1. HERMINIO L. NOCUM, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
s. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Appellee (Nocum), who was a passenger in appellant's (Laguna Tayabas
Bus Co.) Bus No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of
Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers,
contained in a box, loaded in said bus. A total of 37 passengers were injured.
The bus conductor testified that the box belonged to a passenger whose name he
does not know and who told him that it contained miscellaneous items and clothes.
He also said that from its appearance there was no indication at all that the
contents were explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he
just relied on the word of the owner.
Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista added that they were not authorized to open the
baggages of passengers because instruction from the management was to call the
police if there were packages containing articles which were against regulations.
The trial court's decision is that appellant(LTBC) did not observe the extraordinary
or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the articles 1733, 1755,
& 1756 of the Civil Code. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
HELD: NO. We are not convinced that the exacting criterion of said provisions has
not been met by appellant in the circumstances of this particular case.
Article 1755 provides: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the
passengers of appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over
which they had no control, as enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His
Honor, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its
passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the
sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to
be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the
lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly
considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He
cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of
his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In
baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional
boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Since We hold that appellant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of
negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of
its passengers, "according to the circumstances of the (each) case", We deem it
unnecessary to rule whether or not there was any fortuitous event in this case.
The appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is dismissed.
2. FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PAULIE CAORONG and
HER MINOR CHILDREN, 305 SCRA 14 (1999)
FACTS:
Pauli Caurong filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, a bus
company operating in Northern Mindanao, for the death of her husband,
Atty. Talib Caorong. Atty. Caurong was shot by Maranaos in an ambush
involving said bus.
BACKGROUND OF THE STORY:
o In November 1989, a bus of Fortune was involved in an accident with a
passenger jeepney resulting in the deaths of several passengers.
o Crisanto Generalao, a local field agent of the Philippine Constabulary,
conducted an investigation on the accident and found that the owner
of the jeepney was a Maranao and that several Maranaos were
planning to burn some of Fortunes buses for revenge.
o Generalao informed Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of Fortune,
about the plot, and Bravo assured him that they would take the
necessary precautions for safety.
o Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when
three Maranaos went on board the vehicle. The leader of the group
ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later went back
to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already
pouring gasoline on the bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded
for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped out of the
vehicle. Caorong was shot to death as a result.
RTC dismissed the complaint:
o Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion of providing its
buses with security guards is not an omission of petitioners duty. The
evidence showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the
passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and
unforeseen occurrence beyond petitioners control.
 CA REVERSED RTCs ruling:
o Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious
plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take any safety
precautions at all.
o One available safeguard that could have absolved Fortune from
liability was frisking of incoming passengers en route to dangerous
areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to do.
The frisking system is not novel in sensitive and dangerous places.
Many companies adopt this measure. Fortune did absolutely
nothing.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing to take
necessary precautions to ensure the safety of its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?
3. Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket
extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket?
4. Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper?
HELD: Petitioner is liable. Attack was not a fortuitous event.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers
caused by the wilful act of other passengers, if its employees failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the act.
Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to
protect the safety of its passengers.
If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered
the weapons and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried
with them.
A common carrier is liable for failing to prevent hijacking by frisking
passengers and inspecting baggages.
The seizure of the bus was not force majeure. Of the four elements to
constitute an event as caso fotuito, the element of unforeseeable or
unavoidable circumstances was lacking. The seizure of the bus was
foreseeable, given the fact that petitioner was well-informed of the
possibility, days before the incident. This situation was likened to a case
where the common carrier failed to take safety precautions despite
warnings of an approaching typhoon.
Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorongs death. There was no
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, since all he did was
pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither an act of
negligence or recklessness.
3. Quisumbing Sr. vs. Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 605
FACTS: Norberto Quisumbing and Gunther Loeffler were passengers of PALs Fokker
Friendship plane flying from Macatan City bound to Manila. A senior NBI agent,
Florencio O. Villarin, a senior NBI agent and also one of the passengers of the said
plane, saw a certain Zaldy boarded on the same flight. Zaldy was a suspect for the
killing of a Judge Valdez. Villarin sent a note to the Captain of the plane requesting
that they contact the NBI director to send agents on their point of destination
because of the presence of Zaldy. However, Captain Luis Bonnevie came out of the
cockpit and informed Villarin the he could not send the message because it would
be heard by all ground aircraft stations. Villarin advised the Captain of the danger
having Zaldy and his companions onboard. Consequently, gunshots ensued between
Zaldys group and Villarin. Zaldy announced a hold-up and obtained the belongings
of the passengers. Zaldy and his companions successfully escaped upon landing in
Manila. Petitioners now demand from PAL indemnity for their lost belongings. The
petitioners contended that PAL is liable for breach of contract of carriage, for not
transporting them and their belongings at the point of destination without loss or
damage. As a defense, PAL interposed that the incident was force majeure.
ISSUE: Whether PAL can be held liable for the loss of petitioners belongings due to
the hi-jacking?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that PAL cannot be held liable for the loss of
property. Where the defendants has faithfully complied with the requirements of
government agencies and adhered to the established procedures and precautions of
the airline industry and particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a
passenger in hindsight believes should have been done is not the negligence or
misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause.
It was proven that PAL cannot be faulted with negligence. Hence, there was no
breach of contract of carriage because there was no clear evidence that PAL acted in
bad faith in their obligation to transport the passengers and their properties at the
point of destination. The mandatory use of the most sophisticated electronic
devices may have minimized hijackings but all these have proved ineffective against
truly determined highjackers. Such incident which occurred was indeed force
majeure.
4. La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals 17 SCRA 739
FACTS: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La
Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted
from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the
vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not
unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the
running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run
so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and
killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding
La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La
Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger
and therefore the contract of carriage terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the
moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle.
HELD: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was
already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists,
we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rules that the relation between carrier
and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carriers premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was
no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off
the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave
him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said
passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still
exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court, although
incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs
to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or
not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has
already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its
driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in
the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of
P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.
5. Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals GR. No. 118864
FACTS: Private respondents were passengers of Japan Airlines from California bound
for Manila. The flights were to make an overnight stopover at Nairita, Japan as an
incentive for traveling. However, due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which
rendered the NAIA inaccessible, respondents flight from Japan to Manila was
indefinitely. JAL assumed the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay on
June 15, 1991. However, JAL no longer settled their hotel and accommodation
expenses during stay at Nauta, Japan. Since NAIA was only reopened for airlines
traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondent were forced to pay for their
accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to
June 21, 1991. Hence, they commenced an action for damages against JAL for
failing to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay
for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to June 21, 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not JAL was liable for the hotel and meal expenses defrayed by
private respondents while pending destination.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that JAL cannot be held liable. In the case at bar,
there was absence of bad faith and negligence on the part of Japan Airlines. Such
occurrence of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo amounts to a force majeure. When a
party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is
that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Common carriers
are not insurer of all risks. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
mode of travel. However, JAL is not completely absolved from liability. It has the
obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on
its first available flight to Manila.
6. Baliwag Transit vs. CA (GR 116110, 15 May 1996)
FACTS: On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded
Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They
took the seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo
truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its
left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too
narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of
the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, and his helper
were then replacing a flat tire.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the
truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiagos passengers urged
him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated
conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision
became imminent, the bus passengers shouted Babangga tayo!. Santiago stepped
on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing
him instantly and the trucks helper, and injury to several others among them herein
respondents.
Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique
for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for
having failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their point of destination safely in
violation of Garcias and Baliwag Transits contractual relation; and likewise found A
& J and its truck driver liable for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early
warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. All were ordered to pay
solidarily the Garcia spouses.
On appeal, the CA modified the trial courts Decision by absolving A & J Trading
from liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries.
HELD: Yes. As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it
failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and
sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed
that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is
injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the
formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of
the common carriers do not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of their employees.
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides Lights and
reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one
hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such
vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in
such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices
either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be
visible at night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any
of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered.
x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene
lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as
an early warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. The law clearly allows the use not only of an early
warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights
or flares visible 100 meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a
kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No
negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-31246)
with the modification reducing the actual damages for hospitalization and medical
fees to P5,017.74; without costs.
7. Cervantes v. CA
FACTS: On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner
Nicholas Cervantes a round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-
Manila, which is valid until March 27, 1990. On March 23, 1990, petitioner used it.
Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he immediately booked a flight to Manila, which was
confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane would make a stop-over in San
Francisco, and because he would be there on April 2, petitioner made arrangements
to board in San Francisco. On April 2, he was not allowed to board due to the
expiration of his ticket. He filed a complaint for damages. It was not given due
course by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket
extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket?
2. Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper?
HELD: (1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that
there was a need to send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the extension of the
period of validity of his ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts
of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the
latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person
(herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority,
the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person
is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover
damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's
ratification.
(2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that PAL
acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San Francisco. In
awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be
wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with
malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not
use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his
departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it
should be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple
negligence. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up
ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, and the existence of
bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an
award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Here, there is no showing that PAL acted
in such a manner. An award for attorney's fees is also improper.
8. Zulueta vs. Pan Am
FACTS: Mr. Zulueta and his wife and child boarded a flight of Pan Am from Wake
Island to the Phil. Mr. Zulueta, however, had to relieve himself and thus looked for a
secluded place in the beach. As a result, he was delayed in boarding for some 20 or
30 minutes. While Mr. Zulueta was reaching the ramp, the captain of the plane
demonstrated an intemperate and arrogant tone thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to
answer back. Thus, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded. The airport manager of then sent
Mr. Zulueta a letter stating that his stay in Wake Island would be for a minimum of
one week during which he would be charged $13.30 per day.
ISSUE: WON Pan Am should be held liable.
HELD: Yes. Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded to retaliate and punish him for the
embarrassment and loss of face thus suffered by defendants agent.
The Zuluetas had a contract of carriage with the defendant, as a common carrier,
pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a substantial monetary consideration
paid by the former, not merely to transport them to Manila, but, also, to do so with
extraordinary diligence or utmost diligence. The responsibility of the common RULING:
carrier, under said contract, as regards the passengers safety, is of such a nature,
affecting as it does public interest, that it cannot be dispensed with or even
lessenedby stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or
otherwise.
In the present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to
transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate
him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible
inconvenience.
With regard to DAMAGES
It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the
circumstances, defendants agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident
bad faith. If gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with
more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate,
malicious and tainted with bad faith.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to
provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its
contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in
addition to moral damages.
9. Alitalia v. Court of Appeals 187 SCRA 763
FACTS:
On September 3, 1981, the private respondents Spouses Jose and Victoria
Juliano (hereinafter referred to as the Julianos), arrived at the Fumicino
Airport in Rome, Italy in order to board Flight AZ 1774 of Alitalia Airways
scheduled to depart at 10:30 a.m. for Hongkong.
However, Flight AZ 1774 left Rome without the Julianos. When private
respondent Jose O. Juliano arrived in Manila, he returned to his employer
Bristol-Myers, Inc., of which he was Vice-President for Operations, the
unused Rome-Hongkong leg of the Alitalia ticket. However, the cost of the
Thai Airways tickets they had to purchase in lieu of Alitalia was not
refunded by his office.
On December 15, 1981, the Julianos filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City against the petitioner for damages from the
alleged breach of its contractual obligations when the petitioner failed to
transport the private respondent to Hongkong on the Alitalia Flight AZ
1774 2 .
When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular
flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger
has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of
carriage.
When a passenger contracts for a specific flight, he has a purpose in
making that choice which must be respected. This choice, once exercised,
must not be impaired by a breach on the part of the airline without the
latter incurring any liability. Besides, why should the Julianos be compelled
to wait for another Alitalia flight to risk a similar rebuff and suffer the
consequent further delay?
It was already too much of a coincidence that, at Fumicino Airport, the
Julianos would find another Filipino, in the person of Ms. Estanislao, in the
same predicament that they were in.
That Alitalia had no intention to accommodate all who had confirmed their
flight reservations could be seen in the absence of any measure to contract
 and possible passengers for each flight who might be within the airport
premises. As a result, some passengers would really be left behind in the
long and disorderly queue at the check-in counter.
Common carriers, like commercial airlines, are in the business of rendering
service, which is the primary reason for their recognition in our law. They
can not be allowed to disregard our laws as if they are doing the
passengers any favor by accommodating them.
Because the passengers in a contract of carriage do not contract merely for
transportation, they have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy, and consideration. Hence the
justification why passengers must be spared from the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute.
As held in Trans World Airlines v. Court of Appeals, such inattention to and
lack of care [by the petitioner airline] for the interest of its passengers who
are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their
convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the
award of moral damages. Ergo, we affirm the respondent court's award of
moral damages at P200.000.00. This award should be sufficient to
indemnify the Julianos for the delay, inconvenience, humiliation, and
embarrassment they suffered.
10. Korean Airlines v. Court of Appeals 234 SCRA 717
FACTS:
Sometime in 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive electrician, was
contracted for employment is Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a period of one
year through Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. Lapuz was
supposed to leave on November 8, 1980, via Korean Airlines. Initially, he
was "waitlisted," which meant that he could only be accommodated if any
of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before
departure. When two of such passengers did not appear, Lapuz and
another person by the name of Perico were given the two unclaimed seats.
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in with one suitcase and one
shoulder bag at the check-in counter of KAL. He passed through the
customs and immigration sections for routine check-up and was cleared for
departure as Passenger No. 157 of KAL Flight No. KE 903. Together with the
other passengers, he rode in the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of
the KAL aircraft for boarding. However, when he was at the third or fourth
rung of the stairs, a KAL officer pointed to him and shouted "Down!
Down!" He was thus barred from taking the flight. When he later asked for
another booking, his ticket was canceled by KAL. Consequently, he was
unable to report for his work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2-week
period and so lost his employment.
KAL, on the other hand, alleged that on November 8, 1980, Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services Inc. coordinated with KAL for the departure of 30
contract workers, of whom only 21 were confirmed and 9 were wait-listed
passengers. The agent of Pan Pacific, Jimmie Joseph, after being informed
that there was a possibility of having one or two seats becoming available,
gave priority to Perico, who was one of the supervisors of the hiring
company in Saudi Arabia. The other seat was won through lottery by Lapuz.
However, only one seat became available and so, pursuant to the earlier
agreement that Perico was to be given priority, he alone was allowed to
board.
RULING:
The Court held that the status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed
to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the
passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through
immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed
as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the
contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination.
A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the
traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these
employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when, instead of
courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed" passenger, a KAL
officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing
him embarrassment and public humiliation.
The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in at
the departure counter, passed through customs and immigration, boarded
the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his
baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to
Jeddah. The contract to carriage between him and KAL had already been
perfected when he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding
the aircraft.
The defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it "bumped off" plaintiff-
appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated him rudely and
arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines,"
 which clearly malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to
moral damages.
A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz
is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The
assessment of P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is
reasonable and realistic.
11. M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN BUENA, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO MONSERRAT, and MARTA
CONSIGNADO, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE SAFE
FLOOR IN PASSENGER BUS. A common carrier neglects its duty to transport its
passengers safely where one of its passengers died because the floor of its bus gave
way after a tire blow-out caused by overcrowding, overspeeding and weak flooring.
2. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS LIABILITY NOT DISCHARGED BY ERRONEOUS AFFIDAVITS OF
PARENTS OF VICTIM. Signed statements of the claimants expressing their belief
that the transportation company is not liable to them are not proof that the latter
have discharged their legal liability to claimants, where such belief is erroneous and
said claimants are ignorant.
3. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED. In a contract of
carriage breached by the passengers death, moral damages and attorneys fees
may be awarded.
DECISION
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the Laguna court of first instance, the spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta
Consignado sued M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc., and Martin Buena to recover
damages for the death of their four-year old daughter Victoria.
In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were paying passengers
in a bus of defendant transportation company driven by co-defendant Buena, bound
for Antipolo, Rizal. In Sta. Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a rear tire
exploded, blasting a hole in the very place where Victoria was standing in front of
her mother. As a result, the child fell through the hole, and died that same morning
from injuries sustained in the fall.
The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the
accident was not due to negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2)
even if negligence was attributable to defendants, their liability had been
discharged, as evidenced by Exhibits 2 and 3 quoted in the footnote. 1
On appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, upon the
finding that (1) defendants failed to prove the extraordinary diligence required of
carriers; and (2) exhibits 2 and 3 did not effect a waiver of plaintiffs right to
damages. Said appellate court, therefore required defendants to pay plaintiffs
P6,000 as indemnity for the childs death, P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00
as attorneys fees, with interest from the date of its decision, minus the P150.00
that had been given to plaintiff Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).
In their petition for review by certiorari, the carrier and the driver raise the
following issues: (1) whether in a contract of carriage breached by the passengers
death, his parents may be granted moral damages; and (2) whether the sum of
P6,000.00 may be awarded as death indemnity for a child passenger. In their brief,
they pose the following questions in addition to the above issues: (3) was there a
contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation
company; (4) have petitioners rebutted the presumption that they have been
negligent; (5) was the bus crowded; (6) was the bus running fast when the tire
exploded; (7) what caused the bursting of the tire; (8) was the bus floor weak; (9)
was the blow-out of the tire caso fortuito; and (10) was petitioners liability
cancelled by Exhibits 2 and 3?
The alleged lack of contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner
transportation company, if true, is a complete defense against claimants cause of
action. However, the issue is now inarguable, it being partly factual, on which the
appellate court made its finding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus; petitioners were duty
bound to transport them, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art.
1755, New Civil Code). Therein they failed. The child died because the floor of the
bus gave way; this reinforces the presumption that petitioners had neglected to
provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). Evidence of the required
extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the presumption.
On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and
overspeeding, and the floor thereof was weak persuasive indications of
negligence; and reasoned out that the tire exploded due to one or a combination of
the following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly
checked; the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have overstrained
the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could have expanded
the already compressed air therein." 2
Petitioners venture to guess that it was due either to accidental puncture by a sharp
instrument, as a nail, or to latent defect in the tire. Evidence should have been
but was not presented to establish such defense.
Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still hold the carrier
liable for failure to provide a safe floor in the bus.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to
claimants. What is expressed there is the latters belief clearly erroneous that
petitioners are not liable to them, and acknowledgment of the voluntary help
extended by petitioner transportation company. The belief is baseless. That
respondents entertained such an ill-founded impression is not to be wondered at.
They are ignorant, illiterate, indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibit 2 and 3,
thoroughly confused and distracted by the death of their child.
The minimum death indemnity is P3,000 3 , although this Court has in various
instances granted P6,000.00. As for moral damages, the carrier is liable therefor to
the parents of a child who meets death while a passenger in any of the carriers
vehicles (Art. 2206 and 1764, New Civil Code). Since respondents are indigents, and
have litigated as paupers, they should be allowed attorneys fees of P500.00.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
12. ANTONIA MARANAN v. PASCUAL PEREZ
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT BAR. R.C. was a passenger in a
taxicab owned by P. P. when he was stabbed to death by the driver, S.V. In the
subsequent action for damages, P. P. cited Gillaco v. MRR, 97 Phil., 884, which ruled
that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the
passengers. Held, the Gillaco case does not apply. There, the passenger was killed
outside the scope and course of duty of the guilty employee while here, the killing
took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when he was acting
within the scope of his duties.
2. ID.; ID.; OLD AND NEW CIVIL CODES COMPARED. Unlike the old Civil Code, the
new Civil Code of the Philippines in its Article 1759 expressly makes the common
carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its
passengers.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS OF CARRIERS LIABILITY FOR ASSAULTS ON PASSENGERS
COMMITTED BY ITS DRIVERS. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of
Common Carriers (Sec. 4, Chap. 3, Title VIII, Rep. Act No. 386) are new and were
taken from Anglo-American Law (Report of the Code Commission, 64). There, the
basis of the carriers liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rest
either on (1) the doctrine of respondent superior, or (2) the principle that it is the
carriers implied duty to transport the passenger safely (53 ALR 2d 721-728; 732-
734). Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the
act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient
that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view,
upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault
happens within the course of the employees duty. It is no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carriers
orders (10 Am. Jur. 105-107; 263-265). The carriers liability her is absolute in the
sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees (Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 1997 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W., 2d, 618; Van
Hoeffen v. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591, 162 S.W. 694; Brockway v.
Mordenti, 199 Misc. 898, 103 N.Y.S. 621; Korner v. Cosgrove, 141 N.E. 265, 31 A.L.R.
1193).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CIVIL CODE FOLLOWS SECOND VIEW. As can be gleaned from
the Article 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based
on the second view: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish
its passengers that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high
degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the
hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carriers
own servants charged with the passengers safety; (2) said liability of the carrier
from the servants violations of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers
confiding in the servants hands the performance of his contract to safely transport
the passenger, with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the
carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carriers employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them. (Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe
110 Tex 97, 216 S.W. 388, 380, 390; and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 L.R.A. 84,
85.)
5. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS DUTY IN SELECTING ITS DRIVERS AND SIMILAR EMPLOYEES.
It is the carriers strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due
regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less
important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral
fibers, and social attitude.
6. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES FOR PASSENGERS DEATH. P3,000 is
the minimum compensatory damages recoverable when a breach of contract of
carriage results in the passengers death (Arts 1764 & 2206, Civil Code) but
consistent with the policy of this Court, the minimal award should be raised to
P6,000. In addition, the parents of the decedent are entitled to moral damages to
compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefore having been
properly made, it becomes the courts duty to award moral damages (Mercado v.
Lira, L-13328-29 & L-13358, Sept. 29, 1961). Interest upon such damages are also
due to plaintiff-appellant (Art. 2210, Civil Code).
DECISION
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and
operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the
Court of Appeals.
On December 6, 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelios mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was
dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this
Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier
mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila
Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults
of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of
that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. As this Court there found:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had 10 duties to discharge in
connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The
stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa, was
assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco
Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train he was
engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two hours after
the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was
riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa
at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties
that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result,
Devesas assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillacos contract of
transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the
passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the
contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the
passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when
the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of
1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers
absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts
committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was
truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art.
1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from
their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite
of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory
difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual
situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case.
Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the
common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its
passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that.
"Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers although the
negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are new and were
taken from Anglo-American Law. 2 There, the basis of the carriers liability for
assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of
respondent superior or (2) the principle that it is the carriers implied duty to
transport the passenger safely. 3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of
the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that
the act be within the course of employment only. 4

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employees duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carriers orders. 5 The carriers liability here is absolute in the
sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees. 6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows
the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this
rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-
390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85; (1) the special undertaking of
the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection
afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia
from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above
all, from the acts of the carriers own servants charged with the passengers safety;
(2) said liability of the carrier for the servants violation of duty to passengers, is the
result of the formers confiding in the servants hands the performance of his
contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as
between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful
acts or negligence of the carriers employees against passengers, since it, and not
the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carriers strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns
of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court
rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.
The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiffs
action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage 7 and the cab driver was not
a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was
convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount
recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a
breach of contract results in the passengers death. As has been the policy followed
by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged
actual damages, the lower courts finding that plaintiffs evidence thereon was not
convincing 8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral
damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger
killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor having
been properly made, it becomes the courts duty to award moral damages. 9
Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We
consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as
sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in
plaintiffs favor to P6,000, plus P3,000 moral damages, with legal interest on both
from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is
paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So
ordered.
13. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION),
RICARDO BETER, SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA
RAUTRAUT, respondents.
SUMMARY: Ornominio and Narcisa were on board a Bachelor bus bound for
Cagayan de Oro. When they were passing Butuan, a passenger ran amuck and
stabbed a policeman who was on board. A stampede ensued; Ornominio and
Narcisa were pushed off the bus as the passengers scampered for the solitary door.
As the bus was still running, the unlucky couple (kasi dalawa sila eh) fell into the
road and died, as the door was forced open by the panicking passengers. Their
parents sued Bachelor, its owner and the bus driver. RTC absolved them from
liability on the ground of caso fortuito and lack of negligence. CA reversed, holding
that RTC overlooked material facts showing negligence of Bachelor (inappropriate
speed, drivers failure to stop bus promptly, not enough doors, conductor panicked).
SC upheld CA and held Bachelor et.al. liable.
DOCTRINE: Common carriers are presumed negligent in case of injury or death of a
passenger, even when the proximate cause of the death is a fortuitous event. In
such cases, the common carrier must show that it exercised extraordinary diligence
in preventing harm to its passengers; for it to be absolved from liability. (NCC 1173,
1732, 1733, 1735 & 1736)
Common carrier must prove that it exercised care and diligence in protecting its
customers in the case of a fortuitous event (e.g., an unexpected stabbing incident).
For the defense of force majeure to prosper the accident must be due to natural
causes and exclusively without human intervention.
Application of the formula for computing damages loss of earning capacity.
NATURE: Petition for review of a CA decision. Original action for sum of money Categorically stated that she saw Ornominio fall of the
[with quotation marks; apparently it was a suit for damages]. bus as the door was pushed open by the force of
onrushing passengers.
FACTS
o PEDRO COLLANGO (the conductor; an employee of Bachelor)
August 1, 1980 BACHELOR Express Bus No. 800 was travelling from Davao
City to Cagayan de Oro via Butuan. Owner/Operator: Samson YASAY.
He shut the door after the last passenger had entered the
Driver: Cresencio RIVERA. Conductor: Pedro COLLANGO. Bus had only one
bus. Some passengers jumped out of the windows while
door at the front.
the bus was running [Bachelor claims that Ornominio and
Narcisa were among them]. Asked to provide an estimate
While the bus was in Tabon-tabon, Butuan, the bus stopped to pick up a
of the bus speed at the time the commotion occurred,
passenger.About 15 minutes later, a commotion arose when a passenger at
he stated that they were running at not less than 30 or
the rear end of the bus (not identified by name) ran amuck and stabbed a
40 miles [per hour], equivalent to 48-65 kilometers per
fellow passenger who was a member of the Philippine Constabulary.
hour. The bus was running slowly as they have just picked
A stampede ensued and the bus had to be stopped. In the aftermath of the up a passenger. The bus was running at second gear
incident, passengers ORNOMINIO Beter and NARCISA Rautraut were found when the commotion broke out.
lying on the roadside.
BACHELORS DEFENSES
o Ornominio died on the spot from head injuries. He was 32 y/o and
o It was able to transport the passengers safely to their respective
a carpenter by trade. Narcisa eventually died due to severe
places of destination except Ornominio and Narcisa, who jumped
injuries she sustained from the accident. She was 23 y/o and
off the bus without the knowledge and consent of Rivera and
unemployed. The passenger who ran amuck was able to jump off
Collango
the bus but was killed by the police after he was pursued into the
bushes. o It had exercised due diligence in the choice of its employees
Ornominios parents (the SPS. BETER) and Narcisas parents (the SPS. o The incident was not a traffic accident or vehicular accident but a
RAUTRAUT [RA-UT-RA-UT]) filed a complaint for sum of money against
fortuitous event very much beyond the control of Bachelor, Yasay
Bachelor, Yasay, and Rivera before Branch I of the Butuan RTC.
or Rivera
TESTIMONIES
o Bachelor et.al. were not parties to the incident complained of as it
o LEONILA CULLANO (a passenger, testifying for the defense) was an act of a third party who is not in any way connected with
them and of which they have no control and supervision.
o When the commotion occurred, she stood up, and noticed a
RTC DECISION
wounded man.
o FACTUAL FINDINGS
Collango opened the door only when the passengers
were shouting at the driver to stop the bus. Collango was
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how
panicking. The passengers were in a state of panic as
Narcisa and Ornominio died.
well. She saw Narcisa and Ornominio alight the bus
through the door. From the evidence adduced by Sps. Beter and Sps.
Rautraut, the Court could not see why the two deceased
o SERGIA BETER (also a passenger; Ornominios mother)
could have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses
testified that when the commotion ensued inside the
 bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each other
towards the door apparently in order to get off from the
bus through the door.
The passengers could not have passed through the door
because according to the evidence the door was locked.
Court gave credence to the evidence adduced by
Bachelor et.al. that when the commotion ensued inside
the bus, the two deceased panicked and, in a state of
shock and fear, they jumped off from the bus through the
window.
Rivera and Collango were not negligent in their duties.
They had every right to accept passengers absent any
manifestation of violence or drunkenness.
o HOLDING
Complaint was dismissed.
Transportation companies are not insurers of their
passengers.
If and when such passengers harm other passengers
without the knowledge of the transportation company's
personnel, the latter should not be faulted.
CA DECISION
o FACTUAL FINDINGS
There was no evidence to support the conclusion that
the door was locked.
Collangos testimony must not be given weight because,
apart from being inconsistent, it is biased. He is an
employee of Bachelor; he was also involved in the
incident and would be inclined to testify in his employers
favor.
The lone disinterested eyewitness, Cullano, testified that
the door was opened.
Court gave credence to the testimonies of Sergia and
Cullano.
The bus was not running slowly. 48-65 km/h cannot be
considered slow.
CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING NEGLIGENCE
Rivera stopping the bus only after mass agitation
by the passengers
Reckless opening of the doors of the bus while
traveling at an appreciably fast speed
Violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code in operating a public utility bus with only
one door
o HOLDING
Bachelor et.al. held liable:
For Ornominios death - P75,000.00 in loss of
earnings and support, moral damages, straight
death indemnity and attorney's fees
For Narcisas death - P45,000.00 for straight
death indemnity, moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Costs of suit
Bachelor et.al. appealed to the SC
ISSUE (HELD)
W/N Bachelor et.al. is liable for the deaths of Ornominio and Narcisa (YES)
SUB-ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N the proximate cause of the incident was beyond the control of Bachelor
et.al. (YES)
2) W/N Bachelor exercised extraordinary diligence to safeguard its passengers lives
(NO)
RATIO
1) RUNNING AMUCK WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE; EVENT WAS FORTUITOUS; COMMON
CARRIERS NOT IMMEDIATELY ABSOLVED
Bachelor is correct in claiming that the proximate cause of the incident was
the stabbing of the constable.
 o The sudden and unexpected stabbing incident drove the
passengers and the bus crew to panic.
o A stampede ensued when the passengers all rushed to the solitary
exit, causing the death of Narcisa and Ornominio (more on this
below)
NCC 1173: Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulations, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable. This provision was taken from Art. 1105 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which uses the term caso fortuito.
Lasam v. Smith [Torts]: some extraordinary circumstance independent of
the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a
caso fortuito.
COMMON CARRIER MUST STILL PROVE THAT IT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN
CAUSING THE INJURIES RESULTING FROM FORTUITOUS EVENTS
o NCC 1756: Common carriers are presumed negligent if a
passenger dies or is injured.
o Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co.: Common carrier must prove
that it exercised care and diligence in protecting its customers in
the case of a fortuitous event
o BLTB Co. v. IAC: For the defense of force majeure to prosper the
accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without
human intervention.
Now the Court had to find out if Bachelor could not really be faulted in any
way for the death of Ornominio and Narcisa, which was brought about by
the stabbing incident.
2) BACHELOR DID NOT EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Bachelors arguments:
o Rivera was driving cautiously giving due regard to traffic rules,
laws and regulations throughout the course of the trip, even
during the incident.
o As ruled by the trial court, common carriers are not insurers of
their passengers.
SC: Untenable. There is enough evidence to prove Bachelors failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence. It therefore failed to prove that the deaths
of Ornominio and Narcisa were attributable solely to the fortuitous event.
SC noted that the RTCs and CAs factual findings were conflicting. [hence
the SC reviewed the record]
SC upheld the CAS findings of fact [see above], which point to the failure
of Bachelor to exercise extraordinary diligence. The RTC disregarded these
material facts.
CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING NEGLIGENCE
o Rivera did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the
commotion
o The bus was speeding from a full stop
o The victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave
way while the bus was still running
o Collango panicked and blew his whistle after people had already
fallen off the bus
o The bus was not properly equipped with enough doors in
accordance with law
It is therefore clear that Bachelor et.al. have failed to overcome the
presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common
carriers.
BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS
o Culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage
o NCC 1732: Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
o NCC 1733: Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
 o NCC 1755: A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers o Considering his social standing and position
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for o Deductible, living and incidental expenses=P400 a month, P4,800
all the circumstances. annually, and P120,000 for 25 years.

o NCC 1756: In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common o Daily Income: Considering that Ornominios work is seasonal
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted (arawan), SC assumed that he works 20 days a month at P25 a day
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary or P500 a month.
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
o Annual Income=P6,000 or P150,000 for 25 years.
3) On Bachelors allegation that the Sps. Beter and the Sps. Rautraut were not the o Compensation for Loss of support and service=P30,000 (150,000
parents of Ornominio and Narcisa, respectively: Nagpapalusot na lang ang
minus 120,000)
Bachelor. The spouses were identified as the parents of the deceased during the
trial and were recognized by the RTC as such. The complaint was dismissed solely on o Straight death indemnity under NCC 2206=P30,000
the ground that Bachelor et.al. were not negligent. It is a belated attempt to evade
liability. o Moral Damages=P10,000.00 as an exception to the general rule
against moral damages in case of breach of contract rule Art. 2200
4) Award of Damages (Necesito v. Paras).
FACTORS TO CONSIDER (Alcantara v. Surro):
o Attorney's fees=P5,000.
1) life expectancy (considering the state of health of the deceased
o TOTAL INDEMNITY for Ricardo and Sergia Beter as parents and
and the mortality tables are deemed conclusive) and loss of
heirs of Ornominio=P75,000.
earning capacity
2) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service COMPUTATION FOR NARCISA
3) moral and mental suffering
Villa Rey Rule, as reiterated in People v. Daniel: BASES FOR COMPUTING o Straight death indemnity=P30,000.00
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY:
o Moral damages=P10,000.00
1) number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed; and 2) rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs should o Attorney's fees =P5,000.00
be fixed.
Using Davila v. PAL formula: at the age of 30 one's normal life expectancy is o TOTAL INDEMNITY= P45,000.00
33-1/3 years based on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality (2/3 x
o No indemnity for loss of earning capacity as there was no
80-32).
evidence that she had visible means of support.
By taking into account the pace and nature of the life of a carpenter, it is
reasonable to make allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed, CA decision affirmed.
expectancy of Ornominio to 25 years.

To fix the rate of losses it must be noted that Art. 2206 refers to gross
earnings less necessary living expenses of the deceased, in other words,
only net earnings are to be considered.

COMPUTATION FOR ORNOMINIO