COUNCIL TRACKER

SUMMARY REPORT

CALGARY
2013-2017
PETER MCCAFFREY & BEN WOODFINDEN
09 AUGUST 2017
 ABOUT THE
MANNING FOUNDATION

2
The Manning Foundations vision is of a freer, stronger, better-governed
Canada.

Our mission is to strengthen the values, knowledge, ethics, skills,

communication capabilities, and leadership capacities of Canadas political
participants who share our founding values and principles through
research, training, and networking.

Those guiding principles are:

Maximize freedom, responsibility, and accountability

Pursue market-based solutions to public problems
Live within our means, fiscally and ecologically
Decentralize economic and political power through subsidiarity
Strengthen grassroots democracy and democratic institutions
Respect Canadas cultural, religious and democratic traditions

3
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

4
 PETER MCCAFFREY
Peter McCaffrey is the Director of Research at
the Manning Foundation, where he oversees the
development of research, education, ideas, and
public policy.

He is a regular feature in a wide variety of local

and nationwide media, including TV, radio, and
print, on topics as diverse as municipal finance
and transparency, taxi regulation, liquor laws,
environmental regulation, economic policy, drug
reform, and technology.

Peter has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the Manning Foundation,

a Policy Analyst for the Frontier Centre in Saskatchewan, and has significant
experience in issue-campaigning, political campaign management, technology,
data, and general consulting in both Canada and New Zealand.

BEN WOODFINDEN
Ben Woodfinden is a Research and Data Intern at
the Manning Foundation, where he assists in data
collection, analysis, editing, and policy research.

He has experience in a wide range of public policy

areas, such as transportation regulation, civil
liberties, tax policy, and the environment, and has
been published in a variety of academic journals
and magazines. Ben has previously worked with
Transport Canada and the Canadian Federation of
Independent Business.

He holds an MA in Political Science from Carleton University, where he graduated

with High Distinction and was awarded a Senate Medal. He has previously held
both a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship and an Ontario
Graduate Scholarship.

5
 CONTENTS

6
I. Executive Summary . . . . 8

II. Introduction . . . . . . 12

III. Methodology . . . . . . 14

IV. Time . . . . . . . . 16

V. Attendance
. . . . . . . 20

VI. Votes . . . . . . . . 24

VII. Who Votes With Whom . . . 32

VIII. Coalitions . . . . . . . 38

IX. Conclusion
. . . . . . . 46

X. Notes . . . . . . . 48

7
 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

8
An essential part of the democratic process, and of government
accountability is the ability of the public to monitor and assess the
representation they receive.

However, this monitoring is an immense challenge for the public, whose

time is valuable and who face many demands.

In particular, its hard to follow whats going on at City Hall.

In one year, a municipal council can meet for thousands of hours in

total, while considering many more thousands of motions some
of which have policy implications, but most of which are merely
procedural.

The aim of the Council Tracker project is to take data coming from
Canadian council chambers and present it in a useful and more easily
understandable format.

This report assesses the official voting records and behaviour of

Calgary City Council during the 2013-2017 term, and the analysis
is conducted across a wide variety of measures, including time,
attendance, votes, and organic coalitions.

The principal results of this report are summarized below for the
2013-2017 Calgary City Council term, beginning October 28, 2013 and
ending July 24, 2017:

Calgary City Council met 120 times for a total of about 1,127 hours
and 53 minutes: 861 hours and 8 minutes in public (76.3%), and 266
hours and 45 minutes in secret (23.7%).

Calgary City Council met in camera at least 748 times during

2013-2017 for an average of 21 minutes and 41 seconds each time.

The percentage of time spent in camera, at 23.7%, is up from 19% in

the previous term.

9
 For comparison, between 2014 and 2016, Hamilton met in camera 13
times, Toronto 18 times, and Ottawa only one time.

There are significant irregularities in the way that Calgary City

Council records time stamps in the minutes of meetings, including in
camera sessions, a serious concern for such an important topic.

Average attendance was 96.8%, very similar to the previous terms

98%.

Council considered 10,405 motions, the vast majority of which

passed, with only 2.8% failing.

Council members Woolley and Carra very often vote the same way
(80% of divided votes), as do Councillors Chu and Magliocca (72%).

Conversely, Council members Farrell and Stevenson voted the same

way only 32% of the time.

The data also appears to show two reasonably clear coalitions of five
councillors each.

Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Pincott, and Woolley tend to vote together

quite often.

Chu, Chabot, Demong, Magliocca, and Sutherland also vote together

reasonably often, though the correlation is less significant.

10
THERE CAN BE NO
FAITH IN GOVERNMENT
IF OUR HIGHEST
OFFICES ARE EXCUSED
FROM SCRUTINY -
THEY SHOULD BE
SETTING THE EXAMPLE
OF TRANSPARENCY
- Edward Snowden

11
 II. INTRODUCTION

12
The involvement of political parties at the Canadian provincial and
federal levels of government, and in some cities, makes it easier for the
public to know what general positions their elected representative is
likely to take.

However, in most cities across Canada, this kind of party organization

does not exist, making it hard to anticipate how a councillor will vote in
advance of an issue, or even just work out how they voted afterwards.

Council Tracker aims to solve this problem by providing citizens with

the tools they need to better track and hold to account the level of
government that is closest to them.

Since being launched in 2014, tens of thousands of Calgarians have

logged on to www.counciltracker.ca and studied up on everything
from time spent in secret, to voting positions on major issues, and
attendance.

The project showed the kinds of insights that can be gained

from assembling quantitative data on a law-making body where
representatives do not vote along party lines, as well as how their
behaviour evolves over time.

More than just being an academic exercise, Council Tracker has resulted
in tangible improvements to how the City of Calgary does business, on
issues ranging from council workload, to open data, and transportation
planning.

In 2015 we released pilot reports for Toronto, Hamilton, and Ottawa,

City Councils, followed by full reports for those cities in 2016.

This Calgary Summary Report takes the lessons from our previous
Calgary reports, and our expansion to new cities in Ontario, and applies
our new methodology to the entire set of voting records and minutes
for the 2013-2017 Council term.

13
 III. METHODOLOGY

14
This report incorporates data from the official minutes of 120 Calgary
City Council meetings held between October 28, 2013 and July 24, 2017.

Council Tracker simply reports what has occurred and does not attempt
to judge the merits of those events.

This research is based on the official City of Calgary minutes and

agenda as approved by Calgary City Council.

Unfortunately, the data provided in the City of Calgary minutes is

somtimes inaccurate or unclear.

Where there were clear and obvious innacuracies in the minutes, the
inaccuracies were fixed in our data, and reported to the City to allow
them to update their own records.

If the correct data was not immediately obvious, however, the record
was either excluded or left ambiguous.

There is no single measure that can determine the performance and

effectiveness of an elected body or single representative, but given
enough data and measures, clear patterns begin to emerge.

With over 10,000 votes for each councillor, and even more data on
attendance records, time, and coalitions, we believe any minor errors
that remain in the official City of Calgary records do not affect the
findings of the results.

We encourage anyone who discovers any innaccuracies to report them

to both ourselves and to the city, in order to correct the record.

We also encourage the City of Calgary to transition to a digital storage

format for minutes and votes, that would allow for more accurate
tracking of data, as per the citys Open Data policy.

15
 IV. TIME

16
Research has shown that the sheer volume of material produced at
every level of government can make it difficult for the general public to
participate in the democratic process, and for the media to hold elected
officials to account.

A thorough consideration of council workload is vital not just because

of the problems posed for Council members, but because of the
potential impacts they could have on public participation and the
decision making process at large.

The initial findings on how Calgary City Council spends its time are
presented in this section.

THERE ARE NO
SECRETS THAT TIME
DOES NOT REVEAL
- Jean Racine
17
 During 2013-2017, Calgary City Council met 120 times for a total of
about 1,127 hours and 53 minutes: 861 hours and 8 minutes in public
(76.3%), and 266 hours and 45 minutes in secret (23.7%). This is an
increase from 19% of time spent in secret during the previous term.

Calgary City Council meetings lasted an average of approximately 9

hours and 23 minutes. The shortest meeting lasted only 1 hour and 56
minutes, and the longest meeting lasted 33 hours and 25 minutes.

Note that all figures are approximate because various minor

inaccuracies in the record make it difficult to definitively state how
often Council met and for how long.

Figure 1 Meeting time in public and in camera (Calgary, 2013-2017)

In Camera (Secret), 23.7%

In Public (Open), 76.3%

18
 Calgary City Council met in camera at least 748 times during 2013-2017,
for an average of 21 minutes and 41 seconds each time.

For comparison, between 2014 and 2016, Hamilton Council met in

camera 13 times, Toronto Council 18 times, and Ottawa Council only one
time.

The breakdown of topics discussed in camera in Calgary during

2013-2017 is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Items discussed in camera by topic (Calgary, 2013-2017)

Arts / Parks / Recreation, 1.74% Strategy / Plan, 0.94%

Governance, 2.14% Utilities, 0.94%
Business / Regulation, 2.14% Appointment / Personnel / Pay, 23.66%
Civic Partner / Community, 2.27%
Budget / Funding, 2.27%
Transit / Infrastructure / Taxi, 3.07%

Study / Review / Report Card, 4.81%

Inter Municipal / Regional /

Provincial, 4.81%

Insurance / Legal, 5.61%

Unknown, 19.92%

Procurement / Sale / Lease, 8.69%

Program / Policy, 16.98%

19
 V. ATTENDANCE

20
 Attendance is an important measure for judging the performance of
any elected assembly.

This analysis avoids any subjective discussion of what it means to be

present, and only counts a Council member as being away if they
were cited as such in the official record.

Assuming that each council meeting is equally important, without

subjective regard to length or issues discussed, average attendance
was 96.8%, very similar to the previous terms 98%.

This attendance figure was determined by dividing the total absences

for each council member by the total number of meetings they were
eligible for, and is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Attendance record by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

TITLE

100.0%

100.0%
99.2%

99.2%
98.4%

98.4%

98.4%

98.4%
97.5%
95.9%
94.2%

94.2%
93.4%

93.4%
91.7%

21
 There were 58 absences observed over 120 meetings. 51.7% of meetings
had all councillors present - down from 75.6% in the previous term.

Calgary City Council members were absent due to council business

(22.4%), and with no reason given (77.6%)

Councillors Farrell and Chabot had perfect attendance. The average

number of meetings missed by council members was 3.9.

Figure 4 provides a breakdown of meetings missed, by council member

and reason.

Figure 4 Meetings missed by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

1

7
4
8
6

6
5

4
3

3
2

2
1

No Reason Provided Council Business

22
 The records of the Calgary City Council only note whether a council
member was present or absent for a meeting, not the times they
arrived, left, or re-joined a council session.

This means that a council member could miss a portion of a meeting,

but still be listed as present in the official minutes.

Time spent out of the room is not recorded in the minutes and so
cannot be added to the total absence calculations.

Given this constraint, Figure 5 shows the total time missing from
council, by council member, as officially recorded in the minutes - real
world attendance is lower than depicted here.

Figure 5 Time missed (hh:mm) by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

82:50:00
77:26:00
77:11:00
65:25:00
45:41:00
42:16:00
38:13:00
36:32:00
30:57:00
28:37:00
9:14
8:21
4:21
0:00

0:00

23
 VI. VOTES

24
 This report considers 10,405 votes as found within the Calgary City
Council record for the 2013-2017 term.

While these votes are not a definitive measure of a councillor by any

means, analysing them can provide some insight into how council
members perform on the publics primary area of interest: legislation.

As shown in Figure 6, there is a wide range in propensity for council

members to move or second a motion at council.

The main outlier is Mayor Nenshi, but these low figures are not
surprising given the Mayor chairs most meetings and so would not be
expected to move or second many motions.

Figure 6 Items moved/seconded by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

1131
1029

1145
755
746
348

759
854
692
824
420

600

1084

1048
1043

1038
687

1111

988
548

749
691

611
563

533
449
8

235

221
41

Mover Seconder

25
 Figure 7 shows that there is also a very wide range in the likelihood of a
council member voting against any given motion.

Not only is there a wide range, but all these figures are very high
compared to other City Councils we have studied.

In Hamilton, for example, even the councillor most likely to vote against
a motion does so only about 2% of the time.

Figure 7 No votes by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

36.47%
26.67%
22.62%
20.29%
18.49%
17.29%
13.90%
12.60%

13.12%
12.45%
11.18%
9.77%
9.53%
9.36%
8.12%

26
Figure 8 shows that a few council members also appear to be more
likely to be a dissenting voice on Council - for example, by voting
against a proposal that passes with the support of the vast majority of
their peers.

We define a dissenting vote as being either the sole (1) or among a

pair (2) of no votes on a motion that passes, or the sole or pair of
yes votes on a motion that fails.

Figure 8 Dissenting votes by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

1584
1222
1028
909
786
672
629
572
539
538
492
442
399

401
352

27
 The vast majority of votes on council (97.2%) were carried, and very few
(2.8%) were lost.

On average, Calgary City Council debates around 86.7 motions per

meeting, spending about 5 minutes and 30 seconds on each. This is an
increase from the previous terms average of 70.6 motions per meeting.

Given the vast majority of votes were carried, and relatively little
time was spent on each item we can infer that, despite outwards
appearances, there are many topics that are uncontroversial, and a
majority of councillors vote together regularly.

Figure 9 Breakdown of all motion outcomes (Calgary, 2013-2017)

Motions lost, 2.84%

Motions carried, 97.16%

28
 To get a better understanding of how Council operates on more
contentious items, we can eliminate from our analysis votes that passed
easily and assess only those items that showed some disagreement.

We define a divided vote as a vote where at least one councillor voted

against the majority.

Of all items and recommendations considered, one or more council

members voted against the majority 3,330 times (32.0% of all motions
and recommendations).

This suggests that while many votes are uncontroversial, amongst the
remaining topics there exists significant disagreement, though the
minority doesnt often get its way.

Figure 10 shows that amongst these 3,330 divided votes, 8.8% were
defeated, 90.9% were carried.

Figure 10 Breakdown of divided motion outcomes (Calgary, 2013-2017)

Not Carried Unanimously, 0.30%

Lost, 8.80%

Carried, 90.90%

29
 Figure 11 breaks down the margin of how close divided votes were
decided.

For example, votes were decided by a margin of 2 votes (such as 9-7)

only 5.7% of the time.

Even these divided votes showed substantial majorities, rather than

coming down to a few swing votes.

Almost two-thirds of divided votes were decided by an overwhelming

margin (a 10 vote difference or more). Tied votes are very unusual.

Note that with absences, various vote spreads are possible.

Figure 11 - Divided votes by margin of victory (Calgary, 2013-2017)

910
863
486

293
260

263
180
183

174
169

162
161

148

142
137

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

30
 Using this data, Figure 12 uses a controversy measure of each
councillor that represents their likelihood to be attached to a divided
vote, either as a mover or seconder.

For example, if there was a divided vote, Councillor Pincott was most
likely (13.5% of the time) to be the mover or seconder of the motion.

Its important to consider that bringing a motion forward is often a

technicality performed by a council member with seniority, or by the
chair of a committee.

It may also reect only support for debating an issue, rather than
support for the motion itself.

Figure 12 - Controversy measure by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

400
496
281
262
259
178

194
81

247

495
251
187
236
110

335
136

312

297
292

291
259

249
175
text5

149
141

129
106
Add20

80

Mover Seconder

31
 VII. WHO VOTES WITH WHOM

32
While many voters claim to be opposed to political party organizations
at the municipal level, in reality, organic coalitions of councillors are
quite common across Canada.

For example, on divided votes, Mayor Nenshi votes with Councillor

Farrell 82% of the time, but with Councillor Stevenson only 36% of the
time.

Note that as this analysis uses only divided votes - a relatively

small subset of votes overall - it is likely to exaggerate day-to-day
disagreement between councillors.

THE MOST POWERFUL

FORCE EVER KNOWN
ON THIS PLANET IS
HUMAN COOPERATION
- A FORCE FOR
CONSTRUCTION
AND DESTRUCTION
- Jonathan Haidt
33
 The matrix in Table 1 displays pairings of council members who vote the
same way 100% of the time (green), 50% of the time (yellow), or 0% of
the time (red), for divided votes.

With the data from Table 1, we can use multidimensional scaling (MDS)
to build a visual representation of the distances among a set of objects
(in this case, council members), and plot them on a map, as shown in
Figure 13.

MDS plots each council member on the map such that those council
members that agree often are placed near each other, and those
council members that rarely agree, are placed far away from each other
on the map.

Table 1 Council member vote pairings (Calgary, 2013-2017)

Colley-Urquhart

Sutherland
Stevenson
Magliocca

Pootmans
Demong

Woolley
Keating
Chabot

Pincott
Nenshi

Farrell

Jones
Carra

Chu

Nenshi 100 80 50 69 59 62 82 65 68 59 78 75 36 66 78
Carra 80 100 51 70 57 63 78 68 71 58 75 77 39 68 80
Chu 50 51 100 57 65 63 46 65 60 72 48 64 57 68 54
Colley-Urquhart 69 70 57 100 63 66 66 69 70 64 66 76 44 71 74
Chabot 59 57 65 63 100 69 55 68 65 69 57 67 48 71 61
Demong 62 63 63 66 69 100 57 71 71 67 59 71 47 73 67
Farrell 82 78 46 66 55 57 100 63 65 54 79 73 32 62 78
Jones 65 68 65 69 68 71 63 100 72 70 65 77 55 76 72
Keating 68 71 60 70 65 71 65 72 100 67 66 77 49 73 75
Magliocca 59 58 72 64 69 67 54 70 67 100 57 69 57 73 63
Pincott 78 75 48 66 57 59 79 65 66 57 100 73 36 64 80
Pootmans 75 77 64 76 67 71 73 77 77 69 73 100 50 78 80
Stevenson 36 39 57 44 48 47 32 55 49 57 36 50 100 53 43
Sutherland 66 68 68 71 71 73 62 76 73 73 64 78 53 100 73
Woolley 78 80 54 74 61 67 78 72 75 63 80 80 43 73 100

34
 The result of all votes is placed on the map too - the closer each
councillor is to the result, the higher their win-rate.

Looking at the data this way offers extra insight into the power
dynamic on Council.

For example, it appears that Councillors Stevenson and Carra are far
apart from each other on policy matters, with Pootmans in a midway or
compromise point between the two.

This data appears to show two reasonably clear coalitions of five

councillors each, with another five in the middle in various directions.

Figure 13 MDS arrangement on divided votes (Calgary, 2013-2017)

0.4

0.3

Pincott
Colley-Urquhart
0.2
Farrell
Woolley
Stevenson
0.1 Carra
Jones
Pootmans Nenshi

Magliocca Sutherland
-0.1
Keating

-0.2
Chu
Demong
Chabot
-0.3
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

35
36
39%

CARRA
51%

NENSHI
57%
58%
63% 36%

68%
68% 50%
70%
71% 59%
75%
77% 59%
78%
80% 62%
80%

65%

66%

68%

CHU
46%
48% 69%
50%
51% 75%
54%
57% 78%
57%
60% 78%
63%
64%
80%
65%
65%
82%
68%
72%
Figure 14 Council member pairings on divided votes (Calgary, 2013-2017)
 55% 47% 44%

JONES
63% 57% 57%

DEMONG
65% 59% 63%
65% 62% 64%
65% 63% 66%
68% 63% 66%
68% 66% 66%
69% 67% 69%
COLLEY-URQUHART

70% 67% 69%

71% 69% 70%
72% 71% 70%
72% 71% 71%
76% 71% 74%
77% 73% 76%

49% 32% 48%

60% 46% 55%
CHABOT

FARRELL

KEATING
65% 54% 57%
65% 55% 57%
66% 57% 59%
67% 62% 61%
68% 63% 63%
70% 65% 65%
71% 66% 65%
71% 73% 67%
72% 78% 68%
73% 78% 69%
75% 79% 69%
77% 82% 71%
Figure 14 Council member pairings on divided votes (Calgary, 2013-2017)

37
38
53% 50% 54%
62% 64% 57%
64% 67% 57%
66% 69%

POOTMANS
58% MAGLIOCCA
68% 71% 59%

SUTHERLAND
68% 73% 63%
71% 73% 64%
71% 75% 67%
73% 76% 67%
73% 77% 69%
73% 77% 69%
73% 77% 70%
76% 78% 72%
78% 80% 73%

43% 32% 36%

54% 36% 48%
PINCOTT

61% 36% 57%

WOOLLEY
63% 39% 57%
STEVENSON

67% 43% 59%

72% 44% 64%
73% 47% 65%
74% 48% 66%
75% 49% 66%
78% 50% 73%
78% 53% 75%
80% 55% 78%
80% 57% 79%
80% 57% 80%
Figure 14 Council member pairings on divided votes (Calgary, 2013-2017)
Figure 15 averages the percentages in each councillors individual
pairing graphs, to form an overall relative index for each councillor.

This shows roughly how closely each councillor votes to the average of
the rest of council on any individual vote.

The higher the percentage, the more support that council member
enjoys from their peers, on average.

With the exception of Councillor Stevenson, who is the only councillor

with less than 50%, all other councillors are within 13% of each other.

This suggests that, despite the data suggesting some clear clusters of
councillors, the two clusters themselves are not too far apart from each
other.

Figure 15 Relative index by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

TITLE

72%
70%
69%
68%

68%
67%
66%

66%
65%
64%

64%

64%
63%
59%
46%

39
 VIII. COALITIONS

40
Using all of this data, we can compare council members outlook
toward the rest of council to see if they, as groups, tend to agree or
disagree with certain individuals.

The following case studies examine the voting relationships between

council members.

Council members Woolley and Carra very often vote the same way
(80% of divided votes), as shown in Figure 16, as do Councillors Chu
and Magliocca (72%).

Conversely, Council members Farrell and Stevenson voted the same

way only 32% of the time, as seen in Figure 17.

The data also appears to show two reasonably clear coalitions of five
councillors each.

Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Pincott, and Woolley tend to vote together quite
often (Figure 18).

Chu, Chabot, Demong, Magliocca, and Sutherland also vote together

reasonably often, though the correlation is less significant (Figure 19).

Using the data in Table 1, these graphs can be generated for any
combination of two or more councillors.

More combinations of council members, and more details are available

on our website: www.counciltracker.ca

41
 Figure 16 Woolley and Carra voting patterns (Calgary, 2013-2017)

100% TITLE
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Carra Woolley

Figure 17 Farrell and Stevenson voting patterns (Calgary, 2013-2017)

100% TITLE
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Farrell Stevenson
42
 Figure 18 Coalition 1 (Calgary, 2013-2017)

100% TITLE
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Nenshi Carra Farrell Pincott Woolley

Figure 19 Coalition 2 (Calgary, 2013-2017)

100% TITLE
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Chu Chabot Demong Magliocca Sutherland

43
 Lastly, Figure 20 breaks down how often each council member voted
with the majority (win-rate).

All council members have a greater than two thirds win-rate.

Mayor Nenshis win-rate of 85.1% is higher than in the previous

2010-2013 term, when it was 80.4%, and compares favourably to the
current terms of the Toronto (71.7%), Hamilton (65.6%), and Ottawa
(80.4%) mayors.

Figure 20 - Divided vote win-rate by council member (Calgary, 2013-2017)

TITLE
92.30%

92.84%
92.52%
91.68%
89.84%
89.53%
88.53%
86.20%

87.19%
85.10%
82.64%
81.59%
78.97%
74.41%
66.84%

44
WHAT IS THE USE OF
LIVING, IF IT BE NOT
TO STRIVE FOR NOBLE
CAUSES AND TO MAKE
THIS MUDDLED WORLD
A BETTER PLACE FOR
THOSE WHO WILL LIVE
IN IT AFTER WE ARE
GONE?
- Winston Churchill

45
 IX. CONCLUSION

46
Democracy itself was an invention of the city-state politics of
ancient Greece, so it is appropriate that efforts toward democratic
accountability be made at the municipal level.

Essential to democratic accountability is the ability of the public to

monitor and assess the representation they receive.

However, this monitoring is an immense challenge for the public, whose

time is valuable and who face many demands.

In one year a council can meet for thousands of hours in total,

while considering thousands of motions, some of which have policy
implications and many of which are merely procedural.

At the provincial and federal levels of government this information is

filtered through party lenses, so it is easy for the public to see what
general positions an elected representative is likely to take.

In most Canadian municipalities, however, there is no party

organization, making it much harder to follow what goes on at City Hall,
but we can make it easier.

Technology enables the public to better understand the substance of

what is being discussed, both in public and behind closed doors.

Better data also allows for better decisions, for voters and elected
officials alike.

While this report provides only a snapshot, we aim to provide citizens

with the technology and tools they need to track and hold accountable
the level of government closest to them, on an ongoing basis.

We are just beginning our research in this area, and will continue to
expand Council Tracker to more issues and more cities across Canada.

Council Tracker reports are all published digitally online at:

ww.counciltracker.ca

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 X. NOTES

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1. The Manning Foundation firmly believes in open data. For more
information, including databases of all the votes studied,
and the source data used to build each of the figures comprising
this report, please visit our website:
http://www.counciltracker.ca

2. Meeting records of Calgary City Council can be viewed at:

http://agendaminutes.calgary.ca/sirepub/meetresults.aspx

3. The Manning Foundation wishes to recognize Dr. Tom Flanagan,

whose ideas originally sparked this line of work. His book,
Game Theory and Canadian Politics highlights how detailed
analysis of legislatures not only challenges intuitions, but can
produce new, and oftentimes surprising, conclusions.

4. Thank you to Jeromy Farkas for his role in the creation of the
Council Tracker project and to Angela Irons, John Whittaker,
Danielle Hartung, and Dan Osborne for their work on
previous editions of the report.

5. Thank you also to Taylor Kawaguchi, Shall Marriott, and Justin

Hatherly for their assistance with this report.

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 6. References for previous work on municipal vote tracking
conducted by the Manning Foundation:

Farkas, Jeromy. (2013). Growing the Democratic Toolbox:

City Council Vote Tracking

Farkas, Jeromy. (2014). Calgary City Council Performance Report:

The Democratic Toolbox 2.0.

Farkas, Jeromy. (2015). Council Tracker Summary Report:

Toronto 2010-2014.

Farkas, Jeromy. (2015). Council Tracker Summary Report:

Hamilton 2010-2014.

Farkas, Jeromy. (2015). Council Tracker Summary Report:

Ottawa 2010-2014.

Farkas, Jeromy. (2015). Council Tracker Summary Report:

Calgary 2010-2014.

McCaffrey, Peter. (2016). Council Tracker Midterm Report:

Toronto 2014-2016.

McCaffrey, Peter. (2016). Council Tracker Summary Report:

Hamilton 2014-2016.

McCaffrey, Peter. (2016). Council Tracker Summary Report:

Ottawa 2014-2016.

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