Sie sind auf Seite 1von 10

How Institutional Design Affects Turnout in Local Elections

Considerations for Amherst Charter Commission

Paul Musgrave

Assistant Professor of Political Science

University of Massachusetts-Amherst*

musgrave@umass.edu

*Does not reflect the opinions or positions of the University of Massachusetts or any other member of the faculty, administration, or student body of UMASS.

Abstract

Elections play a central role in democracy. Voters’ decisions to participate in elections—turnout—can be affected by a variety of factors. Although the most important elements in determining whether citizens vote are individual and household attributes (for instance, wealth, education, and a sense of civic obligation), the characteristics of municipal institutions also play a substantial role in affecting turnout. Among the most important factors are election timing and the design of government institutions. Those institutional characteristics are extremely hard to change once a form of government is set. The decisions of a charter commission therefore may affect voter turnout for decades, if not generations. Because variations in turnout also affects the types of policy elected officials enact, being explicit about the kinds of tradeoffs that different institutional design choices make matters greatly. This memorandum reviews findings in the political science literature relevant to the question of how mayor-council or council-manager systems affect voter turnout.

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

2

Introduction

Citizens in a democracy are asked to participate in their government in many ways: writing to elected officials, showing up to public forums, protesting injustices, serving on boards and commissions, and running for office. The fundamental—and most frequent—element of citizen participation is voting in elections.

Turnout matters for three reasons:

1.

In a democracy, citizens should value turnout for its own sake. People have organized, protested, and even died for the right to vote. A system in which few vote may be a system in which few value democracy relative to other forms of government. Encouraging participation in democracy at all levels seems likely to encourage healthier habits of citizenship.

2.

Turnout influences the decisions governments reach. Elected officials rationally feel that holding onto their jobs requires them to pay more attention to the citizens who actually vote, and therefore can choose to retain or dismiss officials, than to citizens who refrain from voting. Politicians who face low turnout in elections, as in many municipal elections, will therefore face incentives to cater only to a narrow slice of the population they represent. The wider the net is cast, the more they will have incentives to provide policy that produces benefits for a wider audience.

3.

The consequences of low and differential turnout reinforce existing harms and biases in society. In general, the most frequent voters tend to be richer, whiter, better educated, more socially connected to government officials, more directly interested in government policy, and more rooted than non-voters. To the extent that such voters might weigh the general interest of all people who live under the jurisdiction of a given government, there is little to be worried about. However, ample evidence confirms that the decisions such a biased sample of the potential electorate will reach do not reflect “better” or wiser decisions. Instead, empirically, the decisions made by a small share of the electorate tend to disproportionately reward organized interest groups with high benefits and low costs to organizing. Consequently, lower turnout by disadvantaged minorities—including racial and ethnic groups as well as economically disadvantaged classes—tends to generate policies that fail to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable in society and are driven instead by the interests of the most comfortable.

Despite the centrality of voting to the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the responsiveness of governments to the populace, turnout among citizens varies tremendously. How can governments seek to increase turnout? Although many of the most important determinants of turnout are beyond the control of policymakers, there are factors that policymakers can influence:

Timing and frequency of elections. The most important single variable in turnout for local elections is the timing of elections. Elections held “on-cycle” (coincident with presidential or gubernatorial elections) attract far more turnout than elections held “off- cycle” (in odd years or in months other than November). The size of this effect is on the order of 30 percentage points—all else constant, moving a local election from an off-cycle to an on-cycle election might take turnout from 15 to 45 percent of eligible voters. (Presidential years have higher turnout than midterm elections, which are higher than state elections.) Reducing the number of elections (that is, going from annual to biennial or even quadrennial contests) and moving elections to coincide with higher-visibility contests will increase turnout substantially.

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

3

Form of government. Controlling for other factors, having an elected (strong) mayor increases voters’ participation in local government by several percentage points relative to having a council-manager government. Single-member-district city councils tend to encourage more voter participation, and participation by different voters, than at-large districts. In general, single-member-districts seem associated with a greater frequency of election of minorities relative to at-large districts. Elections with local referenda on the ballot see more participation than elections without such participation. Consequently, allowing referenda and requiring them to take place on the same day as local elections may allow more participation.

Competitiveness. The more competitive elections are, the likelier turnout is to be higher. Designing a structure of government that encourages competition among candidates (for instance, one with a manageable number of districts that encourages visibility of candidates) will likely drive up participation.

Below, I review some relevant articles on each topic.

Variation in Turnout: What the Political Science Says

Voting is arguably the central act in democracy. So if voting is important, why do people not vote? Political scientists have long studied this question. Choosing to turn out to vote (or not) is not a reflection of a moral failing but instead reflects the mixture of benefits people receive from voting and the costs of voting. 1 Even someone who is very interested in being a good citizen may face high costs to taking part (for instance, because of work schedules or the difficulty of keeping track of candidates). Although people differ in their propensity to turn out to vote, therefore, variations in other factors, both individual and structural, can influence overall turnout in predictable ways.

Factors that increase the cost of voting tend to decrease turnout. Most obviously, laws that make it harder to register to vote will decrease voter participation. At the extreme, even bad weather can discourage voting by driving up the costs of getting to the polls. 2 Other factors that make voting easier or give people more of a perceived stake in elections can increase turnout. Education can increase voting participation, probably by helping to make it easier to understand politics but also by cementing an image of oneself as rooted in a community. Those with higher incomes tend to vote more frequently, as do those who are older (at least until very late in life; those over 75 experience sharp declines in turnout). 3 Community factors also seem to matter, as people in rural areas vote more than people in cities. And elections themselves can influence turnout. Living in a “battleground state” during a presidential election leads to higher turnout, for instance. 4 Campaigns

1 Timpone, Richard J. "Structure, behavior, and voter turnout in the United States." American Political Science Review 92, no. 01 (1998): 145-158.

2 Brad T Gomez, Thomas G Hansford and George A Krause, "The Republicans Should Pray for Rain:

Weather, Turnout, and Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections", Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007).

3 Joshua Harder and Jon A Krosnick, "Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the Causes of Voter Turnout", Journal of Social Issues 64, no. 3 (2008).

4 Thomas M Holbrook and Scott D McClurg, "The Mobilization of Core Supporters: Campaigns, Turnout, and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential Elections", American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 4

(2005).

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

4

and activists have been shown to boost turnout substantially by placing phone calls, mailing postcards, and—most important—engaging in direct voter contact. 5

Beyond the characteristics of individuals and voters, the type of election—whether it is national, state, or local—matters a great deal. In general, the higher the office being chosen, the more people will turn out. Between about half and three-fifths of eligible Americans tend to vote in national elections for president and Congress, while only about two-fifths of eligible Americans tend to vote in midterm elections for Congress alone. 6 Turnout for state and local elections, however, can be much lower: “In the U.S., Almost No One Votes in Local Elections,” says the headline for an article in The Atlantic’s CityLab blog. 7 For instance, in Dallas, Texas, only 6.1 percent of eligible voters participated in the May 2016 mayoral election. More generally, turnout regularly falls below a quarter of the eligible population in city elections. 8

Turnout Matters For Local Government

Do changes in voter turnout matter for local government? That is, would the same city with different rates of voter turnout adopt different policies and elect different people to office? The answer is unequivocally “yes.” When voter turnout is lower, the population of voters tends to be disproportionately well-educated, richer, more “rooted” in a community (as measured by years in a town), and interested in a policy’s outcomes.

One argument against higher turnout is that only people who take a strong interest in local government deserve to vote. To those who find that argument appealing, these outcomes may all sound like desirable qualities. But rephrasing those observations in another way suggests how those outcomes might be undesirable. Adopting policies that make it harder to vote will—predictably and almost inevitably—make it harder for those who are least advantaged in society to participate in their own government. The results of low turnout local elections prove to be what we would expect given this logic. Hajnal and Trounstine find that “lower turnout leads to substantial reductions in the representation of Latinos and Asian Americans on city councils and in the mayor’s office,” while “for African Americans…off-cycle local elections are more important barriers to representation.” 9

In other words, empirically policies that discourage voting do so by discouraging more vulnerable members of the citizenry from casting their ballots. To the extent that people care about using local government as a way to protect the interests of the vulnerable and not to extend the

5 Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green and Christopher W Larimer, "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence From a Large-scale Field Experiment", American Political Science Review 102, no. 01 (2008). Donald P Green and Alan S Gerber, Get Out the Vote : How to Increase Voter Turnout (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015). Alan S Gerber and Donald P Green, "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment", American Political Science Review 94, no. 03 (2000). David W Nickerson, "Is Voting Contagious? Evidence From Two Field Experiments", American Political Science Review 102, no. 01

(2008).

6 McDonald, Michael P. 2017. “Voter Turnout.” United States Elections Project 14 May 2017. http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data

7 Capps, Kriston. 2016. “In the U.S., Almost No One Votes in Local Elections.” City Lab. 1 Nov. http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/11/in-the-us-almost-no-one-votes-in-local-elections/505766/ Last Accessed: 14 May 2017.

8 Jessica Trounstine, "Representation and Accountability in Cities", Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010).

9 Zoltan Hajnal and Jessica Trounstine, "Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics", Journal of Politics 67, no. 2 (2005).

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

5

privileges of the comfortable, taking action to encourage turnout matters greatly. Thinking about turnout is therefore asking important question about whether the goal of government is to restrict turnout, and thereby to ensure that government is most responsive to a narrow, privileged subset of the citizens, or whether the goal is to ensure that government takes into account a broader set of concerns held by people who may have more limited resources with which to engage in politics.

Timing and Frequency of Elections

One factor that greatly influences turnout is when elections are held. Turnout in local elections varies tremendously with the timing (the calendar date of elections) and the frequency (the time between elections). Since presidential elections tend to be the most salient events in the American electoral calendar, they also draw the highest turnout rates in most areas. Hajnal and Lewis estimate that, controlling for a wide variety of other characteristics, local turnout in a presidential election is 36 percentage points higher than in an “off-cycle” (non-general election, “odd-year” election), a finding consistent with other studies. 10 Holding elections on the same day as a congressional midterm election or presidential primary generated turnout about 25 percentage points higher than an off-cycle election.

Do these effects matter for how governance proceeds? The answer is probably yes. The more a given social or economic interest group has at stake in an election, the more likely their members are to turn out and to organize their allies to turn out. However, people who are less directly involved in an election’s stakes are more likely to stay home and less likely to be mobilized. 11 The more frequent and the more oddly-timed elections are, the harder it is for people to participate in local governments. As Berry and Gersen write, “When the costs of participation rise, elections that might otherwise have been dominated by majoritarian interests may turn into elections dominated by special interests, resulting in concrete differences in public policy.” 12

Beyond the findings established above about turnout and diversity in government, Anzia finds that lower participation in local races was associated with higher influence by organized groups and that moving elections “on-cycle” reduced the influence of special interests in local elections. 13 Holding more frequent and less conveniently timed elections can thus actively discriminate against those who are not rich, who do not own a house, who may have recently moved to a community, who may be part of an ethnic or racial minority, and so on, while such inconveniently timed elections can also reward groups who are most organized regardless of whether they seek the public good or (more often) their private interest. 14

10 Zoltan L Hajnal and Paul G Lewis, "Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections", Urban Affairs Review 38, no. 5 (2003). Christopher R Berry and Jacob E Gersen, "The Timing of Elections", The University of Chicago Law Review 77, no. 1 (2010): 37-64. Curtis Wood, "Voter Turnout in City Elections", Urban Affairs Review 38, no. 2 (2002).

11 J Eric Oliver and Shang E Ha, "Vote Choice in Suburban Elections", American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007).

12 Berry and Gersen, "The Timing of Elections", 39.

13 Sarah F Anzia, "The Election Timing Effect: Evidence From a Policy Intervention in Texas", Quarterly Journal of Political Science 7, no. 3 (2012).

14 Albert Saiz, "The Median Voter Didn't Show Up: Costly Meetings and Insider Rents", Regional Science and Urban Economics 41, no. 5 (2011).

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

6

The Form Of Local Government Affects Voter Turnout and City Council Composition

Beyond electoral timing, the form of local government greatly affects turnout. All else being equal, a city that adopts a council-manager form of government will have a voter turnout rate that is lower than a city with a mayor-council form. 15 Trounstine summarizes the literature as suggesting the magnitude of this effect is about ten percentage points. That is, a city with a mayor-council system and 25 percent turnout in elections that switches to a council-manager system would then have only about 15 percent turnout subsequently. Council-manager systems do not appear to have any compensating benefits in terms of other ways of eliciting voter participation—for instance, through public forums. 16

The structure of city councils also influences who turns out and who wins elections in terms of the diversity of the electorate and the city council. Although the most important determinant of minority representation on city councils are the diversity of a city and the spatial concentration of minority group members, institutional form also matters. Scholars have found that single-member districts tend to be associated with higher rates of representation for minority groups, as measured by the number of minority-group members who run for and win spots on city councils. 17 Elections for single-member-district council seats (that is, when a single member is chosen from a given ward or precinct) are associated with a substantial (approximately 17 percentage point) increase in the likelihood of having African-American men on a council compared to at-large districts.

The effect of single-member-district versus at-large seats on women candidates’ ability to win is harder to disentangle. Recent work suggests that when voters know little about each candidate (as is common in local elections), they are more apt to fall back on implicit biases especially when asked to make choices among large fields of candidates. Thus, when voters have to pick their three top choices out of a field of six or more (as is common in local elections for at-large seats), they are more likely to vote according to their prejudices (and thus less likely to vote for women or racial/ethnic minorities). However, when voters choose between only two choices, they are more likely to be able to suppress their implicit bias and vote for a woman or a member of a racial/ethnic minority group. 18

Finally, Hajnal and Lewis find that cities with a local referendum on the ballot tended to draw about 4 percent more voters to the polls—an effect size about half as much as the difference between mayor-council and council-manager forms of government. 19 Allowing for local referenda to be held at the same time as local elections for mayors and councilmembers (or just councilmembers, in a council-manager system) may drive up turnout.

15 Trounstine, "Representation and Accountability in Cities". Wood, "Voter Turnout in City Elections". Jered B Carr, "What Have We Learned About the Performance of Council-Manager Government? A Review and Synthesis of the Research", Public Administration Review 75, no. 5 (2015). Oliver and Ha, "Vote Choice in Suburban Elections".

16 Carr, "What Have We Learned About the Performance of Council-Manager Government? A Review and Synthesis of the Research", 679.

17 Trounstine, "Representation and Accountability in Cities". Hajnal and Trounstine, "Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics".

18 Melody Crowder-Meyer and others, Complex Interactions: Candidate Race, Sex, Electoral Institutions, and Vote Choice (Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2015).

19 Hajnal and Lewis, "Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections".

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

7

Competitiveness Increases Turnout

One major factor that a charter commission can influence in seeking to improve turnout is the competitiveness of local elections. Competition for office is one of the most important factors linking voters and officials (and candidates). At the extreme, when officials do not face competitive elections, they have little incentive to inform voters of what they are doing and little reason to fear that anyone else will inform the voters as well. In the absence of competition for office, then, city officials can enact policies against the best interest of the public.

The worst-case scenario happened in Bell, California, a small city with a council-manager system and turnout of as low as percent in its (off-cycle) elections. This low-turnout, low- competitive town paid its city manager nearly $800,000 annually and part-time city councilors received nearly $100,000 in annual salaries, among numerous other frauds. 20 Although it is unlikely that Amherst residents would ever allow such a scenario to come to pass, it is worth taking seriously the fact that competition among office-seekers does provide strong incentives for candidates to provide information that incumbents might want to keep hidden.

Measures that would increase the competitiveness of local races—such as creating larger districts for offices—might help to improve the quality of governance by improving the incentives for challengers to bring information that exposes such abuses to light and by discouraging officeholders from behaving in that manner in the first place. 21 A mayoral election is one sort of larger-districted election, but combining precincts into wards for elections might also do the trick. At-large elections would also tend to be more competitive, although—as the attentive reader will note!at-large elections would also raise other problems.

But the biggest takeaway is that elections for mayor-council or council-manager offices will be much more competitive than elections for Town Meeting. This will, on the one hand, tend to increase the level of overt competition among people interested in Amherst’s government in a way that some may find off-putting. But, on the other hand, such competition is also the sign of a healthy and engaged political system—one that encourages people to commit to running for office and to finding ways to frame issues that allow voters to make more competent decisions. Candidates in competitive elections will also be likelier to contact voters to urge them to vote, a key non- institutional factor in driving up turnout.

Conclusion

Institutional design is hard. Arrangements that provide the maximum of some set of desired qualities (for instance, increasing the professionalism of municipal management by centralizing executive functions in an appointed manager) may unintentionally lead to undesired outcomes on other scores (for instance, by reducing turnout in local elections and leading to a democratic deficit). Striking a balance on many such dimensions is difficult and requires not just empirical evidence but also deep introspection and deliberation about what values matter most to a community. This memorandum provides no new evidence about turnout and makes no recommendations about how this information should influence the charter commission’s decisions. Instead, I write simply to

20 Jennifer G. Rodgers and Jacob Watkins, Rebuilding Bell, California: Review and Recommendations for Continued Improvement of Accountability, Oversight and Transparency (Chapman University Center for Public Integrity Report).

21 John Gerring and others, "Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation", American Political Science Review 109, no. 3 (2015).

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

8

encourage members of the commission to take note of these findings in the hopes that they will help sharpen debates and contribute to a better understanding of the tradeoffs to be made.

The major takeaway point is that the form of a city or town government will not entirely influence turnout in local elections. However, there are features of local government that can raise or lower turnout, all else being equal. In general:

“On-cycle” (even-year, November) elections will have higher turnout than off-cycle elections—substantially so.

Mayor-council systems will have higher turnout than council-manager systems.

More competitive, higher-stakes elections (e.g., elections with referenda on the ballot or in which city governments provide more services) will have higher turnout than less competitive, lower-stakes election.

The institutional form of city government can also affect the types of candidates who win and how government works:

Higher turnout is likelier to increase the diversity of the electorate and the city government.

Higher turnout is likely to make government more responsive to the needs of ethnic and racial minorities.

Single-member-districts are likeliest to increase the representation of racial and ethnic minorities relative to at-large districts.

Elections for offices with many candidates (that is, pick-three-of-six) may be likelier to depress the representation of women and minorities relative to elections with only two candidates.

There is no magic formula for designing the perfect government. Designing a government, like politics itself, is about making hard tradeoffs between valuable goals. But clarifying one’s beliefs about which goals matter, and how much relative to other goals, can at least lead discussions to center on what kinds of tradeoffs should be made—and knowing the approximate magnitude of those effects can lead to more predictable tradeoffs.

As the Commission members know well, a successful charter revision may be a once-in-a- generation—or even once-in-a-century—opportunity to influence the dynamics of Amherst politics. Institutions last a long time when they are put in place, and changing them is hard. Thinking now in an evidence-based manner about how best to influence turnout could affect the community and its governance for decades—for generations yet unborn.

Works Cited

Anzia, Sarah F. "The Election Timing Effect: Evidence From a Policy Intervention in Texas." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 7, no. 3 (2012): doi:10.1561/100.00011056.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00011056.

Berry, Christopher R, and Jacob E Gersen. "The Timing of Elections." The University of Chicago Law Review 77, no. 1 (2010): 37-64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40663025.

Carr, Jered B. "What Have We Learned About the Performance of Council-Manager Government? A Review and Synthesis of the Research." Public Administration Review 75, no. 5 (2015):

doi:10.1111/puar.12415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/puar.12415.

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections

9

Crowder-Meyer, Melody, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Jessica Trounstine, and Kau Vue. Complex Interactions: Candidate Race, Sex, Electoral Institutions, and Vote Choice. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2015.

Gerber, Alan S, and Donald P Green. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." American Political Science Review 94, no. 03 (2000):

doi:10.2307/2585837.

Gerber, Alan S, Donald P Green, and Christopher W Larimer. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout:

Evidence From a Large-scale Field Experiment." American Political Science Review 102, no. 01 (2008): doi:10.1017/S000305540808009X.

Gerring, John, Maxwell Palmer, Jan Teorell, and Dominic Zarecki. "Demography and Democracy:

A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation." American Political Science Review 109, no. 3 (2015): doi:10.1017/S0003055415000234.

Gomez, Brad T, Thomas G Hansford, and George A Krause. "The Republicans Should Pray for Rain: Weather, Turnout, and Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007): doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00565.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-

2508.2007.00565.x.

Green, Donald P, and Alan S Gerber. Get Out the Vote : How to Increase Voter Turnout. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015.

Hajnal, Zoltan, and Jessica Trounstine. "Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics." Journal of Politics 67, no. 2 (2005): doi:10.1111/j.1468- 2508.2005.00327.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00327.x.

Hajnal, Zoltan L, and Paul G Lewis. "Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections." Urban Affairs Review 38, no. 5 (2003): doi:10.1177/1078087403038005002.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087403038005002.

Harder, Joshua, and Jon A Krosnick. "Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the Causes of Voter Turnout." Journal of Social Issues 64, no. 3 (2008): doi:10.1111/j.1540- 4560.2008.00576.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00576.x.

Holbrook, Thomas M, and Scott D McClurg. "The Mobilization of Core Supporters: Campaigns, Turnout, and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential Elections." American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 4 (2005): doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00149.x.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00149.x.

Nickerson, David W. "Is Voting Contagious? Evidence From Two Field Experiments." American Political Science Review 102, no. 01 (2008): doi:10.1017/S0003055408080039.

Oliver, J Eric, and Shang E Ha. "Vote Choice in Suburban Elections." American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007): doi:10.1017/S0003055407070323.

Rodgers, Jennifer G., and Jacob Watkins. Rebuilding Bell, California: Review and Recommendations for Continued Improvement of Accountability, Oversight and Transparency . Chapman University Center for Public Integrity Report.

Saiz, Albert. "The Median Voter Didn't Show Up: Costly Meetings and Insider Rents." Regional Science and Urban Economics 41, no. 5 (2011):

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2010.10.002.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166046210000748.

Institutional Design and Turnout in Local Elections 10

Timpone, Richard J. "Structure, behavior, and voter turnout in the United States." American Political Science Review 92, no. 01 (1998): 145-158.

Trounstine, Jessica. "Representation and Accountability in Cities." Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.032808.150414.

Wood, Curtis. "Voter Turnout in City Elections." Urban Affairs Review 38, no. 2 (2002):

doi:10.1177/107808702237659. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107808702237659.