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Cases Ruling

Tenchavez v Escano 1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu 2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her
City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.
Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for 3. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos parents were sufficient in form.
divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character." The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book
acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
the CFI-Cebu.
1. YES
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then
of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not
failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give
raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society
contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not
involves the performance of a positive act. entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the 2. Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union
plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff- wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code,
appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against
Court. the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

3. 2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez own letters written before the suit had begun. An action for
alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest
and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
People v Sensano Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had
one child. Shortly after the birth of this child, the husband left his wife to go to the "Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, spouse.
without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an existence for
herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who "The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are
took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders."
filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor. The court, in its decision, the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant
stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is
been somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife, having abandoned her as he did." not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She thereupon
appealed to the municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in
husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was
house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was
he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or to live with her and said she impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years.
could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and
she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
went back to her coaccused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they
have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with
her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his
rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where he
remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his
return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved
with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the
provisions of Act No. 2710.
Bugayong v Ginez Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez dismissal of the action.
on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the
marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went
back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his
sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of
the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a
local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-
law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing,
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife
informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked
him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in
the house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro,
cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife.
The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila
the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely
packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then
filed a complaint for legal separation.
Matubis v Praxedes 1. Whether or not the action had not yet prescribed.
2. Assuming it had not yet prescribed, WON the agreement amounts to consent precluding the action
for legal separation

Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from
and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the
date when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with
Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was,
therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred.

Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in
Exhibit B, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband. Her consent is clear
from the following stipulations:

(b) That both of us is free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife without any interference
by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime
or suit arising from our separation. (Exh. B).

This stipulation is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented to the
concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.

Somosa-Ramos v Vamenta

Here would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need
not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the
management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers
under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is
justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from
respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt
against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her
paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him

What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion,3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the
period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make
possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may
only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give
them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative
policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the
children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that
these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts
close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused."4 At any rate, from the time of the issuance of
the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no
more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Contretas v Macaraig Whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period
Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a
little too late, while the reverse would be true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the
After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special month of December 1963.
agent at Malacaang. He began to be away so often and to come home very late.
Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a series of After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant
confidential missions. In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963
told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When
defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph
from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his
defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue
defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmarias St., for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have
she was so happy that defendant again return to the family home in May, 1963 that commenced.
she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not
wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and
whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but
would be gone for a period of about a month.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children,
Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his
place of work on Espaa Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to
Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up
Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing
to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann
and refused to return to his legitimate family.

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