1.
LLDA vs CA gr 120865-71, statutory
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) was created through
Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted,
inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water
for any project or activity in or affecting
the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean
that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over
the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishing privileges is concerned, the
LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters
because the charter of the LLDA
prevails over the Local Government
Code of 1991. The said charter
constitutes a special law, while the
latter is a general law. It is basic in
construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is
a general law, cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. The special
law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA
embodies a valid exercise of police power
for the purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake region, as
opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to
issue fishing permits for revenue
purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the
charter of the LLDA should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. Isagani cruz vs sec of DENR gr
135385,
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and
its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain
provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene
the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not
contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs
by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership
and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.
3. Loloy unduran vs ramon
aberasturi gr 181284,
Facts:
Petitioners... are members of the
Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig
Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or
Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have
been living since birth on the land
located at Barangay Miarayon,
Talakag,... Bukidnon, Mindanao, which
they inherited from their forefathers.
Respondents, represented by attorney-
in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be
the lawful owners and possessor of an
unregistered parcel of agricultural land
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a
Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction with Damages...
before the Regional Trial Court of
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC)
On March 23, 2004, the rest of the
petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT)
As awardees of a CADT, petitioners
argued that NCIP has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the case, as the
subject matter concerns a dispute and
controversy over an ancestral
land/domain of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples
(IPs).
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty.
Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to
Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing
Office-National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP),
alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Issues: In resolving the pivotal issue of
which between the RTC and the NCIP
has jurisdiction over the respondents'
amended complaint,
Ruling: The petition has no merit.
Court disagrees with their contention
that petitioners do not have legal
capacity or standing and locus standi to
file the petition, for failure to show that
they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that
they are authorized to... represent the
Talaandig tribe.
That petitioners are the real parties in
interest can be gleaned from the Entry
of Appearance with Motion to Refer the
Case to the Regional
Hearing Office of the NCIP[12] filed by
the NCIP Special Transition Team-
Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU).
The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged
therein that the respondents' complaint
for recovery of ownership (accion...
reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an
unregistered real property situated in
Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners,
all of whom are, with the exception of
Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil,
member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-
TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in
the name of... the Talaandig Indigenous
Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of
Bukidnon. In support of their allegation,
petitioners presented a certification[13]
that the disputed land is within the area
covered by the same CADT, and the
NCIP List of Beneficiaries of
Talaandig Ancestral Domain of
Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel,
Talakag, Bukidnon.[
In contrast, respondents failed to submit
any evidence to dispute petitioners'
claim that they are members of the
Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents'
contention... that petitioners have no
legal standing to file the petition, is
without merit.
Having spelled out the jurisdictions
conferred by law to the RTC and the
NCIP over the subject matters of their
respective cases, the Court now
examines the allegations in the original
and amended complaints to find out
which tribunal may properly exercise
jurisdiction over this... case.
respondents traced the provenance of
their title over said land to one Mamerto
Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe,
by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on
July 27, 1957
They claimed that by means of fraud,
stealth and surreptitious means,
petitioners entered the said... land,
without permission and against the
consent of the landowners, caused
damages therein and harassed
respondents by indiscriminately firing
upon their farm workers.
The Court therefore finds that the CA
correctly ruled that the subject matter of
the amended complaint based on
allegations therein was within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
contrary to petitioners' contention, the
mere fact that this case involves
members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral
land is not enough to for it to fall under
the jurisdiction of the NCIP under
Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:
A careful review of Section 66 shows
that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to
the same ICC/IP.
The qualifying provision requires two
conditions before such disputes may be
brought before the NCIP, namely: (1)
exhaustion of remedies under customary
laws of the parties, and (2) compliance
with condition precedent through the
said certification by the Council of
Elders/Leaders.
In this case, while most of the
petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not
belong to the same ICC/IP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a
dispute over land which appear to be
located within the ancestral domain of
the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP
but the RTC which shall have the power
to hear, try and... decide this case. the
Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the
IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 5 and Rule
IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP
Rules as null and void insofar as they
expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA to include
such disputes where the parties do not
belong to the same ICC/IP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
Court of Appeals Decision
AFFIRMED.
Principles:
Locus standi is defined as a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a
given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the "real parties
in interest"
The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint... of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
Once vested by the allegations in the...
complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein."[15]
Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines
customary laws as a body of written
and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs
and practices traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted and
observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From
this restrictive definition, it can be
gleaned that it is only... when both
parties to a case belong to the same
ICC/IP that the abovesaid two conditions
can be complied with. If the parties to a
case belong to different ICCs/IPs which
are recognized to have their own
separate and distinct customary laws
and Council of Elders/Leaders, they...
will fail to meet the abovesaid two
conditions. The same holds true if one of
such parties was a non-ICC/IP member
who is neither bound by customary laws
as contemplated by the IPRA nor
governed by such council. Indeed, it
would be violative of the principles of
fair play and... due process for those
parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary
laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or
where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP,
the case shall fall under the jurisdiction
of the proper Courts of Justice, instead
of the NCIP.
GR: the NCIP does not have jurisdiction
over a case if one of the parties is not a
member of the tribe EXCS: 1: Claims
over boundary disputes 2. fraudulent
claims by parties who are not members
of the same ICC/IP
There are, however, exceptional cases
where the NCIP shall still have
jurisdiction over such claims and
disputes even if the parties involved do
not belong to the same ICC/IP, viz.:...
conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on...
the boundaries of ancestral domain
claims,... fraudulent claims by parties
who are not members of the same
ICC/IP, to wit:
Considering the general rule that the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section
66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and
claims between and among members of
the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights
under the IPRA, as well as the basic
administrative law principle that an...
administrative rule or regulation must
conform, not contradict the provisions of
the enabling law
"[J]urisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or the law
and rules of procedure yield to
substantive law.
4. Pollution adjudication board vs
CA gr 93891
FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation was involved in
bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles
with wastewater being directly
discharged into a canal leading to the
adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River.
Petitioner Board, an agency of the
Government charged with the task of
determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment
comply with or violate applicable anti-
pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions, have been remarkably
forbearing in its efforts to enforce the
applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.
Solar, on the other hand, seemed very
casual about its continued discharge of
untreated, pollutive effluents into the
river. Petitioner Board issued an ex
parte Order directing Solar immediately
to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source
installations. Solar, however, with
preliminary injunction against the
Board, went to the Regional Trial Court
on petition for certiorari, but it was
dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e.,
that appeal and not certiorari from the
questioned Order of the Board as well as
the Writ of Execution was the proper
remedy, and that the Board's
subsequent Order allowing Solar to
operate temporarily had rendered
Solar's petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the
Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case to that court for
further proceedings. In addition, the
Court of Appeals declared the Writ of
Execution null and void. At the same
time, the CA said that certiorari was a
proper remedy since the Orders of
petitioner Board may result in great and
irreparable injury to Solar; and that
while the case might be moot and
academic, "larger issues" demanded that
the question of due process be settled.
Petitioner Board moved for
reconsideration, without success.
Arguing that that the ex parte Order
and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not
violative of the requirements of due
process; and the ex parte Order and the
Writ of Execution are not the proper
subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar
A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre
for petitioner asked the Supreme Court
to review the Decision and Resolution
promulgated by the Court of Appeals
entitled "Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication
Board," which reversed an order of the
Regional Trial Court. In addition,
petitioner Board claims that under P.D.
No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal
authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie
evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the
maximum permissible standards set by
the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner
Board contends that the reports before it
concerning the effluent discharges of
Solar into the River provided prima facie
evidence of violation by Solar of Section
5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on
the other hand, contends that under the
Board's own rules and regulations, an ex
parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life." In
the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board
made no finding that Solar's wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court on the ground that Solar had been
denied due process by the Board.
HELD: The Court found that the Order
and Writ of Execution were entirely
within the lawful authority of petitioner
Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders
are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like here. The relevant
pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted
and promulgated in the exercise of that
pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police
power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power.
Hence, the trial court did not err when it
dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari.
It follows that the proper remedy was an
appeal from the trial court to the Court
of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
The Court gave due course on the
Petition for Review and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
were set aside. The Order of petitioner
Board and the Writ of Execution, as well
as the decision of the trial court were
reinstated, without prejudice to the right
of Solar to contest the correctness of the
basis of the Board's Order and Writ of
Execution at a public hearing before the
Board.
5. Henares vs LTFRB gr 158290
G.R. No. 158290 October 23,
2006
FACTS
Citing statistics from National and
International agencies, petitioners
prayed for a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require
public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that
the particulate matters (PM) complex
mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and
compositions emitted into the air from
various engine combustions have
caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the
overall quality of life. In addition, they
allege that with the continuing high
demand for motor vehicles, the energy
and transport sectors are likely to
remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. They cited studies showing
that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence
of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD); that pulmonary
tuberculosis is highest among jeepney
drivers; and that the children in Metro
Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural
counterparts. Petitioners infer that
these are mostly due to the emissions of
PUVs.
Asserting their right to clean air,
petitioners contend that the bases for
their petition for a writ of mandamus to
order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987
Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.
and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999.
Petitioners insist that since it is the
LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power
to regulate and control motor vehicles,
particularly PUVs, and with the same
agencies awareness and knowledge that
the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air
pollutants, then, the responsibility to see
that these are curbed falls under
respondents functions and a writ of
mandamus should issue against them.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General
said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are
not in a position to compel the PUVs to
use CNG as alternative fuel. He
explained that the function of the DOTC
is limited to implementing the emission
standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as
setting the maximum limit for the
emission of vehicles, but it does not
recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel.
He recommended that the petition
should be addressed to Congress for it to
come up with a policy that would compel
the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUES Whether the respondent is
the agency responsible to implement the
suggested alternative of requiring public
utility vehicles to use compressed
natural gas (cng)
Whether the respondent can be
compelled to require public utility
vehicles to use compressed natural gas
through a writ of mandamus
RULING Mandamus is available only
to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is
no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners
of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most
the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No.
290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises
to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys.
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it
is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the
task of developing an action plan. As far
as motor vehicles are concerned, it
devolves upon the DOTC and the line
agency whose mandate is to oversee that
motor vehicles prepare an action plan
and implement the emission standards
for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint
the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will
justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public
utility vehicles. The legislature should
provide first the specific statutory
remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken. In addition, the
petition had been mooted by the
issuance of Executive Order No. 290,
which implemented a program on the
use of CNG by public vehicles. The court
was assured that the implementation for
a cleaner environment is being
addressed.
6. Republic of the PH vs Marcopper
Mining Corp gr 137174