Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SARDIC PUBLICATION
AGRARIAN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
PREFACE
This book has inauspicious beginnings. The original intent of the UNDP-
SARDIC project, which eventually bore this book, was to map out special areas
for policy reform in agrarian reform law. But as the project team delved deeper
into the subject, the long unaddressed need for an organized and systematic
presentation of agrarian law and existing jurisprudence was again put to fore. In
response to that problem, the project team and the UNDP-SARDIC project
decided to widen the scope of the project and, thus, what came of it was not only
a map of the difficult problem areas in the law's implementation but also this
book.TcHCDI
Any foray into the complicated, and often contentious, arena that is agrarian
reform law necessitates a complete and well-grounded grasp of the basics. If
anything, our study revealed that, even after decades, agrarian reform law
remains vastly misunderstood and under-appreciated not only by stakeholders
but by agrarian reform law implementors themselves.
This is largely due to the dearth of materials on the matter. Over the years,
laws and their implementing rules have been refined and promulgated to reflect
the lessons learned and the changing times. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court
issued rulings that elucidate and interpret the law, as well as repudiate portions
thereof. The rights and obligations of the different stakeholders have been
constantly redefined and readjusted.
Despite these exciting developments, however, there has been little done to
mesh all these pieces of knowledge into an organized whole.
This book is an effort towards that end.
In a nutshell, this book is a humble attempt in summing up years of agrarian
reform law implementation. This book intends to reach out to all sectors and
stakeholders to heighten their understanding and appreciation of the agrarian
reform in the Philippines, and hopefully help refine the terms of the ongoing
debates among them. This book hopes to appeal to both familiar and unfamiliar
on the subject. It attempts to present, in an academic fashion, all relevant
agrarian reform laws, DAR implementing rules, and pertinent judicial declarations
on the matter. Hopefully, this will provide a holistic framework for understanding
agrarian law.
Extra effort was also exerted to demonstrate agrarian reform in action by
giving concrete illustrations and discussion from an operational perspective.
Interspersed with the theoretical discussions are the various operational
issues and difficulties that DAR implementors faced or are still facing.
The authors would like to thank
the UNDP-SARDIC project management team for providing the
financial and logistic support to see this project through.
the members of DAR's management committee who shared with the
project team their invaluable insights and experience in agrarian reform
implementation. Their contribution in making this book complete and
insightful is immeasurable.
the DAR-PPLAO support staff for providing administrative and
secretariat support; and
Antonio Ramos who served as auditor for this project.
This is but a first step. We derive inspiration from the words of T.S. Eliot:
THE AUTHORS
CHAPTER 1
Coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
InNatalia v. DAR, 225 SCRA 278 (1993), the Supreme Court held:
Section 4 of RA 6657 provides that the CARL "shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as
"land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are
only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not
include commercial and industrial lands" (at 282, 283).
Agricultural lands reclassified by local governments into "forest
conservation zones"
Agricultural lands reclassified by local government units (LGUs) into "forest
conservation zones" even prior to the effectivity ofCARLdo not become forest
land under Sec. 3 (c) ofRA 6657as to be exempted from CARP coverage.
It should be noted that under the Constitution, lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks
(CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 3). These classifications are called primary classifications
or "classification in the first instance." The same provision of the Constitution also
provides that agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of
agricultural land is referred to as secondary classification. The responsibility over
primary classification of lands of the public domain is vested in the President who
exercises such power upon the recommendation of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) (Com. Act No. 141[1936], Sec.
6;EO 192[1987]). On the other hand, the authority to reclassify agricultural lands
into residential, commercial or industrial is lodged, among others, in cities and
municipalities (Rep. Act No. 7160[1991], Sec. 20).
The group of lands referred to in Sec. 3 (c) ofRA 6657as non-agricultural
(i.e., mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial) is a mix of primary and
secondary classifications. Forest and mineral lands are, under
theConstitutionandCommonwealth Act No. 141(1936), primary classifications,
while the rest are secondary classifications.
Reclassification by LGUs of agricultural lands into "forest conservation zones"
does not have the effect of converting such lands into forest lands as to be
exempted from CARP. Firstly, an agricultural land is already a primary
classification and, hence, can only be subjected to secondary classification.
Secondly, LGUs have no authority or power to make primary classifications
considering that such power is the sole prerogative of the President exercising
such power upon the recommendation of the DENR.
The forest (or mineral) land referred to in Sec. 3 (c) ofRA 6657is therefore to
be understood as referring to forest (or mineral) land declared to be such by the
President/DENR and not by the LGUs.DAR Administrative Order No. 1
(1990)makes this qualification in its definition of "agricultural land," as follows:
. . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies,
and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or
industrial use.
Agricultural lands reclassified LGUs into residential,
commercial or industrial
Taking into consideration the effectivity of the law, the secondary
classifications mentioned in Sec. 3 (c) ofRA 6657are treated according whether
they were classified as such before or after the effectivity of the law on 15 June
1988.
If the agricultural land was classified as residential, commercial or industrial
by the LGU and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), or its predecessor agencies, prior to 15 June 1988, the land will be
recognized as so classified under Sec. 3 (c) of RA and is therefore not covered
by CARP. However, anexemptionclearance from DAR is still necessary to
confirm or declare its exempt status. (DAR Adm. O. No. 6 [1994]).
This is based onDepartment of Justice Opinion No. 44 (1990)which provides
that with respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered byRA 6657to
non-agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR to approve such conversion may
be exercised from the date of its effectivity or on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands
already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before that date no
longer need any conversionclearancefrom the DAR.
If an agricultural land is reclassified after 15 June 1988, the provisions on land
conversion underCARLand its implementing rules will apply (Rep. Act No.
6657[1988], sec. 65;DAR Adm. O. No. 1 [1999]).
Conversion prior to 15 June 1988 through presidential
proclamation binding before DAR
The reasoning inDOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990)was validated by the Supreme
Court inNatalia v. DAR, supra. This case involved the question of whether or not
lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved
by HLURB and its precursor agencies, prior to 15 June 1988 are covered by
CARP. SDHCac
Facts:
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. is the owner of a 125.0078-ha land set aside by
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 (1979) as townsite area for the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation. Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC), the
developer of the area, was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances
by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) for the
establishment of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision therein. In November 1990, a
Notice of Coverage was issued by DAR on the undeveloped portion of the
landholding. The developer filed its objections and filed this case imputing grave
abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including the undeveloped portions of
its landholding within the coverage of CARP.
Issue:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, and
approved by HLURB and its precursor agencies prior to 15 June 1988, covered by
RA 6657?
Held:
Sec. 4 of RA 6657 states that the CARL covers "regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private and agricultural
lands" and as per the transcripts of the Constitutional Commission, "agricultural
lands" covered by agrarian reform refers only to those which are "arable and
suitable lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
The land subject of the controversy has been set aside for the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation by Proclamation No. 1637 prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 and in
effect converted these lands into residential use. Since the Natalia lands were
converted prior to 15 June 1988, DAR is bound by such conversion, and thus it
was an error to include these within the coverage of CARL.
Facts:
Petitioner Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business. It
seeks to nullify Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 in so far as they apply to
livestock and poultry business.
Held:
Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as they include
lands devoted to raising livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage. The use
of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration of productivity in
this industry. The Supreme Court held that:
The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The Supreme Court noted that the intention of the Committee to limit the
application of the word "agriculture" is further shown by the proposal of
Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties. The proposal, however, was not considered because the
Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
Moreover, in his answer to Commissioner Regalado's interpellation, Commissioner
Tadeo clarified that the term "farmworker" was used instead of "agricultural
worker" in order to exclude therein piggery, poultry and livestock workers (Record,
CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
DAR AO 9 (1993)imposes two (2) conditions in order that these lands may be
exempted: (a) that the land or portion thereof is exclusively, directly, or actually
used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as of 15 June 1988; and (b) the farm
must satisfy the ratios of land, livestock, poultry and swine, as follows:
cattle, carabao and horse raising maximum of 1 head to 1 hectare; 21
heads for every 1.7815 hectares of
infrastructure
sheep and goat raising 7 heads to 1 hectare; 147 heads for
every 0.7205 hectare of infrastructure
swine raising 21 heads of hogs for every 0.5126
hectare of infrastructure
poultry raising 500 layers for every 0.53 hectare of
infrastructure or 1000 boilers for every
1.428 hectares of infrastructure
Fishponds and prawn ponds
With the amendment of Sec. 3 (c), 10 and 11 ofRA 6657byRA 7881,
fishponds and prawnponds are also exempted from the coverage of CARP,
provided that said lands have not been distributed to ARBs and no CLOAs have
been issued.
To be exempted, the agricultural land must have been actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds as of 12 March 1995, the date of
effectivity ofRA 7881. To avail of the exemption, a landowner or his authorized
representative still has to file a written application for land exemption/exclusion
with the DAR Provincial Office (DAR Adm. O. No. 3 [1995]).
In cases were the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to CARP, by
voluntary offer to sell, commercial farms deferment or notice of compulsory
acquisition, they can be exempt from CARP if a simple and absolute majority of
the actual regular workers or tenants consent to the exemption within one (1)
year from the effectivity ofRA 7881or on 12 March 1995. In cases where the
fishponds or prawnponds have not been subjected to CARP, the consent of the
farm workers shall no longer be necessary (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 10[b],
as amended).
Sec. 4 ofRA 7881also amendedRA 6657by introducing a new provision
mandating the introduction of an incentive plan for employees of all fishponds
and prawn farms. Operators and entities owning or operating fishponds and
prawn farms are directed to execute within six (6) months from its effectivity an
incentive plan with their regular fishpond or prawn farm worker's organization, if
any, whereby seven point five percent (7.5%) of net profits before tax from the
operation of the fishpond or prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60) days at
the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other pond workers
over and above their current compensation. This incentive plan requirement,
however, does not apply to agricultural lands subsequently converted to
fishponds or prawn farms provided that the size of the land converted does not
exceed the retention limit of the landowner.
Lands used for academic or educational use. The CMU case.
InCentral Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 85 (1992), the
Supreme Court passed upon the exemption of lands directly, actually and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes provided for under Sec. 10 ofRA 6657, as amended.
Facts:
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to
be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty
members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty
members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how,
training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for
use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy
relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In
its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of
the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the
basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for
exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational
purposes.
Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for
public use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and
exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?
Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and
answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The
Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of
"CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for
the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student
population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth
of the university in the years to come.SHECcT
TheCMUcase is unique as it involves land transferred by the state to CMU
throughPD 467which provided for its commitment to a specific use and purpose.
Thus, the said land was already set aside for a specific purpose and, in effect,
was taken outside the coverage of agrarian reform by law. It is submitted that a
more accurate basis for the exemption should have been that the exclusive use
of the land both present and future has been determined by law, and not
because of the determination of the CMU of what it needs and how it intends to
use it.
In ruling that the CMU is in the best position to determine the use of the land
and not DAR, the Supreme Court seems to have overlookedEO 407(1990), as
amended byEO 448(1991), which provides that DAR is vested with the power to
determine whether lands reserved for public uses by presidential proclamation is
no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose
for which they are reserved. Said EO provides that:
Sec. 1-A. All lands or portions thereof reserved by virtue of Presidential
proclamations for specific public uses by the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations suitable
for agriculture and no longer actually, directly and exclusively used or necessary
for the purposes for which they have been reserved, as determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform in coordination with the government agency or
instrumentality concerned in whose favor the reservation was established, shall be
segregated from the reservation and transferred to the Department of Agrarian
Reform for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
Facts:
Subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land acquired by
respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the
provisions of CA 141. Respondents wanted to personally cultivate these lands, but
the petitioners refused to vacate, relying on the provisions of PD 27 and PD 316
and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
Issue:
Are lands obtained through homestead patent covered under PD 27?
Held:
No. While PD 27 decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till, the same
cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public
Land Act or CA 141. InPatricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45, it was held that:
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and
protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land
where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant
what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They
have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human
beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's
happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital
right.
In this regard, Sec. 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian
reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in
the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands
of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture,
subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Moreover, Sec. 6 of RA 6657 contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability
of PD 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in
question, reading:
Section 6.Retention Limits. . . . Provided further, That original
homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
xxx xxx xxx
While homestead lots are declared exempt underPD 27, they are not
expressly declared as such underRA 6657. However, Sec. 6 ofRA
6657provides that homesteaders are allowed to retain the total homestead lot
subject to the conditions provided in the same section and as setDAR MC 4
(1991), to wit:
a)That the original homestead grantee or his/her direct compulsory
heirs still own the land on 15 June 1988;
b)The original homestead grantee or his or her compulsory heirs
cultivate the land as of 15 June 1988 and continue to cultivate the same.
It also provides that the tenants of lands covered by homestead patents
exempted fromPD 27or retained underRA 6657shall not be ejected therefrom
but shall remain as leaseholders therein.
Schedule of Implementation
Sec. 7 ofRA 6657lays out the schedule of acquisition and distribution of all
agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act:
For untitled public alienable and disposable lands which are tenanted and with
claimants not qualified under the criteria specified inRA 6940, the disposition
shall be under the jurisdiction of the DENR. The role of the DAR in this case is
limited to the documentation and protection of the leasehold arrangement
between the public land claimant and the tenants.
If the alienable and disposable land is not tenanted but has actual farm
occupants, and the public land claimant lacks the requisite thirty (30)-year
possession, these shall be under the jurisdiction of the DENR and the
appropriate tenurial instrument shall be applied.
It is submitted, however, that these alienable and disposable lands that are
privately claimed by claimants who are not qualified under the criteria set
underRA 6940(1990) should be turned over to DAR for distribution under CARP.
As these claimants/tenants are mere occupants and can not be granted Free
Patents by the DENR, these land should instead be committed for agrarian
purposes.
A recently issuedDENR MC 22 (1999)entitled "DENR Jurisdiction over all
Alienable ad Disposable Lands of the Public Domain," seems to abrogate or set
asideJoint DAR-DENR MC 14 (1997). It directs all Regional Executive Directors
to strictly exercise DENR's jurisdiction over all alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, including those lands not specifically placed under the
jurisdiction of other government agencies, and prepare the same for disposition
to qualified and legitimate recipients under the People's Alliance for the
Rehabilitation of Environment of the Office of the Secretary of the DENR.
This recent issuance impliedly prohibits the turnover of alienable and
disposable lands to CARP, and thus, effectively removes remaining public
alienable and disposable lands out of the scope of CARP. While merely an
administrative order that can not overturn legislation on the matter,DENR MC 22
(1999)poses another roadblock which if not corrected or legally challenged in
court can derail the already delayed coverage of public agricultural lands. Sec. 7
ofRA 6657explicitly provides that alienable and disposable public agricultural
lands are among the priority lands for distribution. Needless to say, the political
implications of government's reluctance to commit public agricultural lands for
agrarian ends in the face of its relentless expropriation of private landholdings is
serious.
Ancestral Lands
Sec. 9 ofRA 6657defines ancestral lands as those lands that include, but not
limited to, lands in actual, continuous and open possession of an indigenous
cultural community and its members. Sec. 3 (b) ofRA 8371(1997) or the
"Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997," has a more encompassing definition, to
wit:
Sec. 3.Definition of Terms. . . .
b).Ancestral Lands Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families, and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs (indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples) since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interests, under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership continuously, to the present,
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings
entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not
limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and treelots;
CHAPTER 2
Agricultural Leasehold
Agricultural Tenancy
Definition and nature of agricultural tenancy
Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a person of land
devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, whether in
produce or in money, or both." (RA 1199[1954], sec. 3)
InGelos vs. CA,208 SCRA 608 (1992), the Supreme Court held that
agricultural tenancy is not a purely factual relationship. The written agreement of
the parties is far more important as long it is complied with and not contrary to
law.
Facts:
Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their
laborer on a 25,000-sq. m farmland. They executed a written contract which
stipulated that as hired laborer Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00.
Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed of the termination of his services
and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working
on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court found
Gelos as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.DHACES
Issue:
What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?
Held:
The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. The
agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner
would disavow the agreement, but his protestations are less than convincing. His
wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in
another proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement
does not stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared
under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer of the court) that he
explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it himself before
signing it. . . . Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and
suggests that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not
so. The work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also
be done by a hired laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in the
case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties
that determines the relationship between them. As this Court has stressed in a
number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of
the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to
law, are even more important."
Facts:
Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7)
years when he was advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would
be given to another tenant. Thereafter, a new tenant was installed who forbade
Macaraeg from working on the riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro denied that
Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed that he had always leased all of his 39-
hectare riceland under civil lease. He further claimed that after the expiration of his
"Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter did not anymore renew his
contract.
Held:
The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a
leasehold tenancy agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an
agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. More specifically, the parties
stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be
used for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of
nine (9) cavans ofpalayper hectare for one agricultural year . . . must be of the
same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an
area of only four and a half (4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a bigger area
may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members
of his immediate farm household.
From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as thatproduced
by the LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was
that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he did as found by the Agrarian
Court, thus: "In the instant case,petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding
belonging to said respondent(Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in
consideration of a fixed annual rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no
evidence that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in dispute. Neither
did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance
in the cultivation of the said riceland.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the
possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in
produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover, the
provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce 9 cavans per hectare
is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties
did actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation (at 16-17;underscoring
supplied).
Castillo vs. CA
205 SCRA 529 (1992)
Facts:
Alberto Ignacio filed a complaint for injunction against Castillo alleging that he is
the agricultural tenant of the latter. He claims that Castillo allowed him to construct
a rest house in the property and that, thereafter, Castillo started cutting fruit-
bearing trees on the land and filled with adobe stones the area intended for
vegetables. On the other hand, Castillo denied that Ignacio was his tenant but that
the latter was only a "magsisiga" of the landholding and that he did not ask
permission from Ignacio when he constructed his rest house. The trial court found
no tenancy relationship between the parties but this was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Held:
The element of personal cultivation is absent in this case. The alleged tenant "is a
businessman by occupation and this is his principal source of income. He
manufactures hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry farm as well as a
hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To add to that, the
respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos. It is thus evident that the
working hours of the respondent as a businessman and his other activities do not
permit him to undertake the work and obligations of a real tenant. This is further
supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot even personally
perform the work of a smudger because on 22 October 1986, the respondent
hired some 20 people who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass
in the premises of the subject land." (at 535-536).
An owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the
contemplation of the law (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 194 (1990).
InOarde vs. CA, et al., 280 SCRA 235 (1997), certifications of tenancy/non-
tenancy issued by DAR are not conclusive.
"The certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts, as ruled by
this Court inCuao vs. Court of Appeals, citingPuertollano vs. IAC. Secondly, it is
well-settled that the "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning
the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties
is merely preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon the courts." (at 246)
Landholder-lessor
A landholder-lessor is defined as "any person, natural or juridical, either as
owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, who lets,
leases or rents to another said property for purposes of agricultural production
and for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce."
(Rep. Act No. 1199[1954], sec. 42). Thus, consent need not be necessarily given
personally by the registered owner as long as the person giving the consent is
the lawful landholder as defined by law.
Facts:
Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her
brother, Benigno, so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his
children's education in Manila. The property was leased by Bernas pursuant to a
production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno.
Natividad played no part in this arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by
Benigno to his sister but when the owners sought to take possession, Bernas
refused to relinquish the property. Bernas was claiming that he was an agricultural
lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for recovery of
possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently
reversed by the CA.
Issue:
Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner,
sufficient to create tenancy relationship?
Held:
Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to
enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law expressly grants
him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural
leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed." (at 125-126)
Facts:
Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale,
Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental
to the owner. Abajon was also allowed to plant on a portion of the land and that
the produce thereof would be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new
owners took over, they told Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the southern portion
of the property because they would be building a poultry near Abajon's house.
Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed the property.
Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that Abajon dutifully
gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation.
Held:
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of
a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to
live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side
rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural production as the primary
purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent
was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10
of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is
not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Personal cultivation
Cultivation
UnderDAR AO 5 (1993), cultivation is not limited to the plowing and
harrowing of the land, but also the husbanding of the ground to forward the
products of the earth by general industry, the taking care of the land and fruits
growing thereon, fencing of certain areas, and the clearing thereof by gathering
dried leaves and cutting of grasses. In coconut lands, cultivation includes the
clearing of the landholding, the gathering of the coconuts, their piling, husking
and handling as well as the processing thereof into copra, although at times with
the aid of hired laborers.
Meaning of "Personal Cultivation"
"Personal cultivation" exists when a person cultivates the land by himself and
with the aid available from his immediate farm household.
InOarde vs. CA, et al.,supra, the Court held that the element of personal
cultivation is essential for an agricultural leasehold. There should be personal
cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the
family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or
who usually help him in his activities (Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law
is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land
(Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons
to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559). InGabriel vs.
Pangilinan,supra, the Court held that the tenancy relation was severed when the
tenant and/or his immediate farm household ceased from personally working the
fishpond when he became ill and incapacitated.
Compensation in money and/or produce
InMatienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981), the Supreme Court held that:
A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who,
himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates
the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the
above definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no
tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties. What transpired was
that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to supervise
applications for loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to build his
house thereon and to plant specified plants without being compensated; he was
free to clear and plant the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing
arrangement between him and defendant; and he was not obligated to pay any
price certain to nor share the produce, with the latter.CaSHAc
Security of Tenure
Under Sec. 7 ofRA 1199, "the agricultural leasehold relation once established
shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the
landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided."
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has
been established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The
tenant has a right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected
therefrom for cause as provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC,175 SCRA 559
[1989]).
Transfer of ownership or legal possession does not affect security of
tenure.
InTanpingco vs. IAC,207 SCRA 653 (1992), the Court upheld the validity of
donation but the donee must respect the rights of the tenant and ordered the
donee to pay the tenant disturbance compensation.
Facts:
Primero owns a tenanted riceland in Cavite. Because of his desire to let the
property to one Porfirio Potente, he notified his tenant advising the latter to vacate
the land. The tenant refused. Primero filed a case with CAR which subsequently
dismissed the same. On appeal, Primero assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 9
and 50 of RA 1199 claiming that said provisions are limitations on freedom of
contract, a denial of equal protection of law, and an impairment of, or limitation on,
property rights.
Held:
The provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not impair the right of the
landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such
transfer or alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease,
as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his
tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or
protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the
land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants
in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection
against unjustified dismissal from their landholdings. Republic Act 1199 is
unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice
precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the state to
promote the commonwealth. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199,
like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking body, was passed by
congress in compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State" (Art II, sec. 5) and that "the state shall regulate
the relations between landlord and tenant in agriculture" (Art. XIV, sec. 6). (at
680).
InPineda vs. de Guzman,21 SCRA 1450 (1967), the Supreme Court also
held:
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as amended,
enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenants, such that it prescribes
that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes
provided by law. The principle is epitomized by the axiom on land tenure that once
a tenant, always a tenant. Attacks on the constitutionality of this guarantee have
centered on the contention that it is a limitation on freedom of contract, a denial of
the equal protection of the law, and an impairment of or a limitation on property
rights. The assault is without reason. The law simply provides that the tenancy
relationship between the landholder and his tenant should be preserved in order to
insure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed of the land. Its termination can take place only for causes and
reasons provided in the law. It was established pursuant to the social justice
precept of the State to promote the common weal.(Primero vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-10594, May 29, 1957)(at 1456).
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty owns a parcel of land, a portion of which is occupied
by Herminigildo Pascual. Despite repeated demands, Herminigildo refused to
vacate the property and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is
helping his mother, the corporation's tenant, to cultivate the property.
Held:
Only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or
maintain a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he
is not petitioner's tenant. In fact, he admits that he is a mere member of Ana
Pascual's immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we find private
respondent not entitled to a homelot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of
his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of
petitioner. . . . Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argument and
allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household to construct and
maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one thousand (1,000)
square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted this Court to
dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses.
In sugarcane lands, the lessee shall have the following rights to be exercised
by him personally or through a duly registered cooperative/farmers' association of
which he is abona fidemember (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]):
a)To enter into a contract with the sugar central millers for the milling
of the sugarcane grown on the leased property;
b)To be issued a warehouse receipt (quedan) or molasses storage
certificate by the sugar central for the manufactured sugar, molasses and
other by-products;
c)To have free access to the sugar central's factory, facilities, and
laboratory for purposes of checking and/or verifying records and procedures
in the processing of sugarcane through professional representation;
d)To be furnished a weekly statement of cane and sugar account
showing, among other things, the tonnage of the delivered cane and
analysis of the crusher juice;
e)To be given 30 days notice in writing before the sugar and other by-
products are sold through public auction; and
f)To be provided with the standard tonnage allocation by the miller/
sugar central.
Rights and responsibilities of lessor
The lessor shall have the following rights:
a)To inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and
conditions of the leasehold contract;
b)To propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural
purposes, or in the kind of crops planted;
c)To require the lessee, taking into consideration his/her financial capacity
and the credit facilities available to him/her, to adopt proven farm practices
necessary to the conservation of the land, improvement of the fertility and
increase in productivity; and
d)To mortgage expected rentals (Rep. Act No. 3844[1963], sec. 29):
The lessor may propose a change in use but the change shall be agreed upon
by the landowner and the lessee. In case of disagreement, the matter may be
settled by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), or in his absence
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993])
The lessor shall have the following obligations:
a)To keep the lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of the
land; and
b)To keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the
landholding at the start of the leasehold relation (Rep. Act No. 3844[1963],
sec. 30).
Sec. 31 ofRA 3844provides that the lessor is prohibited to perform any of the
following acts:
a)To dispossess the lessee of his/her landholding except upon
authorization by the Court;
b)To require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment
of the taxes or part thereof levied by the government on the land;
c)To require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any rent or
obligation of the lessor to a third party;
d)To deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the
lessee in cases where the crop has to be sold in processed form before
payment of the lease rental;
e)To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or
growth of unions or organizations of lessees in his/her landholding; and
f)For coconut lands, indiscriminate cutting of coconut trees will be
deemedprima facieevidence to dispossess the tenant of his/her
landholding unless there is written consent of the lessee and there is PCA
certification, copy of the findings and recommendations of which shall be
furnished to affected tenants or lessees, or a resolution from the Municipal
Board allowing the cutting for valid reasons (DAR Adm. O. No. 5
[1993]andDAR Adm. O. No. 19 [1989]).
Termination of Tenancy Relation
Causes for termination of leasehold relation
Section 8 ofRA 3844provides that agricultural leasehold relation shall be
extinguished by the following acts or omissions:
a)Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
b)Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
c)Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her
death or permanent incapacity.
Conversion of the land to non-agricultural uses also extinguishes the
leasehold relation because the subject land is no longer an agricultural land and
the purpose is no longer agricultural production. However, under Sec. 16 ofDAR
AO 1 (1999), the tenant affected by the conversion is entitled to disturbance
compensation which must be paid within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the
order of conversion.
Abandonment
In the case ofTeodoro vs. Macaraeg,supra, it was held that the word
"abandon," in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. "The emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which
some thing or body is thus put in the control of another, and hence the meaning
of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or
interests." In other words, the act of abandonment constitutesactual, absolute
and irrevocabledesertion of one's right or property. . . . Likewise, failure to
cultivate the land by reason of the forcible prohibition to do so by a third party
cannot also amount to abandonment, for abandonment presupposes free
will." (at 19-20;underscoring supplied).
Voluntary surrender of property
The tenant's intention to surrender landholding cannot be presumed, much
less determined by mere implication, but must be convincingly and sufficiently
proved.
Facts:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4.9774 hectare land
in Davao del Sur. Policarpio, the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of
said land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold
contract which stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978,
Gavino sold two (2) ha of the land, including the land tenanted by Policarpio, to
spouses Mancera. As a result of the sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They
then filed an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the Manceras. The
Manceras, on the other hand, countered that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of
action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Issue:
Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding?
Held:
Other than their bare allegations, private respondents failed to present any
evidence to show that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding
voluntarily after the private respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover,
the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-
spouses against private respondents before the CAR militates against the private
respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their
landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of
extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the
landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.
CHAPTER 3
Land Acquisition
In
the case ofLocsin vs. Valenzuela, 194 SCRA 195 (1991), the Supreme
Court explained the legal effect of land being placed under OLT as vesting
ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent case,Vinzons-Magana vs.
Estrella,201 SCRA 536 [1991], the High Tribunal, citingPagtalunan vs.
Tamayowhich predated the Locsin case, ruled that the mere issuance of a
certificate of land transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee. There
seems to be an inconsistency regarding the treatment of the legal effect of the
placing of the property under the Operation Land Transfer. This is because the
issuance of a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over a landholding presupposes
that the property has already been covered under the OLT. Therefore, if indeed,
as the Locsin doctrine enunciated, ownership of the land is transferred to the
farmer at the time the property is placed under OLT, then, it necessarily follows
the CLT, being an instrument issued subsequent to the coverage of the land
under OLT, is evidence of ownership. However, the latter case ofVinzons-
Maganadisputes this conclusion.
In the case ofLocsin vs. Valenzuela, 194 SCRA 195 (1991), the petitioners
are owners of a landholding which was subject to the lifetime usufructuary of
private respondent. The subject landholding was placed under the Operation
Land Transfer. Petitioners filed a collection suit against the private respondent
claiming that the payments made by the tenants in the subject properties should
be considered as amortization payments for the price of land and as such should
belong to the landowners and not to the usufructuary. The Court, upholding the
petitioners contention, by construingPD No. 27in relation toPD No. 57,
Department Circular No. 8, dated 1 April 1975 andEO No. 228dated 17 July
1987, ruled that underPD No. 27, the tenant-farmer became owner of the land
as of 21 October 1972.
. . . Reading the foregoing provisions together, we observe that under Presidential
Decree No. 27, the basic statute, the tenant-farmer became owner of a family-size
farm of five (5) hectares or, if the land was irrigated, three (3) hectares, and that
the tenant-owner had to pay for the cost of the land within fifteen (15) years by
paying fifteen (15) equal annual amortization payments. Thus, it appears clear that
ownership over lands (like Lot No. 2-C-A-3) subjected to Operation Land Transfer
moved from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants (the new
landowners). The fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be paid by the tenants-
owners were intended to replace the landholdings which the old landowners gave
up in favor of the new landowners, the tenants-owners. It follows that in respect of
land subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the tenants-farmers became owners of
the land they tilled as of the effective date of Presidential Decree No. 27, i.e., 21
October 1972. Pending full payment of the cost of the land to the old landowner by
the Land Bank of the Philippines, the leasehold system was "provisionally
maintained" but the "lease rentals" paid by the tenants-farmers prior to such full
payment by the Land Bank to the old landowner, would be credited no longer as
rentals but rather as "amortization payments" of the price of the land, the
unamortized portion being payable by the Land Bank. In respect of lands brought
within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the leasehold system was legally
and effectively terminated immediately on 21 October 1972 (notwithstanding the
curious statement in Department Circular No. 8 that it was "provisionally
maintained"). It was in respect of lands not yet subjected to the terms and effects
of Operation Land Transfer that the leasehold system did continue to govern the
relationship between the "landowner and his tenant-tillers".
The exemption of the old landowner from the capital gains tax on the amortization
payments made to him by the tenants-purchasers, under Presidential Decree No.
57 (supra), underscores the fact, referred to above, that ownership or dominion
over the land moved immediately from landowner to tenant-farmer, rather than
upon completion of payment of the price of the land. In general, capital gains are
realized only when the owner disposes of his property. . . .
In the case ofPagtalunan vs. Tamayo, 183 SCRA 252 (1990), petitioner
sought to intervene in the expropriation proceedings filed by the Republic of the
Philippines over the subject parcel of land. Petitioner argues that he, being a
bona fide tenant of and holder of Certificate of Land Transfer covering the subject
properties, is entitled to the proceeds of the expropriation. The Supreme Court, in
rejecting petitioner's contention, ruled that the petitioner, being merely a CLT
holder is not the owner of the subject property and thus, not entitled to just
compensation. In explaining the nature of the CLT, the Court stated that:
. . . However, a careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 27, and the
certificate of land transfer issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the transfer
of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the
compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right
of absolute ownership over them.
Under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of
title to lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27, full compliance by the grantee
with the abovementioned undertakings is required for a grant of title under the
Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation
patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the
emancipation patent which constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an
Original Certificate of Transfer, or a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the
grantee.
The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/
grantee ownership of the land described therein. The certificate simply evidences
the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the
statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as
provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor
irrevocable. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation
to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period
of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of
his certificate of land transfer [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].
Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/
grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding a right which has become fixed and established,
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy . . . . At best, the farmer/grantee,
prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or
expectant right of ownership over the landholding. . . .
Said ruling was reiterated in the case ofVinzons-Magana vs. Estrella, 201
SCRA 538 (1991).
The factors to be considered in the determination of just compensation as
enumerated in Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657are not exclusive. The DAR and LBP
are not confined in their determination of just compensation to the factors/criteria
set forth in said provision. Notably, Section 17 does not provide hard and fast
rules which must be strictly adhered to by DAR and LBP in the determination of
just compensation. While said section provides that the factors/criteria mentioned
therein" shall be considered" it does not expressly state that only these factors/
criteria and no other shall be considered. The factors/criteria set forth in Sections
17, 18 and other pertinent provisions for that matter should be deemed as mere
standards to guide the proper officials in the determining just compensation, but
in no case shall control or limit such determination, the ultimate consideration
being that the compensation be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. [DOJ Opinion No. 109 (1991), July 25, 1991).]
In the case ofLand Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Pascual, G. R. No.
128557, December 29, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that in the determination
of just compensation pursuant to Section 18 ofR.A. No. 6657, consent of the
farmer-beneficiary is not needed. Furthermore, the Court ruled that once the
Land Bank agreed to the valuation, it is its duty to pay the landowner said
amount. In this case, private respondent's properties were subjected to Operation
Land Transfer. Consequently, the PARO issued a valuation of the land which was
rejected by the private respondent who filed a case before the PARAD seeking to
annul the PARO's valuation. The PARAD, ruled in favor of private respondent,
came up with its own valuation, and directed the petitioner LBP to pay private
respondent said amount. Petitioner refused to pay the value of the land as
determined by the PARAD arguing among others that since it merely guarantees
or finances the payment of the value of the land, the farmer-beneficiary's
consent, is indispensable and that the only time the petitioner becomes legally
bound to finance the transaction is when the farmer-beneficiary approves the
appraised value of the land. In other words, petitioner asserts that the landowner,
the DAR, the Land Bank and the farmer-beneficiary must all agree to the value of
the land as determined by them. The Court, brushing aside petitioner's
contention, stated:
A perusal of the law however shows that the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is
not required in establishing the vinculum juris for the proper compensation of the
landowner. Section 18 of R. A. No. 6657 states
Sec. 18.Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP
shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon
by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP in accordance with the
criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions
hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as just compensation
for the land.
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned section, the landowner, the DAR and
the Land Bank are the only parties involved. The law does not mention the
participation of the farmer beneficiary.
. . . Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the DAR, which bears the
approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal duty to finance the transaction. In
the instant case, petitioner participated in the valuation proceedings held in the
Office of the PARAD through its counsel . . .
What the Supreme Court nullified was merely the form in which the deposit
was made, i.e., the deposit in trust and not the deposit per se as payment to the
landowners for the expropriated lands. Thus, in effect, the Court in making such
pronouncement, upheld the validity of deposit per se as payment of just
compensation.
f)Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to
the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination.
In the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners, the Supreme Court explained
that the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts
of justice. [175 SCRA 343 (1989)].
The operating procedures for the acquisition of private agricultural lands are
outlined in the following administrative issuances:
DAR A. O. No. 2, Series of 1996entitled "Revised Rules Governing
the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Pursuant to R. A. 6657" as amended
byDAR A. O. No. 2-98;
DAR A. O. No. 09, Series of 1998entitled "Rules and Regulations
on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred
Commercial Farms";
DAR A. O. No. 08, Series of 1997entitled "Revised Rules on the
Acquisition and Distribution of Compensable Agricultural Lands Under VLT/
DPS";
DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1990entitled "Policy Guidelines and
Operating Procedures in the Identification and Acquisition of Idle and
Abandoned Lands".
Reconstitution of Lost or Damaged Title
A pressing operational problem besetting agrarian reform implementors is the
delay in the acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands with lost or destroyed
titles. To address this concern,DAR Memorandum Circular No. 05, Series of
1994was issued outlining the procedures on the reconstitution of lost or
destroyed titles.
Reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration of the instrument
which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have
the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were
when the loss or destruction occurred. (Heirs of Pedro Pinote vs. Dulay 198
SCRA 12 [1990])
There are two types of reconstitution of titles: judicial and administrative.
Judicial reconstitution partakes of a land registration proceeding and is perforce a
proceedingin rem.(Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 62
[1988]). Judicial reconstitution is governed byRepublic Act No. 26in relation to
Section 110 ofP. D. No. 1529. Administrative reconstitution of title is likewise
governed byRepublic Act No. 26, as amended byRepublic Act No. 6732.
UnderDAR Memorandum Circular No. 5 (1994), the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), through the duly authorized DAR lawyer, may file a petition for
administrative or judicial reconstitution when the notice of coverage over
landholdings whose titles were lost or destroyed has already been issued.
As a general rule, the remedy for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed
original copies of certificates of titles in the offices of the Register of Deeds is the
filing of a petition for judicial reconstitution of title. However, administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed original copies of certificates of title may be
availed of in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood
or other force majeure where the number of certificates lost or damaged is at
least ten (10) percent of the total number of titles in the custody of the Register of
Deeds but in no case shall the number of titles lost or damaged be less than five
hundred (500) as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority. (Section 1,R.A. No. 6732[1989]).
Detailed discussion of the procedures for the filing of petition for reconstitution
are provided for inR.A. No. 6732as implemented by LRA Circular dated 26 July
1989,R.A. No. 26as amended, LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983
andDAR Memorandum Circular No. 05, Series of 1994.
CHAPTER 4
Just Compensation
Definition
Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the
time of its taking. It means afair and full equivalentfor the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements
and capabilities should be considered. (Export Processing Zone Authority vs.
Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]).
In the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,supra, the Supreme Court further explained the
meaning of "just compensation". It said:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court
that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is
used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample.
As held inRepublic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking
when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry
must be under warrant or color of authority; (4) the property must be devoted to
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these are
envisioned in the measures before us (at 378, 379).
(T)he content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not
mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on
this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The
Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian
reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant
masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of
the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the
farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the
intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today" (at 388).
Valuation or Computation
General formula
The basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by Voluntary Offer to Sell
and Compulsory Acquisition is:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
The above formula is used if all the three (3) factors are present,
relevant, and applicable (DAR Admin. O. No. 5 [1998]). In any case, the
resulting figure in the equation is always multiplied to the number of area or
hectarage of land valued for just compensation.
To illustrate the formula wherein all of the factors above mentioned are
present:
Area : 3 hectares Capitalized Net Income : P24,900
Market Value : P10,000 Comparable Sales : P 5,000
In any case, the resulting land value should not exceed the value of
productive land similar in terms of crop and plant density within the estate under
consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that order)
approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of CF. And in case the CS is
relevant or applicable, the land value is computed in accordance with the general
formula where MV is based on the applicable classification of the land (DAR
Admin. O. No. 5 [1998]).
Use of Salvage Value on valuation of lands planted to permanent but no
longer productive or ready for cutting crops
When lands being valued are planted to permanent but no longer productive
or the crops are ready for cutting, the computation considers the applicable UMV
classification of idle land plus the salvage value of the standing trees at the time
of the FI. In equation form:
LV = (MV x 2) + Salvage Value
But the resulting land value should not exceed the value of productive land
similar in terms of crop and plant density within the estate under consideration or
within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within
one (1) year from receipt of CF. In case where CS is relevant or applicable, the
land value is computed in accordance with the general formula where MV is
based on the lowest productivity classification of the land (DAR Admin. O. No. 5
[1998]).
Land value under Voluntary Offer to Sell
In VOS, the computed value using the applicable formula should not exceed
the landowner's offer. The landowner's offer is grossed up from the date of the
offer up to the date of receipt of CF by LBP from DAR for processing. The date of
receipt of CF by LBP from DAR means the date when the CF is determined by
the LBP-LVLCO to be complete with all the required documents and valuation
inputs duly verified and validated, and ready for final computation/processing.
Factors of Land Value
Computation of Capitalized Net Income
Capitalized Net Income refers to the difference between the product of the
gross sales and selling prices (AGP x SP) and total cost of operations (CO)
capitalized at 12%.
Expressed in equation form:
(AGP x SP) - CO
CNI =
0.12
Hence:
= P24,900.56/hectare
Comparable Sales
Comparable sales refers to any one or the average of all the applicable sub-
factors, namely sales transactions (ST), acquisition cost (AC) and market value
based on mortgage (MVM):
Where: ST = (Peso Value of Sales Transactions)
The criteria in the selection of the comparable sales transaction (ST) shall be
as follows:
a)When the required number of STs is not available at the barangay
level, additional STs may be secured from the municipality where the land
being offered/covered is situated to complete the required three comparable
STs. In case there are more STs available than what is required at the
municipal level, the most recent transactions shall be considered. The same
rule applies at the provincial level when no STs are available at the
municipal level. In all cases, the combination of STs sourced from the
barangay, municipality and province should not exceed three transactions.
b)The land subject of acquisition as well as those subject of
comparable sales transactions should be similar in topography, land use,
i.e., planted to the same crop. Furthermore, in case of permanent crops, the
subject properties should be more or less comparable in terms of their
stages of productivity and plant density.
c)The comparable sales transactions should have been executed
within the period 1 January 1985 to 15 June 988, and registered within the
period 1 January 1985 to 13 September 1988.
d)STs are grossed up from the date of registration up to the date of
receipt of CF by LBP from DAR for processing.
AC or Acquisition Cost is deemed relevant when the property subject of
acquisition was acquired through purchase or exchange with another property
within the period 1 January 1985 to 15 June 1988 and registered within the
period 1 January 1985 to 13 September 1988, and the condition of said property
is still substantially similar from the date of purchase or exchange to the date of
FI.
AC is grossed up from the date of registration of the deed of sale/exchange up
to the date of receipt of CF by LBP from DAR for processing.
MVM or Market Value Based on Mortgage. For MVM to be relevant or
applicable, the property subject of acquisition should have been mortgaged as of
15 June 1988 and the condition of the property is still substantially similar up to
the date of FI. MVM refers to the latest available appraised value of the property
(DAR Admin. O. No. 5 [1998]).
Market Value
MV or Market Value per Tax Declaration is the latest Tax Declaration (TD) and
Schedule of Unit Market Value (SUMV) issued prior to receipt of CF by LBP. The
Unit Market Value (UMV) is grossed-up from the date of its effectivity up to the
date of receipt of CF by LBP from DAR processing.
Formula in Grossing-Up of Valuation Inputs
The basic formula in the grossing-up of valuation inputs such as LO's Offer,
Sales Transaction (ST), Acquisition Cost (AC), Market Value Based on Mortgage
(MVM) and Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV) is:
Grossed-up
Valuation Input = Valuation Input x Regional Consumer
Price Index (RCPI) Adjustment Factor
The various valuation inputs are multiplied with the RCPI Adjustment
Factor. The RCPI Adjustment Factor refers to the ratio of the most recent
available RCPI for the month issued by the National Statistics Office as of the
date when the CF was received by LBP from DAR for processing and the
RCPI for the month as of the date/effectivity/registration of the valuation input.
Expressed in equation form:
Most
Recent RCPI for the Month as of the Date
of Receipt of CF by LBP from DAR
RCPI Adjustment Factor =
RCPI for the Month Issued as of the Date/
Effectivity/Registration of the Valuation Input
* government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21,
1972
** government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21,
1972
InLBP vs. CA, supra, the Supreme Court decided not to apply the 6%
increment to the valuation because the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARAD's
use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in the valuation of the private respondent's
land (following the ruling in the Court of Appeals case ofGaleon vs. Pastoral, CA-
G.R. No. 23168; Rollo, p. 36)
Mode of Compensation
Landowners may be paid in cash or in kind. Payment in kind is justified in the
case ofAssociation of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)as follows:
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment
of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not
deal here with thetraditional exerciseof the power of eminent domain. This is not
an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is arevolutionarykind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands wherever found
and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention
limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of
the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished
farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole
territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present
generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as
we are today, . . . .
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to
the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the
basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money,
primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value.
No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance
of the payment are "negotiable at any time". The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax
credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
The recognized rule indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass
from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and
in other democratic jurisdictions" (at 386, 388 and 389).
Cash Payment
Under Sec. 18 ofRA 6657, the proportion of payment in cash, dependent on
the area/hectarage of the land valued is subject to the following:
a)above 50 hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned =
25% cash
b)above 24 hectares and up to 50 hectares = 30% cash
c)24 hectares and below = 35% cash
For voluntary offer to sell, the cash portion is increased by 5%.
Payment in kind
Landowners may be paid with:
a)Shares of stock in government owned or controlled corporation, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments.
b)Tax credits; or
c)LBP bonds
Features of LBP bonds
The new ten (10)-year LBP bonds have attractive features which are more
acceptable and marketable than the other investment instruments. As provided
under Sec. 18 ofRA 6657, these features are:
1)Its market interest rates are aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates,
net of applicable final withholding tax, payable twice a year six months
from date of issue and every six months thereafter.
2)One-tenth of the bond's face value matures every year from date of
issue up to the tenth year.
3)The bond is fully guaranteed by the national government.
4)The bond is non-denominated. Upon request, it can be split
according to amounts desired by the bondholder.
5)The bonds are highly transferable and negotiable. Such LBP bonds
may be used by the landowner, his successors in interest or his assigns, up
to the amount of their face value, for any of the following:
a)Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets
foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or
region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
b)Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
c)Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or performance bonds;
d)Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided
the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small-and medium-scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
e)Payment for various taxes and fees to government; Provided, That
the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments:
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentage mentioned
above;
f)Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
g)Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government hospitals; and
h)Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The 100% face value and negotiability of LBP bonds are well described in the
case ofGonzales vs. GSIS,107 SCRA 492 (1981). Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) to accept 6% interest-bearing bonds issued by the Land Bank of the
Philippines at their par or face value as payment for petitioners' outstanding
housing loan. The act of the GSIS in discounting the LBP bonds was found
invalid. The Court ruled:
Land Bank bonds are certificates of indebtedness, approved by the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank, fully tax-exempt both as to principal and income, and
bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum redeemable at the option of the Land
Bank at or before maturity, which in no case shall exceed 25 years. They are fully
negotiable and unconditionally guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines. These bonds are deemed contracts and the obligations resulting
therefrom fall within the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution,
and any impairment thereof may take any encroachment in any respect upon the
obligation and cannot be permitted. Thus, the value of these bonds cannot be
diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly, since said bonds are fully
guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. They are issued
not in the open market nor for the captive market of landowners and to facilitate
the speedy transfer of lands to the tenant-farmers in support of the land reform
program of the Government. They are not ordinary commercial paper in that sense
subject to discounting (at 498, 499 and 502).
Mode of Payment forPD 27Landowners
The landowners shall be paid in any of the following modes, at their option
(Exec. Order No. 228[1987], sec. 3):
a)Bond payment over ten (10) years, with ten percent (10%) of the
value of the land payable immediately in cash, and the balance in the form
of LBP bonds bearing market rates of interest that are aligned with 90-day
treasury bills rates, net of applicable final withholding tax. One-tenth of the
face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance
until the tenth year.
The
LBP bonds issued hereunder shall be eligible for the purchase of
government assets to be privatized.
b)Direct payment in cash or in kind by the farmer-beneficiaries with
the terms to be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiaries and landowners
and subject to the approval of the DAR; and
c)Other modes of payment as may be prescribed or approved by the
PARC.
Under Sec. 9 ofEO 229, landowners who voluntarily offer to sell their lands
are given the same incentive given toPD 27landowners underEO 228, which is
the exemption from the payment of capital gains tax and other taxes and fees.
CHAPTER 5
Land Redistribution
Qualified Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Under CARP
Section 22 ofRA 6657enumerates the groups of farmers and tillers who are
qualified to become beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. They are the following:
(a)Children of landowners, who qualify under Section 6 ofR.A. 6657;
(b)Agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(c)Regular farmworkers;
(d)Seasonal farmworkers;
(e)Other farmworkers;
(f)Actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(g)Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(h)Others directly working on the land.
Section 22 also provides that "[t]he lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in
the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality", following the
order of priority quoted above.
Qualifications of Agrarian Reform Beneficiary
According to Section 22 ofRA 6657, to qualify as an agrarian reform
beneficiary, one must:
(a)be landless;
(b)be at least 15 years old or head of a family at the time the property
was transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines; and
(c)have the willingness, ability, and aptitude to cultivate the land and
make it as productive as possible.
The requirements enumerated in Section 22 are the minimum or basic
qualifications for a farmer to become a beneficiary of land under the agrarian
reform program.
Qualifications of landowner's children as preferred beneficiaries
As provided in Section 6, three (3) hectares of agricultural land may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, on the condition that he is at least 15
years of age at the time of the award, and that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm. "Directly managing the farm" refers to the cultivation
of the land through personal supervision under the system of labor
administration.
Children of landowners are classified as preferred beneficiaries, and the land
awarded to them does not form part of the retention right of the parent-
landowners. The transfer of the land to them is effected by the issuance of
CLOAs.
The rules on payment for the value of the land by the Land Bank and the
payment of amortizations by the beneficiary do not apply in the case of preferred
beneficiaries, unless there has been a tenancy relationship between the parent-
landowners and the children. In the latter case, the Land Bank shall finance the
acquisition of the property.
The rights and obligations of landowners' children as preferred beneficiaries
are governed byMemorandum Circular No. 4, Series of 1994.
"Landless Persons" UnderCARL
Section 25 ofRA 6657provides that a landless person is one who owns less
than three (3) hectares of agricultural land. Section 7 also provides that an
owner-tiller may still be awarded another parcel of agricultural land under the
program, provided that he is actually cultivating that land, and only to the extent
of the difference between the area of the land he owns and the award ceiling of
three (3) hectares. A tenant who owns one hectare of agricultural land may still
qualify as a beneficiary for two more hectares.
Persons Disqualified as Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
The following persons are disqualified from becoming agrarian reform
beneficiaries:
a)Those who are not included in the enumeration in Section 22;
b)Those who fail to meet the qualifications prescribed under Section
22;
c)Those who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land
received under CARP orP.D. 27;
d)Those whose land has been foreclosed by the Land Bank, or
repossessed by the landowner in case of Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct
Payment Scheme, for non-payment of an aggregate of three annual
amortizations;
e)Those who have converted their land to non-agricultural use without
prior approval by DAR; and
f)Those guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support
extended to him (Sec. 22).
Grounds for disqualification of beneficiary
UnderDAR Memorandum Circular No. 19 (1996), the following violations will
result in the disqualification of a farmer from being a beneficiary or from
continuing as such under the agrarian reform program:
(a)Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the
beneficiary;
(b)Misuse of the land;
(c)Material misrepresentation of the beneficiary's basic qualifications as
provided under Section 22 ofR.A. No. 6657,P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian
reform laws;
(d)Sale, transfer, lease, or other forms of conveyance by the beneficiary
of rights over the land, in circumvention orR.A. No. 6657,P.D. No. 27, and
other agrarian reform laws;
(e)Continuous neglect or abandonment of the awarded land over a
period of two calendar years as determined by the Secretary or his
authorized representative;
(f)Failure to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations to
the Land Bank or to the landowner, except in cases of fortuitous events;
(g)Illegal conversion of the land by the beneficiary;
(h)Waiver of rights to awarded lands;
(i)Beneficiary's surrender of awarded land to landowner or other non-
beneficiary; and
(j)Other acts or omissions that circumvent laws related to the
implementation of the agrarian reform program.
A separate chapter on prohibited acts,supra., discusses these violations in
detail.
Squatters disqualified to become CARP beneficiaries
In the caseCentral Mindanao University vs. DARAB,G.R. No. 100091,
October 22, 1992, the university entered into a contract with members of the
faculty and staff for an experimental rice project, under which the latter were
given tracts of land for cultivation. It was expressly stipulated in the contract that
no landlord-tenant relationship arose between the parties. After the term of the
project has expired, the university served notices to vacate on the occupants of
the land. The occupants refused to vacate the land, claiming that they are now
entitled to be awarded the land they are tilling pursuant to the land reform
program.
The Supreme Court held that squatters are disqualified from becoming CARP
beneficiaries because they are "guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible
entry or illegal detainer, [and therefore] do not qualify as beneficiaries of and may
not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform".
The Supreme Court also ruled that "a person entering upon the lands of
another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his
own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he
believes holds title to the land, is a squatter.Squatters cannot enter the land of
another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim
rights to said property as landless peasants." (Emphasis supplied.)
Selection of Beneficiaries
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer or the Agrarian Reform Program
Technologist, with the participation of the BARC, screens the beneficiaries.
A farmer who claims priority over those who have been identified by the
MARO as beneficiaries should file a written protest with the MARO or the PARO
who is processing the claim folder. Once the protest is filed, the MARO/PARO
shall comment on the protest and submit the same to the Regional Director who
shall rule on the protest. If the parties disagree with the RD's decision, they can
file a written motion for reconsideration. If the motion is denied, the farmers can
appeal to the Secretary.
Landowner not entitled to select beneficiaries
It is not the landowner who distributes his land, so he does not have the right
to select who the transferees. Land acquisition and land distribution are two
different transactions. It is the government which buys the land from the
landowner and then sells it to the beneficiaries. It is not a direct transaction
between the landowner and the beneficiaries.
This rule also applies to voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme. Even
under this scheme, it is not the landowner who determines who will be the
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries must qualify under the law, and it is still the
MARO and the BARC who do the screening.
Farmworker defined
A farmworker is defined by Section 3 (g),R.A. 6657as a natural person who
renders service for value as an employee or laborer in an agricultural enterprise
or farm regardless of whether his/her companion is paid on a daily, weekly,
monthly, or "pakyaw" basis. The term includes an individual whose work has
ceased because of a pending agrarian dispute and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular farm employment.
Special qualifications for farmworkers in commercial farms
Aside from the minimum qualifications in Section 22 ofR.A. 6657, Section 4
ofAdministrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, provides for special qualifications
for farmworkers in commercial farms, which are as follows:
(a)they must be at least 18 years old upon filing of application as
agrarian reform beneficiary;
(b)they must have the willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate and
make the land productive; and
(c)they must have been employed in the commercial farm between
June 15, 1988 and June 15, 1998 or upon expiration or termination of the
deferment.
Farmworkers who have worked longest on the land continuously shall be
given priority.
Specific disqualifications for commercial farmworkers
Section 5 ofAdministrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, provides that the
following shall be grounds for the disqualification of potential beneficiaries:
a)Mandatory retirement;
b)Optional retirement or resignation, provided that the farmworker has
not filed any case questioning such retirement or resignation;
c)Dismissal for cause by final judgment;
d)Waiver or refusal to be a beneficiary; and
e)Violation of agrarian reform laws and regulations as determined with
finality by the proper tribunal or agency.
Questions have been raised on whether dismissal for cause distinguishes
between just and authorized causes as these two categories are defined
inPresidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
"Just cause" may consist in serious misconduct, willful disobedience of
reasonable and lawful orders of the employer, gross neglect and abandonment of
duties, dishonesty and loss of confidence of the employer in the employee,
commission of crime or offense by the employee against the person or immediate
family of the employer, and analogous cases (seeLABOR CODE, Article 282).
"Authorized cause", on the other hand, may be one of the following:
introduction of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment due to legitimate
business losses, closure of business, and ailment or disease of the employee
(seeLABOR CODE, Article 283).
Just cause is distinguished from authorized cause in theLabor Codebecause
while just causes have something to do with the moral depravity and fault of the
employee, termination for authorized causes is due to circumstances beyond the
control of the employee.
It is evident from the history of the provision of the administrative issuances
on qualified farmworkers that the intention is to distinguish between just and
authorized causes. For one, the list of qualifications in Section 4,Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1998provides that the potential beneficiary "must have
been employed in the commercial farm between June 15, 1988 and June 15,
1998 or upon expiration or termination of the deferment". This new provision
makes the qualifications encompass even those whose services have been
terminated by the commercial farm as of the time the deferment period expires.
Secondly, the original rules governing the acquisition of commercial
farms,Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1998, in item (b), no. 2, letter M, Part
IV thereof, provides for dismissal from servicefor causeas a ground for
disqualification. Retrenchment as a ground for disqualification is listed as a
separate item, namely, item (d). This shows that item (b) refers only to dismissal
for just causes, and does not include dismissal for authorized causes.
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1998was eventually superseded
byAdministrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998. The latter administrative order
removed retrenchment as a ground for disqualification. Only dismissal for cause
(meaning just cause) has been retained.
Thirdly,Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, item (h), Section 6, Article
II, which provides for the prioritization of beneficiaries, still includes retrenched
workers among the potential beneficiaries. The provision states:
The Beneficiary Screening Committeeshall prioritize the potential
ARBspursuant to Section 22 ofR.A. 6657. They shall be ranked according to the
length of their continuous service in the commercial farm reckoned from June 15,
1988 up to the expiration of the deferment period; residency, i.e. whether residing
in the same barangay or municipality;whether they have been validly retrenched,
i.e. with approval of the Dept. of Labor and Employment; the nature of their work,
i.e. whether directly related to farm activities, and such other factors as the
Committee may deem appropriate. (Underscoring supplied.)
Different Categories of Farmworkers
Section 3,R.A. 6657identifies these categories as follows:
(a)Regular farmworkeris a natural person who is employed on a
permanent basis by an agricultural enterprise or farm.
(b)Seasonal farmworkeris a natural person who is employed on a
recurrent, periodic, or intermittent basis by an agricultural enterprise or farm,
whether as a permanent or a non-permanent laborer, such as
"dumaan"and "sacada".
(c)Other farmworkeris a farmworker who is neither a regular nor a
seasonal farmworker, such as a farmworker who performs farm activities
but is not paid for his or her labor.
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1998, on the other hand, identifies two more
categories:
(a)Technical farmworkeris a natural person employed by an agricultural
enterprise or farm, who is highly educated and trained and performs functions in
scientific, engineering, medical, teaching, and other fields, but who is not vested
with managerial or supervisory functions, such as chemists, agronomists,
veterinarians, and soil analysts.
(b)Managerial or supervisory farmworkeris a natural person who is
employed by an agricultural enterprise or farm vested with powers and
prerogatives (1) to lay down and execute management policies; (2) to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees; and/
or (3) to effectively recommend such managerial actions.
Categories of farmworkers qualified to become beneficiaries under
CARP
Farmworkers who aredirectly working on the land at the time DAR conducts
actual investigation and documentation of the agricultural enterprise, whether as
regular, seasonal, or other farmworkers are qualified beneficiaries. UnderA.O.
No. 9, Series of 1998, however, other farmworkers who are directly employed by
the agri-business enterprise or corporation may be considered as beneficiaries,
provided they meet the basic qualifications prescribed in Section 22.
Selection of Beneficiaries of Commercial Farms
UnderA.O. No. 9, Series of 1998, there is a Beneficiary Screening Committee
responsible for the qualification, identification, and selection of agrarian reform
beneficiaries for acquired commercial farms. The Committee is composed of the
following:
(1)The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, as Chairman;
(2)The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer;
(3)The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) Chairman or his duly authorized representative;
(4)The Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman or his
duly authorized representative from each of the barangays where the
subject commercial farm is situated; and
(5)The Barangay Chairman or his duly-authorized representative, from
each of the barangays where the subject commercial plantation is situated;
as members.
The Committee comes up with a master list of qualified beneficiaries, and a
waiting list of those who possess the minimum qualifications and none of the
disqualifications, but who could not otherwise be accommodated in the updated
master list.
Remedy of farmworker excluded from master list
A farmworker who is excluded from the masterlist may file a written protest
with the Beneficiary Screening Committee. The Committee Chairman shall
furnish a copy of the protest to the beneficiaries whose inclusion in the list is
being questioned. The protestees shall file their answer or comment on the
protest, and the Chairman shall transmit the records to the Regional Director for
the latter's decision. The Regional Director shall resolve the protest based on
substantial evidence showing the qualification or disqualification of the
beneficiary subject of the protest. No motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Regional Director shall be allowed, but such decision may be appealed to the
Office of the Undersecretary for Field Operations and Support Services, whose
decision shall be final and executory. Notwithstanding the appeal, the decision of
the Regional Director shall not be stayed.
Managerial and supervisory farmworkers
Managerial and supervisory farmworkers may qualify as CARP beneficiaries
provided that they have been identified as qualified beneficiaries prior to their
promotion, and that they give up their managerial or supervisory positions
(seeA.O. No. 9, Series of 1998). In the case, however, of supervisory or
managerial employees whose responsibilities do not actually conform to the
definition of supervisory or managerial farmworkers, there are two views on the
matter. One holds that supervisory and managerial employees of commercial
farms are disqualified from becoming beneficiaries since the laws and regulations
specify the rank and not the job description. The other view is that they are
qualified so long as they are directly working on the land, and possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for becoming an agrarian reform
beneficiary.
It is our opinion that these so called "supervisory or managerial" employees
can qualify as beneficiaries. The definition of supervisory or managerial
farmworkers inA.O. No. 9, Series of 1998, provides that to be considered a
supervisor or a manager, the farmworker must be vested with the power to
formulate and implement management policies; to hire, fire, assign, and
discipline employees; and/or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.
Jurisprudence supports the view that this power is essential before an
employee may be considered as supervisory or managerial. InFranklin Baker
Company vs. Trajano, G.R. No. 75039, January 28, 1988,it was held:
To make one a supervisor, the power to recommend must not be merely routinary
or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. In other words,
the recommendation is (1) discretionary or judgmental, not clerical; (2)
independent, not a dictation of someone else; and (3) effectively considered in the
management decision. If these qualities are lacking or, worse, if the power to
recommend is absent, then the person is not really a supervisor but a rank-and-file
employee.
There are instances when the position of a farmworker is denominated
"managerial" or "supervisory" even when he is not performing the functions
enumerated in the definition. Hence, it is our view that the functions performed,
rather than the rank, should be determinative of the status of the farmworker. They
should still qualify as beneficiaries, provided they meet all the qualifications and
possess none of the disqualifications, subject to the rules on prioritization set
down under the law.
Seasonal farmworkers
Section 22 includes seasonal farmworkers among the beneficiaries qualified
to receive land underR.A. 6657, following the order of priority set forth in the law.
There is a view that seasonal farmworkers are entitled "only to a just share of
the fruits of the land", but not to own land. This view finds support inFortich vs.
Corona,G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999,wherein the Supreme Court said:
Again, as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Martin, intervenors, who are admittedly
not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive
interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own land. Rather,
their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.
It is our view, however, that the fact that seasonal farmworkers may not have
been given a constitutional right does not mean that they do not have a statutory
right. Congress, in interpreting and implementing Article XIII, Section 4 of
theConstitutionenacted Section 22 ofRA 6657which explicitly includes
seasonal farmworkers among the qualified beneficiaries. Moreover, the
observation made by the Supreme Court is only anobiter dictumand cannot be
made the basis for the loss or acquisition of legal rights. Moreover, even a
collective or cooperative of, among others, "seasonal farmworkers" and "other
farmworkers" may be awarded lands under the agrarian reform program.
Collectives or Cooperatives as Qualified Beneficiaries
A collective or cooperative composed of the beneficiaries listed in Sec. 22 (a)
to (e) ofR.A. 6657, to wit: agricultural lessees and share tenants, regular
farmworkers, seasonal farmworkers, other farmworkers, and actual tillers or
occupants of public lands, can, by itself, be an awardee of land under CARP.
Sec. 25 ofR.A. 6657, in fact, provides that "(t)he beneficiaries may opt for
collective ownership, such as co-ownership or farmers cooperative or some other
form of collective organization".
Cooperatives refer to "organizations composed primarily of small agricultural
producers, farmers, farmworkers, or other agrarian reform beneficiaries who
voluntarily organize themselves for the purpose of pooling land, human,
technological, financial, or other economic resources, and operated on the
principle of one member, one vote. A juridical person may be a member of a
cooperative, with the same rights and duties as a natural person." (Section 3 [k]
ofR.A 6657).
The aggregate size of land that may be awarded to an association or a
cooperative shall not exceed the total number of members multiplied by the
award ceiling of three hectares, except where the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) approves the award of an area exceeding this limit. Thus, a
cooperative composed of 25 members, for instance, can receive a maximum
award of 75 hectares. (see Sec. 25,R.A 6657)
Inclusion of names of members of collective or cooperative not
mandatory
Memorandum Circular No. 24, Series of 1996,Memorandum Circular No. 14,
Series of 1994, andAdministrative Order No. 3, Series of 1993, governing the
issuance of collective CLOAs, expressly require the listing of the names of all
members in the CLOA issued to a collective or cooperative. The purpose of this
requirement is to "protect a farmer-member from possible summary and unjust
separation by the cooperative or association" (Part IV-A-1).
It is our view that inclusion in the CLOA of the names of all the members of a
collective or cooperative is not necessary in all cases. Where the CLOA is under
co-ownership, the names of all the co-owners (i.e. individual farmer-beneficiaries)
should be listed in the collective CLOA. However, where the CLOA is awarded in
the name of the association or cooperative, there is no need to include the
names of the individual members thereof in the collective CLOA. Sec. 25 ofR.A.
6657, in fact, provides that "(t)itle to the property shall be issued in thenameof
the co-ownersorthe cooperative or collective organization as the case may
be." (Underscoring supplied)
Women as Beneficiaries under CARP
Women are qualified to become agrarian reform beneficiaries in their own
right, not only as spouses of agrarian reform beneficiaries. For as long as a
female farmer's rights have vested and have been established separately from
her husband's or her father's, she is entitled to receive land under the program.
The term "vested right" has been defined in the case ofBalboa vs.
Farrales,G.R. No. 27059, February 14, 1928, as some right or interest in
property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt
or controversy". The Supreme Court, citing American cases, explained that
"rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest".
Involved in theBalboacasewas an application for homestead patent. During
the pendency of his application, however, the law granting him the right to such
patent was repealed. The Supreme Court upheld his claim, stating that at the
time the law was repealed, the applicant has complied with all the requirements
for the issuance of a patent, hence, his right to the patent has vested. "At least on
that date," said the Court, "his right to the land, as owner, ripened into a vested
right. It was no longer expectant as depending on some events or the
performance of some conditions."
Other rights as beneficiaries have been granted to women through other DAR
administrative issuances. UnderMemorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 1986,
support services in terms of loan assistance in an amount not to exceed three
thousand pesos (P3,000.00) has been guaranteed for qualified rural women's
pre-cooperative groups. UnderMemorandum Circular No. 4, Series of 1992, a
budget has been allocated for support services that will empower women
beneficiaries.
Under Part II.D ofAdministrative Order No. 2, Series of 1993, farmworkers
who are husband and wife may be separately entitled to three (3) hectares each
provided that their vested rights to the land have been duly established. Each of
the spouses shall be issued a separate CLOA.
Requirement for separate cultivation by spouses of beneficiaries
UnderMemorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 1996, women who are
spouses of agrarian reform beneficiaries are required to also cultivate the land,
aside from the cultivation undertaken by her husband. We are of the opinion that
separate cultivation must be required of women only where they are recipients of
land in their own right, and should no longer be required of women whose
spouses receive land under the program.
To require separate cultivation by spouses of male agrarian reform
beneficiaries would work against, rather than protect, the interests of women.
This requirement fails to recognize the role of women in the rural household,
particularly in agrarian areas. Women are usually given reproductive tasks, such
as upbringing of children, household chores, and other work having to do with the
maintenance of the home. An additional burden of cultivating the land would be
harshly onerous upon women who are spouses of beneficiaries.
TheCivil Codeand theFamily Coderecognize that the role of women in
traditional families is the maintenance of the household. In both Codes,
maintenance of the home is recognized as the wife's contribution to the conjugal
partnership of gains or to the absolute community of property as to entitle her to
one-half share of the marital partnership property. As long as the wife works in
the home, all properties received or acquired during the subsistence of the
marriage is considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property. There is no reason forR.A. 6657to be given a different
interpretation as regards the rights of women to land awarded to their spouses
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Modes of Distribution: Individual vs. Collective Ownership
It is the policy of the CARP to establish owner-cultivatorship of economic-
sized farms as basis ofPhilippine agriculture. In line with this is the award of
three hectares to the individual beneficiaries as the distribution limit. With a view
of equitable land distribution and ownership, DAR is mandated to distribute
agricultural lands to as many tenants and farmworkers as possible. Furthermore,
the distribution of land shall be made directly to individual beneficiaries.
In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker
beneficiaries. In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land
then it shall be collectively owned by the worker beneficiaries who shall form
into a worker cooperative or association which will deal with the corporation or
business association. [Rep. Act No. 6657(1988) Sec. 29;DAR A.O. No. 10
(1990), II (B)]
The beneficiaries may opt for collective ownership such as co-ownership or
farmer's cooperative or some other form of collective organization. The total area
that may be awarded under a collective CLOA shall not exceed the total number
of co-owners or members of the cooperative or collective organization multiplied
by the award limit of three hectares except in meritorious cases as determined by
the PARC, pursuant to Section 25 ofR.A. No. 6657. Collective co-ownership
CLOAs may be issued to cover any CARPable lands whether private lands or
public lands within proclaimed DAR settlement projects or public lands turned
over to the DAR by other government agencies and institutions pursuant toE.O.
No. 407as amended. [Rep. Act No. 6657(1988), sec. 25.]
Lands covered by collective CLOAs on a co-ownership basis shall be subdivided
in accordance with the actual occupancy of the ARBs, provided it does not
exceed three (3) hectares. Landholding covered by CLOAs in the name of
cooperative or farmer's organization, may, at the option of the organization, also
be subdivided based on the share of each member provided that the subdivision
as determined by the DAR shall be economically feasible. [DAR A. O. No. 03
(1993), III (E).] Subdivision of lands under collective CLOA is governed byA.O.
No. 03, Series of 1993.
Factors Considered in Land Distribution
In the equitable distribution of lands subject of CARP, actual occupancy of a
tenant shall be the basis of the award, provided it does not exceed three
hectares. For untenanted lands, all the farmworkers therein shall be considered
as potential beneficiaries in the estate; provided that the proportional share of
each will not exceed three (3) hectares; otherwise, additional ARBS, shall be
considered. For unoccupied lands, each identified ARB may be allowed the
award ceiling of three hectares, provided that there are enough lands for
distribution under CARP in the barangay to accommodate others who are equally
qualified but who may not have been considered as awardees in such land under
acquisition. In all cases, the aggregate award to an ARB shall not exceed the
limit of three hectares and his total land ownership as a result of the award shall
not exceed three (3) hectares. (DAR A.O. No. 10 [1990], II [D])
Distribution Procedure
The MARO, upon completion of land acquisition, validates the list of qualified
beneficiaries who were identified during the acquisition phase who are still
present and qualified to receive the land. Through a letter or CARP Beneficiary
Certificate (CBC), the identified ARBs are formally notified by the MARO that they
have qualified to receive the land. The ARBs are consulted by the MARO as to
their preferred mode of distribution . Thereafter the Land Distribution Folders are
prepared and based on the ARBs preference and submitted to the PARO.
Upon transmittal, the PARO reviews all documents and generates the
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs). If the ARBs prefer individual
parcels, the PARO requests the DENR to conduct subdivision survey. The PARO
then submits the CLOAs to the DAR Regional Office which causes them to be
signed by the Secretary. Lastly, the PARO registers the CLOAs with the Register
of Deeds and forwards the same to the MARO for distribution. (DAR A.O. No. 19
[1990]).
A compelling issue in respect to land distribution is the matter of physical
possession by DAR as a necessary prerequisite to its distribution to the ARBs. It
is submitted that physical possession is not necessary for land to be distributed.
Nothing inR.A. No. 6657requires DAR to take physical possession as a
precondition for redistributing lands subject of acquisition. What is required is
"immediate possession" under Section 16 or "actual possession" under Section
24. Actual possession of the land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
own property. (Ramos vs. Dir. of Lands [39 Phil 175 [1918]). In issuing the CLOA,
the Republic of the Philippines, which became the registered owner of subject
property, acting through DAR, exercised an act of dominion over the landholding
as redistribution involves disposition or alienation. Having manifested its
dominion over the land, the Republic of the Philippines through DAR, is deemed
to be, for all legal intents and purposes, in actual possession thereof.
Redistribution is not limited to the installation of farmers in the landholding. The
generation and distribution of CLOAs is embraced within the concept of
redistribution.
Distribution of Homelots
A homelot refers to a parcel of agricultural land used by the ARB as the site of
his permanent dwelling including the area utilized for raising vegetables, poultry,
pigs and other animals and engaging in minor industries. The area of the homelot
may not exceed 1,000 square meters. It is an integral part of the farm and an
indispensable factor in farm operations. The procedure for the acquisition and
distribution of farmlots likewise apply to homelots. If the homelot of a tenant-
beneficiary falls within the retained area of the landowner, the beneficiary may be
made to transfer his dwelling to his farmlot or other area to be designated for his
homelot which shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Provided that the
landowner shoulders the cost of the transfer of his dwelling and the agreed cost
of other improvements introduced by the tenant-beneficiary on said homelot.
[DAR A.O. No. 12 [1991], II [C])
Distribution of Commercial Farms and Facilities
Commercial farms may be distributed collectively or individually. Qualified
beneficiaries shall be awarded a maximum of three (3) hectares or a minimum of
one (1) hectare each in case the land is not sufficient to accommodate them.
Toexpedite the acquisition, the commercial farms shall be initially distributed
collectively or under co-ownership. In the case the beneficiaries desire to
partition the land, DAR shall first determine whether it is economically feasible to
divide the land, in coordination with the Department of Agriculture and other
concerned agencies. Thereafter, the beneficiaries may, by majority vote, decide
whether to proceed with the partition or not. In the event the beneficiaries decide
to partition, the land shall be allocated to the individual beneficiaries by drawing
lots in the presence of DAR Representatives. (Section 17DAR A.O. No. 2-1998)
Facilities and improvements acquired shall be distributed collectively, through
a Deed of Transfer which shall specify the names of the ARBs and duly
annotated in the CLOAs generated over the subject landholding where said
facilities and improvements are found. Areas where the facilities and
landholdings are found are deemed common areas and shall not be partitioned
individually. (Section 28DAR A.O. No. 02-98)
Collective CLOAS shall be generated within thirty (30) days upon receipt by
the PARO of the certified copy of the certificate of title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
In individual CLOAs shall be generated within thirty (30) days upon receipt of
the approved Segregation Plan (ASP). However in the case of individual
distribution and considering the time and financial constraints particularly in the
conduct of individual surveys, a collective CLOA may be generated in the interim
over the subject landholding (Section 18,DAR A.O. No. 02-1998)
CLOAs shall be registered immediately upon generation. (Section 20DAR
A.O. No. 02-98)
Distribution of Corporate Farms
The general rule is that corporate farms are distributed directly to the
individual worker-beneficiaries. However, in case it is not economically feasible
and sound to divide the land, corporate farms shall be owned collectively by the
worker-beneficiaries who shall form a cooperative or association which will deal
with the corporation or business association. In the latter case, the individual
members of the cooperatives or corporations shall have homelots and small
farmlots for family use, to be taken from the land owned by the cooperative or
corporation. (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 29).
Corporate farms owning or operating under lease or management contract
Pending final land transfer, corporate farms that own or operate under lease
or management contract and realize gross sales in excess of P5 million are
mandated to execute a production and profit sharing (PPS) plan provided
underDAR AO No. 8 (1988). The PPS plan is imposed in order to allow the
farmworkers in corporate farms to realize an improvement in their farm income
pending final transfer of the farm.
All farmworkers in a corporate farm, whether classified as regular, seasonal,
technical or other farmworkers are entitled to PPS. On the other hand,
managerial and supervisory employees are excluded from entitlement to PPS.
(DAR Adm. O. No. 8 [1988])
PPS are distributed to farmworkers, over and above the compensation they
are currently receiving, based on the following schedules:
1.Three (3%) of Annual Gross Sales from 15 June 1988 until final land
or corporate stock transfer to the farmworker-beneficiaries is effected,
provided that the employer is not obligated to pay more than 100% of the
regular annual compensation of the farmworker-beneficiaries;
2.In addition, 10% of net profit after tax, provided that in cases where
the retention right is allowed, the amount to be distributed shall be reduced
by an amount equivalent to the proportion of the retained area to the total
land area. (DAR Adm. O. No. [1988])
To ensure that corporate farm employers comply with the PPS provisions, the
Secretary of DAR or his authorized representatives shall have the power to order
and administer compliance with the PPS provisions and to require submission of
reports, compel the production of books and documents, compel answers to
interrogatories, issue subpoena and subpoenaduces tecum, and enforce its writs
through Sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. Moreover, Sections 73 and 74
ofRA 6657regarding prohibited acts and omissions and the penalties therefor,
are applicable to any person or entity found to be violating any PPS provision.
(DAR Adm. O. No. 8 [1988])
Proof of Ownership of Awarded Lands
The Certificate of Land Ownership Award evidences the ARB's ownership in
respect to private agricultural lands covered underR.A. No. 6657(Rep. Act No.
6657 [1988], sec. 24). Ownership of public lands, upon the other hand, are
evidenced by Free Patents. Emancipation Patents is the ARBs proof of
ownership of lands awarded under Operation Land Transfer. Discussing the
nature of an Emancipation Patent, the Supreme Court ruled in the case
ofVinzons-Magana vs. Estrella(201 SCRA 536 [1991]) that it is only compliance
with the prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer/grantee to an
emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership
in the landholding a right which has become fixed and established and is no
longer open to doubt and controversy.
The pronouncement of the court respecting the impregnable character of an
Emancipation Patent should be qualified. The mere issuance of an Emancipation
Patent does not put the ownership of the ARB beyond attack and scrutiny. It must
be noted thatP.D. No. 946vests the Court of Agrarian Relations (now the DAR
Adjudication Board) jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of
emancipation patents issued underP.D. No. 266(Pres. Decree [1976], sec. 12
[g]). This only goes to show that ownership of awarded lands covered by
Emancipation Patents may be challenged. The aforecited Supreme Court ruling
presupposes that the issuance of emancipation patents to the ARB is not tainted
with any irregularity such that it acquires the character of indefeasiblity.
TheVinzons- Maganaruling must be appreciated in this context.
Rights and Obligations of Beneficiaries
Once a Certificate of Land Ownership Award has been issued to a beneficiary
and registered in his name, it serves as an evidence of title to the land, entitling
the beneficiary to occupy the land, cultivate it, and maintain possession of the
same. cSIADH
InUalat vs. Judge Ramos,265 SCRA 345 (1996), the respondent judge of
MTC was fined P20,000.00 with stern warning from the Supreme Court for gross
ignorance of law for taking cognizance of an ejectment case despite allegations
of tenancy between the parties.
Facts:
Complainants filed an administrative case against respondent Judge Ramos for
taking cognizance of the illegal detainer case filed by their landowner against
them. It was shown that the respondent judge had knowledge of a previously filed
DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the complainants
containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent judge took
cognizance of the illegal detainer case.
Issue:
Was the action of Judge Ramos proper?
Held:
The Supreme Court in finding the respondent Judge liable for ignorance of the law
opined: "As can be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and
Ualat in the civil case, they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy
relationship between themselves and the landowner. Additionally, in the
proceedings before respondent Judge, complainants were even represented by a
lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put
respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our
agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine
issue involving agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject
property. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence
on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence would have
prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for preliminary
determination of the real nature of the parties' relationship, as required by law" (at
357).
InIsidro vs. CA,228 SCRA 503, one of the issues raised is the jurisdiction of
the MTC in taking cognizance of a case involving an agricultural land. The
petitioner refused to vacate the land despite the demand of the private
respondent. The Supreme Court held that there exists no tenurial relations
between the parties, to wit:
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee (at 510).
The 'third party' mentioned in the said sec. 21 should be construed to mean a
person who is neither landholder or tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or
factually for the landholder. For instance, a sheriff enforcing an execution sale
against the landholder; or a purchaser or transferee of the land, or a mere
dummy of the landowner (De Luna v. CA, 221 SCRA 703 [1993]).
Jurisdiction of the Regional Adjudicator (RARAD) and the Provincial
Adjudicator (PARAD)
Sec. 2, Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules and Procedures provides that
the RARAD and the PARAD has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board to
hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in
connection therewith, arising with their assigned territorial jurisdiction.
The RARAD is the Executive Adjudicator in his/her region directly responsible
to the Board. He/she shall:
1)Direct supervision over the PARADs;
2)Recommend to the Board the territorial assignments and the
disciplinary measures appropriate to the PARADs;
3)Adjudicate agrarian disputes and land valuation cases;
4)Hear and handle other cases which cannot be handled by the
PARADs:
a)by reason of PARADs disqualification or inhibition;
b)PARADs cannot handle the case properly;
c)because of the complexity and sensitivity of the case;
d)delegated just compensation cases;
e)and those assigned by the Board.
The RARAD has concurrent original jurisdiction with the PARAD.
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Board
Under Sec. 5, Rule II of theDARAB Revised Rules and Procedures, the
Board has the jurisdiction to review all the decisions of the Adjudicators.
However, underDAR MC 7 (1991), reiterating Sec. 1, par. (c) of the Revised
DARAB Rules and Procedures, it is emphasized that DARAB has no jurisdiction
over cases involving annulment or cancellation of orders and decisions of the
Secretary.
Not all decisions or orders of the PARAD and RARAD are reviewable by the
Board. UnderDAR AO 8 (1993), the PARADs, RARADs and DARAB has original
and exclusive jurisdiction in the preliminary determination of just compensation
cases which are appealable only to the Special Agrarian Courts.
Mediation/Conciliation at Barangay Level
The BARC does not function as an adjudicator at the barangay level. The
BARC is mandated to mediate and conciliate agrarian disputes at the barangay
level. In a mediation/conciliation, BARC's objective is to persuade the contending
parties to settle their dispute amicably. The BARC does not act as an adjudicator.
It is the responsibility of the BARC to promote a speedy and cost-free
administration of justice, prevent a dispute from going out of the barangay level
to DARAB level, and help the landowners and farmer-beneficiaries commit
themselves in complying with their agreements. This in turn is envisioned to help
in the efficient and successful implementation of the CARP.
Where the land in dispute straddles two (2) or more barangays or the parties
involved reside in different barangays, the BARC of the barangay where the
biggest portion of the property lies, shall have the authority to conduct the
mediation or conciliation proceedings, unless for convenience and accessibility
and upon agreement of parties such proceedings should be held in another
barangay within the municipality or adjacent municipality where the land in
dispute is located (DARAB Revised Rules and Procedures[1994] Rule III, sec. 3)
Under theDARAB Revised Rules and Procedures, DARAB can take
cognizance of an agrarian dispute even without the BARC Certification if:
1)The dispute does not involve any of the following:
a)Valuation lands to determine just compensation for
landowners;
b)One of the parties is a public or private corporation,
partnership, association or juridical person, or a public officer/
employee wherein the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
c)Issue involved is an administrative implementation of agrarian
laws and policies; and
d)Cases determined by the Secretary as beyond the ambit
mediation/conciliation or compromise.
2)The required certification cannot be complied with for valid reasons
like the non-existence or non-organization of the BARC or the impossibility
of convening it. The PARO shall conduct mediation and conciliation
proceedings and issue a certification to that effect.
3)It involves resolving and disposing of preliminary incidents related to
the case, such as motion for the issuance of status quo orders, temporary
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and such similar motions
necessitating immediate action (DARAB Revised Rules and Procedures
[1994], Rule III, secs. 1 and 2).
The lack of a BARC certification is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
complainant is given every opportunity to secure said certification.
Powers and Duties of DARAB
Under the DARAB Revised Rules and Procedures, the powers and duties of
the Adjudicators include but are not limited to the following:
a)Personally conduct a hearing, take control of the proceedings,
employ reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the case, determine the
real parties in interest, define and simplify the issues of the case, and thresh
out preliminary matters.
b)To subpoena, summon witnesses, examine witnesses, may limit the
right of parties/counsels to ask questions to clarify the points of law at issue
or of facts involved, may limit the presentation of evidence to matters
relevant to the issues, and endeavor to settle the case amicably/approve
compromise agreements.
c)To hold a party in contempt, to issue writs and interlocutory orders,
and may award actual, compensatory, exemplary and moral damages and
attorney's fees.
Special Agrarian Courts (SACs)
Special agrarian courts are Regional Trial Courts within each province
designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction in addition to its
regular jurisdiction. The Supreme Court may designate more branches to
constitute such additional SACs as may be necessary to cope with the number of
agrarian cases in each province. (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 56)
Sec. 57 ofRA 6657provides that the SACs shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses underRA 6657.
InRepublic vs. Court of Appeals,758 SCRA 263 (1996), the Supreme Court
held that "any effort to transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 ofRA 6657and therefore would be
void."
Judicial Review
Orders or Decisions of DAR Secretary
The decisions of the DAR Secretary in ALI cases may be appealed to the
Office of the President or the Court of Appeals, at the option of the appellant.
Sec. 54 ofRA 6657states that any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR
on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent
laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari. On
the other hand, Sec. 15 and 20, Book VII ofEO 292(1987) or the Administrative
Code of 1987, as implemented byDAR MC 3 (1994)provides that an appeal
from the decision/order issued by DAR shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days
after receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of by the party adversely
affected. Said appeal shall be perfected by filing with the DAR a notice of appeal,
serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the Office of the President
and paying the required fees. The DAR shall upon perfection of the appeal
transmit the records of the case to the Office of the President.
DARAB Decisions
Any decision, order, resolution, award or ruling of DARAB on any agrarian
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement, interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari. (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988],
sec. 54;Revised DARAB Rules[1994], Rule XIV, sec. 1)
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of DAR shall
be immediately executory. (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 50;Revised DARAB
Rules [1994], Rule XIV, sec. 1)
Decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by
filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice of the decision. (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 60)
Note:
1.The transfer of jurisdiction over applications for CALABARZON areas
from the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI)
2 to the Regional Director shall take effect upon implementation of the DAR
reorganization, or as directed by the Secretary (DAR Admin. O. No. 6 [2000],
sec. 36)
CHAPTER 7
Land Use Conversion
Definition
DAR AO 1 (1999), entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion
of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," defines "land use conversion" as
"the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by DAR." (Sec. 2(k)). Pursuant to the Memorandum
of the President dated 16 April 1999, this administrative order serves as the
primary guidelines on the conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses.
RA 8435(1997), also known as the "Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
Act of 1997," provides for a similar definition: "agricultural land use conversion
refers to the process of changing the use of agricultural land to non-agricultural
uses." (Sec. 4).
Conversion versus Reclassification
DAR's conversion authority is most often seen as synonymous with the power
of local government units (LGUs) to reclassify lands within their territorial
jurisdiction. This misconception has resulted in a lot of conflicts and confusion not
only between the two agencies but among other concerned sectors.
"Reclassification" refers to the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall
be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for
conversion. It also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural
use." (Joint HLURB, DAR, DA, DILG Memo. Circular Prescribing the Guidelines
to Implement MC 54, [1995], sec. 2[2.3]). On the other hand, conversion is
defined by the same Memorandum Circular as the "act of changing the current
use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use." [Id., sec. 2[2.2])
Under section 20 ofRA 7160(1991) or the "Local Government Code of 1991,"
a city or municipality may authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition under the following
circumstances:
a)when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the DA; or
b)where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned.
Said Act mandates that the reclassification should be made after conducting
public hearing and that it shall be limited to the following percentage of the total
agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: (a) for highly
urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%); (b) for
component cities and third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and (c) for
fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):Provided, further,that
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant toRA
6657shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such
lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act. This
percentage ceiling on the land area which the LGUs can reclassify is not
absolute. The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA),
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits cited
above (Rep. Act No. 7160[1991], sec. 20 [b]).
Also, LGUs are mandated to exercise such authority in accordance withMC
54 (1993)of the Office of the President entitled "Prescribing the Guidelines
Governing Section 20 ofRA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural
Lands Into Non-agricultural Uses." Under these Guidelines, the following types of
agricultural lands shall not be covered:
a)Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries subject
to Sec. 65 ofRA 6657;
b)Agricultural lands already issued a notice of coverage or voluntarily
offered for coverage under CARP;
c)Agricultural lands identified underAO 20 (1992), as non-negotiable
for conversion.
On the other hand, the power of the DAR to approve or disapprove land use
conversion applications is exclusive (Exec. Order No. 129-A[1982], sec. 5[e];
seeOP Memorandum Circular No. 54, Sec. 4, [1993] Book IV, Title XI, Chapter 1,
sec. 3 [13];RA 6657[1988[, sec. 65). It is distinct from the power of LGUs to
reclassify agricultural land under Section 20 of theLocal Government Code.
This is evident in Sec. 20 (e) ofRA 7160which provides: "Nothing in this
Section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner
the provisions of RA 6657." In his commentary, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, stated as follows:
Sanggunian Power to Reclassify Not to Convert. This is one section of the Code
which evoked a lot of discussion among the members of the Conference
Committee. The proposal to allow local governments to reclassify land and
provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition was made by
Congressman Pablo Garcia of Cebu, who argued that the central government has
no business dictating to the local governments how to classify land within their
jurisdiction. Some legislators, however, felt that to allow local governments to
reclassify land may open the door to a nationwide frustration of the goals of the
agrarian reform law.
Congressman Garcia disputed the argument by pointing out that the power he had
sought to invest the local governments with was not to convert land for any
purpose contrary to the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law but
merely to "reclassify" land. (A.Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of
1991, The Key to National Development 111).
Facts:
The Governor of Camarines Sur filed two (2) separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto and Efren San Joaquin pursuant to Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 129 authorizing the Governor to purchase or expropriate properties
owned by the San Joaquins for the establishment of a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered. The motion was denied and a writ of possession
was issued in favor of the province. On appeal with the CA, the San Joaquins
asked the appellate court to, among others, nullify the resolution issued by the
Sanggunian. The CA asked the Office of the Solicitor General to comment to the
petition. The Solicitor General stated that the approval of the Office of the
President is not needed but the province must first secure the approval of the DAR
of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners. The CA set aside the order of
the trial court allowing the province to take possession and ordered the
suspension of the expropriation proceedings until after the submission of the DAR
approval to convert the property.
Issue:
Is DAR approval still necessary before an LGU can expropriate agricultural lands
for conversion to non-agricultural use?
Held:
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is also true that in
delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or
impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin
Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such
delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly
expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislation.
Resolution No. 129 [1988] was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
337, the Local Government Code, which provides: . . .
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government
units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the
conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings.Likewise,there is no provision
in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.The closest provision of law that the Court of
Appeal could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform
in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
which reads: . . .
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to
lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the
lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5(l) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority
of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the
applications for reclassifications submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries..
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot
be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249,
176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 41).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can
no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads,
bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of
the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects
would naturally involve a change in the land use.In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use. (at 179-181;underscoring supplied).
DAR's authority to allow conversion is not limited only to lands awarded under
CARP. As stated inDOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990):
Being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform,it is believed to be the agrarian reform law's
intention that any conversion of a private agricultural land to non-agricultural uses
should be cleared before hand by the DAR. True, the DAR's express power over
land use conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded
have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have
a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.But to
suggest that these are the only instances when the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner may
use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should
logically follow from the said department's express duty and function to execute
and enforce the said statute that any commercial or industrial property should first
be cleared by the DAR.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view thatwith respect to
conversions of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses,
the authority of DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date
of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988.This conclusion is based on a liberal
interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and the extensive
coverage of the agrarian reform program.(Underscoring supplied.)
Elements:
a)The offender is any person;
b)The person either effects the
i.sale, transfer or conveyance of the land; or
ii.change the nature of the land.
c)The land must be outside of urban centers and city limits;
d)The transaction or the change of the nature of the land may be of
the whole or a portion of the land; and
e)The transaction or the change of the nature of the land was effected
after 15 June 1988.
DAR AO 1 (1989) provides for administrative sanctions for the sale, transfer,
conveyance of lands outside urban centers. The elements of the administrative
offense is similar to that defined under Sec. 73 (e). Sec. 6 ofRA 6657also
provides that the sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of
possession of private lands executed by the original owner in violation ofRA
6657shall be null and void. The sale or disposition, however, is not totally void.
Part I (B) ofDAR AO (1989)provides that the sale or disposition of agricultural
land is valid to the extent that the total landholding of the transferee as a result of
the said acquisition does not exceed the landholding ceiling.
3.Illegal/Premature/Unauthorized Conversions
Illegal Conversion
Sec. 73 (c) of RA 6657 penalizes "The conversion by any
landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use with intent
to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to dispossess
his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them."
Elements:
a)The land is agricultural land;
b)The offender is the landowner;
c)There are acts committed converting the use of the land into non-
agricultural use; and
d)The intent is to:
i.avoid the application ofRA 6657; and
ii.to dispossess tenant farmers tilling the land.
DAR AO 1 (1999) provides a more expansive definition of illegal
conversion. Sec. 2 (g) ofDAR AO 1 (1999)defines illegal conversion as
"the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-
agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to his
landholding and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by
them; or the change of the nature of lands outside urban centers and city
limits either in whole or in part after the effectivity of RA 6657, as
provided in Sec. 73 (c) and (e) respectively, of the said Act." Thus, under
the administrative rule, there are two (2) ways of committing illegal
conversion.
Elements of the First Type:
a)Offender is the land owner;
b)He/she converts his/her agricultural land into any non-
agricultural use without authority or DAR clearance;
c)The intention of the conversion is to
i.avoid the application ofRA 6657; and
ii.to dispossess the farmers of the land tilled by them;
Elements of the Second Type:
a)Offender is the landowner or any other person;
b)He/she changes the nature of the agricultural land, in whole or
in part;
c)Land is located outside urban centers and city limits; and
d)Act was committed after 15 June 1988.
Premature Conversion
Sec. 11 ofRA 8435penalizes ". . . the undertaking of any development
activity, the results of which modify or alter the physical characteristics of the
agricultural lands to render them suitable for non-agricultural purposes without an
approved order of conversion from the DAR."
Elements:
a)The land is agricultural land;
b)The offender may be any person;
c)Actual development activity is undertaken on the land;
d)The development activity modifies or alters the physical
characteristics of the land;
e)The land development renders the land suitable for non-agricultural
purposes; and
f)There is no approved order of conversion from the DAR.
Unauthorized conversion
Unlike illegal and premature conversions, unauthorized conversion is not a
criminal act but is merely administratively sanctioned.
Sec. 2 (w) ofDAR AO 1 (1999)defines unauthorized conversion as "the act of
changing the current use of the land from agricultural (e.g. riceland) to another
agricultural use (e.g. livestock) without an order of conversion from DAR, or
changing the use of the land other than that allowed under the order of
conversion issued by DAR." There are, thus, two (2) ways to commit
unauthorized conversion.
Elements of the First Type:
a)Offender is any person, i.e., landowner, developer or any other
person;
b)The person changes the current use of an agricultural land into
another agricultural purpose; and
c)The change of use was done without an order of conversion
from DAR.
Elements of the Second Type:
a)Offender is any person, i.e., landowner, developer, or any other
person;
b)The subject land is granted an order of conversion for its
commitment to non-agricultural purposes; and
c)The person commits the land to a purpose other than that
allowed under the order of conversion.
In addition to the foregoing, Sec. 35 ofDAR AO 1 (1999)also provides for
administrative sanctions against certain acts in connection with the grant of
conversion application by landowners or their duly authorized representatives.
These include the following:
a)Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts in
conversion application;
b)Non-compliance with the conditions set forth in the conversion
order; and
c)Non-compliance with the agreement on disturbance
compensation.
Prohibited Acts and Omissions by Beneficiaries underRA 6657
1.Sale, Transfer, Conveyance of Rights Acquired as a Beneficiary
Sec. 73 (f) ofRA 6657prohibits "The sale, transfer or conveyance by a
beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land he
acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of
this Act."
Elements:
a)The offender is an agrarian reform beneficiary;
b)Offender sells, transfers or conveys the right to use or any
other usufructuary right over his land;
c)The subject land was acquired by him/her by virtue of being a
beneficiary; and
d)The act is motivatedby the design to circumvent the
provisions ofR.A. 6657.
Relatedly, Part I (4) ofDAR MC 19 (1996)provides that the "[s]ale, transfer,
lease and other forms of conveyance by beneficiary of the rights to use or any
other usufructuary right over the land acquiredby virtue of being a beneficiary, in
circumvention of the provisions of Sec. 73 ofRA 6657,PD 27and other agrarian
law" is a prohibited act. However, if the lands has been acquired underPD 27/EO
228, ownership may be transferred upon full payment of amortization by the
beneficiary.
Elements:
a)The offender is an agrarian reform beneficiary;
b)He/she sells, transfers or conveys the right to use or any other
usufructuary right over his land without legal basis;
c)The subject land was acquired by him/her by virtue of being a
beneficiary underRA 6657orPD 27/EO 228; Provided that lands
acquired underPD 27/EO 228can be transferred upon full payment of
amortizations. In the case of lands awarded under CARP, the land can
be transferred ten (10) years after the registration of the CLOA; and
d)The act is motivated by the design to circumvent the provisions
ofRA 6657,PD 27and other agrarian laws.
2.Misuse or Diversion of Financial Aid and Support Services
Sec. 37 ofRA 6657provides that the "misuse or diversion of the financial and
support services provided the beneficiary shall result in sanction against the
beneficiary guilty thereof, including the forfeiture of the land transferred to him or
lesser sanctions as may be provided by the PARC without prejudice to criminal
prosecution." This is reflected in Item A, No. 1 ofDAR MC 19 (1996).
Elements:
a)The beneficiary was granted financial aid and other support
services;
b)The beneficiary either:
i.misuses the financial aid and support services; or
ii.diverts such aid or services for other purposes.
3.Misuse of the Land
Par. 4, Sec. 22 ofRA 6657provides that any beneficiary guilty of negligence
or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to
continue as such beneficiary. Misuse of the land is administratively sanctioned
underDAR MC 19 (1996).
Part III, Item (A) ofDAR AO 2 (1994)defines misuse of the land as "any act
causing substantial and unreasonable damage on the land, and causing the
deterioration and depletion of the soil fertility and improvements thereon. It also
includes the act of knowingly planting, growing, raising of any plant which is the
source of a dangerous drug, as defined underPD 1683(1980)." Under the
definition, there are two ways of committing this offense.
Elements of the First Type:
a)Offender is a grantee of land awarded through CLOA or EP;
b)Offender commits acts which cause substantial and unreasonable
damage to the land; and
c)Such act causes the deterioration and depletion of the soil fertility
and improvements thereon.
Elements of the Second Type:
a)Offender is a grantee of land awarded through a CLOA or EP; and
b)He knowingly plants, grows or raises any plant which is the source
of dangerous drug as defined inPD 1683.
4.Continuous Neglect or Abandonment of Awarded Lands
Sec. 22 ofRA 6657provides that any beneficiary who is guilty of negligence
of the land extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary.
Part I, A (5) ofDAR MC 19 (1996)provides that "continuous neglect or
abandonment of the awarded lands over a period of two (2) years as determined
by the Secretary or his authorized representative" is subject to administrative
sanctions.
Part III, Item (B) ofDAR AO 2 (1994)defines neglect or abandonment as the
"willful failure of the ARB, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till, or
develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific
economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years."
Elements:
a)The offender is an agrarian reform beneficiary;
b)The beneficiary willfully fails or refuses to cultivate, till or develop to
produce any crop the land awarded him; and
c)Such failure or refusal continue for a period of two (2) calendar
years.
5.Material Misrepresentation of Qualifications
The material misrepresentation of qualifications provided under Sec. 22 ofRA
6657and other agrarian reform laws is administratively sanctioned under Item A
(3), Part I ofDAR MC 19 (1996).
Elements:
a)The offender is a beneficiary;
b)Offender intentionally made false statements respecting a matter of
fact in his application for qualification as an ARB underRA 6657or any
other agrarian laws; and
c)The misrepresented fact was material to the determination of his
qualification to become a beneficiary.
6.Default and Failure in the Payment of Amortization to Landowner
Part I, item A(1) ofDAR MC 19 (1996)provides that "default in the obligation
of the ARBs to pay the aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations to the
landowner in the case of awarded lands under voluntary land transfer/direct
payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure" is
administratively sanctioned. The administrative rule is based on Sec. 26,RA
6657which states that a beneficiary whose land has been foreclosed shall
thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary.
Elements:
a)Offender is an ARB;
b)The beneficiary acquired the land by virtue of Voluntary Land
Transfer or Direct Payment Scheme;
c)The beneficiary fails to pay the landowner amortization for three (3)
consecutive months; and
d)Failure is due to reasons other than force majeure or fortuitous
events.
7.Failure to Pay Amortizations to LBP
Similarly, the failure to pay amortizations to LBP is penalized underDAR MC
19 (1996)which states that "[f]ailure of the ARBs to pay at least three (3) annual
amortizations to the LBP in the case of awarded lands under the Compulsory
Acquisition (CA) or Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), except in the case of fortuitous
events and force majeure."
Elements:
a)The beneficiary is an awardee of a land acquired through the
Compulsory Acquisition or Voluntary Offer to Sell;
b)The beneficiary fails to pay the LBP at least three (3) annual
amortization; and
c)Failure is due to reasons other than force majeure or fortuitous
events.
8.Waiver of Rights to Awarded Lands
Part I, item A, no. 9 ofMC 19 (1996)treats the waiver of rights to awarded
lands by a beneficiary as an administrative offense.
Elements:
a)Offender is a beneficiary; and
b)The beneficiary has expressly or impliedly waived his rights over the
land.
9.FB's Surrender of Awarded Lands to Landowner or Other Non ARBs.
The surrender by a beneficiary of his awarded lands to landowner or other
non-ARBs is penalized under part I, item A (10) ofMC 19 (1996).
Elements:
a)Offender is a beneficiary;
b)Offender surrenders land awarded him to the landowner or other
non-beneficiaries; and
c)Such surrender is without legal authority or clearance from DAR.
Prohibited Acts and Omissions by Other Persons underRA 6657
1.Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Sec. 73 (b) ofRA 6657provides that "The forcible entry or illegal detainer by
persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail themselves of
the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program" is a prohibited act that is
criminally punishable.
Elements:
a)Offender is any person who is not qualified to become an agrarian
reform beneficiaries;
b)He/she deprives the owner, or legal representatives or any assigns
of the said owner, the right of possession thereof either through the
following acts:
i.by entering the land of another by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth; or
ii.unlawfully refusing to vacate the land after the right to hold
possession thereof has expired;
c)The intention of the acts is to avail themselves of the rights and
benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program.
2.Obstruction and Prevention of CARP Implementation
Sec. 73 (d) ofRA 6657penalized the "[w]illful prevention or obstruction by any
association or entity of the implementation of the CARP."
Elements:
a)Offender may be a landowner, beneficiary or any other person,
natural or juridical; and
b)The person commits acts to prevent or obstructs the implementation
of the CARP.
Prohibited Acts by Agricultural Lessees and Lessor underRA 3844
RA 3844enumerates the criminal acts and omissions by agricultural lessees
and lessors.
By Agricultural Lessor
1.Unlawful Recording of Sale in the Registry of Property Subject to
Right of Redemption
Sec. 13 ofRA 3844states that "[n]o deed of sale of agricultural land under
cultivation by an agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded in the Registry
of Property unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
the written notice required in Section eleven of this Chapter or that the land is not
worked by an agricultural lessee." Failure to comply with this provision is
criminally punishable under Sec. 167(1) ofRA 3844.
Elements:
a)The offender is the landowner or agricultural lessor, or in case of
juridical persons, the manager or person who has charge of the
management or management of the property or in his default, the person
acting in his stead;
b)He effects the recording of the sale of the land subject of an
agricultural lease; and
c)Such recording was effected without the necessary Affidavit by
vendor that he has given prior written notice of the sale to the agricultural
lessor as required by Sec. 7 ofRA 3844.
2.Unlawful Disposition of Lessee
Sec. 31(1) ofRA 3844provides that it shall be unlawful for the agricultural
lessor to "dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except upon
authorization by the Court under Section thirty-six. Should the agricultural lessee
be dispossessed of his landholding without authorization from the Court, the
agricultural lessor shall be liable for damages suffered by the agricultural lessee
in addition to the fine or imprisonment prescribed in this Code for unauthorized
dispossession." Sec. 167(1) ofRA 3844penalizes the commission by an
agricultural lessor of the act defined under Sec. 31 ofRA 3844.
Elements:
a)Offender is an agricultural lessor;
b)Offender dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding; and
c)Dispossession is without authorization from the Court.
3.Inducement to Execute or Enter into a Share Tenancy Contract
Sec. 167(2) ofRA 3844provides that "Any person, natural or juridical, who
induces another, as tenant, to execute or enter into a share tenancy contract with
himself or with another in violation of this Code shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with
theRevised Penal Code: Provided, That the execution of a share tenancy
contract shall be considered prima facie evidence of such inducement as to the
owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor. In case of juridical
persons, the manager or the person who has charge of the management or
administration of the property or, in his default, the person acting in his stead,
shall be liable under this Section."
Elements:
a)Offender is any person, natural or juridical. In case of juridical
persons, the manager or the person who has charge of the management or
administration of the property, or in his default, the person acting in his
stead shall be liable; and
b)Offender induces another person, as tenant, to execute or enter into
a share tenancy contract with himself or another in violation ofRA 3844.
4.Making Untruthful Statements in Affidavit Required under Sec. 13,RA
3844
Sec. 167(2) ofRA 3844provides "Any person who executes an affidavit as
required by Section thirteen of Chapter I, knowing the contents thereof to be
false, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or
imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the court."
Sec. 13 ofRA 3844requires that prior to the registration of the sale or transfer
of land in the Registry of Property, the landowner must execute an affidavit that
written notice of the sale or transfer was made to the agricultural lessor as
required under Sec. 7 ofRA 3844.
Elements:
a)Offender is the landowner, agricultural lessor or any person; and
b)He/she knowingly makes untruthful statements on a material matter
in an affidavit required for the registration of a sale of land subject to right of
pre-emption as required under Sec. 13 ofRA 3844.
5.Acts Violating Farmworker's Rights to Self-Organization and to
Engage in Other Concerted Activities
Sec. 167 (4) ofRA 3844penalizes "Any person who willfully violates the
provisions of Sections forty and forty-one of this Code shall be punished by a fine
of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos or by
imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. If any violation of Sections
forty and forty-one of this Code is committed by a corporation, partnership or
association, the manager or, in his default, the person acting as such when the
violation took place shall be criminally responsible."
Sec. 40 ofRA 3844recognizes the farmworkers' right to self-organization, and
provides that "the farm workers shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join or assist farm workers' organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing:
Provided, That this right shall be exercised in a manner as will not unduly
interfere with the normal farm operations. Individuals employed as supervisors
shall not be eligible for membership in farm workers' organizations under their
supervision but may form separate organizations of their own."
Sec. 41 ofRA 3844likewise recognizes the right of farmworkers to engage in
concerted activities, to wit: "The farm workers shall also have the right to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual
aid or protection. For the purpose of this and the preceding Section, it shall be
the duty of the farm employer or manager to allow the farm workers, labor
leaders, organizers, advisers and helpers complete freedom to enter and leave
the farm, plantation or compound at the portion of same where said farm workers
live or stay permanently or temporarily."
Elements:
a)Offender is the landowner, agricultural lessor or any person;
b)Offender commits acts which impair or prevent the exercise of
i.the right of farmworkers to self-organization under Sec. 40
ofRA 3844; or
ii.the right to engage in concerted activities as defined under
Sec. 41 ofRA 3844.
6.Acts Violative of the Right of Farmworkers to a Minimum Wage
Sec. 167 (5) ofRA 3844provides "Any person who willfully violates the
provisions of Section forty-two of this Code shall, upon conviction thereof, be
subject to a fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or upon second
conviction, to imprisonment of not more than one year or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. If any violation of the provisions of
Section forty-two of this Code is committed by a corporation, partnership or
association, the manager or, in his default, the person acting as such when the
violation took place shall be criminally responsible."
Sec. 42 ofRA 3844protects the farmworkers right to a minimum wage and
provides that "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law or contract to the contrary,
farm workers in farm enterprises shall be entitled to at least P3.50 a day for eight
hours' work: Provided, That this wage may, however, be increased by the
Minimum Wage Board as provided for in Republic Act Numbered Six hundred
and two."
Elements:
a)Offender is a landowner or any other person; and
b)Offender fails or refuses to pay the farmworker the minimum daily
wage as set in Sec. 43,RA 3844or determined by the Minimum Wage
Board.
By Agricultural Lessees
1.Cultivation of Another Farmland without Consent of Lessor
Sec. 167 (1) ofRA 3844penalizes the commission by agricultural lessees of
the prohibited acts under Sec. 27 ofRA 3844.
Sec. 27 (1) ofRA 3844provides that it shall be unlawful for an agricultural
lessee "[t]o contract to work additional landholdings belonging to a different
agricultural lessor or to acquire and personally cultivate an economic family-size
farm, without the knowledge and consent of the agricultural lessor with whom he
had first entered into household, if the first landholding is of sufficient size to
make him and the members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its
cultivation."
Elements:
a)Offender is an agricultural lessee;
b)The land leased by him is of sufficient size to make him and the
members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its production;
c)He contracts to work another landholdings belonging to a different
agricultural lessor or acquires and personally cultivate an economic family-
size farm; and
d)The cultivation of the other landholding is without the consent of his
first lessor.
2.Unlawful Sublease of Leased Land by Lessor
Sec. 27 (b) ofRA 3844declares that it shall be unlawful for an agricultural
lessee "[t]o employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however, That in
the case of illness or temporary incapacity, he may employ laborers whose
services on his landholdings shall be on his account." This prohibition is
reiterated in Item B(1), part VI ofDAR AO 5 (1997).
Elements:
a)Offender is an agricultural lessee;
b)That he employs as sublessee on his landholdings; and
c)The reason for the sub-contracting is other than illness or temporary
incapacity.
Penalties for Violation
The penalties for the prohibited acts and omissions which are criminal in
nature are as follows:
Prohibited Acts or OmissionsImprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not
under RA 6657more than three (3) years or a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (1,000.00) and not more than fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00), or both, at the
discretion
of the court. (Sec. 74, RA 6657)
Violation of Sec. 13, Sec. 27,Fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or
and 31 (1) of RA 3844imprisonment not exceeding one year or both in the
discretion of the court (RA 3844, Sec. 167 (1).)
Acts Violating Farmworker'sFine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than
Rights to Self-organizationone thousand pesos or by imprisonment of not less
and to Engage in Otherthan one month nor more than one year, or both such
Concerted Activitiesfine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court
(Sec. 167[4], RA 6657)(Sec. 167 [4], RA 6657).
Acts Violative of the RightFine of not more than two thousand pesos, or upon
of Farmworkers to asecond conviction, to imprisonment of not more than
Minimum Wage (Sec.one year or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
167[5], RA 3844)discretion of the court (Sec. 167 [5], RA 3844).
Upon the other hand, the penalties for prohibited acts and omissions which
are administrative in nature are as follows:
Acts or O m i s s i o n s
Administrative Sanction
Under MC 19 (1996) Cancellation of EPs/CLOAs and perpetual
disqualification of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries(see MC 19 s. 1996, Part I).
Under AO 1 (1999) 1. Cancellation or withdrawal of the
authorization for the land use conversion;
2.Blacklisting of the applicant, developer,
orrepresentative;
3.Automatic disapproval of pending
subsequent conversion applications that the offender may file with the DAR;
4.Issuance of cease and desist order
(CDO);and/or
5.Forfeiture of cash bond in accordance
withSec. 16 hereof. (A.O. 1 s. 1999, Sec. 49)
Jurisdiction Over Violation of Agrarian Laws
The power and duty to hear and try cases involving the criminal acts
enumerated underRA 6657,RA 8435andRA 3844and other relevant agrarian
laws belongs to the Special Agrarian Courts. HcaATE
With respect to administrative offenses, the DAR shall have jurisdiction over
the same by virtue of its express primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform.