MMDA VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE [328 SCRA 836; G.R. NO.

135962; 27 MAR 2000]

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the
petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe
and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic
Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the
Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police
powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the
National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and
not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a
legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area.

RODOLFO GANZON VS COURT OF APPEALS

200 SCRA 271 Political Law Control Power Local Government
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and
misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the
complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA
affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of
his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the
same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in
contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however
overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO

FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance
the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-
99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required
the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other
requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the
amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC
of 1991.

HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the
IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent
with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision,
which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down
the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA
or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just share shall
be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the
just share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the
current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and
neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or
GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a
specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an
inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive
law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the
LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should
not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People s LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera
Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall notundertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as politicalnegotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement
states that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that couldperform policy-
making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studiesleading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3.
Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the
above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of the representatives of the Cordillera
people. This was then signed into law by President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera
Administrative Region [CAR],which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and
theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,the President,
in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

ORDILLO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.

FACTS-
January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and
the city of Baguio cast their votesin a plebiscite.- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by
148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as such has the second
smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province
of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating
that Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.- March 8, 1990,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.-
E v e n b e f o r e C O M E L E C r e s o l u t i o n , E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y i s s u e d F e b r u a r y 5 , 1 9 9 0 a memor
andum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under
Executive Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others
that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of
the ratification of Organic Act.- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.- Petitioners therefore pray
that the court declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
m e m o r a n d u m o f t h e Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.
6 8 6 1 a n d prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purposes . d e c l a r e
E x e c u t i v e O r d e r N o . 2 2 0 c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e C o r d i l l e r a E x e c u t i v e B o a r d a n d t h e Cordillera Regional
Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have
been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Regions. T h e k e y w o r d i n s A r t i c l e X ,
S e c t i o n 1 5 o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i n c e s , c i t i e s , municipalities and geographical areas connote
that region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means
two or more provinces.- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as possible
should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

b . T h e e n t i r e t y o f R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 6 7 6 6 c r e a t i n g t h e C o r d i l l e r a A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n i s infused with
provisions whi ch rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.- It can be gleaned that Congress never
intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two se ts of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the
Philippines, population -wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten
Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a
lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming from different
provinces and c i t i e s i n t h e R e g i o n , a s w e l l a s t r i b a l c o u r t s a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o m m o n
regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the
COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and
illogical.
ABBAS VS COMELEC (179 SCRA 287)

Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that [t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the
purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes
the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region
would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated
by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention
of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the
same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided
under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Facts:
A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"
(Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conductingthe plebiscite; and (2)
declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The argumentsagainst R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that
certainprovisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.

TORRALBA V. SIBAGAT

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its
validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with thecriteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of any province, city, municipality, or
barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with
any criteria when the Municipality was created.
The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in
existence.

HELD:
The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did notcurtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative
competence to create municipalcorporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe norprohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains
no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way
that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional
provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification ordissolution of local government units should conform
with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except
that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the
unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not
questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions.
A dejure entity has thus been created.

The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitation, a legislative body
may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new
Municipality was a valid exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. (Torralba
vs. Municipality of Sibagat, G.R. No. 59180. Jan. 29, 1987 147 SCRA 390)

TOBIAS V ABALOS 239 SCRA 106 G.R. NO. L-114783 DECEMBER 8, 1994

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute,
the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by
involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted
in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum
population requirements.

(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution stating that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section

Issue:

WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that
each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it
was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. THE CITY OF DAVAO

FACTS:

Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports
Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the ground that the proposed project was within an
environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE:
WON the LGUs are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process
to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

HELD:
No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that "no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative." We note that LGUs are juridical persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area neither
being a critical project. The said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area.
Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance
of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.