Biosemiotics (2015) 8:125143

DOI 10.1007/s12304-015-9229-0
REVIEW

The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency

Morten Tnnessen

Received: 8 May 2014 / Accepted: 2 January 2015 / Published online: 21 January 2015
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Abstract The current article is the first in a series of review articles addressing
biosemiotic terminology. The biosemiotic glossary project is inclusive and designed
to integrate views of a representative group of members within the biosemiotic
community based on a standard survey and related publications. The methodology
section describes the format of the survey conducted in NovemberDecember 2013 in
preparation of the current review and targeted on the terms agent and agency. Next, I
summarize denotation, synonyms and antonyms, with special emphasis on the denota-
tion of these terms in current biosemiotic usage. The survey findings include ratings of
nine citations defining or making use of the two terms. I provide a summary of
respondents own definitions and suggested term usage. Further sections address
etymology, connotations, and related terms in English and other languages. A section
on the notions mainstream meaning vs. their meaning in biosemiotics is followed by
attempt at synthesis and conclusions. Although there is currently no consensus in the
biosemiotic community on what constitutes a semiotic agent, i.e., an agent in the
context of semiosis (the action of signs), most respondents agree that core attributes
of an agent include goal-directedness, self-governed activity, processing of semiosis
and choice of action, with these features being vital for the functioning of the living
system in question. I agree that these four features are constitutive of biosemiotic
agents, and stipulate that biosemiotic agents fall within three major categories, namely
1) sub-organismic biosemiotic agents, 2) organismic biosemiotic agents and 3) super-
organismic biosemiotic agents.

Keywords Agent . Agency . Biosemiotic glossary . Survey . Terminology

Introduction

This first review article is intended as a standard-setting article establishing the format
of the biosemiotic glossary project. Each review is prepared on the basis of a term-

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s12304-015-9229-0)

contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
M. Tnnessen (*)
Department of health studies and Department of social studies, University of Stavanger, Stavanger,
Norway
e-mail: morten.tonnessen@uis.no
126 M. Tnnessen

specific survey in the biosemiotic community and follows a similar structure, including
an Appendix published as electronic supplementary material which presents survey
findings in more detail. Each of the surveys includes a questionnaire which is distrib-
uted to a wide range of biosemioticians through email, list servers, blog posts, and
public web pages (see section 2 for details). Articles are expected to describe the results
of the survey in a systematic and unbiased way. We intend to engage the biosemiotic
community in all phases of the glossary project and make it a true community effort.
Some will surely find the objective, unbiased style of this article disconcerting.
However, I can assure concerned readers that neutrality in style is not necessarily proof
of an impoverished mental life. In actual fact, it is sometimes worthwhile to step out
of, or suspend, ontological (i.e., worldview-related) dogmas, if only temporarily, in
order to make unbiased evaluation of different positions possible. One major issue that
is at stake here is the question: What can biosemiotics learn from other fields and
approaches? While some will hold that biosemiotics has a lot to learn from neighboring
disciplines, others will rather see perceived outside interference as a threat to the true
semiotic nature of biosemiotics. The biosemiotic glossary project aims to bring under-
lying fundamental differences, such as the one just mentioned, to the surface. The goal
of the project is not necessarily to get everybody to adopt the same definitions (though
consistency in term usage could prove to be highly beneficial for our field), but just as
much to reveal, describe and address important disagreements in a process involving
mutual exchange of ideas.
As a reviewer of this article points out, there are well-known ontological disagree-
ments among the respondents, and one could claim that it is hardly meaningful to
pool replies from people working form wholly contradictory positions. Importantly,
this implies that the survey presented in this review article should primarily be
considered as a qualitative study, not a quantitative study. The actual interpretation
and application of terms and differences in views is ultimately what is of interest.
The number of respondents, and for that matter the number of biosemioticians in the
world, is too small to allow for precise, reliable statistics. Nevertheless, the survey
findings this review article build on are arguably quite representative for current
biosemiotic thought, given that they bring several typical disagreements to the fore.
Existing biosemiotic glossaries include Thure von Uexkll (1982b), Emmeche et al.
(2002), Sedov and Chebanov (2009, in Russian), Martinelli (2010), and Barbieri et al.
(2014, first published 2012).1 While the glossary of Barbieri, de Beule and Hofmeyr
has 78 entries and Sedov and Chebanov 75,2 Emmeche, Kull and Stjernfelt has 60 and
Thure von Uexkll 59. Martinellis glossary stands out with its 272 entries including
cross-references .
Why compose a biosemiotic glossary? As Emmeche et al. write (2002: 25), at a
certain point of the development of [biosemiotics] certain more formal explications
unavoidably must take place. The biosemiotic glossary project is an endeavor in this

1
In 2002, Emmeche, Kull and Stjernfelt wrote (p. 25) that [a]ccording to our knowledge, the only published
biosemiotic glossary until now has been the one compiled by Thure von Uexkll (1982b) specifically for the
translation of Jakob von Uexklls Bedeutungslehre cf. J. von Uexkll 1982a.
2
Sedov and Chebanov 2009 includes 20 central semiotic terms (section 4.2.3), 24 central biosemiotic terms
(section 4.2.5), eight terms related to genetics (section 4.2.6), six terms related to neurophysiology (section
4.2.7), 12 terms related to ethology/ecology (section 4.2.8), and five terms related to evolution (section 4.2.9),
altogether 75 glossary entries, among other material.
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 127

tradition. Since this will be an ongoing, distributed writing process, the goal will be
twofold: solidifying and detailing established terminology, and, where appropriate, to
contribute innovatively in the theoretical development of biosemiotic theory and
vocabulary. Emmeche, Kull and Stjernfelt (ibid, 2526) are very much correct in
noting that the emergence of biosemiotics in many cases necessitates modification of
existing definitions within both semiotics and biology, since a number of established
terms originated long before biosemiotics developed.
The terms agent and agency, which this first review article is devoted to, are
certainly central for a field that aims to study living phenomena from a semiotic
perspective. The programmatic article Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegomena to a
Theoretical Biology (Kull et al. 2009) aims among other things to identify points
of common terminology (ibid, 168). These five central contemporary biosemioticians
present eight theses on biosemiotics, the fifth of which being this one: (5) Function is
intrinsically related to organization, signification, and the concept of an autonomous
agent or self. (p. 170, my emphasis). In their treatment of the seventh thesis,
[s]emiosis is a central concept for biology that requires a more exact definition,
the authors list seven properties or conditions that must be met in the interpretive
architecture of an organism, which the simplest model of the creation of a semiotic
relationship should involve (ibid, 171). Agency, described as [a] unit system with
the capacity to generate end-directed behaviors, is the first criterion on the list. Where
there is life, apparently, there is agency i.e., life is fundamentally agential.
This is consistent with Hoffmeyers (2009: 940) observation that

[i]t is indeed possible to explain non-human living systems as if they were

deprived of semiosis, agency and true interests. This is exactly what biology
has been doing for more than a century and often in ingenious ways. In the course
of the last few decades, however, it has become clear that the reductionist
assumptions that lead scientist[s] to pursue such an awkward approach are no
longer supported by scientific evidence.

As we shall see, there is no consensus in the biosemiotic community on what

constitutes a semiotic agent, i.e., an agent in the context of semiosis (the action of
signs). However, most respondents agree that core attributes of an agent include goal-
directedness, self-governed activity, processing of semiosis (i.e., sign use) and choice of
action, with these features being vital for the functioning of the living system in
question. 3 This pragmatic definition is thus a minimal definition that most
biosemioticians can agree on though many biosemioticians will surely want to

3
In response to a draft of this article, one member of the Editorial Board claimed that there is consensus on the
definition provided here. Others, however, appeared to disagree. If nothing else, some biosemioticians find this
definition poor and lacking of semioticity, if not outright wrong. One member of the Editorial Board thought
such a notion of agency willalign biosemiotics with artificial intelligence or cognitive neurophysiology. The
same scholar noted that agency typicallyevokes a process of recursion and interpreted the current article as
implying thatall is linearity of agent-objects, in which even subjects become objects. Another member of the
Editorial Board observed that agency need not bereduced to the linear, narrow, sociological, unsemiotic
assumptions serving as backbone in this essay, and asked:where is emergence?. This scholar further
remarked thatthe established assumptions about agency in fields so often un- or anti-semiotic, should not
be held up as useful for semiotics. Coincidentally, the term sociological was also applied in a negative sense
by one of the reviewers of this article, who characterised it as aquasi-sociological analysis.
128 M. Tnnessen

supplement it with further or richer criteria referring to e.g., the nature of relations,
anticipation, habits, self and other, recursion, action-and-perception cycles, etc.

Methodology

This review article of the notions of agent and agency builds on a survey conducted
in the biosemiotic community, and on a literature review carried out in part ahead of
and in part after the survey. The biosemiotic glossary project, which the current review
article initiates, was planned and designed in October 2013, and conducted November
December as described in the Introduction section. The questionnaire was sent as email
attachment to the members of the editorial board and advisory board of Biosemiotics,
the board members of the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies (ISBS) and of
the International Society of Code Biology (ISCB), and via the biosemiotics email list
(biosemiotics@lists.ut.ee). It was furthermore made available online (on
Academia.edu),4 and the same message as had been sent by email was posted in the
Biosemiosis blog (http://biosemiosis.blogspot.com). There were 54 individual email
recipients in addition to the ca. 90 subscribers to the biosemiotics email list at the time
of distribution (likely with considerable overlap). 18 scholars returned questionnaires
that were fully or partially filled-in. Of the 18 respondents, 16 were men and two
women. One respondent opted for anonymity, the other 17 agreed to be mentioned by
name. All 18 gave permission to be cited.5
In the questionnaire the respondents were asked to state their specialization(s). The
input on this point varied in form and detail while some named academic fields or
subfields, others named topics or scholars. It is therefore difficult to sum up the 18
respondents specialty profiles in any conclusive manner. However, eight respondents
mentioned biology explicitly, and similarly six mentioned philosophy and five
semiotics. While two respondents mentioned the humanities and physics respec-
tively, three mentioned communication. Mention of all of these specializations
overlapped somewhat.

Denotation, Synonyms and Antonyms

Denotation In Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2014), the noun agency is de-

fined (definition 2) as the capacity, condition, or state of acting or of exerting power.
This definition is associated with that of operation, which is (definition 2a) an
exertion of power or influence or (definition 2b) the quality or state of being
functional or operative. In the same dictionary, the noun agent is defined (third
bullet point) as a person or thing that causes something to happen. WordNet (2014), a
lexical database anchored at Princeton University, defines agent as an active and
efficient cause; capable of producing a certain effect (first bullet point), a

4
URL: https://www.academia.edu/5116024/Questionnaire_distributed_in_the_biosemiotic_community_as_
part_of_the_biosemiotic_glossary_project_conducted_by_Biosemiotics.
5
In three cases the questionnaire was filled in an inconsistent manner. In two of these cases the respondents
real intention was clarified by email.
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 129

representative who acts on behalf of other persons or organizations (second bullet

point), a substance that exerts some force or effect (third bullet point), etc.
Of the five biosemiotic glossaries mentioned in the Introduction section, only
Emmeche et al. 2002 has an entry for agency (p. 26): the ability of an organism to
act in order to fulfill needs; may be defined as a stable integration of self-reference and
other-reference. This definition is below, in the context of the first survey, referred to
as AGENCY 1. Furthermore, only Barbieri et al. 2014 has an entry for agent. In this
code biology definition, an agent is a (living) system which connects the objects of
two independent worlds, or realms. In this understanding agents occur at different
levels of biological organization, from the biomolecular level to that of culture,
everywhere giving rise to correspondences between signs and meanings.
As part of the abovementioned survey, respondents were asked to state whether each
of five citations involving the term agent and four involving agency were (A)
perfectly suitable, (B) generally suitable, (C) somewhat suitable, or (D) not at all
suitable. With labels added, these were6:

AGENT 1: Transcendental relations are not relations strictly and properly but
comparative requirements of action and intelligibility. What are the relations
strictly and properly is that which is consequent upon the interactions or actual
understandings not as effects but as the patterns according to which effects
eventuate and causes act. Thus, parenthood is a relation, but a parent is an agent,
and a child is an effect. (Deely 2005: 60)
AGENT 2: What the phenomenon means, signifies, etc. for us should not be the
object of study [of biosemiotics] but rather the way it is meaningful, significant,
accessible etc. for the other one. This other one in focus can be called the
object-agent. We as readers, writers, observers, researchers, etc. can respectively
be called meta-agents []. If the concept of agent is found useful in biosemiotics,
agents should be considered as object-agents, not as meta-agents. (Vehkavaara
2002: 299300)
AGENT 3: Signs, meanings, and conventions [] do not come into existence of
their own. There is always an agent that produces them, and that agent can be
referred to as a codemaker because it is always an act of coding that gives origin to
semiosis. (Barbieri 2008: 579)
AGENT 4: The question of how to account for the existence of natural autono-
mous agents [] leads us to the question of the origin of semiotic competence,
which according to the American linguist and semiotician Thomas A. Sebeok is
probably congruent with the question of the origin of life7. (Hoffmeyer 1998: 38)
AGENT 5: In this paper [] agents in general [] are defined as systems with
goal-directed programmed behavior. Agents are either living organisms or their
products because only these systems are known to pursue their goals. Agents are
interconnected horizontally, hierarchically, and genealogically; they often include

6
In these nine citations, the terms agent and agency have been marked in bold. Notably, in the
questionnaire and to some extent in this review article, these nine citations are taken out of context, as
possible definitions. Detailed reports from closer readings, in context, would of course be valuable in some
cases, but this is neither possible nor necessary within the framework of the current article.
7
In the full sentence there is a reference to Sebeok 1979: 26.
130 M. Tnnessen

subagents and are always produced by other agents of comparable or higher

complexity. (Sharov 2010: 1052)
AGENCY 1: agency the ability of an organism to act in order to fulfill needs;
may be defined as a stable integration of self-reference and other-reference
(Emmeche et al. 2002: 26, citing Hoffmeyer 2000)
AGENCY 2: Recognizing the primacy of self-description implies conferring the
role of agent to the enclosed entity agency being defined as the capability of
interacting as a subject with the external milieu. (Giorgi 2012: 14)
AGENCY 3: In recent decades, it has become clear that living agents depend on,
not just information processing, but also what can be called active embodiment.
Indeed, just as bodies cast shadows, cultural skills and language are inseparable
from human agency. (Cowley 2012).
AGENCY 4: A system has agency with respect to some process if its effects in
the world leave a trace of its individuality. Agents cause historical events that
contribute to the individuation of other systems. (Salthe 1993: 159)

The resulting ratings are depicted in Fig. 1. Overall AGENT 4 (Hoffmeyer 1998)
was evaluated most highly, with nine of the 15 respondents answering ticking the box
Perfectly suitable. No other citation had >50 % in this category. Three more citations,
namely AGENCY 1 (Emmeche, Kull and Stjernfelt / Hoffmeyer 2000), AGENCY 2
(Giorgi) and AGENCY 3 (Cowley), had >2/3 rating them as either perfectly suitable or
generally suitable. However, these citations were predominantly regarded as general-
ly, not perfectly suitable.
Remarkably, all nine citations surveyed had someone regarding them as Perfectly
suitable and others regarding them as Not at all suitable. This speaks to the lack of
consensus in the biosemiotic community with regard to terminological issues. Three of
the citations, namely AGENT 1 (Deely), AGENT 2 (Vehkavaara) and AGENCY 4
(Salthe), had >1/2 ticking either Somewhat suitable or Not at all suitable. Of all
citations surveyed, AGENT 1 was the one quote most often chosen as Somewhat
suitable (by half of those who answered), whereas AGENCY 4 was the one quote

Fig. 1 Percentage of those who replied who regarded nine selected citations as perfectly suitable, generally
suitable, somewhat suitable and not at all suitable
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 131

most often chosen as Not at all suitable. All citations, however, had >2/3 rating them
as somewhat, generally or perfectly suitable.
This leaves AGENT 3 (Barbieri) and AGENT 5 (Sharov) as the citations with the
least extreme ratings overall. Both of these were regarded as perfectly or generally
suitable by >1/2, and (along with AGENCY 2 and AGENCY 3) as perfectly, generally
or somewhat suitable by more than 9/10.
As mentioned in the Methodology section, eight respondents in effect referred to
themselves as biologists, six as philosophers and five as semioticians (with some
overlap among these groups). With a total of 18 respondents representing a biosemiotic
community consisting of perhaps 100 scholars, the error or margin is much too high to
allow for any proper statistical analysis (with a 90 % confidence level the error of
margin would be +/ 17,6 %). However, a few observations may tentatively be made.
Of those who answered, all semioticians regarded AGENT 1 (Deely) as somewhat
suitable (vs. 1/2 overall). AGENT 4 (Hoffmeyer 1998) was regarded as perfectly
suitable by 3/4 of both semioticians and biologists (vs. 3/5 overall). While 2/3 or more
of both semioticians and biologists evaluated AGENCY 1 (Emmeche, Kull and
Stjernfelt / Hoffmeyer 2000) positively, as either perfectly or generally suitable,
all philosophers evaluated this citation as either somewhat or not at all suitable.
AGENCY 2 (Giorgi) suffered a similar fate, with 2/3 or more of biologists and
semioticians rating it as either perfectly or generally suitable, and three out of four
philosophers responding in this case rating it as either somewhat or not at all
suitable. In fact, this means that everybody who rated either AGENCY 1 or AGENCY
2 as somewhat or not at all suitable had mentioned philosophy as a specialty.
Patterns such as these should be subject to further inquiry in later surveys.
Additional data from the survey, and related discussion of Hendriks-Jansen 1996;
Hoffmeyer 1997 and Kauffman 1995 and 1996, is presented in the Appendix (Online
Resource). This includes respondents comments on the surveyed citations. The Ap-
pendix furthermore presents response regarding respondents own definitions of agent
and agency, examples of the respondents own usage of these terms, and examples of
other scholars recommendable usage of the two terms. These sections make reference
to Sharov 2010 and 2013; Sharov and Vehkavaara 2014; Collier 2008; Dubois 2003;
Pattee 2007; de Beule and Stadler 2014; Witzany 2011 and 2012; Maran 2013; Emmeche
1998; Tnnessen and Beever 2014; Juarrero 1999; Hoffmeyer 2008; Kauffman 2000 and
2008; Plumwood 1993; Farina 2010; Marko 2002 and Bergson 1907.

Synonyms In general usage, synonyms of agent include agency, instrument,

instrumentality, machinery, means, medium, ministry, organ, vehicle
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2014, sense 1, something used to achieve an
end). The same synonyms are listed under agency (Merriam-Webster Online The-
saurus 2014, same sense). Synonyms for agent in the sense of a person who acts or
does business for another includes deputy, proxy and representative (Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary 2014, sense 2). In a semiotic context it is perhaps particu-
larly of interest that representative is a synonym for agent. For agency, Collins
Dictionary (2014) lists (point 2, old-fashioned sense) medium, work, means,
force, power, action, operation, activity, influence, vehicle, instrument,
intervention, mechanism, efficiency, mediation, auspices, intercession and
instrumentality as synonyms.
132 M. Tnnessen

In Emmeche et al. 2002, the notion of agency is mentioned in two other entries,
namely degrees of subjectivity (p. 27) and subject (p. 30). In the first of these it is
stated that in the course of evolution we should expect subjectivity to occur in more or
less developed forms, probably along an axis from agency and intentionality to
consciousness and self-awareness. In the second entry subject is defined as a
philosophical term typically involving both agency, intentionality, consciousness, and
self-awareness; talking about degrees of subjectivity, not all these features need to be
present in primitive subject cases. Whereas agency is taken to be typical of
subjecthood, then, it also represents, along with intentionality, the minimal, most
common feature of a subject. Implicitly two terms are here presented as synonyms
for agency: subjecthood and intentionality.8
In Barbieri et al. 2014, the term agent appears in a number of other entries, namely
coding semiosis, convention, conventionalization, coordination, essential pa-
rameters, molecular machines, natural conventionalization, Peirce model of semi-
osis, semiosis (cf. AGENT 3) and semiotic dynamics. Here a convention or
conventional code is said to be a code that is shared among two or more agents,
and coordination is said to occur when the combined (coding) behavior of two or more
interacting agents gives rise to a global or collective phenomenon. As we see in
AGENT 3, in code biology codemaker is the core synonym for agent, and in the
definition of agent cited above we observe that maker, specifically artifact-maker,
are synonyms too.
Data from the survey is presented in the Appendix (Online Resource). Further
synonyms might be found among the terms mentioned in the Appendix Supplement
to Section 6. Related terms in English and other languages. At the very least this
includes something akin to cause (agent), perhaps also causation (agency), and
quite possibly actor, which as Maran observes is largely synonymous to agent.

Antonyms In the context of grammar, patient is an antonym for agent.

Likewisemoral patientis an antonym for moral agent in the context of ethics (see
also the section Connotations in different contexts of use). No sources used mention
antonyms for agency. Drawing on Briers response on related terms (see the section
Related terms in English and other languages in the Appendix), mechanical and
random might perhaps be counted as antonyms for agent.

Etymology

First known use of agent and agency respectively as English terms is said to have
occurred in the 15th century and in 1640 (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2014).
While the English agent is derived from the latin agns, present active participle of
the verb agere (to act, do, drive, etc.), the English agency is derived from the
8
Sedov and Chebanov 2009 mentions the English term agency in the entry (subject) (section
4.2.5.9). As it happens, this refers directly to Emmeche et al. 2002 and its entry subject (p. 30, see above).
This supports Emmeche, Kull and Stjernfelts implicit interpretation of subjecthood as a synonym for
agency. The Russian term [agency] is not used in Sedov and Chebanov 2009; the term
[agent] only in the in our context non-substantial sense of [infectious agent].
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 133

Medieval Latin agentia, which in turn derives from Latin agns. 9 According to
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2014) the English verb act, in comparison, was
first used in 1590, i.e., around the same time as agent and agency (but with agent
as the first). Harper (2014) dates first use of agent, one who acts, to late 15th
century. According to the same source it derives from Latin agentem (nominative
agens) effective, powerful, present participle of agere to set in motion, drive, lead,
conduct, and the [m]eaning any natural force or substance which produces a
phenomenon is from 1550s. Meaning deputy, representative is from 1590s. Sense
of spy, secret agent is attested by 1916. According to this source agency first
appeared in the 1650s and derives from Medieval Latin agentia, noun of state from
Latin agentem (nominative agens) effective, powerful, present participle of agere.
The sense of establishment where business is done for another first recorded 1861.
Oxford dictionaries (2014) confirm that the origin of agent is in late Middle English
(in the sense someone or something that produces an effect): from Latin agent
doing, from agere, and remarks that the origin of agency is to be found in mid
17th century: from medieval Latin agentia, from agent doing.

Connotations in Different Contexts of Use

The notions of agent and agency have numerous different connotations, only some
of which will be described here namely those that are among the most prominent and
simultaneously of some relevance to a biosemiotic notion of agency. This section starts
with the notion of semiotic agent/agency and findings in the survey, and then,
drawing on Martinellis glossary, proceeds with a paragraph on the notion, in ethics,
of moral agents, followed by a treatment of notions of agent and agency in other
academic fields.
In semiotic literature, both of the biosemiotic kind and at large, terms such as
semiotic agent and semiotic agency are sometimes used though, as we see
throughout this review article, it is more common to refer to e.g., agents without
applying the notion semiotic agents. Even so the use of semiosic agent and
semiosic agency suggesting a distinction between the semiotic (sign usage
involving awareness of its sign character) and the semiosic (sign usage bereft of such
awareness) is much less common. In one application of semiotic agents, Joslyn
(1999: 6) writes that these are characterized by possessing autonomy of action, being
dynamically incoherent with the environment, and having memory. In Joslyns under-
standing software agents of sufficient complexity are semiotic agents along with e.g.,
organisms and people. See also Joslyn and Rocha (2000). As for semiotic agency,
Nth (2009: 11) observes that C. S. Peirces semiotics is based on the anti-
instrumental premise that signs, in the process of semiosis, are not instruments but
semiotic agents acting with a semiotic autonomy of their own. Here, unlike in most
biosemiotic term usage, it is not the autonomy of the biosemiotic agent which is in
focus, but that of the sign and it is not a living system that is called an agent, but,
again, the sign. Judging by these few examples, which are among the most cited current

9
Agns or agentis is also a Latin adjective meaning effective (Collins Latin Dictionary 1997).
134 M. Tnnessen

usages of semiotic agent and semiotic agency, we understand that there is no unified
definition of these terms.
Data from the survey regarding what the relevant contexts of use are for agent and
agency respectively, according to the respondents, is presented in the Appendix
(Online Resource). As we see here, while many identify a variation of life, living
beings, living systems, animate nature as the relevant context for the term agent,
some biosemioticians hold that the term is applicable beyond the realm of life too.
While a further candidate (suggested by Salthe) is energy dissipative structures, the
artefacts of living beings might be conceived of as belonging to the living realm.
Though Martinelli 2010 does not have any entry on either agents or agency, the
phrase moral agency occurs in the entry De Waal (1996) (p. 207), and the related
phrase moral agent is used elsewhere in the companion (p. 293, 299). Referring to de
Waal 1996, Martinelli remarks that [a] central thesis in that work is that most animals,
and particularly great apes are not only, and fully, moral patients, but also provide
evidence of moral agency, becoming thus, like humans, insiders of the ethical
discourse. In philosopher Eshlemans words (2014), a moral agent is one who
qualifies generally as an agent open to responsibility ascriptions in other words,
unlike other living agents, only moral agents can be held responsible for what they do.
Eshleman states that only beings possessing the general capacity to evaluate reasons
for acting can be moral agents, and furthermore notes that a moral agent can be
responsible for an action she has performed only if she performed it freely, where acting
freely entails the ability to have done otherwise at the time of action (ibid). As we see,
the idea of moral agency is closely associated with the notion of free will. Combined
these agency-related notions constitute central elements of the general concept of
agenthood as applied in the human context, where the specifically human kind of
being is traditionally conceived of as exceptionally morally responsible and free-willed.
What Martinelli does, building on the work of de Waal, is to put forward the claim that
it is not only human beings that are capable of acting responsibly, i.e., morally.
Implicitly great apes and some other animals must have elements of free will too.
Martinelli is not the first to have pursued these thoughts the relevance for
biosemiotics is of course due to his portrayal of semiotic agents (cf. 2010: 10) both
human and non-human. As often in his work, Martinelli argues in ways that have
implications for our image not only of animals but also of ourselves as humans, i.e.,
both for our understanding of others and for our self-comprehension.10
In chemistry, WordNet (2014) defines an active agent as a chemical agent capable
of activity, and a chemical agent as an agent that produces chemical reactions.
Generally the notion of agent is applied to a range of non-semiotic systems, e.g., in
veterinary science (Blood et al. 2007), pharmacology (cf. chemical agent ibid, and
Mosbys Medical Dictionary 2009; physical agent Blood et al. 2007; Stedmans

10
In a somewhat similar vein, Harries-Jones (1995: 15) describes the way in which Gregory Bateson argued
that concepts based on the primacy of human agency, primacy of human rationality, and primacy of human
control must be abandoned. Instead, we must build on an understanding of recursive communication,
knowledge of which can overcome the divide in our thinking between humanity and nature. In Batesons
own, critical words (2000: 318),a difference which makes a difference is an idea or unit of information. []
But this is not how the average Occidental sees the event sequence of tree felling. He says,I cut down the
tree and he even believes that there is a delimited agent, theself, which performed a delimitedpurposive
action upon a delimited object. In a biosemiotic understanding, however, agency is always relational.
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 135

Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions and Nursing 2012), and military
medicine (biological agent Segen 2002; chemical warfare agent Encyclopdia
Britannica 2014).11 What all these medical and veterinary notions of agent have in
common is that the agent is conceived of as something that causes physiological
changes in humans or animals. In this respect the notion of an infectious agent, as
used in veterinary science an organism able to live in or on the tissue of a living
animal which may not necessarily cause disease (Blood et al. 2007) is somewhat
different. Furthermore we can observe that these notions of agent, except perhaps the
infectious agent, are pragmatic in that they in the main apply to that which affects living
beings of special concern to humans (i.e., human beings or their livestock, pets etc.).
Here a biosemiotic notion of agents must stand out as different, since the fundamental
question for biosemiotics is what agency as a feature of living organisms or systems is
in general and principally. We could perhaps say that while medical and veterinary
science has a pragmatic interest in the notion of agency qua causal (and in selected
organisms as affected by various factors), biosemiotics has an ontological interest in the
occurrence of agency in the living realm at large.
In sociology and cultural studies, Margaret Archer and others distinguish between
culture and agency and further contrast (individual) agency with structure as
interdependent yet distinct factors of influence see Archer 1988 and 1995. 12 In
Archers view the problems of agency vs. structure (which may be associated with
interests) and agency vs. culture (which may be associated with ideas) are two parallel
but distinct problems. As for structure, Archer (1995: 1) observes that the problem of
the relationship between individual and society was the central sociological problem
from the beginning. She thinks a central part of our social condition is to be aware of
its constraints, sanctions and restrictions on our ambitions, and that an inalienable
part of our human condition is the feeling of freedom: we are sovereign artificers
responsible for our own destinies, and capable of re-making our social environment to
befit human habitation (ibid). The urgency of the problem of structure and agency, she
holds (ibid, 65), is not one which imposes itself on academics alone, but on every
human being. Every human being, in other words, has to relate to the tug of war
between personal self-determination and societal influences. Barker (2003: 435),
searching for an intermediate position, defines agency as [t]he socially determined
capability to act and make a difference. In social theory and science studies, Actor-
network theory and its notion of the actor or actant is prevalent (see the next
section).
The evolutionary emergence of advanced symbolizing capacity, Albert Bandura
(2006: 164) narrates in the context of psychology, enabled humans to transcend the
dictates of their immediate environment and made them unique in their power to shape
their life circumstances and the courses their lives take. He lists four core properties of
human agency (ibid, 165), namely intentionality, forethought, self-reaction, and self-
reflection, the latter, [t]he metacognitive capability to reflect upon oneself and the
adequacy of ones thoughts and actions being the most distinctly human core
11
I refer to non-semiotic systems here not because the systems mentioned in medicine and veterinary
science cannot potentially be described as semiotic, but because they are in fact not described as such in
current terminology.
12
Cf. Cobleys mention of Archer in the Appendix Supplement to Section 7. Mainstream meaning vs.
meaning in biosemiotics.
136 M. Tnnessen

property of agency. No mechanism of human agency is in Banduras mind more

central or pervasive than belief of personal efficacy [] Unless people believe they can
produce desired effects by their actions, they have little incentive to act, or to persevere
in the face of difficulties. We could perhaps say that being empowered, whether as an
individual or as a member of a group, implies believing in your own ability to have an
effect on your circumstances. In the outlook of Bandura, referring to the growing
primacy of human agency in virtually every sphere of life (ibid, 176), human beings
have not only increasingly become masters of their own destinies, but have furthermore
increasingly become causes of environmental developments at large. Were Darwin
writing today, he notes (ibid, 174), he would be documenting the overwhelming
human domination of the environment.
Agency theory is central in organization theory, which is applied in economics and
political science. According to Ross 2000: 81, an agency relationship has arisen
between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf
of, or as representative13 for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain
of decision problems. The so-called principalagent problem arises because the agent
is faced with the choice of acting in its own interests or in the interests of the principal.14
Information flow between agents and principals is one of the central issues. In a
classical paper which appears to be the single most cited paper on any topic mentioning
agency in the title, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) establish that

[t]he problem of inducing an agent to behave as if he were maximizing the

principals welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all
cooperative efforts at every level of management in firms, in universities, in
mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in
unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as
are common in the performing arts and the market for real estate.

Finally, in computer science, a software agent is conceived of as a program that has

the capacity to act, and/or to act on behalf of another entity. Distinguished from
arbitrary (non-agentic) programs, in one interpretation software agents live in com-
puter operating systems, databases, networks, etc., and are regarded as a subclass of
computational agents (along with artificial life agents) which again consists of three
subclasses, namely task-specific agents, entertainment agents and viruses (Franklin and
Graesser 1996). In this scheme computational agents are conceived of, along with
biological agents and robotic agents, as a subclass of autonomous agents.

Related Terms in English and Other Languages

According to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2014), the words subdepartment

and subdivision are related to the notion of agency. The same source says agent (in

13
Speaking of economics, travel agent is a central example of agent qua representative.
14
If we compare this terminology with that of AGENT 5, we can note first that principal corresponds to
agent in Sharovs vocabulary and agent to subagent, and second that in organization theory the behaviour
of agents (i.e., subagents) is not regarded as programmed but far more uncertain.
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 137

its relevant denotation) has numerous related terms, including but not limited to
determinant, factor, influence, mechanism, catalyst, driver, executor, gen-
erator, impetus, incentive, inspiration, launcher, mover,15 trigger, anteced-
ent, cause and subagent. Though Thure von Uexklls glossary (1982b) does not
list neither agent nor agency as entries, there is an entry (p. 83) for Act, which
points to Operate, Operation (action, effect) (Wirken) (p. 86). Here the German
verbzu Wirkenis translated as to operate. A related term, Jakob von Uexklls
Wirkwelt, [t]he complimentary part of the perceptual world (ibid), is rendered as
Operational world. Taken as a whole these two worlds form the Umwelt of an animal
subject (ibid). Other central Uexkllian terms which are relevant in this context
include Effector (Effektor) (p. 83), Effector cue (operational cue) (Wirkmal), Effec-
tor organ (Wirkorgan) and Impulse-to-action or operation signs (Wirkzeichen) (p. 84).
The fact that only animals have Wirkwelten, i.e., operational worlds, in Uexklls view
could be interpreted as implying that agency first and foremost applies to animals, cf.
that [p]lants do not possess an Umwelt; since they have no nervous system they have
no receptors and no effectors (ibid, 83). However, under animal Uexkll included
unicellular organisms, and he thus implicitly had a very wide notion of agency. Instead
of an Umwelt, plants (and fungi) possess a Dwelling-integument (Wohnhlle) (ibid), a
living cell layer [] that enables it to make its choice of stimuli (von Uexkll 1982a,
b: 34). If the capacity to make choices qualifies an organism for agency, then plants
have agency too, in an Uexkllian setting in this sense (though not in terms of the
functional cycle, which is representative of animal action) plants too act.
A term related to the verb to act is the German noun Aktr, which corresponds to
the English noun Actor in its sense of one that acts: doer (Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary 2014, definition 1). In this sense, all semiotic agents are actors. More exotic
is the notion of actant, construed by Bruno Latour and defined by Oxford dictionaries
(2014) as [a] noun or noun phrase involved in the action expressed by a verb
(definition 1) or, in literary theory, as a person, creature, or object playing any of a
set of active roles in a narrative (definition 2). An actor or actant, according to
Latour himself (1996), is a word extended to non-human, non-individual entities.
An actor in AT [actor-network theory], in Latours conception, is a semiotic
definition an actant , that is, something that acts or to which activity is granted by
others [] An actant can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of
an action.
Data from the survey regarding terms related to agent and agency is presented in
the Appendix (Online Resource). Unfortunately, no respondent mentioned any foreign
term as related to agent (unless we count Umwelt). Nevertheless altogether around
50 terms were mentioned by one respondent or another as related terms, including
system, individual, autonomy and causality. Anton Marko stands out from the
rest of the pack in force of his disapproval of applying the notions of agent and
agency he suggests to simply use terms such as living being, life, ecosystem,

15
Incidentally, for Aristotle (2002 [c330 BC/c348-347 BC]) the question of the First Mover first agent, so
to speak was central. This ideal agent is also referred to as the Prime Mover or Unmoved Mover. In
Deelys words (2001: 255), Aristotle came to think of the Prime Mover, the Mover that moves without
being moved, in terms of the highest form of distinguished causality, and in terms of thought rather than of
transitive action.
138 M. Tnnessen

etc. instead, and mentions lan vital (cf. Bergson 1907) as a foreign term related to the
notion of agency.

Mainstream Meaning vs. Meaning in Biosemiotics

In the survey, respondents were prompted to state how the usage of agent and
agency in biosemiotics differs from mainstream usage of these two terms. Response
is presented in the Appendix (Online Resource). Several respondents questioned
whether it is actually the case that biosemiotic term usage is, or should be, different.
Others reported significant differences in biosemiotic vs. non-biosemiotic term usage.

Attempt at Synthesis

The aim of accomplishing synthesis is to overcome disagreements or contradictions.

Naturally, there are limits to what can be achieved. Whereas biosemiotic denotations of
the terms in current usage vary considerably, no less than 50 terms were mentioned by
the respondents as terms related to agent or agency. The survey reviewing the terms
agent and agency showed that there is no consensus on proper term usage neither
within biosemiotics nor in general. However, in the biosemiotic context features such
as goal-directedness, self-governed activity, processing of semiosis (i.e., sign use) and
choice of action were implicitly or explicitly mentioned by many. As Emmeche points
out, different notions of agent share a family resemblance but are very much context-
dependent. At the same time, as Pattee and implicitly de Beule remarks, there are
several levels and types of agency.
In what remains of this section I will outline a specifically biosemiotic notion of
agency and point to some implications. While finer distinctions are called for, including
on the agency of animals vs. plants and fungi (which are less coherent and, like free-
living cells, more reactive agents), I will focus here on a simple typology of biosemiotic
agents. My starting point is that agency can be attributed at different levels of biological
organization, from the cell (if not even at a subcellular level) to the ecosystem. Among
what these various living systems, which may all be regarded as sign systems, have in
common is that they are 1) goal-directed and 2) self-governed (i.e., self-regulating), and
that they constitute 3) units of processing of semiosis and 4) units of action-related
choice-making. These shared features, I suggest, are to a large extent constitutive of
biosemiotic agents in other words, they are vital for the functioning of the living
system in question. Life is indeed fundamentally agential. This ontological observation
is augmented by the fact that biosemiotic agents are in effect world-changing powers
which add to the complexity of abiotic nature.
Based on the defining characteristics described above, we can stipulate that
biosemiotic agents fall within the following categories16:

Sub-organismic biosemiotic agents

Organismic biosemiotic agents

16
This is consistent with the scheme of levels of biosemiosis presented in Tnnessen and Tr (2014: 14).
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 139

Super-organismic biosemiotic agents

As is well known, there is no consensus in the biosemiotic community on whether or

not agency is co-extensive with the living realm. While practically all biosemioticians
appear to think that living organisms and/or systems are agents and thus endowed with
agency, the dividing issue is whether or not there are agents beyond living agents.17
My view in this context is, consistent with Sharovs view, that there are indeed agents
beyond living agents, but that these are all subagents of living agents. In this sense all
agency is arguably ultimately of a biosemiotic nature. This implies that biosemiotics
taken to include the study of human semiosis is a relevant framework for the study of
all agency relations whatsoever. It is in principle fully legitimate to hold an even wider
notion of agency, somewhat resembling Latours (ibid) conception of an actant as
anything whatsoever to which activity is granted, but such notions cannot claim to be
specifically biosemiotic notions of agency. Living subagents of biosemiotic agents are
living systems and simultaneously semiotic systems, and these are therefore themselves
defined qua biosemiotic agents. On the other hand, non-living subagents of biosemiotic
agents (notably of humans) are not themselves biosemiotic agents and some may
require definitions of their own.
A biosemiotic notion of agency has wide-reaching implications for how we conceive
of living beings. Just as sociologists might claim that every human being has to relate to
the tug of war between personal self-determination and societal influences,
biosemiotics can make the claim that every living being (if not every living system)
has to relate to the struggle between self-determination and external influences, whether
these influences have their origin in the actions of other living beings or in the brute
forces of the physical environment. In my own terminology, this is a logical starting
point for a semiotics of being (Tnnessen 2010). In this eco-existentialist view,
existing as a living being implies not only making choices but having to make choices.
Implicitly, not only human beings, but other living beings too have lives that are shaped
by the choices they make. Here an important caveat is in order: I fully acknowledge that
the human condition is on some points radically different from the animal condition(s).
With our immense, though not unlimited semiotic freedom, we are open to the world in
ways that no animal is and, alas, we carry moral responsibility. But animals too are
thrown into existence as it were and have to find their ways, with the practical use
of their more or less free will. The struggle for autonomy is in a fundamental sense
common to most (if not all) living beings, human or non-human. Animals too are
proper subjects animals exist and there is, in this eco-existentialist understanding, a
profound difference between being something and being someone (in other words,
existing as a subject is incomparable with existing as something).
Drawing on and generalizing agency theory as applied in economics and political
science, I observe that decision problems are far from restricted to human organiza-
tions. Also in the living realm at large do prospective principals attempt to establish
principalagent relationships, where the recruited agent, which might or might not
be directly submissive, is expected to act in the interests of the principal, so as to

17
On a related note, Sebeok (1991: 22) remarked that the capacity for treating messages distinguishes [all
terrestrial life forms] more from the nonliving except for human agents, such as computers or robots, that can
be programmed to simulate communication than any other traits often cited.
140 M. Tnnessen

maximize its welfare rather than its own. This is relevant e.g., in all animal species that
are social by nature and where individuals are more or less dominant in social terms in a
way that is adaptable, i.e., not fixed by birth. Such power struggles occur between
humans and non-humans as well. As examples, livestock stereotypically represent
agents subjected to the care of human principals, with the task of maximizing the
welfare of human beings as their raison dtre, and well-functioning working animals
(such as guide dogs for the blind, or police dogs) are in a sense by definition agents for
human principals.
For many, acknowledging the agency of non-humans includes truly seeing them (at
least animals) as someone who has needs, desires, preferences etc. The occurrence of
semiotic agency in the living realm at large arguably implies that we as humans have a
responsibility to consider how others are affected by our actions, qua semiotic agents
capable of relating to sign relationships. As Alexander points out, in a biosemiotic
setting agency can only be explained in terms of semiotic freedom (cf. Hoffmeyer
1996). While we as human beings have a special moral responsibility as a consequence
of our high level of semiotic freedom, all living beings have some level of semiotic
freedom and are thus endowed with a measure of freedom when faced with choices that
are to be made. In this sense, instead of stating that all humans have free will whereas
all non-humans are deprived of such will, we can safely state that being alive entails
being more or less free.

Conclusions

Drawing on a survey and study of literature, this first, standard-setting review article in
the biosemiotic glossary project has aimed to map actual term usage in the biosemiotic
community. By describing differences in term usage in a neutral manner, it demon-
strates the value of such broad, open surveys. The prospective outcome of review
articles modeled on the current one, with associated surveys, is twofold: Firstly, to
document (variations in) actual biosemiotic terminology, and secondly, to engage the
biosemiotic community in an open discussion of terminology. In this way the
biosemiotic glossary project attempts to contribute to theory of science understood as
a descriptive undertaking and simultaneously to contribute to theoretical and method-
ological development within biosemiotics.18
While there is no consensus on the terms agent and agency, most biosemioticians
appear to agree that core attributes of an agent include goal-directedness, self-governed
activity, processing of semiosis and choice of action, with these features being vital for
the functioning of the living system in question. I agree that these four features are
constitutive of biosemiotic agents.
A criterion for evaluating each review article in this series is whether, or to what
extent, the reviewed terms are in fact found to be quite concisely used by several
biosemioticians, and whether the biosemiotic usage of the terms stands out from
general usage (cf. the questionnaire). In the case of agent and agency, generally term
usage is not consistent from field to field, nor at times within one and the same field

18
Regarded as belonging to theory of science, the biosemiotic glossary project thus involves both descriptive
and normative theory of science.
The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Agent, Agency 141

(i.e., there are conflicting definitions in use). In several instances biosemiotic term
usage differs from term usage in other fields, but in others it draws on their notions and
might be indistinguishable from them. In conclusion, it is legitimate to refer to a
specifically biosemiotic notion of agency, but such a notion does not cover all usages
of the terms agent and agency within the biosemiotic community.

Acknowledgments This work has been carried out thanks to the support of the research project Animals in
Changing Environments: Cultural Mediation and Semiotic Analysis (EEA Norway Grants/Norway Financial
Mechanism 20092014 under project contract no. EMP151). I would like to thank my fellow editors, Alexei
Sharov and Timo Maran, for contributing to designing the biosemiotic glossary project and for important
feedback on this specific article. Furthermore I thank two reviewers of this paper for critical comments, and the
respondents to the first survey for their contributions. I would also like to thank members of the Editorial
Board of Biosemiotics for providing feedback particularly Peter Harries-Jones, Myrdene Anderson, Gnther
Witzany, Claus Emmeche and Victoria Alexander. Finally I am grateful to Kalevi Kull for providing references
for two biosemiotic glossaries, and to Sergey Chebanov for sending me Sedov and Chebanov 2009.

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