Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City.
Respondent SECOND DIVISION
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and
petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie
refused to accept respondents offer of support and
decided to raise petitioner on her own. While
petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but
all attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a)
petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from
the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from
the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the
petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore
went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and
obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion
to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3,
2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, issued the Order[3] setting the
case for hearing and urging anyone who has any
objection to the petition to file his opposition. The
court also directed that the Order be published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in any
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
and that the Solicitor General be furnished with
copies of the Order and the petition in order that he
may appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of
the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested
inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons
and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should
be served on him as respondent; (3) should the
court agree that summons was required, he was
waiving service of summons and making a
voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication
of the petition and the hearing was improper
because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.
[4]
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a
Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Respondent reiterated that the petition for
recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he
should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[5]
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due
form and substance because petitioner could not
have personally known the matters that were
alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot
be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioners father. Moreover,
JESSE U. LUCAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JESUS S. LUCAS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 190710
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 6, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court
can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for
review on certiorari, we address this question to
guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a
relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this
petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated
December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a
Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing)[2] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that,
sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a
certain Ate Belen (Belen) who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would
oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one
occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an
intimate relationship developed between the two.
Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11,
1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas.
The name of petitioners father was not stated in
petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie
later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.
On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San
the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for
his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the
allegation that the statements in the petition were
not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of
evidence. The court also dismissed respondents
arguments that there is no basis for the taking of
DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled
on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that
the new Rule on DNA Evidence[11] allows the
conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts
instance or upon application of any person who has
legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of
Petition,[12] reiterating that (a) the petition was not
in due form and substance as no defendant was
named in the title, and all the basic allegations
were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie
case, which made the petition susceptible to
dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated
January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.[13]
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, questioning the Orders dated October
20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition
for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The
assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and
January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP.
Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP.
Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.[14]
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondents
special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for
the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over respondent. Although respondent
likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the same is not
equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking
a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings.
It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met. The CA further held
that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case,
thus:
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability
of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents
motion for reconsideration, issued an Order[6]
dismissing the case. The court remarked that,
based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,[7] there are
four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which the parties have to face: a
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child. The court opined
that petitioner must first establish these four
procedural aspects before he can present evidence
of paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood
group test and DNA test results. The court observed
that the petition did not show that these procedural
aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish
a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother
did not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioners
statement as to what his mother told him about his
father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live
birth was not signed by respondent; and (c)
although petitioner used the surname of
respondent, there was no allegation that he was
treated as the child of respondent by the latter or
his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no
obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The
dispositive portion of the said Order therefore
reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to
establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action in his
petition, his motion for the submission of parties to
DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is
hereby DENIED. This case is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008,
which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on
October 20, 2008, it issued the Order[9] setting
aside the courts previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order
dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing on
January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[10]
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the
grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the
petition is premature considering that a full-blown
trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed
that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. It was verified, it included a
certification against forum shopping, and it
contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF
A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS
CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR
THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING
CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER
ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF
HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL
PATERNITY ACTION.[17]
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as
issue in his petition for certiorari the courts lack of
jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no
legal basis to discuss the same, because issues not
raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any
rate, respondent had already voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of
several motions asking for affirmative relief, such
as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20,
2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points
out that respondent even expressly admitted that
he has waived his right to summons in his
Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the
issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in
nature. Although the caption of the petition does
not state respondents name, the body of the
petition clearly indicates his name and his known
address. He maintains that the body of the petition
is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA
testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of
the petition since it is not a legal ground for the
dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt
as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have
simply denied the motion.[18] Petitioner points out
that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does
not require that there must be a prior proof of
filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds
that the CA erroneously relied on the four
significant procedural aspects of a paternity case,
as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.[19] Petitioner
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA
Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not
really have been intended to trample on the
substantive rights of the parties. It could have not
meant to be an instrument to promote disorder,
harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish
for evidence. Such will be the situation in this
particular case if a court may at any time order the
taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory
recognition cases is immediately available to the
petitioner/complainant without requiring first the
presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and
absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and
promote harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like
to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an
absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition
test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish
prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio
and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed
order the taking of DNA test in compulsory
recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-
do members of our society will be easy prey for
opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all,
or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their
younger years could be used as a means to harass
them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity
of their children may just be taking the chances-just
in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long
past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and
unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory
recognition case opens wide the opportunities for
extortionist to prey on victims who have no
stomach for scandal.[15]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December
17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
[16]
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER
RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT
ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED
VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT A QUO.
I.C
action, that is, whether it is an action in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person
based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject
that person's interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns
the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in
the birth certificate, is an action in rem.[22]
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding
in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter
has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the
res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made
effective. [23]
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation
is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the
RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort to the right sought to be
established.[24] Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to
the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.[25] This is but
proper in order to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
[26] Hence, failure to serve summons will not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined
that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity
to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that
the due process requirement with respect to
respondent has been satisfied, considering that he
has participated in the proceedings in this case and
he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.
To address respondents contention that the petition
should have been adversarial in form, we further
hold that the herein petition to establish filiation
was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in
nature despite its caption which lacked the name of
a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as
avers that these procedural aspects are not
applicable at this point of the proceedings because
they are matters of evidence that should be taken
up during the trial.[20]
In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling
on most issues raised in the petition for certiorari
and merely reiterates his previous arguments.
However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners
assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in
relation to his claim that the petition was not in due
form and substance. Respondent denies that he
waived his right to the service of summons. He
insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary
appearance was conditional upon a finding by the
court that summons is indeed required. He avers
that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of
the trial court were orders denying respondents
motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate
filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is
that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari,
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can
a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. In a number of cases, the court has
granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on
the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it
has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21] In
the present case, we discern no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying
the motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by
respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction
over his person due to the absence of summons,
and (b) defect in the form and substance of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is
equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of
jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right
to the service of summons. We find that the
primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on
respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the case. In other words, was the service of
summons jurisdictional? The answer to this
question depends on the nature of petitioners
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a
paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie
case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to
discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as
yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially,
it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted
considering that no such order has yet been issued
by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the
said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be
dangerous to allow a DNA testing without
corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the
Courts attention. In light of this observation, we
find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on
DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions
for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and
other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide
the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use
of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides
the prescribed parameters on the requisite
elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper
procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the
available objections to the admission of DNA test
results as evidence as well as the probative value
of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the
evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA
analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than
prejudice the public.[35]
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of
the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for
good reasons;
defendant, and the non-service of summons upon
respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it.[27] In this petitionclassified as an action
in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial
proceeding was likewise satisfied by the
publication of the petition and the giving of notice
to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial
court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in
substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to
contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of
the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his
claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken
out without leaving the statement of the cause of
action inadequate.[28] A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains the following elements:
(1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.[29]
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts
relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to
respondent. Respondent, however, contends that
the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they
were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such
matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot
be determined at this point but only during the trial
when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of
cause of action, the question submitted to the court
for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations
of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically
admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint.[30]
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the
complaint, and no other.[31] The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.[32]
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in
form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the
court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the
defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his
defense. The veracity of the assertions of the
parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case
on the merits.[33]
The statement in Herrera v. Alba[34] that there are
four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case.
A party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are
matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that
the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,
disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated
December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a
suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA
testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for
the holding of the test. [36] In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a search,
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must
be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order
to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must
be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.[37]
The same condition precedent should be applied in
our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on
the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before he could take his oath, however, complainant
filed the instant petition averring that respondent
and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did
not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before

Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in
their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even
acted as escort to complainant when she reigned
as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded to sexual congress with respondent
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son,
Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It
was after the child was born, complainant alleged,
that respondent first promised he would marry her
after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and respondent allegedly
made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the
latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition.

Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized

the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to
be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her
comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in
failing to file the earlier comment required and that
she remains interested in the resolution of the
present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondents motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a

motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment
filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.[2]
Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in
the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982.[3]
In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his
election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of
time this case has been pending as reasons to
allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to EN BANC

dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of
time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on
November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON
BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia
Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that
his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six
years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him.[10]
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age,
should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the
lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
on leave
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on
certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30,
2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR.
CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed
and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2,
in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's
favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity
of his marriage with private respondent, while the
CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar.
Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972,
petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of
the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to
arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers
were required for the intended marriage between
petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place
at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude
the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended
the dismissal of the case and that respondent be
allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers
oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that
he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging
in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[6] It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members
of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite
relevant because mere intimacy between a man and
a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him,
even if as a result of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock.[9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts
whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainants assertions that she
had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible.
She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend
even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and
until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced
to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued
their relationship and was not an innocent young
girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately,
respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage
is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
entered into because of love, not for any other
reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make
respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the
parties submitted their respective pleadings as well
as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its
Decision granting the petition. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
hereby declares the marriage contracted between
Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the
Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code.
The foregoing is without prejudice to the
application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar
for proper registration of this decree of nullity of
marriage.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence
sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
marriage license when the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such,
the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and
80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
absence of the said marriage license rendered the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in
Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated
its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica
Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents
and purposes.
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact,
solemnized between the contending parties, there
is a presumption that a marriage license was
issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to
overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that
the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a
mere defect in the formal requisites of the law
which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but
the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14,
2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following
issues, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED
"ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE,
ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged
marital vows in a marriage ceremony which
actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before
dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a
public dance held in the town plaza which is just
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue
of the wedding, and the dance only finished at
around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June
1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license
and had not seen much less signed any papers or
documents in connection with the procurement of a
marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the
time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office
was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the
afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the
moment the actual marriage was celebrated before
dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore
could have been validly issued, thereby rendering
the marriage solemnized on even date null and void
for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and
Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized
sans the required marriage license, hence, null and
void from the beginning and neither was it
performed under circumstances exempting the
requirement of such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between
petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at
Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and
of no legal effect;
x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar
which attested to the fact that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of
a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent with respect to their marriage
celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the
petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of
action because there is no evidence to prove
petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage license
and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and
respondent personally appeared before the local
civil registrar and secured a marriage license which
they presented before their marriage was
solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action
was subsequently transferred to the RTC of
(4) When the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the
trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the
CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage
license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are
conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to
review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was
celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs
their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage;
and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional
character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code,
marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war;
(2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular
marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation;
(5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage
does not fall under any of these exceptions.
a JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED
HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE
OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN
COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE
WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING
PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD
TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition
centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established
the absence or lack of marriage license at the time
that petitioner and respondent's marriage was
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in
deciding the case not on the basis of law and
evidence but rather on the ground of what the
appellate court calls as ethical considerations as
well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural
question by arguing that the issues presented by
petitioner in the present petition are factual in
nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve
into these issues in a petition for review on
certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a
determination and application of existing law and
prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with
these issues is the question of the existence of the
subject marriage license, which is a question of
fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without
exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
It is telling that respondent failed to present their
alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22
issued by the officiating priest does not contain any
entry regarding the said marriage license.
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their
marriage contract from the National Archives and
Records Section, where information regarding the
marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license
number, could be obtained. However, she also failed
to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the
RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that
the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as
well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that
a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither
one of them testified that a marriage license was
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed,
despite respondent's categorical claim that she and
petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license,
she failed to present evidence to prove such
allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show
that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to
the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there
was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the
requirements of the law which would not affect the
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that
respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a
marriage which is performed without the
corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the
OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's
ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification
issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to
the absence in its records of a marriage license,
must categorically state that the document does
not exist in the said office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification
of due search and inability to find the record or
entry sought by the parties despite the absence of
a categorical statement that "such document does
not exist in their records despite diligent search."
The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, held that the certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry as to
the purported marriage license, issued by the civil
registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that
there is absence of a marriage license that would
render the marriage void ab initio.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale
for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties,
after the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and
petitioner were able to secure a marriage license
which they presented to the solemnizing officer
before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption
is always in favor of the validity of marriage and
that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such
validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this
principle as well as of the Constitutional policy
which protects and strengthens the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony
of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence
to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt
to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his
favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee
Cario.18 There, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no
record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license.19 It was further
held that the presumed validity of the marriage of
the parties had been overcome, and that it became
the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy
of any marriage license ever issued in favor of
Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata
[respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on
June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage
of petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove
that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was
not able to discharge that burden.
72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated,
petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul
his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out
of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair
with another woman. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent
to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code,
is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14,
2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case
No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of
Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and her
deceased husband as void ab initio as the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent
case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v.
Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking, this
Court relied on the Certification issued by the local
civil registrar, which stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the same
did not appear in their records. Contrary to
petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the
officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this
respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court does not require a categorical
statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case,
this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is
a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or
other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. x x
x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear
and unequivocal finding of the absence of the
subject marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the
parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show
that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to
cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As
cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly
provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except
marriages of exceptional character under Articles
FIRST DIVISION

April 18, 2016

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-
GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed
the same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23
March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the
ground that respondent had a previous valid
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA
believes on the other hand, that respondent was not
prevented from contracting a second marriage if
the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this
purpose she did not have to await a final decree of
nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is

whether the CA was correct in holding thus and
consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of
nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo

(Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,4
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void
due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that
petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for
this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in
this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended

among others that her marriage to Bautista was
null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged.5
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that
since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and
in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable
law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family
Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil
Code does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's
Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA
Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the
CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid
be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired
by the spouses during their marriage be declared
conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner
reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must
be determined in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the
law in force at the time Lea contracted both
marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the
parties were also born while the Civil Code was in
effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court
must resolve this case using the provisions under
the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular,
Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first
paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are
Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a
voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage
from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage,
the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent
court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
(3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage
cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void
marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the
offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while
in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a
void marriage no judicial decree to establish the
invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held
in the cases of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v.
Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil
Code contains no express provision on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage. 37
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to
declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22
January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null
and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued
a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision
dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by
petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was
bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered
that whether or not the first marriage of respondent
was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had
belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration
of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time
she entered into marriage with him, her previous
marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC
thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its
Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC
declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P.
DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979,
at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan,
Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under
Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to
Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato
on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower
court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not
obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage.
The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and
existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared
void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial
decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with
Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the
distribution of their properties were concerned. 15
His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its
Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both
petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their
respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not
apply to marriages that were celebrated before the
effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil
Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that
those cases continue to be governed by Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-
prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife
charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed
that his first marriage was void since he was
merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he
got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
We held that since the second marriage took place
and all the children thereunder were born before
the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the
Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage
of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack
of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondent's second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights
of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x.
(Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza,
and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court
thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of
Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence
of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of
the RTC of Paraaque City declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato
is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did
not err in upholding the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find
no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20
April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three
marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first
wife was already dead, while the third marriage
was contracted after the death of the second wife.
The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed
valid until annulled, which made the second
marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the
third marriage was valid, as the second marriage
was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent
without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to
be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957),
which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and
Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of
void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the
Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted
prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is
thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo
v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind
the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be
protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life." So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability
and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for
the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception
of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of
a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were
this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such
a socially significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing
less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not
only would such an open and public declaration by
the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.40 (Emphases supplied)1wphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v.
Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the
Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the
aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the
principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She
also identified the wedding invitation given to her
by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that
she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife.8
Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was
given a certificate that no marriage license was
issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a
ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage
as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on
him a 200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No.
3613. It held that the petitioners act of giving a
blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he
made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11
It further ruled that in performing a marriage
ceremony without the couples marriage license,
the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or
the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of
the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a
violation of any of its provisions that is not
specifically penalized or of the regulations to be
promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of
not more than one month, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law,
and provides the penalty for violation of the latter
law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the
penalty of a fine in the amount of 200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and
added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple
unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioners negative
statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of
Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA
observed that although there is no prescribed form
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac
and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each
other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed
officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the
couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church.
They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest,
to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that
they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a
mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the
groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the
crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary
Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary
Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary
The elements of the crime punishable under Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the
prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an
authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority
of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance
of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority
to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an
"illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3)
and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. These provisions were taken from Article
5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with
no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the
Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage
is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife."26
Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the
Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that
no prescribed form of religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in
the presence of not less than two witnesses that
they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted
that the parties appeared before him and this fact
was testified to by witnesses. On the second
requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioners allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they
take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked
insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine
a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions
to test the credibility of the witness and to extract
the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and
or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage,
the law provides minimum standards in determining
whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2)
they should declare that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of at least two
witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the
prosecution duly proved these requirements. It
added that the presence of a marriage certificate is
not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners
criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or
Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for
the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of
regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the
following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is vague and does not define what
constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these
provisions require the verbal declaration that the
couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in
writing which is duly signed by the contracting
parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17
The petitioner likewise maintains that the
prosecution failed to prove that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the
principle of separation of church and State, the
State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such
as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the
State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
"marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he
conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes
of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the
couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present
case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does
not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the
petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor
a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURTS RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the
essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the
"blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and
formal requirements of marriage set by law were
lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of
these requirements negates his defense of good
faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the
lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of
determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint
against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does
not make this an element of the crime. The penalty
imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance
with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and
44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any
priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine
National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage,
refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when
called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge
and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any
church, religion or sect the regulations and
practices whereof require banns or publications
previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the
immediate solemnization of a marriage that is
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest
or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this
act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than one month nor more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more
than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law
states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of
any provision of this Act not specifically penalized,
or of the regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment
for not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
material testimony though that testimony may tend
to support or rebut the position taken by one or the
other party. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to
reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory
of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of
questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking
any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary
Anne, and even the petitioners admission regarding
the circumstances of the ceremony, support
Floridas testimony that there had indeed been the
declaration by the couple that they take each other
as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
disowning their declaration as husband and wife
cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces
of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show
that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary
Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the
principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church
"blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioners allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when
it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of marriage is required. This
pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective
marital rites, subject only to the requirement that
the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the
Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and that our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this
end, it is within its power to enact laws and
regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts
resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what
the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony,
as the minimum requirements set by law were
complied with. While the petitioner may view this
merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage
ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the
solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
 From a reading of the provisions cited above, we
find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that
the penalty imposable in the present case is that
covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of
the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613

do not include the present case.1wphi1 As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not
found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law
but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only
the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On
this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
provides for the penalty for any violation of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one
of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the

penalty of fine of 200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the

decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]

REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize

affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they will solemnize.

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court

Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio
V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
and for gross ignorance of the law.1

Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial

Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized
marriages without the required marriage license.
He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2 and
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he
interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same
persons who executed the affidavit.17 The parties
identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod
City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him
[complainant Tupals] doormat, punching bag and
chopping block"20 since other judges also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the
Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be
fined 9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating
the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that
affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges official
functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary,21 a judges duty is to personally examine
the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation
before performing the marriage ceremony.22
Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to
notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine
affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended a fine of 1,000.00 per
affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of
violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of
gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular
No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial
court judges may act as notaries public. However,
they may do so only in their ex officio capacities.
They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official
functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit
trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the function of notaries public ex officio
under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of
1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following
qualifications on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public
ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official
functions and duties x x x. They may not, as
issued them to the contracting parties.3 He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties
marriage.4 These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine
affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge
Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on the day of the
contracting parties marriages.6 The affidavits
contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date]
at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February
26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial
court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and
notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties. Rex argues that
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judges official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio
affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge
Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also
did not require the parties to present their
competent pieces of evidence of identity as
required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross
ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x
simple and elementary to ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He
argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the
father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury
case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false
statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only
filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyns case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of
cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation was connected with his official
functions and duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines
on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of
the Judiciary14 does not prohibit judges from
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they will solemnize.15 Thus, Judge
Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a
notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a
notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized.16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize
the affidavits with the parties presenting their
other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn
statement that he personally ascertained the
parties qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also
provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before
the solemnization of the marriage in legal
ratification of cohabitation. In the case of a
marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation,
the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally
interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the
affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of
having lived together as husband and wife for at
least five [5] years and the absence of any legal
impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a
sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and
(b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting
parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the
judge who will solemnize the parties marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for
at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge
can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with the judges official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties requirements for marriage. If
the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and
review the affidavits statements before performing
the marriage ceremony. Should there be any
irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to
admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the
irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of
cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they
will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are
notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyances which
bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk
of conflict with their judicial duties, but also
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice
of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only
if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as
to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact
that there are still municipalities which have
neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC
and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or
circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in
the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary
public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged
be for the account of the Government and turned
over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs.
Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982,
114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or
circuit.24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation,
which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as
solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No.
1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the
judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they
submitted.25 The parties must have complied with
all the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage
license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil
registrar to parties who have all the qualifications
and none of the legal disqualifications to contract
marriage.27 Before performing the marriage
ceremony, the judge must personally examine the
marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from
the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the
parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation
sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing
officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and the
absence of any legal impediment to marry each

In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This
is the context in which this court stated that
"[judges] should not compete with private [lawyers]
or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90s purpose is not
limited to documents used to transact "legal
conveyancing business." So long as a judge
notarizes a document not connected with his
official functions and duties, he violates Circular
No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this
court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate
of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this
court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the
verification page of an answer filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The documents involved in these cases were not
used to transact "legal conveyancing business."
Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and
Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation, which were not connected with his
official function and duty to solemnize marriages,
he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure
to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking
in the municipality or circuit of the judges court
constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal.
Violations of laws are not excused by practice to
the contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary
public from notarizing documents if the signatory is
not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary
public must require the signatory to present a
competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
documents not connected with their official
function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
solemnized their marriages]."33 He notarized
documents not connected with his official function
and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojos argument will render the
solemnizing officers duties to examine the affidavit
of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that
the requirements have been complied with
redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively
examine a document he himself notarized. Article
34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by
law to administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit
of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who
performs the marriage ceremony are two different
persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only
prohibits municipal trial court judges from
notarizing "private documents x x x [bearing] no
direct relation to the performance of their functions
as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public
document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of
cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when
he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he
notarizes a public document. He did not violate
Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private
document until notarized. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document,
"[rendering the document] admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity."35 The
affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public
purpose," remains a private document until
notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents.
As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judges official duty to solemnize
marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90s purpose
is to "eliminate competition between judges and
private lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing
business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where
this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating
Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge
Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did not violate
Circular No. 1-90.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance
constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic
legal principles and procedure nine times is gross
ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a
serious charge:53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months;55 or
c. A fine of more than 20,000.00 but not exceeding
40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law.
Judges have been dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo
may have been misled by other judges practice of
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City
and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for six
(6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply
with the requirements of the law.1wphi1 They
should act with caution with respect to affidavits of
cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical
requirements as in this case will be dealt with
strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED
FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for
SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon
service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial
courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that
the person appearing before the notary public is the
signatory to the instrument or document to be
notarized. If the notary public does not personally
know the signatory, he must require the signatory
to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo
notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him.
Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were
personally known to him or that the parties
presented their competent pieces of evidence of
identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the
parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They
personally appeared before him to subscribe to
their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed
them on their qualifications to contract marriage.
Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation
need not present their competent pieces of
evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and
that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. The parties are supposed
to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits.
To personally know the parties, the notary public
must at least be acquainted with them.45
Interviewing the contracting parties does not make
the parties personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits
of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v.
Judge How46 where this court held that "[g]ood
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations x x x"47 were defenses
against gross ignorance of the law charges. His
good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation
should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good
faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres]
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x
x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the issues
are so simple and the applicable legal principles
evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins
of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that
lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts territorial jurisdiction before notarizing
documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
requires notaries public to personally know the
signatory to the document they will notarize or
require the signatory to present a competent
evidence of identity. These are basic legal
principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated.
Failure to comply with these basic requirements
nine times is not good faith.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September
29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee
Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios
(A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen,

and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-
1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a

petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011,
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It
further explained that the parties never intended to
enter into the marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family. It
concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for
Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely
gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage
and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should
be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not
fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a
real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to
the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage
was similar to a marriage by way of jest and,
therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10
reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole
question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first
examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file
his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-
trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October
2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination
for failure of both parties to appear at the
scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very
beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that
she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married
each other for convenience only. Giving credence to
the testimony of Albios, it stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the
sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the
parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did
not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for
a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the
Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage
was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used
it only as a means to acquire American citizenship
in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before
the CA.
Ruling of the CA
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case
of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband
to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a
non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack
of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to
obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts
have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to
achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the
RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that
the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the
RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly
did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in
jest considering that the parties only entered into
the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded
on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential
requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must
be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
The institution of marriage carries with it
concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose
of availing of particular benefits. In the United
States, marriages where a couple marries only to
achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose"
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is
one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law
is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely
to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the
couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus,
thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be
noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in
existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive
ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated,
wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to
live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand,
ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was
not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never
married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies
the parties may go through indicating the contrary,
they do not contract if they do not in fact assent,
which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a
marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage
without subsequent consummation will be valid; but
if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake
of representing it as such to the outside world and
with the understanding that they will put an end to
it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all.
They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There
is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions.29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on.30
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the
respondents attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage
void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may
be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable
on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under
Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and
(4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or
deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage
for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws
does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3),
the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. In the present case, there
is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event
the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply
under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so
as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would
be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into
as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound.
The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27
It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for
a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine
consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to
a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to
create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a
genuine consent to be married would allow them to
further their objective, considering that only a valid
marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of
the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing
the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.
(Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on
10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children,
namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed
to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and
Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack
of merit.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic SO ORDERED.

relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was
a customer in the auto parts and supplies business JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Associate Justice
Azucena left for the United States of America. In
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sallys father was against the
relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease
her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins
marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two

children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real
properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)

No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860

registered in the name of Benjamin, married to
Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of

Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681

registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in

1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions
for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage SECOND DIVISION
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally vs.
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their
children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married
to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins
civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court
found that they were bought by Benjamin using his
own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual
contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783.
However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT
No. 61722 and the two condominium units were
purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The
trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of
Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with
Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad
faith because she knew that Benjamin was married
to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code,
the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the
properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982
at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared
NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner
of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos.
17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and
RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950,
188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623,
194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209,
206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are
the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go"
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City
and Manila are directed to delete the words
"married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and
190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioners money without
contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties.
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of
was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked
the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148
of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency
of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and
Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition,
Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a
demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied.
Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the
trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued.
Sally then refused to present any evidence before
the trial court citing the pendency of her petition
before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence
on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still
refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial
court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court
ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from
the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License
Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage
License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin
and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and
the National Statistics Office because it could not
be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage
with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule
on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and
Bentley because they were not parties to the case.
The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal
support because she was not married to Benjamin.
The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice
and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not
ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that
Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named
in her answer as part of her conjugal properties
with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was
not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37
properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
committed no error in declaring Benjamins
marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals
ruled that only the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong
to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both
parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that
they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the
absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution
in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by
them in common, to be shared equally. However, the
share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in
the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad
faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed
to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the
trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27,
2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are
hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by
the petitioner-appellee while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No.
61722 shall be owned by them and common and to
be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership
under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest
of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722,
respondent is further directed within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender
control and possession of these properties
including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-
253681, these properties are under co-ownership of
the parties shared by them equally. However, the
share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor
of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan.
The share of the petitioner shall belong to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two
(2) properties shall be further processed pursuant
to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later
proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children
support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the
parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their
counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City
and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for
Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied
the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision
before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals
partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting
the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made
at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her
evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite
the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who
was not around and was not subpoenaed despite
the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that
Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled
that Benjamins action was based on his prior
marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence
that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before
Benjamin contracted the second marriage with
Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it
was clear that Sally was delaying the case because
she was waiting for the decision of the Court of
Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact
that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for.
Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution
because the trial court also has the duty to ensure
that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and,
at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
further alleges that if she were allowed to present
her evidence, she would have proven her marriage
to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin,
Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring
real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by
declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin
was the informant in their childrens birth
certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his
family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally
claims that there was no real property registered in
the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further
alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the
birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10
September 1973 was duly established before the
trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of
their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March
1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally,
Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II
of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified
that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only
Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that
the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage
was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license.12
It was also established before the trial court that
the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and
the National Statistics Office. The lack of record
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling
that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent;
and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming with modification the
trial courts decision regarding the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in
not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned
its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on
10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled
hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court
warned Sally that in case she still failed to present
her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
despite the presence of other available witnesses,
Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel
insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the
priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding
the trial courts prior warning due to the numerous
resettings of the case. Sally could not complain
that she had been deprived of her right to present
her evidence because all the postponements were
at her instance and she was warned by the trial
court that it would submit the case for decision
should she still fail to present her evidence on 28
November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued
refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to
have waived her right to present them. As pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued
failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her

On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous
under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is
required that the first or former marriage shall not
be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is
no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack
of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held
that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349
but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore
not bigamous because there was no marriage
license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner
cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming
that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage
license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior
existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.24 In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They
lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community of conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio,
Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National
Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes
J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department
of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that
there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally.
As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance
of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends
and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a
fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the
birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally.
This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant
in Bernices birth certificate which stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys
birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19
Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected
on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article
34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of
Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from
the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and
void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of
properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that
"the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court
of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it
can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision
stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The
trial court stated:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011
Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760,
which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the
CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage
license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title
1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for
the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is
stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented
to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that
is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified
that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at
the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one
of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines,
but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.
He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he
had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit
of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37
properties being claimed by Sally which were given
by Benjamins father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before
the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late
father himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule
that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in
accord with the evidence on record. Only the
property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26
The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the
descriptive title "married to Sally." The property
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered
in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title
"married to Benjamin" while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual. We have
ruled that the words "married to" preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G.
Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge
Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella
practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in
favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition
is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the
call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence
to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this
case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for
decision because of Sallys continued refusal to
present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and
while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision,
they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding
the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been
solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further
testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that
the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
with that office.17?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the
sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He
testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that
this Qualin secured the license and gave the same
to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified
that he did not know where the marriage license
was obtained.20 He attended the wedding
ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of
the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola.21?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her
daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law,
and that she was present at the wedding ceremony
held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage
license, and that a week before the marriage was to
take place, a male person went to their house with
the application for marriage license.23 Three days
later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it
to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she
did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage
license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy
dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for
both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed
Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the
persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her
husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them,
and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and
Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003
to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification
reads as follows:cralawlibrary
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary
This is to certify as per Registry Records of
Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN
on January 19, 1993. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been
issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar
Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had
filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002,
and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on
advice of his counsel.8?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic),
an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of
authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
January 20, 1993.9?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial
numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified
that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was
issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite,
certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
January 19, 1993, and that their office had not
issued any other license of the same serial number,
namely 9969967, to any other person.11?r?l1
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and
presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he
was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that
he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses
were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to
the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the
following assignment of errors:cralawlibrary
I previous marriage, and that the case was docketed
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING,
AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL
AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF
THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35?r?l1 ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br? marriage license is an absence of a formal
r requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and
granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held
that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites
laid down by law.37?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to
having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed
only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38?r?l1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.28?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with
Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case
against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been
married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated
under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31?r?l1
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC
held that no valid marriage license was issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in
favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It
also took into account the fact that neither party
was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the
license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:cralawlibrary
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria
Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent even if
no property was acquired during their cohabitation
by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the
parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil
Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are
hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil
registries the marriage contracted by petitioner
Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila. ???r?bl? ??r??l l??
l?br?r
SO ORDERED.34?r?l1
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:cralawlibrary
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except
those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites
under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer
and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution
of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple.
The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid
marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:cralawlibrary
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written
statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification
of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court
held:cralawlibrary
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant
data.44?r?l1
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.39?r?l1
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY
TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized
on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the
Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable
law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to
this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
which read as follows:cralawlibrary
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage
are:cralawlibrary
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.
witness to testify to the validity and existence of
said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could
not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where
the license came from. The task of applying for the
license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of
her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified
that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her
claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case
of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no
record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario
further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and
that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid,
and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that
burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license
was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria
and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to
support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:cralawlibrary
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence,
testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before
the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
The Court held in that case that the certification
issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect
that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording
of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words
"despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage
license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining
the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not
be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical
declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is
a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or
other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of
a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located
and submitted to the court. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria
and Syed does not overturn the presumption that
the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their
marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best
SO ORDERED. members of appellants family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband

and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima
Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took
appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on
01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family
Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10
January 2003 was filed against him for contracting
a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma.
Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity
of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and
perfidy.50?r?l1

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a

wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles
27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51
Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his

marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy
suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it
was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition

is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED.

No costs.