USON V. DEL ROSARIO
It likewise appears that
FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and
possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by
Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegitimate
children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda
who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this
litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow
Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of
their possession and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer
set up as special defense that Uson and her husband,
executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate
as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was
given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband
upon his death. CFI found forUson. Defendants appealed
ISSUE:
1.W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of
death of her husband.
2.W/N the illegitimate children of deceased and his common-
law wife have successional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful
wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five
parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is
likewise no dispute thatMariadel Rosario, was merely a
common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate
1
children with the deceased.
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background,
it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time
passed from the moment of his death to his only heir,
his widow Maria Uson (Art777 NCC).As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death". From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested. The claim of the
defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly
renounced to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the
simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the prior
legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence,
since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the
death of her late husband, the new right recognized by
the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of
the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute
DE BORJA v. DE BORJA
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa,led for
the probate of her will. When the will was probated, Francisco
was appointed as executor and administrator and
hereinappellee, Jose de Borja, their son was appointed as co-
administrator.Subsequently, Francisco tookupon himself, a
secondwife, TasianaOngsingco (Vda. De Borja). Even before
the estate of Josefa wassettled, Francisco died. Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings wherein she was appointed
special Administratrix. The relationship between the children of
the rst marriage and the second wife, Tasiana had been
plagued with numeroussuits and counter-suits and in order to
put an end to alltheselitigation, a compromise agreement was
entered into betweenJose, in his personal capacity andas
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa, and by Tasiana,
as the heir and surviving spouse ofFrancisco. Pursuant to the
compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to
pay Tasiana the amount of P 800,000.00 as full and complete
payment and settlement of herhereditary share in the estate of
the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estateof Josefa, and
toany properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her
forconsideration or otherwise. When Jose submitted the
compromise agreement for Court approval with the CFI of
Rizal (probate of will of rst wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija
(probate of will ofFrancisco), Tasiana opposed in both
instances. She claims among others, that the heirs
2
cannotenter into such kind of agreement without rst probating
the will of Francisco de Borja.
ISSUE:
Whether the compromise agreement is valid?
HELD:
In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on
this Courts decision inGuevara v. Guevara wherein the Court
held the view that presentation of a will for probate
ismandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an
estateon the basis of intestacy when thedecedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. However, the doctrine in said
case is notapplicable to the case at bar. There was here no
attempt to settle or to distribute the estate ofFrancisco among
the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object
of the contract wasmerely the conveyance by Tasiana of any
and all her individual share and interest, actual oreventual, in
the estate of Francisco and Josefa. Since a hereditary share in
a decedents estate istransmitted or vested immediately from
the moment of the death of such predecessor in interest,there
is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after suchdeath, even if the actual extent of
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation
ofthe estate. Of course, the eect of such alienation is to be
deemed limited to what is ultimatelyadjudicated to the vendor
heir.
BONILLA v. BARCENA
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Bonilla, mother of minors
Rosalio and Salvacion, wife of Ponciano Bonilla (petitioner)
instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra. Respondents opposed and when Fortunata
died, moved to dismiss the same since a dead person has no
legal capacity to sue. CFI dismissed the civil action earlier
instituted and although counsel for the plaintiff prayed that
Rosalio and Salvacion be allowed to substitute their deceased
mother, the same was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children of the deceased be allowed to
substitute the deceased plaintiff.
RULING:
If the plaintiff dies, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure
whereby a party who died during the pendency of the
proceeding can be substituted.
Rule 16, Sec 3 ROC states, whenever a party to a pending
case dies it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative.
This duty was complained with by the counsel for the
deceased plaintiff but the court, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead
3
person has no legal personality to sue. Art 777 NCC provides
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.
When Fortunata therefore died, her claim or right to the
parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished but was
transferred to her heirs upon death.
RIOFERIO v. CA
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several
personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are
the herein respondents.
Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner TeodoraRiofero and co-
petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents
Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the
deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of
the decedent located in Dagupan City.
Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate.
Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are
not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso
O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of
the estate pending the appointment of an administrator.
HELD:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the
principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the
rules on party representation.
CAYETANO v. LEONIDES
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes
Campos (father) and her sisters, NenitaPaguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving
heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto
himself the entire estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate
of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an
American citizen and that the will was executed in teh
US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in
Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and
left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix.
Hence, this case.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not the will was valid
o Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate
proceedings
HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issues.
4

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion
was an American citizen and the law which governs her
will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national
law of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent
must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction --
The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was
correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an
estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at
the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident
of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for
relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against
his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
VICTORIA v RIGOR
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, left a will
executed and was probated by the Court of First Instance of
5
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in
the will were the testators nearest relatives, his three sisters. In
addition, the will provided that it be adjudicated in favor of the
legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who
shall take the priesthood.
ISSUE
Whether or not the bequest in question be declared
inoperative.
HELD
In the law of contracts and statutory construction, the primary
issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is
the law of the case. What is no clear is on how long after the
testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew
who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. The SC held that
the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative
living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the
succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). Inasmuch as the testator was
not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the
ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the
wilt was likewise inoperative.
REYES v. CA
FACTS:
1. Benedicta had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the a 16,240 sq. m.
unregistered parcel of agricultural land, located at
Barrio Pintog, Plaridel, Bulacan, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 1910.
2. Benedicta sold the said property to IsmaelaDimagiba,
her niece, manifested by allegedly two deeds of
conveyance: in 1943 and 1944.
3. After the death of Benedictadelos Reyes,
IsmaelaDimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the
probate of the purported will of her late aunt.
4. The will instituted Dimagiba as the sole heir of the
estate.
5. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time,
Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes,
and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be the
heirs of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate
asked.
6. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery,
vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of
the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds
of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made
by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and
1944.
7. They alleged that the property sold prior to Benedictas
death should form part of what they should inherit.
6
8. The Court ruled that said property is no longer part of
the inheritance.
9. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
ISSUE:
1. Did the properties form part of the inheritance, of which
the heirs are entitled to? Yes
2. Was it proper for the heirs to question the intrinsic
validity of the will, on the ground that her compulsory
heir cannot be one, as theirs was an illicit relationship?
No
HELD:
First
1. Even if they are sold, they still form part of the object of
succession, and of the estate.
2. In the case at bar, the sale cannot be considered as valid as
the purpose for entering into such contract is to deprive the
heirs of their legitimes.
3. No consideration whatever was paid by Dimagiba on
account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more
doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee.
4. The testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with
what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an
alteration or departure therefrom.
Second
5. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited
to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated.
6. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the
intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the
will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may
become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.
7.The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because
practical considerations demanded it as when there is
preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful
legality.
8. In this case however, there was never an open admission of
any illicit relationship. Thus, there was no need to go beyond
the face of the will.
CELADA v. ABENA
FACTS:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of
decent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent
was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any
ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents,
and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first
cousins which included petitioner.
7
Before her death, Margarita executed a will where she
bequeathed portions of her undivided shares in real properties
to respondent. Margarita also left all her personal properties to
respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of
her will.
RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament
of Margarita probated and respondent as executor of the will.
CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for
failure to comply with the formalities required by law.
NO
(2) W/N it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings
as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters
of administration to petitioner. NO
HELD:We rule in favor of respondent.
(1) A review of the findings of the RTC reveal that petitioners
arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
About the contestants submission that the will is
fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states
that the will is composed of 3 pages while the will, in truth, only
consists of 2 pages only because the attestation is not part of
the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that
the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court is of the
considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will
as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate
the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some
of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the
honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of
3 pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance
with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Article
809 of the Civil Code.
The Court also rejects the contention that the
signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions
as the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size,
texture, and appearance as compared to the signatures on the
succeeding pages. The picture shows that the testator was
affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that
the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
We find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of
the RTC.
(2) Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs
of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the
decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly
executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim
any part of the decedents estate.
The petition is DENIED. The assailed CA decision is
AFFIRMED.
8
ENRIQUEZ v. ABADIA
FACTS: In 1923, Father Abadia, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will andTestament. He died in 1943
and left properties worth P8,000. In 1946, Andres
Enriquez,one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of
the will in the CFI.
Some of Father Abadiascousins and nephews who would
inherit the estate of the deceased, in theabsence of any
testament executed by the deceased opposed the petition for
probation.One of the attesting witnesses, the other two being
dead, testified that in his presencetogether with his co-witness,
Father Abadia wrote out in longhand the will in Spanishwhich
the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left
hand margin of thefront page of each of the three folios or
sheets of which the document is composed, andnumbered the
same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the
end of hiswriting at the last page, all this, in the presence of
the three attesting witnesses aftertelling that it was his last will
and that the said three witnesses signed their names onthe
last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of eachother.
The oppositors did not submit any evidence. The trial court
declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although atthe time it was
executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic
wills werenot permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil
Code was already in force, which Code permitted theexecution
of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of thetestator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override anydefect in form, said trial
court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament ofFather
Abadia. The oppositors appealed the CFIs Decision.
ISSUE: Should the holographic will be probated despite that
when it was executed theCivil Code effective at that time does
not provide for holographic wills?
RULING: The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity
of the new Civil Codeallowing the execution of holographic
wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and
admitted to probate. As stated in Art. 795 of the New Civil
Code, theextrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the
law existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at
the time of its probate, but by the law existing at the timeof the
execution of the instrument. For the very simple reason that
although the will becomes operative only after the testators
death, still his wishes are given expression at the time of
execution.The general rule is that the Legislature cannot
validate void wills.
FLEUMER v. HIX
Facts: The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of
Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state
govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section
3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code,
annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as
certified to by the Director of National Library.
9
The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of
the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and 301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of
such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance
and recording of said will.
Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the
various states of the American Union. Such laws must be
proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an
extract was taken was printed or published under the authority
of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as
provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at
the time alleged will was executed.
The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the
will. The existence of such law in West Virginia must be
proved.
DELA CERNA v. POTOT
1. The spouses BernabeDela Serna and GerasisaRebabca
executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of land to
manuelaRebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child.
When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the
failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was
dismissed in 1954.
3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and
void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to
the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and
held that Once a decree of probate becomes final in
accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe
final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is
conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that
even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now
become final.)
The probate court committed an error of law which should
have been corrected on appeals but which did not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its
final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole
world.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of
Bernabe and could not include the disposition of the share of
his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not
10
within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will
with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and
adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator.
BELLIS v. BELLIS
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his
wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate
children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided
in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st
and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the
Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its Executors Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the
shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and
the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of
P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition,
the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st
and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that
even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs
theory (lexreisitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule
of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our
appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi.
11
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law,
the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the
testate of Amos Bellis.
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the
determination of the illegitimate childrens successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in
Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by
his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes,
then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not
entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
national law of the deceased.