Sie sind auf Seite 1von 5

LAUREL V.

ABROGAR

KEY WORDS: LAUREL CHARGED FOR THEFT FOR STEALING INTL LONG DISTANCE CALLS
OF PLDT (INTERNATION SIMPLE RESALE or ISR) W/N PERSONAL PROP THAT CAN BE
SUBJECT OF THEFT YES, CALLS ARE PERSONAL PROP BUT THEY DO NOT BELONG TO
PLDT-- IT IS THE BUSINESS OF PLDT THAT IS PERSONAL PROP THAT CAN BE SUBJECT OF
THEFT AND NOT THE CALLS THEMSELVES INTEREST IN BUSINESS IS PROP SINCE IT IS
CAPABLE OF APPROPRIATION

FACTS

Petitioner Luis Laurel is one of the accused charged with theft (Article 308 of RPC) for stealing and
using the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple
Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT.

The Supreme Court previously held that the Amended Information does not contain material
allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal property since international long distance calls
and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services are not personal
properties.

PLDT insists that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes
definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil
Code is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal properties. Since Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code used the words personal property without qualification, it follows that all
personal properties as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft.

PLDT further insists that international phone calls which are electric currents or sets of electric
impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a
receiver, are personal properties which may be subject of theft. Article 416(3) of the Civil Code deems
forces of nature (which includes electricity) which are brought under the control by science, are personal
property.

Petitioner Laurel insists that PLDT does not produce or generate telephone calls. It only provides the
facilities or services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that business is not
personal property. It is not the business that is protected but the right to carry on a business. This right is
what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as property, the same
may not be subject of theft.

OSG agrees with PLDT that international phone calls and the business or service of providing
international phone calls are subsumed in the enumeration and definition of personal property. The theft
provision in the Revised Penal Code was deliberately couched in broad terms precisely to be all-
encompassing and embracing even such scenario that could not have been easily anticipated.

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be
capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of asportation, which is defined as carrying away.
Jurisprudence is settled that to take under the theft provision of the penal code does not require
asportation or carrying away.

ISSUE

Whether or not the unauthorized use or appropriation of PLDT international telephone calls, service and
facilities, for the purpose of generating personal profit or gain that should have otherwise belonged to
PLDT, constitutes theft. -Yes (But the property subject of theft are the business and services of
PLDT and not the international long distance calls per se)
HELD

(Short Summary: The Court acknowledges that telephone calls can be considered as electrical energy
which is capable of appropriation. Electricity is personal prop under Art 416(3). HOWEVER, the Court
ruled that the calls themselves do not belong to PLDT, they just encode, transmit etc so they cannot claim
that they own the calls. HOWEVER, business is personal propnot real since not under exclusive
enumeration under Art 415. So Laurels act of using PLDTs facilities without consent constitutes theft.
The case was remanded to RTC to clearly state the property subject of theft.)

The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private
respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international
long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction: (a)
tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing,
conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise
wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and
(c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain
any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.

The human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party
called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. Intangible property such as electrical energy is
capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal
property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates forces of nature which are
brought under control by science.

The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property


which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be
appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft

Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not
included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things
which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or personal
property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like
interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez,
business should also be classified as personal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive
enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property.

It cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT
since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without
the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and business.

The case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended
Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of
respondent PLDT.
DREAM VILLAGE V. BCDA

KEY WORDS: PRESIDENT PROCLAMATIONS DECLARED THAT FORT BONIFACIO (FB) WAS
RESERVED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES BUT CERTAIN LOTS WERE EXEMPTED AND BECAME
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE FB WAS TRANSFERRED TO BCDA WHEN THE LATTER WAS
CREATED GIVING IT AUTHORITY TO SELL FB FOR ITS CAPITAL - DREAM VILL CLAIMS THAT
THEIR LOT WAS NOT TRANSFERRED AND BECAME EXEMPTED ESP BEC THEY HAVE
CONTINUOUSLY LIVED THERE EVER SINCE PROP OF STATE INTENDED FOR SOME PUBLIC
SERVICE OR FOR THE DEVT OF NATL WEALTH ARE PROP OF PUBLIC DOMINION AND
CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION

FACTS

Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) represent more than 2,000
families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since
1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously.

Pres. Carlos Garcia renamed the property as Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for military purposes.
Then, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declared certain portions of Fort
Bonifacio alienable and disposable thus allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan,
Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. Lastly, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 172, amending PN 2476, limiting Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the
areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition.

On Mar 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA) Section 8 of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided
from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9) military camps in Metro Manila, including 723
has. of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus, expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the
above lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and disposable.

Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its
members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents, the latter filed a
letter-complaint with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to seek its
assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed is within Lot
1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been
occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously for several years," Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those
transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants
should be processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB).

Respondent BCDA questioned the jurisdiction of COSLAP to hear Dream Villages complaint, while
asserting its title to the subject property. It argued that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561 which
created the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various government offices and agencies
involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the
enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a pastureland-lease holder, a timber
concessionaire, or a government reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government property
which cannot be the subject of a petition for classification, release or subdivision by the occupants of
Dream Village.

Nevertheless, COSLAP requested to the DENR a verification survey report. On the basis of the
DENRs verification survey report, COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and
particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, noting that in view of the length of time that they "have been
openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the concept of an owner,

COSLAP argued that Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No. 561 allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for
classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought
by Dream Village. COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more effective mechanism for
the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of
conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. (Baaga v. COSLAP)

BCDA maintained that there is no basis for the COSLAPs finding that the members of Dream Village
were in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner, because not only is the
property not among those declared alienable and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property of the
State.

ISSUE

1. Pertinent Issue: W/N Fort Bonifacio belongs to BCDA. YES.


2. Other Issue: W/N COSLAP had jurisdiction on the case. NO.

HELD

1.While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial in character may be the object
of prescription, those "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are considered property of public dominion and therefore not susceptible to acquisition
by prescription.

The Court ruled that the BCDAs aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond
question, by virtue of R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDAs takeover and management of the subject
lots. The BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio.

Dream Village sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the area
declared in Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable. So it
wasnt alienable until RA 7227 but alienable for a public service.

Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of public dominion and what is patrimonial property:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.

When R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and
disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become patrimonial,
since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds
for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the
purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth"
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion,
albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon
their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become private
property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth."

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is
a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can
commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public
dominion.

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the
State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations
in the country to productive civilian uses. Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by
Dream Village has not even begun to run.

2. The subject property having been expressly reserved for a specific public purpose, the
COSLAP cannot exercise jurisdiction over the complaint of the Dream Village settlers.

A review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over
public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or purpose. E.O. No. 561 created the
COSLAP to be a more effective administrative body to provide a mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to
avoid social unrest.

Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem
lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in
paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account
the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest,
or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem.

COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary or
regulatory interest, or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture
lease agreements, a timber concessions, or a reservation grants, and where moreover, the dispute is
between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between
occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; and between occupants/squatters and public
land claimants or applicants.

The land dispute in Baaga was between private individuals who were free patent applicants over
unregistered public lands. In contrast, the present petition involves land titled to and managed by a
government agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose other than for
settlement. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem, but it has
to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen