Legal Research Midterms Reviewer 2015

I. Introduction to Legal Research

ISSUE: W/N the standards of academic plagiarism be enforced in
A. Definition judicial writing
It is the process of identifying and retrieving information necessary to
support legal decision-making. In its broadest sense, it includes each step HELD: NO
of a course of action that begins with the analysis of the facts of a problem
and concludes with the application and communication (Aleitheia ITL 2014 ACADEMIC JUDICIAL
Comprehensive Reviewer)
B. Purpose: To support a legal claim Intent can be a defense because
there is no intent to pass of
C. Summary of legal research steps (Aleitheia ITL 2014 Comprehensive anothers idea as his own; there is a
Reviewer) Intent, which is fraud, is not a need to be accurate and correct,
1) Problem identification and analysis defense; plagiarism is seen through therefore it is acceptable to lift
the act itself, not intent passages from jurisprudence
Collect the facts
because what is being copied is not
Classify the facts literary in nature, and its purpose is
Determine the legal issue/s to resolve a dispute
Identify the jurisdiction
Exempt from copying to comply with
2) Information search and retrieval stare decisis for consistency and
Based on originality of content
Find materials (cases, jurisprudence, statutes, etc.) relevant to fairness and to maintain the publics
the subject using finding tools, secondary and primary rules faith in courts
3) Communication of result
Remedy for justice, with the
Present answers or results clearly and concisely with correct strength of the decision depends on
and accurate citation of sources Produces original knowledge for a
the strength and acceptance of
D. Plagiarism degree and distinction
jurisprudence; no expectation to
1. Definition, etymology, and some types of plagiarism produce new knowledge

Definition: The deliberate and knowing presentation of another

persons original ideas or creative expressions as ones own
(Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th edition).
Elements: steal idea, passes of as ones own, intent to copy
Etymology: Greek = plagion, Latin = plagium (kidnapping) or
plagiaruis (kidnapper)
Why not theft? Because thoughts are one with the personhood.
Meaning, if you steal someones thoughts, youre also stealing
someones personhood.
Types of Plagiarism:
2. Intent as an element (In the Matter of Charges of Plagiarism, A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC
FACTS: The legal researcher of Justice Del Castillo accidentally
deleted during the clean-up the citations in the Vinuya case, which
is about the petitioners request for claims regarding the acts of the
Japanese during World War II towards 70 comfort women. The
Court dismissed this petition due to the reason that, i) the Executive
has the prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine
whether to espouse claims against Japan, and ii) the Philippines is
not under any international law to espouse their claims. After more
than a month, the petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration,
and a supplemental petition regarding Justice del Castillos acts of
plagiarism in his decision, in which he did not properly cite three
foreign articles. Petitioners invoke that the same standards on
academic plagiarism be applied in this case.
3. Other unethical conducts
a. Code of Professional Responsibility
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.

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a. Hipos v Bay (WRONG CITATION AND LIFTING OF TEXT)
FACTS: This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2
October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch
86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which
denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Informations for the crime of rape and acts of lasciviousness
were filed by the petitioners. Complainants filed for a Motion
for Reinvestigation to study if the proper Informations had
been filed against the petitioners and co-accused. The same
was granted. However, petitioners filed to dismiss the case of
the grounds that there was no probable cause of the crimes
charged.
After which, a resolution was passed by the City Prosecutor
affirming the Informations filed. However, this resolution was
reversed, holding there was a lack of probable cause. A
Motion to Withdraw Informations was filed before the
respondent judge, but was denied.
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to the Supreme
Court, praying that the respondent judge be compelled to
reverse the judgment on the reversal of the resolution.
ISSUE: W/N a writ of mandamus is the correct remedy to be
filed
HELD: NO
-Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding an entity to
do an act required, but cannot control the exercise of
discretion . By seeking a writ of mandamus, the petitioners
seek to curb the respondent judges exercise of discretion.
This is not available to direct exercise in a particular way or
reversal of a judgement that is already taken or acted upon.
The petitioners should have filed for petition for certiorari
instead, in which it can compel for a review of a judgment
decided on.
-Petitioner used a Supreme Court ruling to support its claim
that mandamus is the correct remedy to be filed. However:
1. Petitioners have taken cited passage way out of context.
Sanchez v Demetriou
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable
showing of grave abuse of discretion that will justify a judicial
intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such case
the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for
mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.
In the cited case: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to
challenge order of the respondent judge for denying his motion
to quash Information, claiming that in the case filed against
him for rape and homicide, the other two persons should have
been included in the Information.The Court says there was no
evidence to include said persons in the case, and if there was
an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutors, the petitioner should have filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the filing of charges against
said two other persons.
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In the case at bar: The petition for mandamus was directed not
against the prosecution, but the trial court, compelling the
latter to grant Motion to Withdraw Informations. The
prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. The
Court said that once a information is filed in court, any
disposition or dismissal of the case rests within the jurisdiction,
competence and discretion of the trial court.
2. Petitioners took specific statements from the Decision,
cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of
the pronouncements.
People v Montesa, Jr:
...the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation
and directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan
to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore,
deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution
arm of the Government to con-sider the so-called new relevant
and material evidence and determine whether the information
it had filed should
stand.
In the case cited: Petition for certiorari was directed against a
judge who after granting a motion for reinvestigation,
proceeded to arraign the accused, then decided to dismiss the
case based on a Resolution that recommends the dismissal of
the case which had not yet attained finality. The court held that
the judge should have waited for the reinvestigation to be
concluded, before acting of the recommendation of the
resolution, and proceeding with the arraignment. The original
text was followed by statement to the effect that the case was
not meant to establish a doctrine that the judge should just
follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not
there was a probable cause.
3. Petitioners cited a block text from a case which such text did
not exist.
Ledesma v CA
In the case at bar: In the absence of a finding of grave abuse
of discretion, the courts bare denial of a motion to withdraw
information pursuant to the Secretarys resolution is void.
(Underscoring ours).
In the case cited: ...the trial judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the
information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance
on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our
repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment
of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss.
The counsel of petitioners had purposely misled the court,
violating Rule 10.2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Counsels use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies
that he intends to make it appear that the passages are the
exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words
Underscoring ours after the text implies that, except for the
underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original.
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4. Petitioners capitalized on the part of the Order that there
was NO probable cause. However, in the body of the case, it is
stated that there WAS a probable cause, and it even provided
a discussion of the reasons for such finding. Further, the Court
states that when the conclusion from the body of the decision
is so clear to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
The petition was DISMISSED.
c. Allied Banking Corporation v CA and Galanida (Misquoting the
decision of the Supreme Court)
FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the
decision of the CA, upholding the NLRC decision that Allied
Bank illegally dismissed Galanida awarded him his separation
pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and other
amounts.
Galanida was allegedly illegally dismissed due to his refusal to
be transferred to another branch of the bank. Petitioner
contends that there was discrimination on his part since only
the long staying accountants of the said branch were being
transferred.
Galanida was dismissed from his post, through a memo and
without any due process, because of his continued refusal to
comply with the transfer order and his continued absence from
work despite the denial of his application for additional
vacation leave. Further, the bank states that his grounds for
dismissal shall not qualify him to receive any benefit arising
from his employment with the bank or to his termination pay. A
petition was filed by Galanida to the Labor Arbiter praying that
the bank will pay him his due.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Galanida. However, the
Labor Arbiter misquoted a Supreme Court decision in Dosch v.
NLRC which states to the effect that the exclusive right to
transfer an employee of the employers is not absolute. It states
further that refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee cited reason for
said refusal, such as that of being away from the family.
The CA affirmed the lower courts decision, also citing Dosch v.
NLRC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1.W/N the Labor Arbiter used the correct legal basis in
deciding on the case
2. W/N Galanida was dismissed with just cause
3. W/N Galanida was deprived of due process regarding his
termination
d.
HELD: NO
1. The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee cited reason for
said refusal, such as that of being away from the family does
not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanidas
counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized
lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme
CourtReports Annotated (SCRA).
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The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of
Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the
Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is
simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of
the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the
convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not
a part of the courts decision. A counsel should not cite a
syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision
of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano
began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a portion of the
decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they
even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote
from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme
Court. This is a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, the lower court cannot use Dosch v. NLRC because
the petitioners refusal in this case was due to a transfer
consequential to a promotion. This is not the same with
Galanida. The transfer in Dosch is also overseas in nature,
which cannot be likened to a transfer within the country, which
is the situation in this case.
2. YES
There was no discrimination since Galanida was already due
for transfer, since he stayed in the branch of 7 years already.
Further, the lower court cannot use Dosch v. NLRC because
the petitioners refusal in this case was due to a transfer
consequential to a promotion. This is not the same with
Galanida. The transfer in Dosch is also overseas in nature,
which cannot be likened to a transfer within the country, which
is the situation in this case.
Galanidas continued refusal to a valid order is therefore
considered as insubordination, depriving him to reinstatement
or separation pay.
3. YES
Although the memo was tantamount to a notice of termination
since the body and contents of the former characterized the
latter, the memo suffered certain errors. The Memo was dated
8 September 1994, but the petitioners termination was
effected as of 1 September 1994. Petitioner also received the
memo only on 5 October 1994. To be effective, a written notice
of termination must be served on the employee.
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the NLRC and CA, with
modifications.
COMELEC v Noynay (Incorrectly citing a Supreme Court
decision as basis)
FACTS: COMELEC filed an information to the RTC regarding
the defendant public school teachers were said to engage in
pastisan political activities. However, the respondent judge
ordered the cases to be withdrawn and directed to the
appropriate MTC on the ground that Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129 as amended ba RA 7691 states that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over cases that attaches a penalty of less than 6
years of imprisonment. COMELEC contends that the
respondent judge erroneously misconstrued the provisions of
the said statute. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES
-Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases
Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinance committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof,
Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals[7]
that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening
sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal
cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years
(i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor),
jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or
the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
-On the respondent counsels carelessness in his
reference to Alberto Naldeza v Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,
245 SCRA 296, the Court stated that the counsel quoted a
part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator that was
quoted in the decision.
Further, the correct respondent name was ALBERTO
NALDOZA, not NALDEZA. Moreover, the case was not
reported in volume 254 of SCRA, and not 245. Worse, in both
the motion for reconsideration and the petition, the counsel
deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were the
Supreme Courts findings or rulings, which is a violation of
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Court GRANTS the petition.
II. Law
A. Overview of the Philippine legal system
Common Law vs. Civil Law Jurisdiction (Max Shoop)
PH legal system = civil law, laws created by Legislature and
Judiciarys job to interpret.
Historically, PH needed to refer to common law principles to
construe and apply new laws.
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Applicability of common law principles, insofar as they are: 1.
Founded on principles applicable to local conditions; 2. Not in
conflict with existing laws; 3. Conformable to existing institutions
IN RE: APPLICATION OF MAX SHOOP
FACTS: This case deals with the application of Max Shoop to
practice law in the Philippines without examination under Par. 4 of
the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the
Practice of Law. It was shown that applicant Shoop has been
admitted to practice and he has practiced for more than 5 years in
the highest court of the State of New York.
The Rule above mentioned requires the State of New York by
comity to confer the privilege of admission without examination for
attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippines. The New York Rule
allows admission without examination, in the discretion of the court,
to:
(1) Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five
years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other
state or territory of the American Union or in the District of
Columbia.
(2) Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five
years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the
principles of the English Common Law.
Under this rule, one lawyer from the PH was admitted to the New
York Bar and another one was not.
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the principle of comity is established under the New York
Rule.
(2) W/N petition should be granted to admit Max Shoop to PH bar.
HELD:
(1) YES. The Court ruled that comity is established based on both
grounds of the New York Rule Territory and Common Law
Jurisdiction. The Courts conclusions are summarized as follows:
(a) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the United
States, under a civil government established by the Congress.
(b) This court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-
American cases, except those instances where the remnants of the
Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the
few cases that are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
(c) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English
Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-American Common
Law to an almost exclusive extent.
(d) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, given a reasonable
interpretation, permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to
practice in the Philippine Islands similar to those privileges accorded
by the rule of this court.
(2) YES. PETITION GRANTED. Petitioner sufficiently satisfies the
qualifications for admittance. However, this decision is based on this
Courts interpretation of the New York Rule and does not establish a
precedent for future applications.
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B. Authority and hierarchy of law Determines scope of mandate and authority of the diff. branches of
law (Angara; In Re Cunanan)
STATUTORY LAW CASE LAW Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy (Tawang v. La Trinidad)
Civil Code, Art. 7
Supreme Court decisions - binding in lower Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
Constitution
courts non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
Decisions from appellate courts (Court of When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Statutes passed by legislature
Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, etc) Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
Treaties Decisions from lower courts (MTC, RTC) only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Angara v Electoral Commission
Administrative issuances FACTS: In the 1935 elections, petitioner Angara and respondents
Ynsua et. al. were candidates for a position of member of the
National Assembly (NA) for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7,
Ordinances 1935, Angara was proclaimed as the winner of the elections. On Nov.
15, Angara took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, the NA passed Res. No.
8 confirming the election of petitioner. On Dec. 8, respondent Ynsua
filed for protest against said election to the Electoral Commission.
1. Primary authorities The next day, Dec. 9, the Electoral Commission passed their own
Resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date (Dec 9) as the last day of
Actual verbatim texts of the law filing for protests against the election despite the Resolution of the
National Assembly which confirmed the election. Petitioner Angara
ARTICULATES the law filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Ynsua can no longer protest
Binding upon the courts, government and individuals by virtue of the earlier NA resolution. Respondent replied that EC
resolution governs over the NA and that the EC has jurisdiction over
Can either be mandatory (Courts MUST follow SC the election protest and cannot be prohibited by the SC.
decisions) or persuasive (Courts MAY follow lower court
decisions, foreign jurisprudence) ISSUE: (1) W/N the SC has jurisdiction over the protest.
i.e. Constitutions, Statutes, Case Law, Shariaa Law, (2) W/N the EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
Administrative Regulations, Executive Orders jurisdiction over the protest.
2. Secondary authorities HELD: The EC is an independent constitutional creation. Therefore,
the EC was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
Explanations about the law. Not the law itself. prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest and that
the NA resolution cannot overrule the EC it being created by the
ANALYZES/COMMENTS/EXPLAINS the law Constitution.
NEVER binding upon the court In the matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
It is only persuasive FACTS: Generally, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have
i.e. Law Review Articles, Legal Textbooks, Legal passed the bar, he must have obtained a general average of 75% in
Encyclopedias and Dictionaries, Annotations, Commentaries all subjects, without falling below 50% in any subject. Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 this court passed candidates who had obtained an
average of only 72% in 1946, 69% in 1947, 70% in 1948, and 74% in
PRIMARY SOURCE SECONDARY SOURCE 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74% was raised to 75%.
Those who still failed by a few percentage points, feeling
From unofficial sources; commercially discriminated, went to Congress and after a veto of Senate Bill No. 12
Published by issuing agency which wanted to lower the passing average to 70% since 1946,
produces Congress passed R.A. No. 972 also known as the Barflunkers Act in
1952. The title of the law was An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for
Example: Official Gazette, Supreme Court Example: SCRA Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. Section 1 of
which provided varying passing marks for the years 1946-1955.
Section 2 provided that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75% in any subject in any bar examination after 4 July 1946 shall be
C. Constitution deemed to have passed in such subject and such grade shall be
Expressions of Sovereignty by Filipino People (Plebiscite) included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may
Supreme Law of the Land, against the validity of all other laws are take.
measured.

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ISSUE: W/N the Barflunkers Act is constitutional.
HELD: PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 2 was declared
unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only
the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was
also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary. As to Section 1, the portion for 1946-1951 was
declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. Those declared valid is due to
the fact that the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of a petitioner.
D. Statutes
1. How a bill becomes a law
PHIL. CONST. ART. VI, SEC. 26 PAR. 2 SECTION 26. (2)
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
PHIL. CONST. ART. VI, SEC 27 SECTION 27.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Art VI, Sec.
27)
2. Effectivity
CIVIL CODE, ART. 2
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
TANADA V. TUVERA, G.R. No. L-63915
FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus compelling
respondent to publish in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgate a number of Presidential Decrees, Letters of
Instructions, Executive Orders, etc.
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Respondents wanted to dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners have no legal standing as they were not personally or
directly affected by alleged non-publication. The Court held that
petitioners did have legal standing as the object is one of a public
right and duty. Respondents further contend that the publication in
the Official Gazette is not an essential requirement if the law
provides for its own effectivity date.
ISSUE: W/N publication should be made in the Official Gazette or
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: YES. the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon
their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full
in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause unless
otherwise provided pertains to the date of publication and not the
requirement of publication.
3. Other principles
CIVIL CODE, ART. 3
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
CIVIL CODE, ART. 4
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. General rule on prospectivity
CIVIL CODE, ART. 7
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. Exception on the general rule of prospectivity
Express repeal - express revival
Implicit repeal - implied revival unless otherwise
provided
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, BOOK 1, CHAPTER 5 & 6
CHAPTER 5
Operation and Effect of Laws
SECTION 18. When Laws Take Effect. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
SECTION 19. Prospectivity. Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is
expressly provided.
SECTION 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. In the
interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official
languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case
of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
SECTION 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.When a law which expressly
repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived
unless expressly so provided.
SECTION 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed When a law which impliedly
repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the
repealing law provides otherwise.
SECTION 23. Ignorance of the Law.Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
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CHAPTER 6
Official Gazette
SECTION 24. Contents.There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general
application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by the said courts of sufficient importance to
be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general application or which he may authorize so to be
published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority.
SECTION 25. Editing and Publications. The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of
the President and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and
distributed by the National Printing Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to
subscribers free of postage.
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE V. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
FACTS: Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed to the National
Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to operate a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang. Respondent La Trinidad Water
District (LTWD), a local utility created by P.D. 198, opposed TMPCs application
because LTWD is an exclusive franchise under Sec. 47 of P.D. 198. The NWRB denied
the claim of LTWD as exclusive franchises are unconstitutional. LTWD appealed to the
RTC and the court reversed the decision of NWRB holding that Sec. 47 is valid. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in reversing the decision and holding that Sec. 47 is valid.
HELD: YES. The SC held that the RTC erred in reversing the decision of the NWRB.
The Constitution clearly and expressly states that exclusive franchises are prohibited
under Sec. 11, Art. XII. The assailed Sec. 47 then is clearly unconstitutional. In case of
conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails
because it is the basic law which all other laws must conform to.
E. Case Law
1. Stare decisis
Common law principle; to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle
things that are settled.
A principle underlying in one case is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower
courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in
question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority.
Court may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent
Purpose: to ensure certainty, consistency and stability
in the administration of justice
CIVIL CODE, art. 8
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, 4, 3
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of
such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc.
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De Castro V JBC
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on
May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to
many legal dilemmas. This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section
15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1),
Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to
who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the
process of screening candidates should the incumbent president not
prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lie to compel the submission of
JBCs nominees to the president?
This issue at hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the
Nation. A lot of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to
prohibitions. We limit our discussion with GR191002 for brevity.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file said petition.
HELD:
The court held the case being premature because the Judicial and Bar
Council has until May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit the list of
nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
The petitioner here asserts his right as citizen filing the petition on behalf of
the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment. The
question raised before the court is in fact of transcendental importance.
The court dispels all doubt to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the
resolution of the essential issue squarely presented. Standing is a peculiar
concept to constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought
by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest.
The courts dismissed the petitions, but has ordered JBC to:
-resume proceedings for the nomination of candidates,
-prepare short list of nominees for the said position,
-submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees,
-and to continue proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other
vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of
nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision
The Court in this case has been citing a Valenzuela case, which has been
a precedent for the issue at hand. Intervenors contend that the Court is
abandoning Valenzuela, in violation of the principle of stare decisis.
However, the Courts have given the power to modify or reverse a doctrine
or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.
2. Types of court opinion
a. Concurring
b. Dissenting
c. Per Curiam
d. Unanimous
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3. Minute Resolutions
decisions on cases that are dismissed due to the non-compliance of
procedural requirements that are judged as if with merits
Not published
signed only by the clerk of court by authority; does
not require certification of Chief Justice
decisions are res judicata on the parties, but cannot
fall under stare decisis
Phil. Health Care Providers, Inc V Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
FACTS: The petitioner, a prepaid health-care organization offering benefits
to its members. The CIR found that the organization had a deficiency in the
payment of the DST under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code which
stipulated its implementation:
On all policies of insurance or bonds or obligations of the nature of
indemnity for loss, damage, or liability made or renewed by any person,
association or company or corporation transacting the business of
accident, fidelity, employer's liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar,
elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance (except life,
marine, inland, and fire insurance)
The CIR sent a demand for the payment of deficiency taxes, including
surcharges and interest on the nonpayment of DST.
The petitioner protested to the CIR, but it didnt act on the appeal. Hence,
the company had to go to the CTA. The latter declared judgment against
them and reduced the taxes. Issues:
ISSUE: W/N a health care agreement in the nature of an insurance
contract and therefore subject to the documentary stamp tax (DST)
imposed under Section 185 of Republic Act 8424 (Tax Code of 1997)
HELD:
-Petitioner is an HMO, not an insurance company. It was created primarily
for the distribution of health care, not for an assumption of risk.
-A health care agreement is not an insurance contract as contemplated
under Section 185 of the 1997 NIRC. Such health care agreement did not
complete all the requisites under Section 2 of the Insurance Code. There is
no indemnity precisely because the member merely avails of medical
services to be paid or already paid in advance at a pre-agreed price under
the agreements.
-There was no legislative intent to impose DST on health care agreements
of HMOs. If it had been the intent of the legislature to impose DST on
health care agreements, it could have done so in clear and categorical
terms.
-Petitioner cited a case wherein it was declared that HMOs are not
insurance companies. Petitioner cited a MINUTE RESOLUTION. This
petition was dismissed because it did not follow procedural requirements,
but it was nonetheless decided upon, and the conclusions are deemed
sustained. It must be taken into account that this minute resolution is res
judicata over the parties, but this is not a binding precedent as that of an
SC decision. There are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between
a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement under
the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the
facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed
clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A
minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the
justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief
Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in
the Philippine Reports. Finally, in decisions, this Court lays down doctrines
or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly
signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
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4. Obiter Dicta
Judicial opinion on points of law not directly relevant to the case in
question; not binding but can be persuasive
Latin meaning = an observation (made by a judge) with regard to a
matter that is secondary to the issue before the court and
unnecessary in determining the said issue
5. Ratio decidendi
Principle which the case establishes; binding on courts of lower
jurisdiction through stare decisis.
Latin meaning = the reason of a decision
6. Difference between question of law and question of fact
Question of Fact Question of Law
Pertains to the truth or falsity What law is on a certain set of
of facts facts?
Based on evidence; to reject or Does not review probative
not to reject? value of evidence
RTC factual findings are binding
SC can rule on this
in SC with narrow exceptions
Pagsibigan v People
FACTS: This was regarding an estafa case on Pagsibigan, a bank
manager and a real estate agent, due to a sale of the land of Hinal which
had no intention to sell and did not give authority to Pagsibigan to sell it.
The full payment given by the buyer to Pagsibigan was being asked to be
returned due to the fact that Hinal still owns it, but did not comply.
Pagsibigan was not charged by the RTC with estafa but ordered him to
return the price paid and attorneys fees instead. This was affirmed by the
CA. Petitioner now claims that he did not receive the downpayment from
the buyer and the lower courts erred in ordering him to pay the attorneys
feed.
ISSUE: W/N the Court can review the evidence on Pagsibigans receipt of
the payment and W/N the lower courts erred in ordering him to pay
attorneys fees
HELD:
1. NO. The issue is one of a question of fact, which the Supreme Court
cannot review.The factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court. The exceptions
to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the
findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when
the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts
set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
2. YES. Payment of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses should be
justified with factual evidence, and ths was not done by the lower court.
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Ramos v Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
FACTS:On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as
a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of
Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car
was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-
plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver
and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961,
finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily,
were ordered to pay the plaintiffsP2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00
moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
P1,000.00attorney's fees, with costs.
ISSUE: WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its
drivers.
Held: Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of
defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired
as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he
was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination
and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the
practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver.
In the case of Campo vs. Camarote No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited
in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule
that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied
with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have
carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service."Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides
inter alia :The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be
relieved from liability
7. Reading a case
See types of court opinion
See Obiter Dicta
See Ratio Decidendi
F. Treaties and international agreements
Sources of international law
Section 2, Article 2 of the Constitution
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
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Treaties and executive agreements
Treaties - signed by the President; ratified by the Senate
-Permanent in nature
-If a country is a SIGNATORY, the same is obliged to refrain from
doing certain acts.
-If a country is a STATE PARTY, the same is legally obliged to
perform acts in good faith.
Validity of executive agreements and treaties
Executive Agreements Treaties
No need for senate ratification Requires senate ratification
Binding in international law Binding in international law
Cannot amend duly ratified treaty Enjoys Constitutional efficacy
Agustin v Edu
Agustin v. Edu
FACTS: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of
a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning
devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is
disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of
the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing
the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the
provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue
delegation of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent
Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional
HELD: NO
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in
question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the
exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare
and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction
mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety
by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a
growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the
streets and highways.
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Bayan Muna v Alberto Romula
FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender
agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding
and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement
in contravention of the Rome Statute.
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the
other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the
creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary
jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their
respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into
play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a
State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a
signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification
by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging
the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And
even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still
recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between
States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome
Statute.
2. Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by
long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of
claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts. Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her
conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it,
executive altogether. The right of the President to enter into or ratify
binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Petition is DISMISSED.
G. Ordinances
Exercise of Police Power
Purpose of the ordinance + means by which it is carried out
Standards of judicial review: strict scrutiny (political), rational basis and
immediate scrutiny (economic)
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Test of a valid ordinance
1. Not contravene Constitution or statute
2. Not unfair or oppressive
3. Not partial or discriminatory
4. Does not prohibit, but may regulate trade
5. General and consistent with public policy
6. Not unreasonable
7. Enacted and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law
White Light Corp v City of Manila
FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-
Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that
the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate
exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on
certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of
police power
Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to
meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response as the conditions warrant.Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself
and its people.Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means
for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and
our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative
for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
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arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial
review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any
way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose
exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
HELD: Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
H. Administrative Issuances, rules, and regulations
Publication is required except when issuance is internal
LEGISLATIVE RULE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
Meant to be subordinate legislation,
Meant to provide guidelines for the
implements law by providing details
administrative agency to enforce the law
providing details
Court cannot substitute its judgement - can
look into authority, reasonableness, and
Inquiry is not on validity but correctness of
the rules
procedure
Must be published Internal use
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
CHAPTER 11
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES
Section 50. General Classification of Issuances. - The administrative issuances of
Secretaries and heads of bureaus, offices or agencies shall be in the form of circulars
or orders.
(1) Circulars shall refer to issuances prescribing policies, rules and regulations, and
procedures promulgated pursuant to law, applicable to individuals and organizations
outside the Government and designed to supplement provisions of the law or to provide
means for carrying them out, including information relating thereto; and
(2) Orders shall refer to issuances directed to particular offices, officials, or employees,
concerning specific matters including assignments, detail and transfer of personnel, for
observance or compliance by all concerned.
Section 51. Numbering System of Issuances. - Every circular or order issued pursuant
to the preceding section shall properly be identified as such and chronologically
numbered. Each class of issuance shall begin with number 1 of each calendar year .
Section 52. Official Logbook. - Each department, bureau, office or agency shall keep
and preserve a logbook in which shall be recorded in chronological order, all final
official acts, decisions, transactions or contracts, pertaining to the department, bureau,
office or agency. Whenever the performance of an official act is in issue, the date and
the time record in the logbook shall be controlling. The logbook shall be in the custody
of the chief Administrative Officer concerned and shall be open to the public for
inspection.
Section 53. Government-wide Application of the Classification of Issuances. -
(1) The Records Management and Archives Office in the General Services
Administration shall provide such assistance as may be necessary to effect general
adherence to the foregoing classification of issuances, including the conduct of studies
for developing sub-classifications and guidelines to meet peculiar needs; and
(2) All administrative issuances of a general or permanent character shall be compiled,
indexed and published pursuant to the provisions of this Code.
_____________________________________________________________________
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ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
BOOK VI
Section 36. Authority to Prescribe Forms and Issue Regulations. -
(1) The head of a bureau or office shall prescribe forms and issue circulars or orders to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his bureau or office and to carry
into full effect the laws relating to matters within his jurisdiction. Penalties shall not be
prescribed in any circular or order for its violation, except as expressly allowed by law;
(2) Heads of bureaus or offices are authorized to issue orders regarding the
administration of their internal affairs for the guidance of or compliance by their officers
and employees;
(3) Regional directors are authorized to issue circulars of purely information or
implementing nature and orders relating to the administration of the internal affairs of
regional offices and units within their supervision; and
(4) Issuances under paragraphs (2) and (3) hereof shall not require, for their effectivity,
approval by the Secretary or other authority.
1. Validity
Civil Code, Art. 7
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom, or
practice to the contrary. When the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Tanada v Tuvera
FACTS: Petition for mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various P.D.s, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, E.O.s, letters of
implementation, and A.O.s. They invoke the right to be informed on matters
of public concern as recognized in Sec. 6, Art IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution.
Respondents assert petitioners have no legal personality as they are not
personally affected. Petitioners maintain public right. Also, the object to
compel performance of public duty need not require specific interest.
Respondents assert publication in Official Gazette is not a requirement as
laws themselves provide their own effectivity dates. However, art. 2 of the
Civil Code (Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...)
does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUES:
1. W/N petitioners have legal personality to bring petition.
2. W/N the public officials may be compelled to publish the mentioned
documents in the Official Gazette.
HELD:
1. YES. They do have the public right and the object is to compel
performance of a public duty.
2. YES. The object of the Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act 368, which states
that There shall be published in the Official Gazette... is to give the
general public adequate notice. Without notice, there is no basis for the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat.
Respondents were required to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances of general application. Unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
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Commissioner of Customs v Hypermix Feeds
ACTS: Commissioner of Customs issued a Memorandum Order (CMO)
27-2003 which classified wheat as importer or consignee, according to
country of origin, and port of discharge. Wheat would then further classified
into food grade (3% tariff) or feed grade (7% tariff).
Hypermix Feeds Corp. filed Petition for Declaratory Relief because the
CMO issuance was not in accordance to the Revised Administrative Code,
regulation classified them as feed grade without assessment, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution was violated when flour millers were
treated differently from non-flour millers for no sufficient reason, and the
retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory. RTC ruled in favor
of Hypermix. Customs appealed to CA, but case was dismissed. Customs
now file petition for review assailing CA decision.
ISSUE: W/N CMO issuance is within the powers of Commissioner of
CustomsThis was not satisfied by CMO.
HELD: NO. It is mandated by law that Customs must first assess and
determine classification of the imported article before imposition of tariff.
The CMO should have been within the scope of statutory authority granted
by the legislature to the administrative authority. It should not have
contradicted the standards prescribed by law.
Victorias Milling Co Inc v Social Security Commision
FACTS: Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22, stating that all
employers will include in the employees remuneration all bonuses,
overtime pay, and cash value of other media of remuneration. These will
comprise the Employees remunerationm upon which 3 and 1/2 %
contributions will be based up to a maximum of 500 pesos for any one
month.
Victorias Milling Co. Alleged that it is contradictory to previously issued
Circular No. 7, which excluded overtime pay and bonus in the computation
of monthly premium contributions. RA 1161 also defined compensation,
where bonuses, allowance, and overtime pay were also expressly
excluded. Victorias counsel also questioned the validity of the circular for
lack of authority, without approval of the President and publication in the
Official Gazette.
ISSUE: W/N Circular No. 22 is a rule contemplated in RA 1161
empowering the SSC to adopt, amend, and repeal subject to
the approval of the President such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act.
HELD: NO. Circular No. 22 did not need President approval and publication
in the Official Gazette as it is only an administrative interpretation. It is only
to advise members of the System of what they should include in
determining monthly compensation and social security contributions.
Insofar as to the definition of compensation, RA 1161 has already been
amended by RA 1792, which removed the exemption regarding bonuses,
allowance, and overtime pay. Because of this amendment, Circular No. 22
was issued to inform those concerned.
National Federation of Sugar Workers v Ovejera
FACTS: The National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has been the
bargaining agent of Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) rank and file
employees. Together with CAC, NFSW agreed to a collective bargaining
agreement, and to maintain the grant of Christmas, milling, and
amelioration bonuses. (Christmas + milling bonuses = 1 and 1/2 months
salary.
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NFSW performed a strike to compel 13th month salary payment. This was
declared illegal by National Labor Commissions (NLRC) Labor Arbiter
Ovejera. This caused to NFSW to file a petition for prohibition to annul
Ovejeras decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N NFSW strike is illegal
2. W/N Under P.D. 851 (13th month pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its
workers a 13th month pay in addition to other bonuses.
HELD:
1. YES. NFSW declared the strike before the lapse of the mandatory
cooling-off period, and failed to file with the MOLE before launching the
strike a report on the strike-vote.
2. NO. Employers are exempted from giving 13th month pay if they are
already giving its equivalent not less than 1/12 of the basic salary. This is
based on Rules Implementing P.D. 851 issued by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, the agency charged with the implementation of P.D. 851.
1. Presidential issuances
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
CHAPTER 1
POWER OF CONTROL
Section 1. Power of Control. - The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
CHAPTER 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Section 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general
or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Section 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Section 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation
of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations
which shall have the force of an executive order.
Section 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative
detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular
officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Section 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all
or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Section 7. General or Special Orders. - Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
issued as general or special orders.
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G. Lack of applicable law
Art. 9, Civil Code
No judge or court shall decline to render judgement by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
Floresca v Philex Mining Company (If there is conflict between laws, the
courts must reconcile them using the framework of that law)
FACTS: Petitioners, heirs of Philex employees who died due to an incident
in a Philex copper mine in Benguet, filed a petition for review of the order of
the CFI of Manila that dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.
Petitoners alleged Philex violated government safety mining regulations.
Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the case was in the jurisdiction of
the Workmens Compensation Commission (WCC). Petitioners filed motion
to dimiss after settlement with Philex, but trial continued as there were
other petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. W/N heirs can select workers right under the Workmens Compensation
Act (WCA) and sue in the regular codes under the Civil Code for higher
damages from the employers due to negligence of employers or whether
they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.
2. W/N CFI of Manila had jurisdiction
HELD:
1. YES. Petitioners can recover from employer amounts set by WCA or to
file a civil action against the respondent for higher damages. However,
these courses of action cannot be pursued simultaneously.
Petitioners can still file an action before the regular court even though they
already received benefits under the WCA as they were only informed of
Philexs violations after receiving benefits. If they knew about this
beforehand, they would not have gotten the compensation from WCA.
Now, if they are successful in the lower courts, the compensation gotten
from the WCA must be deducted from the damages decreed to them by the
lower court.
2. YES. Petition was a complaint for damages (Negligence), and WCA
provisions were not invoked. WCA compensation was to mitigate
harshness of working conditions, while Civil case damages were for
vindication for wrongful invasion of rights, and injuries sustained to person
and property.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissenting
Petitioners should not be allowed to sue because WCA proceedings are
finished, and so another benefit cannot be secured, especially, in this case,
where petitioners were successful in securing first option.
Gutierrez, J., dissenting
To allow victims of industrial accidents to file for damages bases on torts
would be contrary to the provisions of the WCA.
Silverio v Republic (Courts cannot legislate by making law)
FACTS: Silverio, a male transsexual, filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate. Petitioner lived as female and was engaged
to be married.
RTC rules in favor of the petitioner as it abides with the principles of justice and
equity, there is no harm caused anybody in granting, and there was no evidence to
show any cause to deny petition.
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The Republic through the OSG then filed a petition for Certiorari. CA favored the
Republic.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners name and sex can be changed in the birth certificate.
HELD: NO.
1. The case was filed in the wrong venue as the remedy and proceedings are
administrative, not judicial. He also did not satisfy the grounds for change of first
name or nickname as stated in Sec. 4 of the Clerical Error Law.
2. Sex is not something that can altered through surgery. To grant changes will
substantially reconfigure the laws on marriage and family relations as well as
those laws which apply particularly to women.
3. There is no law that governs sex reassignment.
4. Though the court shall not decline to render judgement be reason of the silence
of the law (Art. 9, Civil Code), it is not a license for judicial legislation. Remedies
petitioner seek involve public policy, to be addressed by legislature.
Reyes v Lim (In case of gaps in the law, there should be equity in filling in
the open spaces in the law; should be done only in the absence, and never
against, statutory law; aims to do complete justice in cases - parties should
not have it worse than before the legal controversy began)
FACTS: David Reyes sold his property to Jose Lim. The contract included a 28
million peso downpayment upon signing and an 18 million peso balance paid on or
before March 8, 1995. At that time, Harrison Lumber was a lessee of Reyes
property. The contract also stipulated that the tenants (lessee) vacate before
March 8. Tenants leave earlier: Reyes gives Lim one week advance notice for the
balance payment. Tenants have not vacated by March 8: Reyes pays penalty of 4
% of downpayment per month until they leave.
Reyes alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber to not vacate. Accused
denied. Lim said that he was willing to pay but Reyes kept postponing. Reyes
wanted to repay 10 million, but Lim rejected as Reyes already sold the property to
Line One Foods. Lim prayed for downpayment to be given back, which the RTC
granted. Reyes filed motion to set aside the Orders to deposit 10 million.
Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to sell, while Lim is seeking
cancellation of the same contract.
CA ruling: trial court can validly issue assailed orders in exercise of its equity
distribution. Depositing 10 milllion to the custody of the RTC does not mean it
would automatically be returned to Lim.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Orders requiring Reyes to deposit 10 million were valid, when deposit is
not among the provisional remedies in Rules 57 to 61 of 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
2. W/N RTC could issue questioned Orders on grounds of equity, when there is
applicable law on the matter (Rules 57 to 61 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure).
HELD:
1. YES. There is a silence in the law, which would lead to unjust enrichment and
would imperil restitution if left alone.
2. YES. Both want rescission (creates obligation to return things that are the
object of the contract), which requires restitution (parties restored to status quo
ante). Since Reyes wants rescission, he must deposit 10 million.
The order to deposit 10 million is to avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of Lim
as the property has been sold to Line One before the payment of 18 million
balance. Here exercised is equity jurisdiction, which aims to do justice, when the
court is unable to adapt its judgements to the circumstances due to the inflexibility
of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.
Adalim, Aguinaldo, Guerrero, Layno, Ong Vao | I-C 2019