWS train stop override.
The TSO is a facility that allows a train to pass a signal at danger, with the authority of the
Signaller, without being tripped by the train stop system (TSS).


TSS
TPWS train stop system.
A TSS is a facility whose function is to initiate a brake application on a train that passes a
signal at danger without authority.
Target service life

The service life that can be expected from a component without a significant risk of failure.
Train stops/tripcocks
Trains stops are mechanical devices mounted at trackside to engage with tripcocks
mounted in the braking system of vehicles. If the tripcock is triggered at a red signal by the
train stop then the train brakes will automatically be applied.
TTU
Train test unit.
Unipart Rail
Formerly known as National Rail Service name change was effected on 1 December
2006.
VFC
Volt free contact.

References
The Catalogue of Railway Group Standards and the Railway Group Standards CD-ROM
give the current issue number and status of documents published by RSSB. This
information is also available from www.rgsonline.co.uk.
Documents referenced in the text

RGSC 01 The Railway Group Standards Code
Railway Group Standards
GE/RT8000 Rule Book
GE/RT8026 Safety Requirements for Cab Signalling Systems
GE/RT8030 Train Protection and Warning System
GE/RT8035 Automatic Warning System
GE/RT8250 Reporting High Risk Defects
GI/RT7011 Provision, Risk Assessment and Review of Level Crossings
GK/RT0038 Signalling of Permissible Speeds and Speed Reductions
GK/RT0106 Management of Safety Related Failures of Signalling and Operational
Telecommunications System
GM/RT2472 Train Data Recorders Design Requirements
GO/RT3437 Defective on Train Equipment
Other references
ACOP/EC/01001 Approved Code of Practice AWS/TPWS Component Life
Instructions, Association of Train Operating Companies
Handbook Number1395-1.G
TPWS Trainborne Equipment Maintenance Manual, Thales UK
Limited, Land and Joint Systems
NRSSPECXSA003/01
TPWS Vehicle Sub-system Development Installation Design Guide,
Unipart Rail
NRSSPECXSA003/11
TPWS Vehicle Sub-system Test Equipment Maintenance and
Routine Depot Test Specification, Unipart Rail
NRSSPECXSA003/30
TPWS System Components and Technical Descriptions, Unipart Rail
OP606401 TPWS Depot Test Unit Operating Instructions, Thales UK Limited,
Land and Joint Systems
OP608527 TPWS Train Test Unit Mark 2 Operating Instructions, Thales UK
PTP604412-00 TPWS Trainborne Equipment Proof Test Procedure, Thales UK
STS TY287 AWS Fault Tester Operating Manual, STS Signals Ltd
TPWS/TIP/018 TPWS Technical Information Pamphlet, Electronic AWS Receivers,
Thales UK Limited, Land and Joint Systems


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Combined Manual for AWS and TPWS Trainborne Equipment

Rail Safety and Standards Board

Combined Manual for AWS and TPWS Trainborne Equipment

Page 2 of 179 RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD

Combined Manual for AWS and TPWS Trainborne Equipment

Part 2 Overview of AWS and TPWS systems 8

Part 3 Guidance on maintenance and fault finding 70

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1.2.4 The introduction of TPWS incurred a number of operating and equipment

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Combined Manual for AWS and TPWS Trainborne Equipment

Howells Railway Products Ltd

1.4 Approval and authorisation of this document

Rolling Stock Standards Committee on 24 November 2006.

This document was authorised by RSSB on 15 February 2007

RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD Page 7 of 179

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Part 2 Overview of AWS and TPWS systems

2.1.2 General system operation

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2.1.3 Trackside sub-system

Figure 1 Typical track-mounted AWS magnet

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Figure 2 Layout of track-mounted AWS magnet

2.1.3.7 The permanent and electromagnets are provided in two strengths:

a) Standard strength magnets used in all areas except dc electrified line

b) Extra strength magnets for use on dc electrified line areas (traditionally

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2.1.4 Trainborne sub-system

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2.2 General operation of AWS trainborne equipment

OPERATIONAL READY STATE

South pole of track magnet detected

Yes Driver operates

Brake demand cancelled RESTRICTIVE NON-ACKNOWLEDGEMENT STATE

AWS brake demand

Driver operates caution

AWS brake demand continues

Figure 3 AWS trainborne equipment state diagram

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2.2.14 In the restrictive non-acknowledge state the sunflower indicator is maintained at

2.3 Overview of TPWS system

2.3.2 Basic system operation

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2.3.2.7 If a series of signals are to be passed at danger, for example in an engineering

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Figure 4 Typical TPWS trackside sub-system layout

Figure 5 Typical TPWS TSS