The Limits of Iranian Power | Michael Wahid Hanna and Dalia Dassa Kaye
Fears of Iranian ambitions predate the establishment of the
Islamic Republic in 1979.
Such anxiety certainly increased after Irans early efforts to
export its revolution abroad.
For the U.S. and its partners, Irans role in the region
became once again a predominant concern following the
2003 Iraq War, widely perceived to have removed the last
Sunni buffer against Shia Iran.
As American forces battled Iranian-backed militias in Iraq,
Arab neighbors fretted about the growing Shia crescent
enveloping the region.
The changing configuration of power in the Middle East
today places serious constraints on Irans ability to protect
its influence.
Far less attention has been paid to how receptive the region
is to such ambitions, and to the challenges Iran faces.
ON THE MARCH?
Iran is emerging as an inevitable regional hegemon, and that the
chaos and insecurity of the contemporary Arab world have
provided it with new opportunities to project and amplify its
power.
In the aftermath of Irans 1979 revolution, the clerical regime
proclaimed a zealous intent to export its revolution throughout
the region.
Irans idealistic ambitions for a cascade of Islamic revolutions
were blunted by its nearly eight-year war with Iraq, which ended
in a bitter ceasefire in 1988.
Despite the wars catastrophic toll, Iran began extending its
support to Islamists, terrorist groups and other non-state actors
in the Arab world, most notably Hizbullah in Lebanon.
These developments triggered a policy of dual containment
under the Clinton administration, which, while attempting to
neutralize the destabilizing ambitions of Iraq, sought to curb
Irans problematic regional behavior.
Fear of Irans regional ambitions increased following the US-led
military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ouster of
two of Irans strategic rivals: the Taliban and Saddadm Hussein.
Irans regional standing was undoubtedly enhanced by these
developments, and Iran exploited the strategic opening deftly,
particularly in the case of Iraq and its demographic realitiesa
war weakened neighboring country, with a Shia-majority
populace empowered through elections.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran employed soft power to cultivate
allies and shape political outcomes, and hard power in its
support of armed groups and in the case of Iraq, its
establishment of proxy forces.
As early as 2004, King Abdullh II of Jordan spoke with alarm
about the possibility of this new crescentthat would be very
destabilizing for the Gulf countries and actually for the whole
region.
From the more modest notion of expanding Iranian influence
throughout a Shia crescent, we have more recently arrived at
the hyperbolic pronouncement of Israeli Prime Minister,
Benjamin Netanyahu, that Today, Iran, is the greatest threat
to world peaceIrans increasing aggression is many times more
dangerous than that of ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and an-
Sham], which is dangerous enough, and the true goal of this
aggression in the end is to take over the world.
Netanyahu emerged as one of the most vocal critics of the
negotiation process and Irans regional behavior, and his
views have been echoed in policy debates in the United
States.
A prototypical version of this argument was made by the
Wall Street Journal editorial board, which included Iran in
its hort list of emrging regional hegemons and argued that
China, Russia and Iran are taking advantage of American
retreat to assert political and (perhaps eventually) military
dominance over their corners of the globe.
The editorial went to state that Iran is combining Shiite
Islamist revolutionary fervor with traditional Persian
imperialism in a bid to become the dominant power across
the Middle East.
Henry Kissingerformer US secretary of state
Asserted that There has come into being a kind of Shia belt
from Tehran through Baghdad to Beirut. And this gives Iran
the opportunity to reconstruct the ancient Persian
Empirethis time under the Shia label.
General David PetraeusWashington interview
the foremost threat to Iraqs long term stability and the
broader regional equilibrium is not the Islamic state; rather,
it is the Shiite militias, many backed byand some guided
byIran.
Charles Krauthammercolumnist
Warned that Irans march toward conventional domination
of the Arab world has been largely overlooked. In
Washington, that is.
Max Bootmilitary historian and foreign policy analyst
Suggested that Assuming, as appears probable that this
deal is in fact implemented future historians may well write
of July 14, 2015, as the date when American dominance in
the Middle East was supplanted by the Iranian Imperium.
Michael Doranserved as National Security Council senior
director for the Middle East in the George W. Bush
administration
Argued that acquiescence to Irans outsized ambitions is a
core feature of the Obama administrations regional
strategy, and that a nuclear accord will see Iran grow
stronger and bolder: ever closer to nuclear breakout
capacity, ever more confident in their hegemonic
objectives.
Also suggested that the nuclear agreement itself will limit
the ability of the United States and its allies to contain Iran
 and that its very terms have given Iran an instrument to
blackmail us into not containing them.
Michael Gersonformer Bush administration speechwriter
suggested that the agreement will fund Iranian
imperialism.
Senator Bob Menendezopposed the nuclear agreement
He argued that Iranwho has exported its revolution to
Assad in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and directed and supported attacks against
American troops in Iraqwill be flush with money, not only
to invest in their domestic economy, but to further pursue
their destabilizing, hegemonic goals in the region.
Lee Smithconservative writer
Claims that the Iranian security apparatus already controls
four historic Arab capitalsBaghdad, Damascus, Beirut
and Sanaa.
Senator Tom CottonUS Senator
Offered a near verbatim formulation, stating that Put
simply, Iran dominates or controls five capitals in its drive
for regional hegemony.
Aside from Netanyahu, Americas Sunni Arab allies in the Gulf
have also expressed their own fears of Iranian hegemonic
influence.
Spurred by increasing sectarian polarization, concerns over
domestic instability among their own Shia populations and
expanded Iranian intervention in the regions conflicts, the
Sunni monarchies of the Gulf have been uncharacteristically
vocal in publicly airing their discontent with the trajectory
of US policy.
These countries fear the possibilities of US-Iranian
rapprochement and the conclusion of a grand bargain.
Saud al-Faisal then foreign minister of Saudi Arabia
In response to the role of Iran and its proxy forces in Iraqs
spring offensive to recapture Tikrit from ISIS, he asserted
that Iran is on a massive offensive to gain strategic depth
that has extended its areas of control all the way to the Red
Sea and the Meditteranean.
Another Saudi diplomat speaking to the Washington Post argued
that If sanctions are lifted, Iran will try even harder to redesign
the regionIran is trying to change the Middle East, and this is
unacceptable to Sunnis.
MILITARY CONSTRAINTS
Irans military contains overlapping and competing forces.
Irans regular armed forces, the Artesh, comprises an estimated
350,000 personnel, forming conventional land, air, and naval
force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), includes
an estimated 120,000 personnel designed to guard the
revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic with its own
army, navy and air-force units.
The IRGC also heads Basij paramilitary forces, estimated to
number one million on mobilization and which originally
emerged during the Iran-Iraq war as an ideologically motivated
popular resistance fore against foreign invasion.
These multiple and redundant defense structure may be useful
in protecting the regimes revival, but have created significant
impediments to military effectiveness.
As a RAND study argued, Irans military is best with structural,
organizational, and capacity problems that prevent it from
completely operationalizing Tehrans doctrinal ambitions.
Irans military forces have the size and capability to defend
Iranian territory, its land forces are not organized or trained for
power projection or sustained combat beyond its borders.
International sanctions have severely hindered Irans capacity to
modernize its military.
Due in large part of the US sanctions, Iran has not imported
major combat systems since the early 1990s.
It has been relying heavily on systems originally delivered
at the time of the Shah, or lower grade imports, many of
which reflect technologies of the 1960s to 1980s.
While Iran arguably has one of the larger defense-industrial
bases in the region, it struggles to compete with the Western-
supplied advanced equipment of such competitors as Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
Iran lacks modern tanks or armored vehicles of Western
standard to fully translate its numerical strength into ground
advantage in conventional warfare.
Irans conventional aerial and naval capabilities are particularly
limited.
According to the IISS, Irans air force has an inventory of 334
combat aircraft, but the majority of Irans combat air fleet
is obsolescent, with limitations on combat effectiveness.
Over half of the air forces combat-aircraft inventory still
consists of aircraft purchased under the Shah.
Because of international sanctions, Irans warplanes have
seen limited local modernization, curtailing their
operational effectiveness.
Iran has attempted to improve combat capabilities of its
inventory, including acquisition of Russian air-to-air and
surface-to-air missiles, and the Chinese anti-ship missiles.
Iran has embarked on an ambitious domestic programme
for the production of unmanned aerial vehicles and combat
aircraft.
Tehrans relationship with China has allowed it to build a
credible inventory of anti-ship weapons; however, the
same cannot be said of its indigenous combat-aircraft
projects.
Given its limitations, Iran would arguably struggle to deny
air superiority to well-equipped, trained and motivated
opposing forces.
Saudi Arabia operates the F-15C and F-15S, is purchasing
the F-15SA, and operates the Eurofighter Typhoon.
Irans air force is disadvantaged by lack of technology, and
faces challenges in readiness and sustainability.
 In the naval theatre, Irans forces are also limited (though still
capable of posing a serious asymmetric threat to other Gulf-
states and the US Navy).
Irans surface-vessel combat capabilities remain limited,
and its naval forces continue to rely on outmoded platforms
from the era of the Shah, although it has also been
developing a Mowj-class corvette/destroyer.
Iran has three Russian Kilo-class submarineswhich boast
some advanced capabilities, such as laying smart mines and
firing long-range homing torpedoesand is believed to
operate midget submarines, locally produced based on
North Korean designs.
Irans conventional military capabilities are no match for its
neighbors, or the US military.
In the 2014, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states spent
$114 billion on defense compared to Irans $16bn;
Saudi Arabia alone spends over five times more than Iran.
US training and technology for its regional partners is vastly
superior, and has only increased over the last decade because of
concerns about Iranian regional ambitions and, more recently
ISIS.
Irans investment in advanced missile capabilities to offset its
comparative airpower weaknesses is worrisome.
Irans missiles are improving in effectiveness an lethality and can
reach the entire region, including in effectiveness and lethality
and can reach the entire region, including US military bases and
Israel.
Irans entire air-defense system remains vulnerable to stealthy
aircraft, cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles fired from
ranges outside its effective surface-to-air missile coverage.
To compensate for conventional weakness in the naval arena,
Iran has invested in mine warfare littoral combat with fast
missile boats and coastal patrol boats armed with anti-ship
missiles.
Using mine warfare, It can severely restrict shipping for up to two
weeks even though Iran lacks the capability to prevent access to
and from the Persian Gulf for an extended period of time.
The Iranian navy practices the use of small craft, commercial
vessels and amphibious vessels in moving forces to defend and
seize targets in the Gulf and on its coast.
Iran can also use its marines and fast combat to raid key offshore
facilities in the Gulf, attack key petroleum facilities on the coast,
strike at shipping vessels, or raid shore facilities such as
desalination of power plants.
ASSYMETRIC ENTANGLEMENTS
The conflict in Syria has been particularly costly for Iran and its
closest non-state ally, Hizbullah.
Faced with the prospect of the fall of Bashar al-Assads regime
in Syria, Iran and Hizbullah doubled down in support of a key
pillar in their resistance axis against Israel and surrounding
Sunni states aligned with Washington.
Despite economic pressures at home, Iran is estimated to be
spending $6-15bn annually in support of the Syrian regime,
and is supported to be sending Quds Force units to fight and
train local forces defending the Assad regime.
Hizbullah has suffered unprecedented losses in Syria, losing an
estimated 1,000 fighters since the 2011 war began.
Its Syrian involvement is making Lebanese Shiites a target for
Syrian based Sunni extremists, creating Sectarian friction in
Lebanon.
Even if Assad manages to hold on to the western secions of the
country, Syrian will never again be a unified state offering a
secure gateway for Irans links to Hizbullah and its ambitions to
influence the Levant.
Irans gamble in Syria ruptured its relationship with the Hamas,
another non-state actor in the front before the Syrian war.
As a Sunni Islamic organization, Hamas supports the Syrian
opposition fighting the Iran-backed government, leading
the organization to distance itself from Iran in recent years.
Despite some attempts at reconciliation, the Saudis have
lured Hamas back in the Sunni camp, with the group
announcing it is no longer receiving financial assistance
from Iran.
Sudans president, Omar al-Bashir ordered the closure of Iranian
cultural centers throughout the country and the outset of the
Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen, Sudan chose to shift
direction further by participating in the air-campaign against the
Houthi rebels.
Among Sunni Arab states, Sudan has enjoyed close security ties
th Iran and has been accused of smuggling pathway for Irans
supply of support and weaponry to its Palestinian allies,
deteriorating relations between the two countries could
potentially further damage Irans ability to exert influence in the
Israel-Palestine conflict.
Iran is shipping billions of dollars worth of new weapons to Iraq
and is investing heavily to support Shia militia groupsto counter
ISIS, in addition to deploying its own forces but despite this,
significant Sunni areas of Iraq remain under ISIS control.
Irans deep engagement in the regions increasing sectarian
military conflicts has also made Iran a direct target for the
regions transnational Jihadi groups.
The direct role of Iran in the regions wars has created far
enemies.
November 2013 double suicide bombing outside of Iranian
embassy in Beirut showed potential attacks against Iranian
interests.
Iranian press has also noted planning for terrorist attacks
inside Iran.
Mahmoud AlaviIrans intelligence minister
Alleged that groups linked to ISIS had been identified
and disbanded in Iran.
In May 2015, he gave a detailed account of Irans fight
against takfiri groups (a shorthand reference to Sunni
militants who declare other Muslim apostates,
including Shiites and often countenance violence
against them) and described three attempts that had
been averted by Irans security services
 A series of planned suicide bombings at Quds Day
rallies in Shiraz and Zahedan in 2014 and two attempts
by ISIS-affiliated groups
A 2014 attempt to poison a gathering an Ashura
procession in Tehran
An attempt to plan bombs in Tehran and Qom
The sectarian nature of the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq
has fuelled a proxy war between Iran and its Sunni
neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Irans support of the Assad regime sparked significant outside
support for a variety of Sunni Syrian opposition forces, many
dominated by Islamic extremists.
The Syrian conflict is viewed by many neighboring Arab states as
a way to check Iranian power.
Its geopolitical rivalry with Saudi Arabia fuelled by sectarian
tensions, has now expanded well beyond the Levant, most
recently into Yemen.
Its links to the Houthis may have begun in a limited,
opportunistic fashion, given the Houthis primarily local
grievances but the strong Saudi military response to oust the
Houthis from power has Yemen into another regional conflict
fought as in Syriaat the expense of the local people.
(Although Irans influence over the Houthis is marginal, it has
found itself dragged into a proxy war.
SOFTENING SOFT POWER
In the summer of 2006, Iranian soft power reached its high-
watermark, as Hizbullah fought for Israel to an inconclusive
stalemate.
Hassan NasrallahHizbullahs charismatic leader
Was seen as the most popular figure in the Arab world,
despite an outbreak of a sectarian civil war in Iraq and the
beginnings of a more sectarian tensions and suspicion about
Iraqs regional intentions.
The war epitomized the manner in which Iran sought to portray
itself to a Sunni-majority Arab world.
Iran has found its influence to be greatest at moments when it
can embarrass pro-US leaders, and highlight the gaps that often
exist between Arab rulers and their societies.
Iran welcomed the 2011 Arab uprisings as an Islamic awakening,
and an extension of the events of 1979
Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini called the Iranian
Revolution a role model for these popular movements.
Iran saw the rise of the Arab Islamists as a boon to its regional
ambitions, after years of effort constructing positive relations
with Islamist groups and cultivating notions of Islamic solidarity.
Muhammad Morsi
Attempted to form a regional contact group in Syria
that would include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and
Iran.
These initial steps were reflective both of Morsis
desire to carve a more independent course for Egypts
regional policy and of his greater comfort with Iran,
borne of Islamist solidarity despite sectarian division.
His overtures provoked a furious backlash among
Egypts newly politicized Salafis, however, and the
perception that Morsi and the Brotherhood sought to
accommodate Shiites and engaging with Iranalso an
issue of contention between Morsi and the Egyptian
security establishment.
Yasser Borhamya key salafist leader, charged that
Morsi was ignoring the systematic belief dispute
between us and the Shias. And went on to describe
the dangers of a potential cultural invasion.
The unmitigated growth of sectarian polarization in the
Middle East largely destroyed Irans ties with the Islamist
groups.
Syrias Muslim Brotherhood had also taken exemption to
Morsis attempts to improve Egyptian-Iranian relations,
having long had a dim view of the prominent role of Alawis
in the Assad regime and Syrias long standing alliance with
Iran.
Irans relationship with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had
traditionally been tense, and was distinct from its
relationships with other mainstream Sunni groups.
Key among these groups was Hamas.
Cooperation with Hamas allowed Iran to claim non-
sectarian credentials and allowed it to engage directly
with the regions iconic issuethe struggle against
Israel and its occupation of Palestinian land.
Hamas relationship with both Hizbullah and Iran grew
following Israels expulsion of 415 Palestinian Islamists
to Lebanon in 1992.
Its cooperation with Iran continued, facilitated by a
presence of a large number of its external leadership
in Damascus.
Irans projection of power in the Arab world now comes at
the expense of Sunnis, to Irans own detriment.
Sectarianismcombined with a reliance on repression and
violence carried out by allies and proxies, makes Irans
regional influence self-limiting.
In Iraq, the Arab-Iranian divide and Iraqi nationalism remain
potent forces, even at this juncture of heightened Iranian
involvement.
Iraq finds itself in a potentially existentially struggle
with ISIS, in which a pivotal military role is being played
by the Iranian proxy forces, the Hashd al-Shaabi
(Popular Mobilisation Forces)
The resilience of Iraqi nationalism can be seen in the
trajectory of Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army
was a chief driver of sectarian conflict during the civil
war, and who was widely seen as an Iranian influence
in Iraq has grown, Sadr has adopted a distinctly Iraqi
nationalist tone.
AFTER VIENNA

The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 states has
been criticized on the grounds that it will empower Iran.
According to such views, Iran will be strengthened by its
recognition as a nuclear-threshold state.
The nuclear agreement stretched Irans breakout time to over
a year, placing significant limits on all pathways to a nuclear
weapon and imposing an intrusive inspections and verification
arrangement on Iran.
However, even before the deal, Iran had already mastered the
technology and know-how to produce enough nuclear material
to make a nuclear bomb if it decided to do so.
The Vienna Nuclear Deal neither changed nor legitimized Irans
nuclear status; rather it severely curtailed it.
Another concern is that Iran will use sanction relief it receives
under the terms of the deal to increase its financial and military
support to extremist actors throughout the region.
Iran will have the capacity to rescue Syrian regime, reshape
Iraqs political environment, expand its terrorist proxy activities
in various theatres, and otherwise amplify the effects of its
destabilizing regional posture.
While it is difficult to know how Iran will ultimately use its
sanctions windfall, Iran will need to invest significant amounts to
address the countrys dire domestic needs after years of
economic decline.
Severe domestic economic pressures contributed to Irans
willingness to come to the nuclear negotiating table to begin
with, and the Iranian people expect economic gains following the
implementation of the nuclear agreement.

Regional displeasure with the nuclear deal, as well as an American

interest in keeping Arab partners on side in the anti-ISIS fight, will only
serve to increase pressure to maintain and strengthen this posture.

The nuclear deal has not removed the need for vigilance
regarding Irans potential spoiling role in the region and its
capacity to subvert American and allied interests.
The U.S. will need to balance its commitments to its allies to
continue confronting Iran with the need to hold open the door
to future diplomatic cooperation.